Learning causes: Psychological explanations of causal explanation (1998)
| Venue: | Minds and Machines |
| Citations: | 22 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Glymour98learningcauses:,
author = {Clark Glymour},
title = {Learning causes: Psychological explanations of causal explanation},
journal = {Minds and Machines},
year = {1998},
volume = {8},
pages = {39--60}
}
Years of Citing Articles
OpenURL
Abstract
Abstract. I argue that psychologists interested in human causal judgment should understand and adopt a representation of causal mechanisms by directed graphs that encode conditional independence (screening off) relations. I illustrate the benefits of that representation, now widely used in computer science and increasingly in statistics, by (i) showing that a dispute in psychology between ‘mechanist’ and ‘associationist ’ psychological theories of causation rests on a false and confused dichotomy; (ii) showing that a recent, much-cited experiment, purporting to show that human subjects, incorrectly let large causes ‘overshadow ’ small causes, misrepresents the most likely, and warranted, causal explanation available to the subjects, in the light of which their responses were normative; (iii) showing how a recent psychological theory (due to P. Cheng) of human judgment of causal power can be considerably generalized: and (iv) suggesting a range of possible experiments comparing human and computer abilities to extract causal information from associations.







