Efficient, strategy-proof and almost budget-balanced assignment (2007)
by
Hervé Moulin
| Citations: | 21 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Moulin07efficient,strategy-proof,
author = {Hervé Moulin},
title = {Efficient, strategy-proof and almost budget-balanced assignment},
year = {2007}
}
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Abstract
Call a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism to assign p identical objects among n agents, feasible if cash transfers yield no deficit. The efficiency loss of such a mechanism is the worst (largest) ratio of the budget surplus to the efficient surplus, over all profiles of non negative valuations. The optimal (smallest) efficiency loss � L(n, p) satisfies is strictly smaller or strictly �L(n, p) ≤ �L(n, { n 4
