## Grounding power on actions and mental attitudes

Citations: | 1 - 1 self |

### BibTeX

@MISC{Lorini_groundingpower,

author = {Emiliano Lorini and Andreas Herzig and Jan Broersen and Nicolas Troquard},

title = {Grounding power on actions and mental attitudes },

year = {}

}

### OpenURL

### Abstract

The main objective of this work is to develop a logical framework called IAL (Intentional Agency Logic) in which we can reason about mental states of agents, action occurrences, agentive and group powers. IAL will be exploited for a formal analysis of different forms of power such as an agent’s power of achieving a certain result, an agent’s power to do a certain action and an agent i’s power over another agent j.

### Citations

820 | Dynamic Logic
- Harel, Kozen, et al.
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...the logical literature is an integration of the expressiveness of such logics of social interaction with the expressivenesses of a logic of mental attitudes (so-called BDI logic 4 ) and dynamic logic =-=[13]-=- in which actions of agents are explicit. 5 In this work we will try to fill this gap by developing a logic which allows to reason about mental states of agents, action occurrences, agentive and group... |

448 | Alternating-time temporal logic
- Alur, Henzinger, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...or will refrain from doing a certain action. In the literature of applied logic both in philosophy and computer science, several authors have developed very sophisticated logics of social interaction =-=[4, 14, 2, 19]-=-. For instance, Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [2] is a logic in which one can express what coalitions can achieve by cooperating. ATL has coalition modalities 〈〈G〉〉 where G is an arbitrary gro... |

442 |
Extending Modal Logic
- Rijke
- 1993
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...to the class of IAL models. Theorem 1. IAL is determined by the class of models of IAL. Proof. It is a routine to prove soundness, whereas completeness is obtained by Sahlqvist’s completeness theorem =-=[5]-=-. ⊓⊔ 4 Some properties of IAL The following theorems highlight some interesting properties of IAL. Theorem 2. For any i ∈ AGT , a ∈ ACT and B, C ⊆ AGT such that B ∩ C = ∅ 1. ⊢IAL ✸DoesBϕ ∧ ✸DoesCψ → ✸... |

346 |
Reasoning about Rational Agents
- Wooldridge
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...teraction. On the top of a logic which allows to specify what agents and groups of agents can bring about and to talk about occurrences of actions of single agents, we introduce modal operators 4 See =-=[25, 28]-=- for a survey on BDI logics. 5 For a similar attempt to introduce mental attitudes in a logic of strategic interaction, see [17].sfor beliefs and goals of agents. We here consider intentional actions ... |

164 |
The theory of social and economic organization
- Weber
- 1947
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e by i produces an outcome then all outcomes brought 8 Note that Mon is equivalent to DoesBϕ ∧ DoesCψ → DoesB∪C(ϕ ∧ ψ). 9 At the single-agent level, this axiom corresponds to Weber’s concept of power =-=[27]-=- as the capacity of an individual to resist to all interferences of other individuals, that is, “...the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to carry out his o... |

144 | Principles of trust for MAS: cognitive anatomy, social importance, and quantification
- Castelfranchi, R
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...Dahl’s concept of power over [10]. 6 Conclusion There are several ways in which the work presented in this paper can be advanced. An interesting direction of application is social trust theory. As in =-=[9]-=-, we accept a definition of social trust with four arguments, that is, we would say that an agent i trusts j withsrespect to a given task ϕ and action a, when the former wants to solve task ϕ and thin... |

136 | A Modal Logic for Coalitional Power in Games
- Pauly
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...or will refrain from doing a certain action. In the literature of applied logic both in philosophy and computer science, several authors have developed very sophisticated logics of social interaction =-=[4, 14, 2, 19]-=-. For instance, Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [2] is a logic in which one can express what coalitions can achieve by cooperating. ATL has coalition modalities 〈〈G〉〉 where G is an arbitrary gro... |

77 |
Agency and Deontic Logic
- Horty
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...or will refrain from doing a certain action. In the literature of applied logic both in philosophy and computer science, several authors have developed very sophisticated logics of social interaction =-=[4, 14, 2, 19]-=-. For instance, Alternating-time temporal logic (ATL) [2] is a logic in which one can express what coalitions can achieve by cooperating. ATL has coalition modalities 〈〈G〉〉 where G is an arbitrary gro... |

59 |
The concept of power
- Dahl
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...[j : a] ⊥). EffP ower(i, Goalj 〈j : a〉 ⊤) corresponds to i’s power to induce j to intend do a certain action a that i would not otherwise intend to do. This is similar to Dahl’s concept of power over =-=[10]-=-. 6 Conclusion There are several ways in which the work presented in this paper can be advanced. An interesting direction of application is social trust theory. As in [9], we accept a definition of so... |

54 | Cooperation, knowledge, and time: Alternatingtime temporal epistemic logic and its applications
- Hoek, Wooldridge
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ly mean that i sees to it that ϕ and i can see to it that ϕ. There are extensions of such logics of social interaction in which knowledge modalities for agents and coalitions of agents are introduced =-=[24, 7]-=-. Moreover, there are extensions in which actions are promoted to first-class citizens in the formal language [22] and the properties of interaction between action and knowledge of agents can be expre... |

53 | Towards a logic of rational agency
- Hoek, Wooldridge
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...teraction. On the top of a logic which allows to specify what agents and groups of agents can bring about and to talk about occurrences of actions of single agents, we introduce modal operators 4 See =-=[25, 28]-=- for a survey on BDI logics. 5 For a similar attempt to introduce mental attitudes in a logic of strategic interaction, see [17].sfor beliefs and goals of agents. We here consider intentional actions ... |

44 |
Facing the future: Agents and choices in our indeterminist world
- Belnap, Perloff, et al.
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context |

41 |
Action Theory and Social Science: Some Formal Models
- Pörn
- 1977
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...nd not to do) action a. Formally: Definition 6. For any i, j ∈ AGT , a ∈ ACT A. P osP owerOver(i, j, a) =def P ower(i, Goalj 〈j : a〉 ⊤) B. NegP owerOver(i, j, a) =def P ower(i, Goalj [j : a] ⊥) As in =-=[20]-=-, we distinguish power over from indirect power. In our view, agent i has the indirect power of achieving ϕ via agent j if and only if i has the power of ensuring that j will bring it about that ϕ. Fo... |

31 |
A logic for strategic reasoning
- Hoek, Jamroga, et al.
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n in which knowledge modalities for agents and coalitions of agents are introduced [24, 7]. Moreover, there are extensions in which actions are promoted to first-class citizens in the formal language =-=[22]-=- and the properties of interaction between action and knowledge of agents can be expressed [1]. In our view all these approaches are still insufficient to formalize many relevant forms and properties ... |

30 |
Micro-macro constitution of power
- Castelfranchi
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ide a formal characterization of the concept of power of by exploiting the expressiveness of IAL. We will start with a general definition of power of and we will progressively refine it. As argued in =-=[8, 3]-=-, for an agent i to have 13 In [4, 14] it is argued that the deliberative STIT construction [i dstit : ϕ] =def [i cstit : ϕ] ∧ ¬✷ϕ provides a better approximation of agentive causation. It can be prov... |

27 | Modal logic for games and information - Hoek, Pauly - 2007 |

21 | R.: Collective intentions
- Dunin-Ke¸plicz, Verbrugge
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...nd goal operators. Axiom DBel,Goal is a weak realism axiom which relates an agent’s beliefs with his goals, whereas PosIntr and NegIntr are principles of positive and negative introspection for goals =-=[11]-=-. According to Axiom AltStit the biggest coalition AGT always produces deterministic effects, whilst according to Axioms InclStit and 4Does ∅,✷, if the biggest coalition AGT necessarily brings it abou... |

19 |
Agents that know how to play. Fundamenta Informaticae
- Jamroga, Hoek
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...such that i may correctly believe that he will ensure ϕ by doing it” (or “there exists some action such that i correctly believes that he may ensure ϕ by doing that action”) has also been stressed in =-=[1, 15, 7, 21]-=-.swe conclude that at w1 i correctly believes that he can get the treasure and that getting the treasure is not something that is going to necessarily happen: Ki(✸Doesit∧¬✷Xt) holds at w1. Unfortunate... |

16 |
Benthem. Games in Dynamic-Epistemic Logic
- van
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...such that i may correctly believe that he will ensure ϕ by doing it” (or “there exists some action such that i correctly believes that he may ensure ϕ by doing that action”) has also been stressed in =-=[1, 15, 7, 21]-=-.swe conclude that at w1 i correctly believes that he can get the treasure and that getting the treasure is not something that is going to necessarily happen: Ki(✸Doesit∧¬✷Xt) holds at w1. Unfortunate... |

15 |
Action and knowledge in alternating-time temporal logic
- Ågotnes
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...eover, there are extensions in which actions are promoted to first-class citizens in the formal language [22] and the properties of interaction between action and knowledge of agents can be expressed =-=[1]-=-. In our view all these approaches are still insufficient to formalize many relevant forms and properties of agentive and group power. What is still missing in the logical literature is an integration... |

13 |
N.: Embedding Alternating-time Temporal Logic in Strategic STIT Logic of Agency
- Broersen, Herzig, et al.
- 2006
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... is not the case in IAL where for every C ⊆ AGT ✷ϕ ∧ ¬DoesCϕ is satisfiable. 12 [i cstit : [j cstit : ϕ]] ↔ ✷ϕ is also valid and if we refine STIT logic by supposing that time is discrete (as done in =-=[6]-=-) then even [i cstit : X [j cstit : ϕ]] ↔ [i cstit : X✷ϕ] becomes valid.sduced. 13 This is a serious limitation of this logic since it prevents expressing crucial aspects of sociality such as indirect... |

12 |
The nature of power
- Barnes
- 1988
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ide a formal characterization of the concept of power of by exploiting the expressiveness of IAL. We will start with a general definition of power of and we will progressively refine it. As argued in =-=[8, 3]-=-, for an agent i to have 13 In [4, 14] it is argued that the deliberative STIT construction [i dstit : ϕ] =def [i cstit : ϕ] ∧ ¬✷ϕ provides a better approximation of agentive causation. It can be prov... |

6 |
N.: Normal coalition logic and its conformant extension
- Broersen, Herzig, et al.
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ly mean that i sees to it that ϕ and i can see to it that ϕ. There are extensions of such logics of social interaction in which knowledge modalities for agents and coalitions of agents are introduced =-=[24, 7]-=-. Moreover, there are extensions in which actions are promoted to first-class citizens in the formal language [22] and the properties of interaction between action and knowledge of agents can be expre... |

3 |
Toward a Theory of Social Power
- Goldman
- 1986
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... that he can imprison the defendant by sentencing him to imprisonment (sufficiency) and as long as he does not sentence the defendant, the defendant will not be imprisoned (necessity). 18 As shown in =-=[12]-=- and [8] the two views are closely interdependent. In fact, if i has a dependence-based power over j and he knows this, then he is in a position to make threats or offers to i in order to affect his b... |

3 |
Delegation and mental states
- Lorini, Troquard, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ces of actions of single agents, we introduce modal operators 4 See [25, 28] for a survey on BDI logics. 5 For a similar attempt to introduce mental attitudes in a logic of strategic interaction, see =-=[17]-=-.sfor beliefs and goals of agents. We here consider intentional actions only. The syntactic primitives of the logic are the following: – a nonempty finite set of agents AGT = {1, 2, ..., n}; – a nonem... |

3 |
2005) Power: A Radical View,2nd edition
- Lukes
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...f and only if i has the power of ensuring that j will bring it about that ϕ. Formally: IndP ower(i, j, ϕ) =def P ower(i, Doesjϕ). 5.5 Effective power In section 5.1 we have only focused on what Lukes =-=[18]-=- calls operative sense of power, that is, the power sufficient to produce a certain result. A more radical form of power is the so-called power in an effective sense, that is, the power necessary and ... |

1 |
Formalising abilities and opportunities
- Meyer
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...s at w1 (worlds w7 and w9) it is the case that he can get the treasure and that getting the treasure is not something that is going to necessarily happen. From this, 14 A similar argument is given in =-=[26]-=- where the notion of practical possibility is distinguished from the notion of power (formalized by the operator CAN). 15 The necessity to distinguish de dicto sentences of the form “i knows that ther... |