## Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation (2003)

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Venue: | In AMEC-V |

Citations: | 25 - 5 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Sandholm03sequencesof,

author = {Tuomas Sandholm},

title = {Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers: Near-optimal auctions without full valuation revelation},

booktitle = {In AMEC-V},

year = {2003},

pages = {1127--1134}

}

### Years of Citing Articles

### OpenURL

### Abstract

### Citations

1213 |
Counterspeculation, auctions and competitive sealed tenders
- Vickrey
- 1961
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ders do not reveal their valuations completely [9]. Unfortunately, in these auctions, the seller’s expected utility is not optimal and in fact can be arbitrarily far from optimal. The Vickrey auction =-=[20]-=- (a.k.a. second-price sealed-bid auction) suffers from both full valuation revelation and seller’s expected utility being arbitrarily far from optimal. In this paper we present a mechanism that achiev... |

952 |
Optimal Auction Design
- Myerson
- 1981
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...05 ...$5.00. Andrew Gilpin Computer Science Department Carnegie Mellon University Pittsburgh, PA 15213 gilpin@cs.cmu.edu est expected utility to the seller, compared to any other allocation mechanism =-=[13]-=-. Despite being the optimal allocation mechanism, the Myerson auction has several undesirable features. First, buyers must fully reveal their true valuations for the good. 2 Buyers may be unwilling to... |

531 |
Auction Theory
- Krishna
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n the most commonly used auction mechanisms—the English auction (a.k.a. ascending open-cry auction) and the Dutch auction (a.k.a. descending auction)—bidders do not reveal their valuations completely =-=[9]-=-. Unfortunately, in these auctions, the seller’s expected utility is not optimal and in fact can be arbitrarily far from optimal. The Vickrey auction [20] (a.k.a. second-price sealed-bid auction) suff... |

264 |
An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost calculations
- Sandholm
- 1993
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...eferences are and even if others play irrationally. Also, a buyer does not have to know much about her own valuation (the determination of which can be a complex optimization problem itself, see e.g. =-=[18, 19, 15, 10]-=-), merely whether it is greater or less than the offer, making a single-offer TLA easy to play. Proposition 1. In a single-offer TLA, a buyer’s dominant strategy is s ∗ j accept if vi > aj i (vi, j) =... |

185 | Privacy preserving auctions and mechanism design
- Naor, Pinkas, et al.
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ich case the seller may proceed to make other offers. After rejecting an offer, the buyer never has the option of 2 Recently, cryptographic techniques have also been proposed to address this drawback =-=[14]-=-.saccepting that offer. 3 We show how rational buyers should act in such an auction and how the seller can optimize the sequence of offers given her knowledge about the buyers. In this sense, our appr... |

122 | Single crossing properties and the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games of incomplete information
- Athey
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...of offers. Total number of offers: 1 2 3 English v1 ∼ U[0, 1], v2 ∼ U[0, 1] .600 .938 .979 .800 v1 ∼ U[0.5, 2], v2 ∼ U[0, 1] .857 .977 .992 .625 v1 ∼ U[1, 4], v2 ∼ U[0, 1] .932 .994 .997 .350 v1 ∼ Exp=-=[2]-=-, v2 ∼ Exp[2] .551 .932 .977 .749 v1 ∼ Exp[2], v2 ∼ Exp[4] .726 .968 .986 .658 Table 2: Seller’s expected utility of an optimal 2-buyer TLA and English auction divided by the expected utility of the M... |

122 | T.: Complexity of mechanism design
- Conitzer, Sandholm
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ow rational buyers should act in such an auction and how the seller can optimize the sequence of offers given her knowledge about the buyers. In this sense, our approach is automated mechanism design =-=[7]-=-. Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers have been studied in the context of optimal auctions previously [3]. However, in that paper there is an assumption that the seller can decide the accuracy to ... |

104 |
Why are Vickrey Auctions Rare
- Rothkopf, Teisberg, et al.
- 1990
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e able to extract more surplus in the future using information about the buyers’ valuations). Similar long-term adverse effects have been observed in other truthful full-revelation auction mechanisms =-=[17]-=-. Second, buyers may not understand the complex, unintuitive rules of the Myerson auction, and therefore choose to not participate. Third, for a layman, it is unintuitive to submit true valuations bec... |

99 |
Distributional Strategies for Games with Incomplete Information
- Milgrom, Weber
- 1985
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...inite-action game where types are drawn from independent atomless distributions and each player’s utility function does not directly depend on other’s types, a pure strategy equilibrium always exists =-=[12]-=-. (This existence result can be extended to the setting with interdependent valuations in several auction-like settings [2].) Clearly, a TLA is such a game. Furthermore, since each buyer receives stri... |

85 | Competitive Analysis of Incentive Compatible On-line Auctions
- Lavi, Nisan
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...uld be used to compute optimal values for these prices so as to maximize Amazon’s expected utility (under certain reasonable assumptions). A piece of closely related research concerns online auctions =-=[11]-=- and online exchanges [4]. In those papers the authors examine how bids should be treated in an online setting where the auctioneer (or exchange administrator) has to make accept/reject decisions abou... |

68 |
Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and sequential equilibrium
- Fudenberg, Tirole
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...esponding to the region. Thus, without loss of generality we can focus on threshold-based pure strategies in our analysis of an equilibrium of a multiple-offer TLA. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) =-=[8]-=- is the most common solution concept for sequential games with observed actions and private valuations (types). In such a game, with independently drawn valuations, each buyer i has a strategy si and ... |

62 | Optimal auction design for agents with hard valuation problems
- Parkes
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...eferences are and even if others play irrationally. Also, a buyer does not have to know much about her own valuation (the determination of which can be a complex optimization problem itself, see e.g. =-=[18, 19, 15, 10]-=-), merely whether it is greater or less than the offer, making a single-offer TLA easy to play. Proposition 1. In a single-offer TLA, a buyer’s dominant strategy is s ∗ j accept if vi > aj i (vi, j) =... |

57 | Issues in Computational Vickrey Auctions
- Sandholm
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...eferences are and even if others play irrationally. Also, a buyer does not have to know much about her own valuation (the determination of which can be a complex optimization problem itself, see e.g. =-=[18, 19, 15, 10]-=-), merely whether it is greater or less than the offer, making a single-offer TLA easy to play. Proposition 1. In a single-offer TLA, a buyer’s dominant strategy is s ∗ j accept if vi > aj i (vi, j) =... |

52 | Costly valuation computation in auctions
- Larson, Sandholm
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context |

45 | Optimal auction design, Mathematics of operations research 6 - Myerson - 1981 |

38 | Online algorithms for market clearing
- Blum, Sandholm, et al.
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...timal TLAs: Example 1. Consider the 2-buyer, 3-offer setting where buyer 1’s valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval [0, 1] and buyer 2’s valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval =-=[1, 4]-=-. The only optimal sequence of offers is A = 〈2, 2.125〉, 〈1, 0.5275〉, 〈2, 2.0〉. However, decreasing offers can be made to each buyer: Proposition 4. For any given TLA design problem, an optimal TLA ex... |

38 | Auctions with severely bounded communications
- Blumrosen, Nisan, et al.
- 2006
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...eneral case, we have developed a linear-time algorithm for the special case of two buyers with uniform distributions on the interval [0, 1]. This algorithm relies heavily on results obtained recently =-=[5, 6]-=-. The authors examine auctions in which the amount of information a buyer can transmit to the seller is severely limited. One of the main results is that when a buyer is limited to choosing from among... |

16 | 2003, “Multi-Player and Multi-Round Auctions with Severely Bounded Communication
- Blumrosen, Nisan, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...eneral case, we have developed a linear-time algorithm for the special case of two buyers with uniform distributions on the interval [0, 1]. This algorithm relies heavily on results obtained recently =-=[5, 6]-=-. The authors examine auctions in which the amount of information a buyer can transmit to the seller is severely limited. One of the main results is that when a buyer is limited to choosing from among... |

5 |
Optimal auctions are hard
- Ronen, Saberi
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e that the seller has to make the offers symmetrically to the buyers. 4 If the valuations can have arbitrary correlations, then even designing an approximately optimal auction is hard computationally =-=[16]-=-. The optimal mechanism for our setting is the Myerson auction [13]. It is the benchmark against which we will compare our TLA mechanism. 5 Definition 1. (Myerson auction [13]) • Every buyer i reveals... |

2 |
2001): \Information Structures in Optimal Auctions," Discussion Paper Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper 1323
- Bergemann, Pesendorfer
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... her knowledge about the buyers. In this sense, our approach is automated mechanism design [7]. Sequences of take-it-or-leave-it offers have been studied in the context of optimal auctions previously =-=[3]-=-. However, in that paper there is an assumption that the seller can decide the accuracy to which the buyers learn their own valuations. One way they can achieve this is by withholding information. In ... |

1 |
box offers. http://www.amazon.com/gold-box
- Gold
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... offers can be removed from A. Offers might not decrease over time in optimal TLAs: Example 1. Consider the 2-buyer, 3-offer setting where buyer 1’s valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval =-=[0, 1]-=- and buyer 2’s valuation is uniformly distributed on the interval [1, 4]. The only optimal sequence of offers is A = 〈2, 2.125〉, 〈1, 0.5275〉, 〈2, 2.0〉. However, decreasing offers can be made to each b... |