Abstract

A fundamental problem with many peer-to-peer systems is the tendency for users to “free ride”—to consume resources without contributing to the system. The popular file distribution tool BitTorrent was explicitly designed to address this problem, using a tit-for-tat reciprocity strategy to provide positive incentives for nodes to contribute resources to the swarm. While BitTorrent has been extremely successful, we show that its incentive mechanism is not robust to strategic clients. Through performance modeling parameterized by real world traces, we demonstrate that all peers contribute resources that do not directly improve their performance. We use these results to drive the design and implementation of BitTyrant, a strategic BitTorrent client that provides a median 70% performance gain for a 1 Mbit client on live Internet swarms. We further show that when applied universally, strategic clients can hurt average per-swarm performance compared to today’s BitTorrent client implementations. 1

Citations