Evaluating intrusion detection systems: The 1998 darpa off-line intrusion detection evaluation (2000)
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| Venue: | in Proceedings of the 2000 DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition |
| Citations: | 101 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Fried00evaluatingintrusion,
author = {David J. Fried and Isaac Graf and Joshua W. Haines and Kristopher R. Kendall and David Mcclung and Dan Weber and Seth E. Webster and Dan Wyschogrod and Robert K. Cunningham and Marc A. Zissman},
title = {Evaluating intrusion detection systems: The 1998 darpa off-line intrusion detection evaluation},
booktitle = {in Proceedings of the 2000 DARPA Information Survivability Conference and Exposition},
year = {2000},
pages = {12--26}
}
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Abstract
A intrusion detection evaluation test bed was developed which generated normal traffic similar to that on a government site containing 100’s of users on 1000’s of hosts. More than 300 instances of 38 different automated attacks were launched against victim UNIX hosts in seven weeks of training data and two weeks of test data. Six research groups participated in a blind evaluation and results were analyzed for probe, denialof-service (DoS), remote-to-local (R2L), and user to root (U2R) attacks. The best systems detected old attacks included in the training data, at moderate detection rates ranging from 63 % to 93 % at a false alarm rate of 10 false alarms per day. Detection rates were much worse for new and novel R2L and DoS attacks included only in the test data. The best systems failed to detect roughly half these new attacks which included damaging access to root-level privileges by remote users. These results suggest that further research should focus on developing techniques to find new attacks instead of extending existing rule-based approaches. 1.
