Abstract

We expand on the idea, proposed by Kelsey et al. [14], of cache memory being used as a side-channel which leaks information during the run of a cryptographic algorithm. By using this side-channel, an attacker may be able to reveal or narrow the possible values of secret information held on the target device. We describe an attack which encrypts 2 chosen plaintexts on the target processor in order to collect cache profiles and then performs around 2 computational steps to recover the key. As well as describing and simulating the theoretical attack, we discuss how hardware and algorithmic alterations can be used to defend against such techniques.

Citations

496	Differential power analysis - Kocher, Jaffe, et al. - 1999
321	Timing Attacks on Implementations of Diffie-Hellman, RSA, DSS, and Other Systems - Kocher - 1996
166	Differential Fault Analysis of Secret Key Cryptosystems, volume 1294 - Biham, Shamir - 1997
149	The Design of Rijndael - Daemen, Rijmen - 2002
149	Aspects of Cache Memory and Instruction Buffer Performance - Hill - 1987
73	Side channel cryptanalysis of product ciphers - Kelsey, Schneier, et al. - 1998
54	Electromagnetic Analysis: Concrete Results - Mourtel, Olivier
32	Fast software encryption functions - ” - 1991
29	A new class of invertible mappings - Klimov, Shamir - 2003
25	Randomized Cache Placement for Eliminating Conflicts - Topham, Gonza´lez - 1999
20	Power Analysis, What Is Now Possible - Akkar, Bevan, et al. - 2000
15	Non-deterministic Processors - May, Muller, et al.
8	Cold-Start vs. Warm-Start Miss Ratios - EASTON, FAGIN - 1978
6	Physical Side-Channel Attacks on Cryptographic Systems - Smart - 2000