Consciousness as Self-Function (1997)
| Venue: | JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES |
| Citations: | 10 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Perlis97consciousnessas,
author = {Donald Perlis},
title = {Consciousness as Self-Function},
journal = {JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES},
year = {1997},
volume = {4},
pages = {509--525}
}
Years of Citing Articles
Bookmark
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
OpenURL
Abstract
I argue that (subjective) consciousness is an aspect of an agent's intelligence, hence of its ability to deal adaptively with the world. In particular, it allows for the possibility of noting and correcting the agent's errors, as actions performed by itself. This in turn requires a robust self-concept as part of the agent's world model; the appropriate notion of self here is a special one, allowing for a very strong kind of self-reference. It also requires the capability to come to see that world model as residing in its belief base (part of itself), while then representing the actual world as possibly different, i.e., forming a new world-model. This suggests particular computational mechanisms by which consciousness occurs, ones that conceivably could be discovered by neuroscientists, as well as built into artificial systems that may need such capabilities. Consciousness
