Abstract

7 Abstract Goldman and Olsson (2009) have responded to the common charge that 8 reliabilist theories of knowledge are incapable of accounting for the value knowl-9 edge has beyond mere true belief. We examine their ''conditional probability 10 solution'' in detail, and show that it does not succeed. The conditional probability 11 relation is too weak to support instrumental value, and the specific relation they 12 describe is inessential to the value of knowledge. At best, they have described 13 conditions in which knowledge indicates that additional epistemic value is likely to 14 be forthcoming in the future. We also argue that their motive analogy breaks down. 15 The problem, we conclude, is that being produced by a reliable process is not 16 sufficient for a belief to be justified. 17 18 Keywords Knowledge Á Extra value Á Reliabilism Á Justification Á Truth Á 19 Swamping problem 20 21 1 The extra value of knowledge problem 22 Why is knowledge valuable? Part of the answer, plausibly, is that knowledge is at 23 least true belief, which is valuable. 1 It is generally good for our beliefs to be true. But 24 the cases which show that knowledge is more than true belief also make it plausible