## Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity (2007)

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Venue: | In Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC |

Citations: | 36 - 11 self |

### BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Lavi07truthfulmechanism,

author = {Ron Lavi},

title = {Truthful mechanism design for multi-dimensional scheduling via cycle monotonicity},

booktitle = {In Proceedings 8th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce (EC},

year = {2007},

pages = {252--261}

}

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### Abstract

We consider the problem of makespan minimization on m unrelated machines in the context of algorithmic mechanism design, where the machines are the strategic players. This is a multidimensional scheduling domain, and the only known positive results for makespan minimization in such a domain are O(m)-approximation truthful mechanisms [22, 20]. We study a well-motivated special case of this problem, where the processing time of a job on each machine may either be “low ” or “high”, and the low and high values are public and job-dependent. This preserves the multidimensionality of the domain, and generalizes the restricted-machines (i.e., {pj, ∞}) setting in scheduling. We give a general technique to convert any c-approximation algorithm to a 3capproximation truthful-in-expectation mechanism. This is one of the few known results that shows how to export approximation