Sequential auctions for the allocation of resources with complementarities (1999)
Cached
Download Links
- [dli.iiit.ac.in]
- [www.cs.toronto.edu]
- [www.cs.toronto.edu]
- [www.cs.toronto.edu]
- [www.erg.sri.com]
- DBLP
Other Repositories/Bibliography
| Citations: | 74 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Boutilier99sequentialauctions,
author = {Craig Boutilier},
title = {Sequential auctions for the allocation of resources with complementarities},
booktitle = {},
year = {1999},
pages = {527--534}
}
Years of Citing Articles
Bookmark
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
OpenURL
Abstract
Market-based mechanisms such as auctions are being studied as an appropriate means for resource allocation in distributed and inultiagcnl decision problems. When agents value resources in combination rather than in isolation, one generally relies on combinatorial auctions where agents bid tor resource bundles. or simultaneous auctions for all resources. We develop a different model, where agents bid for required resources sequentially. This model has the advantage that it can be applied in settings where combinatorial and simultaneous models are infeasible (e.g.. when resources are made available at different points in time by different parties), as well as certain benefits in settings where combinatorial models are applicable. We develop a dynamic programming model tor agents to compute bidding policies based on estimated distributions over prices. We also describe how these distributions are updated to provide a learning model for bidding behavior. 1
