L-collision attacks against randomized MACs (2000)
by
Michael Semanko
| Venue: | In CRYPTO |
| Citations: | 3 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Semanko00l-collisionattacks,
author = {Michael Semanko},
title = {L-collision attacks against randomized MACs},
booktitle = {In CRYPTO},
year = {2000},
pages = {216--228},
publisher = {Springer}
}
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Abstract
Abstract. In order to avoid birthday attacks on message authentication schemes, it has been suggested that one add randomness to the scheme. One must be careful about how randomness is added, however. This paper shows that prefixing randomness to a message before running the message � through an iterated MAC leads to an attack that takes only O 2 (l+r)/3 + max{2 l/2, 2 r/2 �} queries to break, where l is the size of the MAC iteration output and r is the size of the prefixed randomness.
Citations
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| 404 | Keying hash functions for message authentication - Bellare, Canetti, et al. - 1996 |
| 137 | The security of cipher block chaining - Bellare, Kilian, et al. - 1994 |
| 109 | XOR MACs: New methods for message authentication using finite pseudorandom functions - Bellare, Guérin, et al. - 1995 |
| 65 | Mdx-mac and building fast macs from hash functions - Preneel, Oorschot - 1995 |
| 18 | Stateless evaluation of pseudorandom functions: Security beyond the birthday barrier - Bellare, Goldreich, et al. |
| 14 | American national standard-financial institution message authentication (wholesale - 9 - 1986 |
| 1 | CBC-MAC for Real-Time Data Sources. Dimacs - Petrank, Rackoff - 1997 |
