Abstract

In the complexity and simulation communities there is growing support for the use of bottom-up computer-based simulation in the analysis of complex systems. The presumption is that because these models are more complex than their linear predecessors they must be more suited to the modeling of systems that appear, superficially at least, to be (compositionally and dynamically) complex. Indeed the apparent ability of such models to allow the emergence of collective phenomena from quite simple underlying rules is very compelling. But does this `evidence' alone `prove' that nonlinear bottom-up models are superior to simpler linear models when considering complex systems behavior? Philosophical explorations concerning the efficacy of models, whether they be formal scientific models or our personal worldviews, has been a popular pastime for many philosophers, particularly philosophers of science. This paper offers yet another critique of modeling that uses the results and observations of nonlinear mathematics and bottom-up simulation themselves to develop a modeling paradigm that is significantly broader than the traditional model-focused paradigm. In this broader view of modeling we are encouraged to concern ourselves more with the modeling process rather than the (computer) model itself and embrace a nonlinear modeling culture. This emerging view of modeling also counteracts the growing preoccupation with nonlinear models over linear models.

Citations