## Hypercomputation and the Physical Church-Turing Thesis (2003)

Citations: | 21 - 0 self |

### BibTeX

@MISC{Cotogno03hypercomputationand,

author = {Paolo Cotogno},

title = {Hypercomputation and the Physical Church-Turing Thesis},

year = {2003}

}

### Years of Citing Articles

### OpenURL

### Abstract

A version of the Church-Turing Thesis states that every e#ectively realizable physical system can be defined by Turing Machines (`Thesis P'); in this formulation the Thesis appears an empirical, more than a logico-mathematical, proposition. We review the main approaches to computation beyond Turing definability (`hypercomputation'): supertask, non-well-founded, analog, quantum, and retrocausal computation. These models depend on infinite computation, explicitly or implicitly, and appear physically implausible; moreover, even if infinite computation were realizable, the Halting Problem would not be a#ected. Therefore, Thesis P is not essentially di#erent from the standard Church-Turing Thesis.