## Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions (2004)

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Citations: | 56 - 11 self |

### BibTeX

@MISC{Kothari04approximately-strategyproofand,

author = {Anshul Kothari and David C. Parkes and Subhash Suri},

title = {Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions},

year = {2004}

}

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### Abstract

We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multi-unit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginaldecreasing piecewise constant curves and quantity-based side constraints. We develop a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the multi-unit allocation problem, which computes a -approximation in worst-case time , given bids each with a constant number of pieces. We integrate this approximation scheme within a VickreyClarke -Groves mechanism and compute payments for an asymptotic cost of ! . The maximal possible gain from manipulation to a bidder in the combined scheme is bounded by 4294-16716 " is the total surplus in the efficient outcome.

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