LOMAC: Low Water-Mark Integrity Protection for COTS Environments (2000)
| Venue: | IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2000 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY |
| Citations: | 49 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Fraser00lomac:low,
author = {Timothy Fraser},
title = {LOMAC: Low Water-Mark Integrity Protection for COTS Environments},
booktitle = {IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2000 IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY},
year = {2000},
pages = {230--245},
publisher = {IEEE Computer Society}
}
Years of Citing Articles
Bookmark
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
 |
OpenURL
Abstract
We hypothesize that a form of kernel-resident access-control-based integrity protection can gain widespread acceptance in Commercial Off-The-Shelf (COTS) environments provided that it couples some useful protection with a high degree of compatibility with existing software, configurations, and practices. To test this hypothesis, we have developed a highly-compatible free open-source prototype called LOMAC, and released it on the Internet. LOMAC is a dynamically loadable extension for COTS Linux kernels that provides integrity protection based on Low Water-Mark access control. We present a classification of existing access control models with regard to compatibility, concluding that models similar to Low Water-Mark are especially wellsuited to high-compatibility solutions. We also describe our practical strategies for dealing with the pathological cases in the Low Water-Mark model's behavior, which include a small extension of the model, and an unusual application of its concepts.
