DMCA
Exploiting spectrum heterogeneity in dynamic spectrum market (2012)
| Venue: | University of Malaya, Malaysia. His |
| Citations: | 4 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Min12exploitingspectrum,
author = {Er W. Min and Jaehyuk Choi and Kangg. Shin},
title = {Exploiting spectrum heterogeneity in dynamic spectrum market},
booktitle = {University of Malaya, Malaysia. His},
year = {2012},
pages = {2020--2032},
publisher = {Wiley Press}
}
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Abstract
Abstract—The dynamic spectrum market (DSM) is a key economic vehicle for realizing the opportunistic spectrum access that will mitigate the anticipated spectrum-scarcity problem. DSM allows legacy spectrum owners to lease their channels to unlicensed spectrum consumers (or secondary users) in order to increase their revenue and improve spectrum utilization. In DSM, determining the optimal spectrum leasing price is an important yet challenging problem that requires a comprehensive understanding of market participants ’ interests and interactions. In this paper, we study spectrum pricing competition in a duopoly DSM, where two wireless service providers (WSPs) lease spectrum access rights, and secondary users (SUs) purchase the spectrum use to maximize their utility. We identify two essential, but previously overlooked, properties of DSM: 1) heterogeneous spectrum resources at WSPs and 2) spectrum sharing among SUs. We demonstrate the impact of spectrum heterogeneity via an in-depth measurement study using a software-defined radio (SDR) testbed. We then study the impacts of spectrum heterogeneity on WSPs ’ optimal pricing and SUs ’ WSP selection strategies using a systematic three-step approach. First, we study how spectrum sharing among SUs subscribed to the same WSP affects the SUs ’ achievable utility. Then, we derive the SUs ’ optimal WSP selection strategy that maximizes their payoff, given the heterogeneous spectrum propagation characteristics and prices. We analyze how individual SU preferences affect market evolution and prove the market convergence to a mean-field limit, even though SUs make local decisions. Finally, given the market evolution, we formulate the WSPs ’ pricing strategies in a duopoly DSM as a noncooperative game and identify its Nash equilibrium points. We find that the equilibrium price and its uniqueness depend on the SUs ’ geographical density and spectrum propagation
Keyphrases
spectrum heterogeneity dynamic spectrum market market evolution secondary user duopoly dsm optimal spectrum leasing price lease spectrum access right local decision systematic three-step approach in-depth measurement study noncooperative game market participant interest heterogeneous spectrum propagation characteristic sus optimal wsp selection strategy key economic vehicle wsps optimal pricing spectrum sharing individual su preference heterogeneous spectrum resource spectrum pricing competition spectrum propagation nash equilibrium point sus wsp selection strategy uniqueness depend anticipated spectrum-scarcity problem opportunistic spectrum access software-defined radio wsps pricing strategy comprehensive understanding unlicensed spectrum consumer sus geographical density legacy spectrum owner wireless service provider mean-field limit sus achievable utility market convergence spectrum use spectrum utilization equilibrium price
