Abstract

This chapter presents a social-psychological approach ro the analysis and resolution of international and inrercornmunal conflicrs. Irs central focus is DO interactive conflict resolution (sec Fisher. J997), n family of models [or intervening in deep-roored, procracted conflicts between identity groups, which is anchored in psychological principle,.;, 1ntcmarional conflict resolution can be placed in the context of a larger, growing held of practice. applied at different levels and in diffcrentdomains, and anchored in differem disciplines, theoretical traditions, and fields of practice. Despite this diversity, certain common threads run tbrough most of the work in this ficld. Thus these approac!'cI to eonlllcr resolution \;CII crally call for a nonadversarial framework for addressing the conflict, an analytic point of dl'p::lHllre, a prohleJJl-~olviJ1g or icnmrion, direct pnrrici potion of the conflicting panics in joint efforts to shape a solution, and facilitation by ;;l third party trained ill the proce~ of conflict resolution. Crcsslevel exchanges arc very valuable for developing general principles, bur the application of these principles requires sensitivity (0 the "uuiqne features of the context in which they ale applird_ In this spilit, this chapter bcgir.s with prcsernarion of a social psychological perspective on the nature of Inrernurional conflict and [he normative and perceptual processes that contribute ro its escalation and perpetuation. This uunlysis of international conflict has clear implications for our approach to conflirr resolution. The chapter rhen rurns to a b,ic( dlscnssion of negotiation and mediation, the maS[ common diplomatic ~p preaches to conflict, which have been subjects of extensive research in po lnica! psychology. This review provides a useful reference point for our disclJ.~sioJl of interactive conflict resolution itself. To illustrate the family of approaches subsumed under this rubric, we proceed co a more detailed description of rhe assurnpnons and procedures of tnterac\ive problem solv ing, 3S applied in particular (0 the Israeli-Palestinian ,onBiet [Kelman, 1997a, ]1)98b). The chapter concludes with an identification of some of (he challenges confronting scholar-praerlriollcl) in d,,~ field of conflict anal YSI~ "nd resolutioll. ... The Nature of International Conflict or other, more rradhionnl approaches focusing on structural or strategic [actors (Kelman, 1997h). Withom denying the importance of objectively anchored national interests, the primacy of the state in the international system, the role of power in international relations, and the effcct of srruc [ural factors in determining [he course of an inrernationa] conflict, it en riches the analysis in a variety of ways: by exploring the subjective facrors that scr consrrainrs on raticnaliry: by opening the black box of [he stare as unitary actor and analyzing processes within and between the societies that underlie state action; by broadening the range of influence processes (and, indeed, of definitions of power) that playa role in international politics: and hy conceiving imcrnational conflict as a dynamic proc~s, shaped by changing realities, interests, and relationships between rhc conflicting' par ties. Social-psychological analysis suggcsts four propositions about interna \ tional conflict. These proposirions are particularly relevant to existential conflicts herween identity groups-conflicts in which the collective identi ries of the parties are engaged and in which the continued existence of the group is seen to be at stake. Thus rhc propositions apply most directly to ethnic or ideological conflicts bur also co more mundane inrcrstare conflicts, insofar as issues of national identity and existence cornc into play-as they often do. The first proposition says that international conflict is a process driven by collective needs and fetUS rather than entirely a product of rational cal culation of objective national inreresrs on the pan -of political decision makers. Human needs arc often articulated and fulfilled through imporrnnr collectivities, such ;L,~ the ethnic group, the national group. and the srnrc. Conflict arises when a group is faced with nonfulfillment or threat to rhe fulfillment of basic needs: nor only such obvious material needs as food, shelter. physical safcry and physical well-being bur also, and very centrally, such psychological needs as identity, security, rccognition, autonomy. self esteem, and a sense of justicc (Burton, 1990). Moreover, needs for identity and security aud similarly powerful collective needs, and the fears and con cerns about survival associated with them, contribute heavily co the esca larion and perpetuation of conflict once it has srnrrcd. Even when the con flicring parries have come co rhc conclusion that it is in their best interest. to pur an cnd co thc conflict, rhcy rcsisr going co rhc negotiating table or making rhc accommodations uccessaty for rhc negotiations co move for ward, for fcar that chcy will be propelled inro concessions thar in the end will leave rhcir vcry existcncc compromised. The fears that drive existential conflicts lie at the heart of the relationship between the conflicting parries, going beyond rlre cycle of fears re.~ulring from the dynamics of the security dilemma (jervis. (976). Collective fears and needs, though more pronounced in ethnic couflicrs. play :J parr in all international conflicts. They combine with objective fac tors-for example, a state's resources, rhc ethnic composition of its popu , / \ Conflict Analysis ~l1d Resolution .317 larion, or irs access or kick of access to the sea-in determining how dif (trent scgmcIHs of a society perceive stare interests and what ultimately becomes [he national inrcresr as defined by (he dominant elites. SimihH!y, all conflicrs-Lintcrstace no less than erhnic-c-rcpresenr a combination of rariona] and irrational factors, and in each type of conflict rhc mix may vary from case to case. Some ethnic conflicts may be preponderantly rational, just as some imersmrc clmflicrs may be preponderantly irrational. Furchcr more, in all imemariooal conflicts, (he needs and fears of populations arc mobilized and often manipul:l[cd by the leadership, wirh varying degrees of demagoguery and cynicism. Even when manipulated, collective needs and fears represent authentic reactions within the population and become the focus of sucicra] action. They may be linked to individual needs and fears. For example, in highly viclcm ethnic conflicts. die fear of annihilation of one's group is often (and for good reason) tied to a fear of personal anni hilation. The conception of conflict as a process driven by collective needs and fears implies, fim and foremost, that conflict rcsclution-c--if it is to lead to a stable peace that horh sides consider JUSt and to a new relationship that enhances the welfare and development of the two societies-most address the fundamental needs and deepest fcars of the populations. From a nor mative point of view, such a solution can be viewed as the operarionaliaation of justice within a problem-solving approach to conflict resolution (Kelman, 1996b). Another implication of a human-needs oricnrnrion is that (he psy chological needs on which it focuses-security. identity, recognition-are not inhcrernly r:ero sum (Burton. 1990), although they are usually seen as such in deep-tooted con fliers. Thus it may well be possible to shape nn inregrnrivc sol orion rhar satisfies both sets of needs, which may then make it easier to settle issues like territory or resources through distributive bar gaining. Finally, (he view of conflict as a process driven by collective uecds and fears suggests that conflict resolution must, at some stage, provide for certain proee.\ses (hat take place at the level of individuals and interactions between individuals, such as taking the other's perspective or realistic em pathy (\'Vhite, 1984). creative problem solving, insight. and learning. Focusing on the needs and feats of the populations in conflict readily brings ro mimI a second social-psychological proposition: that international conflicr is 1111 imenocietalprousJ, not merely an intergovernmental or inter stacc phenomenon. The conflict, particularly in the case of protracted ethnic struggles, becomes an inescapable part of daily life for each society and its component elements. Thus analysis of conflict requires aueruion nor only to its strategic. military, and diplomatic dimensions but also to its economic, psychological, cultural, and social-structural dimensions. Interactions on these dimensions. both within and between the confiicnng societies, shape the political environment in which governments function and define the political constraints under which they operatl:. An imcrsociernl view of conflict alerts us to the role of internal divisions ioithin each society, which often play a major pan: in exacerbariog or even creating ccniiicrs bcnoeen societies. Such divisions impose consrrainrs on political leaders pursuing a policy of accommodation, in the form of ac cusations by opposition elements that [hey ace jeopardizing national exis tence and of anxieties and doubts within the general population that the opposition elerncrus both [ester and exploit. The internal divisions, how ever, lIl<ly also provide porenual levers for change in the direction of conflict resolution, by challenging the monolithic image of the enemy that panics ill conflict rend to hold and enabling them to deal with each other in a morc diffcrennarcd way. Internal divisions point to the presence on (he other side of potential partners for negotiation and thus provide the op portunity for forming pro negotiation coalitions across the conflict lines Another implication of an inrersocieral view of conflict is [hat negoti ations and third-party efforts should ideally be directed ncr merely to a political settlement: of the conflict, in the form of a brokered political <Igree mcnr, bur to its raoiuuan, A polincal agreemem may be adequate for rcr ruinating relatively specific, comainnblc inrersrnrc disputes, bur conflicts that engage: the collective identities and existential concerns of the adversaries require a process that is conducive to Structural and altitude change, to reconciliation, and to rhe transformation of the relationship between the tWO societies. Finally, an inrcrsocieral analysis of conflict suggests a view of diplomacy as a complex mix of official and unofficial efforts with compte. mentaty contributions. The peaceful rcrmiuarion or managemelu of conlficr requires binding agreemellts [hat can only be achieved ar [he offici,,1 level, but many different sectors of {he two societies have [0 be involved in cre ating a f.worable environment for negotiating and implementing such agree ments. Our third proposition says rhar inurnruional conjlia is a mulriJuaed proUH 0/mumal influellCt' and not only a couresr in the exercise of coercive power. Much of illlnnational politics entails a process of murual influence, in which each party seeks [0 protect and promore its own interests by sbaping the behavior of the ocher. Conflict occurs when these: interests clash: wheu attainment of one parry's imcresrs (and fulfillment of the needs thal underlie them) threatens, or is perceived 10 threaten, the iurercsrs (and needs) of the other. In pursuing the conllicr, therefore, the parties engagc in mutual influence. designed to advance their own positions and to block the adversary. Similarly, in conflict resolurico-c-by ncgonation or other means-the panics exercise inllucnce to induce the adversary 10 (George & Smoke. 1974; [ervis. Lebow. & Stein, 1985; Schdling. 1%3; Effective use of positive ineentivc..s IC<juin:." more dian offeriltg che other whatever rewards, promises, or confidence-building measures seem mosr readily available. It requires actions rhar add tess the fimdnmerua! needs and fears of the other party. Thus the key to an di-cctive influence strategy based on rhc e:>:ch~nge of positive inccnuvcs is raponsiucness to the other's con cerns: actively exploring ways that each call help meet the other's needs and ;\lhy the other's fears ;Lod way. co hdp each other overcome the constraints within (heir respective societies against taking the actions that each W<1J1{S the other to take. The edvautage of a strategy of responsiveness i.~ dut II allows parties to exert influence 00 each other through pnsitivc steps (001 Self-flilfilling prophecies arc also generated by the conflicr norms that typically gowrn the iOler:letion bcrwceu parries engaged in an Intense con fliCi. Expressions of hmtility and distrust toward che enemy arc noe just spontancous manifestations of the conflict but arc ncrrnarively prescribed behaviors. Po!iticalll'a(\ers' aHumption ,hat the public's evaluation of them depends on their adherence to these norms influences their lactical and srrucegk decisions, their approach [0 negotiations, their public pronounce mcnrs, and, ultimately, the way they educate chcir own publics. For rhe publics, in rum. adherence to rhcse norms is often taken as an indicator of group loyalty. Tbcs the discourse in deep-rooted conflicts is marked by mutual delegirirnizaricn :Illd delwmaniaenou. Imcr:tuion governed by this set of norms-at the micro nnd macro icvels-c-conrribures to escalation ancl perpetuation of rhc conflict. Panics char systematically treat each ocher with hmlili£)' and distrust are likely to become increasingly hostile and unrrusr worthy. The dYI1;](\1iQ of conflict interaction create a high probabdisy that op porcunincs for confiicr rcxolunon will b,· missed. Parries whose inreracrlon is shaped by the norms and images rocred in the herory of the conflict are systematically consuaincd in their capaCI£)' to respond to the occurrence and possibility of o:.:hangc. They find it (\ifhCl11t to communicate Ihe dlallgeS that have occurred on their own sid(" or to notice Ihe changes 01\ the other side, :lOa to explore the pcsslbliitlcs for change that would serve both sides' interests. Conflict resolution cffons. therefore, require promotion of a dif fctent kind of imeracrion, capable of reversing the escalatory and self perpetuating dynamics of cllrdHu: an interaction lh:ll is conducive to shar Nonnative Processes \ A variety of interaction processes at the mass and elite levels within con Hicring societies that influence the evolving course of the conflict are gov erned by a set of powerful social norms that encourage actions and artirudes conducive to the generation, escalation, and perpetuation of conflict and that inhibit the perception and occurrence of change in the direction of tension reduction and conflict resolution (Kelman, 1997b, pp. 212-222). One such process is the formation of CO/&cI;lJ~ moods. With periodic shifis in collective mood, public opinion can act as both a resource and a conscrninr for political leaders in the foreign policy process. In principle, it can provide suppor[ for either aggressive or conciliatory policies, hut under the prevailing norms in an intense, protracted conflict, leaders are more likely to expect-and to mobilize-public support for the fonner than for the latter. Apart from transitory moods, certain pervasive slates of coo sciousness underlie public opinion in a society engulfed in a deep-rooted conflict, reflecting the existcntial concerns and the central national narratives widely shared within thc population. In many cases-such as Serbia, Northern Ireland, ami the Middle East-historical traumas serve as the points of reference For current events. Though these memories may be ma nipulated by demagogic leaders, they-and the associated sense of injustice, abandonment, and vulnerability-are pan of the people's consciousness and available for manipulation. The effeet of such collective moods is to hring to the fore powerful social norms that suPPOrt escalatory actions and inhibit moves toward compromise and accommodation. \'ifhen fundamental con cerns about survival and identity are rapped, national leaders, with fIlII expecration of public support, are far more ready to risk war than to rake risks for peace-in line with the proposition derived from prospect theory that people arc more reluctant to take risks to achieve gains than to avoid losses (sec de Klerk-c-are ofien Il1\JSf effecrive in leading their populations toward peaceful resolution of conflicts, once [hey have decided rhar this approach bcr serves the national interest. In general, however; group loyalties are more readily available to mobilize suppon for aggressive. policies than for conciliatory ones. Proposals for aggressive actions can more easily rely on the vocabulary of nationalism. which characteristically marks off the ingrcup [rom the ourgroup to the detriment of the latter. An appeal ro defend rhe nation against an imminent auack, in particular, is more compelling than an appeal to seize a promising opportunity-as prospect theory might pte dicr (Farnham, 1992; Lev}', 1992). Such nn appeal also elicits almost unan imous response among members of (he populalion, whereas an appeal to take advauragc of an opportunity far pt'ace holds no attraction to that Segmem of the population that equnres peace with surrender. Processes of group loyalty create barriers to change in a conllict rcla ticnship. Group loyalty requires adherence [Q the group's ncrms-c-which, in an intense conflict, call fur a militant, unyielding, and suspicious altitude toward rho enemy. Militancy and intransigence rhus become the measures of lcyalry, Hence, particularly in siruarions of perceived national Lfi~is, the militants n.crcise disproportionate power and often a Veto over officiaJ ac tions and policies. They impose severe constraints on the ability of leaders \0 explore peaceful options. Dissent from the dominant conflict norms be comes defined as an act of disloyalty and is suppressed, thus Further un dermining dlC exploradon nf peaceful alternatives. Derisioll-mnking pr()cesJfJ ill a conflict siruarion [end to inhibit the search for alternntives and the exploration of new possibiiiues, parricula.Iy when decision-makers arc operating in an atmosphere of crisis. These ten dcncics are by no means inevitable, and chert: arc historical insrances-c-such as rhe Cuban missile crisis-of creative: decision-making in dangerous crisis situations (Allison, 1971; A major source of reluctance [Q explore new options arc the domestic constraints under which decision-makers labor. In an intense conflict situ ation, adherence to rhe conflict norms tends to be seen as rhe safeS[ course of action. Cautious decision-makers assume that they are less vulnerable domestically if they smy wirh the confiicr's Slaws quo, adhere to a discourse of hostility and distrust vis-a-vis the odier side. or threaten escalatory aceions than if they take steps wward accommodaricn and compromise. The search for nhcrnarives in response to changing realities is also inhibited by insti tutionalized rigidities in the decision-making apparatus. Decision-makers and their bureaucracies operate within a framework of assumptions about available choices, effective strategies, and constituency expectations, shaped by the prevailing conflict norms, which may make them unaware of rhe occurrence and possibility of change. Punucrmorc, they often rely on es tablished procedures and technologies, which arc more likely to be geared toward pursuing the conflict-by mllhary and other means-than toward resolving it. The microprocesses of acrion and inreracrion in crisis decision-making further inhibit the exploration of ncw opuorw. At the level of individual decision-makers. the stress rhey experience in sirunrions of crisis-c-when consequential decisions have to be made under severe time pressures-limits the number of alternatives they consider and impels them ro settle quickly on the dominant response, which, in intense conflicts, is likely to be ag gressive and escalatory (Holsri, {972: Lebow, 1987). At the level ofdecision making groups, crisis decision-making ofreu leads [0 "groupthink" (Janis, 1982), a concurrence-seeking tendency (hat is designed to maintain the cohesiveness of the group. Decision-making under these circnmsrances is much more likely to produce policies and acrions that perpetuate and es calate the conflict than innovative ideas for conhicr resolution. The norms governing l1£'gorittt;ol1 end bargaining procasaes between par ties involved in longstauding cnnllicr strongly encourage zero-sum thinking, which l:quatcs the enemy's loss with one\ own gain. Negcnarico-c-eveu disrrihurivc bargaining in its narrowest form-is possible only when both parties define [he situation, at least at some level, as a win-win, mixed mcuve game in whieh (hey have both comperirive and cooperative gU;lls. While pursuing its own uueresrs. each ]'<lrtr musr actively seek out ways the adversary an also win and ~ppear to he winning. Bur [his is precisely the kind of erron that is discouraged by the conhicc nonns. At the micro level, negorintors ill <In intense conflict tend W evaluate their performance by the forcefulness with which they presellt rheir own case and by their effectiveness in resisting compromise. Til listen to what ; / / \ the other side needs and to help rhc other side: achieve: irs goals would violate the conflict norms and might subject the negoriarors to criticism from their own constituencies and particularly from their hard-line domestic opposition. At rhc macro level, the panics-even when rhey rccoguo.e their common interest in ncgoriaring certain specific issues-c-rcnd [Q pursue an overall outcome that strengthens [heir own strategic position and weakens the adversary's. Such a Slr.llCg}' reduces the other's incentive fi)f concluding an agreement and ahiliry [Q mobilize public support for wharever agreement is negotiated. Zero-sum thinking at both levels undermines the negotiating process, causing delays, setbacks, and repeated failures. Finally, conflict creates certain strucncra] and plJchologicnl cannnitmrnts, which then take on a life of their own (sec Pruitt & Gahagan, 1974: Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994. Mosr obviously, in a conflict of long standing, various individuals, groups, and organizctions-c-rnilitary, political, industrial, schol arly-devdop a vested interest in maintaining the conflict as a source of profit, power, status, or raison d'erre. Others, though nor benefiting from the conflict as such, may have a strong inreresr in forestalling a compromise solution because it would nor address their particular grievances or fulfill their particular aspirations. Vested interests do not necessarily manifest themselves in deliberate attempts to undermine efforts at conflict resolution. They may take indirect and subtle forms, such as interpreting ambiguous realities and choosing between uncertain policy alreruativcs in W;lyS that favor continuation of the conflicr. Vesrcd interests and similar srrucrural couunirmcnrs to the conflict arc bolstered by psychological commitments. People involved in a longstanding and deep-rooted conflict rend to develop a worldview that is built around the conflict and would be chrcarcncd by an end to the conflict. Resistance to change is likely ro be more pronounced the more elaborate the cognitive structure or ideology in which the view of the conflict is embedded, since changing this view would have wider ramifications. In an intense conflict, the image of the enemy is often a particularly important part of people's wcrldvicw, with implications for their national identity, view of their own society, and interpretation of history. This is one reason why images of rbe enemy, (Q which we turn IIe:Xt, arc highly resisrnnr to change: and conrribure to the escalatory and sclf-perpccuaciog dynamic of conflict. Perceptual Processes Perceptual and cognitive processes-the: ways we interpret and organize conflict-related information-playa major role in the cscalaricu and pe:r pcruarion of conAict and create barriers In redefining and resolving the confiicr despite changing realities and interests. Two pcrceprual proeessc~ that characterize mutual images of panics in conflicr can acconnr for this e:ffCCl: the formation nf mirror imagcs and the resistance: of images to COIl tradicrory information (Kelman. 1997b. pp. 222-231; see: alsn chapter 9 The mirror image concept implies rhnr certain symmetries ill the par rk-s' reactions arise from the VCf)' nature of conAict imemcrion and that they play an important role in escalating the conflict. There is 110 ;nmmp rion Ihat nil images of self and enemy arc mirror images; that images Oil the two sides arc equally inaccurate: or that there is empirical symmetry in the two sides' historical experiences and current situation or mnra] equiva lence in their posiriuns. The dynamics uf the conAict relationship, however, produce a degree of parallelism in some of the images developed by borh participants in that relationship, arising out of the motivational and CO~ nlrivc contexts in which they operatc. Motivationally, each side is concerned with "looking good" when blame for the conilicr events is being appor tioned: pnliticalleaders, therefore, fed a strong need to persuade themselves, their own people, rhe rest of the world, and future historians thai [he blame rests with the enemy. Cognitively, tach side views rhe conljiee from irs own perspective and-c-painfully aware of its OWIl needs, fears, historical traumas, gricv:lJlccS, suspicions, and political constraints-is convinced rlun j\ is act ing defensively and with the best intentions and that this is so sell-evident rhar it must be equally clear [Q the: enemy. Mirror images produce a spiraling dTtCt (exemplified by the classical paucrn of an arms race) 1)(,~<':;H1sc each side interprets any hostile anion by the orbcr as an indication of aggressive inrenr against which it must defend itself, ytt its own rcacrions-c-whosc defensive nature, it assumes, should be obvious to the enemy-arc taken by the ocher as signs of aggressive intent, The eflecr of mirror images is accentuated insofar as the enemy's ideology or national character is perceived to be inherently aggressive and expan sionist. In addition to their escalatory cflccr. mirror images tend to rnnkc conflicts more intractable because: the sharp corurasr between the: innocent self and the aggressive other makes it difficult to break out of a zero-sum conception of the conflict. However, the COllCe:pt of mirror images may be a useful tool in conflict resolution. In problem-solving workshops, for ex ample, rhc parries' discovery that their own actions arc perceived differently by the other side than by themselves may open them up to the possibilicy that the reverse may be true. Thus they lIlay gain access to each other's perspective, insight into the escalatory eflecrs of such rwo-dirccticnal rlif fcrcnces in perception, and awareness of the need for mutual reassurance in order to set a decscalarory process in motion. The second feature of conflict images, their high degree of resistance to contmdiaory illfim/(uion, inhibilS rhe perception of change and [he cxpec ration of furure change. A glear deal of social-psychological theorizing and research has addressed the general phenomenon of the persistence of atti tudes and beliefs in the face: of new information that, from an outside point of view, challenges their validicy but is somehow ncurralixed or ignored. Research has focused on several rypes of mechanisms [hat account for re sistance ro contradictory information: selectivity, eonsisrcucy, attribution, and the self-fulfilling prophecy. The eonecprs nF selective expo.mre, selective perception. and selcerive recall all point to the fact that our attitudes help determine the kind of information that is available to us. We are more likely to seek OUt and be exposed to infonuaunn that confirms our existing ani tildes and to perceive and remember new information ill ways [hat fit into our preexisting cognilive Framework. The various models of cognitive con sistcucy-c-such as Heider's (L 958) theory of cognitive balance and Festin gcr's (1957) theory of cognitive disson:lf)ce--sugge.~t that, in the interest of maintaining consistency, people tend to screen OUt information thal is in congruent wab their existing beliefs and attitudes. Though inconsisrenr information may also instigate attitude change, it is more likely to be resisted whcn the existing anitudes are strongly held and have wide ramifications as is the case with enemy imago. The mechanisms that account for resistance lU disconfirming Infor mation are particularly powerful in a coullict relationship, for several rea sons. First, im::ages of the enemy and conhicr-relatcd self-images arc centra] aspects of the national consensus, and resistance [Q disconfirming infor mation is therefore reinforced by strong normative pressures. Second, in a \ conflict relationship, the opportunities and capacity for taking the per~pec tive of the orhcr side arc limited, which reduces the impact of porcmially new inlorrnaticn about the varieties, changes, and signs of flexibility ill the other side's views. Third, [he resistance of enemy images (0 discouhrmarion is magnified by strong beliefs about the unchangcability of rhe enemy, re inforced hy the view thar it is dangerous or even treasonous (0 propme rhar the enemy has changed or will change. Despite all rhe reasons why conflict images are particularly resistant llJ conrrndictory informacion, they arc nor immutable. Social-psychological ev idence suggests that rhey can change, and historical evidence shows rhur they elf> change. The challenge for scholars and practitioners ofiuteruar icnal conflict resolution is to devise (he means to overcome (heir resistance co chang". Interactive conflict resolution is specifically designed 10 address these kinds of resistances, along with the other social-psychological processes that <,.lllHlibute [() the escalation and perpetuation ofconflict. Before turning to interactive conflict resolution, however, we prcsem a brief review of ne gotiation and mediation-the more traditional approaches to dealing with inrernarional coullictc--and scmc of the: social-psychological literature that nddrcsses them. lilt.. Negotiation The l1lUH common approach to addn:~~ing international conflict within (he domain of diplomacy is that of negotiation, an interactive process thar ap pelrs 10 have a semblance of uJli"cr~alit)' at a generic level, even dlOugh cultural diffcrcuces in approaches and «yles are :1 current focus of study (e.g.. Cohen. 1997). Negotiation is typically defined as a discussion among parries aimed at resolving incompatible goals (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993), 'lldlOugh:l broader dcfiuitlon sees negotiarion .1S a process by which parries , I Conllicr An~lysjs ~nd Resolution 329 develop agreements to guide and regulate their future behavior (Sawyer & Cucrakow, 1965). The broader Jdlniliotl alerts us 10 [he fact rhur all man ner of issues ;H die international level arc approached through negotiation. from trade disputes to financial arrangemcm.~ to cuvironrnental problems, while the more focused definition places negotiation nr the center of conflict resolution over terri LOry, gOVCrJI<tJll.:C, and idennry with other methnds ;llId inrerveurions playing J supplementary and supportive role. It is dierclore essential to understand rhe processes. outcomes, and context ofinccrncnonal negoriarion. so thar a range of efforts can be directed reward achieving mutually acceptable scujernems Ill;).! contribute to susraiuabic and l'Hgdy cooperative relationships. There are [WO important disciccnous in coosidNing expression> of in ternational negotiation: hilarerai versus rnulriiateral and ccmpctirive versus integrative. The furmer distinction has gained importance since the end of the Cold War, with the shift away from" bipolar power snuggle to a Frcld \ uf multiple actors nrrcmpriug to forge u new world order. A concise treat menr of multilateral negotiation by Touval (1989) covered the phases, im pediments. facrlitaring facr(}[~, and rhe challenge of building consensus, 'Ill in comparison to bilateral ncgorimion. Effofls to understand the complexity of multiparty, mulriissue negotiations seeking unanimity of agrecmellt must go beyond rhe common concepts applied ro bilateral ncgutialivl\s (bnga(t\ ing, informarion processing] to include additional concepts (coalition for mation, role diflcrcnriarion) in the context of a system perspective. Treat ments of muleilarcra! ncgoriarion, ir is hoped. will enable us to understand more deeply this increil~ingl}' common way of dealing with inrernarional issues (e.g., Hampson, 1995). I The sccoml distinction ha~ bent ccuual rc rhe ncgoriaeton literature for some time, stemming front the differences between domination, compro mise, and integration. identified by Mary Parker Follen (1924), with the latter approach sec king tu find expression of all parties' interests without s:\erincing ',lny essential ones. The distinction was crystallized in die orga nizntinnnl literature through Walton and McKersic's (J 965) differellli:ltion of disn-ihut.ivc Yer.S\I~ ilHcgl,lLive bnrgaining, the former involving competing interests over rcsnurccs in short supply and the laucr eng:lging cooperative moves to increase the resource domain so that all primary interests can be satisfied. This duality has been rcprescnten In numerous trcaunctus of ne i gotiation to the point where we can speak of competing theories of nego riarion [Murray, 1986), one concern co witn hanl bsrgaioiog and resistance 10 concession making in order to maximize one's gains, the other geared to joint analysis ami prohicm sotviog yielding «iutually high outcomes. This distinction is applied to the imernarinna] level by Hoprnann (l ~95), who contends cmpuicalty thai b;trgaining is more frequent in irucrnariona] ne gotiations, even though problem solving produces greater flexibility and superior agreements. Pan of the reason for this discrepancy between pnelice and effectiveness is that the more traditional, competitive bargaining style I An early and infiucnnal model by Sawyer and "Guerzkow (I %5) cast the negotiation process as <1 temporal Row aflecred by antecedent, concur rem, and consequent conditions. Druckman (1973, 1983) has utilized their model W crganue research In the field and <15 a base for elaborating d\l~ proc~ss of negotiation into a series of stages, turning points, and crises in which morncnrum can be built reward the final agreement. He also makes a strong case for expanding ncgoriauon research (0 consider a rangc of conrexrual factors, a direction that latCI studies ar the imernauonal level are taking seriously {e.g., Hoprnann. l')9cJ). Carncv:tle and Pmiu (1992) review behavioral studies of negotiation in reems of a mcuvarional orienrarion, which predicts outcomes based on strategic choices rooted in negotiator motives. and a cognitive oriematioll. whidl predicts ourccrncs based o n negotiator perceptions and information praces. • ing. The descriptive srnnce of (he behavioral onemnion s11ifrs in the prescriptive direction in tbe theory and research on problem solving by Prujn (l9H6), which identifies methods for nnaining integralive agreements. in addition ill the time-honored tech oiquc of !ngrolling to transform dimihurive sitmrions iuvol ...ing multiple issues into inrcgradve Outcomes, Pmin identifies expanding the pie, non spt:l:iflc eornpcnsauon, cosr cutting, alld bridgillg, wherein a new option is I I When ncgonarion is nonexistent or unsuccessful in situations of destructive and protracted conflict, a Common response is for a neutral third party to enter the arena. either by invitation from the parties or on its own initiative. There are a wide variety of activities that inrermediaries can undertake, or more generally, a number of differenr roles they call enact in conflicts. Kricsberg (19%, 1998) identifies activiues that range from providing a ,pace for communication to saving face, helping invent new options, and adding resources and generating prc.5surcs ro reuch an agreement. Fisher and Keashly (1990) provide a taxonomy of third-parry intervention, which de scribes roles approximately in line with traditional terminology found in the literature at horh the domestic and international levels. Six roles are idemificd in terms of their primary functions and along a continuum of the control that the third p;ury pos~esscs over both the process and the outcome of the interaction between or among the parries. Conciliation and consultation are at the low power end of the continuum and are essentially defined as providing an informal communication link and mcilitating cre ative problem solving respectively At the high end of the concrol conrin uum, pracrkuping is seen as maintaining a cease nrc supplemented by bu rnanimrian and political acrivirics, while arbitration provides a binding third-parry serrlcmcnr on the subsranrivc issues in dispute. AI the intermediate level of control is rhc rhird-pany role of mediation, which. like conciliation and consultation, is a noncocrcivc and nonbinding approach [Q managing conflict with the consent of rhe panics. Specifically, mediation is defined as the intervention of an impartial third parry designed (Q create a mutually acceptable Ilegotiated settlement on the substantive issues of (he conflict [11 addition. Fidler and Keash[y (1990) Problem-Solving Workshops To illustrate the microprocess of interacuvc conflict resolution. we .~halJ describe the problem-solving workshops earned out by Herbert Kelman and 1,'ls colleagues with politically inllueruialIsrnclis and Palesuuians, starring in the early [970s (Kelman, 1992, \ 998b; Kelman & Cohen, 1976; Rouhana & Kelman, (994). Kelman's approach. mteracriue prof,/<'IJI wIlling (Kelman, 1986 Israeli-Palestinian Experiences Kelman's and his colleagues' lsraeli-Palesrinluu work has sought to cnnrrib ute ro all three of these stages of the negotiating process over the course of the years. All of [he workshops in the 1970s and 1980s rook place. of course, ill the prencgoriatioll stagl' and Were designed to explore the pos sibilities for movement toward [he negotiating were carried am during that period-in different conrcxrs and with diflcrcnr types of participants. All of rhc participants, however, were members (or were soon [Q be members) of the political elite. They included political aCWfS, such as parliamentarians and leaders or activists of political parties or political movements: political inlluenrials, such as journalists, editors, directors of think ranks, politically involved academicians, and former dip lomats or military officers; and preinflucnrinls. such as advanced graduate students who seemed headed for politically irnporranr careers (some of whom did indeed become political influenrials as their careers progressed}, Mmeovcr, all of the workshops during this period were "one-rime" events: me particular group of Israelis and Palestinians who [Oak part in J given workshop convened only for this one occasion-usually over an extended weekend. Some of the individuals participated in more than one such work , 1994). As it happened, with the onset of official negotiations in 1991, fim in Madrid and then in Wa~hingwn, this continuing workshop also provided the organizers' firsl experience with interactive problem solv ing as a paranegoeiaeion process. The political relevance of this work was enhanced by the appoinrrncnr, in 1991, of four of the six initial Palestinian participants in the group to key positions in the official negorialing teams and, in 1992, of several Israeli participants ro ambassadorial and cahiuet positions in the new Rabin government. Some participants left rhe group at this point because they saw a conflict of interests between [heir roles in the official and unofficial process (Kelman, 1998b, pp. 19-20). These workshops from the 1970s ro the early 1990s, along with other unofficial activities, helped ro lay the groundwork for the Oslo agreement of September 1993 DI,Jal Purpose Problem-solving workshops can best be vjcwcd as "workshops" in [he [ircral SCI)SC of [h~ rcrm: as providing a specially constructed space in which the parties can engage in the process of exploration, observation, and analysis and f.lshion new products (hat can be exported into the political arena, \'I;'orkshoJls thus have a duni purpose. They arc designed. firsr, (0 produce changc-c--new learning~ in the form of new understandings. new insights, \ and new ideas for resolving the conflict-in the particular individuals who participate in the workshop and, second, to transfer these changes into the political debate and the decision-making process in the two societies. De pending on their particular positions in the society, individual participalHs carl rumniunicare their new Illsigbts and ideas through their writing, lec turing, and political xcrivirics, or the advice (hey give to political decision makers. The participants in the Joint Working Group rook a further step by shaping these insights and ideas into concept papers, which were made available to decision-makers. political elites. and (he wider public as the two sides moved into the final-status negotiations. -. An important th~(]":liL'11 and practical consequence of the dual pnrpose of workshops is that the two purposes may create contradictor), require rnencs. The best example of these dialectics of interactive problem soking is provided by the sdcction of jMlliLipanl.S. Tt-amftr into the political proce~~ would be maximized by uAi.eial.~ who are close to [he decision-making ap par:llus and tnUS in a position to apply immediately what cbey have learned. r.IJflJ1g~, however, would be maximized by par ricipanrs who are removed from rhc decision-making process and therefore less constrained in their inrerncrious and freer to play with ideas and explore bypornelic;t( scenarios. To halance these conft:ldiclOry requirements, sekCfioll has focused un par ncipams who are not official~ hur arc politically mfiuential. They <Ire elms relatively free to engage in rbe process, bur, at the same time, an}' new ideas rhey develop in the course of a workshop ean have an impaCt 011 the lhiuk illg of decision-makers and the society at large. Ground Rules tortn teraction Problem-solving workshops follow a set of ground rules that arc presented La the pamcipanrs in great delil.il. The central ground rule is the principle , / Conllicr Analysis and R<:.Iolmion 339 of privacy and confidcntialiry. ln the early lsracli-I'alestiniun workshops, coufidcnrialtry was particularly important for the protection of the partici pams, because rhc mere fact of mecrln!! with the l.'ocmy was controversial and exposed them ro political. legal. and even physical risks. Confidcmialiry is equally important, however, for protection of rhe process that workshops seck to promote. The: ground fults ;JfC designed 10 encourage rbe partici pants ro talk :Iud listen ro each other, rmhr-r than foclIs Oil their constitu encies, an audience, third parries, or the record. They art: asked to think our loud. ro experiment with ideas, and explore different opliollS, without having to wony about how others would react if their words were quoted outside. This is why [Il~re is no audience. no publiciry, no record, and no artriburion. focusing Oll t';lch orhcr eD:lhJcs and elleouragcs the p:wicipams [Q enter into a eype of interaction that is generally nor feasible among pnrties engaged in a bitter conjlicr-c-a rype of interaction, indeed, that deviates from rhe conflict norms ,h:H mmJJy t;0vcrn rheir behavior: an imcraecion rhar is ilrlfl/ytic rather than polcmicn], that is, in which the parties seck to \ explore each other's perspective and gain insight into the causes and dy namics of rhe conflj(l; and ;In inrcracrioll dlat is proUt'm Jolving radler chan ;\JversariaL char is, in which rhe panics sidestep the usual attempt (0 allocate blame and insrcad take the conflict as a shared problem thnr requires joint efrarr to find a mutually s;llis(acwq< s<llution, Another ground rule is that in a workshcp-c-unlike a negociating ses sion~thf'rf' is no expectation thar the parries will reach an agreement, A5 ill any conflict resolution effort, there is an inrercsr in finding common ground, bur the amount of ngrcemcnr achieved in the discussions is nor necessarily a measure of the success of the enterprise. If panicipanrc come ;lway with a better undersr:lmling of rhe <liller's perspective, their own pri orities, and the dynamics of rhe conflict, the workshop will have fulfilled its purpose, even if it has UOl produced an outline of a peace rreary, The ]oim Working Group was all exception in lhis respcec, ill th:H ir.s purpose wax to produce joint concept papers, ahhollgh even these papers-while they explore diffcrenl options and seek to rcframe issues-do ncr necessarily come up with a singl~ agreed-all soJurion. The Joinr Working Group also differs from the earlier work in tlrar rhe paerkipaucs eveurually went public with the issuance of [he completed concepr papers; up (0 the point of publication, however, the prillciple of mnfidenri:l:liry was sHiedy observed. Yet another grolilld rule calls for the equality of rhe tWO panics within the workshop setting, Asymmetries in power, moral position, or rcpmrnion ekITly pl.ly an illlporc:tl!{ role in tile conflict and muse be taken into account in the workshop discussions. Bur the rwo parties are equals in rhe workshop setting in [he sense that each parry has the same righr to the content and the proccss of the interaction, It also serves as a repository of trust for panics who, by dchnirion, do not trust cncb other. They feci safe to participate because they cruse the third parr)' and irs abiliry to mail!" rain confidentiality and protect their interests. Workshop Agenda III rhc C)-picat ouc time, free-standing workshop, rhe agenda is relatively open and unstructured wirb respect [0 the substantive -issucs under discus sion. Tht way these issucs arc approached, however, and rhc order of dis cussion 'Ire structured so as to facilitate the kind ofdiscomse that the ground rules are designed to encourage. A similar structure, with some necessary modifications, characterizes the agenda within and across rhe meetings of a continuing workshop. The nrst discussion session of any workshop is usually devoted [0 an exchange of information between the two sides, which serves ro break the icc and scr the tone for the kind of exchange the workshop hopes [0 gen crnre. E:Jch party is asked [0 ralk about til(: .,iruatio/l on the gmt/nd and the current mood in its own cornruuniry, about the issues in the conflict as seen in that community, about rhc spectrum of views on the confiicr and its SOIUliul1, and abour participants' own positions within that spectrum. This exchange provides a shared base of informarion and sets a precedent for {he two sides to deal with each other as mumal resources ra.ther dlall wlcly as cornbaranrs. Following the opcning discussion, the core agenda of the workshop consists of four pans. lr begins with a needs analysis, in which members Oil each side are asked to discuss their central concerns in the conflicr-c-rhe /i.llldame{llal needs that would have to be addressed and rhe cxistential fcan that would have to be allayed if a soluriou is to be satisfactory to them. The panics arc asked not to debate the issues raised, although they may ask / Conflicr Analysis and Rc~{)llltion 341 for clarification of what the: orher says. The: purpose: is for tach side (0 gain an adequate understanding of rhc orhcr's needs, fears, and concerns, from rhe perspective of the other..Once they have dcmomrrarcd that they un derstand each other's needs to a substantial degree, the workshop moves to rhc second phase of the agenda: joint thinking nbour possible solutions. The difficult assigumcnr that participants arc given in Ihis phase is to develop, through an interactive process, ideas about [he overall shape of a solution for the conflict as a whole Or, perhaps, a particular isme in the conflict. that would address rhe needs and [tars of both sides. \ As participants develop some: common ground ill this Prl)ChS of joint chinking, rhey turn to the nexr phase of rhe workshop: discussion of the political and psychological constraints within rhe two societies that would create barriers ro carrying Out the ideas for solution that have been devel oped in the group. This is a very important part of the discussion, because parties in conflict usually find it extremely difficult to understand the con srrainrs on [he other sidt:-or even to recognize that the other, Jikt: them selves. has constraints. But it is best to leave the discussion of constraints to [his later phase. so that it does not hamper the creative process of jointly generating new ideas. Finally, depending on how much progres5 has heel! made and how much time is left, the parties are asked to engage in another round of joint thinking-this time about ways of overcoming the COIl srrainrs that have been presented. The parricipams are asked to come up with ideas about-what their governmellts, their societies, and they them selves might do-c-separarely or joindy-c-chac would help to overcome the barriers to negotiating mutually satisfactory solutions ro the conflict. ~ Challenges Facing the Field Confiicr analysis and resolution from a social-scientific base with a profes sional practice orientation is a relatively new field of endeavor, which, in addition co [he fundamental complexity and iruractahiliry of the phenom enon that it addresses. must also confront and overcome many difficult issues This brief section will only be able to identify a numher of die most important of these. Culture and Gender Scholars and practitioners of conflict resolution need 10 lake the questions of cuhnral and gender influences seriously (Avruch, 1998; Taylor & Miller, 1994). It is 110{ appropriate ro assume the universality of concepts and methods, regardless of che sncictal environment to which they ate applied. Each society has its "culture of conllict," which incorporates the beliefs, practices, and institutions relevant to managing differences and which affects what is defined as conflict and how it is addressed (Ross, 1993a). CuI lure , / 342 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IS Imporlant in how it affects negotiating styles and third-party roles, and representatives and intermediaries who work across cultural boundaries re quire sensitivity [0 their own culture and crossculrural understanding ill order to interact appropriatel}' and effecrively. A lirsI step is to carr), OUt a cultural analysis of the situation, 50 that rhc effects of cultural differences on the etiology and expression of the confiicr are clearly understood (Avruch & Black, 1993). Simih r points cnn be made about gender differences as they are expressed in conflict, cspecially given rhe patriarchal and hierar chical nature of most societies, which incorporates significant differences in Slams and power. An analysis based on gender differences created b)' tra ditional socialization contrasts the dominant male, competitive, udversanal, righrs-bnsed approach with ;l relanonship-onenred, cooperative, and caring female style. However, research in Nonh America rends not to support these differences clearly in studies of either negotiation or mediation (Kccshlj-, i \ 1994: Stamato, 1992, possibly because the variable of biological sex is often confused wirh that of gender, which is socially constructed. Nonetheless, there arc indications rhar the mnnuer in which women versus men enter into conflict analysis and resolution may be different, with important im plications for the focus and outcomes of ,he aceiviry For example, based on an analysis of interactive problem-solving workshops, d'Esrree and Bab bin (1998) conclude that women tend to engage in deeper self-disclosure, leading to empathy for the enemy, and a reciprocal acknowledgment of concerns, coupled with an orientation (Q huild relationships and a c.apaciry to surface emoricnal .n well as strategic issues. This implies that women ma)' be heuer equipped (Q build relationships in the pre-negotiation phase and ro craft more integrative agrccments that have increased susminabiliry following settlement. Continuing attention W both gender and cultural is sues is rims warranted. Professionalization, Training, and Ethics Most people who come to the work of ccntlict analysis and resolution are professionals from a related field, such as international relations, law, psy chology. human relations, diplomacy, or psy(hialry, which enahles them to analyze social problems and prnvide some form of service. Only receudy have a small number of interdisciplinary graduate programs been established to train scholar-prnctirioners in the many intricacies of conflict and irs res olution,:t daunting task rh.rr involves the application of a variety of concepts and models from social science and the acquisition of a range of strategies and skills from various domains of social practice. Man)' practitioners begin their practice with only a modicum of the analytical tools and social skills they need and must learn through experience from more seasoned profes sicnals. Thus there is a challenge to develop training programs, both at the gradllate and mideareer levels, thrn will provide practitioners with the knowledge and capacities they require to engage successfully as negotiators, / \ mediators, third-parry consultants, dialogue facilicators, or trainers or con fhct resolution. Then: is also a need to provide continuing professional development opportunities for scholar-pracccioners [Q broaden their COI1 ccprunl knowledge and to enhance their strategic and metical repertoire. Such offerings nQW exist, but mere is no understanding of their quality or depth. or how some collecrion of them might coalesce toward an :ldl:IIU:llC level of professional competence. Thus it would be valuable [0 iniriare ac riviriex that would assist in the profcssionaliaarion of the field at rhc inter national level, so that knowledge bases and best practices could be shared coward the improvement of human welfare. Currently, many scholar practitioners connect through existing associations, such as the International Society of Political Psychology, and have engaged in some useful networking accivirics in these fora. Such interactions need to be enhanced in order to provide an ongoing arena for the discussion of developmcnrai issues, such as training and the ethics of praClicc. that affect the character and effect iveness of the field. Evaluation Onc of the key challenges confronting the field of interactive conflict res olurion is evaluation of [he effectiveness of its efforts in achieving the goals It sets 0111 to achieve. As a field that proposes to introduce inuovanve. academically based forms of iutervcnncn in confiicc into the larger diplo mane process, Interactive conflict resolution has a special obligation ro dem onstrate its utility and snCCess by way of sj'stetuaric. empirical evidence that is consistent with scholarly standards. Writers in the field have increasingly moved 1O respond ro this challenge (e.g., Ross & Rothman, 1999; Rouhana, 2000; Saunders, 2000; Chnrnway in press: d'Esrree, Fast, Weiss, & Jacob sen, 200 I). The ultimate goal of interactive conflict resolution is 10 con trilnnc to the achievement of a negotiatcd ,'greemem that is mutually S2t isfacrory and la.~ting and rhar transforms the relationship beeveen the conflicting parries. Since inrcracrive problem solving-which is not in the business of negotiating ngreemenn-c-cannot prodlta such an ourcome but only contribute ro it, [he most relevant criteria for evaluating it refer to irs success in ;u:hieving its intermediate goals rather than its ulrimnre goal. The imermcdiare goals constitute changes in the political cultures of dlC con !lining panics rhar would make them more receptive to negotiation with each other (Kelman, 1996a Complementarity of Interventions There is a challenge ro understand how variations in third-parry roles COJl rribure differentially and uniquely to ocgoeiaeion SUCCC5S and sustainable resolution. The early proponents ofinteractive conflict resolution were clear on its potential as a useful prcnegotiation acriviry (c.g .. Burton, [969, Kel man & Cohen, 1976), in line with a rationale more fully articulated by , \ Fisher (L989) but it is now evident that it can make conrribucions at all stages of the negotiation and resolution process (Kelman, 1992, L998b). Given that conflict, especially of an ethncpolirical nature between identity groups, is a pOlem mix of objective and subjective factors, irnerveruions are required to address rhe latter, in terms of the rnispcrceptions, misattribu rions, hostile attitudes, mistrust, hatred, and vengeance that fuel escalation and intractability, In fact, it is difficuh to see how identity-based confiicrx can be addressed without methods that focus on the human and psycho logical side of the equation (Ross, 1993b; Rothman, 1997). The question is how these methods can be related to and sequenced with the more rrn dirional forms of conflict management. Fisher and Keashly (1991) devel oped a contingency approach to third-party intervention, proposing that different methods be matched to the stage of conflict escalation for maxi mum utility. They also propose that methods need to be sequenced in a complementary fashion, 50 that a lead intervention givc.s w ay to ochers designed to decscalate and resolve the conflict. There arc tWO points of complementarity between interactive conflict resolution (represented by third-party consultation) and mediation, in both ics pure and power forms. The first occurs where consultation serves as a prernedinrion activity that improves understanding and builds trust in the relationship so that pmc mediation can deal more effectively with objective issues, The second sees consultation as following power mediation, which has achieved a cease-fire or initial serdemenr on substantive issues, in order [Q rebuild the lorn n-. lationship toward a comprehensive agrc:elllem and a sustainable peace. While a limited amount of experimental and empirical research supports the contingency approach (Keashly & Fisher. 19%), it remains a skeletal rcpresentatiou of a complex set of relationships that may not play (Jilt as diagramed in the complexity uf real-world dynamics. Nonetheless, the con tingency model and similar attempts (e.g., Kciesberg, 19%) challenge the orists and practitioners to think more seriously about the coordination and complcmeuramy of interventions that may well be required to adequately address intractable erhnopolirical conflicts. (Kelman, 2000). The challenge is to make effective use of rhc potential contributions of interactive conflict resolution and orhcr unofficial tracks in the official diplomatic process. Ideally, the products of problem-solving workshops and related ncciviries can he used for exploring possibilities, formulating options, and framing issues ill ways that can advance negotiations at irs various stages. This has indeed happened on occasion, but it needs to be done systematically, while making sure that track tWO effons maintain their imegriry and independence and do not become-or come to be seen as-merely another component of the rrack one process. Official negotiations can also benefit from adopting some of the exploratory, analytical, and problem-solving methods of interactive con Hicr resolution in their own proceedings, insofar as they can be accommo dared within the constraints of the official process. Practitioners of inter active conflict resolution, on their parr, need to be well informed of rhc issues, problems, and progress of the official ptoccss so that rhey can provide input that will be most directly relevant to rhc status of ongoing ucgorin nons. Ins!itutiona/iza uon At the level of a particular conflict, it might he useful to institutionalize interactive conflict resolution as part of the peace-building proccss that niusr accompany and follow the negotiation of a peace agreemenl. An ongoing mechanism for conflict resolution is generally an essential COlllJlonent of the civil socicry institutions across the national lines chat must be huilt to / / " \ 3-iG INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ensure a stable peace and cooperative relationship between former enemies who must coexist ill close proxuniry to one another, AT the global level, the persistence and proliferation of deadly conflicts between ethnic groups around the world suggest the urgent need for a large. well-endowed, mostly nongovernmental organi".,atioll devoted to monitoring such conflicts as they evolve and ready to intervene with efFons to help prevent and resolve them (Burton, 1983). The purpose of such an insnrurion would be co supplement rhc work of existing govcrnmcm:tl, inrergovernmcnral, and nongovernmen tal organi7..arions dcvorcd to peacemaking, peacekeeping, and posrconflicr humanitarian aid hy h-inging together politically influential representatives of the opposing sides in an active or impending conflict for joint explora tion, within a problem-solving framework, of steps toward prevenuog, de escalating, or resolving the conflict. The insriunion might include a per manent staff to monitor confiicc regions and provide the infrastructure for workshops as the need arises; a cadre (If regional and conflict resolution specialists avnilahlc to organi7.e and lead workshops; and a cadre of local representatives to recommend appropriate anions or evaluate proposals from the staff and to assist by organir:ing and participating in workshops as needed. There is no direct evidence of how much a global institution or ganized along these lines and dedicated ro the systematic application of interactive conflict resolution techniques to ethnic conflicts around the world could concrihurc [0 preventing such conflicts, defusing them once they have turned violent, and rebuilding the societies torn apan hyviolence. But research and observation suggest that die assumptions behind inrerac rive conflict resolution arc sound, and experience suggests that it has the potential for transforming conflict relationships. If the resources needed for a large-scale effort of this kind can be generated. there is at least [he hope that it can begin to tackle the problem of ethnic violence that has been plagning the inremarioonl cornrnuniry, . Bo.<tun: Allyn and B~CUlI. Ch:lSiJl, R., Hcrl.ig, M., Roth,S., Ch,,-,io, L. Becker, C" & St~jn." R., jr, (19%). From di:Jrribc to di"roguc all divisivc public issue'; Approaches dr~wn (rolll Cunily rh..r~py. M,di"rioll Q"nncrb\ 13, 323-344.