DMCA
1 Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation
| Citations: | 1 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Hafner-burton_1decision,
author = {Emilie M. Hafner-burton and Brad L. Leveck and David G. Victor and James H. Fowler},
title = {1 Decision Maker Preferences for International Legal Cooperation},
year = {}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
Abstract: What determines preferences for cooperation through international legal agreements? Why do some decision makers prefer big multilateral agreements while others prefer cooperation in small clubs? Does enforcement encourage or deter institutional cooperation? We use experiments drawn from behavioral economics and cognitive psychology—along with a substantive survey focused on international trade—to illustrate how two behavioral traits (patience and strategic reasoning) of the individual people asked to play key roles in negotiating and ratifying an international treaty shape their preferences for how treaties are designed and whether they are ratified. Patient subjects were more likely to prefer treaties with larger numbers of countries (and larger long-term benefits), as were subjects with the skill to anticipate how others will respond over multiple iterations of strategic games. The presence of an enforcement mechanism increased subjects ’ willingness to ratify treaties; however, the effect of strategic reasoning was double the effect of adding enforcement to a trade agreement: more strategic subjects were particularly likely to favor ratifying the agreement. We report these results for a sample of 509 university students and also show how similar patterns are revealed in a unique sample of 92 actual U.S. policy elites, suggesting that under some conditions certain types of
Keyphrases
international legal cooperation decision maker preference big multilateral agreement similar pattern condition certain type substantive survey international legal agreement strategic game behavioral economics unique sample cognitive psychology strategic reasoning patient subject institutional cooperation key role decision maker enforcement mechanism international treaty actual u.s. policy elite university student enforcement encourage individual people long-term benefit multiple iteration small club trade agreement behavioral trait strategic subject international trade subject willingness
