Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types (2004)
by
Yeon-koo Che
,
Ian Gale
Active Bibliography
| September 2005Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types ∗ – Yeon-koo Che, Ian Gale, Yeon-koo Che, Ian Gale - 2005 | |
| 302 | Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature – Paul Klemperer - 1999 |
| 3 | Computing With Strategic Agents – Nicole Immorlica, Erik D. Demaine - 2005 |
| 56 | Auctions -- An Introduction – Elmar Wolfstetter - 1994 |
| Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions – Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang | |
| 1 | An Ascending Multi-Item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders ∗ – Gerard Van Der Laan, Zaifu Yang - 2008 |
| 8 | Multidimensional Private Value Auctions – Hanming Fang, Stephen Morris, Hanming Fang, Stephen Morris, We David, J. Cooper, Sergio Parreiras - 2004 |
| 11 | Optimal Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders – Mallesh M. Pai, et al. - 2009 |
| 2 | Precautionary bidding in auctions – Eső, Lucy White - 2004 |
| Pure Strategy Equilibria of Multidimensional and Non-Monotonic Auctions – Aloisio Araujo, Luciano I. de Castro Filho, Humberto Moreira - 2004 | |
| We thank Ronald Harstad for many comments and extremely helpful discussions concerning the FCC auctions. We thank – Matthew J. Clayton, S. Abraham Ravid, Yacov Amihud, Kyle Bagwell, Peter Demarzo, Michael Fishman, Jay Hartzell, David Hirshleifer, Laurie Simon Hodrick, Kenneth Kavajecz, Vojislav Maksimovic, Joshua Rosenberg, Matthew Spiegel - 2000 | |
| 7 | Incompletely Specified Combinatorial Auction: An Alternative Allocation Mechanism for Business-To-Business Negotiations – Joni Lynne Jones - 2000 |
| Auctions and Bidding: A Guide for Computer Scientists – Simon Parsons, Juan A. Rodriguez-Aguilar, Mark Klein | |
| 6 | Asymmetric Information About Rivals' Types in Standard Auctions: An Experiment – James Andreoni, Yeon-koo Che, Jinwoo Kim, Larry Samuelson, Bill S - 2005 |
| Persistent Markups in Bidding Markets with Financial Constraints ∗ – Pablo F. Beker, Ángel Hernando-veciana - 2011 | |
| Bayesian Optimal Auctions via Multi- to Single-agent Reduction – Saeed Alaei, Hu Fu, Nima Haghpanah, Jason Hartline, Azarakhsh Malekian - 1203 | |
| Activity Rule Paper Click here to view linked References Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions – Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang | |
| 63 | Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders – Christian Borgs, Jennifer Chayes, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian - 2005 |
| 20 | Multi-unit auctions with budget limits – Shahar Dobzinski, Noam Nisan, Ron Lavi - 2008 |
