Prediction Mechanisms That Do Not Incentivize Undesirable Actions (2009)

by Peng Shi , Vincent Conitzer , Mingyu Guo
Venue:In WINE
Citations:21 - 1 self

Active Bibliography

4 Eliciting Forecasts from Self-interested Experts: Scoring Rules for Decision Makers – Craig Boutilier - 1106
Eliciting and Aggregating Truthful and Noisy – Xi Gao, C© Xi Gao, Dissertation Advisor, Yiling Chen, Xi Gao - 2014
Gaming Dynamic Parimutuel Markets – Qianya Lin, Yiling Chen
16 Designing Markets for Prediction – Yiling Chen, David M. Pennock - 2010
6 Efficient market making via convex optimization, and a connection to online learning – Jacob Abernethy, Yiling Chen, Jennifer Wortman Vaughan - 2012
5 Decision Markets With Good Incentives – Yiling Chen, Ian Kash, Mike Ruberry, Victor Shnayder
27 Gaming Prediction Markets: Equilibrium Strategies with a Market Maker – Yiling Chen, Stanko Dimitrov, Rahul Sami, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen - 2008
12 Bluffing and strategic reticence in prediction markets – Yiling Chen, Daniel M. Reeves, David M. Pennock, Robin D. Hanson, Lance Fortnow, Rica Gonen - 2007
12 Self-financed wagering mechanisms for forecasting – Nicolas Lambert, John Langford, Jennifer Wortman, Yiling Chen, Daniel Reeves, Yoav Shoham, David M. Pennock