Predictions and causal estimations are not supported by the same associative structure (2007)

by Miguel A. Vadillo , Helena Matute
Venue:THE QUARTERLY JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
Citations:13 - 8 self

Active Bibliography

Adresse: – Kausales Denken, York Hagmayer, Michael R. Waldmann, Einführung Konzepte Von Kausalität, Philosophische Theorien Der Kausalität, Regelbasierte Ansätze, Deduktiver Ansatz, Mechanistischer Ansatz, Kausalmodelle Und Bayes-netze
35 Theory-based causal induction – Thomas L. Griffiths, Joshua B. Tenenbaum - 2003
6 Contrasting predictive and causal values of predictors and causes – Oskar Pineño, James C. Denniston, Tom Beckers, Ralph R. Miller - 2005
Causal and predictive-value judgements, but not predictions, are based on cue–outcome contingency – Miguel A. Vadillo, Ralph R. Miller, Helena Matute - 2005
2 Frequency of judgment as a context-like determinant of predictive judgments – Miguel A. Vadillo, Sonia Vegas, Helena Matute
94 Structure and Strength in Causal Induction – Thomas L. Griffiths, Joshua B. Tenenbaum
The 28th Bartlett Memorial Lecture – Anthony Dickinson
2 Assessing power PC – Lorraine G. Allan - 2003
Cognitive Psychology 51 (2005) 334–384 – Thomas L. Griffiths A, Joshua B. Tenenbaum B - 2004