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107
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Single transferable vote resists strategic voting
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41
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Generalized scoring rules and the frequency of coalitional manipulability
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14
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Complexity of Terminating Preference Elicitation
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26
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Complexity of unweighted coalitional manipulation under . . .
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93
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