Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents

Cached

Download Links

by Aron Archer , Eva Tardos
Citations:191 - 4 self

Active Bibliography

2 Information and communication in mechanism design – Liad Blumrosen - 2006
16 Solving Optimization Problems among Selfish Agents – Amir Ronen - 2000
12 Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design – Rahul Sami - 2003
70 Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists) – Noam Nisan
188 Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms – Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen - 2000
182 Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions – Daniel Lehmann - 2002
21 Competitiveness via Consensus – Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline - 2002
9 Mechanism design with incomplete languages – Amir Ronen - 2001
21 Automated Mechanism Design: Complexity Results Stemming from the Single-Agent Setting – Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm - 2003
115 Frugal path mechanisms – Aaron Archer, Éva Tardos - 2002
3 Mechanism Design for Computationally Limited Agents – Kate Larson - 2004
105 An Approximate Truthful Mechanism for Combinatorial Auctions with Single Parameter Agents – Aaron Archer, Christos Papadimitriou, Kunal Talwar, Eva Tardos
23 Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions – Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin - 2002
14 Making Decisions Based on the Preferences of Multiple Agents – Vincent Conitzer
29 Self-interested Automated Mechanism Design and Implications for Optimal Combinatorial Auctions – Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm - 2004
5 An algorithmic game theory primer – Tim Roughgarden - 2008
37 Optimal mechanism design and money burning – Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden - 2008
3 Mechanisms with verification for any finite domain – Carmine Ventre - 2006
52 Auction Design with Costly Preference Elicitation – David Parkes - 2003