|
22
|
Approximate Mechanism Design Without Money
– Ariel D. Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
- 2009
|
|
50
|
Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)
– Noam Nisan
|
|
231
|
Strategy-proofness and Arrow’s conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare function
– M A Satterthwaite
- 1975
|
|
71
|
Adversarial Classification
– Nilesh Dalvi , Pedro Domingos, Mausam , Sumit Sanghai, Deepak Verma
- 2004
|
|
7
|
Strategyproof Classification Under Constant Hypotheses: A Tale of Two Functions
– Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
|
|
556
|
Multipart pricing of public goods
– E H CLARKE
- 1971
|
|
441
|
Incentives in Teams
– T GROVES
- 1973
|
|
6
|
Strategy-Proof Estimators for Simple Regression
– Javier Perote, Juan Perote-peña, Affiliation Facultad, C. C. Jurídicas Sociales, Juan Perote Peña
- 2004
|
|
480
|
Algorithmic mechanism design
– Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen
- 1999
|
|
19
|
An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
– S Barberà
|
|
9
|
Mechanism Design without Money
– J Schummer, R Vohra
- 2007
|
|
953
|
Auctions and Competitive Sealed Tenders
– William Vickrey, “Counterspeculation
|
|
126
|
Manipulation of voting schemes
– A Gibbard
- 1973
|
|
158
|
Learning in the Presence of Malicious Errors
– Michael Kearns, Ming Li
- 1993
|
|
33
|
Can PAC Learning Algorithms Tolerate Random Attribute Noise?
– Sally A. Goldman, Robert H. Sloan
- 1995
|
|
5
|
Strategyproof Classification with Shared Inputs
– Reshef Meir, Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein
|
|
5
|
Tighter bounds for facility games
– Pinyan Lu, Yajun Wang, Yuan Zhou
- 2009
|
|
6
|
Strategyproof approximation mechanisms for location on networks
– Noga Alon, Michal Feldman, Ariel D Procaccia, Moshe Tennenholtz
|
|
12
|
Pac learning with nasty noise
– Nader H. Bshouty, Nadav Eiron, Eyal Kushilevitz
- 1999
|