Multi-unit auctions with budget-constrained bidders (2005)

by Christian Borgs , Jennifer Chayes , Nicole Immorlica , Mohammad Mahdian
Venue:In Proceedings of the 7th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Citations:74 - 10 self

Active Bibliography

3 Computing With Strategic Agents – Nicole Immorlica, Erik D. Demaine - 2005
SPECIAL ISSUE IN HONOR OF RAJEEV MOTWANI Budget-Constrained Auctions with Heterogeneous Items ∗ – Sayan Bhattacharya, Gagan Goel, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala, Sayan Bhattacharya, Gagan Goel, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala, Gagan Goel, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala - 2010
19 Budget constrained auctions with heterogeneous items – Sayan Bhattacharya, Gagan Goel, Sreenivas Gollapudi, Kamesh Munagala - 2010
1 An Ascending Multi-Item Auction with Financially Constrained Bidders ∗ – Gerard Van Der Laan, Zaifu Yang - 2008
12 Distributed Algorithmic Mechanism Design – Rahul Sami - 2003
1 Prior-free Auctions for Budgeted Agents – Nikhil R. Devanur, BACH Q. Ha, JASON D. HARTLINE - 2013
Combinatorial Auctions: VC v. VCG – Elchanan Mossel, Christos Papadimitriou, Michael Schapira, Yaron Singer
2 Information and communication in mechanism design – Liad Blumrosen - 2006
21 Competitiveness via Consensus – Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline - 2002
3 Mechanism Design via Consensus Estimates, Cross Checking, and Profit Extraction – Bach Q. Ha , Jason D. Hartline - 2012
23 Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions – Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin - 2002
37 Optimal mechanism design and money burning – Jason D. Hartline, Tim Roughgarden - 2008
43 Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing – Aaron Archer, Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker - 2004
48 Worst-case optimal redistribution of VCG payments – Mingyu Guo - 2007
2 Truthful Auctions with Optimal Profit – Pinyan Lu, Shang-hua Teng, Changyuan Yu
115 Frugal path mechanisms – Aaron Archer, Éva Tardos - 2002
September 2005Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types ∗ – Yeon-koo Che, Ian Gale, Yeon-koo Che, Ian Gale - 2005
1 Revenue Comparisons for Auctions when Bidders Have Arbitrary Types – Yeon-koo Che, Ian Gale - 2004
2 Strong Activity Rules for Iterative Combinatorial Auctions – Pavithra Harsha, Cynthia Barnhart, David C. Parkes, Haoqi Zhang