Beyond VCG: Frugality of truthful mechanisms (2005)

by Anna R. Karlin
Venue:In Proceedings of the 46th Annual IEEE Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Citations:47 - 3 self

Active Bibliography

18 On the expected payment of mechanisms for task allocation – Artur Czumaj, Amir Ronen - 2004
3 Computing With Strategic Agents – Nicole Immorlica, Erik D. Demaine - 2005
21 Competitiveness via Consensus – Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline - 2002
89 Competitive Generalized Auctions – Amos Fiat, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin - 2002
41 Collusion-Resistant Mechanisms for Single-Parameter Agents – Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline - 2005
19 True Costs of Cheap Labor Are Hard To Measure: Edge Deletion and VCG Payments In Graphs – Edith Elkind - 2004
23 Truthful and Competitive Double Auctions – Kaustubh Deshmukh, Andrew V. Goldberg, Jason D. Hartline, Anna R. Karlin - 2002
115 Frugal path mechanisms – Aaron Archer, Éva Tardos - 2002
4 Optimization in the Private Value Model: Competitive Analysis Applied to Auction Design – Jason D. Hartline - 2003
1 LOAD BALANCING IN DISTRIBUTED SYSTEMS: A Game Theoretic Approach – Daniel Grosu - 2003
43 Approximation and Collusion in Multicast Cost Sharing – Aaron Archer, Joan Feigenbaum, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Rahul Sami, Scott Shenker - 2004
First-Price Procurement Auctions – Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolova, Rahul Sami
Frugality Ratios and . . . – Edith Elkind, et al. - 2007
4 An antisocial strategy for scheduling mechanisms – Nandan Garg, Daniel Grosu, Vipin Chaudhary - 2005
3 Path auction games when an agent can own multiple edges – Ye Du, Yaoyun Shi, Rahul Sami - 2006
5 An algorithmic game theory primer – Tim Roughgarden - 2008
16 Computer science and game theory: A brief survey – Joseph Y. Halpern
188 Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms – Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen - 2000
The Power of Uncertainty: Algorithmic Mechanism Design in Settings of Incomplete Information – Brendan Lucier - 2011