Truthful approximation mechanisms for restricted combinatorial auctions (2002)

by Noam Nisan
Citations:94 - 3 self

Active Bibliography

182 Truth revelation in approximately efficient combinatorial auctions – Daniel Lehmann - 2002
115 Frugal path mechanisms – Aaron Archer, Éva Tardos - 2002
38 Computational Criticisms of the Revelation Principle – Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm - 2003
16 Making markets and democracy work: A story of incentives and computing – Thomas Sandholm - 2003
90 Incentive compatible multi unit combinatorial auctions – Yair Bartal, Rica Gonen, Noam Nisan - 2003
54 Approximately-Strategyproof and Tractable Multi-Unit Auctions – Anshul Kothari, David C. Parkes, Subhash Suri - 2004
25 Price-Based Information Certificates for Minimal-Revelation Combinatorial Auctions – David C. Parkes - 2002
98 Achieving Budget-Balance with Vickrey-Based Payment Schemes in Exchanges – David C. Parkes, Jayant Kalagnanam, Marta Eso - 2001
1 Auction protocols – Vincent Conitzer
4 Revenue failures and collusion in combinatorial auctions and exchanges with VCG payments – Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm - 2004
37 Preference Elicitation and Query Learning – Avrim Blum, Jeffrey Jackson, Tuomas Sandholm, Martin Zinkevich, Kristin Bennett, Nicolò Cesa-bianchi - 2004
15 Expressive negotiation over donations to charities – Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm - 2004
ITERATIVE COMBINATORIAL AUCTION – Harish G Kammanahalli - 2001
188 Computationally feasible VCG mechanisms – Noam Nisan, Amir Ronen - 2000
2 A principled methodology for the design of autonomous trading agents with combinatorial preferences in the presense of tradeoffs – Ioannis A. Vetsikas - 2005
14 K-Implementation – Dov Monderer, Moshe Tennenholtz - 2004
4 Five AI Challenges in Strategyproof Computing – David C. Parkes - 2003
17 Algorithms for Rational Agents – Amir Ronen - 2000
23 An Ascending-Price Generalized Vickrey Auction – David C. Parkes, Lyle H. Ungar - 2002