



# Democratization and Political Tolerance in Seventeen Countries: A Multi-level Model of Democratic Learning

MARK PEFFLEY, UNIVERSITY OF KENTUCKY  
ROBERT ROHRSCHEIDER, INDIANA UNIVERSITY

Research on mass support for democracies shows that popular support for democratic norms is at an historic high. At the same time, research on political tolerance draws considerably bleaker conclusions about the democratic capacity of mass publics. We attempt to synthesize the essential lessons of these two literatures into a general model of democratic learning which argues that exposure to the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics should enhance political tolerance. We provide a test of the model using multilevel data from a diverse set of 17 countries. At the macro-level, we find, consistent with our theory, that: (1) political tolerance is greater in stable democracies that have endured over time (the longer the better), independent of a nation's socioeconomic development; and (2) that federal systems increase levels of tolerance, as well. At the micro-level, we find that democratic activism, or *using* civil liberties, enhances political tolerance, independent of a host of other individual-level predictors. We conclude with a discussion of the implications of our findings for studies of democratization and political tolerance.

Research on mass support for democracies appears to portray an inevitable march toward liberal democracies. Not only have the past 20 years witnessed the spectacular collapse of several autocracies, but public support for democratic regimes is at an historic high (Norris 1999; Klingemann 1999). Democracies, as opposed to authoritarian regimes, are preferred by large majorities not only in affluent countries, but also by majorities of publics in lesser developed countries across the world. In addition, basic democratic norms—free speech, free elections, a free press, the right to demonstrate—are widely endorsed, both in advanced democracies and Central Europe (Dalton 1994; Fuchs and Roller 1998). Despite the caveats concerning the fragile nature of new institutions, the need to consolidate new systems, and economic obstacles, this literature implies that the future of democracies is bright and that a growing number of citizens around the world enjoy an unprecedented level of protection and guarantees by democratic institutions.

We endorse this assessment. At the same time, however, we believe it is necessary to evaluate the prospects and limits of the democratization literature in light of research on political tolerance, defined here as “a willingness to permit the expression of ideas or interests one opposes” (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982: 2). It is a widely accepted finding in scholarly work on political tolerance that majorities in advanced democracies usually hold intolerant views. That is, while most citizens across the world

support democratic rights in the abstract, just as the democratization literature shows, these same publics are usually considerably less likely to extend these rights to disliked groups. And this “slippage” between support for democratic values and applications of political tolerance is found in a range of countries, including mature democracies such as the US (e.g., Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus 1982) and Great Britain (e.g., Barnum and Sullivan 1990), newly established democracies like Israel (e.g., Shamir and Sullivan 1983; Shamir 1991) and in new democracies such as those in the former Soviet Union (e.g., Gibson and Duch 1993).

It is curious that the two literatures—with few exceptions (e.g., Rohrschneider 1996; Sniderman et al. 1996)—rarely intersect. They both speak to the prospects of democratic systems; and scholars usually share a concern for the viability of liberal democracies. And yet, the democratization and tolerance literatures coexist side-by-side without being effectively linked. Studies of general democratic norms—while impressive in their global scope—usually do not consider whether publics actually extend abstract democratic norms to disliked opponents. In turn, while tolerance studies often consider the connection between the two levels, they typically examine one country at a time or at most a small handful of nations (e.g., Germany, Israel, New Zealand, Russia, and the U.S.A.). Consequently, neither literature provides systematic guidance about how macro- and micro-level traits independently and jointly affect political tolerance.

Our general objective is to synthesize the essential lessons of the democratization and tolerance literatures into one general model of democratic learning. In brief, the model suggests that citizens become more tolerant when they are exposed to the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics. At the macro-level, this model suggests that (1) political tolerance should be greater in more stable democracies which

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have endured over time (the longer the better); and (2) that federal systems—because they provide citizens with multiple points of access and encourage political compromise—should increase levels of tolerance. At the micro-level, the learning model suggests that democratic activism, or using civil liberties, enhances political tolerance.

In this analysis, we develop the general learning model of political tolerance and provide an empirical test of these and other hypotheses using multi-level data from 17 countries. We use the 1995-1997 World Values survey to obtain indicators for the micro-level concepts. We then combine the survey data with information about systems' democratic stability, institutional types, and socioeconomic development in order to assess the independent effects of micro- and macro-level predictors of political tolerance.

#### SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACIES AND POLITICAL TOLERANCE: AN ASSESSMENT

Two contrasting sets of findings serve as the theoretical backdrop for our study. On the one hand, numerous studies show that a preference for democratic institutions is widespread, both in the new democracies in Central Europe (Mishler and Rose 2001) and other regions of the world (Klingemann 1999). Most studies attribute the popularity of democratic institutions to the "diffusion" of these norms through mass media, personal contacts, and rising levels of education (e.g., Weil 1989; Inglehart 1997), as well as the changing value structure of citizens, which occurs also in non-western systems as well (Inglehart 1997).

We find ample evidence for this phenomenon in the World Values surveys conducted between 1995 and 1997. When asked whether it is good or bad to have a democratic system for governing the country, a large majority consider democracy a good thing (84 percent). This pattern also holds across a diverse range of nations, such as publics in the affluent democracies of the US (90 percent), Germany (94 percent) and Australia (86 percent). Moreover, widespread support for democracy as an ideal regime also exists outside the realm of established democracies, such as Peru (89 percent), Serbia (79 percent) and Armenia (75 percent). In short, when asked about democratic institutions and basic rights at a general level, there is strong support for them.

In contrast, students of political tolerance would add to this optimistic scenario a considerable dose of skepticism. For one, country-based analyses—most of which are conducted in the USA—indicate that citizens are substantially less likely to extend democratic rights (e.g., the right to speak or hold a rally) to unpopular groups (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982; Gibson and Duch 1993, Marcus et al. 1995). That is, while democratic norms are widely accepted, levels of political tolerance toward disliked groups are much lower, often by a substantial margin. In addition, there is often a fair amount of "slippage" between a professed commitment to general democratic norms—e.g., the right to demonstrate, free speech—and political tolerance, especially in new democracies, such as Russia (Gibson and

Duch 1993) and eastern Germany (Rohrschneider 1996). And even in more established democracies, this relationship can be surprisingly tenuous (e.g., Shamir 1991).

In addition, people who are intolerant appear more committed to their position than people who are tolerant: not only are the intolerant more likely to express a willingness to act on their views than the tolerant (Sullivan et al. 1993), but it is much easier to talk people out of a tolerant response than it is to persuade them to abandon an intolerant position (Gibson 1998; Peffley, Knigge, and Hurwitz 2001; but see also Sniderman et al. 1996). A myriad of findings thus points to an essential feature of democratic politics: just as Stouffer (1955) suggested over a generation ago, citizens must learn to give tolerance issues a "sober second thought." They must, in other words, reconsider their automatic response, which is a natural intolerance toward groups and ideas they find objectionable (Marcus et al. 1995).

From this research, three patterns are readily apparent: (1) support for democracies is at an all-time high; (2) the slippage between support for democratic norms and political intolerance toward disliked groups observed in the US also appears to exist in other countries, suggesting that tolerance is much more difficult to learn than is support for abstract democratic principles; and (3) while political intolerance seems to prevail, it appears to be higher in less advanced democracies than in more established systems, although the exact institutional source of these differences is unclear.

Beyond such common notions, however, our knowledge concerning the relationship between these two literatures is hampered by two related characteristics of prior studies. First, students of democratization rarely consider the tolerance literature. Second, the few studies that do link the two strands of research typically focus on one nation only, such as Russia (Gibson and Duch 1993) or Germany (Rohrschneider 1996). The only systematic attempt to link the two literatures (of which we are aware) examines political tolerance in several West European democracies (Duch and Gibson 1992). This study, however, focuses on democratic nations only and focuses on tolerance toward a single group—fascists. Consequently, while both literatures abound with suggestions about causal processes that link democratization and political tolerance, these arguments are rarely synthesized and submitted to a systematic empirical test involving a large and diverse set of nations. We are left, therefore, with a series of questions about which macro-level characteristics of countries—e.g., democratic stability, federalism, or socio-economic development—give rise to political tolerance among mass publics.

#### *A Model of Democratic Learning*

We begin with the assumption that the application of abstract support for democratic procedures to political tolerance at a more concrete level is extremely difficult and that, consequently, citizens must be exposed to experiences that encourage the application of democratic norms to specific instances. Theoretically, we agree with Paul Sniderman's

(1975: 181) conclusion that political tolerance manifests ideas that “are complex, rooted in traditions of human history and political theory which are themselves difficult to grasp.” In fact, a number of researchers from Stouffer (1955) to Marcus et al. (1995) have argued that the “natural” state of citizens is to be intolerant, not to tolerate (see also Eckstein 1996 for a discussion of this assumption).

An important question, then, is: how do citizens learn, in Stouffer’s (1955) words, to give the issue of toleration a “sober second thought”? The model of democratic learning assumes that tolerance is learned best when citizens are exposed to the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics. This exposure to lessons of political tolerance can occur in multiple ways, from the mere observation of civil liberties disputes in the daily news (e.g., Nelson, Clawson, and Oxley 1997) to personally employing democratic methods to oppose one’s government in an active and personal way. In short, the democratic learning model stresses citizens’ democratic engagement as well as the broader democratic context in which the civil liberties of unpopular groups are upheld by the government. Below we describe several macro- and micro-level characteristics that give rise to political tolerance in our model of democratic learning.

#### *Macro-Level Characteristics*

Our primary motivation in this study is to examine several characteristics of a nation’s political institutions (e.g., democratic longevity) that may engender political tolerance, independently a nation’s socioeconomic development and the individual-level characteristics of its citizens. The democratic learning model stresses the import of two institutional characteristics in fostering political tolerance. First, as indicated earlier, an important lesson that synthesizes the democratization and tolerance literatures is that political tolerance should be greater in more stable democratic nations that have successfully persisted over time. When civil liberties have been in place for longer periods, citizens have more opportunities to apply democratic norms to disliked opponents. Likewise, citizens in more stable democratic nations have more opportunities to practice or observe toleration through elections, pluralistic conflicts of interests, and so forth, and this should increase citizens’ appreciation of tolerance. Note that the democratic learning model emphasizes not just *whether* a country is democratic but, more importantly, how *long* a system has been democratic. In a similar vein, Muller and Seligson (1994:635) found evidence for their claim that “the successful persistence of democracy over time is likely to cause an increase in levels of civic culture attitudes.” By the same token, the number of years that a democracy has successfully persisted over time should enhance political tolerance.

While there are strong reasons for expecting democratic stability to enhance tolerance, some skepticism is warranted by both prior empirical research and theory. In the first place, other researchers have discovered just the opposite relationship. In their study of Europeans’ tolerance of fas-

cists, Gibson and Duch (1992) found that more mature democracies of Europe were actually less likely to have tolerant citizens than several “emerging” democracies (e.g., Spain, Portugal, and Greece, at the time of the author’s study). While this study was one of the first to examine the macro-foundations of political tolerance in a larger multi-nation context, one important limitation of the study for our purposes is the authors’ measure of tolerance, which is assessed against a single group—fascists. By measuring tolerance toward a particular group instead of allowing respondents to choose the group they like the least, such measures may conflate political tolerance with acceptance or approval of the target group (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982; c.f. Gibson 1992). The fact that approval of fascists (as opposed to political tolerance toward them) was higher in the emerging democracies of Europe (e.g., Spain, Portugal, and Greece) but much lower in some stable democracies (e.g., West Germany) is certainly consistent with the idea that tolerance and approval are confounded in the study. Thus, there is every reason to revisit the relationship between democratic longevity and political tolerance, this time using a more “content-controlled” measure of tolerance.

An even more important challenge to the above hypothesis is that the relationship between democratic longevity and political tolerance may be spurious, as both democracy and political tolerance are likely to be shaped by a country’s level of socioeconomic development (e.g., Dahl 1991). It is widely recognized that democracies are more likely to develop when countries have reached a certain level of socioeconomic development (e.g., GNP/Capita, infrastructure, communication network, or higher levels of education) (e.g., Lipset 1959, 1993). Thus, a nation’s level of modernity must be included as an important control variable in any analysis seeking to link democratic institutions to political tolerance.

Overall, this reasoning leads to our first hypothesis.

*H<sub>1</sub>: Independent of the individual characteristics of the citizens of democratic regimes, and independent of a nation’s level of modernity, political tolerance should be higher in more stable democracies that have successfully persisted over time.*

In addition to democratic longevity, another characteristic of a nation’s political institutions that has been hypothesized to increase political tolerance is the degree to which the system is federalist versus centralist. Federal systems provide citizens with multiple points of access to political institutions (Lijphart 1999). In fact, Lijphart calls federal systems “gentle” institutions (ch. 16). While he refers here to the greater “welfare net” of federal over majoritarian institutions, this argument is easily extended to citizens’ opportunities to absorb the norms of tolerance. In their discussion of “federalist” (i.e., Madisonian) democratic theory, for example, Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus (1982) argue that in a federalist system, no faction is likely to gain complete control of the government, and shifting political fortunes requires respect for today’s political opponents, for they may

become tomorrow's allies. In addition, the multiple points of access that are the hallmark of a federalist system mean that there are more opportunities to resolve conflicts by involving citizens directly. In contrast, unitary systems—an important dimension of Lijphart's majoritarian model—are centralized, which means that citizens have fewer opportunities to become engaged in the democratic process. This in turn may, all else being equal, create differences across the federalism-unitary divide over political tolerance.

*H<sub>2</sub>: Citizens in federal systems should be more politically tolerant than those in unitary systems.*

Finally, our reasoning suggests that a nation's level of democracy should affect the strength of the connection between support for democratic ideals and political tolerance. Since the early studies of political tolerance (e.g., Prothro and Grigg 1960; McClosky 1964), it has been argued that the decision to extend civil liberties to specific groups ought to be rooted in support for more general democratic principles (see Finkel, Sigelman, and Humphries [1999] for a review). Likewise, the democratization literature also suggests that the *connection* between tolerance and support for democracy as an ideal regime should be stronger in more stable democracies. Citizens in more stable democratic nations where unpopular groups have the freedom to express their views and where the government protects those freedoms obviously have more opportunities to associate "democracy" with political tolerance and thus are more likely to learn that political tolerance is an important component of a democracy. In other words, citizens have more opportunities to apply a "sober, second thought" in considering whether to tolerate disliked groups (Stouffer 1955). In contrast, these opportunities are, by definition, restricted in authoritarian or less democratic systems, where the "slippage" between democratic values and applications of political tolerance should be greater. There is some evidence for this claim from studies of political tolerance in Russia (Gibson and Duch's 1993) and east Germany (Rohrshneider 1999), where the authors found that political tolerance is only weakly linked to general democratic norms in those countries. Accordingly, we expect an interactive relationship between support for democracy and democratic longevity.

*H<sub>3</sub>: The impact of support for democracy on political tolerance should be greater in more stable democratic nations that have successfully persisted over time.*

#### *Micro-Level Characteristics*

At the individual-level, a variety of citizen characteristics have been hypothesized (and found) to engender political tolerance, including demographic variables (e.g., education, gender), as well as political (e.g., support for democratic values, conservatism) and personality orientations (e.g., authoritarianism) (see Marcus et al. 1995 for a review). To this list we add an important element suggested by the model of democratic learning—vis., forms of "democratic

activism" in which citizens actually use civil liberties designed to voice dissent from majority policies. Imagine, for example, a citizen who challenges government policy by joining a demonstration or by participating in a boycott. By engaging in such forms of democratic behavior (as opposed to the routine act of, say, voting) the citizen is more likely to approve of extending such rights to unpopular groups (Pateman 1976). For this citizen experiences the benefits of democratic norms—not just as abstract rules, but by practicing them as well. Note that we do not simply focus on political interest; our argument presumes that this process works above and beyond a simple interest in politics. Also note that we do not focus on routine acts of participation, such as voting. Instead, we focus on the beneficial effect of actually *using* civil liberties.

It is important to distinguish our concept of democratic activism from more conventional forms of political behavior such as voting and political interest. While liberal democratic theorists have long promoted the benefits of political participation for raising levels of political tolerance (e.g., Mill 1998; Fishkin 1997; Pateman 1976), research in the U.S. fails to find a strong connection between political involvement and political tolerance (Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). But even the authors of the U.S. study concede that their measure of political involvement—by emphasizing more conventional modes of participation such as voting—may fail to capture the more involving sort of participation that liberal democratic theorists had in mind. A more fruitful strategy, in our view, is one that focuses on the linkage between what we call democratic activism (i.e., using civil liberties) and political tolerance. Compared with more conventional forms of participation, which tend to be superficial and symbolic, unconventional acts such as participating in a boycott or a public demonstration certainly require more personal involvement (Verba, Scholzman, and Brady 1996). Equally important, because such modes of participation are frequently used by those in the minority to win concessions from the majority, they serve to instruct participants on the value of procedural rights. Thus, by using civil liberties, individuals are likely to develop a greater appreciation for political tolerance.

The import of this discussion should be plain by now. All other things being equal, democratic activism should increase political tolerance. In short, we expect the following.

*H<sub>4</sub>: Greater democratic activism (i.e., the use of civil liberties) should enhance political tolerance, independent of a host of other individual-level characteristics.*

In sum, the model of democratic learning synthesizes several arguments in the democratization literature. It predicts, first, that systems that provide a stable democratic environment encourage political tolerance, both independently of, and in interaction with, individual-level characteristics (e.g., citizens' support for democracy). In addition, citizens who engage in democratic activism and thus use civil liberties are more likely to become tolerant than citizens who do not actively use them.

## DATA, MEASURES, AND MODEL SPECIFICATION


We use data from the 1995-1997 World Values surveys (WVS) to test these hypotheses. The surveys in the WVS include the most affluent countries (e.g., the U.S.A., Western Europe, Japan, and Australia) and those at the other end of the economic spectrum (e.g., Turkey, several Central European countries, Latin American nations, and a few African nations). Because the WVS provides a rich store of information about a range of individual political values and attitudes in a broad spectrum of nations, it represents a good source for testing our theoretical arguments.

One particular advantage of the 1995-1997 WVS, for our purposes, is that it contains a battery of questions to assess political tolerance (defined as an individual's willingness to allow the expression of ideas and interests that one opposes) similar to the "content-controlled" measure developed by Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus (1982). The first question in the battery asks respondents to select the group they like the least from a list of unpopular groups (see Appendix, item I), including Neo-Nazis/Right-wing extremists, Criminals, Stalinists/hard-line communists, Homosexuals, Capitalists, Jews, and Immigrants.<sup>1</sup> To measure political tolerance, respondents were then asked whether the disliked group should be allowed to: hold public office and hold public demonstrations.<sup>2</sup>

Figure 1 displays the frequency with which respondents selected various groups in the pooled sample. Neo-Nazis and right-wing extremists are selected by a significant proportion, as are Stalinists/communists, Capitalists, and Jews. While these groups represent the run-of-the-mill collection of disliked minorities, problematic is the selection of criminals by about 30 percent of the pooled sample.

Political intolerance represents a threat to democracy only if the targets of intolerance are entitled to the same political rights and privileges as everyone else in the polity. Unfortunately, including criminals on a list of unpopular groups and organizations makes little sense from the standpoint of democratic theory, which underlies the rationale of the content-controlled question. In most countries, criminals do not enjoy the same citizenship rights as non-criminals (e.g., they may lose the right to vote in elections). Thus, refusing to extend to "criminals" the right to run for office

≡ FIGURE 1



Note: Entries are percentage of respondents who selected groups as the one they liked the least in the full sample

may be more a reflection of a country's legal framework than of political intolerance. Exacerbating this basic problem of validity, the question does not make it clear to respondents how the term "criminals" is to be interpreted.<sup>3</sup>

Given these problems, our first task was to eliminate respondents from our study who selected criminals, which, given the tendency for many citizens to choose this group in several countries, had the unfortunate consequence of reducing the number of cases in some countries to unacceptably low levels.<sup>4</sup> Countries were eliminated for either of two reasons: (1) "Criminals" were chosen by more than half the respondents; and (2) The sample size dropped below a minimum of 500 cases after excluding respondents who selected criminals. After applying these criteria, a significant number of countries were eliminated from the analysis (Table A1). Moreover, an additional seven countries (Bangladesh, Columbia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, South Africa,

<sup>3</sup> Are "criminals" fugitives from justice, ex-felons, political criminals, or the "criminals" who run the country, for example?

<sup>4</sup> To determine whether individuals who selected criminals were substantially different from those who selected another group, we estimated a logit model where we regressed a dummy variable indicating whether respondents chose criminals (coded 1 if the individual selected criminals as their least liked group and 0 otherwise) on the micro-level variables used to predict political tolerance (see Table 2). There is a slight propensity for people to select criminals if they: participate less, value speech less, are rightists, value conformity, are female, older, and more educated. However, altogether the nine predictors in the model account for very little variance in selecting criminals versus other groups. Using the pooled data, the pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> for the entire set of predictors is .02; estimating this model for individual countries, pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> ranges from .000 to .05. Overall, this analysis suggests that respondents who selected criminals as their least-liked group are not that different from those who selected other groups.

<sup>1</sup> In some countries the list of groups was modified to adjust the groups to the local context.

<sup>2</sup> Instead of the standard Likert format used in tolerance questions, which records both the direction and intensity of responses, the WVS uses a dichotomous format where responses are limited to "yes" (tolerant) or "no" (intolerant). This format may underestimate the actual degree of tolerance, even though the patterns found here approximate those revealed by other studies using different surveys and question formats (Shamir 1991; Duch and Gibson 1993; Sullivan et al. 1993). In addition, the amount of variance in the dependent variable is likely diminished, which means that our analyses are biased against finding statistically significant relationships. While this under-estimates the t-values of coefficients, it does have the desirable side-effect of establishing an especially rigorous hurdle for rejecting the null hypothesis.

and Slovenia) had to be dropped because these surveys contained missing data on several key variables.

Despite this reduction in global coverage, the remaining 17 countries (counting the separate East and West German surveys as a single country) represent one of the largest and most diverse samples of nations available for studying political tolerance. The study includes several affluent democracies (e.g., U.S.A., Germany, Australia), recently democratized nations in Central Europe (e.g., Bosnia, Georgia), and a handful of Latin American nations (e.g., Argentina and Peru). We certainly do not claim to represent the entire globe. At the same time, we maintain that this diverse range of nations permits a systematic test of our hypotheses. In addition to the modernity and autocracy-democracy dimensions, these nations vary substantially along the unitary-federalism divide, as well. Thus, our sample of nations allows us to examine the interplay between micro and macro-level sources of tolerance in ways that were hitherto impossible.

### *Levels of Political Tolerance*

In the 1995-97 surveys used here, we examine whether respondents are willing to extend to a disliked group the right to: (1) hold public office and (2) hold demonstrations.<sup>5</sup> We focus on these two indicators as a minimal requirement of a liberal democracy. Substantively, the right to demonstrate is recognized virtually everywhere as a fundamental element of a liberal democracy (Dahl 1991). If a respondent denies *this* right to a disliked group, it would be fair to conclude that an individual is not willing to allow a disliked opponent to enjoy a basic democratic freedom—the hallmark of an intolerant citizen. Similarly, a liberal democracy requires that a diverse group of citizens has the opportunity to hold political office. To deny this fundamental liberty to an individual is tantamount to rejecting a vital element of the democratic process—to allow one's opponents to share political power.

Despite our focus on the minimalist requirements for political toleration, intolerance clearly prevails across our

seventeen nations (Table 1). The first two columns of Table 1 list the percentage of individuals who would allow a disliked group to demonstrate and to hold a public office; the next three columns present the frequency distribution of the tolerance index which is the sum of the two individual indicators. Based on these patterns, it is fair to conclude that political tolerance is a scarce commodity; the highest percentage allowing a group to hold office is found in the U.S.A. (14.4 percent). The vast majority of respondents thus appear to deny disliked groups the right to hold public office. Publics are a bit more willing to permit a disliked group to demonstrate, with the Australian (28.4 percent) and U.S. (24.6 percent) publics taking the lead. On the whole, however, these patterns portray a bleak picture: intolerance is the norm, tolerance the exception.

### *The Micro-Level Model*

In the first part of the analysis, our aim is to estimate a model of political tolerance using strictly individual-level data in the 17 countries. Using the WVS, we were able to construct reasonably good measures of the standard determinants of political tolerance (e.g., democratic values, personality, ideology, and political involvement) found in most studies, with one important exception. The WVS does not contain a measure of one of the more important predictors of tolerance in many studies—perceived threat from least-liked groups (e.g., Sullivan, Pierson and Marcus 1982). Fortunately, because threat is regularly found to be an exogenous determinant of political tolerance (e.g., Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982; but see also Gibson and Gouws 2002), its omission should not unduly bias our estimates of other predictors in the model.

*Democratic Activism.* A particular focus of our study is the role of democratic activism (i.e., using civil liberties) in enhancing toleration of dissent by unpopular groups. To measure citizens' usage of democratic rights, we relied on a battery of items included in the WVS that asked respondents whether they had ever "done" [scored 3], "would do" [2], or "would never do" [1] one of the following: signed a petition, joined in boycotts, or attended a lawful demonstration (see Appendix I).<sup>6</sup> The additive index ranges from 3 (would never do any of the three acts) to 9 (had done all three).

*Democratic Ideals.* The measurement of democratic values receives ample coverage in the WVS. Our measurement strategy parallels one developed in Sullivan et al.'s (1985) comparative study of tolerance, where the authors conceptualized democratic norms at two different levels of abstraction: one reflecting more generalized support for democracy and democratic principles, and one at a lower level of abstraction reflecting support for civil liberties when they conflict with other values (e.g., public order).

<sup>5</sup> The WVS also asks respondents whether they would let their least-liked group "teach in our schools." This indicator was not used because teaching in schools has not been interpreted in most democratic countries (e.g., the U.S.) as a basic political freedom. Moreover, in several nations, some groups on the list (communists in Central Europe, for instance) have denied civil liberties to ordinary citizens for much of the 20th century. It is thus conceivable that within a specific historical context, even a democratic citizen would reach the conclusion that a fascist or communist, for example, should not be permitted to teach in schools in order to protect democratic institutions. Some constitutions, such as Germany's, specifically mention that citizens must be loyal to the democratic state in order to occupy a politically sensitive post. We hasten to add that we do not wish to justify intolerance (for that is what the denial of such political liberties constitute, regardless of the justification for such restrictions). What we would like to assure is that we are focusing on the least controversial elements of Dahl's polyarchy—the right to demonstrate and to hold public office. We note however, that the teaching in schools item is moderately correlated with holding demonstrations ( $r = .37$ ) and public office (.52) and our results do not change if this item is included in the political tolerance scale.

<sup>6</sup> Substantial percentages of publics report either "having done" or "would do" the following: signing a petition (70 percent), joining a boycott (43 percent) and attending a demonstration (54 percent) in the pooled sample.

≡ TABLE 1  
HOW TOLERANT ARE CITIZENS?

Country	Allow to Hold Office	Allow Demonstrations	Allow Two Activities	Allow One Activity	Allow No Activity
	%	%	%	%	%
1 Argentina	7.0	13.8	5.8	17.5	76.7
2 Armenia	3.4	9.2	3.3	12.0	84.7
3 Australia	12.3	28.4	11.7	21.2	67.3
4 Bosnia H.	1.4	4.4	0.7	6.9	92.5
5 Brazil	7.7	17.5	7.8	17.3	74.9
6 Croatia	2.1	8.5	1.1	11.2	87.7
7 E. Germany	2.9	9.4	1.6	9.7	88.7
8 Finland	9.2	22.3	9.9	19.2	70.9
9 Georgia	4.7	6.5	3.1	8.2	88.7
10 Macedonia	3.4	3.2	2.2	3.2	94.6
11 Peru	4.6	4.2	2.1	4.2	93.7
12 Serbia	3.1	7.8	2.5	15.4	82.1
13 Spain	2.7	8.6	2.0	7.2	90.8
14 Sweden	9.4	30.3	7.9	25.6	66.5
15 Switzerland	4.4	6.3	2.9	5.5	91.6
16 Uruguay	3.6	11.1	4.4	12.1	83.5
17 USA	14.4	24.6	18.2	14.9	66.9
18 W. Germany	6.3	19.4	4.4	18.0	77.6

Note: Entries in the first two columns are percent of respondents who would allow an activity. The first two columns are based on the two separate indicators which have two response categories ("Yes" and "No"). The next three column reflects the distribution of the Tolerance Index which is an additive indi-

Thus, our Democratic Ideals indicator is an additive index based on responses to two items that tap support for democracy as an ideal regime (see Appendix for details). Our Value Free Speech scale, on the other hand, is measured by summing responses to three items asking respondents to choose between free speech versus other values (see Peffley et al. 2001 for a similar measure of value priorities). Consistent with our conceptualization, support for democracy is high in the 17 countries, with an average rating of 8.19 on a scale that ranges from 2 to 10, where 10 indicates the maximum support for democracy. The average rating on the Value Free Speech scale, on the other hand, is .76 on a scale that ranges from 0 (indicating a low priority for free speech versus other values) to 2.5 (a high priority).

Conformity. Various personality dispositions, such as authoritarianism, self-esteem and dogmatism, have been hypothesized (and found) to be related to political tolerance, from the earliest studies (Adorno et al. 1950) onward (e.g., Sullivan, Pierson, and Marcus 1982). Our measure of Conformity, or a desire for an orderly and structured world where others conform to rules and authority, is based on a battery of childhood value items similar to those used by others to tap the broader construct of authoritarianism (e.g., Feldman 1989). Higher Conformity scores were given if respondents selected such values as "obedience" and "good manners" from a list of qualities that children should learn at home; lower scores were given for selecting such values as "imagination" (see Appendix). Defined in this way, con-

formity has been linked to both political intolerance and prejudice toward unconventional outgroups who are viewed as a threat to the established social and political order (Feldman 1989, Peffley and Hurwitz 1998).

*Control Variables.* We also include a host of control variables in the model. Political Interest (see Appendix) is included as a proxy for more conventional and non-behavioral forms of political involvement so that the estimated effect of democratic activism on tolerance should primarily capture the behavioral propensity of using democratic rights. In addition, a Left-Right self-placement scale ranging from 1 (Right) to 10 (Left) was included as a measure of Ideology (Appendix). Finally, three demographic variables were incorporated: gender (male = 0, female = 1), age, and education.

## RESULTS

Because our dependent measure ranges from 0 to 2 (with higher values indicating more tolerance), we regressed political tolerance scores on the nine predictors using ordered logit procedures. The logit coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses) are displayed for the seventeen countries in Table 2, where countries are listed in the order of the number of years the country has been a continuous democracy, with Australia at the top of the table and Serbia and Uruguay at the bottom.

Several general patterns of findings are apparent from an inspection of the micro-level models. First, we do a much

≡ TABLE 2  
MICRO-LEVEL MODEL PREDICTING POLITICAL TOLERANCE IN 17 COUNTRIES (ORDERED LOGIT ESTIMATES)

Country	Dem. Activism	Pol. Interest	Demo- cratic Ideals	Value Free Speech	Left- Right Ideol.	Con- formity	Gender (0 = Male)	Age	Edu- cation	N	LR- Chi <sup>2</sup> (9)	Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>
Australia	.19** (.05)	.16* (.05)	.11* (.05)	.33** (.09)	-.01 (.03)	-.47** (.07)	-.52** (.13)	-.01** (.004)	.16** (.04)	1287	287.6**	.127
Finland	.11 (.07)	.17* (.09)	.04 (.06)	.10 (.14)	.07 (.05)	-.30** (.12)	-.35 (.20)	-.003 (.007)	.04 (.08)	505	33.04**	.042
Sweden	.05 (.07)	.23** (.08)	.26** (.08)	.24* (.12)	.06 (.04)	-.05 (.10)	-.76** (.17)	-.02** (.006)	.14** (.05)	716	100.1**	.085
Switzerland	.26** (.10)	-.005 (.114)	.11 (.10)	.26 (.21)	.11 (.07)	-.30 (.17)	-.67* (.31)	-.005 (.01)	.14 (.09)	722	40.23**	.082
USA	.23** (.06)	.29** (.08)	.27** (.07)	.27* (.11)	-.06 (.04)	-.20* (.10)	-.27 (.17)	-.02** (.01)	.16** (.045)	683	189**	.149
W. Germany	.26** (.08)	-.10 (.09)	.11 (.08)	.14 (.13)	.06 (.04)	-.40** (.11)	-.92** (.18)	.01 (.007)	.16** (.04)	783	110**	.108
Spain	.11 (.08)	.21* (.09)	.05 (.09)	.46* (.18)	.04 (.06)	-.24 (.13)	-.13 (.23)	-.01 (.01)	.06 (.05)	920	62.76**	.091
Argentina	.09 (.09)	.07 (.08)	.21** (.08)	-.08 (.16)	-.007 (.05)	-.08 (.14)	-.60** (.23)	.002 (.007)	.25** (.06)	469	54.69**	.0812
Brazil	.13 (.07)	.08 (.08)	.03 (.06)	.04 (.15)	.07* (.035)	-.06 (.13)	.07 (.21)	-.02* (.008)	.13* (.06)	520	28.75**	.038
Armenia	.17** (.06)	-.09 (.09)	.15* (.06)	.36** (.13)	-.02 (.04)	.001 (.14)	.03 (.22)	.005 (.001)	.06 (.06)	788	30.73**	.040
Bosnia H	.03 (.10)	.17 (.13)	.007 (.10)	-.032 (.20)	-.14 (.07)	-.27 (.17)	.04 (.31)	-.03 (.13)	.08 (.08)	649	14.66	.040
Croatia	.24* (.10)	-.08 (.10)	-.11 (.12)	.36* (.17)	.03 (.06)	-.21 (.16)	.03 (.25)	-.008 (.009)	.22 (.20)	611	31.43**	.058
E. Germany	.06 (.10)	-.04 (.11)	.49** (.12)	.31 (.16)	.06 (.07)	-.39** (.15)	-.79** (.25)	-.01 (.009)	.17** (.06)	782	80.69**	.128
Georgia	.15** (.06)	-.06 (.08)	.03 (.06)	-.03 (.14)	-.005 (.04)	-.15 (.15)	-.09 (.20)	-.01 (.01)	.07 (.06)	1179	16.75*	.018
Macedonia	.10 (.14)	.09 (.19)	.25* (.12)	.63* (.28)	-.06 (.08)	.42 (.38)	.04 (.45)	-.000 (.02)	.19* (.09)	528	18.06*	.072
Peru	.19 (.11)	.19 (.12)	-.07 (.09)	.33 (.21)	.08 (.06)	-.29 (.19)	-.33 (.30)	-.001 (.01)	.02 (.08)	847	23.47**	.050
Serbia	.25** (.08)	.27** (.10)	.03 (.09)	.44* (.18)	.04 (.05)	.01 (.15)	.45 (.27)	-.000 (.009)	.18** (.06)	533	83.46**	.141
Uruguay	.15 (.10)	.17 (.10)	.03 (.11)	.23 (.22)	.10 (.06)	-.27 (.17)	.20 (.28)	-.02* (.01)	.04 (.08)	433	28.18**	.060

\*p < .05, \*\*p < .01; Higher values indicate: greater political tolerance, greater dem. activism, interest, hold dem. ideals, free speech, more leftist, greater conformity, female, older, and higher education. Countries presented in order of, first, the number of years of continuous democracy and, second, alphabetically.

better job of explaining political tolerance in the areas of the globe where tolerance has been most intensively studied. We find a greater proportion of significant coefficients and higher goodness of fit measures (e.g., pseudo R<sup>2</sup>) in several

Western countries, such as the U.S., Germany and Australia (where neighboring New Zealand has received some attention). In other parts of the world, however, such as Latin American and East European countries (and even several

Scandinavian countries), a much smaller portion of predictors are significant and our micro-level model explains a more modest portion of the variance in tolerance.

Focusing on the impact of specific predictors, the first column of coefficients indicates that the effects of democratic activism are in the expected direction in all countries, and in 8 of the 17 countries citizens who engage in these forms of participation are significantly more likely to tolerate disliked minorities, even after controlling for the effects of political interest. Thus, our results are consistent with the notion that citizens can gain a sense of appreciation for the political rights of minorities by actually using civil liberties designed to voice dissent from majority policies.

We also find that citizens are more likely to extend civil liberties to disliked minorities if they support democracy—at either a very abstract or a less abstract level. As indicated by the third column of coefficients, people who are more supportive of democracy as an ideal form of government (Democratic Ideals) are more tolerant in seven of the countries. A similar pattern is indicated by the fourth column of Table 2: in 8 of the countries under study, individuals who assign a higher priority to free speech versus other values (Value Free Speech) are significantly more likely to extend these principles to minorities they dislike.

#### *Macro-Level Model*

*Macro-Level Measures.* Our primary interest is in the ability of institutional factors to increase levels of political tolerance in a country. In order to test whether the macro-level variables explain any cross-national variation in levels of tolerance even after controlling for the effects of individual-level characteristics, we added several nation-level indicators to the survey data. First, to measure the persistence of democracy over time, we added the number of years a system has been a continuous democracy to the survey data, taken from Inglehart (1997; see also Muller and Seligson 1994). The advantage of this measure is that it captures our focus on continuous democratic learning in more stable democracies. Second, to measure the degree to which a country's political institutions conform to a federalist versus a unitary system, we used the indicator from the Polity III data set that classifies political systems into a 3-point scale of unitary (at point 1), mixed (point 2), or federal institutions (point 3) (Jagers and Gurr 1995). Third, we also add a country's level of socioeconomic infra-structure as a control variable, since it is widely recognized that democracies are more likely to develop when countries have reached a certain level of GNP/Capita, infra-structure, communication network, or higher levels of education (Lipset 1959 1993). We use the United Nation's human development indicator (HDI) to capture a country's level of modernity by incorporating information about life expectancy, death at birth rates, and income (Lijphart 1999). We then estimate the coefficients using the pooled data set. This allows us to obtain estimates for the nation-level predictors while controlling for individual-level characteristics.

However, a multilevel model creates several statistical problems when the multi-level structure of the data is ignored. Consequently, we conducted the analyses using Hierarchical Linear and Nonlinear Modeling (HLM)<sup>7</sup> (see Steenbergen and Jones 2002). HLM requires that we specify two sets of equations: one for the individual-level model and another for the nation-level model. The coefficients for the macro-level variables thus give the effects of national-level variables on aggregate levels of tolerance across countries that are independent of (or in addition to) the effects of the individual-level variables. The problem with using estimation techniques that ignore the multilevel structure of the data (e.g., OLS) is that such models implicitly assume that *all* of the macro-level variance is accounted for, a heroic assumption in most social science research. Consequently, the standard errors of the macro-level variables tend to be substantially underestimated and the coefficients themselves may be affected. Because HLM does not make this assumption, the coefficients associated with macro-level variables tend to be more accurate and more conservative estimates (Steenbergen and Jones 2002).

## RESULTS

All models in this section were estimated using HLM for windows (version 5.04) developed by Raudenbush et al. (2000). Table 3 presents the results for several multi-level models of political tolerance estimated using ordinal logit procedures where the focus is on the impact of the contextual variables on aggregate tolerance scores across nations. Model 1 includes only the individual-level variables and serves as a baseline for assessing the degree to which adding contextual variables improves the fit of the model. Because we use full maximum likelihood to estimate the models, we use the variance component (the residual variance after accounting for the included variables) to determine whether the addition of contextual variables further increases the power of the model to explain cross-national variations in tolerance levels.<sup>8</sup> In other words, we can assess the fit of the various models by comparing the size and statistical significance of the variance component for each equation.

Model 1 has a variance component of .62 with a chi-square of about 1222.73. The significant chi-square value suggests that there is considerable unexplained variance in political tolerance across nations even after we account for the micro-level predictors. Thus, after controlling for individual-level variables, tolerance levels continue to vary systematically across nations.

Because the three macro variables are moderately correlated, Models 2 through 4 add the institutional variables one

<sup>7</sup> We use the abbreviation HLM as a common shorthand reference, even though hierarchical modeling refers to nonlinear as well as linear modeling. We used the hierarchical generalized linear model in HLM 5.04 which is designed for use with discrete ordered dependent variables to estimate models in Tables 2, 3 and 4.

<sup>8</sup> HLM simultaneously controls for the effects of macro and micro-level variables.

≡ TABLE 3  
A MULTI-LEVEL MODEL OF DEMOCRATIC LEARNING: MACRO- AND MICRO PREDICTORS OF POLITICAL TOLERANCE

Predictors	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
	Micro-level Predictors	Model 1+ Length of Democracy	Model 1+ Federalism	Model 1+ HDI	Model 1+ All Macro Variables
<i>Individual-level:</i>					
Democratic Activism	.15**	.15**	.15**	.15**	.15**
Political Interest	.10**	.09**	.09**	.09**	.09**
Conformity	-.24**	-.24**	-.24**	-.24**	-.24**
Dem. Ideals	.12**	.12**	.12**	.12**	.12**
Free Speech Priority	.25**	.25**	.25**	.25**	.25**
Gender (0 = male)	-.29**	-.30**	-.30**	-.30**	-.30**
Age (younger)	-.001**	-.001**	-.001**	-.001**	-.001**
Education	.13**	.13**	.13**	.13**	.13**
Ideology (hi = left)	.02	.02	.02	.02	.02
<i>Nation-level:</i>					
Dem. Longevity	a	.02**	a	a	.02**
Federalism	a	a	.42*	a	.38*
Human Dimension	a	a	a	1.8	.60
<i>Random Effect:</i>					
Variance Component	.62	.46	.50	.53	.36
Df	17	16	16	16	14
chi-square	1222.73	503.84	894.26	921.62	388.85
Prob	.000	.000	.000	.000	.000

Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients estimated with HLM 5.04. "a" denotes that a variable is excluded from a model. See Table 2 for coding of variables. N = 12,853.

at a time to more clearly reveal the simple effects of each before including all macro-level variables in Model 5.<sup>9</sup> Our argument assumes that tolerance is developed mainly when citizens have an opportunity to experience or practice it. We argue that these opportunities increase in more stable democracies and federalist systems, independent of a country's level of socioeconomic affluence.

First consider Model 2, which estimates the effect of democracies' longevity on aggregate tolerance scores across the countries. When citizens live in such systems, they are considerably more likely to allow disliked minorities to demonstrate or hold public office. Note that the variance component (.46) is now considerably lower than in Model 1 (.62). In other words, after we control for the micro-level variables and a nation's democratic longevity, there is less unexplained or residual variance in cross-national levels of tolerance than in Model 1.

Model 3 produces the same conclusion for the federalism variable: it is statistically significant and the unexplained

variance in the intercept is lower than Model 1, indicating a better fit than Model 1 (but not Model 2). In short, there is some support for the hypothesis that these institutional variables affect how tolerant citizens are, independent of a variety of individual-level characteristics.

Model 4 considers an alternative to the institutional properties (length of democracy and federalism)—namely, a country's level of socio-economic development. As indicated earlier, because socioeconomic development is associated with the level of democracy (and federalism) in a country (e.g., Muller and Seligson 1994), the effect of these institutional properties on political tolerance may be spurious. However, as the coefficient for the Human Dimension Index (HDI) in Model 4 indicates, the effect of modernity is statistically insignificant, even though it improves the fit of the model over the individual-level model (Model 1). But note that the chi-square value is significantly worse (i.e., higher) than that for the model including democratic longevity alone (Model 2)—another sign that levels of modernity do not contribute as much to explaining cross-national variation in tolerance as a country's democratic durability. This signals that nations' socioeconomic infrastructures affect political tolerance less strongly than the institutional properties of political systems.

<sup>9</sup> The correlation between Dem. Longevity and Human Dimension is .62, .28 between Dem. Longevity and Federalism, and .41 between Human Dimension and Federalism.

Importantly, the same conclusions emerge when we include current levels of democracy (as measured by freedom house scores),<sup>10</sup> along with the federalism variable and length of democracy (results not shown). The latter two variables remain significant, whereas freedom house scores are not statistically significant ( $p = .7$ ). Consistent with the notion of democratic learning, it is not the *current* level of democracy that affects political tolerance in our analysis, but a country's years of continuous democracy that matters.

Model 5 now considers all macro-variables simultaneously (along with the individual-level predictors). Both institutional variables remain statistically significant whereas the HDI index remains insignificant. Evidently, what matters in developing political tolerance is exposure to democratic institutions over time, and federal systems. In contrast, a nation's socioeconomic infra-structure has little direct influence on tolerance judgments (net individual-level factors). Note also that this model substantially reduces the variance component, with a chi-square of about 388. This indicates that a combination of the macro-variables provides a much better fit to the data than a model including only one contextual variable (Models 2, 3, and 4).

All told, citizens in more stable democratic regimes are less intolerant than citizens in less democratic regimes—a conclusion that does not hinge on a nation's level of modernity or its level of federalism. In addition, federalism reduces political intolerance, irrespective of the longevity of democracy in a country.

Our next analysis addresses a more subtle aspect of how democracies may affect political tolerance. Up to this point, we have focused on the simple additive effect of democratic longevity on political tolerance. We also hypothesized (hypothesis 3), however, that the connection between tolerance and support for democracy as an ideal regime should be stronger in more stable democracies. In short, support for democratic ideals and democratic longevity should interact in shaping tolerance judgments.

Table 4 shows that there is empirical support for this argument.<sup>11</sup> The interaction term is statistically significant, indicating that the effect of democratic ideals on civil liberties is stronger in more stable democracies, as measured by the years of continuous democracy variable. In other words, the “slip-page” between support for democracies as an ideal regime and tolerance scores is lower in more stable democracies than other systems. Consistent with our argument, citizens in stable democracies are more likely to practice what they believe at the regime level—to extend support for democratic rules to disliked opponents, just as they have been encouraged to do. All told, citizens in mature democracies are both more politi-

≡ TABLE 4

THE INTERACTIVE EFFECT OF SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRATIC IDEALS, BY DEMOCRATIC LONGEVITY ON POLITICAL TOLERANCE

Predictors	Political Tolerance
<i>Individual-level:</i>	
Participation	.17**
Political Interest	.10**
Dem. Ideals	.11**
Free Speech	.28**
Gender (0 = male)	-.28**
Age	-.01**
Education	.14**
Ideology	.01
<i>Nation-level:</i>	
Dem. Longevity	.01**
<i>Dem. Longevity</i> × <i>Dem. Ideals</i>	.01*
<i>Random Effect:</i>	
Variance Component	
Intercept; Slope	.46;.004
Df	16;16
chi-square	702.9;32,8
Prob	.00;00

Note: Entries are full maximum likelihood coefficients estimated with HLM 5.04. See Table 2 for coding of variables. N=12853.

\* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ .

cally tolerant and more consistent in their application of general democratic norms to disliked minorities.

## CONCLUSION

This article synthesizes several arguments in the democratization and political tolerance literatures. The democratization literature argues that support for democratic regime ideals is strong. The tolerance literature, however, while more limited in its geographic scope, points out that political tolerance—an important prerequisite of democracy—is in short supply. The findings presented here are consistent with both these accounts. The major question we have sought to answer in this paper is, What individual-level and institutional-level characteristics are associated with democratic experiences that help to reduce the gap between citizens' high support for democratic ideals, on the one hand, and typically low levels of political tolerance, on the other hand? Our results show that characteristics at both levels of analysis help to reduce political intolerance in a wide array of countries around the globe. Specifically, our research demonstrates that (1) countries characterized by democratic longevity and federalist institutions are more likely to reduce levels of intolerance nation-wide, independently of the level of socioeconomic development of the country and (2) individual citizens who actually *use* civil liberties (i.e., engage in democratic activism) are more likely to develop an appreciation of political tolerance.

<sup>10</sup> We used Freedom House's (Freedom House 2000) evaluations of the 1994 civil liberties and political rights of each country because the waves for the world values surveys were conducted between 1995 to 1997. These results are available from the authors upon request.

<sup>11</sup> We dropped the conformity variable from this analysis because HLM would not converge when all micro-level variables are included in the model.

To the democratization literature, this article contributes the insight that democratic regime ideals are much more easily endorsed than tolerant views. The slippage so often observed in the USA and a few other nations appears to be a universal phenomenon. It also appears that the slippage is especially pronounced outside of western democracies. In undemocratic nations or new democracies, the link between regime ideals and tolerance is often insignificant. To want a democratic system is one thing; to behave according to its principles is another matter.

To the political tolerance literature, this article makes an important contribution in finding that democratic activism is an important predictor of tolerance at the individual level. While prior studies have consistently found that more conventional forms of political involvement (e.g., voting) have no independent impact on tolerance, our results are in keeping with liberal democratic theorists (e.g., J. S. Mill) who argued that more involving forms of political activity should enhance tolerance. Our findings on this score are important for they underline the need for citizens to develop a sense of appreciation for the rights of minorities by actually using civil liberties designed to voice dissent from majority policies.

To both literatures, the study contributes the important finding that political tolerance is significantly higher in democracies that have successfully persisted over time. Notably, it is not current levels of democracy that matter. Instead, the long-term stability of a democratic nation is crucial in fostering tolerance judgments. Of course, just as number of years of formal schooling may not reflect the quality of one's education, democratic longevity is only a rough indicator of the quality of the democratic experience as it affects political tolerance. On the other hand, while analysts are certainly encouraged to investigate more fine-grained measures of democratic experience, we are confident that democratic longevity captures an essential element of democratic learning—the likelihood and intensity of exposure to the rough-and-tumble of democratic politics.

Equally important, we also found that socioeconomic development does not appear to foster political tolerance in any direct or obvious way. Although socioeconomic development is undoubtedly important in order to generate other values conducive to a democratic culture, political tolerance is not among them. And while modernization may indirectly affect political tolerance by, for example, encouraging democratic longevity, we found no evidence for a direct linkage between socioeconomic development and tolerance. What matters for this hard-to-obey civic virtue is simply democratic learning—both by observation and through actively using the range of rights a liberal democracy provides. Finally, our results suggest that federalist systems—presumably because they provide citizens with multiple points of access and encourage political compromise—are better for tolerance than unitary systems.

All of this points to the conclusion that support for general democratic norms, while highly desirable, is only a first step toward the democratization of mass publics. Indeed,

given the abysmally low levels of political tolerance in all seventeen countries in our study, it would be a mistake to be sanguine about the expressions of democratic virtue among mass publics around the globe.

#### APPENDIX SURVEY ITEMS

##### I. Political Tolerance (0 to 2 = high tolerance)

A. I'd like to ask you about some groups that some people feel are threatening to the social and political order in this society. Would you please select from the following list the one group or organization that you like least?

1. Jews\*
2. Capitalists
3. Stalinists/hard-line Communists\*
4. Immigrants
5. Homosexuals
6. Criminals
7. Neo-Nazis/Right extremists\*

\*[if necessary, use functional equivalent for these items]

B. Do you think that [NAME LEAST-LIKED GROUP JUST IDENTIFIED] should be allowed to:

1. Hold public office? [yes = 1, no = 2]
2. Hold public demonstrations?

##### II. Democratic Ideals (2 to 10 = high value)

1. Having a democratic political system...would you say it is a very good (4), fairly good (3), fairly bad (2) or very bad (1) way of governing this country?
2. Democracy may have problems but it's better than any other form of government. Do you agree strongly (4), agree (3), disagree (2), or strongly disagree (1)?

##### III. Value Free Speech (0 to 2.5 = high value)

1. If you had to choose, which would you say is the most important responsibility of government: To maintain order in society (0) OR: To respect freedom of the individual (1)?
2. If you had to choose, which one of the [four value statements] on this card would you say is most important? Protecting freedom of speech (1) [versus the other three value statements] (0)?
3. And which would be the next most important? Protecting freedom of speech (.5) [versus the other three value statements] (0)?

##### IV. Conformity (−1 to 2 = high conformity)

Here is a list of qualities that children can be encouraged to learn at home. Which, if any, do you consider to be especially important? Please choose up to five.

1. Obedience (important = 1; not mentioned = 0)
2. Good manners (important = 1; not mentioned = 0)
3. Imagination (important = 1; not mentioned = 0)

≡ TABLE A1  
DECISION TO INCLUDE WVS COUNTRIES IN THE STUDY

Country	Total N	N Selecting Criminals	% Selecting Criminals	Total N – N Sel. Crim	Included in study?
1 Argentina	1022	330	32.29	692	Yes
2 Armenia	1683	749	44.50	934	Yes
3 Australia	1974	313	15.86	1661	Yes
4 Bosnia H.	1199	434	36.20	765	Yes
5 Brazil	1070	521	48.69	549	Yes
6 Croatia	912	343	37.61	569	Yes
7 E. Germany	996	98	9.84	898	Yes
8 Finland	920	338	36.74	582	Yes
9 Georgia	2268	989	43.61	1279	Yes
10 Macedonia	995	355	35.68	640	Yes
12 Peru	1036	101	9.75	935	Yes
13 Serbia	1188	574	48.32	614	Yes
14 Spain	1196	24	2.01	1172	Yes
15 Sweden	739	71	9.61	668	Yes
16 Switzerland	1109	209	18.85	900	Yes
17 Uruguay	948	375	39.56	573	Yes
18 USA	1480	575	38.85	905	Yes
19 W. Germany	990	93	9.39	877	Yes
20 Bangladesh <sup>a</sup>	1519	0	0.00	1519	No
21 Columbia <sup>a</sup>	2941	93	3.16	2848	No
11 Mexico <sup>a</sup>	1422	585	41.14	837	Yes
22 Philippines <sup>a</sup>	1196	474	39.63	722	No
23 Poland <sup>a</sup>	1051	294	27.97	757	No
24 S. Africa <sup>a</sup>	2584	1028	39.78	1556	No
25 Slovenia <sup>a</sup>	987	341	34.55	646	No
26 Azerbaijan	1902	1038	54.57	864	No
27 Belarus	1978	1108	56.02	870	No
28 Bulgaria	1017	593	58.31	424	No
29 Chile	893	423	47.37	470	No
30 China	1500	1173	78.20	327	No
31 Dominican Republic	399	70	17.54	329	No
32 Estonia	1003	526	52.44	477	No
33 Ghana	64	4	6.25	60	No
34 India	1817	979	53.88	838	No
35 Latvia	1148	574	50.00	574	No
36 Lithuania	910	495	54.40	415	No
37 Moldova	965	600	62.18	365	No
38 Montenegro	229	105	45.85	124	No
39 Nigeria	2724	1602	58.81	1122	No
40 Puerto Rico	1123	593	52.80	530	No
41 Russia	1934	1140	58.95	796	No
42 Taiwan	369	15	4.07	354	No
43 Tambov	452	256	56.64	196	No
44 Ukraine	2491	1467	58.89	1024	No
45 Venezuela	1200	702	58.50	498	No

As noted in the text, countries were dropped if: 1) more than 50 percent of the sample selected criminals, 2) the number of respondents who did not select criminals was less than 500, and 3) the nation survey omitted several variables.

- V. Democratic Activism** (3 to 9 = high activism)  
 . . . [F]or each form of political action that people can take, I'd like you to tell me . . . whether you have actually done any of these things (3), whether you might do it (2) or would never, under any circumstances, do it (1).
1. Signing a petition?
  2. Joining in boycotts?
  3. Attending lawful demonstrations?
- VI. Political Interest** (2 to 7 = high interest)
1. How interested would you say you are in politics—very interested (3), somewhat interested (2), or not very interested(1)?
  2. When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently (3), occasionally (2) or never (1)?
- VII. Ideology** (1 to 10 = Left; missing recoded to 5.5)  
 In political matters, people talk of “the left” and “the right.” How would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? 1 = Right, 10 = Left.

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mpeffl@uky.edu  
rrohrs@indiana.edu