

Not Just Another Labor Party: The Workers' Party and Democracy in Brazil*

John A. Guidry

Abstract

This paper analyzes Brazil's *Partido dos Trabalhadores*, The Workers' Party (PT), from its origins in social movements to becoming one of the largest political parties in Brazil. The party's trajectory from semi-clandestine meetings during Brazil's military dictatorship (1964-85) to a successful national organization with international linkages is an instructive case-study of how labor parties can contend in democratic politics during the neoliberal era. The party developed an innovative, grassroots structure that has sustained ties with both labor and non-labor movements, community movements, the progressive Catholic Church, and a growing sector of non-governmental organizations in Brazilian civil society.

The Workers' Party in Brazil is widely acknowledged as the most important and well-organized party of the left in Latin America today (Castañeda, 1994; Roberts, 1998). It brings together the interests of both organized labor and the broader social bases on which both the party and labor movement rely for support. The party's electoral history over the last 20 years is one of continual expansion, emerging from the fringes in the early 1980s to become, by 2002, the third largest party in the Senate (14 seats) and the largest in the Chamber of Deputies (House of Representatives, 91). In the national election of October 6, 2002, the party's leader and presidential candidate, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, finished in first place with 46.4 percent of the vote. In the second-round run-off on October 27, he received 61.3 percent of the vote, handily defeating José Serra, the candidate of the incumbent president's party, the Brazilian

LABOR STUDIES JOURNAL, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Spring 2003): 83-108. Published for the United Association for Labor Education by the West Virginia University Press, P.O. Box 6295, West Virginia University, Morgantown, WV 26506. © 2003, West Virginia University Press.

Social Democratic Party. Lula will be the first Brazilian president in 38 years whose political base resides in labor and the left, and the Workers' Party is poised to become the world's most important voice of opposition to the "globalization" promoted by the World Bank, International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Trade Organization (WTO), and, in the Western Hemisphere, the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA).

The party owes its success to three factors: *social-organizational*, *ideological*, and *governmental*. In the first instance, the party is able to build bridges between labor and other grassroots movements by maintaining "autonomy" from organized labor and the other social movement organizations that it claims to represent. In other words, the party is not the "official" political arm of any particular union, labor federation, or movement organization. Many of its members and public officials are drawn from organized labor, and many more are drawn from community movements, progressive religious organizations, human rights organizations, and the educational community. The largest number of labor activists in the party itself come from "white collar" unions of bank workers, school teachers, university professors, and other public sector employees. Like Germany's Social Democratic Party, the Workers' Party of Brazil is thus devoted to the issues that concern workers, unions, and other organizations without at the same time being tied to the fate of any one organization, its agenda, or its leadership.¹ Autonomy from its support bases breaks with Brazilian political tradition, in which political parties often control support organizations in a clientelistic fashion, co-opting their agendas. With its broad base, the party is able to build alliances across social movements and act as the political arm of a wide array of popular causes. These networks in civil society are crucial to democratic politics (Putnam, 2000).

Second, while the party's ideology is distinctly left of center, it maintains itself as an "open party" (Branford and Kucinski, 1995: 8) that allows a pluralism of ideological approaches in its membership, which varies from social democratic to radical Marxist perspectives. Ideological openness is important to maintaining the broad social-organizational base the party has. The party's documents and platform statements combine the main lines of Western European-style social democracy of the early post-World War II era with a set of Brazilian concerns for the political autonomy of the working and lower classes, both within and outside of organized labor. A grassroots, participatory structure allows the party to build democratic participation from the bottom-up, in contrast to Brazilian and Latin American historical experience. Through the 1980s and 1990s, the party has also incorporated the issues advanced by the "new

social movements" devoted to women's, Afro-Brazilian, environmentalist, human rights, and other identity issues.

Third, as the party has accumulated electoral victories at the municipal level, it has developed a nationally consistent administrative model—the "Petista Mode of Governing"—that is based on participatory programs that give the most excluded sectors of society a voice in budget allocation and policy development (Genro et al., 1997; Magalhães et al., 1999). Through the Petista Mode of Governing, the party brings the broader social bases that support labor into governance. Every unionized worker in Brazil lives in a community where other family members, friends, and neighbors who are not in organized labor can nonetheless look to the Workers' Party and, by extension, organized labor, to represent their interests. The party gives concrete expression to the idea that organized labor will only accomplish its own goals by combining them with the interests of other grassroots actors who share with labor a common adversary in Brazil's traditional political parties, populist figures, and clientelist machines.

The Workers' Party provides a model of political organizing that can be transferred to other contexts, including the industrialized countries of North American and Western Europe. Its grassroots base and governing practices distinguish it from the social democratic and labor parties of Western Europe, which have increasingly become "catch-all parties" dependent on the mass media and appeals to middle class voters who have not traditionally shared the concerns of labor. While the Democratic Party of the United States, the Labour Party of Great Britain, the Social Democratic Party of Germany, and the Socialist Parties in Spain, Portugal, and Italy have accommodated the neoliberal economic agenda—the legacy of Margaret Thatcher, Ronald Reagan, and "globalization"—the Worker's Party of Brazil has sought to present an alternative grounded in the concerns of both organized labor and the lower classes more generally. The chief lesson here for both organized labor and its political allies in other countries lies in the way that the Workers' Party strives to bring non-labor movements and organizations into its political programs while refusing to cave in to the neoliberal agenda.

This paper develops these themes with an historical and institutional interpretation of the Workers' Party's development from its founding in 1979 to the present. The analysis breaks down the party's history into four stages: social movement, party formation, electoral politics, and participation in government (see Figure 1).² In each section of the paper, the story is deepened with analysis that attempts to explain the successes,

Figure 1
Stages of Party Development and Electoral Participation

Stages of Political Development	Self-Perception and Ideology	Organizational Principles
1. Social Movement	anti-institutional, anti-systemic, revolutionary	social networks, personal connections, anti-hierarchical and anti-leadership orientations, "radical" democracy
2. Party Formation	"basismo"	adapt to formal structures of party according to laws, but only for formal reasons; electoral participation debated.
3 (a). Participation in Elections (running candidates for office)	candidates and electoral participation as representatives of grassroots base, with party machinery acting as link between social movement organizations and candidates	continue to adapt to formal structures of political parties according to national party legislation
3 (b). After Success in Elections (winning office)	internal competition between initial revolutionary rhetorics and more pragmatically oriented approaches	increasing of party hierarchies, professionalism, division of labor organizations into "tendencies" (factions) representing different linkages to grassroots and other political movements
4. Governance (holding legislative and executive office)	pragmatic approaches begin to dominate	developed hierarchies, national organization, greater division of labor, increasing dominance of professionals, increasing importance of leadership and popular party politicians.

failures, and dilemmas faced by the party. The ambiguity of the party's ideology is a major testing point, especially as the party continues to follow a coalition-building strategy at the local level that stretches across the political spectrum. In the end, electoral success will test the party's identity and its capacity to consolidate its gains into a viable alternative for governing Brazil.

Stage 1: Social Movements and New Union Militancy, 1978-80

In 1978-79, a wave of strikes shook Brazil and established the "New Union Movement" in the country. It began with a non-union sit-down strike of 100 workers at the Saab-Scania bus factory in São Bernardo (a suburb of metropolitan São Paulo, Brazil's largest city) on May 12, 1978, and it spread quickly. Within nine weeks more than 245,000 workers were on strike around metropolitan São Paulo in a variety of industries. The wildcat strikers were almost immediately joined by disgruntled members of Brazil's organized labor unions who had long been co-opted and repressed by the country's military regime, which took control in 1964 and remained in power until 1985. The main demands were for increased wages and the example set by the São Paulo workers was emulated around the country.

By year's end, more than 500,000 workers had gone out on strike in diverse sectors of the economy, including port workers, transit workers, teachers, bank workers, and even one rural union. During 1979 alone, over three million workers participated in 113 strikes around the country, and their demands began to take on issues of job security, working conditions and legislative measures to address labor conditions. In 1980, more than 600,000 workers struck, though the metalworkers' strikes of that year failed and were aggressively repressed by the government. Nonetheless, even with the failure of strikes in 1980, followed by the metalworkers' decision *not* to strike in 1981, the structure of Brazilian industrial and labor relations had been permanently altered (Alves, 1985: 191-210).

The movement challenged Brazil's corporatist union structure by demanding shop-floor-based unionism that would break the government's control of the labor movement, which dated back to the 1930s. At that time, a populist dictator, Getúlio Vargas, created a legal structure recognizing and even mandating union formation, with government support, thus incorporating labor into the political process. But, incorporation was intended to blunt the effectiveness of worker organization rather than to encourage it and the right-wing military dictatorship that governed Brazil from 1964 to 1985 was able to use existing labor laws to effectively

co-opt an entire generation of leaders who emerged from Brazil's populist labor movement of the 1950s. These leaders, known as *pelegos*, remained in control of Brazilian unions through the 1970s, helping the military regime avert strikes and maintain docile industrial relations during Brazil's economic miracle from 1968-74, in which the economy grew at an annual average of 11.3 percent (Alves, 1985: 107).³

By the 1970s, however, a younger generation of workers who had no experience with the labor movement of the 1950s had come of age. This new generation formed the backbone of Brazil's richest and most productive industrial area, metropolitan São Paulo and the surrounding towns of Santo André, São Bernardo do Campo, São Caetano and Diadema (known as the "ABCD" region of São Paulo). Metropolitan São Paulo is one of the world's largest urban agglomerations, with a population of close to 20 million and by the late 1970s it also featured dense networks of neighborhood associations and groups attached to the progressive Catholic Church, which together formed a grassroots base for opposition to the regime by working and poorer people.

The New Union Movement was bigger than organized labor and its success depended in large part on support from these community organizations and religious groups that had developed from new, progressive theologies supported by the reforms of Vatican II (1962-65) in the Catholic Church. Through the late 1970s, the new unionists and community leaders in neighborhood associations, squatters' organizations, and Catholic *comunidades eclesiais de base* (Christian Base Communities, CEBs) began to form the basis of a social movement that represented members of the "popular" (or lower and working) classes. These groups formed the backbone of opposition to the military regime. In the larger Brazilian context of widespread poverty, rapid and disorderly urban growth, and a "de-politicized" civil society (i.e., mainly repressed by the military government), neighborhood associations and church groups had become the only legitimate places for organizing popular grievances, and unionists and community militants began to see common ground (Seidman, 1994: 207).

In the political arena, opponents of the military regime had only one choice: the Brazilian Democratic Movement (*Movimento Democrático do Brasil*, MDB). From 1965 to 1979, the MDB was one of only two legally sanctioned political parties, the other being the military's own ARENA (National Alliance for Renovation). The parties competed every four years in elections for a national legislature that the military used to claim some democratic legitimacy to the Brazilian populace and the outside world, even while the regime openly tampered with the results to suit its pur-

poses. In the late 1970s, as the military regime weakened and its exit from power became immanent (due in no small part to the strength of the grassroots opposition and the New Union Movement's strikes) labor and other popular activists began to consider the post-military alternative. Both groups shared a strong desire not to become co-opted into a new version of populism that might replace the military regime.

In the same way that workers supporting the strikes of the late 1970s pressed for *independent* unions organized at the firm and shop (or highly local) level, new community leaders in the same period emphasized a need for grassroots *autonomy* from politicians who would bind these organizations into subordinate and disempowered relationships via clientelism or more mass-based populist exchanges of electoral support for a limited amount of political goods. In 1979, when the military government announced its intention to create a new party law allowing for multiparty competition, both the New Union Movement and grassroots popular movements began to explore the possibility for a political party in which workers and popular sectors could represent their interests without going through the mediation of a middle-class party, however "progressive" or "social democratic" its ideological orientation.

Stage 2: Party Formation

The principal leader of the New Union Movement was a São Bernardo metalworker named Luís Inácio "Lula" da Silva, whose personal political trajectory highlights the complexity of the movement's concerns about organized politics, its opposition to the military regime, and its approach to the prospects of democratization in post-military Brazil. As an apparently non-political union leader in the 1970s, Lula was supported by *pelegos* in the 1975 presidential elections for the São Bernardo Metalworkers. The older *pelegos* thought Lula to be a pliable surrogate, but the arrest of his brother in the same year for being a "communist" had a radicalizing effect on Lula's political outlook, prompting him to develop a critical stance toward the regime. "Before, I had been a typical union leader. I had been afraid of being arrested. I had been worried about my family. I never thought the being a union activist required very much. But, after my brother was arrested, I lost my fear" (Branford and Kucinski, 1995: 37).

Lula's lack of ideological commitments prior to his union leadership and brother's arrest is typical of the outlook that many New Unionists began with. As Seidman notes, it was the *experience* of working conditions in Brazil of the 1960s and 1970s that provided the basis for the New Unionists' views of relationships with other actors: management, busi-

ness and middle-class politicians, in particular (1994: 161, 171). Branford and Kucinski emphasize Lula's anti-intellectualism and disdain for artists and students, and in their profiles of early PT leaders, they stress the factory and working class origins of most of the leaders (1995: 37-43). These leaders mistrusted the middle class radicals whose vanguardist communist parties of varying stripes regarded Brazilian labor as unprepared for political action; in many ways the New Union leaders felt Brazil's traditional left to be as stifling, manipulative and co-opting as populist and clientelist politicians.

It was from within this context that Lula and the other leaders in the unions and grassroots opposition approached the party reform law of 1979. With the inauguration of a new military president, General João Figuerido, in March 1979, the regime began a phase of political liberalization called the *abertura* ("opening"). By October, the party reform law abolished the two-party system of ARENA and the MDB that the military had created in 1965, opening electoral competition to any party that could meet the law's criteria for registration. With this law, the military was trying to fracture the opposition, which had to that point effectively used the MDB to present a united and powerful opposition to the regime.

At this point, leaders in the New Union Movement and the grassroots opposition faced their first dilemma of democratic politics. On the one hand, forming another opposition party along the lines envisioned by Lula and others would break up the united opposition behind the MDB, which planned to form one party, the Party of the Brazilian Democratic Movement (PMDB), under the 1979 party reform law. Left wing opposition leaders sympathetic to the New Unionist's reasons for forming a new party argued that such a move would simply play into the military's hands by helping to split the opposition and allow the military's party to secure a claim to electoral-democratic legitimacy in the elections scheduled for 1982. But, as Margaret Keck notes, "working-class leaders were no longer willing to leave the act of interpret[ing the demands of popular movements] to others—they wanted to create an organizational opportunity for workers to speak for themselves" (1992: 60). Thus, a resolution at the São Paulo State Metalworkers Congress in January, 1979, called for the formation of a "Workers' Party," and by December, 1980, Lula, union leaders, and other progressive politicians established the *Partido dos Trabalhadores* (Workers' Party), the PT.

The PT's early rhetoric and organizational style reflected its opposition to established patterns of politics in Brazil and its drive for autonomy from elite control and co-optation. The PT adopted the bottom-up, par-

tipatory model of its allies in the grassroots movements and progressive Catholic Church—called “*basismo*” for its emphasis on base, or bottom level, participation. For both labor and popular leaders, *basismo* was a radical form of democracy that inverted the traditional top-down, hierarchical form of political relationships in Brazil, creating the space for the direct democracy and *conscientização* stressed in Freirian pedagogy. As Rebecca Abers notes, “during its first decade of existence, the PT was pervaded by a general distrust of party and government ‘machines’ and constantly sought to maintain ties to a multitude of grassroots social movements. With these goals in mind, it has attempted to develop and extremely decentralized organizational structure” (1996: 37).

The PT’s organizational structure began with *núcleos*, or “nuclei,” which were to be small groups of people (of at least 21) that could be “organized by neighborhood, job category, workplace, or social movement” (Keck, 1992: 104). Although *núcleos* resemble a typical Leftist party cell structure, they were not typical party cells carrying out the orders of higher ups in the party in a disciplined manner. In terms of size and function, the *núcleos* resembled more the CEBs of the Catholic Church. The *núcleos* were to meet regularly and discuss issues of relevance to the party and other social movements. Originally the *núcleos* were to have decision-making rights with local party directorates (*diretórios*) to ensure that democracy in the PT flowed from the bottom up. Given the difficulties of national organization in a country as large as Brazil, however, the provisional national directorate of the party decided to leave the *núcleos* as purely consultative bodies, although party rules stipulated that the *núcleos* could convene meetings of local directorates and demand to be consulted. As Keck notes, the diminishing of *núcleos* from decision-making to consultative bodies was a result of the party’s push to organize itself along the lines stipulated in the 1979 party reform act—the movement from Stage 1 (social movement) to Stage 2 (party formation) of Figure 1 (1992: 105-6).

The PT’s stance for autonomy from middle class and elite political parties is matched by its autonomy from organized labor. The party was indeed founded by workers who formed the New Union Movement, but the party is not attached to any one union or federation. The PT helped to found an independent labor federation, the CUT (Unified Workers’ Central) in 1983, as the organized labor arm of the New Union Movement. With more than 18 million members, the CUT is the largest of three major labor federations in Brazil, and while many CUT activists are also PT members, the organizations are separate and act separately in

their respective spheres of action (the political system and the workplace).⁴ A similar stance of autonomy is maintained with regard to other grassroots movements in the progressive Catholic Church, the women's movements, and so forth. There are no official ties to these organizations, and the PT invites persons from these movements to join the party and work to ensure that their objectives are part of the party platform. As it approaches elections, the PT holds large conferences with the labor federations and other labor organizations in order to develop a platform acceptable to the movement.⁵ It is a relationship that PT activists describe as "organic," that is, without being "officially" linked to each other each organization pursues goals that complement each other and reinforce each other's agenda.⁶

In both ideological and organizational terms, the PT was from its beginning an "open party" and it invited actors from across the opposition to join—not only in the New Union Movement, but also in the grassroots movements mentioned above and clandestine communists and other "vanguardist" elements⁷ (Branford and Kucinski, 1995: 8). Despite the public arguing among different political tendencies within the PT from its very outset, the PT carved out a rhetorical consistency that held its membership together, based on an "ethos" of "defiance against the dominant traits in Brazil's political culture" (Branford and Kucinski, 1995: 8).

Ideologically, the PT calls itself a "socialist" party, but this commitment has been equally open-ended, so as to accommodate the various ideological tendencies—from left-of-center social democrats to revolutionary Marxists—that joined the party. Yet we should not confuse openness with vacuousness. The PT developed a notion of "worker" that is at once liberatingly broad and yet based in a concrete understanding of economic and professional relationships,

In today's Brazil, the interests of all workers are denied, from rural workers to doctors, from industrial laborers to engineers and professors ... from manual laborers to the specialized [liberal] professions, artists, journalists, merchants, independent rural and urban workers, and the PT is the indispensable instrument of the political action of workers for their economic and social gains. In this sense, all Brazilians committed to the proposal for action expressed in this program are invited to join and participate (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 1982).

Thus, the PT developed a broad base in both organized labor and

other opposition movements. A broad ideological platform allowed persons of varied political interests to co-exist and develop a larger program of opposition to the neoliberal regime of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003). Support from community and religious organizations ensured that the Party would be able to rely on a wide array of voters in electoral politics. Still, in 1979-80, the party wasn't sure of itself, and no one knew where this experience was heading. Many of the militants who formed the party never quite envisioned what to do with electoral success—most of these persons had been banned from political activity during most of the military regime. Still fewer in the party had any idea or experience with actually running administrations (be they local, state, or federal).

Stage 3: Participation and Success in Elections

Electoral politics gave the PT an opportunity to declare its goals and present them to the public. The party's first (October 1980) manifesto affirmed the principles of political autonomy for workers and popular movements in politics, a refusal to become co-opted into larger parties run by traditional elites (even of the left), and a commitment to its very broad definition of "worker," which included both unionized and non-unionized workers, blue-collar, white-collar, and professional persons as well: "Workers want to organize themselves as an *autonomous* political force. The PT intends to be a real political expression of *all* who are exploited by the capitalist system. We are a Party of the Workers, not a party to illuminate the workers" (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 1980, emphasis added).

The PT threw itself full force into organizing for the elections of 1982, in which local municipal councils, mayoralties, state legislatures, governorships, and the national legislature were up for grabs. These elections were "foundational" for the Brazilian democratic transition, for even though they would not oust the military from the national executive, they constituted the first truly broad and multiparty elections in the country since 1965 (Keck, 1992: 123-4). The party reform of 1979 required that all parties produce an electoral program for the 1982 elections, and the PT's, written in March of that year, continued to stress the 1980 manifesto's commitments to direct democracy and a certain ambivalence toward the value of elections alone in bringing the working classes into full participation in Brazilian society (Partido dos Trabalhadores, 1982).

As an electoral document, the program sought to *differentiate* the PT from other parties, which the PT claimed would, at worse, co-opt workers

into positions of compliance and subordination, or, at best, dilute and compromise workers' demands through indirect representation of popular classes in politics. As Lula and others sought to justify the formation of the PT and its contestation of elections against both the PDS (successor to ARENA) and PMDB, they stressed the fact that PT should offer Brazilians an *alternative* to politics as usual, and the PT's rhetoric during the 1982 elections was centered on the belief in *multi-party democracy* as the best way to allow *all* classes to participate in the democratic transition. This evolved into the public affirmation of the democratic process, even under the military's compromised *abertura*. According to PT militants and propaganda, the PT provided a *real alternative* to the ill-defined umbrella of the PMDB and offered voters the ability to *choose* how to express their political beliefs rather than leaving them with the plebiscitary option of working for or against the military regime.

The open-party model helped the PT remain flexible in the face of adversity, and the party has won increasingly large portions of the vote in every election since 1982 (see Table 1). By the 2002 election, the PT elected the largest bloc of legislators to the Chamber of Deputies, and it ranks third in the Senate.

A similar pattern of growth holds for executive offices, especially at the mayoral level, where the PT presently governs many of Brazil's largest cities, including São Paulo (with a population of approximately nine million), Porto Alegre (4.5 million) and Belém (1.2 million). In the 2000 mayoral elections, the PT stunned the country by winning big in Brazil's largest cities. In cities with more than 200,000 voters, the party won more than seven million votes, almost twice that of its nearest competitor (*Isto É*, 2000: 27). Overall, the PT picked up 187 mayorships, including many of the most populous state capitals in the country: São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, Recife, Porto Alegre (for the fourth consecutive time), and Belém (for the second consecutive time). The front cover of the national newsweekly *Veja* for October 11, 2000, featured a photograph of Marta Suplicy, who won São Paulo for the party, with the headline "The Pink PT," and the caption read, "On exchanging ideological discourse for morality and efficiency, the party bursts forth from the polls" (Flores and Lima, 2000). By "morality and efficiency," the magazine refers to the PT's reputation for transparent, corruption-free, and efficient government at the municipal level, key features of the "PT Mode of Governing" (*modo petista de governar*, discussed below).

At the gubernatorial level, the party appears to making gains. In both 1994 and 1998, the PT won only two state governorships (of 26).

Table 1
PT Electoral Results, 1982-2002

Election Year	Mayoral Victories	Gubernatorial Victories	Seats won in Chamber of Deputies	Senate Seats
1982 (M,S,C) ^a	2	0	8	0
1985 (M)	2			
1986 (S, C)		0	16	0
1988 (M)	36			
1990 (S, C)		0	35	1
1992 (M)	54			
1994 (S, C)		2	50	5
1996 (M)	115			
1998 (S, C)		2	59	7
2000 (M)	187			
2002 (S, C)		3	91	14 ^b

Note: (a) Beginning in 1985, Brazil began to stagger local and state / national elections. M=local (*município*) elections for mayors and town councils. S=State elections for Governor and State assemblies. C= National Congressional Elections for the Chamber of Deputies and Senate. Blank cells indicate that elections were not held for those offices in that year.

(b). For Senate seats, the party won 10 of these in the 2002 elections, but their parliamentary figure is 14 because they retain 4 of their previous seats due to staggered Senate elections.

Source: Magalhães et al. (1999)

This grew to three governorships in 2002, when Anthony Garotinho (of the left-of-center Brazilian Socialist Party, PSB) left the governor's office in Rio de Janeiro to run for president, leaving his coalition partner from the PT, Benedita da Silva, to assume the executive office for the remainder of his term (to the end of 2002). Notably, da Silva became not only the third PT governor in the country, but also the first black Brazilian to hold such a high office. In the October 2002 elections, the PT won two governorships, in Acre and Piauí, in the first round. The party placed eight candidates in second round elections, but Lula's coattails were not sufficient to gain more than one victory in the second round, Mato Grosso do Sul. Still, a number of races were very tight, with the party losing by only two or three percentage points in Pará and Rio Grande do Sul. The proximity of gubernatorial victories demonstrated by the number of PT

candidates who went through to the second round suggest that the party is beginning to make important headway against the mainly conservative, clientelist machine politics that dominates the state level in Brazil. The main disappointing result in gubernatorial elections has been the party's inability to win re-election in Rio Grande do Sul (won in 1998), Espírito Santo (won 1994), and the Federal District (won 1994), although the 2002 results posted PT re-election in both Acre and Mato Grosso do Sul.

Table 2 offers vote totals for presidential elections. In 1989, Lula surprised both the right and left by finishing ahead of the populist figure, Leonel Brizola, to capture second place in the first round and face off against Fernando Collor in the second round. In the second round of balloting, Collor narrowly defeated Lula, but the close race allowed Lula and the PT to claim a great deal of legitimacy as "watchdogs" of the first popularly elected president in Brazil since 1960, and the party formed a "parallel government" of party officials and politicians who developed policy analyses critical of the various ministries and actions of the government. Throughout Collor's term, the PT mounted a vigorous opposition and when Collor was denounced in early 1992 for a massive corruption scheme, the PT became the leaders of the movement to impeach the president. By September, Collor was impeached, and he resigned his office on December 31, 1992, allowing Vice President Itamar Franco to assume the presidency until the elections of 1994.

In contrast to 1989, when Lula's emergence in the second round surprised most observers, the 1994 race was viewed from the outset as a struggle between Lula and Fernando Henrique Cardoso, then Itamar Franco's economic minister. Through April of 1994, Lula was polling in the 40 percent range, well ahead of all others. The government and Cardoso timed the introduction of a new economic stabilization plan, the *Plano Real*, for the winter months (southern hemisphere) of June-July 1994, just four months before the presidential elections, and they hoped that a swift reduction in inflation would push Cardoso past Lula and into the presidency. As the plan took effect and inflation did in fact decrease, Cardoso and Lula closed their gap in the polls and by mid-August Cardoso was polling over 40 percent, while Lula had fallen to around 20 percent. Cardoso, as shown in Table 2, won the election on the first ballot and took office in January 1995.

The 1998 elections were much more straightforward. In office, Cardoso—whose political trajectory went from socialism in the 1970s to social democracy in the 1980s and neoliberalism in the 1990s—used the popularity of his *Plano Real* to engineer a constitutional amendment al-

Table 2
Presidential Elections, 1989-2002

Candidate	Party ^a	Vote Total	Percent of Total
<i>1989, First Round, top three contenders</i>			
Fernando Collor	PRN	20,610,892	30.48
Luis I. Lula da Silva	PT	11,622,673	17.19
Leonel Brizola	PDT	11,168,228	16.51
<i>1989, Second Round</i>			
Fernando Collor	PRN	35,089,998	53.03
Luis I. Lula da Silva	PT	31,076,364	46.97
<i>1994, top three contenders</i>			
Fernando H. Cardoso	PSDB	34,377,829	54.28
Luis I. Lula da Silva	PT	17,126,784	27.04
Enéas Carneiro	Prona	4,672,092	7.38
<i>1998, top three contenders</i>			
Fernando H. Cardoso	PSDB	35,936,540	53.06
Luis I. Lula da Silva	PT	21,475,218	31.71
Ciro Gomes	PPS	7,426,190	10.97
<i>2002, First Round, top three contenders</i>			
Luis I. Lula da Silva	PT	39,413,073	46.4
José Serra	PSDB	19,685,465	23.2
Anthony Garotinho	PDT	15,164,237	17.9
<i>2002, Second Round</i>			
Luis I. Lula da Silva	PT	52,793,364	61.27
José Serra	PSDB	33,370.739	38.73

Notes: (a) PDSB = Brazilian Social Democratic Party; PRN = National Reconstruction Party; PDT = Democratic Workers' Party; Prona = National Order Party; PPS = Popular Socialist Party; PT = Workers' Party

Sources: Tribunal Superior Eleitoral, cited in Fernandes (1995), pp. 114-15, and Moisés (1993), p. 606.

lowing re-election for executive offices (mayors, governors, the president), with a two term limit. The amendment clearly intended to aid the re-election of Cardoso and the governors and mayors who rode his coattails since 1994. Between 1994 and 1998, the *Plano Real* curbed inflation to almost non-existent levels, which in Brazilian terms means about one to two percent per month or less. Individuals and families felt as if their ability to forecast and plan household budgets had at the very least stabilized, after years of hyperinflation and economic chaos. Lula and PT led an opposition that, in general, never reached the levels of pre-Real 1994, when Lula led Cardoso in every poll. Cardoso went to the polls in 1998 confident of the victory he would achieve, again on the first round.

Cardoso had indeed tamed inflation with the *Plano Real*, but throughout his eight years in office the economy has grown only sluggishly, while unemployment has increased. Brazil under Cardoso has been touted as a "model" of neoliberal reform by the IMF, the World Bank, the U.S. government, and international financiers, but the price of economic restructuring along neoliberal lines—privatization, free trade, the gutting of welfare programs, etc.—has been a growing gap between rich and poor in a country that already has one of the most unequal income distributions in the world. Everyday economic anxieties have returned, in spite of low inflation, as most Brazilians continue to earn less than \$300 per month in jobs that could end at any minute. This kind of insecurity registered as support for Lula, who gained about 52.8 million votes on October 27—a larger absolute vote total than has ever been achieved by any presidential candidate in a democracy, including even the U.S., where low voter turn-outs (lately below 50 percent in presidential elections) depress the absolute number of votes far below the actual population. Much of the vote for Lula came from middle class voters who had supported Cardoso in the past, as well as lower class voters who are growing disgruntled with machine politics and clientelism.

The electoral results in Tables 1 and 2 yield two firm conclusions. First, the PT is gaining ground in every electoral cycle and threatens to displace the traditional parties of the center. Second, the PT's growing prominence has redefined the stakes of national politics as neoliberalism versus the PT's model of participatory democracy. These results in Brazil's post-military democracy echo Timothy Power's generalization about Brazilian democracy from 1945 to 1964, "in the post-war era, the right's once-secure hegemony has been challenged whenever the rules of political competition have been relaxed enough to permit real participation and contestation" (2000: 52). That is, when given a real choice Brazilians

have tended over time to reject traditional parties and political elites (even self-proclaimed leftists)—which, as we recall, was the very reason behind the formation of PT in the first place, against the advice and wishes of the mainstream opposition to the military in 1979. In the post-military era, the PT redrawn the stakes and terms of national politics, and this, quite apart from electoral victories, is a stunning achievement in itself.

Stage 4: Governance

Electoral victories have presented the PT with the challenge of converting its grassroots, *basista*, popular version of democracy into practice. How does a party that has campaigned *against* the system suddenly become part of it? How does a group of well-educated but alienated radicals and poorly educated workers come together to develop policy? The risks were high. The PT could prove its critics right by appearing inexperienced and unqualified for the tasks of executive administration. Or the individual office holders from the PT could turn into their own enemy's image by succumbing to pressures of machine-building, clientelism, or the pervasive corruption that surrounds municipal budgeting and contracts. Some early PT administrations became mired in corruption, most notably Gilson Menezes's 1982-85 administration of Diadema in the heartland of the New Union Movement (Keck, 1992: 199-215; Branford and Kucinski, 1995: 76-8). Others took to governance by moderating their policies to the extent that party members, local *núcleos*, and municipal directorates became opponents of their own elected officials. But in the main, PT mayors have developed some of the most innovative practices of participatory democracy in the world, and by the early 1990s the PT had set in place a set of coherent policies that it calls the "PT Mode of Governing."

The PT Mode of Governing is built around some key programs that all incorporate popular participation into policy-making or orient the local government toward the needs and interests of the poorest sectors of society, who tend, by and large, to be non-unionized. The centerpiece of the PT Mode is the "participatory budget," which was developed by PT administrations in Porto Alegre, capital of Rio Grande do Sul, where the PT has won four consecutive terms in office, beginning in 1988. In the participatory budget, a series of municipal assemblies beginning at the neighborhood level debate budget priorities and then allocate much of the budget for the infrastructure programs (such as road repair, sanitation, urbanization programs) and some funds for schooling as well. The

municipal assemblies typical involve upwards of 100,000 citizens in their debates over the course of the budgeting cycle.

Another important program is *Bolsa Escola*, developed in the mid-1990s by the gubernatorial administration of Cristovam Buarque in the Federal District (Brasília, the national capitol). In *Bolsa Escola*, low-income families are given one minimum salary per month (about \$100) for demonstrating that their children are in school, and not on the streets or working to supplement the meager income of poor families. At a low cost, *Bolsa Escola* programs have dramatically increased school attendance, winning awards and attention from international organizations such as UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization]. *Bolsa Escola* is so successful that it has been copied by most Brazilian municipal administrations across the political spectrum, to the point that it has practically become a national policy.

Like the *Bolsa Escola*, the “People’s Bank” project also seeks to provide income incentives to lower-income households by providing low-interest loans to small businesses and micro-enterprises. In many poor neighborhoods, every other house lodges some kind of small business—groceries, bars, lunch-counters, repair shops, and the variety of informal sector enterprises that allow the poor to survive in developing countries. In the city of Belém, where the PT took office in 1996 and won reelection in 2000, the People’s Bank directly created about 11,540 new jobs between November 1998 and October 2001, with another 34,620 indirectly resulting from the bank’s programs, for a total of 46,160. So far, the project has financed about 7,000 projects valued at more than eight million Reais (about four million dollars) in real terms. In 2001, the People’s Bank in Belém was selected as one of the 20 “best experiences” of income and employment generation in Brazil by the Fundação Getúlio Vargas, the Ford Foundation, and the Banco Nacional de Desenvolvimento Social (Guidry and Petit, 2003).

Other programs could be mentioned, but they all follow these simple principles: funds allocated toward lower-income groups and minorities, direct participation by these citizens in the program’s development or implementation, and a transparent accountability that demonstrates to the public the PT’s commitment to ending corruption. The last point is of central importance, both for the PT’s executive administrations and its legislative agenda. The PT has helped to build a movement for “ethics in politics” that has resonated with the country’s increasing dissatisfaction with corrupt politicians. While it is one thing to lead the opposition to Fernando Collor’s massive corruption schemes in 1992, as the PT did, it

is quite another to gain control of large municipal and state budgets and leave office scandal-free. As administrators, the PT has developed a reputation throughout the country as sound managers of the public trust, and it is this that accounts for the party's growing victories at the municipal level—and not principally ideology or the party's autonomy from elite figures, although certainly these two things stand behind and reinforce the party's ability to deliver publicly accountable government.

The campaign for ethics in politics animates the PT's legislative agenda. Even in coalition with other left-of-center parties, the PT has never enjoyed legislative majorities, even in city councils or state assemblies where the party held the executive. Given a long-term minority status in legislative politics, the party built itself into an "loyal opposition" on the European model. At the national level, the PT has formed since 1990 a "shadow government" that has tracked and criticized the national administration. The campaign to impeach Fernando Collor allowed the PT to take its ethical stance to the national stage, and Collor's impeachment was a major victory of the party-as-opposition. The opposition role suited the PT: unable to mount major legislation, it has been able to cast a spotlight on government officials that has proved quite popular and has placed the vocabulary of ethics and accountability into the political discourse of parties across the spectrum. In this way, the PT has used its legislative base to significantly influence national political debates toward a critical analysis of Brazil's traditional political practices of populism and clientelism. The ethics discourse turned the PT's staunch line on the autonomy of workers' and popular movements into the practice of opposition that in turn has enabled the party to win mayoral campaigns and develop its administrative experience in the PT Mode of Governing.

Overall, the PT's work in executive and legislative roles has developed a reputation for serious, efficient, accountable, and non-corrupt governance that is aimed at servicing the public in general, and not only the workers' and popular movements from which the party arose. The PT claims to be a party of "the people" and it has delivered on this promise. While the PT Mode of Governing is certainly aimed at bringing lower-income citizens into the promises of democracy, most PT mayors and governors have recognized a need to govern in the name of all Brazilians and not only those who voted for the party. Thus, the PT has been at the forefront of the refurbishing and development of parks and green spaces that traditionally are located in wealthier neighborhoods and service the leisure activities of those residents. The party has been able to appease

business interests that discover greater profits and larger contracts under more efficient and transparent public works administrations.

Governing always engenders compromises with a party's ideology, and the PT is no exception. Electoral politics and the drive for majorities tend to moderate political agendas, and it is easy to chart such a path across Lula's four presidential campaigns from 1989 to the present. Journalists in Brazil and the industrialized world note, with cautious approval, that Lula has increasingly courted business interests. At the national level, the PT has gone to great lengths to assure the financial community that a PT administration would not be reckless or adventurous in the mold of left-wing parties prior to the end of the Cold War. In the 2002 campaign, Lula committed the PT to maintaining many of Cardoso's neoliberal policies and, importantly, his commitments to avoid default on Brazil's international debt and participate with IMF and World Bank programs. For the 2002 race, Lula chose as his running mate a leader from the Liberal Party, which is based in the evangelical movement of congregational Protestant Churches (e.g., the Assemblies of God, Baptists, Seventh Day Adventists, and several Brazilian fundamentalist churches). A coalition with the Liberal Party was seen as one way to stave off criticism that the PT was merely a party of unionists associated with the progressive Catholic Church.

By the 1990s, many within and outside the PT have questioned whether or not the party continues to represent its "popular base" in workers and poor people's movements in the city and countryside. Some of the PT's prominent, national leaders, such as Lula or Benedita da Silva (a black squatter from Rio de Janeiro, former governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro), come from the working class roots that the party has always held to be its "base." But many more are professional and middle class in their backgrounds—for example, Vitor Buaiz (a doctor and governor of the state of Espírito Santo, 1995-98), Cristovam Buarque (university rector, professor and governor of the Federal District of Brasília, 1995-98), Eduardo Suplicy (economist, researcher, and senator for the state of São Paulo), Luiza Erundina (social worker and university professor, former mayor of São Paulo, 1988-92), or Olívio Dutra (leader of bank workers' unions and former president of the PT).⁸ Today, union members in the PT tend to be from white-collar categories—teachers, social workers, and bank workers. The PT is concerned over the party's lack of resonance with the youth of Brazil and with women, and according to a study mentioned in the *Folha de São Paulo*, "a majority of PT militants is composed by white men, typically from the urban middle class" (*Folha de São Paulo*,

1996). Of the 58 PT members of the Câmara dos Deputados (1999-2002 term), only 8 listed professions (or past experiences) that were distinctly blue collar, and the vast majority were white Brazilians, in a country where over 50 percent of the population is of Afro-Brazilian or mixed ancestry.⁹

Beyond the Labor Movement: The Workers' Party as a Model for Labor Politics

The experience of the PT in Brazil offers important lessons to labor movements and labor parties in other countries, both in the developing and industrialized world. The party's three ingredients to its success need to be translated into other contexts and political systems. First, the party provides a *social-organizational* model that combines a broad base of support *outside organized labor* with party autonomy from these same organizations. By eschewing direct and official relationships with organized labor and other social movements, the party provides a political expression of popular and grassroots objectives without attempting to control or co-opt its own bases of support. Working independently, organized labor, other social movements, and the PT are able to craft three distinct approaches to politics in Brazil that reinforce each other without appearing to voters to be an organized front for one politician or leader, such as Lula. By remaining autonomous of organized labor and other organizations, the PT puts its money where its mouth is by avoiding the clientelism that has traditionally characterized Brazilian politics in both democratic and authoritarian eras. Autonomy also enables the party to avoid being labeled as a "populist" vehicle that only uses grassroots movements for support.

Autonomy is reinforced by the party's second main feature, its *open ideology* that allows for a variety of positions. The party is able to embrace a wide variety of left-of-center political groups by asking only that these groups accept the party's broad definition of the "worker" and its stance against a simple-minded acceptance of the neoliberal policies that have been pursued by the parties of the center and the right. The PT has used its staunch opposition to free trade, "globalization," and other neoliberal programs that would diminish the role of the state in Brazilian society to develop an approach to ethical politics, governance for all Brazilians, and efficient executive administration that resonates with a wide array of voters in the working, middle, and even upper classes.

Third, the party's PT Mode of Governing has enabled it to demonstrate very clearly that it has not only experience but also a specific plan of governing that accords with its commitment to transparency and ac-

countability in government. The PT Mode of Governing has won the party adherents across the spectrum of social classes and has influenced policy well outside of the PT, as parties of the center and right have increasingly adopted the PT's methods of participatory democracy and efficiency. While copy-cat programs on the right and center tend to dilute the objectives of the PT's own model in the search for electoral bases, these other parties' adoption of the PT model serve to legitimate the PT's program. This leads voters to increasingly select the PT as their option in elections, accounting for the PT's dramatic growth over the last 20 years.

The key to developing a PT-style model in other places is organizational communication. Because of the stress on the political autonomy of participants in a broad-scale workerist program, the PT's model relies on developing modes of communication between politicians, party organs, and grassroots organizations that help to insure a strong level of political trust between these groups. The PT's agenda as an opposition party has fulfilled this role to the present, but as the party wins greater electoral victories it will be tested for its promises to organization in and outside of labor that have supported the party. As long as the party is mainly an opposition party in national and state legislatures, it can avoid being held completely accountable by unions and social movements for failing to develop a specific legislative agenda—allowing the party to develop an organization strength through its legislative weakness. Its record of municipal and state governance, on the other hand, allows it to demonstrate that, once in government, it will adhere to the agendas of labor and other groups. In the presidency, the party will be tested, as its constituents will watch carefully to see how the party lives up to ideological and programmatic commitments.

Perhaps the most important lesson the PT provides to labor-based political movements outside of Brazil is in its refusal to embrace the neoliberal agenda. In case after case, across the industrialized and developing world, nominally "left-of-center" parties have one by one capitulated to the *laissez-faire* policies first made prominent in the administrations of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. Britain's "New" Labour under Tony Blair and the U.S. Democratic Party under Bill Clinton are only the most notable examples. By contrast, the PT demonstrates that a labor-oriented, left-of-center party can maintain and expand its base while opposing these kinds of policies. While one might argue that a workerist agenda might be easier to pull off in a poor nation like Brazil, where most workers (unionized or not) are under great economic pressures traceable to neoliberal policies, this criticism does not ring true. In the U.S., more

than 50 percent of the electorate abstain from voting and it is widely known that non-voters in the U.S. are overwhelmingly poor and working class. Critics of the Democratic party in the U.S. charge that these voters stay away from the polls because they perceive no real alternative between the two main parties, and this criticism has more than a grain of truth to it. A vigorous pro-worker party along the lines of the PT could address this gap between voters and non-voters. Of course, in the U.S. or British two-party context this would mean developing a PT-style group within a dominant party, but there are plenty of cases of similar moves in these countries' history—the growth of the civil rights agenda within the Democratic Party being one prominent example.

The PT provides a basis for believing that a party in the U.S. might be able to reach out to non-voters and current-but-disgruntled voters by rejecting the economically conciliatory platforms of most Democratic politicians. The chief factor to be overcome is the insistence, especially in the U.S., on the importance of immediate electoral gains. The PT's model is based on one thing that U.S. politicians and labor activists will have great difficulty accepting: persistence over time and a willingness to accept an oppositional role while the party's message becomes known and consolidated in the public. Winning one election—in 1982, 1985, 1988, and through to 2002—has never been the PT's objective. Providing an *alternative* to politics-as-usual has been the goal, on the belief that a tried and tested commitment to workerist politics would over time win greater and greater numbers of adherents on election day. When the Democratic Party in the U.S., or other left-of-center parties in the industrialized world accept this role, they may be able to put into play the PT's model. This is the risk that the PT has assumed, and it is also the lesson the PT provides.

Notes

- * The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments of my fellow panelists and participants at the UALE's 2002 conference in Los Angeles, three anonymous reviewers for the journal, and Kim Scipes.
- 1 Autonomy benefited both organized labor and the party that claimed to represent labor. In 1949, German trade unionist Hans Boekler led the "Unified Trade Unions Movement" to separate organized labor from official ties to political parties, thereby unifying labor and enabling it to win greater concessions in collective bargaining. At the same time, the Social Democratic Party was able to pursue its own strategies for electoral compe-

tition without appearing to have any agenda to control the labor movement or its agenda.

- 2 The paper's methodology is based on the historical analysis of Workers' Party documents, journalistic discourse about the party, and the existing research on the party (cited in the paper). In 1998, the author began a research project on the local Workers' Party administration of Belém, joined by historian Pere Petit (1996) in 2002 (see Guidry and Petit, 2003). Material on Belém in the paper is based on documentary research there and interviews with key administration officials (with Petit) in 2002. The analytical scheme of Figure 1 comes from a previous collaboration that compared the PT and the Green Party of Germany (Guidry and Probst, 1997).
- 3 Collier and Collier (1991: 169-78), demonstrate how the nature of labor incorporation under Vargas's labor structures both legitimized and co-opted Brazilian labor, paving the way for the military dictatorship in the 1960s. Seidman (1994: 27), notes that the term *pelego* refers to the "blanket that sits between the horse and the saddle," thus describing co-opted labor leaders as a device that makes it more comfortable for a rider (industry, the military government) to ride the horse (the workers).
- 4 The other two labor federations are the CGT (General Confederation of Workers), founded in 1986, which grew out of reforms to the structure of labor organization inherited from the military years, and Força Sindical (FS), which formed in 1991 as non-political federation of union organizations. FS eschews direct ties, official or ideological, with the left, but it membership frequently votes for PT candidates. With regard to the 2002 presidential run-off, FS declared that its members are free to vote for either Lula or Serra, and it about 70 percent voted for Lula (Lyra, 2002).
- 5 The PT's website, www.pt.org.br, lists links and items detailing the party's communication network with organized labor in all three federations. Also, a number of labor-affiliated research organizations, such as the Departamento Intersindical de Assessoria Parlamentar (Interunion Department of Parliamentary Access), help to develop legislative relations between the PT and organized labor.
- 6 I owe this characterization to Pere Petit, a historian who has written an oral history of the PT in the state of Pará (1996).
- 7 This may seem odd, given the PT's refusal to organize itself along the lines of older, vanguardist parties of the traditional Brazilian left, but it is not inconsistent with the PT's stance of trying to bring together all groups and movements who cast their lot with an independent labor party. Lula and other leaders understood the risk involved, and in the end they formed a bloc

(called “tendencies” by PT members) known as *Articulação 113* (Articulation 113), which has dominated the PT since the mid-1980s.

- 8 Buaiz (PT governor of Espírito Santo, 1995-98) and Erundina (mayor of São Paul 1985-88) both demonstrate an important difficulty in governing. Both of these officials were perceived by the party's base as too accommodating to centrist and elite interests, and disputes over their administrations hampered their ability to govern. Both eventually left the PT, Buaiz for the Green Party and Erundina for the Brazilian Socialist Party.
- 9 These data are gathered from the national legislature's website, www.camara.gov.br.

References

- Abers, Rebecca. 1996. “From Ideas to Practice: The Partido dos Trabalhadores and Participatory Governance in Brazil.” *Latin American Perspectives* 23, no. 4: 35-53.
- Alves, Maria Helena Moreira. 1985. *State and Opposition in Military Brazil*. Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Branford, Sue and Bernardo Kucinski. 1995. *Brazil, Carnival of the Oppressed: Lula and the Brazilian Workers' Party*. London: Latin American Bureau.
- Castañeda, Jorge. 1994. *Utopia Unarmed: The Latin American Left after the Cold War*. New York: Vintage.
- Collier, Ruth Berins and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Fernandes, Luis. 1995. “Muito Barulho por Nada? O Realinhamento Político-Ideológico nas Eleições de 1994.” *Dados* 38, no. 1: 107-44.
- Flores, Lourenço and Maurício Lima. 2000. “Com Vocês, O PT Cor-de-Rosa.” *Veja*, 11 (October): 34-40.
- Genro, Tarso et al. 1997. *Desafios do Governo Local: O Modo Petista de Governar*. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo.
- Guidry, John A. and Pere Petit. 2003. “Faith in What Will Change: Belém's Workers' Party Administration,” In *Radicals in Power: The Workers' Party and Experiments with Urban Democracy in Brazil*. G. Baiocchi, ed. London: Zed.
- Guidry, John A. and Lothar Probst. 1997. “Consistencies of Democracy: A Comparative Study of Opposition Parties in Brazil and Germany,” paper presented to the XX International Congress of the Latin American Studies Association (April 17-19, Guadalajara, Mexico).

- Folha de São Paulo*. 1996. "PT, 16, Perde Espaço entre a Juventude." (28 September).
- Isto É*. (October, 11): 27.
- Keck, Margaret. 1992. *The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Lyra, Paulo de Tarso. 2002. "Força Sindical Libera Filiados, mas 70 percent Devem Votar em Lula." *Jornal do Brasil* (October 14).
- Magalhães, I., L. Barreto, and V. Trevas, eds. 1999. *Governo e Cidadania: Balanço e Reflexões sobre o Modo Petista de Governar*. São Paulo: Editora Fundação Perseu Abramo.
- Moisés, José Alvaro. 1993. "Elections, Political Parties, and Political Culture in Brazil: Changes and Continuities." *Journal of Latin American Studies* 25: 575-611.
- Partido dos Trabalhadores. 1980. "Manifesto do Partido dos Trabalhadores." In *Diário Oficial da União* (October 21). <http://www.pt.org.br>.
- _____. 1982. "Programa do Partido dos Trabalhadores." <http://www.pt.org.br>.
- Petit, Pere. 1996. *A Esperança Equilibrista: A Trajetória do PT no Pará*. São Paulo: Boitempo.
- Power, Timothy J. 2000. *The Political Right in Postauthoritarian Brazil: Elites, Institutions, and Democratization*. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
- Putnam, Robert. 2000. *Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community*. New York: Simon and Schuster.
- Roberts, Kenneth. 1998. *Deepening Democracy? The Modern Left and Social Movements in Chile and Peru*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
- Seidman, Gay. 1994. *Manufacturing Militance: Workers' Movements in Brazil and South Africa*. Berkeley: University of California Press.