

The Politicized Participant

Ideology and Political Action in 20 Democracies

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Modern liberal democracies demand high and equal levels of political action. Unequal levels of political action between ideological groups may ultimately lead to biased policy. But to what extent do citizens' ideological preferences affect their likelihood to participate politically? And does the institutional environment moderate this relationship? From rivaling theories, the authors construct hypotheses regarding the relationship between ideological preferences and participation and those regarding the moderating effect of state institutions. They test them for six modes of political action—voting, contacting, campaigning, cooperating, persuading, and protesting—through multilevel analyses of 27 elections in 20 Western democracies. First, they find that citizens' ideological preferences are an important determinant political action. Second, they find that majoritarianism outperforms consensualism: In majoritarian systems, political action is more widespread and not less equal across the crucial factor of ideological preferences. The field should therefore reconsider Lijphart's conclusions about the superiority of consensualism.

Keywords: *political action; left-right position; ideology; consensualism; majoritarianism*

The performance of democratic societies depends strongly on the participation of citizens. Democracy demands high and equal levels of political action. Yet in modern societies participation is highly unequal (Lijphart, 1998): Political action is more common in some groups than in others, which in turn causes the former to have a stronger impact on the political process. Political scientists generally focus on participatory inequality across sociodemographic categories (Lijphart, 1997; Powell,

1986; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978), as epitomized by the infamous male WASP—that is, the privileged White Anglo-Saxon Protestant—who dominates political life.

Whereas participatory inequality across sociodemographic categories results in a bias in the composition of parliament or advocacy groups on age, sex, ethnicity, income, and education, differential levels of participation across ideological groups result directly in a bias in terms of political preferences and thereby in terms of policy output. Therefore, the issue of participatory inequality in modern democratic societies primarily revolves around ideological preferences.

Participatory inequality between ideological groups is important, for two reasons. First, the participatory inequality of ideological groups may directly result in biased policy output. If, for instance, right-wing citizens are more likely than left-wing citizens to vote, then parliament is likely to have a right-wing bias over the population at large. Likewise, if extremist citizens are more likely than moderate citizens to protest, then their voice is likely to be heard more strongly and more often by policy makers. Second, policy preferences have been used to explain the direction of political acts (i.e., who citizens vote for) but not the choice of whether to act. Although the left-right scheme is considered to underlie “the electorate’s orientations toward the surrounding political world” (Pierce, 1981, p. 117), no more than a few studies looked for an effect of ideological preferences on political action (Armingeon, 2007; Jennings & Van Deth, 1990; Martin & Van Deth, 2007; Teorell, Torcal, Montero, 2007; Verba & Nie, 1972). Yet, each of these studies focused on a single form of political action (such as casting a ballot or protesting) or a single aspect of ideological preferences (such as left-right position or extremism).

In this article, we systematically analyze the association between ideology and political action, from a comparative perspective. Upon mapping out the impact of ideological preferences on political action—that is, the participatory inequality across ideological groups—the question arises whether political systems differ in participatory inequality and how political institutions might stimulate equality in participation. Lijphart (1998, 1999)

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suggested that some institutional designs are better equipped than others to stimulate equal levels of political action. Yet, this claim has not yet been empirically tested. Furthermore, a growing literature points out that the willingness to act depends on the ideological position of the government in office. As such, we deal with the following research questions:

To what extent are citizens' ideological positions related to political action (or modes of political action)?

To what extent do institutional arrangements and the ideological position of the government in office affect political action?

To what extent is the association between ideological position and political action (or modes of political action) among individuals moderated by institutional arrangements?

To answer these questions we do a quantitative multilevel analysis on election survey data, incorporating 47,902 respondents and 27 elections in 20 Western countries. This study contributes to the literature on political action, in two ways. First, we systematically develop and test the claim that the left-right position is an important determinant of political action. Second, we condition the individual-level association between the left-right position and political action by institutional characteristics of the polity.

Ideological Preferences and Political Action

Ideological preferences among citizens are usually measured on a left-right scale, which distinguishes both the direction (i.e., left or right) and the extremity (i.e., distance to the midpoint of the scale) of these preferences.¹ Although the meaning of the poles may differ across groups, times, and places, a general understanding of left and right seems to be available. More than 50 years ago, Lipset, Lazarsfeld, Barton, and Linz (1954) defined the left as “advocating social change in the direction of greater equality—political, economic or social” and the right as “supporting a traditional, more or less hierarchical social order, and opposing change towards greater equality” (p. 1135). Later definitions echo this distinction. For Laver and Hunt (1992), for instance, the left pole of the scale has become associated with

policies designed to bring about the redistribution of resources from those with more to those with less, and with the promotion of social rights that apply to groups of individuals taken as a whole even at the expense of individual members of those groups. . . . [The right pole is associated with] the

promotion of individual rights, including the right not to have personal resources expropriated for redistribution by the state, even at the expense of social inequality and of poverty among worse off social groups. (p. 12)

In the broad terms defined by Lipset et al. (1954), the meaning of left and right is similar in different countries. Even though polities may have differing conflict dimensions, the left-right scheme encompasses them “regardless of how many cleavage and/or identification dimensions exist” (Sani & Sartori, 1983, p. 330). Fuchs and Klingemann (1990) show that the general societal values associated with the terms *left* and *right* are similar for the general public in Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States: The left is related to equality, solidarity, progressiveness, and system change; the right is related to individualism, freedom, conservatism, and system maintenance.

Why, then, would we expect left-right position to be related to political action? To some extent, participatory differences between left- and right-wing citizens might be spurious—that is, the consequence of underlying factors, such as economic resources. For instance, because citizens have a higher level of education, they are more likely to adopt a left-wing ideology and are better equipped to participate politically—although no direct causal relation exists between ideology and participation. Although spurious explanations are not our prime concern, we take them into account in our analyses to assess the direct relationship between ideology and political action. We do not formulate extensive theory or estimate additional causal models for the relationship between ideological position and these control factors, because we are interested in them only to eliminate spurious effects. In our empirical analysis, we include only control factors that are highly unlikely to function as intermediate factors, such as sex, education, and income.

Substantially more interesting for the aim of this article are the ways in which the left-right position might be inherently related to political action. Summarizing the various approaches in this area, Pattie, Seyd, and Whiteley (2004, pp. 137-151) distinguish five explanations that explain political action, but they do not link them to ideological preferences and state institutions. Yet, these factors can be related to three of the five explanations: first, the general incentives theory (Whiteley & Seyd, 2002), which considers citizens to be motivated primarily by the benefits of the outcomes and the process of participation; second, the civic voluntarism theory (e.g., Verba & Nie, 1972; Verba, Scholzman, & Brady, 1995), which explains political action via social and economic resources; and, third, the equity fairness theory (Clarke, Sanders, Stewart, & Whiteley, 2004), which emphasizes

relative deprivation as a source of political action—that is, a perceived gap between expectations and outcomes (especially in comparison to a peer group) would motivate citizens to participate politically, especially in an unconventional mode.

Hypotheses

The relationships between ideological preferences and political action can be studied at several levels. Our first set of hypotheses is directed toward the ways in which citizens' ideological preferences are presumed to have some inherent impact on their political activities (i.e., disregarding the context in which they operate). Our second set of hypotheses brings in the context and relates the ideological preferences of citizens to the ideological position of the government in office. Our third and final set of hypotheses relates the institutional features of the political system to the relationships between ideological preferences and political action.

Individual Features

Probably the most straightforward way to measure the relationship between citizens' ideology and their participation is to consider the degree of extremism and its expected impact on participation, regardless of whether the position is left or right. In general, ideological extremists are likely to participate more strongly than ideological moderates (Putnam, 2000, p. 342). Ideological extremists have stronger incentives to become involved in politics—either to defend or to change the status quo. Martin and Van Deth (2007) find support for this claim, stating that “the likelihood of being involved in a participatory way increases with the degree of [of individual citizens'] polarization” (p. 328). This means that we expect the highest levels of political action among ideological extremists on both the left and the right:

Hypothesis 1a: The more extreme the ideological position of citizens, the more likely they are to participate politically.

Even if political extremists show levels of political action higher than those of more moderate citizens, it is unlikely that right- and left-wing preferences have the same impact on political action. For several reasons, citizens with left-wing orientations are inherently more likely to participate

than people on the right-wing side of the ideological spectrum. Traditionally, left-wing preferences aim at changing society, whereas right-wing preferences are about preserving it (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990; Kriesi, 1993). Therefore, if we disregard the context in which they live, left-wing citizens have more outcome incentives to participate politically, given that they aim for system change (Martin & Van Deth, 2007). Right-wing citizens, however, do not aim for such change and so lack this incentive.

Beside being driven by these outcome benefits, left-wing citizens may be motivated by process incentives. Inglehart (1997) found that postmaterialist citizens do not participate for the purpose of political outcome but for intrinsic reasons; that is, the expected satisfaction derived from the participation functions as an incentive. Postmaterialists are dominantly found at the left side of the political spectrum (p. 252). The “old”—that is, proletarian—connotations of the left side of the ideological spectrum have gradually been replaced by the “new” meanings, which emphasize citizen involvement for inherent expressive reasons. As such, we come to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1b: The more left-wing the position of citizens, the more likely they are to participate politically.

The selected modes of participation might also be related to the positions on the left-right spectrum. Conventional modes of participation go within the system of representational government (e.g., voting, campaigns, contacts with the bureaucracy; Verba & Nie, 1972), whereas unconventional modes go outside the representational system (e.g., protests, strikes, boycotts).

The left-wing position seems to be particularly relevant for unconventional modes of participation. According to citizens, protesting is the primary modus operandi for left-wing citizens (Fuchs & Klingemann, 1990). As they aim to change the societal status quo, they are more likely to participate outside the representational, supposedly elitist, structures. Right-wing citizens are far less likely to even consider using unconventional modes of political action (Anderson & Mendes, 2005). Inglehart (1997) presents a similar argument, stressing that there is an intrinsic value in protest forms of political action for left-wing (i.e., postmaterialist) citizens because they prefer elite-challenging, instead of elite-directed, forms of participation.

The third hypothesis, then, stresses that left-wing citizens not only show higher levels of participations in general (Hypothesis 1b) but have a stronger

preference for protest-like forms of political action, when compared to their right-wing counterparts:

Hypothesis 1c: The association between the left-right position and political action is stronger for unconventional modes of political action than it is for conventional modes.

Contested Politics

Until this point, we focused on the isolated impact of ideological preferences. Yet the left-right scale can be used to capture the ideological distance between the position of an individual citizen and the ideological position of the government in office. A lack of congruence between these two ideological positions might be an incentive to participate. In the literature on contested politics, election outcomes have different attitudinal and behavioral effects on electoral winners and electoral losers (Anderson, Blais, Bowler, Donovan, & Listhaug, 2005; cf. Anderson & Guillory, 1997). Citizens who are faced with a newly elected parliament or government that they do not prefer (the “losers”) are less satisfied with the democratic system than are those who support the new government (the “winners”). These losers have a higher incentive to participate politically. Anderson et al. (2005, pp. 40-47) find that losers are more likely to think that their vote can make a difference and that they are more likely to protest. Losing an election leads not to political apathy (exit) but to political action (voice). Therefore, citizens are especially motivated to participate when faced with governmental policies with which they disagree (Hibbing & Theiss-Morse, 2002).

Pattie et al. (2004) offer an explanation for this mechanism in their equity–fairness theory. At its core, this theory claims that frustration, as caused by relative deprivation, can manifest itself in aggressive political action: “If there is a significant gap between expectations and reality then relative deprivation is likely to result and this in turn will have political consequences” (p. 147). Deprived citizens are especially more likely to participate in unconventional political action (Muller, 1979). The bigger the gap between expectations and reality, hopes and outcomes, the stronger the incentive to engage in political action. In electoral terms, the less that the outcome of a government formation corresponds with the hopes of a citizen after an election, the more that he or she will feel deprived and the more that he or she will engage in political action.

Yet, what defines being a winner or a loser? The labels of *winner* and *loser* are often attached to citizens on the basis of their party preference.

However, the labels can be more aptly measured by ideological proximity—that is, by the degree of congruence between the ideological positions of a citizen and the government. The more that one's left-right position differs from the position of the government in office, the higher the political loss of that citizen. Or, vice versa—the more one's left-right position resembles that of the government in office, the more that citizen thinks of herself or himself a winner. This degree of loss or gain can be seen as an incentive to participate. More important than objective criteria of winning and losing is whether a citizen perceives oneself as a winner or a loser. When citizens perceive the ideological position of government to be incongruent with their own position, they are more likely to participate politically. Thus, we come to the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 2: Citizens are more likely to participate politically when the distance is longer between the perceived left-right position of the current government and their own left-right position.

We expect that citizens' distance to the government's ideological position partly explains the positive effect of ideological extremism on political action. The explanation of relatively high levels of participation for ideological extremists (see Hypothesis 1a) lies mainly in their stronger opinion regarding the status quo. However, based on the mechanism described above, this may not be the only explanation. Ideological extremists—who position themselves at the fringes of the left-right scheme—are generally more likely to be a large distance to the government's left-right position. The first explanation results from the general incentives model, the second from the equity–fairness model.

Political Institutions

Political action depends not only on individual resources, skills, or orientations but also on the opportunities, incentives, and incidents provided by the social and political context. If no elections take place, people cannot cast a vote. In a similar way, if academic policies and labor relations remain unchallenged, then there is no need for students to occupy a university building or for workers to block the entrance of their firm, respectively. From this perspective, institutional arrangements condition the individual-level association between ideology and political action. We expect the strength and even the direction of the association to differ cross-nationally—an expectation for which there is indeed some support (Martin & Van Deth, 2007; Teorell, Torcal, Montero, 2007).

The type of democratic regime is likely to affect the level of political action. Lijphart (1999) positions democratic regimes on a continuum ranging from majoritarian to consensual systems. As the name implies, pure majoritarian systems are ruled by a majority without countervailing powers, such as a written constitution, multiple houses of parliament, and minority vetoes. By contrast, consensualism is inclusionist; that is, it is based on coalition governments, a written constitution, the division of power, and minority vetoes (cf. Powell, 2000). The difference between the two types of systems can be summarized as the distinction between voice and accountability (Thomassen & Aarts, 2005). Consensual systems emphasize voice: Political power is shared between national and local authorities and between the governing parties and opposition parties, which offers a large amount of possibilities to all citizens—including minorities—to get their opinions heard. In line with the civic voluntarism model, these possibilities for voice are considered valuable, shared resources to all citizens. Majoritarian systems, however, emphasize accountability: Because all power is disproportionately put into the hands of one executive power, citizens know who to blame when they wish to “throw the rascals out.” Concentration of institutional power functions as an incentive for political action, as Jackman (1987) showed for voter turnout. Similarly, Franklin (2004) concludes that institutional competitiveness stimulates voter turnout.

Because the voice and accountability perspectives—or, respectively, the resource and incentive perspectives—differ in their emphases, opposing hypotheses are formulated on the impact of regime type on political action. From the voice perspective, a direct positive effect of a consensual regime type on political action can be expected. Because the system is more responsive to societal claims, the use of the voice strategy is more likely to have an effect in consensual systems than it is in majoritarian systems. The proportional and inclusive consensual systems are especially more open to minorities and dissenting voices. Because this results in higher levels of political efficacy, such citizens are more likely to participate politically (Karp & Banducci, 2008). This argument echoes the civic voluntarism model of Pattie et al. (2004).

The empirical record—mostly based on aggregated data—shows that voter turnout is indeed higher in consensual systems than it is in majoritarian systems (Blais & Carty, 1990; Lijphart, 1999; Powell, 2000), although these findings might have been overstated (cf. Blais, 2006). Social movements are more common when political cleavages are pacified and when government is weak and inclusive (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, & Giugni, 1995). Local autonomy, a characteristic typical of consensualism,

stimulates membership of political organizations (Morales, 2001). These differences between consensual and majoritarian systems are likely to have similar consequences for other modes of political action. The first hypothesis to be tested is thus the following:

Hypothesis 3a: The more consensual a political system, the more likely that a citizen participates politically.

Yet, when we look at the incentives to participate but emphasize accountability, we come to opposite expectations. Consensual systems do offer citizens more possibilities to voice their opinions, but citizens have fewer incentives to let their voices be heard, given that the likely outcome of the political process will be a compromise (cf. Karp & Banducci, 2008). By contrast, much more is at stake in majoritarian systems: Generally, the winner takes all; political power is balled into a single organization, which might give citizens more incentives to participate politically. Therefore, we come to the opposite hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3b: The more consensual a political system, the less likely that a citizen participates politically.

Lijphart (1999) claims that consensual systems are not only benevolent for levels of political action but conducive to greater political equality. Consensual democracies are supposedly “kinder and gentler” (p. 275)—that is, “more egalitarian and truly representative of citizen’s wishes” (Policzer, 2000, p. 838). In other words, differences between left- and right-wing citizens are supposedly smaller or less salient in consensual systems.² We test Lijphart’s claim more directly by focusing on participation and by relating these actions to citizens’ ideological preferences.

Consensualism diminishes the individual-level association between the left-right position and political action, because ideological conflicts are less salient and less relevant in these systems.³ According to this line of argument, citizens’ ideological preferences offer fewer incentives to participate in the depoliticized consensual system than in the competitive majoritarian system. We build on the general incentives theory of Pattie et al. (2004) and so expect these institutional factors to have conditional effects on the individual-level relationships presented above:

Hypothesis 3c: The more consensual a political system, the weaker the individual-level association between the left-right position and political action.

Hypothesis 3d: The more consensual a political system, the weaker the individual-level association between extremism and political action.

Similarly, consensual regimes are likely to dampen the hypothesized relationships because of the congruence between the left-right position of government and that of citizens. Once in power, governments in consensual systems take minority views into account: Even in the case of a clear left-wing majority, the interests from the right-wing opposition will not be excluded, and vice versa. Consensualism is able to “satisfy large groups’ interests on a great number of issues” (Colomer, 2001, p. 2). Because governments are inclusive, the attitudinal difference between the electoral winners and the electoral losers are much smaller or less salient in consensual systems than in majoritarian systems (Anderson et al., 2005). In other words, winning and losing matter less under consensual institutions than under majoritarian institutions (Anderson & Guillory, 1997). The effect of the perceived ideological distance to the government in power can be specified in the following hypothesis, based on cross-level interaction:

Hypothesis 3e: The more consensual a political system, the weaker the individual-level association between the perceived distance to the current government and political action.

Data and Operationalizations

The hypotheses call for a multilevel design, which distinguishes among three levels of analysis: citizens (individual level), who are nested in governmental periods (meso-level), which are in turn nested in political systems (macro-level). The Comparative Studies of Electoral Systems (CSES) data set, Module 2, provides us with the means to test our hypotheses: It contains the right measures; it covers a large number of elections; and all surveys were held during election time. The CSES data set combines many national parliamentary election surveys held in the 2001–2006 period. To this data set we added six more election survey data sets that build on the CSES modules and so contain the relevant measures: Australia, 2001; Denmark, 2005; Germany, 2005; Netherlands, 2006; New Zealand, 2005; and Norway, 2005.

Thirty-eight countries were included in the second module of the CSES. In our hierarchical analyses, we exclusively focus on the 20 long-standing Western democracies in our data set. Because we have data on two

parliamentary elections for 7 countries, our data set covers 27 elections. The total number of respondents of 18 years and older is 47,902. The appendix presents an overview of the countries and elections in our study.

Dependent Variables: Political Action

The major aim of our analyses is to trace the impact of ideological preferences on the levels and modes of political participation under various political and institutional circumstances. We distinguish six types of political action:⁴ *voting* (casted a ballot at the last parliamentary election), *contacting* (contacted a politician or government official during the last 5 years), *campaigning* (support for a particular party or candidate by, for example, attending a meeting or putting up a poster), *persuading* (talked to other people to persuade them to vote for a particular party or candidate), *cooperating* (worked with others who share the same political concerns), and *protesting* (taken part in a protest, march, or demonstration). All six measures are dichotomous, given that the most important distinction is that between those who participate and those who do not.

Independent Variables: Ideological Positions

To test our hypotheses, we need three types of measures for respondents' ideological positions. First, we apply the readily available 11-point Left-Right Self-Placement Scale: 0 (*left*) to 10 (*right*). Second, we require a measure for ideological extremism. Respondents who positioned themselves in the middle of the left-right scale are considered to be the most moderate. The distance from this midpoint signals the degree of self-reported ideological extremism. The resulting scale ranges from 0 (*moderate*) to 5 (*extreme*). The third and final measure was constructed to capture the perceived distance between the respondent and the government in power directly before the elections.⁵ As respondents report their level of participation at the time of the new elections on which the surveys are held (i.e., time t_0), the theoretically relevant government is the one that was in power during the preceding governmental period, just before these elections (i.e., time t_{-1}). To measure the position of the government in office, we use the left-right positions that respondents assign to the political parties that made up the government—that is, the mean of the governing parties' left-right position, weighted by their relative size in parliamentary seats.⁶ When respondents position themselves on the same position as the point

estimate of the government, they are winners. The larger the ideological distance between the government and the respondent, the more we consider him or her as a loser.⁷

Independent Variables: Institutional Contexts and Control Variables

Lijphart (1999) proposes a standardized two-dimensional measure of consensualism: the executives–parties dimension, and the federal–unitary dimension. Negative scores are assigned to countries with more majoritarian institutions, positive scores to countries with a more consensual system.⁸ Because the Lijphart indices are central to our study but available only for long-standing democracies, we leave out the 18 recently established democracies from the CSES data set in our multivariate hierarchical analyses.

Two additional contextual control factors are included in our models that have been found to be important determinants of political action: First, economic development has been found to be an important stimulant of political action (Teorell, Torcal, Montero, 2007); gross domestic product per capita in the year 2000, the year preceding all elections in our survey, is used as an indicator for this control factor. Second, the voting system—specifically, whether voting is compulsory or not—is included. If voting is compulsory, the state forces its citizens to vote and thereby raises turnout (Engelen, 2007; Jackman, 1987; Lijphart, 1998). Moreover, the positive effects might very well spill over to other domains of political action. Because they have to vote, citizens might get active in contemplating politics, discussing it, and getting more broadly involved. Compulsory voting might also reduce unequal voter turnout (De Winter, 1998; Hooghe & Pellerieux, 1998; Lijphart, 1997, 1998). Following the experts' assignments in the CSES 2001–2006 data set, we measure compulsory voting in three categories: strongly enforced, partially enforced, and noncompulsory.

Finally, we control for several characteristics of individual citizens to exclude possible spurious effects: gender, age, education, marital status, socioeconomic status, household income, attendance of religious services, and urbanization of residence. Unfortunately, not all these characteristics are available in all surveys. For instance, the measure of income is not available for Belgium; attendance is not included in Canada, Finland, Norway, and Spain. If the association between ideology and political action is not affected by the inclusion or exclusion of these control factors, we exclude them to maximize the number of higher-level cases.

Analyses


Figure 1 shows the participatory inequality (between left and right, between extreme and moderate) for all election surveys in our combined data set. On the horizontal axis, we display the odds that left-wing citizens participate more strongly than right-wing citizens. The vertical axis shows the odds of ideological extremists to participate more than ideological moderates. Positive scores show that left-wing citizens and extremists are more likely to participate; negative scores indicate that left-wing citizens and extremists are less likely to participate. From our first set of hypotheses, we expect most countries to be in the first quadrant of the figures (top right section).

Several conclusions can be derived from the graphs of Figure 1. First, the figures show that there is little difference between left- and right-wing citizens in most countries. Only for protesting do we find that left-wing citizens are far more likely to participate than right-wing citizens. Differences between left- and right-wing voters appear to be more moderate for cooperating and campaigning and rather absent for voting, contacting, and persuading. Second, we find consistently large differences between extremists and moderates: The extremists are more likely to participate on all modes in nearly all countries. Only for voting behavior can hardly any differences be noticed, which is trivial given that large numbers of respondents claim to have cast a ballot. Third, the figures imply that countries differ in the strength of association between ideology and political action, which confirms previous findings (Armingeon, 2007; Martin & Van Deth, 2007; Teorell, Torcal, Montero, 2007) and reinforces the need of an explanation for these differing correlations.

Individual-Level Effects

Our hypotheses and our data are hierarchically structured: Individuals (Level 1) are nested in different governmental periods (Level 2), which are nested in different regimes (Level 3). To test our hypotheses, we turn to hierarchical analysis (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998; Snijders & Bosker, 1999). Given that the dependent variables are dichotomous, we select multilevel logistic regression.⁹ We estimate models (simultaneously at the individual level and at the state level) that report the logit of participating politically. To avoid the common pitfalls of complicated models with cross-level interaction effects (cf. Brambor, Clark, & Golder, 2005), we test the hypotheses in several subsequent hierarchical models. First, we focus on the individual-level effects (Table 1). Next, we model the direct unconditional effects of contextual determinants (Table 2) to test their main effects. We then include

Figure 1
Participatory Inequalities Between Left and Right,
Extreme and Moderate



Note: Horizontal axes: odds that left-wing citizens participate more strongly than right-wing citizens. Vertical axes: odds of ideological extremists to participate more than ideological moderates.

the perceived ideological distance between respondents and the government in office (Table 3). Finally, with all main effects in place, cross-level interaction effects are introduced (Table 4) to test whether individual-level relationships differ across regime types.

Table 1
Determinants of Various Modes of Political Action: Individual-Level Effects in a Hierarchical Design

Determinants	Voting			Contact			Campaign		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Left-right position		.01 (.01)	.06 (.01)		.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)		.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)
Ideological extremism		.12 (.01)	.19 (.01)		.07 (.01)	.08 (.01)		.16 (.01)	.17 (.01)
Level of education	.20 (.01)		.19 (.01)	.25 (.01)		.25 (.01)	.20 (.01)		.19 (.01)
Income	.07 (.01)		.06 (.01)	.10 (.01)		.10 (.01)	.04 (.01)		.04 (.01)
Age	.06 (.00)		.07 (.00)	.07 (.01)		.07 (.01)	.02 (.01)		.02 (.01)
Age-squared (/100)	-.04 (.00)		-.05 (.00)	-.06 (.01)		-.06 (.01)	-.00 (.01)		-.00 (.00)
Sex (man)									
Woman	-.10 (.03)		-.05 (.03)	-.29 (.08)		-.13 (.03)	-.17 (.04)		-.15 (.04)
Marital status (not married)									
Married	.26 (.04)		.26 (.04)	-.04 (.04)		-.04 (.04)	-.12 (.04)		-.12 (.04)
SES (white collar)									
Worker	.06 (.04)		.09 (.04)	.12 (.04)		.13 (.04)	.32 (.05)		.33 (.05)
Farmer	.27 (.12)		.27 (.12)	.42 (.12)		.42 (.12)	.67 (.12)		.69 (.12)
Self-employed	-.09 (.06)		-.11 (.06)	.37 (.05)		.36 (.06)	.23 (.07)		.21 (.06)
Other	.37 (.07)		.42 (.07)	-.29 (.08)		-.29 (.08)	-.08 (.09)		-.06 (.09)
Urbanization	-.02 (.01)		-.03 (.01)	.04 (.01)		.04 (.01)	-.01 (.01)		-.01 (.01)
Attend religious services	.05 (.01)		.04 (.01)	.03 (.01)		.03 (.01)	.00 (.01)		.00 (.01)
Constant	-1.40 (.13)	1.84 (.05)	-1.92 (.14)	-5.29 (.16)	-1.78 (.04)	-5.42 (.16)	-3.90 (.18)	-2.34 (.05)	-4.21 (.18)

(continued)

Table 1 (continued)

	Persuade			Cooperate			Protest		
	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
Left-right position		-.02 (.00)	-.01 (.00)		-.06 (.01)	-.03 (.00)		-.23 (.01)	-.23 (.01)
Ideological extremism		.12 (.01)	.13 (.01)		.12 (.01)	.16 (.01)		.13 (.01)	.15 (.02)
Level of education	.16 (.01)		.15 (.01)	.19 (.01)		.19 (.01)	.20 (.01)		.20 (.02)
Income	.04 (.01)		.04 (.01)	.10 (.01)		.10 (.01)	.02 (.01)		.02 (.02)
Age	-.00 (.00)		-.00 (.00)	.04 (.00)		.04 (.00)	.02 (.01)		.03 (.01)
Age-squared (/100)	.01 (.00)		.00 (.00)	-.04 (.00)		-.04 (.00)	-.04 (.01)		-.05 (.01)
Sex (man)									
Woman	-.16 (.02)		-.15 (.03)	-.17 (.04)		-.16 (.03)	-.10 (.04)		-.10 (.06)
Marital status (not married)									
Married	-.11 (.03)		-.11 (.03)	-.19 (.03)		-.18 (.03)	-.23 (.04)		-.20 (.07)
SES (white collar)									
Worker	.11 (.03)		.12 (.03)	-.01 (.04)		.00 (.04)	-.19 (.05)		-.13 (.09)
Farmer	.18 (.10)		.19 (.10)	.25 (.10)		.27 (.10)	.25 (.14)		.48 (.27)
Self-employed	.37 (.05)		.37 (.05)	.03 (.05)		.03 (.05)	-.11 (.07)		-.03 (.11)
Other	-.67 (.07)		-.68 (.07)	-.23 (.07)		-.23 (.07)	-.01 (.08)		.05 (.13)
Urbanization	.09 (.01)		.09 (.01)	.01 (.01)		.00 (.01)	.07 (.01)		.17 (.03)
Attend religious services	-.02 (.01)		-.02 (.01)	-.04 (.01)		-.03 (.01)	-.09 (.01)		.02 (.02)
Constant	-1.90 (.12)	1.18 (.03)	-2.07 (.12)	-3.10 (.13)	-1.22 (.04)	-3.25 (.13)	-2.86 (.16)	-1.15 (.05)	-3.14 (.34)

Note: Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. Bold figures represent significant effects at the .05 level. SES = socioeconomic status.

Table 2
Direct Contextual Effects on Political Action: Individual-Level
and Contextual Effects in a Hierarchical Design

Determinants	Voting	Contact	Campaign	Persuade	Cooperate	Protest
Individual level						
Left-right position	.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.01 (.00)	-.07 (.01)	-.21 (.01)
Ideological extremism	.13 (.01)	.11 (.01)	.20 (.01)	.15 (.01)	.15 (.01)	.14 (.01)
Constant	-0.90 (0.89)	-6.98 (0.53)	-4.34 (0.78)	-1.22 (1.11)	-4.69 (0.53)	-1.50 (0.66)
Regime level						
Consensualism (executive-parties)	.02 (.15)	-.30 (.08)	-.25 (.11)	-.56 (.17)	-1.10 (.08)	-1.10 (.10)
Consensualism (federal-unitary)	.05 (.14)	-.09 (.07)	.09 (.11)	.04 (.16)	.02 (.07)	.09 (.09)
Economic development	-.25 (.38)	.95 (.20)	.53 (.30)	.09 (.44)	.79 (.20)	-2.29 (.25)
Compulsory voting	.84 (.42)	-.04 (.22)	.12 (.33)	-.34 (.48)	-.42 (.22)	-0.09 (.28)
Variance level						
Regime	.34 (.14)	.10 (.04)	.25 (.08)	.55 (.17)	.11 (.04)	.15 (.06)
Election	.10 (.06)	.01 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.04 (.03)
Individual	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Model 4. Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between parentheses. Bold figures represent significant effects at the .05 level. Controlled for sex, education, age, and marital status.

Table 3
Direct Contextual Effects on Political Action: Individual-Level
and Contextual Effects in a Hierarchical Design

	Voting	Contact	Campaign	Persuade	Cooperate	Protest
Individual level determinants						
Left-right position	.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.02 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	-.07 (.01)	-.21 (.01)
Ideological extremism	.13 (.01)	.10 (.01)	.17 (.02)	.13 (.01)	.13 (.01)	.09 (.01)
Perceived distance to government	.01 (.01)	.02 (.01)	.05 (.01)	.05 (.01)	.03 (.01)	.08 (.01)
Constant	-0.73 (.97)	-6.89 (0.55)	-4.36 (0.80)	-1.31 (1.16)	-4.83 (0.54)	-1.50 (0.32)
Regime level determinants						
Consensualism (Executive-Parties)	.04 (.15)	-.28 (.08)	-.24 (.12)	-.55 (.18)	-.12 (.08)	-.10 (.10)
Consensualism (Federal-Unitary)	.06 (.14)	-.09 (.07)	.09 (.11)	.05 (.16)	.02 (.07)	.10 (.09)
Economic development	-.26 (.38)	.93 (.21)	.56 (.30)	.12 (.45)	.82 (.21)	-.29 (.25)
Compulsory voting	.66 (.49)	-.02 (.27)	.14 (.40)	-.46 (.60)	-.65 (.27)	-.23 (.32)
Variance level						
Regime	.32 (.14)	.11 (.04)	.26 (.09)	.59 (.19)	.12 (.04)	.14 (.06)
Election	.11 (.06)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.03 (.03)
Individual	1	1	1	1	1	1

Note: Model 5. Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between parentheses. Bold figures represent significant effects at the .05 level. Controlled for sex, education, age, and marital status.

Table 4
Direct Contextual Effects on Political Action: Individual-Level, Contextual,
and Interaction Effects in a Hierarchical Design

Determinants	Voting	Contact	Campaign	Persuade	Cooperate	Protest
Individual level						
Left-right position	.03 (.02)	-.01 (.01)	-.02 (.02)	-.01 (.01)	-.06 (.01)	-.19 (.01)
(Variance over regimes)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	—
Ideological extremism	.13 (.02)	.10 (.01)	.18 (.02)	.13 (.02)	.13 (.01)	.10 (.01)
(Variance over regimes)	.01 (.00)	—	.00 (.00)	.01 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Perceived distance to government	.00 (.01)	.04 (.01)	.06 (.01)	.05 (.01)	.04 (.01)	.08 (.02)
(Variance over regimes)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)
Constant	-.064 (.79)	-.717 (.53)	-.475 (.69)	-.366 (.80)	-.503 (.53)	-.166 (.65)
Regime level						
Consensualism (executive-parties)	-.02 (.18)	-.33 (.10)	-.38 (.11)	-.64 (.25)	-.17 (.10)	-.14 (.12)
Consensualism (federal-unitary)	-.12 (.10)	-.12 (.07)	-.02 (.09)	-.06 (.09)	-.00 (.07)	.11 (.09)
Economic development	-.31 (.30)	1.00 (.20)	.71 (.26)	1.05 (.30)	.89 (.20)	-.23 (.25)
Compulsory voting	.63 (.61)	.86 (.25)	.35 (.34)	.50 (.39)	-.55 (.26)	-.14 (.32)
Cross-level interaction effects						
LR × Consensualism (E-P)	-.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.02 (.02)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	-.00 (.02)
Extremism × Consensualism (E-P)	.01 (.02)	—	-.02 (.02)	-.00 (.02)	-.00 (.01)	-.02 (.02)
PD × Consensualism (E-P)	.02 (.01)	-.00 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.01 (.01)	.02 (.02)
LR × Compulsory Voting	-.06 (.06)					
Extremism × Compulsory Voting	.19 (.07)					
Variance level						
Regime	.43 (.21)	.12 (.06)	.16 (.07)	1.21 (.40)	.16 (.07)	.25 (.10)
Election	.14 (.08)	.00 (.01)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.00 (.00)	.03 (.03)
Individual	I	I	I	I	I	I

Note: Model 6. Unstandardized coefficients; standard errors between parentheses. Bold figures represent significant effects at the .05 level. Controlled for sex, education, age, and marital status. LR = left-right; E-P = executive-parties; PD = perceived distance.

Table 1 summarizes the individual-level effects of the background characteristics, ideological preferences, and modes of political action are summarized for three different models. First, Model 1 introduces various background characteristics as determinants of political action; as such, the effects are in line with previous studies. In Model 2, we find that extremism has a positive and moderately strong association with all modes of political action, which supports Hypothesis 1a. Left-wing citizens participate more strongly than right-wing citizens in activities such as persuasion, cooperation for political goals, and protesting. However, with regard to the three most conventional modes of political action (voting, contacting, and campaigning), there are no significant differences, which is in line with Hypothesis 1b and Hypothesis 1c: Overall, left-wing citizens are more likely to participate than right-wing citizens, especially in unconventional modes.

When we model the control factors and the ideological measures simultaneously (Model 3), we find little changes (as compared to Model 2). There is, however, one important exception. The effect of the left-right position on voting, which was nonsignificant in Model 2, becomes significant and positive when we control for the other determinants. Right-wing citizens are more likely to vote than left-wing citizens, taking other factors into account. In other words, Hypothesis 1b is not supported for voting. Further analysis shows that the positive effect of the left-right position on voting comes into being when we control for education and sex. The other control factors do not affect the associations between ideology and the six modes of political action. In our subsequent analyses, we can therefore safely exclude those control variables that have many and/or country-specific missing values.¹⁰

Direct Contextual Effects on Political Action

To what extent do contextual determinants affect the level of political action? Table 2 provides the results of empirical tests of Lijphart's claim (1999) that consensualism stimulates electoral participation (Hypothesis 3a). However, we find that voting is not significantly more widespread in consensual democracies than in majoritarian democracies. This is not in line with studies using aggregated turnout data. Yet, Blais (2006) already casted doubt on these studies, noting that the empirical evidence is inconsistent and that the impact of institutions on voting might have been overestimated. He referred to multilevel analysis on voter turnout to get a better estimation. Indeed, our findings are in line with a recent multilevel study of Karp and Banducci (2008), which dissects consensualism to several factors, for which

the researchers expect opposing effects on voter turnout. They did find a negative effect of some factors (owing to lack of incentives) and a positive effect of others (owing to resources to participate), which apparently cancel each other out in our study.

Next, as Table 2 shows (Model 4), citizens are less likely to participate in several other modes of political action in consensual democracies. On Lijphart's executive-parties dimension, there is a significant negative effect of consensualism on contacting officials, campaigning, and persuading others. Citizens are less likely to act in any of these three modes when they live under a consensual regime than under a majoritarian regime. We do not find a significant positive effect of federalism. This, in short, supports the competing Hypothesis H3b.

The negative effect on the executive-parties dimension is difficult to explain with the resource approach. Why do more inclusive governments, with more options of voice for especially political minorities, dampen political action? Morales (2001) comes to a similar finding, wondering why membership of political organizations is lower in states that are more open to the public. Surely, consensual systems with proportional representation, minority rights, and a general openness to society raise the possibilities (i.e., resources) for successful political action. However, exactly because these systems are so inclusive, they dampen the need (i.e., incentives) for it. Crudely speaking, the winner takes all in majoritarian systems, and the stakes are higher. Therefore, citizens will have a stronger urge to get involved in majoritarian systems than in consensual systems, either to support their representatives and stimulate election (or reelection) or to voice dissent (probably a stronger level of such).

Note that these results are obtained after we control for economic development and compulsory voting. Economic development stimulates contacting officials, campaigning, and cooperating with others to reach political goals. Yet, it has no effect on turnout, persuasion, or protesting. In line with previous authors (cf. Lijphart, 1997, 1998), we find a positive effect of compulsory voting on voter turnout. Although compulsory voting stimulates turnout, it has no spillover effect on other modes of political action. Apparently, compulsory voting does not generate highly participating citizens but merely forces them to cast their ballot. Rather, we find that the level of cooperation is lower in systems with compulsory voting.

When we include perceived ideological distance to our models (Model 5), several interesting observations arise (see Table 3). First of all, the larger the perceived ideological distance between a citizen and his or her government, the more likely that citizen participates politically. This finding holds

for each mode of political action, except voting, and so lends unequivocal support for Hypothesis 2. Second, inclusion of perceived ideological distance decreases the impact of extremism on political action, although the decrease is not significant in most cases.

Cross-Level Interaction Effects: Explaining the Correlation Between Ideology and Political Action

In the final step, we test whether regime type conditions the impact of the left-right position, extremism, and perceived ideological distance on political action. We expected the impact to be lower when the system is more consensual.

The inclusion of three cross-level interactions severely strains our three-level model, given that we add a total of 12 parameters (including variance and covariance estimates). We therefore first tested all cross-level interactions separately, and none of the interaction effects were significant. Next, we reran our analyses simultaneously, and the models for voting and cooperating converged without problems. In the models for campaigning and persuading, we needed to assume some covariances to be zero.¹¹ Based on additional tests, this assumption was not violated. Finally, the models for contacting and protesting would not converge. Given our previous separate tests of the cross-level interactions, we left out the weakest of the three variance estimates (which were, of course, nonsignificant): extremism (for contacting) and the left-right position (for protesting). By leaving out these variance/covariance estimates, the models converged. Although these adaptations of the variances and covariances increase the risk of overestimating the size of the accompanying cross-level effects, the results in Table 4 imply that these consequences are probably minor.

As such, Table 4 (Model 6) shows the results obtained with these modified models. Evidently, several effects of the left-right position, ideological extremism, and perceived ideological distance vary significantly over countries. The question is, of course, to what extent can these differences be explained by regime type? First, based on the controls that we introduced for voting turnout, compulsory voting should have an egalitarian effect, but the opposite appears to be the case. In general, extremists are more likely than moderates to cast a ballot (see Tables 1 and 2). Table 4 shows that this difference is larger in countries with compulsory voting than in countries without. Yet, why this would be the case is not clear.

Second, the impact of the left-right position or ideological extremism could be conditioned by regime type. However, this is not the case for any

mode of political action. Clearly, the impact of the left-right position and ideological extremism on political action does not differ between consensual and majoritarian regimes. In other words, when it comes to political action, consensualism is not more egalitarian than majoritarianism, which falsifies Hypothesis 3c and Hypothesis 3d. Finally, perceived ideological distance is presumed to matter less in consensual systems than in majoritarian systems (Hypothesis 3e). Again, we find no significant interaction effects between perceived ideological distance and regime type, which falsifies Hypothesis 3e. In short, we find no support at all for the claim that consensual regimes are more egalitarian with regard to political action.¹²

Robustness

To limit the risks of overestimating our results, we test to what extent our findings are robust at the country level. First, the outliers for the levels of political action are considered. Generally, the findings are rather robust: When deviating countries are deleted from the analyses, some effects that previously bordered on significance turned barely significant, and vice versa. For instance, after the exclusion of Canada and the United States, the negative individual-level effect of the left-right position on contacting and campaigning turned significant, in line with its effect on the other modes of participation. Similarly, after the elimination of outliers, several cross-level interaction effects came closer to significance (but did not quite reach it) for persuading and protesting (respectively, New Zealand and Canada, France and Spain). Although their direction was in line with our expectations, the coefficients were nonsignificant at the .05 level. One change deserves more attention—namely, the effects of compulsory voting appear to be sensitive to outliers. The exclusion of two outliers on contacting an official (Canada and the United States) turned the effect of compulsory voting nonsignificant. The exclusion of the same outliers from the models on campaigning, as well as the exclusion of two others (New Zealand and Canada) from the models on persuading, turned the effect of compulsory voting significant and positive, thereby indicating that campaigning and persuading are more common in countries with compulsory voting. The lack of robustness may be caused by the low share of countries in our analysis with partially or strongly enforced compulsory voting (namely, Italy and Australia).

Second, we eliminated country-level outliers with regard to the associations of the left-right position and extremism with political action. Figure 1 identifies strong outliers for two modes of political action on the difference between extremists and moderates. Our findings on contacting turned out

to be robust to the inclusion or exclusion of Spain. However, when we excluded Italy from our model on cooperating, the negative effect of compulsory voting turned nonsignificant. The simultaneous exclusion of France, Norway, and Spain from campaigning led to one change: The negative cross-level interaction effect between extremism and consensualism turned significant. After excluding Australia (2004) and Iceland from protesting, our findings turned out to be fully robust.

The exclusion of outliers, then, does not evidently affect our main findings. However, the robustness tests indicate that the results obtained for compulsory voting might be especially sensitive for the group of countries considered.

Summary and Discussion

This article started out with the idea that citizens' ideological positions might be important determinants of political involvement. We found that a citizen's ideology is indeed an important determinant of his or her political action. First, left-wing citizens are more likely than right-wing citizens to contact officials, campaign, persuade others, cooperate, and protest; yet, they are less likely to cast a ballot. Second, ideological extremists (i.e., citizens who position themselves at the extremes of the left-right scale) are more likely than ideological moderates to be involved in any of these six modes of political action. Third, citizens who perceive themselves to be ideologically distant from the government in power are more likely to engage in any mode of political action. Anderson et al. (2005) already found attitudinal evidence for this claim; in this study, we brought behavioral evidence to the table.

Contrary to the democratic demand of equal participation (Lijphart, 1997), these findings imply that political participation across ideological groups is not equal. Left-wing citizens are more likely to participate than right-wing citizens, and extremists more than moderates. Policy makers are likely to hear the left-wing voice more strongly and more often than the right-wing voice and that of moderate citizens, which in turn might result in biased policy output. However, this structural overrepresentation can be counteracted. Citizens who perceive a large ideological distance toward the government in office are more likely to engage in political action, irrespective of their ideological position.

Next, we found that context matters for political action. Of course, countries with compulsory voting have higher turnout rates than countries without (Lijphart, 1997, 1998). However, although compulsory voting forces citizens to cast a ballot, it does not generate more involved citizens; it even

dampens cooperation between citizens. Compulsory voting is merely a solution to low voter turnout, not to a more fundamental problem of low participatory involvement (cf. Engelen, 2007). Surprisingly, compulsory voting enlarges the inequality in turnout between ideological extremists and ideological moderates, which goes directly against the findings from other studies (De Winter, 1998; Hooghe & Pellerieux, 1998).¹³ However, our robustness analyses showed that the effect of compulsory voting in our models is rather susceptible to outliers, mainly because of the low number of countries with some form of compulsory voting in our data set.

In line with Lijphart (1999), we expected consensualism to have a positive impact on the level of political action. However, this was not the case. Rather, we found significant negative effects of consensualism on contacting, campaigning, and persuading and no significant effects on voting, cooperating, and protesting. This finding goes against Lijphart's claim that consensual democracies have higher levels of electoral participation. Apparently, because there is less at stake, citizens are less likely to get involved, even though they have more options to get their voices heard.

Moreover, our findings cast doubt on Lijphart's suggestion that consensual systems have a more equal dispersion of political powers across their citizens. We found that the associations among our three measures of ideology (left-right position, extremism, and perceived distance) with the six modes of political action vary across countries. Although the degree of participatory inequality between ideological groups differs across countries, participatory inequality is not significantly lower in consensual systems.

The findings of this study force us to reconsider Lijphart's conclusions that consensual democracies are "more egalitarian and truly representative of citizen's wishes" (Policzer, 2000, p. 838). Lijphart based this claim on cross-national comparisons of income inequality and literacy rates: Low income inequality and high literacy rates imply a more equal distribution of political resources and, consequently, political power and representation. However, modern-day liberal democracies focus on the representation of policy preferences and ideology rather than on unequal distributions of socioeconomic resources. Differences in the level of political action are most problematic when they arise across ideological groups. And with regard to these ideological groups, we conclude that consensual systems do not reduce participatory inequality.

In short, regarding citizens' participation in politics, majoritarianism outperforms consensualism. In majoritarian systems, political action is more widespread but not less equal across the crucial factor of ideological preferences.

Appendix Election Surveys Used and Contextual Information for the Countries Selected

Survey Data Set	Consensualism ^a		Economic Development ^b	Compulsory Voting	Reigning Governing Parties Before Elections ^c
	Executive-Parties	Federal-Unitary			
Australia (2001)	-0.67	1.72	27,193.48	Yes	LPA, NPA
Australia (2004)	-0.67	1.72	27,193.48	Yes	LPA, NPA
Belgium (2003)	1.42	0.21	25,008.49	Yes	VLD, SP, PS, MR, Ecolo, Agalev
Canada (2004)	-1.07	1.88	28,730.69	No	LPC
Denmark (2001)	1.45	-0.38	28,538.82	No	SDP, DSLP
Denmark (2005)	1.45	-0.38	28,538.82	No	V, DKF
Finland (2003)	1.66	-0.83	24,416.36	No	SDP, KOK, VAS, VIHRR, RKP
France (2002)	-0.93	-0.17	23,613.76	No	PS, MDC, Verts, PCF, PRG, DVG
Germany (2002)	0.23	2.53	23,917.44	No	SPD, Gr
Germany (2005)	0.23	2.53	23,917.44	No	SPD, Gr
Iceland (2003)	0.66	-1.03	26,928.55	No	IP, PP
Ireland (2002)	0.12	-0.42	27,197.06	No	FF, PD
Israel (2003)	1.27	-0.97	19,148.44	No	Likud, LM, Shas, NU, CP, NRP, UTJ
Italy (2006)	1.16	-0.11	22,876.28	Yes ^d	FI, AN, LN, BF, PSI
Netherlands (2002)	1.16	0.35	25,758.83	No	PvdA, VVD, D66
Netherlands (2006)	1.16	0.35	25,758.83	No	CDA, VVD, D66

(continued)

Appendix (continued)

Survey Data Set	Consensualism ^a		Economic Development ^b	Compulsory Voting	Reigning Governing Parties Before Elections ^c
	Executive-Parties	Federal-Unitary			
New Zealand (2002)	-1.12	-1.77	20,008.29	No	LP, Alliance
New Zealand (2005)	-1.12	-1.77	20,008.29	No	LP, Alliance
Norway (2001)	0.92	-0.65	32,057.29	No	NLP
Norway (2005)	0.92	-0.65	32,057.29	No	KRF, H, V
Portugal (2002)	0.36	-0.70	17,088.96	No	SP
Portugal (2005)	0.36	-0.70	17,088.96	No	PSD, PP
Spain (2004)	-0.59	0.42	19,036.70	No	PP
Sweden (2002)	1.04	-0.79	24,628.44	No	SD
Switzerland (2003)	1.87	1.61	28,208.76	No	PP, SD, FDP, CD
United Kingdom (2005)	-1.39	-1.19	24,252.44	No	New Labour
United States (2004)	-0.52	2.36	35,618.67	No	NRP

a. Based on Lijphart (1999).

b. Gross domestic product per capita in 2000.

c. Party names are presented namely on the basis of their abbreviations, for space considerations. A quick Internet search, cross-referenced with the country, would reveal any that are unfamiliar to readers.

d. Weakly enforced.

Notes

1. The left-right scheme has been criticized, namely, because the meanings of the terms *left* and *right* supposedly differ intersubjectively and cross-nationally. Nevertheless, the left-right scheme is appropriate to cross-nationally measure general ideological position and proximity. 2. Lijphart (1999) indirectly tests his expectation that political equality is greater in consensual regimes: He treats income inequality and illiteracy rates as proxies of inequality of political resources (not power). Both are higher in majoritarian regimes than in consensual regimes.

3. Because the consensual system is inclusionist, it is defined not by competitiveness between parties and ideological differences but by equal distribution of influence (Daalder, 1995). In the Netherlands, for instance, ideological differences were presented “as if they were not political and therefore divisive phenomena, but questions that could be solved by objective principals of economics, of algebra (proportionality), or of the study of law” (Lijphart, 1976, p. 135).

4. Not all types of political action are measured in all election surveys. Voting is available for all 27 election surveys, contacting for 24 (not for Denmark, 2005; Germany, 2005; Norway, 2005), campaigning for 20 (not for Australia, 2001; Denmark, 2005; Germany, 2005; the Netherlands, 2006; New Zealand, 2005; Norway, 2005; and Portugal, 2005), persuading for 21 (not for Australia, 2001; Denmark, 2005; Germany, 2005; the Netherlands, 2006; New Zealand, 2005; and Norway, 2005), cooperating for 23 (not for Denmark, 2005; Germany, 2005; the Netherlands, 2006; and Norway, 2005), and protesting for 25 (not for Denmark, 2005, and Germany, 2005).

5. When governments changed between elections (Italy, Israel, Norway), we calculated the perceived distance to the government in office directly before the election on which the survey data report.

6. Not all coalition parties are covered by the questionnaire in all countries: For France, Israel, and Italy, we have no information on one or more junior coalition partners. Because of their small size and broad coalitions, their absence hardly affects our findings. Belgian data on perceived party position lack completely. Belgium is therefore left out of models that include perceived ideological distance.

7. To check robustness, we alternated the measure of perceived distance. First, we measured the governmental position as both a point estimate and a range estimate (covering the coalition's position from the most left-wing to the most right-wing coalition member). Second, we measured ideological distance both relatively (degree of incongruence) and absolutely (not holding the same position as the constitutes a loser). Despite these alterations, the outcomes of the analyses were substantially the same.

8. As a robustness check, replacing the executive-parties dimension with a measure of the electoral system (first past the post versus proportional representation) led to substantially similar results (Teorell, Holmberg, & Rothstein, 2007).

9. We use ML-WIN 2.0 (Goldstein, 1995). Our hierarchical logistic regressions are all characterized by MQL, first order, no extra-binominal variance assumed.

10. Because of country-specific missing values, Table 1 focuses on a subset of countries in our data set. By leaving out most control factors, we include more countries in Table 2. As such, we find that the effects of extremism are effectively the same. The effects of the left-right position are now also negative and significant but weak for contacting and campaigning, thus supporting Hypothesis 1b.

11. For campaigning, the covariances between extremism and the other three factors are set to zero. For persuading, we set the covariances of the left-right position with the constant and extremism to zero, and we set those of perceived distance with the constant and extremism to zero.

12. If citizens are less likely to position themselves at the extremes of the scale or at distance from the government in consensual regimes, then Hypotheses 3c, 3d, and 3e might still hold, although it would not be reflected in the models. After additional tests, however, we found that there is no significant relationship between consensualism and the left-right position, extremism, or ideological distance.

13. In comparison to these studies, we perform a more crucial test. The Belgian study compared actual turnout (self-reported) to hypothetical turnout (whether respondents would have voted if it were not compulsory), whereas we compare the actual, self-reported turnout cross-nationally. In turn, a limitation of our study is that it does not analyze how compulsory voting might affect turnout inequality for secondary elections (local, regional, or European).

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