

Strong Password-Only Authenticated Key Exchange *

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A new simple password exponential key exchange method (SPEKE) is described. It belongs to an exclusive class of methods which provide authentication and key establishment over an insecure channel using only a small password, without risk of offline dictionary attack. SPEKE and the closely-related Diffie-Hellman Encrypted Key Exchange (DH-EKE) are examined in light of both known and new attacks, along with sufficient preventive constraints. Although SPEKE and DH-EKE are similar, the constraints are different. The class of strong password-only methods is compared to other authentication schemes. Benefits, limitations, and tradeoffs between efficiency and security are discussed. These methods are important for several uses, including replacement of obsolete systems, and building hybrid two-factor systems where independent password-only and key-based methods can survive a single event of either key theft or password compromise.

1 Introduction

It seems paradoxical that small passwords are important for strong authentication. Clearly, cryptographically large passwords would be better, if only ordinary people could remember them. Password verification over an insecure network has been a particularly tough problem, in light of the ever-present threat of *dictionary attack*. Password problems have been around so long that many have assumed that strong remote authentication using *only a small password* is impossible. In fact, it can be done.

Since the early 1990's, an increased focus on the problem has yielded a few novel solutions, specially designed to resist to dictionary attack. In this paper we outline the problem, and describe a new simple password exponential key exchange, *SPEKE*, which performs strong authentication, over an insecure channel, using only a small password. That a small password can accomplish this alone goes against common wisdom. This is *not* your grandmother's network login.

We compare SPEKE to the closely-related Diffie-Hellman Encrypted Key Exchange [BM92], and review the potential threats and countermeasures in some detail. We show that previously-known and new attacks against both methods are thwarted when proper constraints are applied.

These methods are broadly useful for authentication in many applications: bootstrapping new system installations, cellular phones or other keypad systems, diskless workstations, user-to-user applications, multi-factor password + key systems, and for upgrading obsolete password systems. More generally,

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they are needed anywhere that prolonged key storage is risky or impractical, and where the communication channel may be insecure.

Readers who are thoroughly familiar with the work on Encrypted Key Exchange and related Diffie-Hellman (DH) authentication methods may want to jump directly to § 3.1 and § 4.3 to find new results.

The rest of § 1 defines the remote password problem, § 2 defines what we want from a solution, and § 3 describes the specific SPEKE and DH-EKE methods. Both are reviewed in light of all known classes of attack in § 4, and § 5 contains a fully-constrained description of SPEKE. § 6 discusses some limitations and possibilities for these methods. § 7 shows related efforts, and § 8 shows several uses for these methods.

1.1 The remote password problem

Ordinary people seem to have a fundamental inability to remember anything larger than a small secret. Yet most methods of remote secret-based authentication presume the secret to be large. We really want to use an easily memorized small secret password, *and* not be vulnerable to dictionary attack. In this paper, we make a clear distinction between passwords and keys: Passwords must be memorized, and are thus small, while keys can be recorded, and can be much larger. The problem is that most methods need keys that are too large to be easily remembered.

User-selected passwords are often confined to a very small, easily searchable space, and attempts to increase the size of the space just makes them hard to remember. Bank-card PIN codes use only 4-digits (about 13 bits) to remove even the *temptation* to write them down. A ten-digit phone number has about 30 bits, which compels many people to record them. Meanwhile, strong symmetric keys need 60 bits or more, and nobody talks about memorizing public-keys. It is also fair to assume that a memorable password belongs to a brute-force searchable space. With ever-increasing computer power, there is a growing gap between the size of the smallest safe key and the size of the largest easily remembered password.

Unfortunately, most commonly-known remote password methods require a large password. To counter the threat of attack, we assign the user painfully large passwords, we force frequent password changes, and we issue guilt-instilling mandates to never write the password down. It's almost as if there's an unspoken, cavalier attitude toward the "problem users", that goes something like this: "If they can't remember a large-enough password, then they'll get what they deserve." This is wrong. A more enlightened attitude is needed. We must protect our weak-willed, weak-minded users from themselves.

The problem is compounded by the need to memorize multiple passwords for different purposes. One example of a small-password-space attack is the verifiable plain-text dictionary attack against Kerberos login, described in [BM89, GLNS93]. Kerberos is by no means alone with this weakness. A general failure of many obsolete password methods is due to presuming passwords to be large. Here's a simple example of a bad way for Alice to verify that Bob knows a small password, S : Alice sends a random nonce R to Bob, and Bob returns $Q = h(R, S)$, a one-way hash of the nonce combined with the password. This proves that he knows S . But because the space is searchable with brute force, an eavesdropper can perform a *dictionary attack* by repeatedly computing $h(R, S_i)$ for each candidate password S_i and comparing the result to Q .

To summarize, we assume that any password belongs to a cryptographically-small space, which is also brute-force searchable with a modest effort. Large passwords are arguably weaker since they can't be memorized.

So why do we bother with passwords? A pragmatic reason is that they are less expensive and more convenient than smart-cards and other alternatives. A stronger reason is that, in a well-designed and managed system, passwords are more resistant to theft than persistent stored keys or carry-around tokens. More generally, passwords represent *something you know*, one of the “big three” categories of factors in authentication.

2 Characteristics of strong password-only methods

We now define exactly what we mean by *strong password-only remote authentication*. We first list the desired characteristics for these methods, focusing on the case of user-to-host authentication. Both SPEKE and DH-EKE have these distinguishing characteristics.

1. Prevent off-line dictionary attack on small passwords.
2. Survive on-line dictionary attack.
3. Provide mutual authentication.
4. Integrated key exchange.
5. User needs no persistent recorded (5a) secret data, or (5b) sensitive host-specific data.

Since we assume that all passwords are vulnerable to dictionary attack, given the opportunity, we need to remove the opportunities. *On-line dictionary attacks* can be easily detected, and thwarted, by counting access failures. But *off-line dictionary attack* presents a more complex threat. These attacks can be made by someone posing as a legitimate party to gather information, or by one who monitors the *messages between two parties during a legitimate valid exchange. Even tiny amounts of information “leaked” during an exchange can be exploited. The method must be immune to such off-line attack, even for tiny passwords. This is where SPEKE and DH-EKE excel.

Mutual authentication is desirable. These methods must prove to each of two parties that the other knows the password.

At the same time, we generate a session key for securing a subsequent authenticated session between the parties using the password. The desirability for *integrated key exchange* in authentication is discussed in [vOW96]. The basic idea is that separating the steps of authentication and key exchange creates opportunities for an attacker in the middle. Strong key exchange requires the participation of both parties, and should be an integral part of the process.

The characteristic of *no persistent recorded data* means the user needs no additional symmetric, public, or private keys. There are many ways to create a secure channel over which a clear-text password or a simple hashed-password exchange can be sent. Our goal, however, is more ambitious: We seek a *password-only* method, to make the password an *independent* factor, and simplify the user’s side of the system. Persistent data would have to be generated, distributed, and securely stored, which poses additional problems. Secret data must never be revealed, and non-secret sensitive data must be kept tamper-proof. Either may require specially protected memory, and it weakens the security model by adding another point of failure. Systems where the security of a password depends on a stored key are easily constructed, but they just move the basis of security from the password to the key. If the key is stolen, the password can be compromised. Eliminating persistent user-keys removes this problem, and removes the need for secure storage, enabling some special applications, as discussed in § 8.

Both SPEKE and DH-EKE meet all of these goals, and have other desirable characteristics which are discussed in the subsequent analysis. In § 7 we briefly describe some other attempts to find a strong password-only method.

3 Two strong password-only methods

The two methods of strong password-only authentication described here are both based on a Diffie-Hellman key exchange [DH79]. A classic DH exchange permits two parties with no prior agreement to establish a shared secret session key. For reference, the classic DH exchange is shown in Appendix A. DH by itself does not provide authentication, and is vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.

The SPEKE and DH-EKE methods are both forms of *authenticated* key exchange. The use of DH protects the password from off-line dictionary attack, while the use of the password in each method prevents the standard DH man-in-the-middle attack, as discussed in § 4.3. From another viewpoint, [BM92] describes how the exchange *amplifies* the power of the shared secret password to establish a much larger session key. Two parties, who share only a small password (S), authenticate each other over an insecure network, proving to each other their knowledge of S and generating a new large session key (K).

These methods use arithmetic in a huge finite group. Several such groups can be used in DH, but for simplicity we'll limit discussion to Z_p^* , where p is a huge prime. Appendix A also contains a brief review of relevant group theory terminology and concepts for reference. In order to fully appreciate the methods and the potential threats against them, some knowledge of the underlying mathematics is helpful.

In our discussion, we presume that *Alice* and *Bob* are two well-behaved legitimate parties. In user-to-host situations, Alice is the user. We also use the following symbols:

S	a small shared password for Alice and Bob.
p	a huge prime number suitable for Diffie-Hellman.
q	a large prime factor of $p-1$.
g	a suitable DH base, either primitive, or of large prime order.
G_x	a subgroup of Z_p^* of order x . x is a factor of $p-1$.
$f(S)$	a function that converts S into a suitable DH base.
R_A, R_B	random numbers chosen by Alice, and Bob.
Q_A, Q_B	exponential values sent by Alice, and Bob.
$E_k(m)$	a symmetric encryption function of m using key k .
$h(m)$	a strong one-way hash function of m .
$A \rightarrow B: m$	Alice sends m to Bob.
K	generated session key.

3.1 SPEKE

The simple password exponential key exchange (SPEKE) has two stages. The first stage uses a DH exchange to establish a shared key K , but instead of the commonly used fixed primitive base g , a function f converts the password S into a base for exponentiation. The rest of the first stage is pure Diffie-Hellman, where Alice and Bob start out by choosing two random number R_A and R_B :

- S1. Alice computes: $Q_A = f(S)^{R_A} \bmod p$, A→B: Q_A .
- S2. Bob computes: $Q_B = f(S)^{R_B} \bmod p$, B→A: Q_B .
- S3. Alice computes: $K = h(Q_B^{R_A} \bmod p)$
- S4. Bob computes: $K = h(Q_A^{R_B} \bmod p)$

In the second stage of SPEKE, both Alice and Bob confirm each other's knowledge of K before proceeding to use it as a session key. One way is:

- S5. Alice chooses random C_A , A→B: $E_K(C_A)$.
- S6. Bob chooses random C_B , B→A: $E_K(C_B, C_A)$.
- S7. Alice verifies that C_A is correct, A→B: $E_K(C_B)$.
- S8. Bob verifies that C_B is correct.

To prevent discrete log computations, which can result in the attacks described in § 4.1, the value of $p-1$ must have a large prime factor q .

The function f is chosen in SPEKE to create a base of large prime order. This is different than the commonly used primitive base for DH, and its practical importance will be discussed in § 4.2.2. The use of a prime-order group may also be of theoretical importance.

Other variations of the verification stage are possible. This stage is identical to that of the verification stage of DH-EKE [BM92], and variations such as those described in [STW95] using Q_B instead of the random numbers C_x in an minimal three-message refinement apply to SPEKE as well as to DH-EKE. More generally, verification of K can use any classical method, since K is cryptographically large. This example repeatedly uses a one-way hash function:

- S5. Alice sends proof of K: A→B: $h(h(K))$
- S6. Bob verifies $h(h(K))$ is correct, B→A: $h(K)$
- S7. Alice verifies $h(K)$ is correct.

This approach uses K in place of explicit random nonces, which is possible since K was built with random information from both sides.

3.2 DH-EKE

DH-EKE (Diffie-Hellman *Encrypted* Key Exchange) is the simplest of a number of methods described in [BM92]. The method can also be divided into two stages. The first stage uses a DH exchange to establish a shared key K, where one or both parties encrypts the exponential using the password S. With knowledge of S, they can each decrypt the other's message using E_S^{-1} and compute the same key K.

- D1. Alice computes: $Q_A = g^{R_A} \bmod p$, A→B: $E_S(Q_A)$.
- D2. Bob computes: $Q_B = g^{R_B} \bmod p$, B→A: $E_S(Q_B)$.
- D3. Alice computes: $K = h(Q_B^{R_A} \bmod p)$
- D4. Bob computes: $K = h(Q_A^{R_B} \bmod p)$

It is widely suggested in the literature [BM92, STW95, Sch96 pp. 518-522] that at least one of the encryption steps can be omitted, but this may leave the method open to various types of attacks as described in § 4.3 and § 4.4.

The values of p and g , and the symmetric encryption function E_S must be chosen carefully to preserve the security of DH-EKE, as is discussed in detail in § 4.

In the second stage of DH-EKE, both Alice and Bob confirm each other's knowledge of K before proceeding to use it as a session key. However, with DH-EKE the order of the verification messages can also be significant, as is discussed in § 4.4.

4 Analysis of SPEKE and DH-EKE

In the original paper on EKE [BM92], there is some analysis of DH-EKE. Further work and refinement of EKE is presented in [STW95]. [Jas96] provides further details on a required constraint in the proper selection of the modulus p . [vOW96] describes a refinement in computing discrete-logs, and discusses the selection of the parameters for general DH-based authentication, especially with regard to using short exponents. Results from these papers that are relevant to SPEKE are summarized here, along with new observations about DH-EKE. A quick summary of the threats and relevant constraints for both methods is presented in Table 4.

<i>Constraint</i>	<i>Prevents Attack by:</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Applies to</i>
modulus p is huge	discrete log attack	[BM92], § 4.1	D S †
test $Q_x \neq 0$, when un-encrypted	forcing $K=0$	[BM92]	D S
$p-1$ has large prime factor q	Pohlig-Hellman log computation	[BM92]	D S
encrypted Q_x randomly padded.	leakage from $E_S(Q_x)$	[BM92]	D
base is primitive root of p	partition attack on $E_S(Q_x)$	[BM92], § 4.2.1	D
base is a generator of q	partition attack on Q_x	§ 4.2.2	S
base = $S^x \bmod p$	single discrete log computation	§ 4.12	S
first receiver of verification of K must encrypt Q_x	finding password S using chosen R_x , Q_x , $E_K(x)$ and password dictionary	[STW95], § 4.4	D
use one-way hash of K	narrowing attacks	[STW95]	D S
high bits of p must be 1	partition attack on $E_K(Q_x)$	[Jas96]	D
Receiver of clear Q_x abort if K is small order. <i>or</i> Encrypt Q_A , Q_B .	subgroup confinement of K	§ 4.3	D
Abort if K has small order	subgroup confinement of K	§ 4.3	S

† D: required for DH-EKE

S: required for SPEKE

Table 4 Constraints for SPEKE and DH-EKE

In a Diffie-Hellman exchange, the use of a *safe prime* modulus p (where $p = 2q + 1$, with prime q) and a base g which is a primitive root of p is commonly recommended to prevent discrete log attacks. These are sufficient, but more-than-necessary constraints. The literature [PH78, McC90] discusses proper selection of g and p , in particular to address the concern that easier solutions to the discrete logarithm problem make it easier to attack DH. Values for g in DH that are generators of a huge subgroup in Z_p^* are generally at least as strong as primitive roots. However, widely available literature, with the recent exception of [vOW96], does not discuss how the structure of Z_p^* is particularly relevant to authentication systems that use DH. We address this issue in our discussion.

We discuss three classes of attack directly related to the arithmetic used in the DH exchange in the following sections:

- § 4.1 Discrete log computation.
- § 4.2 Leaking information.
- § 4.3 Small subgroup confinement.

The *discrete log computation* inverts an exponentiation modulo p , to reveal the exponent, and ultimately the password. The difficulty of this computation depends on the size and character of p . The security of these methods relies on the computation being practically impossible.

We are also concerned that the exchanged, possibly encrypted, exponentials do not *leak information* about the password S . Leaking even a single bit of information about S during a single run can be devastating, if the bit is used to partition a password dictionary into possible and impossible candidates. [BM92] This type of slow-leak *partition attack* can reduce a good-sized dictionary to a single password candidate in a small number of runs.

Third, an attacker who knows the structure of G_{p-1} may be able to force the value of K to be confined to a small subgroup, which allows a (previously overlooked) guessing or brute force attack on K . In their security analysis of DH-EKE, [STW95] apparently assume that K is always randomly distributed in G_{p-1} . This assumption is false, since the first exponentiation of g with a random number confines the result to a smaller subgroup at least half the time. We discuss such *subgroup confinement attacks* in § 4.3.

All of these attacks are stopped with the proper constraints. § 4.5 and § 4.6 discuss tradeoffs that can be made with speed vs. security, by using a shorter modulus. More research is needed to increase the efficiency of these methods in light of basic attacks. § 4.7 discusses how short exponents can safely increase speed.

In addition to Alice and Bob, we introduce some other characters who make things interesting:

Mallory, who sits “in the middle” and intercepts, modifies, and re-sends messages,
Eve, who listens-in on the channel and reads all exchanged messages, and
Abby and *Barry*, who don’t know the password, but who try to pose as Alice and Bob.

4.1 Discrete log attack

As the security of these schemes rests primarily on exponentiation being a one-way function, there is a general threat of an attacker computing the discrete logarithms on the exponentials. Known methods of discrete log require a massive pre-computation for each specific modulus.

Modulus size is a primary concern. No method is currently known that could ever compute the discrete log for a safe modulus greater than a couple thousand bits, however a concerted attack on a 512 bit modulus may be soon feasible with considerable expense. Somewhere in between is an ideal size balancing speed against the need for security, in a given application.

Furthermore, a carefully chosen prime modulus p is required to prevent easy shortcut solutions to the discrete log problem. When $p-1$ has a large prime factor q , it resists the Pohlig-Hellman discrete log attack described in [PH78]. A safe prime of the form $p = 2q+1$, is one accepted way to prevent such short-cuts. A recent analysis and survey of these issues can be found in [vOW96].

It is noted in [BM92] that if we assume that a discrete log pre-computation has been made for the modulus, a password attack must also compute the specific log for each entry in the password dictionary (until a match is found). A similar attack in SPEKE may be more efficient, depending on the function $f(S)$. (see § 4.12) It is also noted in [BM92] that for any session established with a modulus vulnerable to log attack, *perfect forward secrecy* is no longer guaranteed (§ 4.9), providing another reason for keeping the discrete log computation out of reach. The feasibility of a pre-computed log table remains a primary concern, and the efficiency of the second phase of the attack is secondary.

4.2 Leaking information

If one is not careful, the exchanged messages Q_x may reveal discernible structure, and can “leak” information about S , enabling a partition attack. This section shows how to prevent these attacks.

4.2.1 DH-EKE partition attack

In DH-EKE, Alice and Bob use a Diffie-Hellman exponential key exchange in the field Z_p^* , with a huge prime p , where $p-1$ has a huge prime factor q . [BM92] use the traditional preference for g as a primitive root of p . In fact, g *must* be primitive to prevent a partition attack by an observer [Bel96]. A third party can do trial decryptions of $E_S(g^{R_x} \bmod p)$ using a dictionary of S_i . If g is not primitive, a bad guess S_i is confirmed by a primitive result. In general, the encrypted exponentials Q_x must contain no predictable structure to prevent this attack against DH-EKE. Constraining g to be primitive insures a random distribution across G_{p-1} .

- g must be primitive

The properties of the encryption method itself may also be a concern, although the primary concern is that the clear-text be random, which simplifies the constraints on the function E_S . Toward this goal, other recommended constraints for DH-EKE are:

- p must be slightly less than a power of 2. ([Jas96] describes how much less.)
- padding bits to fill to the block-size of E_S must be random.

SPEKE does not require these constraints, since it does not use symmetric encryption.

4.2.2 SPEKE partition attack

Using a primitive base is not needed in SPEKE, and may be quite dangerous. If the base $f(S)$ is an arbitrary member of G_{p-1} , since the exponentials are not encrypted, an observer can test the result for membership in smaller subgroups. When the result is a primitive root of p , he knows that the base also is primitive. For a safe prime p , this case reveals 1 bit of information about S . When p varies, as has been recommended when using a reduced modulus size (§ 4.6, 4.7), new information from runs with different p allow a partition attack to reduce a dictionary of possible S_i .

When, for any S , the base is a generator of a particular large prime subgroup, then no information is leaked through the result $f(S)^{R_x} \bmod p$. One such suitable function is $f(S) = g^S \bmod p$, where g generates a large prime subgroup. Another choice is discussed in § 4.12. We assume the use of a prime-order base in SPEKE for the rest of the discussion. As suggested in [vOW96], a large safe prime p can be chosen so that $g = 2$ is of huge prime order q .

Because SPEKE does not encrypt the exponentials, a formal analysis of security may be simpler to achieve for SPEKE than for DH-EKE. The prime-order subgroup is the same as that used in the DSA and Schnorr digital signature methods.

4.3 Subgroup confinement

In a subgroup confinement attack on a Diffie-Hellman exchange, the goal is to confine K to a predictable and small set of values, by causing one or both parties to use a number of a small order t as the base of exponentiation. Use of a safe-prime $p = 2q+1$ reduces, but does not eliminate the presence of small subgroups, as shown in figure 4.3. Even with a safe-prime p , Z_p^* still has the small subgroup G_2 . We'll show two versions of the attack.




Figure 4.3 Subgroups of Z_p^* for a safe prime $p = 2q+1$

In the man-in-the-middle version of this attack described in [vOW96], both parties are unaware that Mallory has intercepted and modified the exponentials. Knowing that t is a small prime factor of $p-1$, Mallory intercepts both Q_A and Q_B and sends $Q_A^{(p-1)/t}$ to Bob and $Q_B^{(p-1)/t}$ to Alice. This converts the exponentials into generators of the small subgroup G_t .¹ Both Alice and Bob go on to compute a shared value for K , which is confined to G_t . Mallory then has the easy job of finding K with a brute force attack. [vOW96] recommends the use of a large prime order subgroup to thwart this attack, making confinement to the only small subgroup G_1 trivial to detect. An alternate safeguard when the factorization of $p-1$ is known is to test K for membership in all small subgroups, and abort if it is confined.

We show that a confinement attack also occurs when Barry masquerades as Bob, and sends a value Q_B of small order t directly to the other. This is feasible in SPEKE, or in DH-EKE when Q_B is unencrypted. This one-side attack also results in K being confined to G_t , which gives Barry a $1/t$ chance of guessing K .

¹ Let $y = x^{(p-1)/t}$ for an arbitrary x . Since $y^t = (x^{(p-1)/t})^t \equiv 1 \pmod p$, it can be seen that the order of y is a factor of t . Since t is prime, y is either of order t or of order 1

He may get lucky with a tiny t . The middle attack is only a threat for SPEKE, since it requires that both Q_A and Q_B be sent unencrypted.

One path to a solution is to try to eliminate small subgroups in Z_p^* . The closest we can come to this is to select p as a safe prime, which yields the small subgroups G_2 and G_1 . An easy solution for SPEKE is to test the value of K . In this case, insuring that $K \notin G_2$ prevents the attack. Each side tests K and only proceeds if $1 < K < p-1$, since $G_2 = \{1, p-1\}$. For DH-EKE, another solution is to always encrypt both exponentials so that an attacker on either side cannot (feasibly) cause Q_x to be of small order.

Another approach to avoiding confinement in SPEKE is to test K for membership in all subgroups other than G_q , where q is a large prime, and $f(S)$ is of order q . If K is found to be a member of any group other than G_q , then the protocol must be aborted. This is conveniently done if each receiving party raises Q_x to the power $(p-1)/q$ before computing K . This forces K to be a member of G_q , so that testing to insure $K \neq 1$ prevents any confinement.² If $Q_x \in G_q$, then this extra exponentiation is just a one-to-one mapping that shuffles K to somewhere else in the group. The extra exponentiation adds negligible cost, since it can be performed as multiplication in the exponent.

4.4 Omitting encryption in DH-EKE

[STW95] shows that when the party who first receives verification of K from the other omits the step of encrypting the exponential, then DH-EKE is open to a dictionary attack on the password. [BM92] describes this attack as it applies to other public-key variants of EKE. In this description, presume that an attacker Abby is posing as Alice, and that the step of encrypting Q_A is omitted.

- | | | | |
|-----|---------------------------|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|
| D1. | Abby computes: | $Q_A = g^{R_A} \text{ mod } p,$ | A→B: Q_A |
| D2. | Bob computes: | $Q_B = g^{R_B} \text{ mod } p,$ | B→A: $E_S(Q_B)$ |
| D3. | Abby yawns. | | |
| D4. | Bob computes: | $K = h(Q_A^{R_B} \text{ mod } p)$ | |
| D5. | Alice computes: | Abby chooses a random $V,$ | A→B: V |
| D6. | Bob computes: | Bob chooses a random $C_B,$ | B→A: $E_K(C_B, E_K^{-1}(V))$ |
| D7. | Abby leaves the building. | | |

In this case, Abby has temporarily displaced Alice, and it may appear to Bob as an ordinary communication failure. At this point Abby performs the off-line attack:

- For each $S_i,$
 - Decrypt $E_S(Q_B)$ with candidate password S_i to obtain candidate Q_B' .
 - Compute $K' = Q_B'^{R_A}$.
 - Decrypt V with K' to get C_A' .
 - Decrypt $E_K(C_B, E_K^{-1}(V))$ with K' to get (X_B, X_A) .
 - If X_A equals C_A' ,
 - Abby knows that $S_i = S$.

² From footnote 1 in § 4.3, we know $Q_x^{(p-1)/t}$ is of order q . Consider any G_t and G_q , q is prime, and $t < q$. We can see that the intersection $G_t \cap G_q = G_1$. Since $K \in G_q$, if K is also confined to G_t , then $K \in G_1$, or $K = 1$.

The problem is due to the fact that the protocol makes Bob show his knowledge of K before Abby shows hers. This attack will not succeed if the order of verification is changed so that the first to receive proof is not the same party as the sender of the unencrypted exponential.

Encryption is a delicate issue in DH-EKE. Omitting one of the encryptions in DH-EKE raises the possibility of either this protocol attack, or the one-sided small subgroup confinement attack described in § 4.3. On the other hand, the *presence* of encryption poses the threat of the partition attack that must be dealt with carefully as described in § 4.2.1.

The protocol attack described here is not possible in SPEKE. In SPEKE rather than encrypting Q_x with the password, the password is hidden on each side by raising it to a random exponent. In order to compute K given Q_A and Q_B , one must either derive the value of R_B from Q_B or derive R_A from Q_A . This requires a discrete log computation.

4.5 Using a short modulus

To increase the speed of exponentiation, the modulus size can be reduced. But since the huge size of the modulus is a cornerstone of DH security, we must be extremely careful here. If the modulus size is reduced well below, say, 600 bits, the threat of discrete log attack becomes significant. [BM92] argues both for and against a decreased modulus. We summarize the debate here.

Pro: A decreased modulus size makes the method faster.

Con: A decreased modulus size permits feasible (though expensive) discrete log attack.

Con: Also, for a session established with a modulus vulnerable to log attack, *perfect forward secrecy* is no longer guaranteed (see § 4.9).

Pro: The log attack can be mitigated by a user-specific or frequently-changing modulus. This is a disincentive for a third-party attacker to spend much time or money computing a discrete log for a particular number.

In order to synchronize a variable modulus for both parties, it has been suggested that one party choose the parameters for the other [BM92, Jas96]. This raises new issues of trust. We must now ask whether an attacking party could maliciously choose parameters so as to gain information about the password from the other, or to make it easier to obtain a key without using the proper password.

4.6 Uncertified ephemeral parameters

We continue the debate, which is now in terms of whether or not one party should choose the ephemeral DH parameters. Presume that Bob chooses p and g randomly from a pre-computed set, and sends them to Alice prior to the exchange. As we maintain our goal of not requiring persistent public keys, these parameters must be uncertified. So, how can Alice trust them?

Con: Barry masquerading as Bob can deliberately send Alice a non-prime or non-safe prime modulus and/or a base with properties that aid in a partition attack against Alice's password (as described in § 4.2).

Pro: Alice can use primality and other tests to insure that the parameters are safe. [BM92]

Con: Practical tests for primality are probabilistic, and are only guaranteed to work for small or *randomly chosen* huge primes. An attacker might be able to deliberately create a non-prime that can pass Alice’s test, and lead to an attack. (Also, [BM92] refers to a communication with Odlyzko about a potential “trap door” modulus, without further explanation.)

A simple way to avoid the debate is to embed fixed safe parameters in the system, where the modulus is large enough to “permanently” preclude the discrete log attack. It has been suggested that 1000 or 2000 bits is adequate for long-term security. The use of a short exponent as is discussed next may make this practical for many situations.

<i>Constraint</i>	<i>Reason</i>	<i>Reference</i>	<i>Applies to</i>
Test that p is prime	non-prime p with calculated log	[BM92]	D S
Test that q is a large prime	non-safe prime p with calculated log	[BM92]	D S
Certified parameters	p has hidden trap door (?)	[BM92]	D S
Certified parameters	chosen false-prime p or q	§ 4.6	D S

Table 4.6 Special constraints for chosen parameters

If we continue the debate in search of a safe way to use a smaller modulus, the analysis becomes more complex. To end our discussion on a positive note, we ask whether there may be some perfect test that Alice can efficiently perform to guarantee that the parameters are trusted to not leak information in the first stage, at least until Bob proves who he is. Toward this goal we note that SPEKE can operate in a large prime subgroup of order $q \ll p$, and that perfect primality tests for non-huge q are possible.

It may also be interesting to consider the case where p and q are also kept secret, possibly within a tamper-proof hand-held device. Though this violates our characteristic 5, it might be useful if the modulus size must be imprudently small. Considering a normal SPEKE exchange with p , q , and S kept secret may also be of interest.

4.6.1 A user-to-station protocol

If despite the warnings in the preceding section, we still desire to let Bob choose the DH parameters for Alice, we may want to omit our desired characteristic 5b of § 2. Bob can sign the parameters with his private key, and require all users to have a certified copy of his public key to verify the signature. Note that this may impose less of a key management problem than the dual-signature approach used in the Station-to-Station protocol [DvOW92, § 7]. If Bob is a relatively secure site compared to Alice, his key may change only rarely. Further, if parameter generation is performed by a trusted authority at a secure central site, we might embed a public key of the trusted authority in read-only memory within all parties’ systems. The trusted authority would periodically send out lists of certified safe parameters.

4.7 Using a short exponent

A less radical approach to increasing speed is to decrease the exponent size to be merely large, leaving the modulus huge. [vOW96] discusses this in detail. The number of bits in the exponents must be at least double the number of bits (t) that are required for K , but this is typically much less than the number of bits in p .

Their conclusions suggest two safe approaches, where the exponents can be reduced to size $2t$ bits:

1. Use a huge safe prime modulus p with a primitive base of 2, or better yet, a prime-order base of 2.
2. Use a huge prime modulus p with a base of large prime order q , where q has at least $2t$ bits.

The first approach works with either DH-EKE or SPEKE, although DH-EKE needs further protection from the small-subgroup confinement attack. Using a base $g = 2$ further increases the speed. When $g = 2$, note that the two methods cannot use the same safe primes. A safe prime p suitable for DH-EKE must have 2 be a primitive root of p (see § 4.2.1), while a safe prime p suitable for SPEKE should ideally have 2 be of order q .

The use of a large prime subgroup where $q \ll p$ has the advantage of speeding up the generation of the DH parameters. This works with SPEKE, but it cannot be used with DH-EKE which requires a primitive base.

4.8 More desirable characteristics

In [DvOW92] the security of general authenticated key exchanges is discussed, and several desirable protocol characteristics are described. We start numbering these at 6 to add to the five characteristics listed in § 2.

6. Perfect forward secrecy
7. Direct authentication
8. No timestamps
9. Hidden identity.

Perfect forward secrecy means that disclosure of the password doesn't reveal prior recorded conversations. *Direct authentication* means that both sides verify the session key before proceeding. *No timestamps* means that the messages do not contain time-dependent data, which might require time synchronization between the parties. Without further discussion, we note that both DH-EKE and SPEKE meet the first three objectives.

Only the ninth characteristic, *hidden identity* is problematic. Neither of the methods described here hides the identity of the user from a passive observer. This limitation could be overcome with an additional prior standard DH exchange that establishes an unauthenticated key, to encrypt the user's identity. A man-in-the-middle attack would reveal this hidden identity, perhaps at the expense of being detected. We also note that while the somewhat-related Station-to-Station protocol (§ 7) can hide identity from passive attack, it also reveals identity to a man-in-the-middle at the expense of disrupting the run.

The problem of authenticating with a perfectly-hidden identity seems to be intractable without using a previously established secure session or large public keys. In these methods, the problem is related to the fact that the secret is shared. In order to choose the appropriate secret for a particular party, one needs to know the identity of the party prior to the exchange. However, prior to the exchange we assume that no secure channel exists over which to send the identity. We forgo any further analysis of this chicken-and-egg problem.

These characteristics have been covered in the referenced literature, with respect to key exchanges in general. At least one more desirable characteristic of these password methods is revealed as we consider the next attack.

4.9 Stolen session key attack

In an analysis of several flavors of EKE, [STW95] describes a variation of what they refer to as the *Denning-Sacco Attack*, where a stolen session key K is used to mount a dictionary attack on the password. The attack on the public-key flavor of EKE is also noted in [GLNS93]. [STW95] correctly points out that DH-EKE resists this attack (as does SPEKE). Resistance to this attack is closely related to perfect forward secrecy, which also isolates one kind of sensitive data from threats to another.

We note that, in DH-EKE, a stolen value of R_A in addition to K permits a dictionary attack against the password S . For each trial password S_i , the attacker computes:

$$K' = (E_{S_i}^{-1}(E_S(g^{R_B})))^{R_A}$$

When K' equals K , he knows that S_i equals S . SPEKE is also vulnerable to an attack using R_A to find S . These concerns highlight the need to promptly destroy ephemeral sensitive data, such as R_A and R_B .

[STW95] also notes a threat when the long-term session key K is used in an extra stage of authentication of the extended A-EKE method [BM94, and § 7], a dictionary attack is possible using the extra messages. To counter this threat, one can use K for the extra stage, set $K' = h(K)$ using a strong one-way function, and promptly discard K .

4.10 Verification stage attacks

The verification stage of either DH-EKE or SPEKE is where both parties prove to each other knowledge of the shared key K . Because K is cryptographically large, the second stage is presumed to be immune to brute-force attack, and thus verifying K can be done by traditional means. However, the order of verification may be important to resist the protocol attack against DH-EKE as was discussed in § 4.4.

4.11 Detecting on-line attack

The threat of repetitive on-line guessing by a masquerading user can be mitigated by a careful logging and accounting of invalid access attempts. The idea is to limit the number of illegal access attempts against any single password, and require that the password be changed before the threshold is exceeded. The threshold should be based on the known (or suspected) size of the password space. It is also advantageous to keep separate per-password and total system counts of invalid attempts to detect both attacks on a single account, and broad-scale attacks that do not exceed any single user's threshold.

It may be tempting to try to distinguish between accidental mistakes and illegal attempts, by noting that most mistakes are followed immediately by a valid access. However, a clever attacker may be able to anticipate or delay a legitimate run, and perform a few quick guesses against the same account before letting the legitimate run succeed. Thus, even apparently accidental mistakes should be counted, by both parties, and viewed with suspicion.

The case of a masquerading host is a little different. Whereas the host usually has long-term storage for logging errors, the user's system may not. It is generally foolish to rely completely on the user himself to enforce security policy dealing with suspicious bad attempts. The user's system should at least keep a short-term count of bad attempts and (securely) update the host with this count the next time access is granted. The host may also alert the user of bad access attempts at this time. These methods greatly deter guessing attacks against both the user and the host.

4.12 Strengthening SPEKE against discrete log attack

In § 4.1 we mentioned that SPEKE can be subject to a more efficient discrete log attack than DH-EKE. We now describe this attack and show a way to prevent the problem. To prevent a partition attack, we want our function $f(S)$ to always produce an base of large prime order q , where $q \mid (p-1)$. We show two candidate functions $f(S)$ that are both efficient for use with SPEKE. If we assume that the discrete log precomputation is feasible, the first function allows a more efficient attack than the second.

4.12.1 $f(S) = g_q^S \bmod p$

An obvious choice is to use $f(S) = g_q^S \bmod p$, where g_q is an element of order q . Note that one might consider protecting against the chance that $f(S) = 1$, but recalling that in G_q , 1 is the only element of the only small subgroup G_1 , this chance is $1/q$, insignificantly small for huge q . We show the relevant SPEKE calculations:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_A &= g_q^{(S \cdot R_A)} \bmod p \\ Q_B &= g_q^{(S \cdot R_B)} \bmod p \\ K &= g_q^{(S \cdot R_B \cdot R_A)} \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

Assume that an attacker Eve knows Q_A , Q_B , p and q . With a single discrete log computation she can iterate through a dictionary of S_i , compute candidates for R_A , and test candidates for K as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} L &= \log_{g_q} \text{ modulo } p \text{ of } Q_A = (S_i \cdot R_A') \bmod (p-1) \\ \text{For each candidate } S_i, \\ R_A' &= L \cdot (S_i^{-1} \bmod (p-1)) \\ K' &= Q_B^{R_A'} \bmod p. \\ &\text{Test } K' \text{ against verification messages for } K. \end{aligned}$$

In contrast, DH-EKE resists a similar attack, apparently requiring a specific log computation for each possible S_i . [BM92] Because DH-EKE sends Q_A encrypted with the password, the value is not immediately available for performing the log computation. The attacker must decrypt the candidates for Q_A using each possible password, and iteratively compute the log for each candidate.

4.12.2 $f(S) = S^{(p-1)/q} \bmod p$

In SPEKE, a preferred choice for f , makes it similarly resistant to the single discrete log attack. Using $f(S) = S^{(p-1)/q} \bmod p$ may also be used to provide a base of order q .³ The computation is now:

$$\begin{aligned} Q_A &= S^{(((p-1)/q) \cdot R_A)} \bmod p \\ Q_B &= S^{(((p-1)/q) \cdot R_B)} \bmod p \\ K &= S^{(((p-1)/q) \cdot R_B \cdot R_A)} \bmod p \end{aligned}$$

With this alternative, the straightforward search for K requires a log computation for each candidate password:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{For each } S_i, \\ L &= \log_{S_i}(Q_A) = (((p-1)/q) \cdot R_A) \bmod (p-1) \\ R_A' &= L \cdot (((p-1)/q)^{-1} \bmod (p-1)) \end{aligned}$$

³ We assume the probability that $g = 1$ is negligibly small. This special case is also easy to detect and avoid.

$$K' = Q_B^{R_A} \text{ mod } p.$$

Test K' against verification messages for K .

In thinking about the case of a safe prime p where 2 is of order q , this subtle advantage of using $f(S) = S^2$ over $f(S) = 2^S$ is surprising.

4.13 Application to Kerberos

[Jas96] applies the DH-EKE method to Kerberos authentication between a client and the Key Distribution Center (KDC). The goal is to simultaneously solve three long-standing limitations in the system, related to dictionary attacks, dependence on timestamps, and *password chaining*. Password chaining is the ability of an attacker to use an old password to determine a new one. The reference describes how DH-EKE prevents this. The proposal uses a mild form for ordinary login, and a strong form for specially protecting the password-change protocol. The proposed protocol (PA-ENC-DH) uses only the first stage of DH-EKE, and omits the verification of K .

By omitting verification of K , there is no direct authentication. One result is that the KDC cannot distinguish valid from invalid access attempts; It can only count the total number of attempts. A tradeoff is being made between the size of the minimally secure password and the total number of allowed uses. Such a system may be impractical for protecting very small passwords. A system that performs direct authentication by verifying K and distinguishing valid from invalid attempts would be friendlier. With this improvement, the frequent user who rarely mistypes his password is not penalized with frequent demands to change the password.

5 A fully constrained SPEKE

Despite the length of the preceding analysis and discussion, a fully constrained SPEKE method is simple in structure. The description here presumes a well-known safe prime p and random numbers R_A and R_B of suitable size. Other formulations are possible.

Stage 1:

$$A \rightarrow B: Q_A = S^{(2 \cdot R_A)} \text{ mod } p.$$

$$B \rightarrow A: Q_B = S^{(2 \cdot R_B)} \text{ mod } p.$$

$$\text{Alice: } K = Q_B^{(2 \cdot R_A)} \text{ mod } p.$$

$$\text{Bob: } K = Q_A^{(2 \cdot R_B)} \text{ mod } p.$$

Each aborts if $K < 2$.

Stage 2:

$$B \rightarrow A: V_B = h(h(h(K))).$$

Alice verifies V_B .

$$A \rightarrow B: V_A = h(h(K)).$$

Bob verifies V_A .

Both then compute the shared authenticated session key $K' = h(K)$, and both promptly destroy all copies of K , R_A , R_B and, if possible, S .

Our constraints would not be complete without mention of the often controversial subject of bit-lengths. Following the standard sizes used for the DSA [NIST94], using 512 to 1024 bits for p and 160 bits for

random exponents, resulting in an 80-bit K , may be sufficient for many uses. Using 1024 bits for p and 336 bits for the exponents has been recommended for DH-EKE in [Jas96] for long-term safety.

6 Other limitations and possibilities

Here are some apparent limitations of any password-only scheme, in light of dictionary attacks:

- The method must be interactive.
- The password-verifier can always perform dictionary attack.
- The password cannot be a private key in a public-key method.

Without an interactive method, the password verification messages can be used in simplistic dictionary or replay attacks. Both parties must be active participants. We further accept that anyone in a position to verify the password can find it with brute-force. This can be done by simulating the actions of the other party using each candidate password. This limitation is mentioned in [BM92].

Passwords as private-keys in a public-key system would be wonderful, but the holder of the corresponding public-key is then in a position to perform dictionary attack -- which defeats the purpose of a public-key. Further pursuit along these lines leads into the domain of identity schemes, which are quite complex and involve a trusted third-party. [Sch96, p. 115]

Password methods are attractive for their simplicity, convenience, and strength. Where the password can be memorized, it need not be recorded and possibly stolen. The attraction of key-based methods is in the richness and power of public-key and non-interactive techniques. By carefully setting expectations, both classes of methods can be widely promoted. Strong hybrid systems can use independent key-based and password-only methods to complement each other.

Need for a trusted path

One of the limitations of any password method is reflected in the need for a *trusted path*. In a classical system this refers to the integrity of the entire system from the user's fingers at a keyboard to the final destination where the password is verified. In a network, password-only methods can be used to "shorten" the trusted-path to end at the software on the user's local processor. The path no longer requires a prior secure network channel. However, any risks to the integrity of the local system are still relevant.

Formal verification

Although strong password-only methods based on Diffie-Hellman have been studied for several years, more formal analysis of the security of SPEKE and other methods would be valuable. Due to its simple structure, SPEKE may more easily facilitate such analysis. The ability to use a prime-order subgroup may also be significant in this regard.

7 Other related work

Only a few other password-only methods have been designed that successfully address the goal of preventing off-line dictionary attacks. More complex variations of EKE using public-key encryption are described in [BM92]. DH-EKE and SPEKE have an advantage over these in being extensible to allow the host to store a one-way hashed form of the password, in methods such as A-EKE [BM94]. In these extended methods, Bob uses the one-way hashed password to verify possession of the clear-text password by Alice. When using this type of extension, we make Alice compute the hashed form, and use S to represent the hashed password in the first stage of the exchange.

A few other approaches to strong password-only protocols have also been explored, with varying degrees of success and complexity.

[GLNS93] describes both three-party and two-party protocols based on using *secret public keys*. The authors express a concern about finding a suitable public-key method for these protocols, which require that any random number of appropriate length be a valid public-key. The paper further describes stored-public-key-assisted protocols, and discusses guessing attacks, Kerberos login, the important concept of verifiable plaintext, which was originally introduced by these authors.

[Gon95] describes an optimal 3-message version of the two-party secret-public-key protocol. [STW95] shows an optimal 3-message form of DH-EKE, which applies equally well to SPEKE.⁴

Fortified Key Negotiation [Sch96 p. 522, And94] is another method which resists dictionary attack, at the expense of reducing the effective size of the password space.

Other variations on the password-only theme are three-party exchanges, where multiple shared secrets are held by a common trusted authentication server who mediates the process of exchange between two parties. [STW95] points out a weakness in some instances of these.

An earlier promising approach was the Shamir and Rivest Interlock Protocol, as used by Davies and Price, of which a brief historical account appears in [Sch96 pp. 54-55]. An attack on the Interlock Protocol for authentication is described in [BM93], and a recent attempt to patch this hole is described in [Eil96].

The *Station-to-Station protocol* described in [DvOW92] is interesting for the sake of comparison, although it depends on the deployment of private and public keys, in violation of our desired characteristic 5 (§ 2). The protocol uses a DH exchange and encrypts the exponentials in a manner similar to DH-EKE, but using public-key encryption.

Still further away along the spectrum of methods are identity-based schemes, which can use zero-knowledge ideas to prove knowledge of a secret held by another party. These do not provide an authenticated key exchange, and they do not allow the “secret” to be cryptographically small. A brief review of these is also included in [DvOW92].

⁴ Whether a minimal message protocol is truly “optimal” depends on the desired goal, and on the cost and speed of communication vs. computation. For example, optimizing SPEKE for minimal time to completion may require more than three messages to maximize parallel processing of both parties.

8 Uses of password-only authenticated exchange

With a strong password-authenticated key exchange, even small passwords can be safely used. The host is presumed to detect and deter on-line attacks, and the protocol itself prevents off-line attacks. These methods are ideal in some applications for several reasons: secure key storage can be problematic, large-key input can be cumbersome, and passwords may need to be better protected. Several applications for strong password-only exchanges are mentioned here.

In § 4.13 we discussed using DH-EKE or SPEKE to correct deficiencies in Kerberos. The same ideas can be used to upgrade many other vulnerable network login systems, which can be essential for new uses such as personal-computer remote banking, and general computer login over the Internet.

In systems where only a numeric keypad is available, such as cellular telephone authentication, a secure, short numeric password is especially convenient. TV remote-controlled set-top boxes might be another area of new applications. These environments may also preclude long-term storage of persistent keys.

Diskless workstations are another class of device where it is inconvenient to have locally stored keys. Password-only methods are ideal for establishing an initial connection to a trusted host, and to obtain the user's safely stored credentials. This concept of remote storage of long-term credentials with a secure download has been used in the SPX authentication system. [TA91]

Any device or system that uses these methods can be *generic*, in that it is not preprogrammed to speak only for a particular user, or to speak to any particular host. Alternative approaches using a persistent public-key need to embed a key which designates a specific trusted authority. This can be inconvenient. Password-only methods make it easier to deploy a system that has no such embedded prior agreement. This model may better fit the “commodity” market model for software and hardware devices.

The concept of *bootstrapping* a new secure system is broad, and is best illustrated with a common case. You're installing a new network workstation from a CD-ROM. Somewhere during installation you're prompted to enter a name and password to let you join the secure corporate network. Unless some additional site-specific keys are manually installed on the system, a strong password-only method is needed to allow the new station to make a secure channel to the rest of the network. Once an authenticated channel is established, the station can automatically obtain any further credentials or keys. Similar “bootstrapping” situations arise in almost all secure systems.

Though we've focused so far on user-to-host authentication, password-only methods may be important for direct *user-to-user authentication*. [Eli96] describes the use of an interactive series of questions and answers to authenticate the identity of an “old friend, out of touch” across a network. The idea is to prove to each other that they know common facts, without revealing those facts. Such situations are actually quite common. Password-only methods solve this general authentication paradox, which is present even in some face-to face situations. For example, you may want to prove that your bank knows your “secret” account numbers, and your bank wants you to prove that you know your “secret” social security number, but neither wants to reveal the information directly to the other. This is solved by these methods. Of course, given that much of this type of shared information is not as secret as we'd like it to be, a series of exchanges may be needed to prove further small amounts of shared knowledge, to build confidence in the authentication.

Multi-factor authentication may be needed when neither a stored key nor a memorized password is strong enough. In a hybrid system, one should strive to make the password an *independent factor*, so that its

security does not depend on persistent stored keys, and vice-versa. Password-only methods can be combined with key-based method to build systems that can tolerate either a stolen password or a stolen key.

9 Summary

We've introduced a new password-only authentication protocol, SPEKE, which appears to be at least as strong as the closely related DH-EKE method. Using only a small password, these methods provide authentication and key establishment over an insecure channel, and are immune to offline dictionary attack.

A review of the classes of attack against these DH-based methods includes some new observations, and new constraints which are required to keep both methods safe. These constraints are listed as a convenience to implementors. Concerns raised about receiving unauthenticated DH parameters argue for the use of either a fixed huge modulus, or certified parameters, or the need for further research. In any case, it is practical to increase speed by using shorter exponents.

Strong password-only methods have many uses, by themselves, or in multi-factor authentication systems. It is apparent that password-only methods can achieve things that no stored-key method can achieve, and vice-versa. A well-designed system can leverage the power of small, easily-memorized passwords, adding significant strength to the foundation for remote security.

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Appendix A Group theory relevant to Diffie-Hellman methods

Finite groups have interesting properties that are used in Diffie-Hellman and the SPEKE and DH-EKE methods discussed in this paper. Several finite groups can be used in DH, but for simplicity we limit discussion to Z_p^* , the group of integers from 1 to $p-1$, under multiplication modulo p , where p is a huge prime. Exponentiation modulo p is a one-way function, for suitable p , due to the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms.

Z_p^* is also known as the multiplicative group of the Galois field of integers modulo p , or $GF(p)^*$. When showing arithmetic within these groups, it is traditional to sometimes omit “mod p ”. As in any group, for any x and y which are members of Z_p^* , the product of x and y is also a member, and thus exponentiation always remains within the group. In other words:

$$\begin{aligned} \forall_{x,y}: \quad x,y \in Z_p^* &\Rightarrow ((x \cdot y) \bmod p) \in Z_p^* \\ \forall_{x,n}: \quad x \in Z_p^* &\Rightarrow (x^n \bmod p) \in Z_p^* \end{aligned}$$

For each x which is a divisor of $p-1$, the group Z_p^* contains a *subgroup* G_x of order x , that is, G_x contains x elements. $Z_p^* = G_{p-1}$. Every group G_x contains the *trivial subgroup* G_1 , consisting of $\{1\}$, and the subgroup G_x itself. A group G_q of prime order q has no subgroups other than G_q and G_1 . A *generator* g of G_x is a number such that the set $\{g^1, g^2, \dots, g^x\}$ includes all elements of G_x . A generator of G_{p-1} is said to be a *primitive root* of p . A number is said to be *of order* x when it is a generator of G_x . If g is of order x , then $g^x \equiv 1 \pmod p$.

Also note that arithmetic *within the exponent* must be done modulo $p-1$.

$$\forall_{x,y}: \quad x^y \equiv x^{y \bmod (p-1)} \pmod p.$$

This is seen from Fermat’s Theorem:

$$\text{Given a prime } p, \text{ for every } a \text{ such that } \gcd(a, p) = 1, \quad a^{p-1} \bmod p = 1.$$

The traditional DH exchange uses two random numbers R_A , and R_B to negotiate a shared key K :

$$\text{Alice} \rightarrow \text{Bob}: \quad Q_A = g^{R_A} \bmod p$$

$$\text{Bob} \rightarrow \text{Alice}: \quad Q_B = g^{R_B} \bmod p$$

$$\text{Alice computes:} \quad K = Q_B^{R_A} \bmod p$$

$$\text{Bob computes:} \quad K = Q_A^{R_B} \bmod p$$

A prime where $p-1$ has *only* small factors is called *smooth*. Smooth primes are avoided in these methods because they allow a much faster discrete log computation [PH78], ruining exponentiation as a useful one-way function. It is easy to select a non-smooth prime by insuring that $p-1$ has a large prime factor q . Using a *safe-prime* of the form $p = 2q+1$, where q is prime, and where the base g is a primitive root of p , is commonly recommended in DH. However, other choices are sometimes preferable. [vOW96] recommends using g as a base of order q to force all results within the large prime subgroup G_q .

Note that a safe prime is somewhat different from *strong primes*, which refers to a more complex (and debatable) set of constraints for the prime factors of a number $n = pq$, in methods such as RSA.

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