

Relating Cryptography and Polymorphism

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Abstract

Cryptography is information hiding. Polymorphism is also information hiding. So is cryptography polymorphic? Is polymorphism cryptographic?

To investigate these questions, we define the *cryptographic λ -calculus*, a simply typed λ -calculus with shared-key cryptographic primitives. Although this calculus is simply typed, it is powerful enough to encode recursive functions, recursive types, and dynamic typing. We then develop a theory of relational parametricity for our calculus as Reynolds did for the polymorphic λ -calculus. This theory is useful for proving equivalences in our calculus; for instance, it implies a non-interference property: values encrypted by a key cannot be distinguished from one another by any function ignorant of the key. We close with an encoding of the polymorphic λ -calculus into the cryptographic calculus that uses cryptography to protect type abstraction.

Our results shed a new light upon the relationship between cryptography and polymorphism, and offer a first step toward extending programming idioms based on type abstraction (such as modules and packages) from the civilized world of polymorphism, where only well-typed programs are allowed, to the unstructured world of cryptography, where friendly programs must cohabit with malicious attackers.

1 Introduction

Information hiding is a crucial concept in programming. It is essential not only for modularity but also for security of programs. *Type abstraction* and *encryption* are common approaches to information hiding.

Type abstraction forbids illegal access to secret data by concealing the *type* of the data. For example, consider the following package, which provides a list *ints* of secret integers and a function *isdiv* to test whether one of the secret integers is divisible by another.

$$\begin{array}{l} \mathbf{pack} \ \mathbf{int}, \{ \mathit{ints} = [1, 2, 3], \ \mathit{isdiv} = \lambda i. \lambda j. (i \bmod j = 0) \} \\ \mathbf{as} \ \exists \alpha. \{ \mathit{ints} : \alpha \ \mathbf{list}, \ \mathit{isdiv} : \alpha \rightarrow \alpha \rightarrow \mathbf{bool} \} \end{array}$$

This achieves the security by concealing the type **int** of the data 1, 2, and 3. The typing rules for existential types [17] guarantee that users of the package must treat the type abstractly.

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On the other hand, *encryption* prevents illegal access to secret data by obfuscating the *value* of the data, for example as follows. (The terms $\lfloor _ \rfloor_k$ and $\lceil _ \rceil_k$ denote encryption and decryption, respectively, under the key k .)

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let  $k = \text{generate\_fresh\_key}()$  in
 $\{ints = [\lfloor 1 \rfloor_k, \lfloor 2 \rfloor_k, \lfloor 3 \rfloor_k], isdiv = \lambda x. \lambda y. (\lceil x \rceil_k \text{ mod } \lceil y \rceil_k = 0)\}$ 
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Type abstraction is static and high-level: a potential violation of secrecy causes a type error before execution, as long as the whole program (including the “attacker”) abides by the type system. This leads to a powerful method of reasoning about type abstraction, known as *parametricity* [24]. The principle of parametricity assures us that “related” programs are equivalent, in the sense that they are indistinguishable in any well-typed context, where the notion “related” is defined as follows:

- Two values of a base type b are related if and only if they are equal.
- Two values of a function type $\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2$ are related if and only if they map any related arguments to related results.
- Two values of an abstract type α are related if and only if they satisfy the relation $\varphi(\alpha)$, where φ maps each abstract type to a relation between its concrete types.

The power of parametricity comes from the fact that we can take *any* relation as $\varphi(\alpha)$ for each α in order to let two programs related. For example, in the first program above, we can take $\varphi(\alpha) = \{(1, 2), (2, 4), (3, 6)\}$. Then, by parametricity, this program is equivalent to the same program with $[1, 2, 3]$ substituted with $[2, 4, 6]$, because $isdiv(i)(j)$ is equal to $isdiv(i')(j')$ for any $(i, i') \in \varphi(\alpha)$ and $(j, j') \in \varphi(\alpha)$. Therefore, the packaging is secure in the sense that it never leaks the secret data, as long as everybody plays by the rules of the type system. However, type abstraction fails if the scope of a value of an abstract type exceeds the scope of the type checker, e.g. if the value is saved in a file or sent over a network. For instance, the security of the package above is broken if the secret data *ints* is written to a file and read from the file just as a list of integers.

By contrast, encryption is dynamic and low-level: illegal access to secret data causes a decryption failure either in the user code (like $\lceil head(ints) \rceil_{bogus_key}$) or in the provider code (like $isdiv \lfloor 7 \rfloor_{bogus_key} \lfloor 8 \rfloor_{bogus_key}$) during execution. It keeps attackers from breaking the protection with no assumptions about what they do, except for the secrecy of the keys and the mathematical strength of the underlying cryptosystem.

These comparisons between type abstraction and encryption lead us to wonder whether we can establish some more formal relationships between them. In particular:

- Can we adapt the parametricity theory of type abstraction to reason about programs that use encryption for information hiding?
- Can we have our cake and eat it too, first writing programs in the high-level but restrictive setting of type abstraction, and then translating them to the lower-level but more flexible setting of encryption *without losing modularity and security*?

In this paper, we give a full answer to the first question and a partial answer to the second. Specifically, we (i) present the *cryptographic λ -calculus*, a simply typed λ -calculus with shared-key cryptographic primitives, and illustrate its expressive power through several examples (Section 2), (ii) establish a theory of relational parametricity à la Reynolds [24] for this calculus (Section 3),

and (iii) sketch an encoding of System F [13, 23] into the cryptographic λ -calculus (Section 4), using encryption to simulate type abstraction. Our primary contributions are (ii) and (iii). The expressiveness of the calculus is—though useful for modeling malicious attackers—a secondary issue.

2 The Cryptographic λ -Calculus

2.1 Syntax and Semantics

Our calculus is a standard simply typed call-by-value λ -calculus with records, booleans, and integers, enriched with simple primitives for shared-key cryptography.

An encryption $[t_1]_{t_2}$ encrypts the plaintext t_1 with the key t_2 , and a decryption **let** $[x]_{t_1} = t_2$ **in** t_3 **else** t_4 tries to decrypt the ciphertext t_2 with the key t_1 . If the decryption succeeds, it binds the plaintext to the variable x and evaluates the body t_3 . If the decryption fails, it evaluates the handler t_4 . A key generation **new** $\langle \tau, \alpha \rangle$ generates a key to encrypt and decrypt values of the type τ using the password α . A key $\langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle$ consists of the type τ of the values to encrypt and decrypt, the password α , and the sequence number n . The type is necessary for type soundness: without it, two values of different types could be encrypted using the same key, and then confused when they are decrypted, like **let** $[x]_{\langle _, \alpha, 0 \rangle} = [\mathbf{true}]_{\langle _, \alpha, 0 \rangle}$ **in** $x - 1$ **else** \dots (cf. Section 2.2). The sequence number is taken from a global counter, incremented on each key generation. Passwords are used for statically tracking knowledge about (possibly infinite) sets of dynamically generated keys to state security properties of programs in our calculus. (This point is discussed further after Corollary 10 in Section 3.) The primitive **fail** aborts evaluation.

We assume the following properties of these cryptographic primitives.

- No ciphertext can be decrypted or forged without using the key. In particular, no ciphertext can be fabricated from other ciphertexts (*non-malleability* [10]).
- No operation can be performed on ciphertexts without decrypting them. In particular, no ciphertexts can be compared for (in)equality. In practice, this condition can be satisfied by including random nonces in ciphertexts.
- No password can be guessed by conjecture. In practice, this assumption can be fulfilled by choosing “good” passwords for keys.

In short, we assume *perfect* encryption. Although no present-day cryptosystem—to our knowledge—has been proven to satisfy all these conditions (and some are known not to), they offer a clean starting point for the arguments that we give in this paper. Investigating what kind of results can be obtained when these assumptions are weakened is a topic for future work.

Formally, the syntax and semantics of the cryptographic λ -calculus are given in Figure 1. (Throughout this paper, we abbreviate a sequence of the form X_1, \dots, X_n to a vector of the form \tilde{X} when the number n is obvious.) In order to deal with the impurities such as key generation and failure in a rigorous manner, the evaluation function $\llbracket t \rrbracket_n$ takes an initial sequence number n and either diverges (written \perp) or returns (i) a value v and a final sequence number n' (written $[v]_{n'}$), (ii) **fail**, or (iii) **error**. Note that **fail** denotes a safe, intentional failure while **error** denotes an unsafe, unintentional error (a run-time type error).

We abbreviate $\llbracket t \rrbracket_n = [v]_{n'}$ to $\llbracket t \rrbracket = v$ when n and n' are unimportant. For the sake of readability, we also use the syntactic sugarings $(\mathbf{let} \ x = t_1 \ \mathbf{in} \ t_2) \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\lambda x. t_2)t_1$ and $[t_1]_{t_2} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathbf{let} \ [x]_{t_2} =$

$$\begin{aligned}
t &::= x \mid \lambda x. t \mid t_1 t_2 \mid \{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{t}\} \mid \#_{\ell}(t) \mid \mathbf{true} \mid \mathbf{false} \mid \mathbf{if} \ t_1 \ \mathbf{then} \ t_2 \ \mathbf{else} \ t_3 \mid i \mid t_1 - t_2 \mid t > 0 \mid \\
&\quad \langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle \mid \mathbf{new} \langle \tau, \alpha \rangle \mid [t_1]_{t_2} \mid \mathbf{let} \ [x]_{t_1} = t_2 \ \mathbf{in} \ t_3 \ \mathbf{else} \ t_4 \mid \mathbf{fail} \\
\tau &::= \tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2 \mid \{\tilde{\ell} : \tilde{\tau}\} \mid \mathbf{bool} \mid \mathbf{int} \mid \langle \tau \rangle \mid \mathbf{bits} \\
v &::= \lambda x. t \mid \{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{v}\} \mid \mathbf{true} \mid \mathbf{false} \mid i \mid \langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle \mid [v]_{\langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle} \\
V &::= [v]_n \mid \perp \mid \mathbf{fail} \mid \mathbf{error}
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\llbracket \lambda x. t \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [\lambda x. t]_n \\
\llbracket t_1 t_2 \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [\lambda x. t]_{n_1} \Rightarrow \\
&\quad (\text{case } \llbracket t_2 \rrbracket_{n_1} \text{ of } [v]_{n_2} \Rightarrow \llbracket t[x := v] \rrbracket_{n_2} \\
&\quad \mid V_2 \Rightarrow V_2) \\
&\quad \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V_1 \Rightarrow V_1 \\
\llbracket \{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{t}\} \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [v_1]_{n_1} \Rightarrow \\
&\quad \dots \\
&\quad (\text{case } \llbracket t_m \rrbracket_{n_{m-1}} \text{ of } [v_m]_{n_m} \Rightarrow \llbracket \{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{v}\} \rrbracket_{n_m} \\
&\quad \mid V_m \Rightarrow V_m) \\
&\quad \dots \\
&\quad \mid V_1 \Rightarrow V_1 \\
\llbracket \#_{\ell}(t) \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [\{\ell = v, \dots\}]_{n'} \Rightarrow [v]_{n'} \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V \Rightarrow V \\
\llbracket \mathbf{true} \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [\mathbf{true}]_n \\
\llbracket \mathbf{false} \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [\mathbf{false}]_n \\
\llbracket \mathbf{if} \ t_1 \ \mathbf{then} \ t_2 \ \mathbf{else} \ t_3 \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [\mathbf{true}]_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket t_2 \rrbracket_{n'} \mid [\mathbf{false}]_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket t_3 \rrbracket_{n'} \\
&\quad \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V \Rightarrow V \\
\llbracket i \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [i]_n \\
\llbracket t_1 - t_2 \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [i_1]_{n_1} \Rightarrow \\
&\quad (\text{case } \llbracket t_2 \rrbracket_{n_1} \text{ of } [i_2]_{n_2} \Rightarrow [i_1 - i_2]_{n_2} \\
&\quad \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V_2 \Rightarrow V_2) \\
&\quad \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V_1 \Rightarrow V_1 \\
\llbracket t > 0 \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [i]_{n'} \Rightarrow [i > 0]_{n'} \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V \Rightarrow V \\
\llbracket \langle \tau, \alpha, m \rangle \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [\langle \tau, \alpha, m \rangle]_n \\
\llbracket \mathbf{new} \langle \tau, \alpha \rangle \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [\langle \tau, \alpha, n + 1 \rangle]_{n+1} \\
\llbracket [t_1]_{t_2} \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [v_1]_{n_1} \Rightarrow \\
&\quad (\text{case } \llbracket t_2 \rrbracket_{n_1} \text{ of } [\langle \tau, \alpha, m \rangle]_{n_2} \Rightarrow \llbracket [v_1]_{\langle \tau, \alpha, m \rangle} \rrbracket_{n_2} \\
&\quad \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V_2 \Rightarrow V_2) \\
&\quad \mid V_1 \Rightarrow V_1 \\
\llbracket \mathbf{let} \ [x]_{t_1} = t_2 \ \mathbf{in} \ t_3 \ \mathbf{else} \ t_4 \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [\langle \tau, \alpha, m \rangle]_{n_1} \Rightarrow \\
&\quad (\text{case } \llbracket t_2 \rrbracket_{n_1} \text{ of } [v_2]_{n_2} \Rightarrow \\
&\quad \quad \mathbf{if} \ k = \langle \tau, \alpha, m \rangle \ \mathbf{then} \ \llbracket t_3[x := v_2] \rrbracket_{n_2} \ \mathbf{else} \ \llbracket t_4 \rrbracket_{n_2} \\
&\quad \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V_2 \Rightarrow V_2) \\
&\quad \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V_1 \Rightarrow V_1 \\
\llbracket \mathbf{fail} \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{fail}
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 1: Syntax and Semantics

$$\begin{array}{c}
\Gamma, x : \tau \vdash x : \tau \quad \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{true} : \mathbf{bool} \quad \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{false} : \mathbf{bool} \quad \Gamma \vdash i : \mathbf{int} \\
\\
\frac{\Gamma, x : \tau_1 \vdash t : \tau_2}{\Gamma \vdash \lambda x. t : \tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : \tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2 \quad \Gamma \vdash t_2 : \tau_1}{\Gamma \vdash t_1 t_2 : \tau_2} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash \tilde{t} : \tilde{\tau}}{\Gamma \vdash \{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{t}\} : \{\tilde{\ell} : \tilde{\tau}\}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \{\ell : \tau, \dots\}}{\Gamma \vdash \#_{\ell}(t) : \tau} \\
\\
\frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : \mathbf{bool} \quad \Gamma \vdash t_2 : \tau \quad \Gamma \vdash t_3 : \tau}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{if } t_1 \mathbf{ then } t_2 \mathbf{ else } t_3 : \tau} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : \mathbf{int} \quad \Gamma \vdash t_2 : \mathbf{int}}{\Gamma \vdash t_1 - t_2 : \mathbf{int}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \mathbf{int}}{\Gamma \vdash t > 0 : \mathbf{bool}} \\
\\
\Gamma \vdash \langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle : \langle \tau \rangle \quad \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{new} \langle \tau, \alpha \rangle : \langle \tau \rangle \quad \Gamma \vdash \mathbf{fail} : \tau \\
\\
\frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : \tau \quad \Gamma \vdash t_2 : \langle \tau \rangle}{\Gamma \vdash [t_1]_{t_2} : \mathbf{bits}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : \langle \tau_1 \rangle \quad \Gamma \vdash t_2 : \mathbf{bits} \quad \Gamma, x : \tau_1 \vdash t_3 : \tau_2 \quad \Gamma \vdash t_4 : \tau_2}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{let } [x]_{t_1} = t_2 \mathbf{ in } t_3 \mathbf{ else } t_4 : \tau_2}
\end{array}$$

Figure 2: Typing Rules

t_1 **in** x **else fail**). We assume distinction between the names of variables, and apply α -conversion implicitly.

2.2 Type System

The typing rules for the cryptographic λ -calculus are shown in Figure 2. They are standard except for the types given to keys and ciphertexts. The type $\langle \tau \rangle$ describes keys for encrypting and decrypting values of the type τ . The type **bits** (“bit string”) includes *all* ciphertexts. The fact that the type of a plaintext is included in the type of the key used to encrypt it, rather than the type of the ciphertext, is the source of the surprising expressive power of our calculus (cf. Section 2.4).

The correctness of the type system with respect to the semantics guarantees that a well-typed program incurs no run-time type error.

Theorem 1 (Type Soundness). Suppose $\tilde{x} : \tilde{\tau} \vdash t : \tau$ and let $t' = t[\tilde{x} := \tilde{v}]$ for any $\emptyset \vdash \tilde{v} : \tilde{\tau}$. Then, for any n , we have $\llbracket t' \rrbracket_n = \perp$, **fail**, or $\llbracket v \rrbracket_{n'}$ for some $\emptyset \vdash v : \tau$ and $n' \geq n$.

Proof. By induction on the derivation of $\tilde{x} : \tilde{\tau} \vdash t : \tau$. □

2.3 Example

As a first example of programming in our calculus, consider the following situation. There are three entities S , A and B . The entities S and A share a password α , and the entities S and B share another password β . A wants to send an integer i to B in a secure manner, assuming that S is trustworthy.

To express A ’s transmission of i to S under the password α , we use encryption (under α) and application:

$$A \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} S([i]_{\langle \mathbf{int}, \alpha, 0 \rangle})$$

To capture S ’s actions—receiving the integer i under the password α , and forwarding it to B under the password β —we use abstraction, decryption (under α), encryption (under β), and application:

$$S \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda x'. \mathbf{let } x = [x']_{\langle \mathbf{int}, \alpha, 0 \rangle} \mathbf{ in } B([x]_{\langle \mathbf{int}, \beta, 0 \rangle})$$

Similarly, B 's receipt of i under the password β is expressed using abstraction and decryption:

$$B \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda y'. \text{let } y = \lceil y' \rceil_{\langle \text{int}, \beta, 0 \rangle} \text{ in } t(y)$$

The whole program works as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} & \llbracket \text{let } B = \lambda y'. (\text{let } y = \lceil y' \rceil_{\langle \text{int}, \beta, 0 \rangle} \text{ in } t(y)) \text{ in} \\ & \quad \text{let } S = \lambda x'. (\text{let } x = \lceil x' \rceil_{\langle \text{int}, \alpha, 0 \rangle} \text{ in } B(\lfloor x \rfloor_{\langle \text{int}, \beta, 0 \rangle})) \\ & \quad S(\lfloor i \rfloor_{\langle \text{int}, \alpha, 0 \rangle}) \rrbracket \\ = & \llbracket \text{let } B = \lambda y'. (\text{let } y = \lceil y' \rceil_{\langle \text{int}, \beta, 0 \rangle} \text{ in } t(y)) \text{ in} \\ & \quad B(\lfloor i \rfloor_{\langle \text{int}, \beta, 0 \rangle}) \rrbracket \\ = & \llbracket t(i) \rrbracket \end{aligned}$$

The security of each part of this program is guaranteed by the fact that, to any observer who does not know the passwords α and β , the functions S and B are indistinguishable from the function $\lambda _. \mathbf{fail}$, and the ciphertext $\lfloor i \rfloor_{\langle \text{int}, \alpha, 0 \rangle}$ is indistinguishable from the ciphertext $\lfloor 0 \rfloor_{\langle \text{int}, \alpha, 0 \rangle}$. Details of such reasoning will be presented in Section 3.

2.4 Expressiveness

As we mentioned above, the cryptographic λ -calculus is rather expressive despite the fact that it is simply typed, thanks to the dynamic nature of the type **bits**. In this section, we illustrate its power by showing how to encode several constructs found in other λ -calculi. In these encodings, secrecy plays no role and a single, public password ε suffices for all encryptions. We write $\langle\langle \tau \rangle\rangle$ for the dummy key $\langle \tau, \varepsilon, 0 \rangle$ using this non-secret password.

The correctness of each encoding $\mathcal{E}(_)$ can be stated in the same way.

Theorem 2 (Soundness of Encodings). Suppose $\tilde{x} : \tilde{\tau} \vdash t : \tau$ and let $t' = t[\tilde{x} := \tilde{v}]$ for any $\emptyset \vdash \tilde{v} : \tilde{\tau}$, where t, \tilde{v}, τ and $\tilde{\tau}$ are terms, values, and types in the source language. Then, $\emptyset \vdash \mathcal{E}(t') : \mathcal{E}(\tau)$ and $\llbracket \mathcal{E}(t') \rrbracket_n = \mathcal{E}(\llbracket t \rrbracket_n)$ for any n , where $\mathcal{E}(\lfloor v \rfloor_n) = \lfloor \mathcal{E}(v) \rfloor_n$, $\mathcal{E}(\perp) = \perp$ and $\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{fail}) = \mathbf{fail}$.

Proof. By induction on the derivation of $\tilde{x} : \tilde{\tau} \vdash t : \tau$ using the lemmas below, given at the end of each section for each extension introduced in that section. \square

2.4.1 Disjoint Sums

A disjoint sum $\tau_1 + \tau_2$ is the tagged union of the types τ_1 and τ_2 . Its syntax, semantics, and typing rules are given below. (To simplify the encoding, we annotate each **case** expression with its result type τ .)

$$\begin{aligned} t &::= \dots \mid \mathbf{inl}(t) \mid \mathbf{inr}(t) \mid \text{case } t_1 \text{ of } \mathbf{inl}(x) \Rightarrow t_2 \parallel \mathbf{inr}(y) \Rightarrow t_3 : \tau \\ \tau &::= \dots \mid \tau_1 + \tau_2 \\ v &::= \dots \mid \mathbf{inl}(v) \mid \mathbf{inr}(v) \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \mathbf{inl}(t) \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t \rrbracket_n \text{ of } \lfloor v \rfloor_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket \mathbf{inl}(v) \rrbracket_{n'} \mid V \Rightarrow V \\ \llbracket \mathbf{inr}(t) \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t \rrbracket_n \text{ of } \lfloor v \rfloor_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket \mathbf{inr}(v) \rrbracket_{n'} \mid V \Rightarrow V \\ \llbracket \text{case } t_1 \text{ of } \mathbf{inl}(x) \Rightarrow t_2 \parallel \mathbf{inr}(y) \Rightarrow t_3 : \tau \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_n \text{ of } \llbracket \mathbf{inl}(v) \rrbracket_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket t_2[x := v] \rrbracket_{n'} \mid \llbracket \mathbf{inr}(v) \rrbracket_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket t_3[y := v] \rrbracket_{n'} \\ &\quad \mid \lfloor _ \rfloor_{n'} \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V \Rightarrow V \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \tau_1}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{inl}(t) : \tau_1 + \tau_2} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \tau_2}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{inr}(t) : \tau_1 + \tau_2} \\
\\
\frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : \tau_1 + \tau_2 \quad \Gamma, x : \tau_1 \vdash t_2 : \tau \quad \Gamma, y : \tau_2 \vdash t_3 : \tau}{\Gamma \vdash (\mathbf{case } t_1 \mathbf{ of } \mathbf{inl}(x) \Rightarrow t_2 \parallel \mathbf{inr}(y) \Rightarrow t_3 : \tau) : \tau}
\end{array}$$

Since disjoint sums are the dual of products, they can be encoded into the cryptographic calculus by a kind of CPS transformation as follows.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{E}(\tau_1 + \tau_2) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathcal{E}(\tau_1) \rightarrow \mathbf{bits}) \rightarrow (\mathcal{E}(\tau_2) \rightarrow \mathbf{bits}) \rightarrow \mathbf{bits} \\
\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{inl}(t)) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{let } x = \mathcal{E}(t) \mathbf{ in } \lambda f. \lambda g. f(x) \\
\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{inr}(t)) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{let } x = \mathcal{E}(t) \mathbf{ in } \lambda f. \lambda g. g(x) \\
\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{case } t_1 \mathbf{ of } \mathbf{inl}(x) \Rightarrow t_2 \parallel \mathbf{inr}(y) \Rightarrow t_3 : \tau) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} [\mathcal{E}(t_1)(\lambda x. [\mathcal{E}(t_2)]_{\langle\mathcal{E}(\tau)\rangle})(\lambda y. [\mathcal{E}(t_3)]_{\langle\mathcal{E}(\tau)\rangle})]_{\langle\mathcal{E}(\tau)\rangle}
\end{aligned}$$

For the other cases, the encoding works in a homomorphic manner, i.e., along the structure of the type or the term. For example, $\mathcal{E}(\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2) = \mathcal{E}(\tau_1) \rightarrow \mathcal{E}(\tau_2)$ and $\mathcal{E}(\lambda x. t) = \lambda x. \mathcal{E}(t)$.

Lemma 3. $\llbracket \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{case } \mathbf{inl}(v) \mathbf{ of } \mathbf{inl}(x) \Rightarrow t_1 \parallel \mathbf{inr}(y) \Rightarrow t_2 : \tau) \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \mathcal{E}(t_1)[x := \mathcal{E}(v)] \rrbracket_n$ and $\llbracket \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{case } \mathbf{inr}(v) \mathbf{ of } \mathbf{inl}(x) \Rightarrow t_1 \parallel \mathbf{inr}(y) \Rightarrow t_2 : \tau) \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \mathcal{E}(t_2)[y := \mathcal{E}(v)] \rrbracket_n$ for any v, t_1, t_2 , and n .

We can now—if we like—define the type **bool** as the disjoint sum $\{\} + \{\}$ of the empty record $\{\}$. For the sake of presentation, however, we continue to take booleans as primitives.

2.4.2 Recursive Types

A recursive type is a type whose definition mentions itself, like $\mathit{intlist} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\} + \{\mathit{head} : \mathbf{int}, \mathit{tail} : \mathit{intlist}\}$. Such types are often written as $\mu\alpha. \{\} + \{\mathit{head} : \mathbf{int}, \mathit{tail} : \alpha\}$, using the least fixed-point operator μ . In general, a recursive type $\mu\alpha. \tau$ satisfies the equation $\mu\alpha. \tau \equiv \tau[\alpha := \mu\alpha. \tau]$. Its syntax, semantics, and typing rules are given below. Here, we use the simpler *iso-recursive* presentation (rather than the more powerful *equi-recursive* one), explicitly inserting the coercions **fold** and **unfold** to convert between values of the folded type $\mu\alpha. \tau$ and the unfolded type $\tau[\alpha := \mu\alpha. \tau]$. Again, we provide type annotations to assist the encoding.

$$\begin{aligned}
t &::= \dots \mid \mathbf{fold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(t) \mid \mathbf{unfold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(t) \\
\tau &::= \dots \mid \alpha \mid \mu\alpha. \tau \\
v &::= \dots \mid \mathbf{fold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(v)
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
\llbracket \mathbf{fold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(t) \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{case } \llbracket t \rrbracket_n \mathbf{ of } [v]_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket \mathbf{fold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(v) \rrbracket_{n'} \mid V \Rightarrow V \\
\llbracket \mathbf{unfold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(t) \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{case } \llbracket t \rrbracket_n \mathbf{ of } [\mathbf{fold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(v)]_{n'} \Rightarrow [v]_{n'} \mid [-]_- \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V \Rightarrow V
\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{array}{c}
\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \tau[\alpha := \mu\alpha. \tau]}{\Gamma \vdash (\mathbf{fold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(t)) : \mu\alpha. \tau} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \mu\alpha. \tau}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{unfold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(t) : \tau[\alpha := \mu\alpha. \tau]}
\end{array}$$

Recursive types can be encoded into the cryptographic λ -calculus by taking values of recursive types to be ciphertexts and the folding and unfolding operations to be encryption and decryption.

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{E}(\alpha) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{bits} \\ \mathcal{E}(\mu\alpha. \tau) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{bits} \\ \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{fold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(t)) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lfloor t \rfloor_{\langle\mathcal{E}(\tau)\rangle} \\ \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{unfold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(t)) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lceil t \rceil_{\langle\mathcal{E}(\tau)\rangle}\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 4. $\llbracket \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{unfold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(\mathbf{fold}_{\mu\alpha. \tau}(v))) \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \mathcal{E}(v) \rrbracket_n$ for any v and n .

2.4.3 Recursive Functions

Since recursive types can be encoded, recursive *functions* can be encoded as well. Using the encoding of recursive types above, the standard call-by-value fixed-point operator

$$\mathbf{fix}_{\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2} \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda f. (\lambda x. f(\lambda a. \mathbf{unfold}_{\tau}(x)xa)) (\mathbf{fold}_{\tau}(\lambda x. f(\lambda a. \mathbf{unfold}_{\tau}(x)xa)))$$

with $\tau = \mu\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2$ can be implemented as follows, with $k = \langle\mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2\rangle$.

$$\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{fix}_{\tau_1 \rightarrow \tau_2}) = \lambda f. (\lambda x. f(\lambda a. \lceil x \rceil_k xa)) \lfloor \lambda x. f(\lambda a. \lceil x \rceil_k xa) \rfloor_k$$

2.4.4 Dynamic Typing

Dynamic typing [2] is a mechanism for injecting values of different types into a single dynamic type **dyn** in a type-safe manner.

$$\begin{aligned}t &::= \dots \mid \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(t) \mid \mathbf{let} \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(x) = t_1 \mathbf{in} t_2 \mathbf{else} t_3 \\ \tau &::= \dots \mid \mathbf{dyn} \\ v &::= \dots \mid \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(v)\end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}\llbracket \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(t) \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [v]_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(v) \rrbracket_{n'} \mid V \Rightarrow V \\ \llbracket \mathbf{let} \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(x) = t_1 \mathbf{in} t_2 \mathbf{else} t_3 \rrbracket_n &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{case } \llbracket t_1 \rrbracket_n \text{ of } [\mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(v)]_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket t_2[x := v] \rrbracket_{n'} \mid [\mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(v)]_{n'} \Rightarrow \llbracket t_3 \rrbracket_{n'} \\ &\quad \mid [-]_{-} \Rightarrow \mathbf{error} \mid V \Rightarrow V\end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma \vdash t : \tau}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(t) : \mathbf{dyn}} \quad \frac{\Gamma \vdash t_1 : \mathbf{dyn} \quad \Gamma, x : \tau \vdash t_2 : \tau \quad \Gamma \vdash t_3 : \tau}{\Gamma \vdash \mathbf{let} \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(x) = t_1 \mathbf{in} t_2 \mathbf{else} t_3 : \tau}$$

Thanks to the “dynamic” type **bits**, it is also straightforward to implement dynamic typing in the cryptographic calculus.

$$\begin{aligned}\mathcal{E}(\mathbf{dyn}) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{bits} \\ \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(t)) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lfloor t \rfloor_{\langle\mathcal{E}(\tau)\rangle} \\ \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{let} \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(x) = t_1 \mathbf{in} t_2 \mathbf{else} t_3) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathbf{let} \lfloor x \rfloor_{\langle\mathcal{E}(\tau)\rangle} = \mathcal{E}(t_1) \mathbf{in} \mathcal{E}(t_2) \mathbf{else} \mathcal{E}(t_3)\end{aligned}$$

Lemma 5. $\llbracket \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{let} \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(x) = \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(v) \mathbf{in} t_1 \mathbf{else} t_2) \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \mathcal{E}(t_1)[x := \mathcal{E}(v)] \rrbracket_n$ and $\llbracket \mathcal{E}(\mathbf{let} \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(x) = v' \mathbf{in} t_1 \mathbf{else} t_2) \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \mathcal{E}(t_2) \rrbracket_n$ for any n , v and $v' \neq \mathbf{indyn}_{\tau}(v)$.

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{R}_S(\tau \rightarrow \tau')\varphi &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(\lambda x. t_1, \lambda x. t_2) \mid \forall (v_1, v_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi. (t_1[x := v_1], t_2[x := v_2]) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau')\varphi\} \\
\mathcal{R}_S(\{\tilde{\ell} : \tilde{\tau}\})\varphi &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(\{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{v}_1\}, \{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{v}_2\}) \mid (\tilde{v}_1, \tilde{v}_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tilde{\tau})\varphi\} \\
\mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bool})\varphi &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(b, b) \mid b = \mathbf{true}, \mathbf{false}\} \\
\mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{int})\varphi &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(i, i) \mid i = \dots, -2, -1, 0, 1, 2, \dots\} \\
\mathcal{R}_S(\langle \tau \rangle)\varphi &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(\langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle, \langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle) \mid \alpha \notin S\} \\
\mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{([\![v_1]\!]_{\langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle}, [\![v_2]\!]_{\langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle}) \mid \emptyset \vdash v_1 : \tau \wedge \emptyset \vdash v_2 : \tau \wedge \alpha \notin S \wedge (v_1, v_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi \\
&\quad \cup \{([\![v_1]\!]_{\langle \tau_1, \alpha_1, n_1 \rangle}, [\![v_2]\!]_{\langle \tau_2, \alpha_2, n_2 \rangle}) \mid \emptyset \vdash v_1 : \tau_1 \wedge \emptyset \vdash v_2 : \tau_2 \wedge \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in S \wedge \\
&\quad \quad (v_1, v_2) \in \varphi(\langle \tau_1, \alpha_1, n_1 \rangle, \langle \tau_2, \alpha_2, n_2 \rangle)\}\} \\
\mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{(t_1, t_2) \mid \emptyset \vdash t_1 : \tau \wedge \emptyset \vdash t_2 : \tau \wedge \\
&\quad \forall n. ([\![t_1]\!]_n = [\![t_2]\!]_n = \perp \vee \\
&\quad \quad [\![t_1]\!]_n = [\![t_2]\!]_n = \mathbf{fail} \vee \\
&\quad \quad \exists v_1. \exists v_2. \exists n' \geq n. \\
&\quad \quad \quad [\![t_1]\!]_n = [v_1]_{n'} \wedge [\![t_2]\!]_n = [v_2]_{n'} \wedge (v_1, v_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi)\}
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 3: Logical Relation

3 Parametricity

In this section, we develop a tool for reasoning about information hiding in the cryptographic λ -calculus, adapting the concept of *parametricity* [24] from the polymorphic λ -calculus [13, 23].

Consider the packages $p_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{c = [1]_k, f = \lambda x. [x]_k + 2\}$ and $p_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{c = [3]_k, f = \lambda x. [x]_k\}$, where $k = \langle \mathbf{int}, \alpha, n \rangle$ for some α and n , and $t_1 + t_2$ stands for $t_1 - (0 - t_2)$. A function that does not know the password α cannot distinguish p_1 and p_2 , because it cannot decrypt the ciphertexts $\#_c(p_1)$ and $\#_c(p_2)$, and the function applications $\#_f(p_1)\#_c(p_1)$ and $\#_f(p_2)\#_c(p_2)$, which are the only ways to do anything on the ciphertexts $\#_c(p_1)$ and $\#_c(p_2)$, return the same integer 3.

To formalize such reasoning, we define a relation $\mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi$ between values of the type τ , where S is a set of “secret” passwords $\{\tilde{\alpha}\}$ and φ maps a pair of secret keys to a relation between plaintexts. Intuitively, two values v_1 and v_2 will be related by $\mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi$ if and only if

- v_1 and v_2 do not reveal any information about the secret passwords S , and
- they are indistinguishable by any function that does not know the secret passwords.

The first condition is essential because if the values themselves leak the secret passwords, then the observer can break the abstraction without knowing any secret password in advance. For example, suppose $k = \langle \mathbf{int}, \alpha, n \rangle$ for some $\alpha \in S$ and n . Although the ciphertexts $[4]_k$ and $[5]_k$ are indistinguishable to any observer who does not know the secret password α , the records $\{c = [4]_k, k = k\}$ and $\{c = [5]_k, k = k\}$ are distinguishable to the observer $\lambda r. [\![\#_c(r)]\!]_{\#_k(r)}$. Thus, the key k should not be related to itself if the password α is secret.

Just as we can take any relation for values of an abstract type in the parametricity theory of type abstraction (cf. Section 1), we can take any relation for ciphertexts encrypted with secret passwords because they are anyway indistinguishable to the observer. The map φ in the relation $\mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi$ provides such a relation between values of the type τ_1 and values of the type τ_2 for each pair of keys $\langle \tau_1, \alpha_1, n_1 \rangle$ and $\langle \tau_2, \alpha_2, n_2 \rangle$ with $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in S$.

Formally, the relation $\mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi$ is defined in Figure 3 by induction on the type τ . It is a standard logical relation except for the following points.

- Since the cryptographic calculus is impure (because of key generation, failure, and divergence), we actually define two relations $\mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi$ and $\mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$, the former over *values* (i.e., results of evaluations) and the latter over *computations* (i.e., closed terms with potential effects).
- Two keys are *not* related if their passwords are secret, because they would leak the secret and break the first condition (like the second example above).
- Two ciphertexts encrypted with a non-secret key are related if and only if the plaintexts are related.
- Two ciphertexts encrypted with secret keys k_1 and k_2 are related if and only if they satisfy the relation $\varphi(k_1, k_2)$.

For instance, in the first example above, let us take $S = \{\alpha\}$, $\varphi(k, k) = \{(1, 3)\}$ and $\varphi(k_1, k_2) = \emptyset$ when $k_1 \neq k$ or $k_2 \neq k$. Then, $(\lfloor 1 \rfloor_k, \lfloor 3 \rfloor_k) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$ because $(1, 3) \in \varphi(k, k)$ and $\alpha \in S$, and $(\lambda x. \lfloor x \rfloor_k + 2, \lambda x. \lfloor x \rfloor_k) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{int})\varphi$ because $\llbracket (\lambda x. \lfloor x \rfloor_k + 2) \lfloor 1 \rfloor_k \rrbracket = \llbracket (\lambda x. \lfloor x \rfloor_k) \lfloor 3 \rfloor_k \rrbracket = 3$. Therefore, $(p_1, p_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\{c : \mathbf{bits}, f : \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}\})\varphi$.

Thus, we expect that the packages p_1 and p_2 are observationally equivalent, in the sense that a function that does not know the password α cannot distinguish them. That is, $g(p_1) = g(p_2)$ for any $g : \{c : \mathbf{bits}, f : \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}\} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool}$ where α does not appear in g . In order to prove this fact, it suffices to show $(g, g) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\{c : \mathbf{bits}, f : \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}\} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool})\varphi$, which is a special case of the general theorem below.

Definition 6. $knows(t) = \{\alpha \mid \alpha \text{ appears in } t\}$.

Theorem 7 (Parametricity). Suppose $\tilde{x} : \tilde{\tau} \vdash t : \tau$. Then, $(t[\tilde{x} := \tilde{v}_1], t[\tilde{x} := \tilde{v}_2]) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$ for any $(\tilde{v}_1, \tilde{v}_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tilde{\tau})\varphi$, provided that $S \cap knows(t) = \emptyset$ and $dom(\varphi) = \{(\langle \sigma_1, \alpha_1, n_1 \rangle, \langle \sigma_2, \alpha_2, n_2 \rangle) \mid \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in S\}$.

Proof. By induction on the derivation of $\tilde{x} : \tilde{\tau} \vdash t : \tau$. Let $\theta_1 = [\tilde{x} := \tilde{v}_1]$, $\theta_2 = [\tilde{x} := \tilde{v}_2]$, and $\Gamma = \tilde{x} : \tilde{\tau}$.

Case $t = x_i$. Immediate from the assumption that $(v_{1i}, v_{2i}) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau_i)\varphi$ and the fact that v_{1i} and v_{2i} are values.

Case $t = \lambda y. t'$. Suppose $\tau = \tau'' \rightarrow \tau'$, $\Gamma, y : \tau'' \vdash t' : \tau'$, and $(v'_1, v'_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau'')\varphi$. Then, by the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t'[y := v'_1], \theta_2 t'[y := v'_2]) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau')\varphi$. Therefore, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for arrow types, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi$. Thus, since $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$ are values, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$.

Case $t = t_a t_b$. Suppose $\Gamma \vdash t_a : \tau_b \rightarrow \tau$ and $\Gamma \vdash t_b : \tau_b$. Then, by the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t_a, \theta_2 t_a) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau_b \rightarrow \tau)\varphi$ and $(\theta_1 t_b, \theta_2 t_b) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau_b)\varphi$. If the evaluations of $\theta_1 t_a$ and $\theta_2 t_a$ (or $\theta_1 t_b$ and $\theta_2 t_b$) diverge or fail, then so do the evaluations of $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$, and the theorem follows from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . Otherwise, suppose $\llbracket \theta_1 t_a \rrbracket_n = [\lambda y. t'_1]_{n_a}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_a \rrbracket_n = [\lambda y. t'_2]_{n_a}$ where $n_a \geq n$ and $(\lambda y. t'_1, \lambda y. t'_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau_b \rightarrow \tau)\varphi$, and $\llbracket \theta_1 t_b \rrbracket_{n_a} = [v'_1]_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_b \rrbracket_{n_a} = [v'_2]_{n_b}$ where $n_b \geq n$ and $(v'_1, v'_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau_b)\varphi$. Then, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for arrow types, $(t'_1[y := v'_1], t'_2[y := v'_2]) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$. On the other hand, by the definition of the evaluation for function applications, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket t'_1[y := v'_1] \rrbracket_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket t'_2[y := v'_2] \rrbracket_{n_b}$. Therefore, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$.

Case $t = \{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{t}'\}$. Suppose $\tau = \{\tilde{\ell} : \tilde{\tau}'\}$ and $\Gamma \vdash \tilde{t}' : \tilde{\tau}'$. Then, by the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 \tilde{t}', \theta_2 \tilde{t}') \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tilde{\tau}')\varphi$. If the evaluations of $\theta_1 \tilde{t}'_i$ and $\theta_2 \tilde{t}'_i$ diverge or fail for some i , then so do the evaluations of $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$, and the theorem follows from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . Otherwise, suppose $\llbracket \theta_1 \tilde{t}'_i \rrbracket_{n_{i-1}} = [v'_{1i}]_{n_i}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 \tilde{t}'_i \rrbracket_{n_{i-1}} = [v'_{2i}]_{n_i}$ where $n_i \geq n_{i-1}$ and $(v'_{1i}, v'_{2i}) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau'_i)\varphi$ for every i . Then, by the definition the evaluation for record constructions, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_{n_0} = [\{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{v}'_1\}]_{n_m}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_{n_0} = [\{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{v}'_2\}]_{n_m}$. Therefore, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for record types, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$.

Case $t = \#_\ell(t')$. By the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t', \theta_2 t') \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\{\ell : \tau, \dots\})\varphi$. If the evaluations of $\theta_1 t'$ and $\theta_2 t'$ diverge or fail, then so do the evaluations of $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$, and the theorem follows from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . Otherwise, suppose $\llbracket \theta_1 t' \rrbracket_n = [\{\ell = v'_1, \dots\}]_{n'}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t' \rrbracket_n = [\{\ell = v'_2, \dots\}]_{n'}$ where $n' \geq n$ and $(v'_1, v'_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi$. Then, by the definition the evaluation for record destructions, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_n = [v'_1]_{n'}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_n = [v'_2]_{n'}$. Therefore, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$.

Case $t = \mathbf{true}, \mathbf{false}$. Immediate from the definition of \mathcal{R} for boolean types.

Case $t = \mathbf{if } t_a \mathbf{ then } t_b \mathbf{ else } t_c$. By the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t_a, \theta_2 t_a) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{bool})\varphi$. If the evaluations of $\theta_1 t_a$ and $\theta_2 t_a$ diverge or fail, then so do the evaluations of $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$, and the theorem follows from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . Otherwise, suppose $\llbracket \theta_1 t_a \rrbracket_n = [b_1]_{n'}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_a \rrbracket_n = [b_2]_{n'}$ where $n' \geq n$ and $(b_1, b_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bool})\varphi$. Then, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for boolean types, $b_1 = b_2$. Let us consider the case $b_1 = b_2 = \mathbf{true}$. (The case $b_1 = b_2 = \mathbf{false}$ is similar.) By the definition the evaluation for conditional branches, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \theta_1 t_b \rrbracket_{n'}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \theta_2 t_b \rrbracket_{n'}$. On the other hand, by the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t_b, \theta_2 t_b) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$. Therefore, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$.

Case $t = i$. Immediate from the definition of \mathcal{R} for integer types.

Case $t = t_a - t_b$. By the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t_a, \theta_2 t_a) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{int})\varphi$ and $(\theta_1 t_b, \theta_2 t_b) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{int})\varphi$. If the evaluations of $\theta_1 t_a$ and $\theta_2 t_a$ (or $\theta_1 t_b$ and $\theta_2 t_b$) diverge or fail, then so do the evaluations of $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$, and the theorem follows from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . Otherwise, suppose $\llbracket \theta_1 t_a \rrbracket_n = [i_1]_{n_a}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_a \rrbracket_n = [i_2]_{n_a}$ where $n_a \geq n$ and $(i_1, i_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{int})\varphi$, and $\llbracket \theta_1 t_b \rrbracket_{n_a} = [j_1]_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_b \rrbracket_{n_a} = [j_2]_{n_b}$ where $n_b \geq n_a$ and $(j_1, j_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{int})\varphi$. Then, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for integer types, $i_1 = i_2$ and $j_1 = j_2$. On the other hand, by the definition of the evaluation for integer subtractions, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_n = [i_1 - j_1]_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_n = [i_2 - j_2]_{n_b}$. Therefore, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{int})\varphi$.

Case $t = t' > 0$. By the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t', \theta_2 t') \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{int})\varphi$. If the evaluations of $\theta_1 t'$ and $\theta_2 t'$ diverge or fail, then so do the evaluations of $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$, and the theorem follows from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . Otherwise, suppose $\llbracket \theta_1 t' \rrbracket_n = [i_1]_{n_a}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t' \rrbracket_n = [i_2]_{n_a}$ where $n_a \geq n$ and $(i_1, i_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{int})\varphi$. Then, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for integer types, $i_1 = i_2$. On the other hand, by the definition the evaluation for integer comparisons, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_n = [i_1 > 0]_{n_a}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_n = [i_2 > 0]_{n_a}$. Therefore, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{bool})\varphi$.

Case $t = \langle \tau', \alpha', n' \rangle$. By the assumption that $S \cap \text{knows}(t) = \emptyset$, $\alpha' \notin S$. Therefore, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for key types, $(t, t) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\langle \tau' \rangle)\varphi$. Thus, since t is a value, $(t, t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\langle \tau' \rangle)\varphi$.

Case $t = \mathbf{new} \langle \tau', \alpha' \rangle$. By the definition of the evaluation for key generations, $\llbracket t \rrbracket_n = [\langle \tau', \alpha', n + 1 \rangle]_{n+1}$ for any n . On the other hand, by the assumption that $S \cap \text{knows}(t) = \emptyset$, $\alpha' \notin S$. Therefore, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for key types, $(\langle \tau', \alpha', n + 1 \rangle, \langle \tau', \alpha', n + 1 \rangle) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\langle \tau' \rangle)\varphi$. Thus, $(t, t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\langle \tau' \rangle)\varphi$.

Case $t = \lfloor t_a \rfloor_{t_b}$. Suppose $\Gamma \vdash t_a : \tau_a$ and $\Gamma \vdash t_b : \langle \tau_a \rangle$. Then, by the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t_a, \theta_2 t_a) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau_a)\varphi$ and $(\theta_1 t_b, \theta_2 t_b) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\langle \tau_a \rangle)\varphi$. If the evaluations of $\theta_1 t_a$ and $\theta_2 t_a$ (or $\theta_1 t_b$ and $\theta_2 t_b$) diverge or fail, then so do the evaluations of $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$, and the theorem follows from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . Otherwise, suppose $\llbracket \theta_1 t_a \rrbracket_n = [v'_1]_{n_a}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_a \rrbracket_n = [v'_2]_{n_a}$ where $n_a \geq n$

and $(v'_1, v'_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau_a)\varphi$, and $\llbracket \theta_1 t_b \rrbracket_{n_a} = [k_1]_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_b \rrbracket_{n_a} = [k_2]_{n_b}$ where $n_b \geq n$ and $(k_1, k_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\langle \tau_a \rangle)\varphi$. Then, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for key types, $k_1 = k_2 = \langle \tau_a, \alpha', n' \rangle$ for some $\alpha' \notin S$ and n' . On the other hand, by the definition of the evaluation for encryptions, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket [v'_1]_{k_1} \rrbracket_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket [v'_2]_{k_2} \rrbracket_{n_b}$. Therefore, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for ciphertext types, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$.

Case $t = (\mathbf{let} \ x]_{t_a} = t_b \ \mathbf{in} \ t_c \ \mathbf{else} \ t_d)$. Suppose $\Gamma \vdash t_a : \langle \tau' \rangle$ and $\Gamma \vdash t_b : \mathbf{bits}$. Then, by the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t_a, \theta_2 t_a) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\langle \tau' \rangle)\varphi$ and $(\theta_1 t_b, \theta_2 t_b) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$. If the evaluations of $\theta_1 t_a$ and $\theta_2 t_a$ (or $\theta_1 t_b$ and $\theta_2 t_b$) diverge or fail, then so do the evaluations of $\theta_1 t$ and $\theta_2 t$, and the theorem follows from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . Otherwise, suppose $\llbracket \theta_1 t_a \rrbracket_n = [k_1]_{n_a}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_a \rrbracket_n = [k_2]_{n_a}$ where $n_a \geq n$ and $(k_1, k_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\langle \tau' \rangle)\varphi$, and $\llbracket \theta_1 t_b \rrbracket_{n_a} = \llbracket [v'_1]_{k'_1} \rrbracket_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t_b \rrbracket_{n_a} = \llbracket [v'_2]_{k'_2} \rrbracket_{n_b}$ where $n_b \geq n$ and $([v'_1]_{k'_1}, [v'_2]_{k'_2}) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$. Then, by the definition of \mathcal{R} for key types, $k_1 = k_2 = \langle \tau_a, \alpha', n' \rangle$ for some $\alpha' \notin S$ and n' . By the definition of \mathcal{R} for ciphertext types, the following two sub-cases are possible:

Sub-case $(k_1 = k_2 = k'_1 = k'_2) \wedge (v'_1, v'_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau')\varphi$. By the definition of the evaluation for decryptions, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \theta_1 t_c[x := v'_1] \rrbracket_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \theta_2 t_c[x := v'_2] \rrbracket_{n_b}$. On the other hand, by the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t_c[x := v'_1], \theta_2 t_c[x := v'_2]) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$. Therefore, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$.

Sub-case $(k_1 \neq k'_1) \wedge (k_2 \neq k'_2)$. By the definition of the evaluation for decryptions, $\llbracket \theta_1 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \theta_1 t_d \rrbracket_{n_b}$ and $\llbracket \theta_2 t \rrbracket_n = \llbracket \theta_2 t_d \rrbracket_{n_b}$. On the other hand, by the induction hypothesis, $(\theta_1 t_d, \theta_2 t_d) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$. Therefore, $(\theta_1 t, \theta_2 t) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$.

Case $t = \mathbf{fail}$. Immediate from the definition of \mathcal{R}' . \square

From the parametricity theorem above, the non-interference property below follows immediately. It states that values encrypted with secret passwords cannot be distinguished from one another by any function ignorant of the secret passwords.

Corollary 8 (Non-Interference). Suppose $\emptyset \vdash t : \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool}$ and $\alpha_1, \alpha_2 \notin \mathit{knows}(t)$. Then, $\llbracket t[v_1]_{k_1} \rrbracket_n = \llbracket t[v_2]_{k_2} \rrbracket_n$ for any n , $k_1 = \langle \tau_1, \alpha_1, n_1 \rangle$, $k_2 = \langle \tau_2, \alpha_2, n_2 \rangle$, $\emptyset \vdash v_1 : \tau_1$, and $\emptyset \vdash v_2 : \tau_2$.

Proof. Let $S = \{\alpha_1, \alpha_2\}$, $\varphi(k_1, k_2) = \{(v_1, v_2)\}$, and $\varphi(k'_1, k'_2) = \emptyset$ whenever $(k'_1, k'_2) \neq (k_1, k_2)$. Then, $(t, t) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool})\varphi$ by Theorem 7 and $([v_1]_{k_1}, [v_2]_{k_2}) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$ by the definition of $\mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$. Therefore, by the definition of $\mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool})\varphi$, we have $(t[v_1]_{k_1}, t[v_2]_{k_2}) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{bool})\varphi$. Thus, by the definition of $\mathcal{R}'_S(\mathbf{bool})\varphi$, $\llbracket t[v_1]_{k_1} \rrbracket_n = \llbracket t[v_2]_{k_2} \rrbracket_n$. \square

More generally, related terms can be proved as follows to be indistinguishable to any observer who does not know the secret passwords.

Definition 9. Two closed terms t_1 and t_2 of type τ are said to be *observationally equivalent* with respect to a set S of secret passwords, written $t_1 \stackrel{\text{obs}}{=}_S t_2 : \tau$, if and only if $\llbracket t(t_1) \rrbracket_n = \llbracket t(t_2) \rrbracket_n$ for any n and t with $\emptyset \vdash t : \tau \rightarrow \mathbf{bool}$ and $S \cap \mathit{knows}(t) = \emptyset$.

Corollary 10 (Soundness of Parametricity). $(t_1, t_2) \in \mathcal{R}'_S(\tau)\varphi$ implies $t_1 \stackrel{\text{obs}}{=}_S t_2 : \tau$ for any t_1, t_2, τ, S , and φ with $\text{dom}(\varphi) = \{(\langle \tau_1, \alpha_1, n_1 \rangle, \langle \tau_2, \alpha_2, n_2 \rangle) \mid \alpha_1, \alpha_2 \in S\}$.

Proof. Immediate from Theorem 7 and the definition of the logical relation for arrow types. \square

The reason why we include passwords (in addition to sequence numbers) in keys can now be explained more precisely. Consider two terms $t_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathbf{let} \ k_1 = \mathbf{new}(\mathbf{int}, \alpha) \ \mathbf{in} \ [1]_{k_1})$ and $t_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\mathbf{let} \ k_2 = \mathbf{new}(\mathbf{int}, \alpha) \ \mathbf{in} \ [2]_{k_2})$, for example. Then, $t_1 \stackrel{\text{obs}}{=}_{\{\alpha\}} t_2 : \mathbf{bits}$. Without the password α , it would be hard to specify the values of the secret keys k_1 and k_2 , because we would have to determine their sequence numbers, which depend on the contexts.

Example 11. Suppose $p_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{c = \lfloor 1 \rfloor_k, f = \lambda x. \lceil x \rceil_k + 2\}$ and $p_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{c = \lfloor 3 \rfloor_k, f = \lambda x. \lceil x \rceil_k\}$ where $k = \langle \mathbf{int}, \alpha, n \rangle$ for some α and n . Then, as we saw in the first example at the beginning of this section, $(p_1, p_2) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\tau)\varphi$ where $\tau = \{c : \mathbf{bits}, f : \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}\}$, $S = \{\alpha\}$, $\varphi(k, k) = \{(1, 3)\}$, and $\varphi(k_1, k_2) = \emptyset$ for $(k_1, k_2) \neq (k, k)$. Therefore, $p_1 \stackrel{\text{obs}}{=}_S p_2 : \tau$ by Corollary 10.

Example 12. Suppose $k = \langle \mathbf{int}, \alpha, n \rangle$, $\alpha \in S$, and $(4, 5) \in \varphi(k, k)$. Then, $(\lfloor 4 \rfloor_k, \lfloor 5 \rfloor_k) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$ but $(k, k) \notin \mathcal{R}_S(\langle \mathbf{int} \rangle)\varphi$, so $(\{c = \lfloor 4 \rfloor_k, k = k\}, \{c = \lfloor 5 \rfloor_k, k = k\}) \notin \mathcal{R}_S(\{c : \mathbf{bits}, k : \langle \mathbf{int} \rangle\})\varphi$ as we saw in the second example at the beginning of this section. Indeed, $\lfloor 4 \rfloor_k \stackrel{\text{obs}}{=}_S \lfloor 5 \rfloor_k : \mathbf{bits}$ but $\{c = \lfloor 4 \rfloor_k, k = k\} \not\stackrel{\text{obs}}{=}_S \{c = \lfloor 5 \rfloor_k, k = k\} : \{c : \mathbf{bits}, k : \langle \mathbf{int} \rangle\}$.

The next example suggests how to enforce the abstractness of polymorphic types (e.g., a value of the type $\forall \alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$ is the universal identity function) by wrapping a term with encryption and decryption. Section 4 develops this intuition in greater detail.

Example 13. Suppose $k = \langle \tau, \alpha, n \rangle$ and $\emptyset \vdash f : \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits}$, with $\alpha \notin \text{knows}(f)$. Then, $\llbracket f[v]_k \rrbracket_k = v$ for any $\emptyset \vdash v : \tau$, provided that the evaluation does not fail or diverge.

Proof. Let $S = \{\alpha\}$, $\varphi(k, k) = \{(v, v)\}$, and $\varphi(k_1, k_2) = \emptyset$ when $(k_1, k_2) \neq (k, k)$. Then, by the definition of the logical relation for ciphertexts, $(\lfloor v \rfloor_k, \lfloor v \rfloor_k) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$. At the same time, by Theorem 7, $(f, f) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits})\varphi$. Therefore, by the definition of the logical relation for arrow types, $(\llbracket f[v]_k \rrbracket_k, \llbracket f[v]_k \rrbracket_k) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$. On the other hand, since the decryption $\lceil f[v]_k \rceil_k$ does not fail, $\llbracket f[v]_k \rrbracket_k = \lfloor v' \rfloor_k$ for some v' . Thus, we have $(\lfloor v' \rfloor_k, \lfloor v' \rfloor_k) \in \mathcal{R}_S(\mathbf{bits})\varphi$, which implies $v = v'$ by the definition of the logical relation for ciphertexts. Therefore, $\llbracket f[v]_k \rrbracket_k = \llbracket \lceil f[v]_k \rceil_k \rrbracket_k = v' = v$. \square

4 Encoding Type Abstraction

In the previous section, we adapted the parametricity theory of type abstraction for the cryptographic λ -calculus, providing a high-level tool for reasoning about “cryptographic abstraction.” An even more attractive scenario would be one where we could simply write our programs in terms of polymorphism (for simplicity), and then translate uses of polymorphism into encryption to allow our programs to operate in a more flexible setting (including networking, etc.) with a broader range of attackers *while preserving the abstraction guarantees of the original program*. In this section, we propose such an encoding of the polymorphic λ -calculus into the cryptographic calculus. We begin in Section 4.1 with a naive version that illustrates most of the ideas but does not protect itself from malicious functions that may be passed in from the environment. In Section 4.2 we show how to add such protection.

The source language of the encoding is the standard polymorphic λ -calculus (System F) [13, 23] with existential types, with two minor changes:

- Each type application $(e_1 : \forall \alpha. T)[e_2]$ is annotated with the type $\forall \alpha. T$ of the term e_1 , so that the encoding can be defined on typed terms instead of their typing derivation trees. (This type annotation will be elided when it is unimportant.)
- The primitive **fail**, the divergence \perp , and the global counter increment **inc** are included for the sake of convenience, since those effects are also present in the target language. Alternatively, we could exclude them from the source language and weaken the conjecture of full abstraction (Conjecture 15) to “full abstraction modulo effects,” i.e., the encodings of equivalent terms are equivalent except for failure, divergence, and sequence numbers.

In the encoding, we assume that all bound type variables are pairwise distinct by α -conversion.

4.1 Naive Encoding

Before presenting an encoding that preserves type abstraction, let us consider an encoding that just preserves well-typedness of terms. This is already non-trivial, since we are translating a polymorphic language into a monomorphic one. Consider, for example, the term

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbf{let} \ id : \forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha = \Lambda\alpha. \lambda x : \alpha. x \\ &\mathbf{in} \ \{i = id[\mathbf{int}]123, b = id[\mathbf{bool}]\mathbf{true}\} \end{aligned}$$

in the source language. If we only erase the types, we get an ill-typed term:

$$\mathbf{let} \ id = \lambda_. \lambda x. x \ \mathbf{in} \ \{i = id\{\}123, b = id\{\}\mathbf{true}\}$$

Instead, as we did in the encoding of recursive types, we encode each type variable α as the ciphertext type **bits** and insert encryption and decryption when we use values of universal types (and, dually, when we make values of existential types). In the present example, the universal type $\forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$ is encoded as the type $\{\} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits}$, the type abstraction $\Lambda\alpha. \lambda x : \alpha. x$ is encoded as the function $\lambda_. \lambda x. x$ of type $\{\} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits}$, and the instantiations $id[\mathbf{int}]$ and $id[\mathbf{bool}]$ are encoded as functions $\lambda z. \lceil id\{\}[z] \rrbracket_{\langle\mathbf{int}\rangle}$ and $\lambda z. \lceil id\{\}[z] \rrbracket_{\langle\mathbf{bool}\rangle}$ of types $\mathbf{int} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}$ and $\mathbf{bool} \rightarrow \mathbf{bool}$, respectively. These translations together yield the following well-typed term:

$$\begin{aligned} &\mathbf{let} \ id = \lambda_. \lambda x. x \\ &\mathbf{in} \ \{i = (\lambda z. \lceil id\{\}[z] \rrbracket_{\langle\mathbf{int}\rangle})123, \\ &\quad b = (\lambda z. \lceil id\{\}[z] \rrbracket_{\langle\mathbf{bool}\rangle})\mathbf{true}\} \end{aligned}$$

Formally, the encoding $\mathcal{E}(e)$ is given in Figure 4. Type abstractions and type applications are encoded as abstractions and applications of the empty record $\{\}$, so that the evaluation order is preserved. The coercions \mathcal{C}^+ and \mathcal{C}^- insert the encryption and decryption, respectively, to convert between (the encodings of) values of abstract types (such as $\alpha \rightarrow \alpha$) and concrete types (such as $\mathbf{int} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}$) by η -expansion. More specifically, if $\alpha = T'$ and $k : \langle\mathcal{E}(T')\rangle$, then the coercions $\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, T)$ convert between (the encodings of) values of the abstract type T and a concrete type $T[\alpha := T']$ by η -expanding the value x along the type T . For example, consider a function f of type $T = \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$ in the source language. In order to instantiate its encoding $f' = \mathcal{E}(f)$ of type $\mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits}$ in the target language, say, with $\alpha = \mathbf{int}$, the coercion $\mathcal{C}_\alpha^-(f', k, \alpha \rightarrow \alpha)$ η -expands it to a function $\lambda y. \lceil f'[y]_k \rceil_k$ of type $\mathbf{int} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}$ with $k : \langle\mathbf{int}\rangle$.

4.2 Better Encoding

Although the encoding above suffices as far as only “good citizens” translated from the source language are concerned, it does not protect type abstractions from malicious attackers hand-coded in the target language, because not all terms of type $\mathcal{E}(T)$ (such as $\{\} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits} \rightarrow \mathbf{bits}$) in the target language behave like encodings of terms of the type T (such as $\forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$) in the source language. For example, consider the terms $e_1 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda f : (\forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha). f$ and

$$e_2 \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda f : (\forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha). \Lambda\beta. \mathbf{let} \ f' : \beta \rightarrow \beta = f[\beta] \ \mathbf{in} \ \lambda x : \beta. \mathbf{let} \ y : \beta = f'x \ \mathbf{in} \ x$$

of type $T \stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha) \rightarrow (\forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha)$. In the source language, they are indistinguishable because $\llbracket f[\tau]v \rrbracket = v$ for any $f : \forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$ and $v : \tau$ unless the evaluation fails or diverges. On the

$\mathcal{E}(\Lambda\alpha. e)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda_. \mathcal{E}(e)$
$\mathcal{E}((e : \forall\alpha. T_1)[T_2])$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{let } x = \mathcal{E}(e) \{ \} \text{ in } \mathcal{C}_\alpha^-(x, \langle\langle \mathcal{E}(T_2) \rangle\rangle, T_1)$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{pack } T_1, e \text{ as } \exists\alpha. T_2)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{let } x = \mathcal{E}(e) \text{ in } \mathcal{C}_\alpha^+(x, \langle\langle \mathcal{E}(T_1) \rangle\rangle, T_2)$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{open } e_1 \text{ as } \alpha, x \text{ in } e_2)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{let } x = \mathcal{E}(e_1) \text{ in } \mathcal{E}(e_2)$
$\mathcal{E}(x)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x$
$\mathcal{E}(\lambda x : T. e)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda x. \mathcal{E}(e)$
$\mathcal{E}(e_1 e_2)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{E}(e_1) \mathcal{E}(e_2)$
$\mathcal{E}(\{\tilde{\ell} = \tilde{e}\})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\tilde{\ell} = \mathcal{E}(\tilde{e})\}$
$\mathcal{E}(\#_\ell(e))$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \#_\ell(\mathcal{E}(e))$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{if } e_1 \text{ then } e_2 \text{ else } e_3)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{if } \mathcal{E}(e_1) \text{ then } \mathcal{E}(e_2) \text{ else } \mathcal{E}(e_3)$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{true})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{true}$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{false})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{false}$
$\mathcal{E}(i)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} i$
$\mathcal{E}(e_1 - e_2)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{E}(e_1) - \mathcal{E}(e_2)$
$\mathcal{E}(e > 0)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{E}(e) > 0$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{fail})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{fail}$
$\mathcal{E}(\perp)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} (\lambda x. x[x]_{\langle\langle \text{bits} \rightarrow \{ \} \rangle\rangle})(\lambda x. \lceil x \rceil_{\langle\langle \text{bits} \rightarrow \{ \} \rangle\rangle} x)$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{inc})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{let } _ = \text{new}\langle\{ \}, \varepsilon \rangle \text{ in } \{ \}$
$\mathcal{E}(\alpha)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{bits}$
$\mathcal{E}(\forall\alpha. T)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{ \} \rightarrow \mathcal{E}(T)$
$\mathcal{E}(\exists\alpha. T)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{E}(T)$
$\mathcal{E}(T_1 \rightarrow T_2)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{E}(T_1) \rightarrow \mathcal{E}(T_2)$
$\mathcal{E}(\{\tilde{\ell} : \tilde{T}\})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \{\tilde{\ell} : \mathcal{E}(\tilde{T})\}$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{bool})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{bool}$
$\mathcal{E}(\text{int})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{int}$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^+(x, k, \alpha)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lfloor x \rfloor_k$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^-(x, k, \alpha)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lceil x \rceil_k$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, \beta)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x \quad (\text{if } \alpha \neq \beta)$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, \forall\beta. T)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda_. \text{let } y = x \{ \} \text{ in } \mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(y, k, T)$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, \exists\beta. T)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, T)$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, T_1 \rightarrow T_2)$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda a. \text{let } r = x(\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\mp(a, k, T_1)) \text{ in } \mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(r, k, T_2)$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, \{\tilde{\ell} : \tilde{T}\})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{let } \tilde{y} = \#_{\tilde{\ell}}(x) \text{ in } \{\tilde{\ell} = \mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(\tilde{y}, k, \tilde{T})\}$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, \text{bool})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x$
$\mathcal{C}_\alpha^\pm(x, k, \text{int})$	$\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x$

Figure 4: Naive Encoding

$$\begin{aligned}
\mathcal{T}(e : T) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{let } x = \mathcal{E}(e) \text{ in } \mathcal{G}^+(x, T) \\
\mathcal{G}^\pm(x, \alpha) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x \\
\mathcal{G}^+(x, \forall \alpha. T) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda _ . \text{let } y = x\{\} \text{ in } \mathcal{G}^+(y, T) \\
\mathcal{G}^-(x, \forall \alpha. T) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda _ . \text{let } k = \text{new}\langle \text{bits}, \gamma \rangle \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } y = x\{\} \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } z = \mathcal{C}_\alpha^-(y, k, T) \text{ in } \mathcal{G}^-(z, T) \\
\mathcal{G}^+(x, \exists \alpha. T) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{let } k = \text{new}\langle \text{bits}, \gamma \rangle \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } z = \mathcal{C}_\alpha^+(x, k, T) \text{ in } \mathcal{G}^+(z, T) \\
\mathcal{G}^-(x, \exists \alpha. T) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \mathcal{G}^-(x, T) \\
\mathcal{G}^\pm(x, T_1 \rightarrow T_2) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \lambda y . \text{let } a = \mathcal{G}^\mp(y, T_1) \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } r = xa \text{ in } \mathcal{G}^\pm(r, T_2) \\
\mathcal{G}^\pm(x, \{\tilde{\ell} : \tilde{T}\}) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} \text{let } \tilde{y} = \#_{\tilde{\ell}}(x) \text{ in } \{\tilde{\ell} = \mathcal{G}^\pm(\tilde{y}, \tilde{T})\} \\
\mathcal{G}^\pm(x, \text{bool}) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x \\
\mathcal{G}^\pm(x, \text{int}) &\stackrel{\text{def}}{=} x
\end{aligned}$$

Figure 5: Better Encoding

other hand, their naive encodings $t_1 = \lambda f. f$ and

$$t_2 = \lambda f. \lambda _ . \text{let } f' = f\{\} \text{ in } \lambda x. \text{let } _ = f'x \text{ in } x$$

of type $\tau = (\{\} \rightarrow \text{bits} \rightarrow \text{bits}) \rightarrow (\{\} \rightarrow \text{bits} \rightarrow \text{bits})$ are distinguishable, say, to the observer

$$\lambda F. [F(\lambda _ . \lambda x. [\text{true}]_{\langle \text{bool} \rangle})\{\}[\text{false}]_{\langle \text{bool} \rangle}]_{\langle \text{bool} \rangle}$$

of type $\tau \rightarrow \text{bool}$.

We can improve this naive encoding by wrapping all values coming from the outside of the encoding with encryption and decryption, and thereby forcing them to behave as they should, so that the decryption fails if they do not. For instance, in the example above, we can wrap the incoming function f like

$$\begin{aligned}
t'_2 = \lambda f. \text{let } f = \lambda _ . &(\text{let } k = \text{new}\langle \text{bits}, \gamma \rangle \text{ in} \\
&\quad \text{let } f' = f\{\} \text{ in } \lambda x. [f'[x]_k]_k) \\
&\text{in } \dots
\end{aligned}$$

so that it does nothing but behaving as a function of type $\forall \alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$ (cf. Example 13 in Section 3).

Formally, the better encoding $\mathcal{T}(e : T)$ is given in Figure 5. To protect type abstractions, the guard $\mathcal{G}^\pm(x, T)$ wraps incoming values of universal types (and, dually, outgoing values of existential types) by η -expanding the variable x along the type T and inserting encryption and decryption using a single secret password γ . Note that it never changes the types of the values that it wraps—for instance, in the example above, both t_2 and t'_2 have type τ —since it encrypts values of the type **bits**. This double encryption is not a waste of work: the first encryption (in the naive encoding) focused on well-typedness, while this second encryption (in this better encoding) aims at protection.

The “correctness” of this encoding can be formalized as follows.

Definition 14. $(e_1 \stackrel{\text{obs}}{=} e_2 : T) \stackrel{\text{def}}{\iff} (\emptyset \vdash e_1 : T) \wedge (\emptyset \vdash e_2 : T) \wedge \llbracket e(e_1) \rrbracket_n = \llbracket e(e_2) \rrbracket_n$ for any n and $\emptyset \vdash e : T \rightarrow \mathbf{bool}$.

Conjecture 15 (Full Abstraction). For any e_1 and e_2 , $e_1 \stackrel{\text{obs}}{=} e_2 : T$ if and only if $\mathcal{T}(e_1 : T) \stackrel{\text{obs}}{=}_{\{\gamma\}} \mathcal{T}(e_2 : T)$.

We leave it for future work to determine whether this conjecture is true or false. It is not straightforward for at least the following reasons:

- The target language is much more expressive than the source language. Consider, for instance, two functions F_1 and F_2 of type $(\mathbf{int} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}) \rightarrow \mathbf{bool}$. Even if $\llbracket \mathcal{E}(F_1)f \rrbracket = \mathbf{true}$ and $\llbracket \mathcal{E}(F_2)f \rrbracket = \mathbf{false}$ for some function $f : \mathbf{int} \rightarrow \mathbf{int}$ in the target language, we cannot conclude that F_1 and F_2 are inequivalent in the source language, because the function f might be undefinable. Neither does this imply that the encoding is *not* fully-abstract, because the “test” for the function f might also be undefinable.
- As far as we are aware, it remains an open problem to find *any* fully-abstract model of the polymorphic λ -calculus. Indeed, this was a hard problem even for the simply typed λ -calculus (with recursion) [14, pp. 212–215].

5 Related Work

The history of abstraction is as long as the history of programming languages. More than 27 years ago, Morris [18] informally presented the idea of protecting type abstractions by “sealing” values of the abstract types. Our encoding of polymorphism into cryptography in Section 4 can be regarded as a formalization of his idea.

Parametricity was first formalized by Reynolds [24] and further popularized by Wadler [26]. Although it was developed primarily in the setting of universal types, it can be applied easily to the setting of abstract types, because abstract types can be interpreted as existential types [16] and existential types can be encoded into universal types. Alternatively, parametricity can be extended directly to existential types [16, 20].

Abadi, Fournet, and Gonthier [4–6] have studied process calculi with security features such as authentication and private communication, and presented fully-abstract encodings of these systems into process calculi with cryptographic primitives (adaptations of the spi calculus [1, 7] and the join calculus [11, 12]). As their work itself shows, however, direct reasoning about such calculi is not easy. Boreale, De Nicola, and Pugliese’s theory [8] of trace-based equivalence in spi-calculus would mitigate the difficulty.

Zdancewic, Grossman, and Morrisett [28] developed a variant of the simply typed λ -calculus that preserves abstractions between multiple principals by distinguishing them through the syntax and the type system. They also gave a syntactic proof of (an adaptation of) parametricity in their calculus, using the small-step semantics of their calculus. It would be interesting to see whether and how their syntactic approach applies to our cryptographic framework and vice versa.

Heintze and Riecke [15] proposed a typed λ -calculus with information flow control, and proved a non-interference property (that a value of high security does not leak to any context of low security) by using a logical relation like parametricity as we did in Section 3. While their calculus is high-level and uses static typing to keep secrecy, our calculus is low-level and uses dynamic encryption to hide information. As a result, it is forbidden in their scheme to, say, communicate a secret value over a public network, because the potential illegal access leads to a static type error.

Lillibridge and Harper [personal communication, July 2000] have independently developed a *typed seal calculus* quite similar to our cryptographic λ -calculus, and studied encodings of various constructs such as recursive types and polymorphism. The main thrust of their work is finding various alternative implementations of the seal primitives in terms of lower-level mechanisms such as exceptions and references and vice versa, rather than establishing techniques for reasoning about properties of programs in their calculus or protecting translations of high-level programs from low-level attackers.

6 Conclusion

We have (i) developed a λ -calculus with cryptography, (ii) adapted the parametricity theory of polymorphism to this calculus, and (iii) proposed an encoding of type abstraction into encryption. Besides investigating whether the encoding in Section 4.2 is fully abstract, at least the following issues will be interesting for further research.

Dynamic Typing and Polymorphism. It is known that dynamic typing does not coexist well with polymorphism, because it breaks the type abstraction of polymorphism [3]. By implementing polymorphism with cryptography, however, it would be possible to allow the coexistence without losing the abstraction.

Aliasing and Information Hiding. It is also known that language features such as references cells and communication channels break type abstractions in subtle ways via aliasing [19]. For example, in an extension of the polymorphic λ -calculus with reference cells, a function

$$\begin{aligned} \text{bogus_id} &= \Lambda\alpha. \text{let } r : \alpha \text{ option ref} = \text{ref}(\text{None}) \text{ in} \\ &\quad \lambda x : \alpha. \text{case } !r \text{ of } \text{None} \Rightarrow (r := \text{Some}(x); x) \mid \text{Some}(y) \Rightarrow y \end{aligned}$$

of type $\forall\alpha. \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$ does not behave as the universal identity function, e.g. in the program **let** $f : \mathbf{int} \rightarrow \mathbf{int} = \text{bogus_id}[\mathbf{int}]$ **in** $(f1, f2)$. It would be interesting to see how such phenomenon affects the information hiding that cryptography achieves.

Public-Key Cryptography. Although we have focused on shared-key cryptography so far, it is natural to wonder what *public-key* cryptography corresponds to in term of the type theory. A possible answer to this question might involve *bounded quantification* [9].

Conventional upper-bounded quantification corresponds roughly to digital signatures or *trade-marks* [18]. If a package exports an abstract type $\alpha \leq \tau$, then clients of the package can read α -values without help from the package, but only authorized code inside the package can create elements of α .

Conversely, a lower-bounded abstract type $\alpha \geq \tau$ roughly corresponds to a public key for encrypting values of type τ , because those who do not know the concrete type (i.e., the private key) can make a value of the type α (i.e., a ciphertext) but cannot use it. For example, using a “public key” $\alpha \geq \mathbf{int}$, we can program transmission of a secret datum $i : \mathbf{int}$ to a “remote host” $f : \alpha \rightarrow \tau'$ over a “public network” $g : \alpha \rightarrow \alpha$, as $f(g(\text{coerce}_\alpha(i)))$. Because the type α is abstract, the function g *must* return the argument as it is, or just diverge and discard it (which a real network might also do).

Encoding Encryption into Type Abstraction. As the reverse of the encoding in Section 4, it also seems possible to implement encryption using type abstraction with some extensions such as references and dynamic typing. The following program in Standard ML illustrates this intuition, implementing public-key cryptography in terms of existential polymorphism. The **exn** type is used for dynamic typing and functor application is used for fresh key generation.

```

type ciphertext = exn
exception DecryptionFailure

signature CRYPT =
sig type plaintext
  val encrypt : plaintext → ciphertext
  val decrypt : ciphertext → plaintext
end

functor Crypt (type plaintext) : CRYPT =
struct type plaintext = plaintext
  exception C of plaintext
  fun encrypt x = C x
  fun decrypt (C x) = x
    | decrypt _ = raise DecryptionFailure
end

```

In this program, the functor *Crypt* takes the place of the fresh key generator, and the functions *encrypt* and *decrypt* play the role of the encryption and decryption keys, respectively. For example, it works as follows.

```

- structure IntCrypt1 = Crypt (type plaintext = int);
structure IntCrypt1 : CRYPT
- structure IntCrypt2 = Crypt (type plaintext = int);
structure IntCrypt2 : CRYPT
- val c = IntCrypt1.encrypt 123;
val c = C(-) : ciphertext
- IntCrypt1.decrypt c;
val it = 123 : IntCrypt1.plaintext
- IntCrypt2.decrypt c;
uncaught exception DecryptionFailure

```

Since it is possible to interpret the module system of Standard ML in terms of universal and existential polymorphism [25], it would be possible as well to encode cryptography into polymorphism (with some extensions) by generalizing this example.

Encoding Subtyping into Cryptography. As a variation on our encoding of parametric polymorphism into cryptography, we might consider implementing subtype polymorphism in terms of cryptography. The idea would be to encrypt the “private” part of a value. For instance, the coercion between a sub record type $\{b : \mathbf{bool}, i : \mathbf{int}\}$ and a super record type $\{b : \mathbf{bool}\}$ can be simulated by encrypting and decrypting the second element i , e.g. like

```

let upcast =  $\lambda r. \{b = \#_b(r), other = \lfloor \#_i(r) \rfloor_k\}$  in
let downcast =  $\lambda r. \{b = \#_b(r), i = \lceil \#_{other}(r) \rceil_k\}$  in
  downcast( $f(upcast(r'))$ )

```

where r' is a record of type $\{b : \mathbf{bool}, i : \mathbf{int}\}$, f is a function of type $\{b : \mathbf{bool}, other : \mathbf{bits}\} \rightarrow \{b : \mathbf{bool}, other : \mathbf{bits}\}$, and k is a key of type $\langle \mathbf{int} \rangle$. This trick is reminiscent of the treatment of record subtyping in terms of row polymorphism [22, 27].

Concurrency and Distribution. Last but not least, we would like to consider adapting these ideas to concurrent and/or distributed calculi with cryptographic primitives, such as Abadi and Gordon’s spi-calculus [1, 7]. This adaptation is challenging because the semantics of these languages is typically given in a small-step style, with no notion of “the value of a program.” Pierce and Sangiorgi’s treatment of parametric polymorphism in π -calculus [19], Boreale, De Nicola, and Pugliese’s theory of trace-based equivalence in spi-calculus [8], and Pitts and Ross’ work on big-step semantics of process calculi [21] may provide clues.

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