

**Approach
to
The Single Democratic State
Two Separate and Interlocked
Communities**

Ahmad Katamesh
Translated by: Nadia Ali Hamad

Munif Al-Barghouthi Cultural Center

**Supported by
Health Work Committees**

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Stemming from its commitment to promoting theoretical dialogue within the Palestinian political community, the Health Work Committees (HWC) supports the publication and the distribution of this important book written by the prominent Palestinian activist and author, Ahmad Qatamesh. The book is published by the Munif Barghouti Cultural Center.

During the past two decades, many transformations have occurred on the levels of political agendas, practices and ideological favoritism in Palestine. As a result, new demands have arisen for reactivating the role of political ideology in theoretically redefining these changes and in envisioning new strategies that can address these new conditions.

This work by Ahmad Qatamesh must be viewed in this context: A serious attempt to find a strategic solution for the national Palestinian question. The “one democratic state” slogan was previously proposed by Palestinian resistance parties with different ideological affiliations; it was also put forth by the National Palestinian Movement in the forties of the past century. However, the fact that it is being proposed now by Qatamesh confirms that this slogan is once again assuming its substantial place, after a compulsory absence, in the mainstream Palestinian political discourse . Moreover, it shows that there is a return to the more democratic solution of the Palestinian – Zionist conflict, based on ending Zionist colonization in historic Palestine. Finally, it further underlines the quandary of the two-state project and the crucial need to find more just and democratic alternatives to it. The transformations that have taken place in this colonial conflict for decades is the most fundamental legitimizing impetus behind the advocacy of the One State slogan.

Other than reconfirming this slogan, the significance of this

book is enhanced by the author's leftist and Marxist background, formed after the 1967 occupation. The book corroborates the one state slogan based on demographical, geographical, economic, and political transformations that are analyzed by the author to support his perspective.

For all the above reasons, and while recognizing the fact that the author's views do not necessarily represent or converge with its own, HWC is proud to support publishing and distributing Qatamesh's valuable book.

HWC

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A-Submitted a query ... Why?

There are several approaches to settle the Arab-Palestinian-Israeli conflict; more than 50 political settlements have been suggested to date to solve the question of Palestine, of which the Oslo accords and their track were the latest, together with resultant projects up to the Road Map and Bush's vision of the viable state... Yet, all of that did not lead to peace or capitulation but to aggravating the causes for hatred and war, multiplying human and economic losses, inflaming the already volatile situation and releasing a new wave of uncontrollable colonial racism.

Karl Marx once stated: "We are convinced of the real danger lies in theoretical formulation of ideas, while practical attempts, even those of the masses, may be interpreted and responded to as long as they seem dangerous; whilst the ideas which subdued the cultural ability and occupied a place in the mind ... are devils that humans can only control by subjugating them." (1)

Well, the trouble starts from the vision which directs practice, "because thought defines and politics decides." (2)(Habash) Decades of renewed conflict, whose rates increase constantly, are a great inventory of which lessons should be concluded "because we recognize only history and historicism" (Marx), and which "if it does not endow us with appropriate measures, it, at least, provides us with lessons that teach us drawing out models" (Kissinger).

Since the 1948 catastrophe and the illegal occupation of Arab land in 1967, the “Middle East” that went through several wars is in need of a creative vision for the future to be able to get out of the circle of blood. It is not enough to have usual ideas and traditional solution solving. Reference to the writer, Michael Bertran (Any major historical change in a society is also in need of changing in the vision and ideas of that society) (3) (Marx).

This approach, which aims to be an idea that directs the political mind, depends on facts and indispensable data, forming a background of the analysis and monitoring contradictions in search of an outlet and a solution which is enabled by the historically possible. Such a solution must take into consideration objective facts, such as the existence of more than 5 million Palestinians with their own towns, villages, and cultural characteristics in the West Bank and Gaza and behind the Green Line, and about 5 million more who were uprooted from their land in an ugly campaign of ethnic cleansing around 1948 and a wave of coerced departure in 1967. Those refugees, who for decades have lived under humiliating circumstances in the diaspora, in neighboring countries and different parts of the world, have not lost their individual or collective memories or dream of return, which they baptized with sacrifices and blood, refusing resettlement and the hell of homelessness. In a poll in 1997, for instance, 96% of dwellers of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon declared their attachment to return to their villages and homes from which they were uprooted during the *Nakba*. In another poll, in Jordan, where 2.5 million Palestinians live, 98% declared that their main identity is Palestinian-Arab. “In two of the largest questionnaires done in the Israeli Prisons it showed that 62% - 70% of the Palestinian prisoners are refugees.” (4) On the other hand, there are 5.5 million Israeli Jews, most of whom were brought by the

Zionist project from all over the world. More than 60% of those were born outside historic Palestine. They rely on an advanced economic-technological base and are spread throughout Mandate Palestine. (In 1948 the percentage of Jews born abroad that immigrated to Palestine was 65% and in 1987 the percentage was 38%. After the collapse of the USSR, the percentage rose to 50% with the immigration of more than a million Russian Jews. (5) However, 56% of those that immigrated during that period were not Jews (6). As such the Ashkenazim Jews created 63% of the Jewish society and the Sephardim created 37% (7))

The second fact is the interlocking of the Palestinian Arab community and the Israeli Jewish community and their economic and service interrelatedness, especially in the labor market, transportation lines and water resources, which have great importance in a country with water scarcity. Despite the dominance of this population concentration or that, in this spot or that, there is no Great Wall of China separating the two communities geographically. Palestinian and Jewish spaces are more interlocked than separate, but are clearly dominated by Zionist ethnic/racial supremacy.

There is no doubt that millions of Palestinians are characterized by cultural – linguistic – educational attributes; this is also the case for millions of Israeli Jews. There are collective characteristics for each community, despite any common characteristics connecting eastern (Mizrahi) Jews, who form 35% of the Israeli Jewish community, with their Arab roots. There is class and ethnic differentiation among Ashkenazi, Mizrahi and Russian Jews, as Jews before coming to Palestine belonged to different nations: French, German, American, Russian, Arab, etc. Such differentiations are gradually melting away in the process of formation of a collective Israeli-Jewish identity. This is the

situation with Palestinians, too. Despite the usurpation of their homeland and their dispersion into several neighboring countries, where living conditions varied substantially and even political priorities diverged, particularly in the Oslo decade, Palestinians maintained a strong sense of national identity and collective cultural attributes.

It should be clear and categorical enough that the Arab Palestinian question and the Israeli Jewish question are interlocked in a contradictory duality; neither can exist without the other, nor can one be solved alone. The process of expelling and displacing two thirds of the Palestinians from their homes, orchards, cities and villages and occupying 78% of their homeland took place in 1948, when the Jews owned only 5.6% of the land(8). According to the Israeli professor Yafthail (The Jews owned only 7% of the land in the year 1948) (9). The Israeli policy hoped to transform the Palestinians into “earth dust,” failed to dilute their identity or national aspirations. As the Israeli researcher Meron Benvenisti once wrote, “All the wishes of their disappearance were only dreams resulting from a profound calamity.” In 1967, the occupation was repeated and continued up to the imposition of Oslo, “as an Israeli monologue” (Peres), and its effects and results without realizing peace... and with violation of Palestine, people and land... and the bending of more than one Arab regime before the American-Israeli will, signing agreements and opening embassies... let alone the organized crimes and extra-judicial killings which the Palestinians are subjected to, and the corruption and subjugation of influential media... but all that did not succeed in stopping the Palestinian struggle for freedom. As to the demagogic threats, drummed up in the media, to “throw the Jews into the sea” or expel them out of Islamic countries, they did not prevent Jews in Mandate Palestine from growing to half

a million in the 1940s, to two million in the sixties and more than 5.5 million today.

There are some burning questions that need to be urgently addressed. What is the destiny of the millions of Palestinians and Israeli Jews? Do they have the right to live? Does ethical political action allow for displacing them in time and place or exterminating them physically? Are they humans or an epidemic? Is the conflict an eternal one or, like any other colonial conflict, one that will vanish as soon as its causes vanish? Were the Palestinians uprooted and dispossessed in 1948 and their rights usurped? What about “Zionist Colonialism that brought damage and destruction, and made alliance with the most powerful and fierce imperialists” (Bulos Farah)? What about the Palestinians: are they a socio-political structure, or should they be treated solely as pieces of scrap? What about the saying that Arabs are “backwards” while Jews are “civilized”? Do the “civilized” have a right to appropriate the country of the “backward natives” and establish a racial state in their place? Did that really lead to stabilization?

“There is no other way than equality in humanity or being involved in racism” (Edward Said). All the Chauvinistic- racial projects were doomed to failure throughout history, beginning with the Assyrian history three thousand years or more ago, passing by the Roman Empire two thousand years ago and the Anglo-Saxons in the late centuries, up to Hitler’s Nazism of modern times. The destiny of racial Zionism will not be any different from that of the apartheid regime in South Africa; they are very similar. Even the kingdom of Khazar, which favored “the chosen people” -- as did Turkish, Mogul and Finnish groups -- and continued for five centuries, was eventually defeated by Slavic Russians and its people were scattered across Europe.

It is imperative that creative ethical solutions be made to return the rights and lead to “real fraternity” (George Habash), as was the case for thousands of years.

“The ancient Israelites had developed from the Canaanite civilization” (Finkelstein, an archaeologist in Tel-Aviv University). (They intermixed with the Aramaeans in Syria and Palestine and took from them their language, habits and traditions, as shown by the Ugarit Alphabets and Mari’s manuscripts)(10). (Cultures intermix greatly, and their historical events and contents are interlocked and mixed largely) (Edward said); moreover, “the Jewish presence in Palestine was discontinuous; we can’t talk about one epoch but of different groups) (Yaa’cov Barnei). “After dispersion, those people were included in the people of the countries they stayed at, except some groups that looked for their own traditions.... In the Hellenistic era emigration was reinforced toward the Near East and the Mediterranean region, and a huge number of Jews did not return to Judaism” (Dr. Ibrahim Fanni).

This whole story took place before modern Zionism succeeded in involving Jewish groups “in the context of the colonial project and its expansion in the east” as stated by Rodinson, A Jewish French writer (11). “If the Zionist movement did not exist, Britain would have created it because this would be for her benefit” (the Zionist leader, Weizmann). Zionists went so far as to prefer creating an enemy to the Jews. In the Zionist Ruppin words, “the collapse of anti-Semitism leads the collapse of Zionism, and its continuity benefits Zionism” (contemporary Jews – 1920). Today the situation is that the “United States of America, like Britain, supports Israel as an ally to the West in the region” (the Soviet Obrin). “It is a treasure and a strategic ally” (Reagan), in the American Globalization structure and the Empire

of monopolies... some call it monstrous globalization which is proved by the United Nations statistics about the increasing ratio of unemployment, poverty, violence against women and growth of fundamentalism... up to the occupation of Iraq and its fragmentation and igniting the sectarian massacres among the people of the same country.

B. The Research Methodology and Chapters:

As a sociological phenomenon that has witnessed a century and increases (the conflict between the Zionist program to build the state of Israel in Palestine and Palestinian Nationalism) as the regional and international factors that affect this conflict, and in some cases the external factors are the main and definitive factors. I have adopted the methodology of historical material, which analyzes the contradictions of the phenomenon as a process of human creation immune to philosophical bids, like the Hygienists, that believes that the dialectic reality as an inevitable reflection to the dialectic of the sky (Absolute Mind) or the religious views that explain events as creations of the Gods, as either punishment or rewards or tests, as Satan plays his role to spread evil in the world (the tragedy of Satan as it came in the Torah and Quran).

Further more, the Historical Material platform tries to analyze the reality of the conflict, its contradictions and movement based on (the principal of faculty association) Lukash. It is also biased in helping human willpower to solve struggles in a progressive form which defends the path of life and development for the better because (past philosophies have been satisfied with analyzing reality, while what is needed is changing the reality) (12) Marx-about Forbach.

It is true that the opinions and views revolve around sociological phenomenon in both its definition and interpretation like Ben Vincity, the Israeli researcher says “history is like a quarry, you find all the different types of rocks”. What tempts a historian or researcher is the selection of the rocks needed to serve his view... However what I endeavored here is to submit a reading which

helps understand the conflict prelude my approach for a solution on a political and moral basis, learning from the South African experience, which is closest to the Palestinian experience despite of the differences between them.

The research in Arabic is more branched than in English. English is abbreviated and does not reach 40% of the Arabic text.

The three main difficulties that arose while doing this research are:

First: having to go back to history that is full of contradicting stories.

Second: the conflict is charged with emotions and ideologies with tensions high enough to assassinate more than 500 Palestinian activists by the Israeli government, and murder more than 4000 of them 40% children in the recent years of the conflict. Palestinian had explosions that targeted Israeli civilian in restaurants and markets, without differentiating between soldier and civilian, women men and children and without looking into the reasons, factors, the executioner and victim ect...

Third: the references I used where many, and the quotes and statistics where more. I have been publishing books for many years and collecting hundreds of quotes, but without always keeping their original references. In this text I have documented some references.

The text is made up of:

A- the justification of the research

B- Clarifying the methodology and chapters of the research.

- First chapter: A throwing light about the timeline from the last 5,000 years since the old Arab tribes immigrated to geographical Palestine and of the oldest cities passing through the Hebrew tribes, and what came in the Torah, the roman era, the Arab Islamic period, the last centuries of the Ottoman rule, the rise of the Zionist movement, addressing the Arab Palestinian identity and the Jewish identity, the 1948 Nakbeh and confiscation of the Palestinian land (the land of the Palestinian refugees, the Naqav Land, the public land and the rural land) (13) and the social-economic buildup of Palestinian Arabs and the buildup of the Israeli Jews nowadays.
- Second chapter: exposing the regional unity in historic Palestine for hundreds and thousands of years. The failure in the attempts to divide it several times which led to the geographical-economic-demographics between the two societies, Palestinian and Israelis today. This can be shown by statistics and maps in Jerusalem, West Bank and inside the Green Line (Israel).

This chapter exposes the reason for the failure of tens of political projects and answers the question ‘why is it excusable to divide Palestine into two nations’ and the failure of a moving peace process in order to reach peace. It finishes with the question ‘is it possible for Palestinian refugees to return home?’

- Chapter three: points out the failure of racist solution and the interrelated Palestinian issue with the Jewish question, Palestinian Israeli security. It also discusses the political models (the democratic secular state, the bi-nationalist state and the Islamic solution). Where does this context converges and where does it conflict with these methods reaching a vision that answers the research question, explaining the components

of (Approach- The Single Democratic State two Separate and Interlocked Communities).

On the basis of equal citizenship and collective level , and clarifying the political system of the state, economical ownership, culture, religion, law, marriage ...

- The conclusion: Results and conclusions
- Bibliography
- References

Throwing Light on Past and Present Historical Context

1. D. Shofani wrote (Egyptian antiquities point to Arab emigrations from the Arabian Peninsula towards Syria five thousand years ago. The Iraqi Acadian documents mention the invasion of Palestine and fighting Arabs 4200 years ago. There are ruins in Jericho that go back 10 thousand years and in Bisan 7 thousand years. Yabous, Hebron and Shechem - Nablus- were inhabited six thousand years ago; Akko, Ashdod and Yafi 5 thousand years ago)(14). Ilyas Shofani, in “A Brief Political History of Palestine,” talks about 200 Canaanite cities. While Mohammad Ghosheh, in “Yebusite Jerusalem,” studied the stone age, where archaeologists found human skulls dating back 150 thousand years and traces of a homosapien from 40 thousand years ago in the *Magharat el-Wad* (cave of the valley); the Galilee man before 25 thousand years; and agriculture and domestication of animals before 12 thousand years, (which is confirmed by *assuwwaah* in the puzzle of Ishtar; let alone, graveyards, lamps, house utensils, drawings, sickles, graves which contain blood stained personal things and pottery....) (15)

Palestine was distinguished by its strategic location at the crossroads of the three old continents, which made several powerful empires (Pharaonic, Assyrian, Persian, Greek,

Roman) alternate in ruling it. It is noteworthy that the alliance of (Canaanite leaders in the Megiddo battle 4000 year ago, when they sustained the siege for seven months, was an embryonic sign of national identity, before their surrendering to the army of Pharaoh Thutmose, whose military record registered his invasion of 114 cities. The Canaanites and the country's folks (amongst them, Amorite, and Amalekite Arab tribes) revolted against the Pharaohs during the era of Ramses, after they were exhausted by taxes and punitive campaigns)(16).

According to Ilyas Shofani, the Hebrews, or the passers by, are Arab Bedouin tribes whose travels very much resembled other emigrations moving from the desert to fertile lands. As for Abraham, he belongs to Iraqi-Chaldean clans, and among his descendants are Jacob and the tribes up to Moses and the Jewish beliefs. Their culture, like the cultures of other communities at the time, interacted with and was influenced by their environment and surroundings. The Judges chapter in the Old Testament mentions that, "The Israelites lived among the Canaanites, Hittites, Amorites and Jebusites...; they worshipped Baalim, Eshtar, the Goddess of Aram and Sidon... and the Gods of the Palestinians." Israel is a Canaanite word which found its way to Hebrew, a language that evolved afterwards.

(In the Old Testament, which was inscribed over hundreds of years, "to your descendants I give this land from Egypt's river to Euphrates" in the Deuteronomy (the Lord ordained to occupy the land from the Mediterranean to Euphrates and from the Negev to the Northern Lebanon)(17). The Talmud, exegesis of the Torah, which was inscribed during a thousand years (search for truth – Isam Kassab) says, "Jews are the chosen people of God while others are animals; and the Arabs

are lowly.” In the Mishna, it is written that “the difference between humans and animals is the same as the difference between Jews and other nations.” (The Current Settlement – Crisis Management or Crisis Solution – Ahmad Qatamish).

What recurs in many historical references is that Hebrew-Mosaic-Jewish tribes were part of the texture of the area and its history, whilst the story of Torah about the very wide kingdom in Solomon’s time is refuted by the Israeli archeologist (Finkelstein who wrote, “There is no historical evidence for the existence of Abraham or a kingdom from the Nile to the Euphrates; this is just imagination and illusion.” This intersects with Sulaibi in his book, “The Torah came from the Arabian Peninsula,” where he denies the existence of Solomon’s Temple in Jerusalem, which has not been traced by even by Israeli excavations till now. Also Sayyid Qimni, an Egyptian historian, contests the idea of a hurried exodus from Egypt and considers it a myth that contradicts with the historical record (Israel-Torah-History). The French historian Polyacov says that, “The dispersion of the Jews preceded the war against the Kingdom of Judea and the destruction of the temple; they came to North Africa as the Phoenicians did...; basically, the Jews of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are of local origins from Berber tribes like the tribes of Jurawa, Madyona and Baranis... .”(the History of anti-Semitism). The Historian Kalman Levy wrote, “The land of Khazar, a people of Turkish origin, occupies a strategic position between the Caspian Sea and the Black Sea. Around 740, the king there, his retinue and the ruling military, embraced Judaism which became the official religion for Khazar. The Russians destroyed their kingdom in the 11-12 centuries, when crowds of Khazar emigrated to East Europe especially Russia and

Poland, i.e. their forefathers did not come from the sides of River Jordan and so are not from the descendants of Abraham and Isaac's." Calico said, "The Khazari accent was abandoned gradually where Yeddish evolved, influenced by German." (Non-Existent People – 1984.)(18)

2. The Arab ethnic presence in Palestine, before the Islamic conquest, formed the overwhelming majority. Emigrations from the Arabian Peninsula were continuous. As for the diverse other constituencies, whether Greek, Roman, Persian or Pharaonic (before the arabization of Egypt), they were minorities that survived after their empires had passed away. The academic, Athamnah wrote (that Arab emigrations to Palestine had reached their peak in the first century before Christ, after the collapse of the Nabataean kingdom and the ruining of Petra 160 a.c.; that the existence of Arab majority and Arab tribes' rebellions at the end of the fifth century helped in appointing the Ghassanian prince, Al-Jafni, ruler of large areas in the Canaanite lands. The internecine wars between the Romans and Persians exhausted both of them and enabled the Arabs of the Peninsula in the days of the Caliph Omra Ibn al-Khattab to control Syria, Mesopotamia, and the two rivers and the Nile Valley, and to arabize them both in language and religion)(19). This is discussed by Dr. Mruwwa , who argues that armies of pastoral origin defeated armies belonging to agricultural civilization. Most of the Islamic soldiers were Yemenis and a third of them were Qaisis from Najd and Hijaz. In Palestine, there were, then, 30 towns and villages. In Jerusalem resided 80 thousand and in the other cities between 40 and 50 thousand, according to the message of the Roman king Hercules... let alone the Bedouin tribes. Agricultural life flourished, and new villages were established

in the Umayyads time; Arabic language was widely used and became a means for communication and speech(20). Khalil Athamnah mentions that most natives became Muslims after three centuries, whilst Christianity receded. As regards the Jewish minority, it had welcomed the Islamic Arab conquest and considered it as its saviour from the Romans who banished the Jews out of Jerusalem, prevented them from worshipping and treated them as subjects who follow the local Christian leader. The Muslims also banished them out of Jerusalem and did not let them come back until after four centuries to build a synagogue in Olive Mountain and transfer their Sanhedrin from Tiberias to Jerusalem (Khalil Athamnah); some of their notables became part of the Fatimids' men, while a number of them emigrated to Iraq and Egypt at the time of warring between the Qarmatian movement and Bauu Tayy in the 11 century, and the preceding Qaisi and Yemeni wars. As regards the Arab conquest of Andalusia, the Jewish historian Desmonde mentions the Jewish supporting of Tariq Ibn Ziad's army in 711 to conquer Andalusia; their destiny was that of massacres and then banishment after the collapse of the Arab rule.

Yet, throughout centuries of the Arab rule, the Jews had no tangible importance in the political and economic life; their presence was marginal while the conflict was raging between "the big ones" of Umayyads and Abbasids, each of whom ruled nearly 90 years, and so were the Palestinian leader's rebellions against Caliphs (Alsaffah, Almu'tasim, Almu'tazz, Almu'tamid, and a series of rebellions that aggravated during the Abbasid period in several Arab and Andalusian states (21).

The conflict between the Ikhshidis, the rulers of Egypt, and

the Abbasids, the rulers of Baghdad, (led to the partition of Palestine -- the Abbasids in the north, and the Ikhshidids in the south. The latter later controlled the north before the Qarmatian expansion from Bahrain to Palestine and Syria, where a bitter fight broke out between them and with the Fatimids after them. In the 11 century, Seljuks, who are of Kirgizian origin, expanded their rule till the Middle of Asia and Syria and defeated the Fatimiads in the Battle of Ramleh)(22).

In brief, Palestine was exposed to terrible wars that exhausted it and made it an easy target to feudalist Europeans whose invasions of Palestine came under the banner of the Cross. In 1099, Syria and (Palestine fell to the crusaders; a huge massacre was perpetrated in Jerusalem, with victims of tens of thousands including a Jewish minority. One of the poets of the middle ages described the massacre by saying “the Franks wandered through the city, unsheathing their swords, sparing nobody....)(23)” The Arab leader Saladin, after succeeding in unifying Egypt and Syria, launched sustained attacks against the crusaders till he won victory in the battle of Hittin in 1187, and freed most of Palestine. The battle was a turning point that proved the ability of Arabs to withstand and to triumph.

The crusaders launched a new campaign 1189-1192 and occupied Acre and other cities in Palestine and Lebanon. In another campaign, in 1215, they expanded their occupation and influence, until the Egyptians held out and freed Gaza, while the Iranian Khawarizmites freed Jerusalem. Mamlukes of Turkish origin became powerful enough to rule Egypt and Syria for two centuries, and they were famous for their victory over the European Franks in the sixth and seventh crusades; they also defeated the Mongols who destroyed Iraq and occupied Syria.

In 1516, the rule of Mamlukes ended after they were exhausted by internal conflicts, while the Ottomans of middle Asiatic origin, occupied Constantinople in 1453 and fought the Byzantines, Mongols and Islamic states in Iran and Egypt, and went towards the west till they captured Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Athens. Palestine did not resist the Ottoman invasion except in few cities.

The academic, Manna', names in his book four stages:

- 1- The Golden age with economic prosperity and security in the 16th century.
- 2- The transitional stage in the late years of 17 century.
- 3- The local leadership period in the 18th century.
- 4- Inclusion of the Ottoman Empire in the capitalist system in the 19th century)(24).

It is worth mentioning that the Ottoman authorities supported the local Palestinian families after the failure of Taher AlOmer Alzaidani's rebellion against Istanbul, forming an alliance with the Egyptian rule in an attempt for independence that expanded in the middle and northern parts of Palestine and continued for decades. Peasants, Bedouins, Jews and Christians supported him because of following a policy of religious tolerance. When the Egyptian rule changed he was assassinated in 1775, and thus an end was put to an era that witnessed the growth of national identity.

In 1800, Acre held out against Napoleon's campaign and so did some other cities; Napoleon, who in a declaration from Egypt, (called the Jews to rally around the French flag to rebuild Urshalim, the kingdom of Jerusalem, did not succeed. The forces

of Mohammad Ali, the Egyptian ruler who introduced bourgeois reforms – called by Emil Toma “an attempt of modernization depending on the central state” -- including canceling tribute over Jews and Christians, and who is described by Marx “as a replacement of the eastern turban with a real head,” controlled not only the Nile Valley but also Syria and the Arabian Peninsula)(25).

In 1833, masses of the eastern part of the Arab world welcomed the campaign of Mohammad Ali’s son, Ibrahim, whose administration hastened to dry up swamps; organize and encourage the law; and reduce the feudal and princes’ power to the benefit of the central authority. The battles that his forces waged against the Ottomans deepened Arab national sentiments, alarming the British foreign minister Palmerstone, who wrote, “(It is not in Britain’s interest to witness the appearance of an Arab king who can unify the Arabs and fragment Turkey, jeopardizing the way to India.)”(26)”

The British-Ottoman armies, aided by local feudal forces and groups disaffected by taxes and compulsory conscription attacked the Egyptian forces, leading to the failure of Muhammad Ali’s renaissance project. Syria, which at the time included Palestine, was returned to Ottoman rule in 1840.

With the return of Ottoman rule, foreign economic, missionary and consular influence increased, and recurrent articles appeared which called for establishing a Jewish base in Palestine.

Palestine was divided into three sanjaks and the conflict increased between Qaisis and Yemenis. The influence of feudal families increased. Adel Manna’ described the class division at the end of the nineteenth century as follows: “Peasants, feudal lords, agricultural workers, serfs, Bedouins, financial and commercial

petty bourgeoisie, administrative bureaucracy, Jewish and foreign capital, “while the population was about 470 thousand in 1880, 20% were resident in the cities, 70% in the country, and 10% in the desert. Muslims were 85%, Christians 11% and Jews 4%; the population grew to 650 thousand in 1906.

3. The constituents of Arab Palestinian national identity evolved through a long historical period. On the one hand, the tribes and people who settled in geographical Palestine interacted with each other, accentuated by the exposure to successive invasions with the resultant common sufferings and struggles. On the other hand, the Palestinian community’s existence interacted with its surrounding environment, be it the ancient Arab immigrations or the Arab rule since the roaming tribes, and passing by the villages, as they were called by Tayyib Tizini, in addition to agricultural villages and what accompanied that of trade exchange and crafts, up to the feudal estates and the emergence of capital production relations which were interrupted by the western imperialistic project and the Zionist project – (“We will be a stronghold for Europe in Palestine against Asia, the advanced guardian of civilization against barbarism.”) (Herzl, – the Jewish state)(27).

The Arabic language constituted a strong pillar of national identity, unifying the Arab World with other countries under a central political authority, comprising the Arabs and others with the resultant common culture and economical life.

Habash said that the Arab nation has “a communal and civilized context that differs from western communal context”(28) - a context similar to the Asian production type which India and China witnessed, where feudalism and slavery overlapped under the leadership of bureaucratic central authority and

national characteristics. Land, being the most important means of production, was divided among the state, Islamic waqf and personal property. Palestine was characterized by the diverse religious elements which formed the texture of its community, just as its clothes, food, dialects, proverbs, mythical stories, arts and traditions in the wide Canaanite frame and the wider Arab-Islamic one.

The Palestinian identity is not an imagined or alien thing, but rather a real fact created at important historical junctures throughout thousands of years; it is still taking shape, effected by the contemporary winds --"identity changes and are made by men" (Adonis). The dialectics of self, reality, environment and external factors act together in making it. The Zionist invasion in the last century had its clear impact on Palestinian identity; it was characterized by colonial settlement and racial uprooting that made most of the people homeless and usurped most of their land, in an alliance sometimes with British colonialism and sometimes with American imperialism, with the resultant process of Palestinian struggle and national liberation culture.

Zionism stripped Palestinian Jews and Arabs of their Arab identity and caused a destructive schism in the Palestinian context with a resultant situation of conflict, where wide sectors of the world Jewry are mobilized for the benefit of colonial political goals, though "Jews do not belong to one civilized formation; they do not have one history, one cultural heritage, or live on one geographical place; they do not talk the same language or work in one market"(29). Endowing the conflict with a religious character returns the clock of history centuries backwards and perpetuates conflict, without providing a solution, while "the Jewish settlement in mandate Palestine took place in a context of transferring surplus to Asia, Africa and America, and to serve

a colonial job for the benefit of the West... the United States' support for Israel comes in the context of the organic connection between the Zionist project and Anglo-Saxon imperialism" (Massiri). Hence, removing the racial colonial character of the Jewish community in Palestine is the main prerequisite needed to pave the path to a just solution of the conflict.

4. Palestine, people and land, suffered from the 1948 Nakba, or catastrophe. The British Zionist alliance, which was manifest in Balfour's declaration offering the Jews "a national home in Palestine," manifested itself in waves of Jewish immigration and establishing military, educational and economic institutions. The conflict was between a colonial, European capitalistic mentality and a traditional peasant mentality leading to Nakba for Palestinians. Jews in Palestine, who owned 5.6% of the land and who were about 30% of the population, were able to dispossess and make homeless 65% of the Palestinians and to occupy 78% of the land including the houses, the properties and... they had "stolen a state" (Said Zaidani), and disabled a "Modern project" (Azmi Bshara). The West Bank was annexed to the emirate of the State of East Jordan while Gaza Strip was put under the Egyptian administration, and the government of whole Palestine which was formed after the Nakba did not hold out more than one year.

This specific turning point is the root and the essence; subdividing the essence, or essentializing the subdivision does not cure the root, as in saying that the Palestinian problem began in 67 when the Israeli expansionist project occupied the West Bank, Gaza and other Arab lands. The problem goes back to a previous stage whose clearest feature is racial purging which the Palestinians suffered from in 1948 and confirmed by the United Nations 194 resolution which called explicitly for the return of the refugees

and compensating them for the resultant damage. There are still 90% of the Palestinian lands behind the “green line” uninhabited, 7% partially inhabited and 3% crowded according to maps which were presented by Salman Abu-Sitta before the British House of Commons. Though the Zionist project dominates Palestine, most of the Jewish community is still located in 15% of the geography.

The Israeli Academicm Papay proved through the documents in his book, *Ethnic Cleansing, That*(the Palestinian refugee were result of the political ethnic cleaning that happened During the year 1948. The majority of the jews approved and supported the ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people by occupying Palestine land and expelling them from their homeland.)⁽³⁰⁾

The Zionist policy implementations in the 1967-occupied territories are much similar to those applied in the 1948-occupied territories, i.e. stealing the land and settling therein. Jewish settlements exist on 6% of the area of West Bank and Gaza, in addition to the by pass roads, while the area of the Palestinian villages and cities is 12%, let alone the annexation of East Jerusalem, whose area is 17%, planted with settlement fences enclosing about 200 thousand persons, which is 30,000 more than the number of the Arab inhabitants⁽³¹⁾. The expansionist racist Wall, built on the western part of the West Bank and expropriating the Jordan Valley in the eastern parts of the West Bank, partitioned the West Bank into four isolated parts, fragmenting the Palestinian market and causing every isolated part to become connected in its trade and services mainly to the Israeli market. This is on top of the existing separation between the West Bank and Gaza and the forced detachment of Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank, all resulting in the significantly weakening the sought-after Palestinian national entity. This Israeli success came after

its original success in the Oslo phase in creating contradictory priorities for the Palestinian concentrations in the homeland and the diaspora.

The Zionist project is in a belligerent and aggressive phase; Israel has not yet drawn its borders, and, as Sharon declared, “the independence war has not ended.”

5. Numbers show that about 5.5 million Jews live on the land of geographical Palestine, those millions form one third of the world Jewry.

The Jewish collective is the dominant ethnic group in Israel; regarding land, “it controls over 96%, the state owns 94% of the land and the water resources” Dr. Haider), after seizing the “absentee property” that is the land of Palestinians who were expelled in 1948. It also owns 25% of the economic base and employs 25% of the work force, in addition to what it receives in foreign aid, which is about 5% of the national product, while tax returns amount to 45% of the budget. The Histadrut’s property amounts to 25% and it employs 25% of the work force; its membership together with the families constitute 58% of the population and the majority of health insurance. (32).

As for the capitalist private and small properties, they constitute 50% of the economic base, and 50% of the work force, while they employed 36% in 1965, which indicates an increase in the privatization within the neo-liberal context “Haider”.

It is worth mentioning that the structural transformations in the Israeli economy between 1970 and 1995 have led to the retreat of the agricultural sector from 16% to 2.4%; of industry from 31% to 21%; construction from 21% to 9%; while the service sector increased to 63% in harmony with the global capital

transformations and with the age of globalization(33).

The annual growth of the Israeli economy was about 10% in the 1950s and 1960s; the consumption increased 9% and became in the 1980s and 1990s less than 3%. Today growth is more subdued, owing to the effect of the Palestinian uprising; it went below 2% in the last two years, rising to 4% in 2006(34).

Regarding the geographical distribution, Salman Abu-Sitta indicates that 85% of the Jews live on 10% of the land; while the cities accommodate 80% of the population; 20% are distributed over co-operatives and private agricultural properties.

The foundation of “Israel” created problematic questions. On the one hand, “Israel” is founded on a racial ideology and racial policy, similar in nature to all the racial experiences which are known throughout history, starting with the Assyrians, passing by the Saxons and Nazis till South Africa’s white supremacists. (Israel is based on an ideological identity, which is necessarily transient, while the nationalistic ideology is based on historically specified identity)(35). Does racialism hold out before the human consciousness where acculturation of cultures lead to more democracy and human equity?

On the one hand, the Palestinian question is one of national liberation, whose stem and branches are the millions of Palestinians who increasingly crystallized their national personality to the point that it could not be dissipated, subdued or emptied of its essential demands, especially the return of refugees and independence. This development of Palestinian national identity caused a radical retreat of support for Palestinian political leaders who violated these demands, with the Palestinian masses turning away from Oslo’s declaration of principles, whose true implications were

discovered by the masses from their own experience, to the failure of the authority that brought it about....

More than 9.5 million Palestinians in their homeland and the diaspora enjoy the power of existence, indefatigable resistance energy and incessant dreams for return and decent life. Knesset member, Shulamit Aloni, once said, "So long as occupation exists, resistance exists." The Israeli historian, Baruch Kimmerling, said "the Palestinian people has the right to use force, he is naïve who thinks otherwise."(36)

On the other hand, Israel is hostile to Arab ambitions for liberation, renaissance, and unity. It is hostile to the Arab future and culture. Such hostility, which keeps the conflict alive, was manifest in the aggression against Arab territories in 1967 and in occupying Beirut 1982 and the open alliance with the American occupation of Iraq. Betting on the domestication of the Arab street is no more than an illusion. Arabs consider Israel as an antibody and an advanced base for imperialistic plans, be it for nationalistic, religious or class motives. Hence, we notice that one quarter of a century after signing the Camp David Accords by the Sadat regime little has changed in the overwhelming resistance of the Egyptian street intellectuals alike to opening normal cultural and trade relations with Israel. Until now, the great majority of Egyptians is strongly opposed to Israel. The same applies to Jordan after the Wadi Araba Agreement. As for the Oslo accords, an overwhelming majority of the Palestinian people publicly opposes them. The occupation of half of Lebanon in 1982 created a brave resistance which led to a crushing defeat of the occupational forces after two decades of struggle and forced them to withdraw in panic, frightened, in an unconditional way; this was repeated in the aggression of July 2006 which confirmed the ability of a small people, even parts of a people, to achieve victory despite the uncontested American-

Israeli military and technological superiority.

This is to be added to the regional reserve which is directed by religious perspectives that consider Palestine as an Islamic endowment land, and Jerusalem as the holy city with religious symbols. It is evident that the level of contradiction between the regimes of Tehran and Tel-Aviv is soaring up, with Tehran's supporting Hizbullah, the Lebanese resistance movement that created a second Vietnam complex, this time for Israel.

Finally, Israel was never a solution for the Jewish problem; those who resisted Jewish assimilation in other nations and elevated differences with those nations to the national level said that their separation in a state of their own was their only insurance against another Holocaust of waves of anti-Semitism in Europe. Establishing Israel over the ruins of Palestine did not provide peace; a series of wars were fought -- 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, let alone 1982 and the first intifada, which former Israeli prime minister Shamir described as an uprising war. Yet, Israel's human losses in the last years of confrontation were more than in any other war fought by the state. The same applies to the economic losses and the loss of the individual security. Israel's military defeat in Lebanon in July 2006 only encouraged Israel to start preparing for a yet more destructive, more technological, more devastating war.

Arab and Palestinian losses I particular have always been consistently larger than Israel's. This was also the case with the Vietnamese, the Algerians, the Soviets and the majority in South Africa, but that did not prevent the defeat of the Americans, the French, the Nazis and the Apartheid regimes respectively.

Israeli Jews are less than a third of world Jewry; this was the

case when Titus the Roman destroyed the temple in 70 B.C.(37) despite the fact that there are already other hypotheses that deny the existence of the temple in Jerusalem, particularly since excavations, to date, have not produced any concrete evidence of its existence. These archaeological attempts started in the late years of the 19th century. Furthermore, the Archeologist Fanni (Israeli archeologists have not found anything that corresponds to what is written in the Torah about the temple, its demolition, and rebuilding in Jerusalem)(38). Two thirds of all Jews refuse to be separate from the nations that they currently live in, in America more than in Israel, and New York more than “Jerusalem” and half of the Israeli cities.

As regards what is said about Zionism as a national liberation movement and Israel as an oasis for democracy, history is full of evidence and events that unmask the racial imperialistic character of the Zionist movement and its physical embodiment, Israel, in thought, alliances and policies. It is enough to remember the Israeli refusal, formally and communally, with a few bright exceptions, to admit responsibility for the Nakba and the refugees caused by Zionist ethnic cleansing of the Palestinian people. Hardly any Israeli-Jews accepts the right of Palestinian refugees to return. Furthermore, most Israeli-Jews still oppose a full withdrawal from all the lands Israel occupied in 1967, including East Jerusalem. Even the establishment of the “Jewish State” in 1948 clashed later with the well known fact that there were 1.25 million Palestinians on whom the Israeli citizenship was imposed without being treated as equal citizens; and we cannot forget that 20% of them are “present absentees” after being uprooted from 39 villages and concentrations; let alone the citizens of Jerusalem, which was annexed to Israel after its occupation in 1967, without accepting its Palestinian inhabitants as citizens -- only residents.

On the one hand, there is no chance to establish a pure Jewish state neither in the 1948 land nor in the whole of Palestine; on the other hand, Israel does not attract more than one third of the world Jewry; moreover these Jews were forced to face the fire of the guns and the horror of the battle fields.

6. Palestinian society in the West Bank and Gaza amounts to 3.8 million persons, while that in the 1948 land is about 1.25 million. The joint uprising in October 2000 proved Palestinian unity across the “Green Line.” This unity is not only based on history, but also on intermarriage and a steady growth of economic and social relationships, despite Israel’s colonial policies and its “divide and rule” policy.

In the West Bank and Gaza the class structure indicates that 5-6% are bourgeois business people, from the owners of firms and industries to entrepreneurs; 30% are self-employed in crafts, small-scale trade, or agriculture; about 25% are government employees or intellectuals; and finally, 40% are hired workers(39). The percentage of participation of women in the work force ranges from 10% to 12%(40), while the majority of women are housewives who work hard in informal work at home.

The work force is about 800 thousand, nearly 300-400 thousand of whom are unemployed and 170 thousand work in the governmental sector -- 80 thousand of them in the various security forces and 20 thousand or more are militias. About 50 thousand Palestinians, compared to 150 thousand before the policy of siege was implemented, are employed in Jewish projects, the majority of which is in the Jerusalem area. These are concentrated in construction workshops. About 300 thousand are employed in the national economy, 30 thousand in the non-governmental organizations, and 15 thousand in UNRWA.

The distribution of the work force in the West Bank and Gaza is 17% in industry, more than 90% of which is in family workshops and small commodities production facilities employing 1-9 employees(41). Most industrial workers are concentrated in the transformational industry of sewing and clothes, while the limestone industry is considered a pioneering sector.

This is also the situation in agriculture: 16% work hard in the land seasonally and work as a hired laborers in the two sectors of building and services the rest of the year. While agricultural workers, similar to the agricultural bourgeoisie, are a limited sector, this is also the situation of the peasants who depend in their income on their possessions; while they are looking to the olive tree as a pioneering sector. Agriculture contributes 6% to the gross national product(42).

Last, building workshops include 12% of the work force; restaurants and small business 18%; transportation 5%; and services 30%. (PCBS - 2002). Business with the Israeli market accounts for an average of 73% of all Palestinian trade; the Arab market for less than 2%; while the international market, whose products mainly arrive through the Israeli market, accounts for the remaining 25%. 45% of Palestinians inhabit the cities, 16% the camps, most of them in the Gaza Strip, where the refugees constitute 67% and the rest are in the rural areas of the West Bank. Gaza has almost no rural areas.

The Oslo agreements had the most dramatic negative effects on the socio-economic structure, not to mention its political and cultural results. The gross domestic product decreased 20% between 1994 and 1999(43) and 30% between 1999-2003 (The International Bank), while the per capita share decreased 30% between 1994 and 2003. Palestinian economic losses were

mainly due to the continuous Israeli military invasions with all the systematic damage and destruction that accompanied them, as well as about 400 closures, causing losses to the tune of 12-15 billion dollars; as a result, the poverty rate reached a staggering 64% (44)

But there is a new social segment which underwent an upward class mobility: the high ranks of the banking sector, composed of about 22 banks distributed into 80 branches with deposits reaching 5 billion dollars, 4 billion of which were leaked abroad. Also belonging to this segment are the bureaucracy of the ministries and Palestinian Authority highest paid employees, some powerful persons from the non-governmental organizations which are funded by foreign money, and local agents of Israeli and foreign companies forming the comprador class. It is important to note other trends in the Palestinian economy. Annual trade with the Israeli market increased from 700 million dollars before Oslo to 2 billion dollars now, 40% of which are luxury goods. Universities doubled their personnel, so did satellite and other media outlets and research centers. All these sectors are not productive and the highest ranking persons' income is many times that of the other personnel or that of the community at large. This had several political and ideological consequences to the extent that Bush could bet on "the Palestinian talents."

But all these variables, and whatever the results of their dynamics, are insufficient to prevent the emergence of Palestinian resistance capable of reproducing itself in different ways and forms. Neither can it dilute the attachment of the overwhelming majority of Palestinians to their national rights, particularly the right of return. The Geneva accord, which tried to erase the right of return, swiftly fell into oblivion, as did its authors, even before its ink dried; all other political concessions by any leadership were

met with widespread opposition from most.

As regarding Palestinian masses of 1948, “Ben Gurion’s philosophy - which was founded on expelling all the Palestinians, failed in uprooting them” (Israel Shahak). Nearly 150 thousand held on and became today 1.25 million. In spite of the declaration of establishing a Jewish state, perpetrating massacres, ethnic cleansing, iron curtain policies and military rule -- up to Koenig’s document to get rid of the Arabs -- and the suppression of October uprising with iron and fire, all that did not prevent the natural growth of the Arab Palestinians population in Israel at an annual rate of 4.2%. The Palestinian community constitutes at least 18% of the population, spread over 137 locations including 38 separate cities and villages. More than two thirds of this Palestinian community inside Israel do not hide their Palestinian and Palestinian-Arab identity(45), clinging to the national identity (contrary to the stooges), including the production of a variety of political and union expressions up to the Day of the Land 1976 and support of the Palestinian uprising.

The Palestinian community in Israel, where 80% depended on agriculture in the 1950s, was transformed by confiscation of land and the accompanying forced proletarianization, whereby 60% work today in the building sector and transportation as hired workers for the colonialist who pays them 50-70% of the Jewish worker’s wage, leading to the rise of unemployment to 22%, compared to only 7% among Jews(46).

The Palestinians, the indigenous owners of the land, now possess only 4% of the land and consume 2.4% of the water; their proportion in the universities is 4% and less than that for the higher degrees, while the university fees costs an average Palestinian student 150% the cost incurred by an average Jewish

student. Palestinians occupy about 3% of the high job positions in the ministry of education and 5% of the academic and scientific careers, compared to 9% in the Jewish sector. There are about 20% “present absentees” who were uprooted from their villages and replaced by Jews.

The forms of racial discrimination are endless, but Palestinians in Israel are struggling for their right to return home, for putting an end to racism, and for establishing their collective identity as a part of the larger national identity. Despite all measures for isolating them, their interaction and communication with the Palestinian concentrations in the West Bank and Gaza have steadily increased.

A-The Unity of the Palestine Territory challenged the Forces of Division

Looking at the Mandate Palestine map, from the Mediterranean sea to the west till the Jordan River to the east, and from Ras an-Naqura in the far north to Um-Rashrash in the south, one will certainly notice the geographical harmony of this country without any internal natural boundaries, like a series of mountains, a river or a desert. It is a geography that generates its own diversity including the coast, the mountain and the desert; it contains four geographical sectors (the coastal which is narrow; the series of middle hills; the big depression in the Jordan Valley; Tiberias and the eastern plateau, which was considered by Homer a series of low mountains; it is all part of the fertile crescent which was connected by cultural and commercial relationships with the Mediterranean countries since thousands of years, as the Syrian and Egyptian archives indicate. (Dr. Fanni).

When foreign political players tried to impose themselves by drawing political borders that do not take into account the natural geographic borders, they eventually failed.

Two thousand years ago, in the Roman era, the Palestine administration included, in addition to what became Mandate Palestine, some parts of East Jordan and south Lebanon, including Tyre down to the south to include some parts of the

Sinai desert. Nearly 1400 years ago, at the time of the Islamic conquest, Palestine was a little smaller than Mandate Palestine; the north belonged to the Jordan division, while some parts of eastern Jordan belonged to Palestine. Maps in Isam Sakhnini's book, "The Palestinian State," clearly illustrate these facts.

In the late Ottoman feudal era, around two centuries ago, Palestine was divided into three districts: the northern district, which belonged to Beirut; the Nablus district, which included the sub-district of Jenin, in addition to Salt and Zarqa (two Jordanian cities); and the Sanjaq of Jerusalem, which included the coast, Hebron and Gaza that followed directly the Sublime Porte in Istanbul.(47)

In the last century, in the time of the capitalist western project, Britain and France signed the Sykes-Picot Agreement in 1916 dividing up the Arab region, including Palestine, without any mention of Zionist rights. Palestine became four units: the British administration controlled Jaffa and Haifa; the French administration controlled Tiberias, Safad and Zarqa; the Arab administration controlled Southern Palestine, particularly Hebron, the Negev, and parts of East Jordan; and an international administration was set up over the central parts of Palestine.

The British High Commissioner in Egypt, Kitchener, drew the borders of Palestine in his correspondence "from the Gulf of Acre– Haifa – to the Gulf of Aqaba," which did not include the northern parts of Palestine, annexed to Jordan, in a way similar to the Islamic regions a thousand years or more ago.

In 1917, the British foreign minister Balfour granted the Jews "the right to establish a national homeland in Palestine" and guaranteed British support to such a state. According to the

Balfour Declaration, the map of Palestine included parts of Jordan too, but the Zionist movement in the negotiations at Paris 1919 presented its own map that included geographical Palestine in addition to south Lebanon till the Litani river, south Syria till the borders of Damascus and, Sinai till the Arish area and parts of east Jordan, similar to what it was like two thousand years ago in the era of the Roman Empire.

The Palestinian delegation to the Paris negotiations, though calling for unity and looking for the unification of Syria, had as a background Mandate Palestine, which was under the British Mandate, i.e. geographical Palestine from the sea to the river and from Aqaba to Ras-an-Naqura.

Owing to the primary importance of water resources, Balfour wrote, “the main point in determining the borders is the enablement of Zionist policy through making available economic extent and control over the water resources in Palestine.”

In 1937, the Peel Commission’s recommendations suggested the partition of Palestine between Jordan and the Zionist movement almost equally, while Jerusalem, which extended from Ramallah in the north to Bethlehem to the south, and from Jericho in the east till Lydda and Ramleh in the west, was submitted to the British Mandate(48).

Such was also the project of Prince Abdullah of Jordan, who called for establishing a united Arab kingdom, including Jordan and Palestine, with a Jewish administration in the Jewish areas. The Zionist movement responded in 1938 by its suggestion for the international Woodhead commission to divide Palestine and parts of Jordan into three, almost equal units, where Jews would control the western coastal areas extending to Safad and Jerusalem,

an Arab unit divided into two areas and a third mandated area. The Woodhead commission produced a map that was strikingly similar to the Zionist proposal regarding the three units, though partially reducing the Jewish geographical unity.

The White Book (1939), after the Palestinian rebellion broke out in 1936-1939, dictated the establishment of an independent state of Palestine (geographical Palestine) in ten years' time, to be shared by Arabs and Jews, considering the establishment of two states as an impractical matter. The partition resolution 181 declared by the United Nations in 1947 -- agreed upon by the majority of two thirds of the General Assembly -- called for establishing two states in Palestine, economically united, while Jerusalem would be under an international administration. One third called for an Arab-Jewish federal state with a joint capital, Jerusalem(49).

Despite the fact that Jews had 5.6% of the land, according to British archives, the partition resolution called for establishing a Jewish state on 56%, of the land, which is ten times more than what they actually had, 43% for the Arab state and 1% for international Jerusalem. The Arab state was divided into three non-contiguous areas(50).

The population consisted of 495 thousand Jews, 490 thousand Arabs in the Jewish state and 800 thousand Arabs and a few thousand Jews in the Arab state.


UNGA resolution 194, issued late in 1948, called for the return of Palestinians to their property *and* compensating them for the harm done to them; while Israel was established on 78% of the whole Palestinian land, the West Bank was annexed to Jordan and the Gaza Strip, 1% of Palestine, was put under Egyptian

administration.

In 1967, Israel occupied the West Bank (including East Jerusalem), Gaza, the Golan Heights and Sinai.

Although Palestine has suffered from foreign invasions throughout its history, some of which lasted many decades, even for centuries, but the invaders have always been driven away and the political divisions of the land that they brought with them disappeared with their defeat. The Roman rule continued for six centuries; the Hellenic rule for 250 years preceding it; the Persian rule 350 years before the Hellenic one; the Ottoman rule for 400 years and the British rule for 30 years; in addition to other invasions and occupations, all of which went away, and the Palestinian territory remained intact with its social constituents and natural geographic unity.

Similarly, Poland was divided five times in less than two centuries, between 1772 and 1945, but all these divisions went away, and Poland survived with its borders and people who live on its national territory intact. Political divisions are not as strong as geography and the human factor; this is also what we observed later in the experiences of Germany and Yemen.




*The United Nations partition plan,
29 November 1947*

B -Territorial Separation an Impossibility / Geographic – Economic – Demographic Interlocking

It is tragic to witness Zionist thinkers arguing for “the unity of the Jewish people,” a religious group hailing from different nations and continents, while the Palestinian people suffers from an organized process of fragmentation. This people is a political community with historical bonds since thousands of years in a well- defined geographic region, with a common identity, up to 1948 when it faced ethnic cleansing and expulsion of two thirds of its members. Any approach that has a claim to morality and scientific validity has to admit the unity of the Palestinian structure and find a comprehensive solution for the people, rather than deal with it on an individual basis as if it were a piece of scrap or a worn cloth.

The Palestinian people extend throughout Palestine, from the far north to the far south, and from the coast to the river Jordan; the connections between the communities in the 48 and the 67 territories grow more profoundly day after day, comprising about 5 million in addition to 4.5 million others in the diaspora, two thirds of whom are in Jordan, Syria and Lebanon.

Zionist racism, supported by Britain and the USA, succeeded in 1948 in stealing three fourths of the Palestinian land, which prevented the establishment of a Palestinian state, while other Arab peoples succeeded in gaining their political independence at various stages. After 1948, the Zionist movement sponsored a wide Zionist Jewish immigration to “Israel,” boosting the number of Jews to close to 6 million. In other words, a systematic



MAP
Population Concentration in the Proposed Return Plan

process was implemented for the expulsion of the natives and replacing them with Jewish settlers in a racist and repressive way. The register of the legal ownership of the land indicates that the property of Jews in 1947 Palestine was only 5.6%. While the Jewish community mostly resides at present on 15% of the 48 land, more than 88% of these live in the cities(51) and in 6% of the land of the West Bank while Palestinian concentrations are present in 12% in the 1967 territories are 4% in the 1948 land in addition to mixed population. The accompanying maps show the extent of interlocking of the two communities in the same geographical regions; such an intersection is impossible to become subject to territorial separation, the more so in Jerusalem.

It is one geography where communities are spread, where Jews and Arabs have larger density in this region or that, while in other regions the two communities mingle in the same way as in the Ukraine, where 40 million Ukrainians, and 11 million Russians are interlocked geographically, economically, politically and culturally; also in South Africa, with 30 million blacks and 8 million whites, the populations are interlocked economically and geographically, subject to the same political and legal system after the fall of apartheid, though the density of one group may be larger in this region or that.


On the economic and services level, the interconnection is to a greater extent between the Palestinian population in 48 Palestine with 1.25 million persons and the Jewish population with 5.5 million persons. In fact, no Palestinian economy exists separately from the Jewish economy; more than half the Palestinian workforce works directly in Jewish establishment and projects. This is the case also in the universities. No Palestinian universities exist in 1948 territory; all Palestinian education is under the Israeli racist hegemony.

The economy of Gaza is also interlocked with the Israeli economy, even more than with the West Bank economy, and vice versa. The utmost that Palestinians hope to attain is liberating their economy from annexation and regaining their confiscated land. In recent years, the Occupation fragmented the market of the West Bank, joining its north and south separately to the Israeli economy, especially the workforce, trade and ways of transport. As for Jerusalem, the total municipal territory of which was extended from 3 % to 17%(52) of the entire area of the West Bank, it was systematically detached from the West Bank, forcing its economic integration with the Israeli market. The number of Jews in it is 200 thousand and that of Palestinians is less than 180 thousand. This is to be added to the negative effects of the Apartheid Wall and the confiscation of the Jordan Valley, which alone amounts to 40% of the area of the West Bank, with its water aquifers, archeological sites and villages.

Most networks of electricity and water and main streets in the West Bank are common networks utilized by the Palestinians and Jewish settlers; moreover, 80% of the water of the West Bank(53) was seized by the occupation authority to satisfy the needs of the Israeli community, a fact that was ignored by the Palestinian negotiator in the Oslo accords, leaving the main water resources in the hands of the Israeli authority, which stole the Mawaasi aquifer of Gaza, using its water for the use of Jewish settlements, before the redeployment that removed those settlements from Gaza. The power grid in Gaza is completely dependent on Israel.

On the other hand, there are common transport lines in the whole of Geographical Palestine; these are common to most Arab and Jewish concentrations, only rarely do special transport lines exist; in addition to the existence of one customs system; the Israeli shekel is the main currency; no convenient conditions are

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available to ensure issuance of a Palestinian currency; the tax returns which the Palestinian Authority receives from the Israeli side constitute 62% of its income, according to an announcement by Nashashibi(54), the ex-minister of finance, though a large proportion of it has been seized like the deductions from the wages owed to Palestinian workers in Jewish establishments, seized by the Israeli government since 1967, which amount to 2 billion dollars.

It is an illusion to think that the Oslo accords moved things in the opposite direction; there are no Israeli or Palestinian plans to separate the 48 market from the 67 market; the Paris agreement, rather, came to strengthen the ties, as well as the Judaization of Jerusalem, and looting of the Palestinian land in the West Bank; the area of Jewish settlements increased from 3 % to 6% , and the size of the Palestinian trade with the Israeli market increased, also, from 700 million dollars to 2 billion dollars annually.

In a few words, there is no possibility of separating the Arab Palestinian community of 1967 and 1948 from the Jewish community in the same geography; their interlocking prevents talking of our playground and their playground, or that our space with its economy and demography is separate from their space with its economy and demography. The facts on the ground impose themselves; they cannot be dispensed with theoretically, without annihilation of one side or evacuating it from place and time and perpetrating dreadful massacres and fresh waves of ethnic cleansing that spare nothing. This paper is opposed to such bloody exclusion.

Massacres and ethnic cleansing were tried in 1948, aiming to change the Palestinian people into “dust of the earth,” as the documents of the Israeli Ministry of Exterior wished, but these

wishes were themselves reduced into dust; the Palestinians emerged from the ashes of the Nakba, and even acquired an identity of struggle for a just cause, and multiplied many times.

Modern history has witnessed three racial models: South Africa, where the racial regime came to an end, with the black and white citizenship surviving; Zimbabwe, where the racial regime collapsed, with the departure of most of the white settlers; and Hitler's Germany, where the regime fell and German society was liberated from the Nazi nightmare to undergo a new renaissance. The first model is the closest to the Palestinian experience.

As regards the signing of political agreements with Arab leaders (Camp David, Oslo, Wadi Araba), none led to any progress in the search for a just peace; the Egyptian public, including the intellectuals, refused normalization, as did most Jordanians. As for the Palestinian people it stood solidly behind the banner of struggle, with nothing left over from the Oslo accords except the failing Palestinian Authority on all levels, with the Israeli occupation gaining and the Palestinians fundamental rights violated. Such colonial and racist policies are doomed to fail, being unable to end Palestinian existence in this land or to end resistance to oppression.

The attempts to Israelize the Palestinian community in 1948, Jordanize the Palestinian community in Jordan, and disintegrate that in 1967-occupied territory to the extent that most of it would abandon the land and seek residence in the diaspora, were all met with opposition by the factors of identity, historical memory, common aspirations, and incessant waves of resistance. But it is racist Zionism that denies the other and appropriates his rights, kindling or reproducing war, and hatred anew.

A Zionist ideological and political racism oppresses Palestine -- people and national existence -- through its refusal to recognize the Nakba and the massacres committed against the Palestinians. In fact, this denial has its roots in the origins of the Zionist project which assume a “land without people,” a stupid statement invented by the British only to be repeated by Herzl decades afterward.

It is too difficult nowadays to defend the segregation attitude in an age of civilized interaction between cultures and a scientific cycle where human knowledge doubles every seven years; the progress of life objectively contradicts racism and opposes the mechanisms used by the imperialistic regimes to occupy the lands of the others. Throughout history national chauvinism and racism have been defeated; they are certain to fall in the present time.

There are additional factors that counter territorial separation other than the previously mentioned territorial intertwining:

- 1) The Arab Palestinian mental frame of reference considers Palestine an Arab land on the basis of history and geography which underlie the Arab popular refusal to recognize Israel, still seen as a foreign body performing an imperialistic function that hinders the unification of the Arab nation. This is applicable also to the racist Zionist frame of reference which succeeded in attracting millions of Jewish settlers, refusing the division of Palestine or even withdrawal to the 67 borders. If the Zionist leadership recognized, only verbally, the 47 partition resolution, soon afterwards it destroyed it by occupying most of Palestine without delineating the borders of Israel until this moment. It is worth noting that the Israeli delegation to the Paris negotiations in 1919 presented a map of mandatory Palestine including the Litani river.

It is well known that the recommendation of the Peel

Commission for partitioning Palestine almost immediately evaporated, and so before did the divisions installed by the Ottoman empire; also the division of Palestine by the Abbasids, and Ikhshidis couldn't endure: Palestine is one territorial unit irrespective of extending or narrowing its boundaries; the territorial unit is in complete harmony with the unity of its historical spirit.

- 2) The spread of more than 1.25 million Palestinians in 1948 Palestine and about 400 thousand Jews in the West Bank with increasing numbers which makes impossible any territorial separation along ethnic/religious lines; this applies also to East Jerusalem, let alone the Palestinian rights in West Jerusalem.
- 3) The return of Palestinian refugees to their homes, which is not only an individual and collective right, a national dream, but also a political necessity for settling the conflict and a means for liberating the Jewish community from the imperialistic racism which put it in a state of hostility with the region. The implementation of return will enhance territorial intertwining and put an end to territorial separation.
- 4) The domination of the whole of Palestine by the Zionist project in all fields with the resultant realities throughout Palestine, economic, social and in services, in addition to strengthening the connections between the two Palestinian concentrations in 67 and 48 with growth of readiness for common struggle against racist and exclusivist hegemony, together with the struggle of the Palestinian concentrations in the diaspora for return, freedom, dignity and a firm democratic solution.

Hence, the Palestinian-Arab and the Israeli-Jewish communities will find themselves interconnected in Palestine; but lest this interconnection be similar to the one we experienced in the

last century, hostile and aggressive, it is imperative, first of all, to read things from a new perspective.

What should be done?

It seems plausible that the decisive factor which led to the failure of dozens of settlement projects by the ruling regimes and classes is their neglect of the historical and geographical facts. These facts are categorical in stating that Jewish communities have lived among the Arab and Palestinian community as a part of the texture and constituents of the country. The birth of the Zionist idea paved the way for the Zionist movement to harmonize its colonial conquest with European imperialist designs, beginning with the French campaign of Napoleon in 1800, the calls of the British Ministry of Exterior after the defeat of the project of Mohammed Ali in 1840, passing by the British Royal maps, in conjunction with the crushing of the Orabi rebellion and the settlement points that were established dozens of years thereafter, and lastly the and the first Zionist congress in Basel in 1897. All of these events paved the way for the Jewish imperialistic immigration to Palestine and founding of a Zionist state therein, at the expense of the native Palestinians.

Hence, the turning point and the first step in uprooting the causes of conflict is the return of the Palestinian refugees to their homes; they are the primary component of the Palestinian liberation movement and their return is at the very core of the Palestinian national program. In a questionnaire in 1993, in al-Junaid prison, it was shown that the refugees among the political prisoners constituted 61%; in another questionnaire they were about 69%. The return is the starting point of peace and defeating racism;

ultimately, it is peace in the region that can serve the long term interests of international players, reminding all of the fact that the disaster which afflicted the Palestinians was produced by many of those same players.

The often advocated international temporary protection of the refugees and Palestinians under occupation, who are oppressed and humiliated, is no more than a transitional step alongside a comprehensive developmental project which supports Palestinian steadfastness, relieves several accumulated problems, and reinforces a civil, legal culture among the people and promotes an independent judiciary. This would rally around common factors in the framework of a long process of struggle that adheres to the national political rights and is interlinked dialectically with the Arab popular struggle.

The return of refugees would redress a historical injustice and at the same time create a new political and cultural climate conducive to the liberation of the Jewish community from its own racism; that would open the door to its return “to the East,” to coexistence based on mutual understanding with the Arabs. The South African experience is a good guiding example of such understanding; after the racial regime’s collapse and ensuring equality before the law of all the citizens, a committee was formed for resolving state disputes, returning property to its owners and returning uprooted people to their lands and properties.

The United Nations’ resolution number 194 provided explicitly for the return of the Palestinian refugees to their lands and compensating them for the damages that followed.

Is the Right of Return Feasible?

This question was raised by Dr. Salman Abu Sitta, who argues as follows:

The feasibility of the return is raised frequently by pro-Israel authors who claim that it is ‘neither feasible nor practical’ (e.g. Peretz, 1993, p.72). He says that “Palestinian towns and villages have disappeared [and] ... it would be difficult to re-establish these former sites.” He calls the villages from which the people were expelled “abandoned,” as if the inhabitants left them of their own free will.

The claim that it is not possible to ‘re-establish former sites’ is factually erroneous. There is no land better documented than Palestine. As early as 1871, a full and detailed survey (26 sheets with 15000 names) had been prepared by the [British] Palestine Exploration Fund. In the period 1920-1947, the Survey of Palestine produced detailed maps for the whole of Palestine. After the Israeli occupation of Palestine in 1948, these very same maps, with their Arabic names erased and replaced by Hebrew names, were used by Israel. Physical changes in the critical period of 1949-1959, when Palestinian villages were destroyed and fields ploughed over, were marked over British maps. These were recorded not only by Israel, but by Britain and the U.S as well. Israel Land Administration which leases Palestinian land to Jews has complete records of every plot of land. Today, the satellite mapping system makes the comparison between old and new quite feasible.

Destroyed villages, not only live in the memory of their people and in old maps, but they are preserved in the comprehensive aerial survey conducted by the British over most of Palestine in 1945 and 1946 The myth that this land had been barren, uncultivated and under-populated is belied by [photographic evidence]. Hardly an acre was not cultivated. This so called “desert” was green before the Israelis came. The real desert in Negev is still desert today.

Then there is the question: where would the Palestinians return to? And what is to be done with all those multi-national immigrants who were brought to Israel? The answer lies in examining Israel’s demography.

Demographic analysis of Israel today shows that the concentration of Jews today is largely in and around pre-1948 Jewish land and that Palestinian land is still largely empty (Abu-Sitta 1996, 1998). Israel’s 41 natural regions may be divided into 3 areas, designated A, B, C (see Table 10 ...). Area A consists of 8 natural regions with a total area of 1,683 sq. km. (8% of Israel) in which 68% of the Jews (2,924,000 - 1994 figures) live. This area is almost the same area in which Jews lived in pre-1948 Palestine.

Area B consists of 5 natural regions with a total area of 1,318 sq.

Table 10: Past, Present and Future Demography of Israel with the Return of Refugees.

(1) Palestine 1948 Occupied by Israel		(2) Israel 1994						
	Area (Sq.Km)	Designation	Description Area	Area (Sq.Km)	Total Jews (1000's)	of which: rural Jews 1000's)	Present Density Of all population P/Sq.Km	% Jews
Jewish Controlled Land	1,682a	A	Largely Jewish	1,683	2,294	115	1,934	90
Remaining Palestinians' Land	1,465b	B	Mixed	1,318	420	100	482	66
Expelled Palestinians' Land	17,178c	V	Palestinian Concentration	17,324	956	154	82	67
Total	20,325			20,325	4,300	369	261	81

a See Hadawi, App. VI, p. 230. This area includes public land, concessions, other transfers. Area duly registered is about half, or 3.6% of Palestine.

Cf Survey of Palestine report to the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine at 1,392 sq. km., correcting for Turkish donoms.

Zionist sources: Gamou: 1,588 Sq. km., Y. Weitz map: 1,731 Sq. km., both include concessions.

b See Hadawi, App. VU, p. 242.

c Based on compilation of individual village ownership, see Abu-Silta 1996. Also see Hadawi, App. VIII, p. 247, 248.d I Statistical Abstracts of (Israel No. 46 (1995), Central Bureau of Statistics

e UNRWA records of registered refugees on 9 April 1997, reduced 10.31 December 1994.

(3) Future Israel				(4) Future Israel		
(1) Return of Lebanon Refugees				(2) Return of Gaza Refugees		
Area	Returning Palestinians (000's)	New Density P/Sq.Km	% Jews	Returning Palestinians (000's)	New Density P/Sq.Km	% Jews
A	41	1,959	89	197	2,052	85
B	40	512	62	30	505	63
C	248	96	57	452	108	51
Total	329	278	76	679	295	72

km. (7% of Israel) in which 10% of the Jews and 20% of the Palestinians in Israel live. This mixed area is almost the same in area as the land of the Palestinians remaining in Israel. Thus 78% of the Jews in Israel live in 15% of Israel.

The remaining part, Area C, has a total area of 17,325 sq. km. and is essentially the land of Palestinian refugees. Apart from a few urban centers (mostly Palestinian towns originally) in which urban Jews live, only 154,000 rural Jews control and exploit this vast Palestinian land.

Contrary to Israeli claims, the return of the refugees will not cause mass dislocation of Jewish immigrants, although they have no right to seize Palestinian property in the first place. The return, however, may initiate voluntary relocation of some of the 154,000 rural Jews.

To test the impact of the phasing of the refugees return, we shall examine two important scenarios. The first is the return of the Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. This is most pressing because of their bad working and living conditions and the political constraints under which they live. The second is the return of the Palestinian refugees in Gaza. Almost one million people are crammed in 360 sq. km. with no identity, employment or future. They are often described as the political dynamite of the Middle East. Although the entire issue of the refugees must be resolved, these two explosive situations must be addressed without delay.

Section (1) of Table 10 shows the classification of the areas in the part of Palestine that became Israel in 1948. Section (2) shows the demographic distribution of the same area half a century later. The concentration of Jews today is remarkably similar to the 1948 distribution. It is shown that only 154,000 rural Jews live in the

land of the expelled refugees (Area C). Total population density in Israel in Area C is 82 persons/sq. km., which is 4% of the density at the centre of the country. Although the Jews represent 90% of the population at the centre, they are only two-thirds in areas B, C. This two-thirds majority is largely due to the expulsion of the Palestinians.

If Lebanon refugees return to their homes in Galilee and elsewhere (Section (3) of Table 10), the impact is hardly felt by the Israelis (Jews and Palestinians alike). The density of the whole new population increases by only 1 % in Area A, 6% in B, and by 17% in Area C to which most of the refugees would return. The much-touted concern for Jewish majority is not warranted. They remain above 50% where they are least in number. The Jews who may barely feel the effect of the return are the rural Jews (Kibbutz and Moshav) who count only 76,000. Of course, the urban Jews (71 % of Jews) will continue to live and flourish in towns. Ninety percent of them live in just 9 towns, 3 of which are Palestinian (Acre, Tiberias, Shafa Amr).

While Lebanon refugees could return to a largely Arab territory, with minimum effect on the Jews, the Gaza refugees would return to almost totally empty land. Today, the rural Jews who exploit their land are spread at a density of 6 persons/sq. km., or close to one-thousandth of the density in Gaza. There are barely 79,000 rural Jews in the southern half of Israel. In addition, there are 553,000 urban Jews, two-thirds of whom live in 3 Palestinian towns (Beer Sheba, Ashdod and Majdal-Ashqelon) and another 24% live in 3 new towns. These urban Jews are engaged in industry, education and services. The return of the refugees would be of benefit to those Jews and vice versa, and as such, it is a positive element. As shown in Section (4) of Table 10, after the return of Gaza refugees, the density of the total population in

Israel would increase by only 6% in Area A, 5% in Band 32% in Area C to which the refugees return. Once again as in the case of Lebanon refugees, the Jews will still be over 50% in Area C where they are least in number.

In spite of the much-touted proclamation of turning the desert green, the present population is much less than the capacity of the area (Efrat 1988, p.182) and the present cultivated area, largely irrigated, is a fraction of the area cultivated before 1948 by the Palestinians. The Israelis concentrate in half a dozen towns (half in Beer Sheba alone) leaving 32,000 Jews control 14,320,000 donums (Efrat 1988, p.182).

It is significant to observe that the returning Gaza refugees are less in number than the Russian immigrants freely admitted to Israel in this decade. While it is clear that the admission of the Russians is a cause of tension in Israel itself, an obstacle to peace in the region, and a probable cause of a new war (Abu-Sitta 1998), the return of the Gaza refugees will bring peace and stability to the Middle East. This point is not lost on friends and foes alike.

If the Right of Return is implemented and the Palestinians return to their homes, hardly any infringement on the Jews' *Lebensraum* (living space) would occur. The Palestinians, mostly farmers, would return to their fields which they had tilled for centuries. Their efforts would compensate for the drop in Israel's agricultural production from 11 % of GNP (1950) to only 3.5% (1993). This will continue to drop as the rural areas continue to suffer a desertion of Israelis, especially in the south, in favour of towns. Already the farmers in Gaza, in spite of being deprived of economic support and of water supply, produced superior agricultural products to that of Israel. Israelis are frequently accused of destroying their export products at the border point,

by obstruction or ill-will.

When peace prevails, the historical link between Egypt, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, severed by the Israeli invasion of Negev, shall then be restored. With the projected economic cooperation, the southern tip of Negev, the meeting point of 4 countries at the Gulf of Aqaba, may develop into an important commercial and recreational area.

The return of the refugees from Lebanon to their homes in Galilee would restore their link with their kith and kin in the West Bank. Separated families would unite again. The historical continuity between Jordan and Lebanon through the West Bank and Galilee, would be restored. No doubt peace would then be restored to Lebanon's south and Israel's north. Such an important dividend cannot easily be dismissed.

While it is the right of the Palestinians to recover their land and homes from the Jews, their repatriation in this manner would minimize the existing population's dislocation. The transition would be practical and reasonable. The severed link between the Arab east and west, undoubtedly one of the important reasons for continued wars, would be restored.

The Palestinians dispossession cannot be realistically tolerated or continue to be ignored with any degree of realism. As [photographical evidence] shows, Gaza Strip is packed with refugees (2500 persons/km², or 4,200 persons/km², if net area is used) while the refugees see, across the barbed wire, their land to the east, in which only 6 persons/km² live. This striking contrast in demography is the root cause of the conflict.

(Palestinian Right to Return-P45-54 Dr. Salaman Abu Sitta, 1999, London.)

The current settlement provided the Zionist project with a cover for its escalating aggression, and all that is said about two states is no more than an illusion and deception that consolidates the Israeli racist and expansionist policies, with the accompanying violation and massive killing on one hand, and confiscation of land and “enrichment” of settlements on the other. The Oslo track and its results are a clear evidence of that; the remainder of the land that Palestinians still have is no more than 10% of historic Palestine, without a modern industrial or agricultural base that provides the Palestinians with work opportunity, being fragmented, and unconnected, in addition to its lack of institutions and sovereignty. This means that the bare existence of the essential constituents of the state is not available.

What is meant by a “Palestinian State” in Bush’s project, and the platforms of the Israeli Labor party and Kadima before him, is just a bubble, or more exactly hungry reservations annexed to the Israeli market (say empire) as Peres said, that are fenced with settlement fences and racist walls separating the northern parts of the West bank from its southern parts, and Jerusalem in the middle, detached from its natural West Bank context and forcefully attached to

Israel. The rest of the West Bank is separated more from Gaza. Rejecting the right of return is internationally promoted by Israel as its only way to maintain a Jewish majority in a Jewish state. This is the discourse of crisis management and not crisis resolution, as it allows the Zionist project to contain the tenets of Palestinian national liberation and harvest a third victory, after “the victory of establishing the state in 1948 and the Oslo

accords,” as Peres puts it, who calls for keeping the Jewish form of the Israel and not the Democratic, and the secular judge Barach explains that the Jewish state is for Jewish people , a state that considers settlements the main prospect , belongs to the Jewish culture , depends on the Jewish traditions, and the religion plays a very important role in it(55)

All that after Israel was established as emigrants settlement state (based on Palestinian destroyed community)(56) .

Following the illusion of a state led to Oslo with its catastrophic results. There are Palestinian elites and social sectors that seek their narrow interest in satisfying America, once in signing Oslo, another in signing Geneva, and also in glorifying the separation of Gaza from the West Bank, or the redeployment plans promoted by Olmert.

The growing facts on the ground, however, make the slogan of two states mere deception and anesthetization of the Palestinian consciousness. And while some Palestinian circles would run after this illusion, mainly for personal gain at the expense of the national cause, the conditions of the masses continue to decline systematically, after being excluded from participating in the political decision-making, even having their role marginalized in the political action, and replaced with the action of the elites. The current political leadership does not even hear the pain and suffering or the legitimate demands of the masses; huge sectors of the public became disenchanted with political work and lacking any real political leadership, paving the way for chaos and loss of social cohesion. These bleak conditions were further aggravated by grave infighting between the two heads of the Palestinian Authority that emanated from Oslo.

The two-states slogan is a false approach to a false solution. The alternative track that the Palestinians could embark on is that which combines the liberation line that observes confrontation with the enemy in rates proportionate to the people's potential people and the requirements of a long fighting without rash risks. We are not in the last quarter of the hour to throw all the people's powers into one battle; and, at the same time, we have to accomplish an analytic modern education; a resistant, unifying cultural project; socio-economic development; independent judiciary; fighting the different forms of corruption; building a civil society; and observing the common goals of the Palestinians inside the country and outside. That is all that may firmly establish the Palestinian structure to become resistant to penetration, fragmentation, despair and, crucially, to capitulation.

There is always a need for demanding temporary international protection, as a necessary prelude to ending the occupation in the context of a continuous struggle for implementing UN resolution 194, which provides for the return of the Palestinian refugees. Once again, return is the most important tenet of any comprehensive solution to the conflict.

Dialogues and Models

Che Guevara once said, “Humanity will be afflicted by many setbacks before becoming liberated; but I am convinced that liberation can not be achieved without radical change in the revolutionary strategy.”

If we take into consideration the facts of this intifada, we can only imagine how devastating future wars in the region can be, with all the technological advances in deadly weaponry. Since September 2000, more than four thousand Palestinians were killed by Israel’s occupation army; 500 activists were extra-judicially executed; nearly 50 thousand -- predominantly civilians -- were wounded; around 1200 Jewish Israelis were killed and 4 thousand wounded; and Palestinian economic losses soared to around 15 billion dollars, compared to nearly 4 billion dollar economic loss on the Israeli side. This excludes the devastation caused by Israel’s aggression against Lebanon in July 2006. Considering the steady development of more lethal and destructive weapons, the wars of 1948, 1956, 1967, 1982 and 2006 may look like child’s play compared to the coming wars whose potential triggers are continuously mounting.

Therefore, it becomes imperative to activate creative imagination, looking for a new vision that aims at solving the essential contradictions that produced these past wars, taking into consideration that “the potentials of reality are richer than

reality, especially noting that reality is changeable” (Hegel-Mind in History). The social movement that arises from the conflict of contradictions produces the new through accumulations and mutations. This vision has to have peace, justice and security as its main objectives. Peace can’t be realized without returning Palestinian rights; and security can not be achieved for one side alone. A vision that reconciles these requirements is what guarantees the “inclusion of the Jews in the Arab East,” as the Jewish Brit Shalom Movement wrote in the 1930s as an alternative to racism and colonial arrogance.

The Palestinian question became intertwined with the Jewish question, the Arab Palestinian security with that of the Israeli Jewish security; there is no solution for one question without the other or security for one side without the other.

Racist Zionism, which was supported by Britain, did not succeed; hence, it practiced an ugly campaign of ethnic cleansing against the Palestinians in 1948, and so was the case with Israeli colonialism, supported by the US, when it occupied the West Bank and Gaza and other Arab lands in 1967. But all that did not succeed in eliminating the Palestinians from the geographical and political map; a series of wars broke out accompanied with increasing hatred and hostility, in addition to indescribable Palestinian suffering. Moreover, in the words of Israeli sociologist Smooha, “Israel is not a western liberal democratic state, because Zionism and democracy are essentially contradictory;” rather, “occupation poisons the Jewish spirit,” as Professor Rabinowitz says. And, as the Israeli researcher Shirabi wrote, “Israeli children consider Palestinian children as dirty and ugly and wish for their death”.

Israel failed in establishing a national ethnic state that guarantees the domination of the majority and accomplishing equality among

all the citizens irrespective of their religion or race, as well as enabling the minority to participate in the government. In fact, Israel practices a repressive, racist policy that includes constant assault against Palestinian collective identity and a continuous gnawing off of the Palestinian lands.

Just as it failed in building a nation-state similar to Germany or the Ukraine, where the rule of law and the judiciary prevail and equality among the citizens is guaranteed by law. Rather than promoting equal citizenship regardless of ethnic and religious identity, Israel combines racism with colonialism and Jewish fundamentalism to define itself, without shame, as a “Jewish State.” It has also failed to delineate its own borders -- “its borders are where its army stands” (Ben Gurion). Even among Jews, Ashkenazis dominate and marginalize Mizrahis. All of that is structurally related to uprooting the Palestinians and preventing them from returning to their lands and villages, in addition to the systematic torturing of the Palestinians.

Hence, it is imperative to present new ideas, with new dynamic formulations that are able to go beyond the current context to establish a different context, even if the advocates of this formulation are a minority at the beginning. What is important is the historically possible and what makes the field open. In Guevara’s words, “it is imperative to continue holding and protecting the small handful of seeds which are in our hands, even if we feel afraid that the project is far away from our ability to accomplish.”

A-The Secular Democratic State

It is true that most of the Palestinian forces that held this slogan decades ago have abandoned it after their recognition of Israel and their inability to mobilize the masses in its support. Still, many polls, like the ones sponsored by American Greens and The Palestinian Information Center, indicate that that between 18-22%(57) of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and in the 1948 territory, and about 13-17% of the Israeli Jews support this slogan. Such percentages, undoubtedly, are far larger than the combined weight of all the political parties that at one point adhered to this solution. The explanation is that there is a popular current standing behind this slogan, without standing exactly behind the political forces owing to their crises and failures since Oslo.

In spite of the fuzziness that surrounded the slogan of the secular democratic state, it is very clear in its attempt to establish a unitary state in geographical Palestine, and not two states, without discrimination based on religion, sex or race; this means that it believes in equal citizenship, and, hence, in a civil state, separating church and state, while respecting the freedom of faith.

The critical aspect of this slogan is that it ignores the collective characteristics that have emerged. Common, particular factors do exist among Arab Palestinians as a group, just as they exist among Israeli Jews as a group; these include language, culture, values, and concentration in certain geographical areas. This is not to belittle any common grounds shared by the two distinct groups, whether geographical or in service provision, let alone the intersections between the upper classes as well as the lower classes across both communities – a fact that is only liable to deepen given the monstrous globalization era that is taking over

the world.

So it is inevitable to present a solution that recognizes collective characteristics and rights; the denial of these led to internecine wars at Sri Lanka between the Sinhala majority and Tamil minority (16%), while the recognition of the collective characteristics in Belgium and Switzerland led to opposite results. Such recognition is even more needed in our context, where each of the two warring groups has its memory crowded with a bitter vocabulary -- Nakba, expulsion, occupation, oppression, among the Arab Palestinians, and the phobia of the Holocaust and the Diaspora among the Israeli Jews.

The liberal individual demand is essential but it has to be linked to the collective identity demand.

Lest the relationship should be one of conflict between the two groups, dominance and monopolizing power have to be avoided; such domination, after all, would entail a racist attitude, while what is required is a democratic relationship so as not to repeat the Yugoslavian experience.

One should consider also that the slogan of the secular democratic state glosses over another important question: the relations of production and the distribution of wealth. Palestinians have cities, villages, homes from which they were uprooted, their return to them is inescapable; this was the case in South Africa after the collapse of the apartheid regime where whites appropriated the property of blacks for more than three centuries. Jews also have cities, villages, property and establishments -- this is one thing.

The other thing to be remembered is the wealth of the country which shouldn't be monopolized by an Arab – Jewish class minority; rather, public utilities and assets should be fairly

distributed. The required democratic state comprises political democracy and social democracy simultaneously. Algeria, after liberation from French imperialism, which lasted 130 years, underwent a bloody struggle that is still burning three decades after independence, with a national debt amounting to 30 billion dollars, whose interest is repaid by the people; as for the wealth, it is monopolized by a class minority, with unemployment reaching about 35%.

All of that was a main factor in kindling the Algerian civil war, to be added to the absence of democracy, and the fanatic ideology of extremist fundamentalist groups. It is to the benefit of capitalist classes to deny the interests of the popular classes; they are the main beneficiary of the monopoly of wealth (Shimon Peres).

Lastly, the slogan of the secular democratic state lacks clarity regarding the character of the state: is it an Arab Palestinian state or a democratic state in Palestine?

The Israelization of Palestine led to racism, massacres, ethnic cleansing, occupation and wars; likewise, denial of the existence of the Jewish community may lead to similar results and, therefore, will not put an end to wars. It is inevitable, in the final analysis, to admit the diverse constituents of Palestine, the Arab Palestinian constituent and the Jewish Israeli constituent.

B- The Binational State

This slogan represents the collective identity as well as the impossibility of territorial separation, without satisfying itself with a liberal democratic state on separate bases. Its underlying premise is the existence of two nationalities. Here, one faces a fuzzy scene lacking the references that may clarify it. Is the intention behind a binational state within the boundaries of 1948 or of 1948 and 1967 as Professor Nadim Ruhana wrote? Is it an ethnic state where the larger nationality dominates the smaller one or what? Also lacking is the open declaration that the aim is to be preceded by the return of Palestinian refugees to their property and homes, let alone the fact that this slogan doesn't mention the distribution of the economic resources of the state even in a general manner.

The roots of this slogan go back to the beginnings of the 20th century by some Jews like Sapir, Lorea, the rabbi Benjamin(58) and to the 1920s by the president of the Hebrew University, Magnes, and the leader of Brit Shalom movement, Reubin, who called for one state of two peoples, living together with full equality of rights and assimilation of Jews in the Arab East. Binationalism is also alluded to in the 1940s program of Hashomer Hatsair party, which called for a binational state based on political equality and recognition of the other nationality. Recently, this slogan was raised by figures like Azmi Bishara, Edward Said, Mahmoud Darwish, as well as Uzi Bar'am, one of the leaders of the Israeli Labor party, who wrote about a binational state with civil equality in addition to mechanisms that preserve cultural characteristics(59), without mentioning the disaster of 1948 and the right of return for the Palestinians.

Does the concept of a binational state mean that Judaism is a nationality?

Judaism is a creed, not a nationality; this creed is spread in several national/ethnic communities, similar to Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Confucianism. In no way can these creeds be considered nationalities; otherwise, the globe has to be divided into religious states, which would contradict current reality and history, particularly since all existent states today include several components of religions and creeds.

The announcement of “Today the Opponents of Zionism Speak,” which was signed by dozens of historians, academics, and intellectuals from Europe and America in 1997, says: We, women and men, of different citizenships, religions and opinions declare, on the occasion of the Zionist congress in Basel that no Jewish nation or people exist; there are French, Pole, Russian, Moroccan, Yemeni, Ethiopian, Hungarian and American citizens of Jewish religion or Hebraic creed origins, some are descended from Judaized Caucasians, Khazars, Moroccans, Tunisians or Arab Yemenis.” The American sociologist, Cecil Ruth, emphasizes: “An error lies in the modern legend which considers Jews a race, whether physically or historically. In fact, Israeli Jews descended from many nationalities and peoples, some of these are Palestinian and Arab...; those who were born in ‘Palestine/Israel’ are less than 45-50 %, remembering that Jewish emigration from the ex-Soviet union brought in about 1.2 million, including 56 % who are non- Jewish.”

Furthermore, it is erroneous to equate Palestinianism with nationalism. Palestinians form a part of the larger Arab nation. This is attested to in the history of the region for many centuries. To say that Palestinianism is nationalism implies separating

Palestinians from the Arab nation and excluding them from their role in the common struggle for the renaissance and unity of the Arab nation. Such isolation also implies that the direct conflict in the region is only an Israeli-Palestinian conflict; while, in fact, it is an Israeli-Palestinian as well as an Israeli-Arab conflict. Any serious solution necessitates the settlement of both conflicts together. All the wars in the region were Israeli- Arab wars -- in 1948, 1956, 1967, 1973, 1982 and 2006.

Similarly, the inflexibility inherent in calling for two nationalities leads to establishing a political system on this basis, which would stir up the conflict between them, as if they were two separate pillars. A genuinely peaceful solution must therefore advocate equal citizenship, common struggle in a unitary state, and, as a consequence, the formation of institutions and movements that preclude religious or racial discrimination. In fact, one observes some initiatives in this direction. The struggle runs, essentially, between a liberation project and an imperialistic and racist project; it is not a Palestinian struggle against the Jews.

The globalization era of today divides the world mainly on a class- political basis; otherwise what do the Oslo accords mean? Isn't that an agreement between class elites? Moreover, clinging inexorably to the two nationalities scenario gives credence to the statement: we desire regional separation in independent states, which puts us back in the first square.

What is certain is the existence of two constituents in the whole of Palestine: the Arab Palestinian and the Jewish Israeli. Here, the power of imagination should be released and a creative solution devised.

C- The Islamic State

Irrespective of the multiplicity of viewpoints and scarcity of sources, the Islamic viewpoint rests upon determinants similar to the following ones:

- 1- Palestine belongs to Islam; abandoning as little as a span of the hand of it means abandoning the path of God and deviating from His law. The whole Islamic nation is obliged to liberate Palestine to establish an Islamic state in it. It is said, sometimes, that the struggle will go on till the Day of Judgment. On the other side, the viewpoints of the Old Testament are: to your descendants I gave this land... You are the chosen people of God...
- 2- The Jew has the right of creed and economic activity and filling positions as was the case in the time of the Islamic caliphate; i.e., there will be a religious state led by Moslem clerics following Islamic texts and Islamic judiciary law; there are also dhimmis, or followers of other religions
- 3- The Islamic state will have the basis of *shura* in its government; some see in public elections, which were not existent in the time of Moslem caliphs, a way for the existence of the caliph or – imam.
- 4- The Iranian ex-president, Khatimi, called for the return of the Palestinian refugees, and making a plebiscite about the future of Palestine in which all Palestinians participate; he considered the Zionist denial of the basic rights of the Palestinian people the cause of instability in the Middle East(60). The Islamic scholar, Nabeel ‘alqam, called for the establishment of an Arab Islamic state in Syria whose inhabitants decide on the type of political system, after the return of the Palestinian refugees. In

his proposal Jews will have the right to live in that state(61).

Hence, the cornerstone of the Islamic solution is that Palestine should be an Islamic country, governed by Islamic religion with its injunctions, laws and leadership; the citizens will be divided on the basis of religious membership: Moslems, Christians and Jews. Hence, it is out of question that the parliament would formulate the governing rules, which are already defined as Islamic ones; the equality of citizenship is inconceivable also, since the division is religious and racial. This applies to the right of choice since Islamic law governs all. This raises certain questions related to political multiplicity, alternation of authority, independence of the judiciary, and the legislative nature of the Parliament

One can claim that history, in the last centuries, has gone beyond the era of religious empires, and replaced them with national states which include different religions, belief, and views. The political system and governing laws are of modern parliamentary nature which are formed according to the result of free competition between political parties, of political sectors, and individualistic membership without discrimination in religion, race, or faith. Such parliaments adopt constitutions and formulate laws without commitment to religious texts; they adhere to the separation of church from state. (Note what the resulting state of affairs in Iraq was owing to sectarian and confessional division, and imagine what would happen to Lebanon if it fails to overcome its sectarian and confessional divisions.)

The struggle in Palestine, in both its essence and its main form, is a struggle for liberation between a people whose land is occupied and who was uprooted from it and a racist, imperialistic colonial project; it is not between Moslems, Christians and Jews. Despite the effects of the religious element, such a fierce and feverish

struggle was not existent before the creation of Israel and its destruction of the Palestinian space. Palestinians are not hostile towards Judaism as a religion or Jews as humans; in fact, there are many Jews who, throughout the whole century, turned away from the Zionist project, even some Jewish groups that support the Palestinian struggle; and there always existed Palestinian groups that collaborated with the Zionist project. Removing the *causes* of conflict will lead to removal of the conflict itself; people from both groups will remain on the same geography. Today, many Moslem and Christian communities live in peace with Jewish communities on the basis of equal citizenship before the law in many countries.

Kindling religious feelings and explaining the conflict in exclusively religious terms imply an eternal verdict, since it is impossible to abolish religion or annihilate religious differences, let alone the nihilism of such annihilation. One should remember that the majority of the Jewish Israeli public and also the majority of the Arab Palestinian public do not vote for religious parties today, despite the presence and influence of religious parties and authorities.

Throughout thousands of years, Palestine comprised multiple cultures, religions and social components, taking into consideration the growth of modern culture in the last decades before the disaster of 1948.

Peace cannot be realized in future Palestine without democracy as a solid base, without the recognition of diversity and the consequent rights. Peace cannot prevail with hegemony or racial exclusiveness; democracy is a multifarious system that combines freedoms of the individual and human rights, particularly freedom of choice and citizenship without racial or religious discrimination,

passing by the right to form trade unions and political parties, an independent civil judiciary, and alternation of authority to social democracy which differs greatly from, and far surpasses the principle of Islamic *shura* – consultation-though it includes it as well as other positive aspects of the cultural heritage.

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The unitary, shared state is a strategic aim as well as a long-range ambition; it is also an idea that directs action, consistent with historical and geographical facts and the possibilities of the future. Palestine always was of multiple races and cultures; all attempts to divide it were doomed to failure, just as the displacement of most of its native people and attempts to subdue the rest in accordance with Zionist ambitions collided with incessant Palestinian resistance and hostility of the Arab and regional domains. The liberation of Palestine in history took place once through the intervention of the Arabian Peninsula -- during the reign of Omar Ibn Al'Kattaab; once by the Egyptian-Syrian coalition led by Saladin; and once again by the Egyptians and the Iranian Khwarizmites, who together liberated Jerusalem in the 13th century.

On that basis, and given the impossibility of regional division, cancellation of the right of return, or the formation of two independent states, I present the following approach, hoping that it will open new horizons and pave the way for simultaneous international and local rallying. There is no need to immediately tackle the transitional steps and plans; what matters most now is working hard to restore the concept of just peace and to realize a true humanistic fraternity (George- Habash).

What we present is a formula that combines unity and contradiction,

simultaneously, as is the case with any other dialectical essence, which accumulates its dynamics gradually and persistently as a historical process. Such a process is called for by the failure of other formulae and by the necessity of its examining and drawing lessons from experience, as well as its release of imagination and innovation. Our first bet is not only on the facts on the ground but also on the possibilities of the wider history.

Despite the raging contentious state of affairs to date, and the resultant uprooting, agonies and sea of blood, there do exist Palestinian-Arab and Israeli-Jewish political and cultural voices that advocate a democratic state in which Palestinians and Jews live together. There also exists a remarkable popular support for this idea on both sides, Arab-Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli, as is revealed by a poll administered by the Jerusalem Media and Communication Center, with no less than 15% on the Arab side, and 10% on the Jewish side supporting a democratic, unitary state*. The One State will remain mere ink on paper if not realized by the human will. The will of the masses is its lifeline and the sole factor capable of implementing, developing, correcting and rectifying it through live experience and practice, despite the fact that it is still no more than a dream in the current bleak reality. In fact, the greatest missions began as dreams. If the success of the racist Zionist project was a benefit to the imperialistic plans and a catastrophe to the Palestinians in which many factors were involved, what is required is a political ethical project which brings about peace and justice to the popular whole; the only way to confront racial imperialistic triumph is ethical democratic justice.

The present situation is the best prescription for the reproduction of conflict and turning in a vicious cycle; neither can the

Palestinians -- with their meager potential and horrific conditions -- defeat Israel, nor can the latter -- despite its immense power and strategic advantage -- impose capitulation on the Palestinians. To solve the dilemma, a new option and a new form of struggle are called for that represent the interests of the popular classes against upper classes in both communities; an option that controls the tactics -- "tactics don't violate strategy, and politics doesn't violate ideology" (George Habash).

The new dynamic formulation, the formulation of the single state, with separate and interrelated communities, is based on the following bases:

- (1) The map: one state in Mandate geographical Palestine, from the sea to the river, and from Eilat to Ras an-Naqura;
- (2) The Social Constituent: two civil communities, Arab-Palestinian and Jewish-Israeli, linked by belonging to the state and its political and legal order; what applies to the community applies to individuals as well.

The two communities are interrelated in work, economy, education, mixed cities, political parties, clubs -- as was the case in the beginning and is at present. But they are separate in all these domains. With the enablement of civil society, all formations and institutions between the authority and the family, whether they belong to one of the two communities or to both, have the right to struggle for achieving benefits by legal means.

- (3) The Structure: this is based on combining the collective and individual levels in such a manner as to guarantee expression of civil and cultural collective identity, and also equal citizenship of free individuals, with freedom of choice, without racial, sexual or religious discrimination. The state ensures equal

rights to all citizens in all domains, considering that the human being is the supreme and most important value in life.

Accordingly, Palestine may be divided administratively into cantons and municipalities, each having the right of administering civil affairs -- similar to local governments, mixed and unmixed, preserving special identity and administration, and also joint administration and factors, in accordance with the spread and existence of each community; i.e., the country is one central administrative unit like the units of local affairs, in an integral relationship between the central and the local.

- (4) The Political System: this is based on democracy and pluralism that ensure the unity of the country; peaceful alternation of authority; separation of authorities; independence of the judiciary; a parliament elected by all; a government for all; laws that apply to all; and policies that ensure the development of civil society and its participation in the determination of state affairs and the equality between men and women and equal pay for equal work, etc.

The government undertakes the administration of external, defense and public affairs, in accordance with the laws of the country. A supervising body of the state and a fair legal arbitration body have to be formed to settle disputes of racial/ethnic origin and to give solutions to disputable issues.

- (5) Culture: this is based on pluralism and equality between citizens, respect of each other's language, culture, religion, special values, special cultural establishments, and also the development of a comprehensive democratic culture for all, cultural establishments for all; i.e., a civil, non-violent culture, which is not polarized racially or religiously. Gradually,

common values will develop—along side the cultural specificity -- that surpass and liberate themselves from the tenet of my existence is contrary to the existence of the other.

- (6) Language: The state acknowledges two official languages, Arabic and Hebrew, to be reflected in education, information and official departments. Education should be enabled in one language, two languages or more; there must be education institutions for each community and commonly for the two communities, hence building on the existent and enhancing it, and allowing the existence of schools that teach religion and schools that teach philosophy and ethics, as is the case in many countries today. Teaching history should be done objectively and neutrally without encouraging hatred; the Arab and Jewish histories should be given through the general history of Palestine.
- (7) Economic ownership: ownership should be based on mixing private ownership, cooperative ownership, state ownership (of which all the population benefit without discrimination), state capitalism (private capital, state capital) in all fields: industry, agriculture, services, construction, etc, allowing for central planning and market freedoms, and gradual transition according to the will of the masses. The state should observe social justice and social democracy together with human rights and liberal-democratic freedoms; this will be conditional upon the transference of state property, facilities and establishments to the new regime which allots sufficient budgets to the development areas, especially of the poorest communities, in addition to the guarantee of a minimum income to each family, especially of the lowest classes: a house of equal size to all, together with a piece of land of equal area and an equal bank account, which will provide a basis for each family to add to

through its labor, in addition to a social policy that ensures free education, free medical services, insurance for old age, unemployment benefits, etc.

Guarantee of opportunities for initiatives should be observed together with differentiation due to work and endeavor and not to exploitation of the other. This is to be implemented in one territorial market which observes the law, equal rights, freedom of investment, work, movement, ownership, and tax system. Such a new reality would abolish the residuals of Zionist hegemony and imperialist plunder, which were the rule in the previous phase.

It is evident that the procedures must take place after the absorption of returning Palestinian refugees.

It is worth mentioning that the dominant production type has a drastic effect on the dominant culture and the identity of the two communities. The capitalist production type, productive or comprador alike, is associated with the culture of exploitation which feeds both inter and intra contradictions, whilst a production type that is directed to serve popular classes, will have different results.

- (8) The State and the Army: Reconstruction of the state machinery and the army in accordance with the new situation. The machinery of the state should cease to be a Zionist authoritative monopoly for repressing the Palestinians and hostility towards the Arab. The state itself does not need a huge army which uses up a major chunk of the budget; the expected reductions are to be used for the welfare of the citizens. The army is to be educated on new values and principles that represent the unity of the land; it should learn civics that respect the human being instead of repressing him; that obeys the law instead

of revolting against it. As for the law of military service, it should be applied to everybody, male and female without discrimination in the army or in a civil service counterpart; anybody refusing it should be subject to accountability by law as is the case in many countries. As for the police, there should be federal police for the state, and a special police force for each canton.

- (9) Religion: Guarantee of freedom of worship, in the mosques, churches, and synagogues; freedom of belief is guaranteed as well as freedom of choice and indiscrimination on the basis of belief. The only criterion by which one is judged is his/her practical ethical conduct, i.e. his/her role in life and his/her commitment to public legal standards; the question of belief is a private matter of conscience.
- (10) Marital Law: In matters of marriage and divorce, the state ensures the availability of both forms, religious and civil, with the required religious and civil courts alike, and providing both common and special judiciary.

Such a state evidently needs to establish the widest constructive relationships possible with the surrounding Arab environment and sever all its relations with the Zionist movement and its racist, colonial project. This entails the abolition of the racist law of return for the Jews, without banishing any Jew from the country, or banishing anybody on the basis of his/her beliefs. As for citizenship of the state, it will be endowed in accordance with international law; those who fail to adapt to the arrangements of the new solution and law of the country have the right to depart.

Such a vision, evidently, requires massive social support, a popular revolutionary one that struggles for its sake and surpasses the past formulations whose results are evident.

The new Palestine, which combines unity and particularity, must be based on equal political freedoms and the principle of equal social and economic opportunities. It is the dream that replaces the nightmare that tortures all at present.

The preceding approach is a formulation that combines unity and contradiction, accumulating its dynamics gradually, constantly, correcting itself in dialectical interaction with the motion of life.

Conclusion, Findings and results:

1. Ultimately, there will always be those dreamers with greater goals which dig out the hopes of the future, and there are those realists that call for kneeling in spite of the difficult conditions of that task. The text belongs to the first group who dreamed of peace, justice and fraternity between real people and the requirements. In the words of Hegel “great things cannot be accomplished without great hardships”(62) and according to Marx “Ideals need to keep the level of enthusiasm in the great historical tragedy(63).

In addition, vision research bet on the future history empowered whatever reason pessimism in the analysis of the moment. So an example like this (open the door to the end of hatred and bloodshed and injustice prevail where freedom and development away from the domination responds to the Palestinian people and form a basis for coexistence and integration of Jews in the region which had not made of the imperialist solution to the Jewish issue) (64)

(Throughout history there were three laws and the results for the foreign invasions. One is Genocide of indigenous people and that's impossible in the case of Palestine and in modern times in general. Another is the defeat of colonialism, as happened in Algeria and Vietnam. The third is the invasion or integration and uniformity with the original as happened in South Africa (65)

2. The Palestinian identity and national rights of Palestinian is a real issue formed over thousands of years that is not imaginary. although most of dispersion and the uprooting of people from their homeland, while (Jews of Palestine do not belong to

a civilized one in history and one in one culture came the Jewish settlements in mandatory Palestine, in the context of the transfer of human surplus and converted to the post colonial) (66).

The removal of racist colonial Jewish community in Palestine was first submitted to end the conflict. The removal of racist colonialism first requires recognizing the Palestinian «Nkbah» of 48 and the confiscation of Palestinian property and their right of return to their homeland which is the root of the conflict. In addition, the removal of the racist wall built by the Israeli occupation in the West Bank, which is like pouring gasoline on the flames of the conflict and stands as much on the looting of Palestinian lands and waters bright pieces of racism and apartheid. The mechanisms and the next stages could be the way to end the conflict :

- A) Palestinian steadfastness clinging to national rights and democratic solution radical and building a steadfast community both at the education level and cultural or socio-economic developmental or institutional authority and the law In order to ensure the protection of official international and popular of the Palestinian people.
- B) Preserving the Intifada (uprising) Palestinian struggle against occupation and the oppressive and looting policies and weave relations with the wider currents of Progressive Jews based on rejecting the occupation and recognition of the national Palestinian rights ending with a one state of democracy.
- C) Looted-creating climates for the imposition of international and Arab boycott of Israel along the lines of what the apartheid regime South Africa was subjected to and to abandon its policies of occupation and racism.....

- D) Create a balance of powers guaranteed to end the occupation and insure the return of refugees to their homes, including rectifications in the historic mistake and create a favorable cultural-political to pave the way for a new qualitative leap establishing a democratic one state of democracy as indicated above. The time factor leads to this conclusion in the end, even if obtained reversals and backsliding wars They must terminate the factors that lead to wars, and the answer is the goal above.
- 3) In light of the division of the Palestinian Authority and Gaza fighting bloody stories in the press saying (regional solution) and retreated saying (the Palestinian state) Sole concept of a Palestinian proposal Bush or haze-free content with giving his administration the green light to the occupation government atrocities against Palestinians.

People see the reality and facts which dispel any possibility of constituents independent state capable of life.

And regardless of whether deepened dynamic division Palestinian arisen or will to unite the Palestinian position, racist policies of the occupation continues, but what is going foreshadows a new round of conflict. The completion of the expansionist wall and settlement incursions and killings stresses that the factors of the conflict persist.

However, the deterioration of the living conditions of Palestinians in the occupied territories and compromising their individual and collective security, and Mad prices and corruption and increasing adoption of the Palestinian Authority on foreign aid, which constituted 80% of the budget in 2006 (67) which is all paid towards the explosion.

Calls to resolve regional linking between Gaza and Egypt,

sharing the West Bank between Israel and Jordan returns the conflict back to square one to what looks like a calamity in 1948.... It is a waste of time and the rage of the conflict even if there are strong socio-political Palestinian consistent with regional solution because other forces will resist and created new forces to mobilize on demand of justice for the Palestinians, but in a way more virulent. The Palestine Liberation Organization was more firm of political parties that preceded it. The Hamas movement was more stringent than PLO and Al Qaeda cells began growing in Palestinian society..... All this calls for a new vision.

Ahmad Qatamish

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