

Rediscovering the Later Version of Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs: Self-Transcendence and Opportunities for Theory, Research, and Unification

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The conventional description of Abraham Maslow's (1943, 1954) hierarchy of needs is inaccurate as a description of Maslow's later thought. Maslow (1969a) amended his model, placing self-transcendence as a motivational step beyond self-actualization. Objections to this reinterpretation are considered. Possible reasons for the persistence of the conventional account are described. Recognizing self-transcendence as part of Maslow's hierarchy has important consequences for theory and research: (a) a more comprehensive understanding of worldviews regarding the meaning of life; (b) broader understanding of the motivational roots of altruism, social progress, and wisdom; (c) a deeper understanding of religious violence; (d) integration of the psychology of religion and spirituality into the mainstream of psychology; and (e) a more multiculturally integrated approach to psychological theory.

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Abraham H. Maslow (1908–1970) was arguably one of the most important psychologists of modern times. In a recent survey, Maslow was found to be the 14th-most-frequently cited psychologist in introductory psychology textbooks; on the basis of various indicators, some researchers proclaimed Maslow as the 10th most eminent psychologist of the 20th century (Hagbloom et al., 2002).

The hierarchy of human needs outlined by Maslow (1943, 1954) is one of his most enduring contributions to psychology. However, the standard textbook version of this hierarchy is inaccurate as a reflection of Maslow's later descriptions of his motivational theory. In this article, I describe Maslow's later state-

ment of his theory and suggest some potential reasons why an inaccurate version of the theory has been maintained for more than 3 decades in psychology texts; I then point out important implications that Maslow's later theory statement has for theory and research in contemporary personality and social psychology.

I have three objectives here. First, I wish to correct the way that Maslow's theory is depicted in current textbooks; accurate description of a theory is a prerequisite to its scientific testing. Second, I wish to promote theory and research efforts regarding motivational self-transcendence (described below); I believe that this construct has important behavioral implications. Third, I wish to focus attention on motivational self-transcendence, a construct that cuts across psychological specialty areas, as a means to further unification within disciplinary psychology.

It is also important to indicate what my objectives are not. I am not primarily interested here with any of the following: empirical evidence regarding Maslow's theory; critical appraisal of Maslow's theory; comparisons between Maslow's theory and other motivational theories; attempts to revise Maslow's scheme in light of other theoretical, rational, or empirical

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considerations. Although these issues are worthy of attention, they are beyond the scope of this article. Nor would I wish to give the impression that what Maslow had to say about motivational self-transcendence is anything but a beginning, something for others to develop.

The Popular Misconception of Maslow’s Motivational Hierarchy

Maslow’s motivational scheme, as originally construed, is depicted in the bottom five entries in Table 1 (i.e., physiological or survival needs through self-actualization; Maslow, 1943, 1954). Maslow posited that human needs are arranged in a hierarchy:

It is quite true that man lives by bread alone—when there is no bread. But what happens to man’s desires when there *is* plenty of bread and when his belly is chronically filled?

At once other (and “higher”) needs emerge and these, rather than physiological hungers, dominate the organism. And when these in turn are satisfied, again new (and still “higher”) needs emerge and so on. This is what we mean by saying that the basic human needs are organized into a hierarchy of relative prepotency. (Maslow, 1943, p. 375)

In addition to physiological needs, Maslow posited needs for safety, belongingness and love, esteem, and self-actualization, in ascend-

ing order on the hierarchy. He described self-actualization this way:

It refers to the [person’s] desire for self-fulfillment, namely, to the tendency for him to become actualized in what he is potentially.

The specific form that these needs will take will of course vary greatly from person to person. In one individual it may take the form of the desire to be an ideal mother, in another it may be expressed athletically, and in still another it may be expressed in painting pictures or in inventions. (Maslow, 1943, pp. 382–383)

This formulation still stands as a strong statement regarding the structure of human motivation. By the time of Maslow’s death, many studies had been published about the needs hierarchy (Roberts, 1972). The hierarchy attracted scholarly attention following Maslow’s death (e.g., Lester, Hvezda, Sullivan, & Plourde, 1983) and continues to attract research attention today. For example, Chulef, Read, and Walsh (2001) found broad support for Maslow’s theory in their research into the hierarchical structure underlying human goals. Many undergraduate texts in psychology perpetuate this version of the model, with self-actualization at the top of the hierarchy (e.g., Atkinson, Atkinson, Smith, Bem, & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1996; Hall, Lindzey, & Campbell, 1998; Larsen & Buss, 2002; Mischel, 1999; Myers, 2003; Pervin & John, 2001). However, this description was not

Table 1
A Rectified Version of Maslow’s Hierarchy of Needs

Motivational level	Description of person at this level
Self-transcendence	Seeks to further a cause beyond the self ^a and to experience a communion beyond the boundaries of the self through peak experience. ^b
Self-actualization	Seeks fulfillment of personal potential.
Esteem needs	Seeks esteem through recognition or achievement.
Belongingness and love needs	Seeks affiliation with a group.
Safety needs	Seeks security through order and law.
Physiological (survival) needs	Seeks to obtain the basic necessities of life.

Note. The earliest and most widespread version of Maslow’s hierarchy (based on Maslow, 1943, 1954) includes only the bottom five motivational levels (thus excluding self-transcendence). A more accurate version of the hierarchy, taking into account Maslow’s later work (especially Maslow, 1969a) and his private journal entries (Maslow, 1979, 1982), includes all six motivational levels.

^a This may involve service to others, devotion to an ideal (e.g., truth, art) or a cause (e.g., social justice, environmentalism, the pursuit of science, a religious faith), and/or a desire to be united with what is perceived as transcendent or divine.

^b This may involve mystical experiences and certain experiences with nature, aesthetic experiences, sexual experiences, and/or other transpersonal experiences, in which the person experiences a sense of identity that transcends or extends beyond the personal self.

Maslow's final statement concerning the motivational hierarchy.

Maslow's Description of a Motivational Step Beyond Self-Actualization

Maslow developed compelling doubts about self-actualization's suitability as a motivational capstone; these doubts were first related to the phenomena of peak experiences and their attendant cognitive activity. Maslow described peak experiences, which include such phenomena as mystical experiences, aesthetic experiences, emotional experiences involving nature, and so forth; he considered peak experiences in several papers in the late 1950s and early 1960s, some of which appeared in his hugely popular collection *Toward a Psychology of Being* (Maslow, 1959/1999a, 1961/1999b; 1959/1999c; see also Maslow, 1962a, 1962b, 1963, 1964). Maslow addressed the motivational significance of peak experiences in a series of lectures in the early 1960s, later published as *Religions, Values, and Peak Experiences* (Maslow, 1964/1970). He called the special cognitive activity that attends such phenomena "Being-cognition," or "B-cognition" for short.

Originally, Maslow thought that Being-cognition was the province of self-actualization, although in a very paradoxical way: Peak experiences often led the self-actualizing individual to transcend the personal concerns of the very self that was being actualized. As Maslow put it,

As he [that is, the person in the peak experiences] gets to be more purely and singly himself he is more able to fuse with the world, with what was formerly not-self, for example, the lovers come closer to forming a unit rather than two people, the I-Thou monism becomes more possible, the creator becomes one with his work being created, the mother feels one with her child.

That is, the greatest attainment of identity, autonomy, or selfhood is itself simultaneously a transcending of itself, a going beyond and above selfhood. The person can then become relatively egoless. (Maslow, 1961/1999b, p. 117, footnotes omitted)

[In conclusion] I wish to underscore one main paradox I have dealt with above . . . which we must face even if we don't understand it. The goal of identity (self-actualization . . .) seems to be simultaneously an end-goal in itself, and also a transitional goal, a rite of passage, a step along the path to the transcendence of identity. This is like saying its function is to erase itself. Put the other way around, if our goal is the Eastern one of ego-transcendence and obliteration, of leaving behind self-consciousness and self-observation, . . . then it looks as if the best path to this goal for

most people is via achieving identity, a strong real self, and via basic-need-gratification. (Maslow, 1961/1999b, p. 125)

Several points in the preceding quotation are noteworthy. First, Maslow was puzzled by the situation that he described and was not shy about admitting that his thought was still under development concerning the relationship between self-actualization and self-transcendence. Second, Maslow recognized a paradox—at least an apparent contradiction—in combining self-actualization and self-transcendence. Third, Maslow recognized a sequence: Self-actualization preceded self-transcendence. One can see in these points the prefiguration of his later thought.

After his 1961 paper, Maslow began to think that Being-cognition characterized a different motivational level than self-actualization. At least by October 1966, as shown by his unpublished critique of self-actualization theory (Maslow, 1996), Maslow thought that "self-actualization is not enough" (p. 31) for a full picture of the optimally functioning human being. Maslow came to a clearer sense of what was missing during the following year. As he recorded in his private journal in an entry dated May 28, 1967,

All sorts of insights. One big one about SA [self-actualization] stuff, brought on, I think, mostly by my deep uneasiness over [popular press] articles [on the topic]. . . . I realized I'd rather leave it behind me. Just *too* sloppy & too easily criticizable. Going thru my notes brought this unease to consciousness. It's been with me for years. Meant to write & publish a self-actualization critique, but somehow never did. Now I think I know why. I think I had [used] a hidden, unconscious [hence mistaken] criterion of selection [for examples of self-actualization] *beyond* health. (Maslow, 1979, Vol. 2, p. 794; Maslow, 1982, p. 204)

Maslow here surmised that, in describing self-actualization, he had contaminated that construct with notions that belonged to another, as-yet-unnamed motivational level. The contaminant was Being-cognition, which properly belonged somewhere on a level above self-actualization on the hierarchy (i.e., "*beyond* health"). In this journal entry, Maslow related an insight: He had mistakenly put forth, as examples of self-actualization, people who seemed to exhibit Being-cognition, even though these people had gone beyond self-actualization and operated from a higher state of motivation:

Why did I get so excited over Arthur E. Morgan¹ just from reading his book—so sure he was a self-actualizing person? It's because he was using the B-language! What I've done was pick B-people [i.e., mistakenly, as examples of self-actualization]! In addition to all the other overt and conscious criteria [for defining self-actualizers]. People in the B-realm using B-language, the awakened, the illuminated, the "high-plateau" people who normally B-cognize and who have the B-values very firmly and actively in hand—even tho not consciously. . . . There are plenty of "healthy" people & even self-actualizing people . . . who are far from B-realm and from unitive perception.

I *did* read into my selectees [for healthy self-actualization] a criterion beyond "health." (Maslow, 1979, Vol. 2, pp. 794–795; Maslow, 1982, p. 204).

In this journal entry, Maslow also reflected on his previous depiction of some American presidents as self-actualizers: "Eisenhower. He *does* fit. So does Truman. . . . And yet they are clearly *not* B-people" (Maslow, 1979, Vol. 2, p. 794; Maslow, 1982, p. 204). Two weeks later, Maslow related this insight in some detail to the personologist Harry Murray. As Maslow noted in his journal entry of June 11, 1967,

I told him [i.e., Murray] of my new discovery of the difference between Eisenhower-Truman SA and the health-beyond-health of the B-person. The B-person may be *more* symptom-loaded and have more value pathology² than the symptom-free "healthies." Maybe one is symptom-free *only* by virtue of not knowing or caring about the B-realm, never having experienced the B-realm in the highest peaks (now *that* must be changed also; must separate Eisenhower-Truman-type peaks from those with full cognition of the B-realm).

Having value-pathology symptoms is "higher" (& B-healthier?) than being symptom-free. One can get fixated at Eisenhower-Truman SA level of health and nonillness & then be perfectly content, happy, . . . without even being aware of the B-realm in an experiential way. . . . If one tries to transcend healthy SA of the Eisenhower-Truman level, *then* troubles (of the highest type) begin. Value pathologies can be a *very* high achievement. And one can respect profoundly those in whom one can see—*through* the symptoms of frustrated idealism—the beautiful B-realm that they are reaching for and may therefore get to.

The ones who are struggling & reaching upward really have a better prognosis than the ones who rest perfectly content at the SA level.

(I've really been *touting* value pathology & singing its praises!) (Maslow, 1979, Vol. 2, pp. 798–799; first paragraph also in Maslow, 1982, p. 206)

Here Maslow made an important distinction: one could be self-actualizing and "healthy," yet still not experience Being-cognition, which characterizes certain peak/mystical/transcendent experiences. Those who were satisfied with self-actualization without Being-cognition were, ac-

ording to Maslow, at a lower stage of motivational development than those who were motivated to seek experiences of Being-cognition.

Over the next 3 months, Maslow refined these insights into a public presentation. On September 14, 1967, in San Francisco, Maslow delivered a public lecture, titled "The Farther Reaches of Human Nature," in which he described the higher levels of his by-then familiar needs hierarchy; he then took a large step further:

The major emphasis in Humanistic psychology rests on the assumptions regarding "higher needs." . . . These higher human needs are . . . biological, and I speak here of love, the need of love, for friendship, for dignity, for self-respect, for individuality, for self-fulfillment, and so on.

If however, these needs are fulfilled, a different picture emerges. There are people who do feel loved and who are able to love, who do feel safe and secure and who do feel respected and who do have self-respect. If you study these people and ask what motivates them, you find yourself in another realm. This realm is what I have to call transhumanistic,³ meaning that which motivates, gratifies, and activates the fortunate, developed, [i.e., already] self-actualizing person. These people are motivated by something beyond the basic needs. The . . . point of departure, into this transhumanistic realm comes when they answer the following kind of questions: "What are the moments which give you . . . the greatest satisfaction? . . . What are the moments of reward which make your work and your life worthwhile?"

The answers to those questions were in terms of ultimate verities. . . . [For example,] truth, goodness, beauty . . . and so on. What this amounts to is that this third [i.e., humanistic] psychology is giving rise to a fourth,

¹ Arthur Ernest Morgan (1878–1975) was president of Antioch College and an early proponent of what might now be called humanistic education. It is unclear which of Morgan's many books is meant in Maslow's journal entry, but possibilities include Morgan (1946), Morgan (1957), or a republication version of Morgan (1968).

² Value pathology, for Maslow, was another term for what he called *metapathologies*. These are "the spiritual-existential ailments that result from the persistent deprivation of *metaneeds* [i.e., the higher needs in Maslow's hierarchy]—the lack of fulfillment of *metamotivations*. They include cynicism, apathy, boredom, loss of zest, despair, hopelessness, a sense of powerlessness, and nihilism" (Hoffman, 1996, p. 206).

³ What Maslow here called "transhumanistic" he later termed *transpersonal* (Koltko-Rivera, 1998). Both terms refer to a motivational state in which the person seeks something beyond personal benefit, for example, the furtherance of some greater cause, union with a power beyond the self, and/or service to others as an expression of identification beyond the personal ego. This motivational state expresses a need for self-transcendence.

“transhumanistic psychology” dealing with transcendent experiences and transcendent values.

The fully developed (and very fortunate) human being working under the best conditions tends to be motivated by values which transcend his *self*. They are not selfish anymore in the old sense of that term. Beauty is not within one’s skin nor is justice or order. One can hardly class these desires as selfish in the sense that my desire for food might be. My satisfaction with achieving or allowing justice is not within my own skin It is equally outside and inside: therefore, it has transcended the geographical limitations of the self. Thus one begins to talk about transhumanistic psychology. (Maslow, 1969a, pp. 3–4)

Maslow here noted that some individuals have gone beyond even self-actualization as a salient motivation. Such individuals arrive at the top of Maslow’s new hierarchy of motivation with a strong motive toward *self-transcendence*. That is, such individuals seek a benefit beyond the purely personal and seek communion with the transcendent, perhaps through mystical or transpersonal experiences; they come to identify with something greater than the purely individual self, often engaging in service to others. (As Maslow put it in his unpublished October 1966 paper, “the good of other people must be invoked” [Maslow, 1996, p. 31]. For a further discussion of the meaning of transcendence for Maslow, see Maslow [1969/1993c].)

This represented a major course change for Maslow. In a paper published shortly before Maslow gave his “Farther Reaches” lecture (although likely composed at least a year before that lecture), Maslow had written about how self-actualizing individuals were motivated by metamotivations, devoting themselves to callings or vocations “beyond themselves” (Maslow, 1967/1993a, p. 291)—that is, devoting themselves to aspects of self-transcendence. Yet, in the “Farther Reaches” lecture, Maslow clearly differentiated self-actualization from self-transcendence.

Maslow, who had helped to form humanistic psychology as a distinct approach within psychology, went on to help found the *Journal of Transpersonal Psychology*. He defined transpersonal psychology as a separate “force” within psychology, differing from the humanistic as self-transcendence differs from self-actualization. Maslow pondered making this distinction the topic for his address as president of the American Psychological Association (APA). As he wrote in his journal almost a year after his “Farther Reaches” presentation (entry of August 25, 1968),

Possible beginning for presidential address: “I will choose, as a strategy of presentation, to begin with a vast oversimplification & then later fill in the details, struggle with the complexities, and so forth.

[“]Let me call behavioristic psychology the first psychology, Freudian psychology the 2nd, and humanistic psychology the 3rd. And then what I think of as a real possibility, what I am fascinated with, is the psychology of transcendence & of ends, the transhuman or transpersonal (really *should* be “transcendent”[!]) psychology = the 4th psychology.[”] (Maslow, 1979, Vol. 2, p. 1059; Maslow, 1982, p. 267)

Maslow, recuperating from a heart attack, never delivered an APA presidential address (Hoffman, 1999), but he did prepare a different paper for the *American Psychologist*, a sort of “would-be” presidential address, in which he stated, “I am Freudian and I am behavioristic and I am humanistic, and as a matter of fact I am developing what might be called a fourth psychology of transcendence as well” (Maslow, 1969b, p. 724).

In summary, Maslow identified a construct, self-transcendence, that went beyond self-actualization in his motivational hierarchy; he then helped to establish a corresponding perspective, transpersonal psychology, that was intended to go beyond the perspective of humanistic psychology as originally construed, with a corresponding professional journal. Thus, the typical textbook version of Maslow’s hierarchy of needs is seriously inaccurate as a reflection of Maslow’s later formulation of theory. A rectified version of Maslow’s hierarchy includes the top line of Table 1, self-transcendence.

The implications of this change in Maslow’s thought must not be underestimated. The earlier model positions the highest form of motivational development at the level of the well-adjusted, differentiated, and fulfilled individual self or ego. The later model places the highest form of human development at a transpersonal level, where the self/ego and its needs are transcended. This represents a monumental shift in the conceptualization of human personality and its development. At the level of self-actualization, the individual works to actualize the individual’s own potential; there is thus, at least potentially, a certain self-aggrandizing aspect to this motivational stage, as there is with all the stages below it in Maslow’s hierarchy. At the level of self-transcendence, the individual’s own needs are put aside, to a great extent, in favor of service to others and to some higher

force or cause conceived as being outside the personal self. Certainly the image of the best-developed human being that emerges from Maslow's hierarchy is very different, depending on which of these two stages is placed at the top of the motivational hierarchy.

Objections to This Reinterpretation of Maslow

Some scholars studying Maslow's work have come to very different conclusions than I have. For example, Daniels (1982), following a close study of many of Maslow's published writings, has taken the position that Maslow never developed a final coherent theory of self-actualization and that Maslow described self-actualization in ways that intertwined it deeply with self-transcendence. I agree that Daniels has pointed out several unresolved theoretical issues involving Maslow's theory of self-actualization. However, concerning a supposed intertwining of self-actualization and self-transcendence in Maslow's thought, I must note that Daniels reviewed and cited neither Maslow's pivotal "Further Reaches" talk and publication (Maslow, 1969a) nor Maslow's posthumously published journals (Maslow, 1979, 1982); these sources, which I quote extensively earlier in this article, demonstrate conclusively that although Maslow initially conflated self-actualization and self-transcendence, during the last 3 years of his life he came to consider the two constructs as quite distinct.

It may also be claimed that Maslow's writing subsequent to the "Farther Reaches" lecture seemed still to conflate self-actualization and self-transcendence, suggesting that Maslow never actually settled on the addition of a sixth stage to his formal model. For example, in his famous "Theory Z" paper, Maslow stated,

I have recently found it more and more useful to differentiate between two kinds (or better, degrees) of self-actualizing people, those who were clearly healthy, but with little or no experience of transcendence, and those in whom transcendent experiencing was important and even central.

It is unfortunate that I can no longer be theoretically neat at this level. I find not only self-actualizing persons who transcend, but also *non*healthy people, non-self-actualizers who have important transcendent experiences. It seems to me that I have found some degree of transcendence in many people other than self-actualizing ones. (Maslow, 1969/1993b, p. 270)

There is a subtle but important distinction to be made here. In this passage, Maslow noted the mutual orthogonality of self-actualization and the experience of transcendence: Self-actualizing individuals may or may not have peak/transcendent experiences, and individuals who have peak/transcendent experiences may or may not be self-actualizing. However confusing this state of affairs may have been to Maslow, it has no bearing on the issue of a separate motivational stage for self-transcendence. The crucial issue is the *dominant* motivation at work in the individual's life. All individuals experience hunger; however, hunger is the defining experience only for individuals centered on the physiological or survival level of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Similarly, many individuals have transcendent experiences, regardless of their position on Maslow's hierarchy. This fact has nothing to do with the matter of a separate stage for self-transcendence. Maslow no more confined the *experience* of transcendence to the *stage* of self-transcendence needs than he confined the experience of hunger to the motivational stage where physiological needs predominate.

In sum, for Maslow the experience of transcendence is one thing; having one's motivational life be centered at the level of self-transcendence is entirely another. Only the latter is what I shall refer to hereafter as *motivational self-transcendence* or *self-transcendence as a motivational status*.

Why Has the Misconception Persisted?

Why has the popular misconception of Maslow's theory persisted for so long? Why does it pervade the literature so thoroughly? These questions arise because, even though isolated individuals have noted self-transcendence as a neglected step within Maslow's motivational hierarchy (e.g., Koltko-Rivera, 1998; Roberts, 1982), there is no mention of self-transcendence as a motivational status distinct from self-actualization in almost any textbook treatment of Maslow's theory. There are a few exceptions (e.g., Battista, 1996; Fadiman & Frager, 2002; Zimbardo & Gerrig, 1999); in addition, some texts describe self-actualization as embracing self-transcendence (e.g., Ryckman, 2000, p. 439). By far, however, self-transcendence is not described in textbooks as a separate motivational step in the hierarchy. Indeed, this inaccuracy has not even been cor-

rected in the third, posthumous edition of *Motivation and Personality* (Maslow, 1987). At least three factors may have played a part in propagating this misconception.

First, there was little opportunity for Maslow to publicize his amended theory before his death. On July 8, 1966, he learned that he had been elected to the presidency of APA (Maslow, 1979, Vol. 2, p. 739; Maslow, 1982, p. 192). As noted above, although he began studying peak experiences in the mid-1950s, his sense of the limitations of the self-actualization construct coalesced in May and June 1967, just a few months before beginning his term as APA president. In the fall of 1967, more or less simultaneously with the beginning of his presidential term, he began to occupy a 1-year Ford Foundation fellowship (Hoffman, 1999, p. 283), during which term (in September) he gave the "Farther Reaches" talk as his first public presentation on self-transcendence as a successor step to self-actualization. After a few months lecturing at Harvard, MIT, and Yale on his Theory Z management approach and after appearing at a December 1967 conference on transcendence, Maslow was hospitalized in intensive care following a serious coronary event. Much of 1968 was spent in convalescence or in working to involve psychologists in the cause of civil rights (Hoffman, 1999), although Maslow was too ill to deliver a presidential address at the annual APA meeting in the fall of that year. Maslow left his long-time teaching position at Brandeis in early 1969 for a fellowship in California. Although his time in California was productive, it was all too brief: He died of a coronary attack on June 8, 1970. Thus, there simply was very little opportunity for Maslow to incorporate the self-transcendence aspect of his needs hierarchy into the theory as it appeared in book form.

Second, the journal publication of Maslow's amended theory has been difficult for many psychologists to find. Maslow's clearest presentation of his amended theory (the "Farther Reaches" lecture; Maslow, 1969a) appeared in what was, at the time, an obscure venue, as the first article published in the then-fledgling *Journal of Transpersonal Psychology*. By some editorial quirk, the published lecture was not even collected into the posthumous collection of essays that bears the same name as the lecture itself (Maslow, 1971). Maslow's personal jour-

nals, where his later thought also was described, were not published until almost a decade after his death (Maslow, 1979, 1982).

Third, the organized psychology of Maslow's day simply may not have been ready to incorporate Maslow's concept of self-transcendence into the quasi-official canon of acceptable theory. This interpretation of events would be consistent with Maslow's experience. In the 1950s, Maslow's first major paper on Being-cognition during peak experiences was rejected by both the *Psychological Review* and the *American Psychologist* (Hoffman, 1999, p. 206; Maslow, 1979, Vol. 2, p. 774; Maslow, 1982, p. 200). To bring this material to light, he arranged to present it as his APA Division 8 (Personality and Social Psychology) presidential address at the 1956 APA national meeting, a situation in which his ideas could not be rejected for public presentation; he later published these remarks in a non-APA venue (Maslow, 1959/1999a). Subsequent to this experience, despite a history of more than 20 publications in APA core journals from 1932 to 1957 (see publication lists in Hoffman, 1999, and Maslow, 1987), after 1957, Maslow would only publish two more items in APA journals: his APA would-be presidential address (Maslow, 1969b) and the provocatively titled comment "Are Our Publications and Conventions Suitable for the Personal Sciences?" (Maslow, 1961).

Fourth, notions concerning self-transcendence were not well received within APA for many years after Maslow's death. This is suggested by the dispute in the mid-1980s regarding the unsuccessful effort to form an APA Division of Transpersonal Psychology ("Debating the Legitimacy," 1986; "In Defense," 1986; May, 1986a, 1986b). It is interesting to observe that a book published by APA almost a decade after Maslow's death noted that "he was a leader in humanistic psychology and a founder of the *Journal of Humanistic Psychology*" (Hilgard, 1978, p. 531), omitting what would have been equally accurate to state, namely that Maslow was also a leader in transpersonal psychology and a founder of the *Journal of Transpersonal Psychology*. This anecdotal evidence is consistent with the idea that institutional psychology was largely unwilling to recognize transpersonally oriented changes in Maslow's theory.

Fifth, there is no denying that there are problems inherent in Maslow's motivational model, problems that Maslow failed to resolve. The reality is that so-called "higher" motivations, such as self-actualization and self-transcendence, can appear as the *dominant* motivations in individuals who seem not to have firmly resolved the needs for survival, safety, and so forth. This is a serious problem for a strictly hierarchical model such as Maslow's, where lower, prepotent needs must be addressed successfully before higher needs come to the fore. It may be the case that, in light of this, subsequent theorists were loathe to recognize the addition of yet another level onto the hierarchy. However, it is clear that *Maslow* meant to do so, which settles the question of his theory's content, although not its validity.

If organized psychology was resistant to Maslow's ideas about self-transcendence, one wonders why this might have been so, a question that falls outside the scope of this article. Maslow himself was of the (perhaps uncharitable) opinion that many prominent psychologists of his day did not understand the psychology of peak or transpersonal experiences because they had not experienced these themselves.⁴

Although Maslow's opinion was highly speculative, other observers have noted a tendency among psychologists to avoid issues that involve spirituality, presumably including mystical or peak experiences (see discussion in Richards & Bergin, 1997). It has been claimed that this may be because of problematic or uninvestigated assumptions regarding either spirituality or science (Jones, 1994; Slife, Hope, & Nebeker, 1999; Sperry, 1988). It has been noted that, perhaps out of a desire to gain scientific respectability, psychology has historically tended to stigmatize serious researchers of religion (R. Hogan, quoted in P. Young, 1979). Sociological and affective reasons have also been advanced for the neglect of religion by psychology (Baumeister, 2002). These issues may have had an effect on the receptivity of disciplinary psychology to the notion of self-transcendence.

The preceding exposition demonstrates that the accepted version of Maslow's needs hierarchy is not accurate as a reflection of his later thought on the matter. The time has come to rewrite the textbooks.

However, theories can be described accurately without making an impact on a scientific discipline; the humoral theory of personality, for example, generates little contemporary scholarship. For a rectification of Maslow's theory to have more than solely historical interest, it must offer some advantage to theory or research. As it happens, there are several such advantages.

Implications of the Rectified Version of Maslow's Motivational Theory

The rectified version of Maslow's hierarchy of needs has several important implications for theory and research in personality and social psychology. These implications include more comprehensive approaches to (a) personal and cultural conceptions of the purpose of life; (b) the motivational underpinnings of altruistic behavior, social progress, and wisdom; and (c) suicidal terrorism and religious violence; in addition, the rectified theory provides a basis for (d) closer integration of the psychology of religion and spirituality into both personality and social psychology and (e) a more multiculturally integrated approach to psychological theory. Each of these areas is addressed below. In some areas, Maslow's rectified theory allows deeper understanding of a single construct; in others, the theory allows us to make connections across theories. Making such connections, of course, is highly desirable; it has long been recognized that building bridges between formerly unrelated theories is important for the advancement of psychology as a science (e.g., Staats, 1981, 1999).

Self-Transcendence, Worldview, and Purpose of Life

Worldviews are sets of assumptions held by individuals and cultures about the physical and social universe (Koltko-Rivera, 2004). One important aspect of a worldview involves notions

⁴ As Maslow mentioned in his journal, after putting forth U.S. Presidents Eisenhower and Truman as examples of people who were self-actualizers yet without experience of Being-cognition, "Same for the APA board of directors—very capable & sound, etc., *but* no B-cognition" (journal entry for May 28, 1967; Maslow, 1979, Vol. 2, p. 794; Maslow, 1982, p. 204).

about the purpose or meaning of life; this has been described as a central issue for individual psychology (Baumeister, 1991). It has rarely been noted, but Maslow's needs hierarchy defines a framework that identifies and organizes notions about the purpose of life (Koltko-Rivera, 2004). Maslow noted that each stage of the motivational hierarchy can be characterized by a distinctive worldview:

[A] peculiar characteristic of the human organism when it is dominated by a certain need is that the whole philosophy of the future tends also to change. For our chronically and extremely hungry man, . . . life itself tends to be defined in terms of eating. Anything else will be defined as unimportant. Freedom, love, community feeling, respect, philosophy, may all be waved aside as fripperies that are useless since they fail to fill the stomach.

All that has been said of the physiological needs is equally true [of the safety needs]. . . . Again, as in the hungry man, we find that the dominating goal is a strong determinant not only of his current world-outlook and philosophy but also of his philosophy of the future. (Maslow, 1943, pp. 374, 376)

The inclusion of self-transcendence in Maslow's hierarchy allows for a richer conceptualization of the meaning-of-life worldview dimension. Others have also noted the importance of self-transcendent goals in forming a sense of the purpose of life (e.g., Emmons, 1999). By making our models of worldview more comprehensive, we in turn gain a better articulation of theory in personality and social psychology.

Self-Transcendence, Altruism, Social Progress, and Wisdom

History has demonstrated that a significant minority of the human species functions primarily from the position that it is more important to serve some selfless greater purpose than to serve one's own purposes. (One thinks in this respect of the Mother Teresas, Albert Schweitzers, and Gandhis of the world, as well as many lesser known individuals who put their lives at risk for social justice and environmental and religious causes.) A comprehensive theory of human personality and social behavior must account for such individuals. There are, of course, various scientific approaches to altruism (e.g., Barash, 2003; Sober & Wilson, 1998). The self-transcendence aspect of Maslow's theory should be seriously considered in relation to these issues.

On a somewhat different plane, the sociologist Rodney Stark has asserted, on the basis of

the historical record, that despite the association of monotheistic religion and violence (Stark, 2001), monotheistic religion has been a driving force behind social progress and the advance of science (Stark, 2003, 2005). It seems plausible that some of this effect might be associated with a motivational stance centered in self-transcendence, putting aside self in favor of the greater good, the search for truth, and so forth.⁵

Wisdom is traditionally considered to be a form of the highest human development. It is noteworthy that a central aspect of Sternberg's (1998, 2003) balance theory of wisdom involves self-transcendence. As Sternberg defined the construct,

Wisdom is defined as the application of successful intelligence and creativity as mediated by values toward the achievement of a common good [italics added] through a balance among (a) intrapersonal, (b) interpersonal [italics added], and (c) extrapersonal interests [italics added], over (a) short and (b) long terms, in order to achieve a balance among (a) adaptation to existing environments, (b) shaping of existing environments, and (c) selection of new environments.

Thus, wisdom is not just about maximizing one's own or someone else's self-interest, but about balancing various self-interests (intrapersonal) with the interests of others (interpersonal) and of other aspects of the context in which one lives (extrapersonal), such as one's city or country or environment or even God. . . . Extrapersonal interests might include contributing to the welfare of one's school, helping one's community, contributing to the well-being of one's country, or serving God [italics added], and so forth. Different people balance these interests in different ways. At one extreme, a malevolent dictator might emphasize his or her own personal power and wealth; at the other extreme, a saint might emphasize only serving others and God. (Sternberg, 2003, pp. 152, 154)

The relationship between Maslow's notion of self-transcendence and Sternberg's notion of a common good and interpersonal and extrapersonal interests is easy to see. Recognition of the inclusion of self-transcendence into Maslow's motivational hierarchy thus allows us to make a connection between Maslow's motivational theory and cognitive psychology, inasmuch as the latter is where Sternberg has positioned his theory of human wisdom (see Sternberg & Ben-Zeev, 2001, pp. 325–326).

⁵ I certainly would not wish to imply that monotheistic religions have some sort of monopoly on self-transcendence. I simply wish to associate the notion of a religious connection to science with the construct of motivational self-transcendence.

Self-Transcendence, Terrorism, and Religious Violence

Self-transcendence is not just about the Mother Teresas and Gandhis of the world. Surrendering personal needs to a power or cause conceived as being beyond the self has certainly been an impetus not only for service but for religious violence as well (Fields, 2004). The suicide terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, may need to be framed within a context that we might call the negative pole of self-transcendence.

Religious violence has been with us for millennia (Ellens, 2002, 2004; Stark, 2001). Although it is easy to dismiss perpetrators of religious violence as simply malign, unintelligent, or deranged, such facile explanations are often inaccurate and overlook the way in which perpetrators of such violence have spiritual motivations (Lincoln, 2003; Stern, 2003)—what Maslow would have called motives of self-transcendence. We have much to learn in terms of what separates the founder of a soup kitchen or a home for lepers from a suicide bomber; however, the uncomfortable truth is that there is a dimension in which they are similar: devotion to a cause or purpose beyond the self. Certainly, if we are to appropriately respond to the threat of religious terrorism in the 21st century, we will need to understand self-transcendence, in both its positive and negative poles. (As Kfir [2002] has pointed out, Maslow's notion of the peak experience is also relevant to discussions of the motivations behind terrorist acts.)

In investigating the relationship of self-transcendence to violence (or to altruism, for that matter), we will be confronted with some of the less-developed aspects of Maslow's theory. Some of those engaged in self-transcendent violence or altruism are quite young. It would seem unlikely that these individuals have successfully negotiated the prior steps of Maslow's motivational hierarchy. Is there something peculiar about self-transcendence in this respect? If so, is there an inherent difference between those who reach the motivational stage of self-transcendence after traversing the other levels of the hierarchy and those who confront motivational self-transcendence out of sequence, so to speak? Is the theory itself in need of readjustment? Future developments in theory and research in this area will be exciting to consider.

Integrating the Psychology of Religion and Spirituality With Personality and Social Psychology

Robert Hogan, the first section editor for the Personality Processes and Individual Differences section of the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, noted that religion has acted as one of the most powerful social forces in human history (as quoted in P. Young, 1979). Moving from an historical perspective to a present-centered one, Baumeister (2002, p. 165) has noted, "Like TV, money, sex, and aggression, religion is an important fact of life, and psychology cannot pretend to be complete unless it understands religion alongside these other phenomena." Despite this, scientific psychology's attitude toward the study of religion or spirituality can be described, at best, as ambivalent. Although some rigorously edited specialty journals publish psychological research involving religious or spiritual variables, in the APA core journals such research is exceedingly rare. For example, only 2 of the 150 articles published in the volumes of the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP)* for the year 2000 dealt with religion or spirituality in any substantive way (i.e., Gilbert, Brown, Pinel, & Wilson, 2000; Tetlock, Kristel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000)—and in one of those (Gilbert et al., 2000), the variables were only part of the introduction and discussion and were not actually studied in the empirical investigation focused on in the article.⁶

There are several likely reasons why the psychology of religion and spirituality is largely isolated from the mainstream of personality and social psychology (as distinct from the reasons for religion's outright neglect by psychology as a whole). Classical psychoanalytic theory, of course, considered religion as essentially an expression of neurosis and defense against anxiety (see Freud, 1930/1961a, 1927/1961b). Most other major theories of personality, it seems, simply ignore religion and matters of spirituality. (Exceptions would include the theories of

⁶ Abstracts from all articles appearing in the year 2000 issues of *JPSP* were consulted for this survey. I omit from the total of 2 a study (Epley & Dunning, 2000) whose only relation to religion or spirituality was the use of biblical metaphors in the title and text, which were not integral to the authors' study or discussion.

Jung, 1951/1969a, 1938/1969b; Allport, 1950; and Maslow, 1964/1970; see also Pargament, 2002.) In the absence of much theory with which to address nonpathological religion, it is unsurprising that contemporary personality and social psychology have largely ignored religion and spirituality.

There is thus plenty of room for attempting to build a bridge between personality and social psychological theory, on the one hand, and religious and spiritual phenomena, on the other. Inclusion of the self-transcendence step in Maslow's motivational hierarchy builds such a bridge. We must make sense of the great deal of research literature that finds positive associations between spiritual or mystical experience and measures of psychological health (e.g., Argyle & Hills, 2000; Byrd, Lear, & Schwenka, 2000; Hunt, Dougan, Grant, & House, 2002; Koltko, 1991; Koltko-Rivera, 2006; Mallory, 1977; Murphy et al., 2000; Pargament, 2002; Waldron, 1999; J. S. Young, Cashwell, & Shcherbakova, 2000). It is also necessary to relate to personality theory the burgeoning clinical literature that speaks to a need to address spiritual issues in therapy (e.g., Constantine, 1999; Engels, 2001; Richards & Bergin, 1997, 2000; Shafranske, 1996). To better comprehend these matters in terms of personality theory, it may help to associate at least some spiritual phenomena and religious behavior with the highest motivational stage in the rectified version of Maslow's theory.

Maslow—himself an atheist⁷—clearly considered spiritual phenomena and peak experiences to be crucial aspects of human experience (Maslow, 1964/1970, 1969a). Certainly one can imagine Maslow agreeing with the proposition that religious experience can be rooted in any of the steps of the needs hierarchy, allowing us to understand that some superficially similar experiences would have vastly differing psychological implications for different individuals.⁸ Including the step of self-transcendence allows us to apply a long-standing motivational theory to some aspects of religious experience and to understand how spiritual and even mystical experiences can be associated positively with mental health and other personality variables.

Similarly, a theoretical focus on self-transcendence can help to integrate the field of positive psychology (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000) even more closely with disciplinary

psychology in general. Spirituality and transcendent experience are domains addressed by positive psychology (Pargament & Mahoney, 2002; Peterson & Seligman, 2004). The construct of self-transcendence as a motivational status can thus build a bridge between positive psychology and a major theory of motivation.

Self-Transcendence and Multicultural Psychological Theory

A culturally aware psychology recognizes that spirituality is a basic dimension of the human condition (Sue, Bingham, Porché-Burke, & Vasquez, 1999). The cultures of the world are home to a variety of traditional personologies, which have as a common factor one or more motivational constructs similar to self-transcendence. Although this is not the place for a comprehensive treatment of the immense literature on this topic, one can discern such constructs in traditional Hindu or yogic psychology (Scotton & Hiatt, 1996), the traditional psychologies of central and western Asia (Scotton, 1996), the traditional psychologies of Africa (Bynum, 1999), and the traditional psychologies embedded within shamanic cultures (Krippner, 2002).

A theoretical focus on motivational self-transcendence also creates connections to the cross-cultural values research literature. Looking at values from the perspective of motivational goals that they express, Shalom Schwartz has conducted research involving values with participants from more than 50 countries (a program summarized in Smith & Schwartz, 1997). Schwartz has found that 10 motivationally distinct types of values are empirically organized into two bipolar dimensions: Openness to Change versus Conservation and Self-Enhancement versus Self-Transcendence. In

⁷ As he put it, "For me no God ever existed" (Maslow, 1979, Vol. 1, p. 525).

⁸ Thus, in terms of Allport's (1959) original concept of religious orientation, one might hypothesize that higher intrinsic religiosity is related to higher need for self-transcendence and that higher extrinsic religiosity is related to higher degrees of needs found on the other levels of Maslow's rectified hierarchy. In terms of the quest dimension found in later conceptualizations of religious orientation (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993), one might hypothesize that higher quest is related to higher needs for self-actualization and self-transcendence.

Schwartz's research, the Self-Transcendence pole reflects values promoting universalism ("understanding, tolerance and protection for the welfare of *all* people and nature"; Smith & Schwartz, 1997, p. 86) and benevolence ("preserving and enhancing the welfare of people to whom one is close"; Smith & Schwartz, 1997, p. 86). Thus, it appears that Schwartz's notion of self-transcendence has a great deal of resemblance to Maslow's notion (although the two are not identical). For our purposes here, the most important issue is to note that the construct of motivational self-transcendence provides a bridge between the cross-cultural values literature and a major theory of motivation.

Another point of connection involves a different construct in the cross-cultural literature: individualism–collectivism. It was mentioned earlier that there is a certain potential for self-aggrandizement implicit within the construct of self-actualization that is not present within the construct of self-transcendence. This tension parallels a dimension of cultural and individual worldview difference, a dimension known as individualism–collectivism (Kagitçibasi, 1997; Triandis, 1995) or relation to group (Koltko-Rivera, 2004). This bipolar dimension reflects an individual's or a culture's preference concerning situations in which there is a conflict of agenda between what the individual wants and what the individual's reference group requires (e.g., I wish to be a poet or a theorist, but my family wishes me to be a lawyer or a plumber). Those who position themselves at the individualism pole take the view that the individual's agenda should prevail, whereas those who position themselves at the collectivist pole take the view that the reference group's agenda takes priority. This dimension appears robustly across cultures (Hofstede, 1984; Schwartz, 1992) and has been considered crucial to an understanding of cultural differences (Triandis, 1995, 1996). The incorporation of the self-transcendence construct within Maslow's motivational theory may allow us to more clearly conceptualize at least some of the motivational issues underlying the individualism–collectivism polarity.

Thus, including self-transcendence as a stage of Maslow's needs hierarchy allows us to make a firmer connection between mainstream personality theory and the traditional psychologies of the world and may permit us to more fully understand a crucial dimension of cross-cultural

difference. This effort cannot but help to make for more culturally informed theories of the person and of society.

Conclusion

It is time to change the textbook accounts of Maslow's hierarchy of needs. Inclusion of self-transcendence at the top of the needs hierarchy is a more accurate reflection of Maslow's theory, but there are more benefits to be gained from this rectification of theory than historical accuracy alone. The construct of self-transcendence as a motivational status provides a means to a deeper understanding of other important constructs and builds bridges between bodies of theory that are currently isolated. Incorporating self-transcendence into Maslow's theory can help psychology develop a better grasp of how different people and cultures construe the meaning of life. Considering the construct of self-transcendence can help us better understand the motivational underpinnings of both altruism and religious violence, as well as human wisdom. This construct can allow us to more firmly connect the psychology of religion and spirituality with the mainstream of theory in personality and social psychology. The construct allows us to more clearly relate mainstream psychological theory to the traditional psychologies of the world and may ultimately help us to build a more culturally informed psychology. In summary, incorporating self-transcendence into Maslow's hierarchy of needs gives us a theoretical tool with which to pursue a more comprehensive and accurate understanding of human personality and behavior.

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