

Chapter 1

Europe for the Europeans: The Foreign and Security Policy of the Populist Radical Right

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Introduction

There is a new populist moment in Europe. Populist politicians are enjoying unprecedented success at the polls and throughout Europe there is a crisis of confidence in how contemporary politics are being shaped. As Krastev has noted, '[t]he result is a new type of politics where the main structural conflict is not between the Left and the Right or between reformers and conservatives. The real clash is between elites that are becoming more suspicious of democracy and the angry publics that are becoming more hostile to liberalism.'¹ Added to this political dilemma are rising fears of insecurity which have shifted from classical fears of Soviet state aggression to less tangible threats from non-state actors, such as terrorism, organized crime, and uncontrolled immigration, as well as economic fears about the costs of globalization and European integration.

Europeans have become increasingly worried. In a recent survey of 51 countries, western Europeans were the most pessimistic, with 64 per cent being negative about the future. Most of them feel 'unsafe, powerless, and gloomy'.² Europeans fear radical Islamists or ending up as demographic losers in a new 'Eurabia', and are anxious about being left behind in the globalization process or, even worse, being governed by an outside power such as the United States or the 'elite driven' and 'undemocratic' European Commission.³ Seventy-five per cent of West Europeans believe there will be further deterioration in global security in the future.⁴ According to another recent survey, Central European citizens are the most sceptical about the merits of democracy of all the regions of the world.⁵ According to a recent Gallup International Poll, 79

1 Krastev, I. (2007), 'The populist moment', Eurozine.com, <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-18-krastev-en.html>>.

2 Gallup Poll (2007), 'Future Threats' prepared for the 2007 World Economic Forum Conference, Davos, Switzerland.

3 Moïsi, D. (2007), 'The Clash of Emotions: Fear, Humiliation, Hope and the New World Order', *Foreign Affairs* 86:1, 1.

4 Gallup International Association (2006), 'Voice of the People 2006: What the World Thinks on Today's Global Issues', Gallup International Association.

5 Krastev, I. (2007), 'Is East-Central Europe Backsliding? The Strange Death of the Liberal Consensus', *Journal of Democracy* 18; 4, 57.

percent of the world believes that democracy is the best form of government available but only one third agrees that the voice of the people is heard by the governments of their countries.⁶

In view of these fears, it is not surprising that after decades at the margins of political life, European populist radical right parties are making a political comeback across the continent. As many books on the topic have already argued, one of the most significant developments of the past two decades has been the transformation of these parties from the margins to the mainstream.⁷ In western Europe, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, the Netherlands and Switzerland have strong right-wing populist parties that have influenced their national governments and are shaping their countries' foreign and security policies. In eastern Europe, populist and nationalist parties have developed in Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Even though the new European order has brought many positive changes, reform fatigue is causing pro-European and pro-market parties to lose ground to nationalist and populists groups.⁸

This book argues that the populist radical right's foreign political platforms play an important role in their growing appeal in Europe. Until now, the vast majority of research on these parties has focused on their historical origins, political platforms, voter patterns and domestic politics. Only limited attention has been given to their international agenda. This is especially surprising since several of these parties were founded to specifically deal with foreign political issues. The meteoric rise of the Swiss People's Party (SVP) can be attributed to putting foreign policy issues at the centre of its agenda, namely preventing Switzerland from 'unnecessarily' getting involved in international affairs, and by mobilizing public opinion against Swiss membership in the European Economic Area and the United Nations, furthering ties with the European Union (EU), and defending Switzerland's role in the Second World War.⁹ The German *Republikaner* also gained political notoriety when they argued for a new direction in German foreign policy based not on American political interests but rather focusing on its own national interests, namely German reunification. As the subsequent chapters in this book show, the foreign-political platforms of numerous populist right-wing parties have allowed them to formulate coherent messages that have met with success at the polls.

Although other works have covered some specific aspects of foreign policy issues¹⁰, this is the first book which attempts to describe the European populist radical right's

6 Krastev, I. (2007), 'The populist moment', Eurozine, <<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-18-krastev-en.html>>.

7 Hainsworth, P. (2000), *The Politics of the Extreme Right: From the Margins to the Mainstream* (London: Pinter).

8 Larrabee, S.F. (2006), 'Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe', *Foreign Affairs* 85:6, 1.

9 Betz, H.-G. (2004), *La droite populiste en Europe : Extrême et démocrate?* (Paris: Autrement), p. 96. See also chapter 11 by Mazzoleni.

10 Mudde, C. (2007), *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), discusses globalization and International Organizations. Greven, T. and Grumke T. (eds.) *Globalisierter Rechts-extremismus? Die extremistische Recht in der Ära der Globalisierung*, (Wiesbaden : VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), discusses globalization issues. Betz, H.-G. (2004), *La droite populiste en Europe : Extrême et démocrate?* (Paris: Autrement), discusses Islamophobia and migration.

foreign and security policy objectives. It is a result of a workshop that was organized by Professor Philippe Burrin¹¹ and the editor of this volume at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva in July 2004, which brought together experts in the field of right-wing populism to examine the right-wing foreign policy agenda, the importance of these views in attracting voters, as well as their ability to cooperate at the international level. The expanded contributions to this study seek to examine the wider foreign-policy platform of Europe's populist radical right parties, to highlight the particular issues that exist at the national level, and to raise further questions for future scholarship.

Defining the Populist Radical Right

Before addressing the foreign policy landscape of the populist radical right it is important to formulate a common definition of the parties explored in the book. It is extremely difficult to find a common definition in the plethora of terms that exist: 'fascist', 'neo-Nazi', 'extreme right', 'radical right', 'far right', 'old right' and 'new right' are but some of the most common concepts used in the past. According to Mudde, there are no less than 26 definitions of extreme right used in the literature and they list no less than 58 different features.¹² Added to this complexity is the fact that some definitions carry historical significance no longer relevant to the new generation of right-wing populists that emerged after the Cold War.¹³ Eastern European parties, which emerged from the double historical legacy of fascism and communism, are a particular challenge. Added to this dilemma is the ongoing political reform process of opportunistic parties constantly reinventing themselves. The book covers parties¹⁴ representing the Old Right (*Front national, Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja, Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) and regional separatists (*Vlaams Blok, Lega Nord*) as well as right populist parties (*Schweizer Volkspartei, Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs/Bündnis Zukunft Österreich, Dansk Folkeparti*), and ultra-catholic party (*Liga Polskich Rodzin*), and post-fascist turned conservative (*Alleanza Nazionale*) or post-modern (*Lijst Pim Fortuyn*). A common term to describe this wide range of parties is difficult to find.

Mudde, in his most recent book, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe*, develops the term 'populist radical right' which simplifies these complexities into a simple and usable, minimum and maximum definition, in which elements of the 'maximum' are also contained in the 'minimum' group.¹⁵ According to this definition, all parties which fit into this category espouse, at a minimum, a specific form of nationalism. He has argued effectively that nationalism is one core concept of these parties. Outliving many of the other *-isms* in our century, nationalism espoused by these political parties

11 Professor Philippe Burrin is currently the Director of the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies (IHEID) in Geneva, Switzerland.

12 Mudde, C. (1996), 'The War of Words Defining the Extreme Right Party Family', *West European Politics*, vol. 19, no. 2, pp. 225–48.

13 Griffin, R. (2000), 'Interregnum or Endgame? The Radical Right in the 'Post-fascist' Era', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 5:2, 163–78.

14 The myriad of party names – often long and mutable – necessitates the use of many acronyms. A list of abbreviations can be found at the end of the chapter.

15 Mudde, C. (2007), *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 15.

declares the maintenance and strengthening of one's own nation to be the highest principle of human thought and action, and denigrates other nations.¹⁶

Nationalism alone, however, cannot describe the parties in this book, since the minimum definition 'nationalist' here does not make a distinction between 'moderate' nationalists – so-called 'liberal' nationalists – and radical nationalists. Thus the term *nativist* helps further refine this distinction. The term nativism is defined by Mudde 'as an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state.'¹⁷ Mudde maintains that nativism can also accommodate the xenophobic and nationalist reactions to (so-called) indigenous minorities within the country (for example, Russians in the Baltic States, Roma and Sinti groups in Central and Eastern Europe).¹⁸ Nativism thus can encompass groups that are specifically racist or simply protectionist in relation to their own culture.

In addition to nationalism and nativism, the parties examined in this volume support authoritarianism. Stöss defines authoritarianism as the willingness to voluntarily submit oneself to those who are stronger, or rather to a power that has not been legitimated, as well as the tendency to dominate those who are weaker.¹⁹ Drawing on Theodor Adorno's *The Authoritarian Personality*, Robert Altemeyer further defines three facets of this authoritarian personality: conventionalism, authoritarian aggression and authoritarian submission. In order to measure this cluster of beliefs, Altemeyer developed the Right Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) scale, asking subjects to rate their agreement (or disagreement) with statements such as 'Our country will be great if we honor the ways of our forefathers/Do what the authorities tell us to do/Get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything.' This example contains all three facets of RWA scale: 'honor the ways of our forefathers' – conventional/traditional values; 'do what the authorities tell us to do' – authoritarian submission; 'get rid of the "rotten apples" who are ruining everything' – authoritarian aggression.²⁰ All the parties described in this book share these traits, which seem to feed off a growing taste for authoritarianism in Europe. In a recent study by the Friedrich Ebert Foundation, for example, 9 per cent of Germans polled believed that under some circumstances a dictatorship could be a better system to run a state than a democracy.²¹ An iron-fisted leader who would 'govern Germany for the benefit of all' would be supported by 15

16 Ibid., p. 16-17. See also Prizell, I. (1998), *National Identity and Foreign Policy: Nationalism and Leadership in Poland, Russia and Ukraine* (Cambridge Russian, Soviet and Post-Soviet Studies) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), p. 13.

17 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.* p. 19. Hans-Georg Betz further elaborates the term in the subsequent chapter. See also Betz (2002), 'Conditions Favouring the Success and Failure of radical Rightwing Populist Parties in Contemporary Democracies', in Mény, Y. and Surel, Y. (eds.), *Democracies and the Populist Challenge* (Basingstoke: Palgrave); Friedman, N. (1967), 'Nativism', *Phylon* 28:4, 408–15.

18 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 19.

19 Liang, Christina (2002), *German Far Right Ideology in the Decade of German Unification*, these no. 641, IUHEI, Geneva, p. 10.

20 Altemeyer, R. (1981), *Right-Wing Authoritarianism* (Manitoba: University of Manitoba Press).

21 Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 9 December 2006.

per cent of the respondents. One in four – 26 per cent – said they favoured a single party in Germany ‘that would embody the national community as a whole ...’.²² It is the authoritarian element of the nativism espoused by these parties that places them into the spectrum of radical parties, which, by democratic means, seek to change the conception of democratic values at the same time. The term radical in this sense does not necessarily mean marginal or extremist (although it can). Populist radical right parties can range from the Swiss SVP, which has a radical wing in what is otherwise a mainstream populist right party, to the French *Front national*, which is an ethnocentric party attempting to achieve a more mainstream populist image, to parties like the German National Democratic Party (NPD) and the British National Party (BNP), which are direct heirs of European Nazism and fascism.

Finally, Mudde also suggests that the element of *populism* delineates specific parties from each other. Populism can be considered to be an ideology that separates society into two homogenous and antagonistic groups – ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’ – and that holds that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people. For Krastev populists maintain that politics is the expression of the general will of the people and social change will only be possible with radical change of the elite.²³ According to populist notions of democracy, nothing is more important than the general will of the people, not even human rights or constitutional guarantees. Following Napoleon Bonaparte’s dictum that ‘the politics of the future will be the art of stirring the masses’, populist radical right parties seek to foster populist leaders ‘who think with the head of the citizens.’²⁴ They encourage ‘plain speaking’ and they believe they represent the common man from the street whom the traditional leadership elite has forsaken. Their task, according to the Austrian *Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs* (FPÖ) Jörg Haider, is to protect ‘the citizens against a political and intellectual dispossession and incapacitation.’²⁵ Neo-populist parties are able to address common feelings shared by large numbers of people that are largely ignored by politicians. Kriesi has suggested that the emergence of populist movements is intricately linked to major experiences of social and cultural turmoil and dislocation.²⁶ Taggart also supports this argument by stating that populism is not the politics of the stable, ordered polity, but instead comes along due to change, crisis and challenge.²⁷

Linked to the notion of populism is the characteristic of resentment politics. For Krastev, populism indicates that liberal solutions in the fields of politics, economics and culture are no longer considered attractive to voters who are drawn instead to politics of exclusion.²⁸ Many of the parties examined pose themselves as political outsiders who dare to break political taboos and thus express the resentment felt by the populace against the political elite. For example, many of the parties in question express racist viewpoints, all the while abiding by democratic rules and staying within the legal

22 Ibid.

23 Krastev, I. (2007), Eurozine, p. 2–3.

24 Crick, B. (2005), ‘Populism, Politics and Democracy’, *Democratization* 12:5, 627. Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 45.

25 Ibid.

26 Kriesi in Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 52.

27 Taggart, P. (2004), ‘Populism and Representative Politics in Contemporary Europe’, *Journal of Political Ideologies* 9:3, 275.

28 Krastev, op. cit., p. 1–6.

parameters of racism laws. As Betz has argued, this strategy of breaking political taboos allows the radical right to present itself as a fresh political force outside the established parties and not corrupted by power. If punished for breaching racism laws, this tactic allows the radical right to present itself as a victim of the established parties and to advance a range of extreme demands without having to assume responsibility for the consequences.²⁹

Resentment politics have received a further boost through changes in the democratic political process brought about by information technology. In the past, people traditionally identified with a particular party that espoused the same political traditions of the voter, based usually on political and religious traditions. Voters are now choosing their candidates based on real-time information in a rapidly expanding media world. The Internet has allowed the populist radical right an equal speaking platform with established mainstream parties. In almost all Western European countries there are declining levels of trust in political leaders. Legitimizing democratic governance has become a leading challenge in European democracies, especially in Eastern Europe, where 40 years of communist control have undermined the legitimacy of party-related activities and where the political class is viewed as corrupt. In Eastern Europe, the populists' obsession with corruption has become more important than the actual policy options. Voters are mostly interested in revenging themselves against the politicians who are viewed as corrupted elites. Clearly this is not helped by the fact that politicians such as the current Hungarian Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány admitted to lying "in the morning, in the evening, and at night." According to the Eurobarometer surveys, parliaments, governments and parties are facing increasing scepticism in almost all European democracies.³⁰ In 2005, 32 per cent of all EU citizens trusted their parliament, 28 per cent trusted their government, and just 14 per cent trusted their political parties.³¹ The populist radical right has helped foster this political disenchantment, arguing that mainstream political parties no longer meet the demands of their citizens.

A further populist strategy employed by a number of parties is what Swyngedouw describes as the "jumping of scales technique" whereby global complexity is rescaled to local simplicity.³² Using this technique, radical right-wing parties describe global issues such as the processes of European integration, economic globalization as local, comprehensible matters which are a direct threat to established prosperity, rights and power.³³ International migration, organized crime and international terrorism that are global issues can be redefined as national or local problems. Jean-Marie Le Pen has used this simple formula when describing immigration, which, according to him, if prevented, would resolve all of France's domestic problems. The SVP, DPP, and LPF have also used this formula. The *Vlaams Blok* (VB) suggests that criminality, domestic security and family politics can all be prevented by ending the preferential treatment of foreigners.³⁴

29 Betz (2004), pp. 49–50.

30 European Commission (2006), 'Attitudes towards European Union Enlargement', *European Commission: Special Eurobarometer*, <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_255_en.pdf>.

31 Ibid.

32 Swyngedouw (1997), Urry (2003) as described in chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al.

33 See chapter 4 for an explanation of this formula as it pertains to the *Vlaams Blok*.

34 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., p. 97.

Ethno-pluralism

A final concept linked to much of the populist radical right is ethno-pluralism. In the past these parties focused largely on anti-party rhetoric and issues such as immigration, asylum and refugees and, according to Betz, made little effort to develop a coherent ideology as a basis of legitimization for their demands.³⁵ However, as Betz, Griffin and others have pointed out, after the Cold War these parties developed a core doctrine based on ethno-cultural pluralism whose main characteristic is a highly restrictive notion of society, citizenship and democracy, all which are seen as intricately tied to a culturally and ethnically homogenous community.³⁶ In some cases, ethno-cultural pluralism is also an attempt to preserve the idea of race and ethnicity in political discourse without evoking Nazi ideas of racial exclusion and persecution. Ethno-pluralism uses their own notion of ‘difference’ and ‘multiculturalism’ – mirroring anti-racist terms used in left-wing discourse – so as to seemingly reject all notions of biological racism and racial superiority and to promote the coexistence of races. Nonetheless, the concept of ethno-pluralism denounces the mixing of the races either through marriage or through immigration.³⁷ Ethno-pluralist thinkers argue that multiculturalism will lead to ‘ethno-suicide’ due to the fact that lifestyle and traditions of the different peoples are inherently not compatible.

Ethno-pluralists further maintain that if each ethnic identity were to develop its own separate political space, cooperation and harmony among different ethnicities would be assured. They want to ensure that ethnic-pluralism is first and foremost to be preserved at home and in Europe. As one German *Republikaner* affirmed:

We are Europeans and would like to remain Germans within this Europe. We want a Europe that lives on cultural diversity, does not look down upon traditions, and in which diligence and civic-mindedness, order and security for everyone, the love of one’s own people and respect of others are not discounted as relics of a bygone era.³⁸

The parties examined in this book thus comprise what can be called populist radical right parties. They have at a minimum a specific form of nationalism and a core identity of nativism, authoritarianism, and populism. These characteristics separate these parties from the mainstream Right, and from the radical and populist Left. Finally, as will be shown, they are all gravitating towards an ethno-pluralist foreign political outlook, which is the closest the groups have yet come to defining a common platform in Europe.

Towards a European Populist Radical Right Foreign Policy

The post-Cold War development of the populist radical right’s foreign policy was marked by three events: the perception of the economic and social effects of globalization

35 See chapter 6 by Evans.

36 Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 145.

37 Minkenberg, M. (1997), ‘The New Right in France and Germany: Nouvelle Droite, Neue Rechte, and the New Right Radical Parties’, in Merkl, P. (ed.), *The Revival of Right-Wing Extremism in the Nineties*, p. 72.

38 ‘Warum nicht Volkswahl!’, *Der Republikaner* 5, 1989, p. 1.

in the mid-1990s; the increased rate of European integration in the late 1990s; and, the launch of the US-led ‘war on terror’ after the terrorist attacks in New York and Washington on 11 September 2001. Each of these themes merits closer examination.

Globalization

The fear of the globalized economy runs as a sub-current through many of the positions of the populist radical right parties, who see globalization as a threat to be countered with strong national preference, welfare systems that favour indigenous populations, strong immigration laws and strong criminal legislation. Globalization is largely seen as being driven by the United States – economically from Wall Street, politically from Washington, and culturally from Hollywood. Indeed, the populist radical right have mapped out much of their foreign political programme on the feared impact of globalization on the economy, political sovereignty and national culture.

The economic threat of globalization has been one of the most important catalysts of bringing the populist radical right to power in Europe. Due to the globalization of production, capital, labour and information, the world economy is perceived by the populist radical right to have become ‘a contest of regions’. Millions of cheap labourers are prepared to produce highly valued products for low wages. The German *Republikaner* consequently fear that

[t]he world is at the brink of a world economic revolution, which will make the Europeans the biggest losers. In the end it will lead to a complete dispersal of political and economic power from western Europe to Asia, which might lead to a destabilization of social cultural structures and result in a recrudescence of ‘Marxist values’.³⁹

The *Republikaner* further maintain that globalization undermines the welfare state and emasculates democracy. Economic globalization has also raised fears in Europe of the death of social welfare – a shock to deeply embedded mentalities for those who are accustomed to a ‘cradle to grave’ welfare state. Competition puts pressures on governments not only to deregulate and liberalize goods and labour markets, but also to substantially alter the welfare state. These changes especially affect small pensioners and the elderly. To respond to this fear, the populist radical right promote a welfare chauvinism to protect the nation state for their ‘own people’.⁴⁰ An example of this is an initiative promoted by Le Pen, who enjoys particular support among the French elderly, which called for a ‘national preference’ welfare system favouring indigenous French over immigrants.⁴¹ In Poland, the Kaczynski brothers have used extreme social conservatism to attract voters. Both the capitalists (liberals) and the neo-communists were blamed for the plummeting standards of living in the East, mostly due to the fact that during the transition period there was a certain continuity between the ruling “communists” and the parties’ pro-market reformist wing. Currently both are out of favour and are being replaced with populist leaders who argue that the social welfare

39 Ritter, M. (1996), ‘Droht eine Weltwirtschafts-Revolution?’, *Der Republikaner* 11, p. 7.

40 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 186-87.

41 Poggioli, S. (2006), ‘Europe’s Right Turn Anti-Immigrant Policy Boosts France’s Le Pen Again’, radio broadcast, *National Public Radio*, 12 January .

institutions are the backbone of identity and the only remaining principle of cohesion in traditionless capitalist society. This new revolt is based not only on fears of losing the nation but more importantly fears of becoming *déclassé* in a new materialistic society.

According to the populist radical right, the biggest winner of economic globalization is the United States, which through its powerful business giants and its control of international economic institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the World Trade Organization (WTO), has managed to dominate the global economy. One of the only exceptions to this is the Swiss SVP, which has maintained a more positive attitude towards the global economy and international financial institutions, partially due to its close ties with the business community through party chief Christoph Blocher, himself a leading industrialist.⁴² Another exception are the Kaczynski brothers in Poland who have managed to combine anti-Russian and anti-German sentiment with pro-Bush military zeal.

The populist right's depiction of economic globalization draws on well-documented anxieties among European workers in the face of foreign competition. Indeed, studies have pointed to a systematic link between the decline in manufacturing employment and support for the populist radical right parties, even in the context of a developed welfare state.⁴³ The impact of globalization on European economies and rising unemployment are producing a growing sense of insecurity that is provoking a populist backlash.

This backlash is not only due to economic concerns. For the populist radical right, the United States is not only the economic power in the world, it is also the omnipotent driver of world politics – a *hyperpuissance*.⁴⁴ Anti-Americanism has become one of the dominant foreign policy themes of the populist radical right since the end of the Cold War, and the United States is widely perceived as the main state adversary of Europe. Moreover, the populist radical right believes that globalization has led to a devolvement of traditional economic and political powers of states to international institutions, international companies, and other non-state actors. The United States is viewed by many populist radical right parties (notably by the *Front national*, the DVU, and the NPD) as having hegemony over international institutions, in particular the United Nations (UN), the WTO and international business. The United States is also represented as a warmonger, forcing countries to join in unwanted conflicts and instigating and forcing political, economic, and cultural integration. The *Front national*, FPÖ, the DVU and the NPD, among others, portray the United States as the biggest threat to world peace. They maintain that while the United States attempts to cloak itself in a mantle of good offices and propaganda, bestowing upon itself the role of the world's policeman and protecting countries from foreign aggressors, it is in fact using any means necessary to further its imperialist ambitions—sometimes even by breaking international law – in order to control the globe for its enormous economic needs. In Eastern Europe, there is the popular perception that the ultimate winners of the painful convergence process for European integration were not Eastern Europeans

42 See chapter 11 by Mazzoleni.

43 Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 160.

44 A political concept first described in 1999 by then French Minister of Foreign Affairs Hubert Védrine to describe the United States at the end of the 20th century.

but mainly, multinational corporations, the American-led military alliance and the EU bureaucracy.⁴⁵

While political and economic globalization has led to important foreign policy positions – notably a shift towards anti-Americanism and the rejection of global institutions – the cultural aspects of globalization have brought the populist radical right together in a perceived common clash of cultures, giving new impetus for populist parties to pose as guarantors of the authentic national culture. Numerous anti-foreign culture slogans abound, including ‘Britain for the British’ (National Front), ‘Bulgaria for the Bulgarians’ (*Ataka*), ‘Denmark for the Danes’ (Danish People’s Party) and ‘*Deutschland den Deutschen, Ausländer raus!*’ (Germany for the Germans, foreigners out!) by the *Republikaner*. They also stress the predominance of their own nationals – *Les français d’abord*’ (‘the French first’ by the FN); *Eigen volk eerst!* (‘own people first’ by the Flemish VB). These notions are not only anti-immigration, but reflect a cultural anxiety about the dilution of national cultures. Consequently, the current populist radical right rejects multiculturalism, with its ideas of a melting pot and cultural plurality. The DVU, for example, presents the United States as a cultural enemy. ‘The United States knows no national boundaries and embodies the concept of immigration, the entire humankind being on its territory. As a result, internationalism becomes national identity, based on the fundamental concept of the melting pot of races and peoples.’⁴⁶ The United States is also represented as engaged in ‘cultural suicide’, which has led to high criminality, drugs and HIV/AIDS. This representation serves the dual purpose of holding the United States as an example of the failures of multicultural society and at the same time depicting the United States as an enemy composed of cultural degenerates. The DVU maintains ‘that it is impossible to counter the basic instincts of peoples to identify themselves with their ethnic group and their region and the strong desire not to become part of the amorphous mash of peoples that the European population is threatening to become.’⁴⁷ By externalizing multi-culturalism as the ideology of the enemy, much like the creation of a Jewish conspiracy hosted abroad, the populist radical right justify the destruction of foreigners at home, or as Herf has pointed out, ‘that the destruction of foreigners in Europe would eliminate the spirit of multiculturalism from Europe.’⁴⁸

European Expansion and Integration

A specific issue for the populist radical right in its fear of a global culture clash is European expansion. The recent ‘big bang’ enlargement added eight Eastern European states, and in 2006, Bulgaria and Romania also joined, making a grand total of 27 EU countries. So far the purpose of enlargement has been to consolidate EU power and

45 Tamás, G.M., ‘Counter-revolution against a counter-revolution, Eastern Europe Today,’ Eurozine.com <<http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-18-tamas-en.html>>.

46 Rassen, S. der and Völker (1990), ‘Die USA als Richter der Welt? Serie zur Geschichte und Gegenwart des US-Imperialismus, 2 Teil’, *DNZ*, 21 September, p. 4.

47 ‘Die Stunde des Nationalismus Europagedanke zum Scheitern verurteilt,’ *DNZ*, 24 January 1992, p. 6.

48 Herf, J. (1984), *Reactionary Modernism. Technology, Culture, and Politics in Weimar and the Third Reich* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), p. 231.

to enhance political and economic reform in Eastern Europe. The EU is also meant to act as a political and economic counterweight to the United States. Most populist radical right parties have supported the integration of Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic states but have opposed the ‘big bang’ of EU membership. These sentiments were shared with 42 per cent of the EU population who opposed enlargement. Some voters were especially unfavourable to greater enlargement, such as the Germans (66 per cent), the French (62 per cent), the Austrians (61 per cent) and the Finnish (60 per cent).⁴⁹ The rhetoric of the populist radical right has found resonance precisely because support for the EU has declined sharply in the last decade – from 72 per cent in 1990 to 54 per cent in 2005.⁵⁰ The failure of the European Constitutional Treaty to win popular approval in the Dutch and French referenda in 2005 was a symbolic reminder of declining support for the EU, especially since it was rejected by two of its original founding countries.

For most populist radical right parties, the EU represents a political problem. Since 1996, the populist radical right has formed the largest group of so-called ‘Eurosceptics’ in the EU.⁵¹ One of the key grievances is that the EU lacks democratic accountability. Pointing out that the EU’s power rests within the unelected Council of Ministers rather than with the elected European Parliament, the populist radical right claims that the EU is undemocratic. It also does not support the idea of a European ‘superstate’ and it does not want to relinquish political power to Brussels. Brussels is represented as corrupt and being run by a political and technocratic elite. Already in 1997, Pim Fortuyn in his book ‘Soulless Europe’ described Europe as a heartless, distant, bureaucratic monster.⁵² For the populist radical right, the creation of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 represented a step too far in the direction of supra-national control and signified an unacceptable loss of national sovereignty, and an egregious violation of constitutional principles such as the principle of democracy and the separation of powers. They proclaimed that the treaty was a coup d’état from above.⁵³ The often-invoked principle of subsidiarity did not redress the fact that the European Union would not be able to solve the conflict between centralization and decentralization nor alleviate the democratic deficit of the European institutions.⁵⁴

Others attacked the Maastricht Treaty even more sharply. The DVU maintained that ‘[a]pparently one wants to quietly withdraw our *Bundeswehr* from German sovereignty and internationalize it under the sign of the Maastricht *über-Versailles* [treaty].’⁵⁵ In a somewhat unusual deployment of their symbolic heritage, they compared the establishment of the EU with the Nazi takeover of Germany in 1933: ‘[w]ith the intended *Machtergreifung* of the Brussels bureaucracy and the renunciation of our

49 European Commission (2006), op. cit., p. 255.

50 Clark D. et al. (2005), *A New Deal for Social Europe* (London: Foreign Policy Centre), p. 2.

51 Taggart, P. (1998), ‘A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in Contemporary Western European Party Systems’, *European Journal of Political Research* 33:3.

52 See chapter 10 by Mudde.

53 See chapter three of the 1987 *Republikaner* Party Platform.

54 Ibid.

55 ‘Das Verbrechen an Somalia. Bonn als Mittäter,’ *DNZ*, 13 August 1993, p. 1.

national identity, German history would have come to its end.⁵⁶ Le Pen compared Maastricht to the ‘infamous Treaty of Troy’.⁵⁷

Conspiracy theories abound within the populist radical right as regards to who is really in charge of the EU – the Americans, the Germans, the French. The German *Republikaner* believe that the EU is a strategy of the United States to keep Germany controlled in Europe. In Central and Eastern European countries, the populist radical right argues that the EU is but an extension of the old Soviet Union or its economic organization (COMECON).⁵⁸ Weaver points out that the Hungarian *Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja* (MÍEP) calls the European Constitution a ‘new Soviet system of centralization that was prepared in the West’.⁵⁹ Similarly, the *Lega Nord* (LN) refers to the ‘Soviet Union of Europe as a nest of freemasons and Communist bankers’.⁶⁰ Some Eastern Europeans such as the Czech National Party (NS) and Association for the Republic–Republican Party of Czechoslovakia (SPR-RSČ) maintain that joining the EU would make the country fully dependent on Germany, which will end up dominating it.⁶¹ The Polish radical right harbours similar views.⁶²

According to most populist radical right groups, the creation of the European Union was a ‘no’ to Maastricht and a ‘yes’ to the idea of a ‘Europe of Nation States’, or a Europe of peoples based on ethnicity. Drawing on their ethno-pluralist values, the populist radical right promotes the idea of a ‘Europe of the Europeans’, based on the core values of a ‘European civilization’ – a Europe whose sovereignty does not lie with Europe or with the existing states but with their cultural communities.⁶³ This concept of Europe is best expressed in the words of Pim Fortuyn: ‘I love Europe, I love its multitude of peoples, cultures, landscapes, weather conditions, language and human beings. I sometimes hate the Euro-elite in its arrogant negligence. In short, I want a Europe of the people, of the human scale, a Europe of you and me.’⁶⁴ After German unification, the *Republikaner* called for the reaffirmation of lost European strength, and thus an integrated Europe detached from the West. They were interested in a model of a ‘Europe of the Fatherlands’ as envisioned by Charles de Gaulle. In their view, the ‘nations that are joining together here are not losing their proper personalities. And the path they are going down will be the organized co-operation of states, until one day they might form a powerful confederation of states’.⁶⁵ For many the idea of a Europe of the Fatherlands reconciles both national and European interests. A majority of the populist radical right parties strongly oppose the idea of a federal ‘United States

56 *Deutsche National-Zeitung* 11, 1992, p. 4, as quoted in the Bundesministerium des Innern (1993), *Verfassungsschutzbericht 1992* (Bonn: Bundesministerium des Innern), p. 112.

57 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 160.

58 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 161. Chapter 8 by Weaver.

59 See chapter 8 by Weaver.

60 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 161.

61 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 163.

62 *Ibid.*

63 See chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al.

64 See chapter 10 by Mudde.

65 *Der Republikaner*, No.6, 1989.

of Europe', believing it will erode national identity and will eventually lead to a multicultural Europe that will be 'open to antidemocratic and violent' movements.⁶⁶

This does not mean that the populist radical right is entirely against the European project. Most populist radical right parties presented in this book believe in the basic tenets of European integration but are sceptical about the direction the EU has taken. These groups can be identified as Eurosceptics, among which Mudde includes the FN, LN, and *Republikaner*.⁶⁷ He has argued that most populist radical right parties in the accession countries also fall into this category, since they are inconsistent about their membership.⁶⁸ So-called 'Eurorejects,' on the other hand, are more nativist and believe that the EU represents a threat to national independence with a serious 'democratic deficit'. Among the Eurorejects are the BNP, *Democracia Nacional*, Democratic Unionist Party, *Veritas*, and the SVP.⁶⁹ Larrabee has shown that parties in Poland, especially the *Prawo i Sprawiedliwość* (PiS) and the Catholic League of Polish Families, have also been critical of Poland's membership in the EU.⁷⁰

While the above categories are useful typologies, the parties examined in this book appear difficult to classify as Euroenthusiasts, Eurosceptics and Eurorejects since they are constantly reinventing themselves. Good examples of this are the *Republikaner*, the FN and the LN who started out as Euroenthusiasts but have become Eurosceptics. The *Republikaner*, FN and the LN, have vacillated between supporting and rejecting the EU. As populists, the parties opportunistically use their animosity against the European Union as a political tool, depending on what best suits their political needs. In this regard some parties supported the European Union when a large enough majority of the country was in agreement, but then dropped political support when it became a political liability.

The Populist Radical Right and the European Union

In 2005, greater international cooperation was set in motion by the Austrian think tank, *Freiheitliche Akademie*, which organized an international meeting of high level populist radical right party members from seven countries including the FPÖ, Vlaams Belang, *Ataka*, FN, *Italian Azione Sociale* and Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore (MS-FT), as well as the Romanian PRM and the Spanish *Alternativa Española*.⁷¹ The parties agreed to conduct annual meetings and to create a "Contact Forum for European Patriotic and National Parties and Movements with a permanent office in Vienna."⁷² At the meeting they adopted the Vienna Declaration of Patriotic and National Movements and Parties in Europe, whose main points clearly articulate a new globalized nationalist agenda:

66 BZÖ is one of the exceptions. See chapter 5 by Anderson and chapter 7 by Schori Liang.

67 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 164.

68 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.* p. 164.

69 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 163.

70 Larrabee, S.F. (2006), 'Danger and Opportunity in Eastern Europe', *Foreign Affairs* 85:6.

71 The DFP, *Lega Nord*, the Polish PiS sent official greetings but did not attend the meeting.

72 *Ibid.*

1. The establishment of a Europe of free and independent nationals within the framework of a confederation of sovereign nation states;
2. The renunciation of all attempts to create a constitution for a centralist European super-state;
3. The clear rejection of a boundless enlargement of European integration to geographical, cultural, religious and ethnic non-European areas of Asia and Africa such as Turkey;
4. The effective protection of Europe against dangers of terrorism, aggressive Islamism, superpower imperialism, and economic aggression by low-wage countries;
5. An immediate immigration stop in all states of the European Union, also in the area of so-called family reunion;
6. A pro-natalist family policy, which aims at the promotion of large numbers of children of the European ethnic communities (Völker) within the traditional family;
7. The solidarist struggle of European ethnic communities against the social and economic effects of globalization;
8. The restoration of the social systems of the member state of the European Union and social justice for the European ethnic communities.⁷³

The recent accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the EU provided another opportunity for the populist radical right and its more extremist fringes to build common consensus and to further their political agendas at a transnational level. Ironically, while many of these groups were opposed to further enlargement, two of the new EU members, Bulgaria and Romania, helped the ‘Identity, Tradition, and Sovereignty Group (ITS)’ to achieve its critical mass to form a party within the European Parliament.⁷⁴ Along with greater funding⁷⁵ they will have the ability to chair debates and help set the agenda for plenary sessions, allowing for more time to outline their policies. Many of the 23 ITS members reiterated some of the points they had already outlined in 2005 Vienna declaration. These included:

- Recognition of national interests, sovereignties, identities and differences.
- Commitment to Christian values, heritage, culture and the traditions of European civilization.
- Commitment to the traditional family as the natural unity within society.
- Commitment to the freedoms and rights inherited by all.
- Commitment to the rule of law.
- Opposition to a unitary, bureaucratic, European superstate

⁷³ “Wiener Erklärung der europäischen patriotischen und nationalen Parteien und Bewegungen”, November 2005, available at the FPÖ website (http://www.ots.at/presseaussendung.php?schluessel=OTS_20051114_OTSO051&ch=politik).

⁷⁴ EU rules require groups to raise 20 members from seven different EU states in order to form a party.

⁷⁵ ITS party is entitled to approximately one million Euros for staff and administrative costs.

- Commitment to direct accountability of governments to the people and the transparent management of public funds.⁷⁶

The group itself is made up of a mixed bag of Holocaust deniers, ultra-nationalists, neo-Fascists and anti-Islamists making it difficult for them to reach common consensus on some of the more specific issues. Bruno Gollnisch of the FN is currently leading the group. He was convicted in January, 2007 by a French court for Holocaust denial. Other members include FN leader Jean Marie Le Pen and his daughter, Marine, as well as, Alessandra Mussolini, granddaughter of Benito Mussolini, who was voted into the Italian Parliament on the motto “better Fascist than gay”, and Dmitar Stoyanov of the Bulgarian *Ataka* party who during the ITS’s foundation launched an attack on the “powerful Jews, with a lot of money who are paying the media to form the social awareness of people.” He has also accused Roma parents of selling their young daughters.⁷⁷ Other members include, Philip Claey's of Vlaams Belang, who is a well known supporter of the late Léon Degrelle, a notorious Belgian Nazi, who later became a prominent Holocaust denier. Corneliu Vadim Tudor of the Greater Romania Party, a former propagandist of Nicolae Ceausescu⁷⁸ and anti-Semite, and who regularly attacks the Roma and Hungarian minorities living in Romania. While in the past, populist radical right groups mainly focused on purely national policies and showed little interest in cooperation, they have found common ground on issues such as immigration, the treatment of minorities, and keeping Turkey out of the European Union.

The Union for Europe of the Nations (UEN)⁷⁹ is another national conservative group within the European Parliament. They include the Danish People’s Party, the Northern League and the League of Polish Families among others. It is a generally Euroskeptic party which does not necessarily want to leave the European Union.

Both the ITS and the UEN include many members from states within East and Central Europe, whose historical experience as Communist satellite states largely dictated by the Soviet Union make them largely unwilling to concede to a new supra national structure such as the Brussels bureaucracy.

The voting power of the ITS will be mostly negligible since they are opposed by virtually all of the other political groups. Nonetheless, their notoriety at the European level attracts media attention and the fact that ITS organized a faction might provide them a certain amount of legitimacy internationally, which could translate into more popularity at home if the mainstream parties are not able to articulate their ideas into concrete and effective new policies within the European Union.

76 <http://www.its-pe.eu/pages/page.php?LANG=EN&TYPE=2>, download 12 October 2007.

77 In response to a Roma MEP receiving parliamentarian of the year. Stoyanov wrote to the organizers: “Well, Gentlemen, I must disagree with you. In my country there are tens of thousands of gypsy girls way more beautiful than this honourable one. In fact if you’re in the right place at the right time you even can buy one (around 12–14 years old) to be your loving wife. The best of them are very expensive – up to 5,000 euros a piece, wow!” as quoted in Kroeger, Alix, ‘EU’s surprise far right coalition,’ BBC News, Brussels.

78 The Former Communist President of Romania who was in office from 1965–1989.

79 Members include, Danish People’s Party, Irish Fianna Fáil, Italian - National Alliance, Northern League, Sicilian Alliance, Latvian For Fatherland and Freedom, Lithuanian – Peasant Popular Union and Order and Justice; Polish – Law and Justice, League of Polish Families, Self-Defence of the Republic of Poland and Polish Peasant Party.

The new group of Parliamentarians which have strong representation within the Eurosceptic parties could also play a role in the future policies of the European Union. While joining the European Union has brought with it many positive changes, building democratic institutions and producing economic growth, their have been heavy social costs, including social alienation, high unemployment and growing income discrepancies. The fact that the transition led to rapid social stratification that hurt many and only privileged a few caused a lot of antagonism towards those in power. Especially since the politics of transition included cooperation between the communist elite (old nomenklatura) and the anticommunist counter-elite, allowing current populists to vilify not only the old communists but the new liberal elite.⁸⁰ The paradox of this situation lies in the fact that it was not the failures but the successes of postcommunist liberalism which has given rise to the nationalist and populist groups.⁸¹ In an effort to bring economic prosperity (EU) and security and democracy (NATO), policies were presented not as “good” but as “necessary.” Liberal elites did not give their constituents the ability to protest or express dissatisfaction, opening the door for the populists. Krastev argues that in Central Europe there is a new political polarization, a rejection of consensual politics and the rise of populism.⁸² Parties that espouse strong nationalist language in Central and Eastern Europe such as in Romania and Slovakia and the anti-Communist parties in Poland and Hungary are enjoying electoral success in the face of economic insecurity. Rupnik argues that these populist movements’ could lead to further apprehension towards European integration and could make current EU member states even more resistant to further enlargement and could erode the political bonds within the EU.⁸³

European Security and NATO

In their position regarding Europe, populist radical right parties have also developed specific ideas about European defence policy. During the Cold War, the populist radical right greatly supported the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the absence of a European defence force that could realistically counterbalance the Soviet threat. After the Cold War, some parties broke with NATO, which was at that point seen as an instrument of US imperialism. The most extreme populist radical right parties such as the FN, LN and FPÖ believe NATO to be redundant and call for the creation of a European defence force.⁸⁴ The FPÖ’s Haider heaped scorn on the Maastricht Treaty as it ‘only contains a small segment on Common Foreign and Security Policy which makes it impossible to function’.⁸⁵ However, some groups still uphold a more realist foreign policy view of NATO as an interim insurance to protect them while they establish their own European security and defence policy. Other groups, influenced by Samuel Huntington’s clash of civilizations theory – which argued that post-Cold War conflict

80 Krastev, p. 60.

81 Krastev, *op. cit.*, p. 58.

82 Krastev, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

83 Rupnik, J. (2007), Anatomy of a crisis : The referendum and the dilemmas of the enlarged EU, Eurozine, < <http://www.eurozine.com/articles/2007-09-10-rupnik-en.html>>.

84 See chapter 6 by Evans.

85 See chapter 3 by Virchow.

would occur most frequently and violently along cultural instead of ideological lines, as under the Cold War – look upon the United States as the only true protector against the ongoing war on terror and ‘Islamification’ of Europe (Danish People’s Party, *Alleanza Nazionale*, the VB, *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*). Interestingly, as the contributions to this volume indicate, many populist radical right parties view future aggressions coming from their proximate neighbours: Central and Eastern Europeans view Russia and Germany as potential adversaries; the Italians fear their Balkan, African and Asian neighbours; the Austrians fear their Balkan neighbours and look upon Germany as a protector. Hungary and Poland still fear Russian and German aggression.⁸⁶

Populists generally call for a well-defined European security policy and believe that European integration will make them less reliant on the United States for security. Haider, for example, believes the EU can act as a counterweight to the United States, allowing Europe to delimit itself ‘from Slavic orthodoxy on the one hand and the Anglo-American sphere on the other.’⁸⁷ Europe can only protect itself from further aggression with a strong European military force. Both the populist radical right in Germany and Austria speak of Berlin and Vienna being back in the centre of the new Europe whose frontiers will be reminiscent of the Holy Roman Empire.⁸⁸ For the Italian *Alleanza Nazionale* (AN), Italy will play an important role in the formation of European interests because of its proximity to the Mediterranean, which they believe has become the gravitational centre of world geo-politics. The Austrian FPÖ hopes to enlarge its influence to encompass both Eastern and South Eastern Europe.⁸⁹

Security concerns weigh heavily in the populist radical right’s discussion of further European enlargement. Almost all parties agree that the European border should be drawn at the Urals and that the EU should eventually include all the Christian or occidental nations of Eastern Europe. They maintain that the EU represents a civilization based on Greek, Roman and Christian civilizations. Mudde argues that most parties would probably agree with the *Republikaner*’s statement that ‘[g]eographically Europe ends at the Mediterranean, at the Bosphorus, and at the Urals’.⁹⁰ The VB dreams of a united Indo-European Europe stretching from the Atlantic to the Urals, united in a loose Confederation of Peoples.⁹¹

Most populist radical right parties adamantly reject Turkish membership in the European Union, claiming it would lead to a clash of civilizations.⁹² In this position the populist radical right have captured a common sentiment shared by a number of European governments, even though Turkey’s eligibility as a European country to join has already been unanimously approved by the European Council on several occasions. According to the 2005 EU barometer, across the EU 25, 41 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘Turkey’s accession to the EU would favour the mutual comprehension of European and Muslim values’. However, 54 per cent of the respondents agreed with the statement that ‘the cultural differences between Turkey and the EU Member States are too significant to allow for this accession’.

86 See chapters on Central and Eastern Europe, Italy, Austria and Hungary.

87 See chapter on Austria.

88 See chapter 7 by Liang and chapter 3 by Virchow.

89 See chapter 3 by Virchow.

90 *Republikaner* Platform 2003. Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 171.

91 See chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al.

92 See chapter 3 by Virchow.

European hesitations and populist radical right rhetoric is supported by the politicians of the big three of Europe – France, Germany and the United Kingdom – all of whom have expressed reservations on a number of occasions about Turkey joining the European Union.⁹³

Immigration

Already before the fall of the Berlin Wall, populist radical right parties harboured ethno-pluralist fears about immigration. Yet they hoped that the eventual fall of the Soviet Union would lead to the creation of independent, neutral states with robust foreign policies, precluding the need for immigration and multiculturalism. This utopian vision did not materialize after the collapse of the Soviet Union; instead, the wave of migration from Eastern Europe and the conflict zones in the former Yugoslavia accelerated the capacity for the populist radical right parties to gain support based on anti-immigrant positions.⁹⁴

Immigration and related fears of cultural conflict figure heavily in the populist radical right agenda. One of the major political problems within the EU is that it opened its borders with the Schengen agreement while at the same time extending its borders with big bang enlargement without creating a common immigration policy beforehand. For the populist radical right, the effects of international migration have not only meant a loss of traditional group ties, traditional values and culture, but are increasingly being perceived as a security threat. The *Vlaams Blok* revealed these kinds of fears when it argued

there is no reason whatsoever, religious, political, historic, economic or cultural to accept Turkey as a member of the EU. ... The person who opens the door to Turkey, moves Europe's borders to Egypt, Syria, Iraq and the Caucasus, and flings open the gates to a new and massive tidal wave of immigration.⁹⁵

The populist radical right's reaction to the immigration issue plays on the increasingly negative perception of immigration in Europe. Media reports filled with accounts of illegal migration and human trafficking especially have caused public distrust and lack of confidence in politicians being able to address the problems effectively, despite the fact that European states are increasingly limiting immigration and some countries are attempting to block immigration all together. In a European Social Survey study

93 Dominique de Villepin argued that Turkey must recognize the present Republic of Cyprus before membership talks can resume. Jacques Chirac, during the campaign for the French referendum on the EU Constitutional treaty in 2005, backed calls for France to hold a referendum on whether Turkey should enter the European Union. Angela Merkel pledged to oppose Turkey's membership of the EU, and Austria's Finance Minister Karl-Heinz Grassler stated that he will strive to ensure that membership is not a realistic option for Turkey. Austin, G. and Parker, K. (2005) 'The Mono-Cultural Delusion: Turkey and Migration Politics', in Austin, G. et al. (2005), *Turks in Europe: Why Are We Afraid?* (London: Foreign Policy Centre), pp. 19–21.

94 Although some parties rise to power were due to country specific issues: taxes in Denmark; unification and the 'criminalization of history' in Germany. See Betz (2004), op. cit.

95 See chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al.

in 2003,⁹⁶ half of the respondents expressed a resistance to immigrants belonging to a different race or ethnic group rather than the majority population. These feelings are shared by a large majority of Europeans who believe that their country has reached the limits of cultural ethnic diversity. In 2003, in the EU 15, 60 per cent of people surveyed believed that ‘there is a limit to how many people of other races, religions or cultures a society can accept’ and ‘if there were to be more people belonging to these minority groups, we would have problems’.⁹⁷ According to the European Monitor Centre report⁹⁸ on European public attitudes towards migrants and minorities, 58 per cent of people surveyed held the dominant perception of minorities in Western and Eastern Europe as ‘a collective ethnic threat’.⁹⁹ In a recent Eurobarometer survey, respondents from across the EU ranked the importance of immigration higher than terrorism, pensions, taxation, education, housing, the environment, public transport, defence and foreign affairs.¹⁰⁰ In Britain, a public survey found that immigration was considered a more important problem than the economy, education, drugs or Europe.¹⁰¹ Luedtke argues that

EU citizens have been resistant to the idea of Brussels’ control over immigration *not* because of instrumental calculations regarding perceived strategic gains or losses from immigration cooperation and *not* because of their opinions of immigrants themselves, but because the proposed supranationalism of immigration control clashes with historically rooted *national identities*.¹⁰²

Precisely because of the cultural issues at heart of the immigration debates, several researchers have argued that populist radical right parties have achieved their greatest success with this issue, forcing moderate parties to adopt the positions of the right.¹⁰³ Over the years, the populist radical right claimed that all social problems of the state, be they job loss or insecurity, increased competition or criminal activity, are directly linked to immigration. Their argument that immigration is a direct threat to welfare and increased criminal activity has particularly managed to mobilize public opinion enough to force governments to change their immigration laws. Schain suggests that in France, fear of Le Pen managed to persuade the Rally for the Republic (RPR) and the Union for French Democracy (UDF) to adopt populist anti-immigrant rhetoric as

96 European Social Survey 2003, round I.

97 Chebel-d’Appolonia, A. (2006), ‘How Wonderful It Is to “Hate”’: The Use of Anti-Migrant Sentiments by ERPs’, paper presented at the CEVIPOF Conference on ‘The Radical Right and its Impact on Migration Politics and Policies’, Paris, France, the New York University in Paris, Center for Political Research at Sciences Po, 17–18 November.

98 European Monitor Centre on Racism and Xenophobia.

99 Canoy, M. et al. (2006), ‘Migration and Public Perception’, Bureau of European Policy Advisors, European Commission, <http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/publications/docs/bepa_migration_final_09_10_006_en.pdf>.

100 Eurobarometer 60, 2004

101 British Business Survey 2001.

102 Luedtke, A. (2005), ‘European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy Testing the Impact of National Identity’, *European Union Politics* 6:1, 83–112.

103 Norris, P. (2005), *Radical Right: Voters and Parties in the Electoral Market* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); Scharenberg (2006), op. cit.; Schain, M. (2002), *Shadows Over Europe: The Development and Impact of the Extreme Right in Western Europe* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan).

early as 1986 in an attempt to prevent further support for the FN. Pettigrew has argued that Austria also followed suit with more restrictive immigration policies when the FPÖ entered the coalition government with the *Österreichische Volkspartei* (ÖVP).¹⁰⁴ Scharenberg has shown that the *Dansk Folkeparti* (DF) managed to tighten Danish immigration laws after its success in 2001.¹⁰⁵ The Dutch government also copied this trend when it acted to remove tens of thousands of failed asylum seekers, a move heavily influenced by *Lijst Pim Fortuyn*'s success at the polls. The Swiss SVP also managed to have strong immigration and asylum legislation passed in 2006 through a national referendum after many years of propaganda that criminalized immigrants and asylum seekers. The author of the SVP initiative, a member of the Swiss Federal Council, and current Swiss Justice Minister, Christoph Blocher, has in the meantime become a role model on this issue for the populist radical right across Europe. The United Kingdom also promulgated new regulations to limit low-skilled workers from Bulgaria and Romania ever since they joined the EU in 2006, marking a departure from the open-door policy adopted after eight other former Eastern European communist states joined the EU in May 2004.

Islam

The greatest single group of 'foreigners' singled out by populist radical right groups are Muslims. Before and immediately after the Cold War, immigration anxieties focused on migrants from the developing world who were perceived to exploit Europe's welfare systems. This changed dramatically after the launch of the US-led war on terror in 2001, following the September terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. Subsequent events, including the 2004 murder of the Dutch filmmaker Theo Van Gogh by a Dutch-born Moroccan, the Madrid train and London bus bombings of 2005, the 2005 cartoon controversy in Denmark, which sparked rioting in Muslim countries, and the attempted bombings of British Airway flights as well as the weeks of unrest in France which following the death of two Muslim boys in 2006 all nurtured the idea of a growing culture clash between Islam and Europe.¹⁰⁶

Drawing on these events, the populist radical right portrays Islam as one of the greatest threats to Europe in the twenty-first century, replacing the old spectre of communism across Europe.¹⁰⁷ Bossi, the leader of the Italian LN, used the wars in the Balkans to attack the United States and Muslims by maintaining that the 'Christian Serbs' were attacked by NATO because they represented the 'ultimate obstacle to advance the global American and Muslim Empires'.¹⁰⁸ According to the Danish People's Party (DPP), Islam is anti-modern, anti-democratic, patriarchal, violent dogmatic religion belonging to a lower level of civilization.¹⁰⁹ Islam is a political religion that is contemptuous of human beings and anti-democratic, the *Republikaner*

104 Norris (2005), op. cit., p. 366.

105 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., p. 94.

106 Savage, T. (2004), 'Europe and Islam: Crescent Waxing, Cultures Clashing', *The Washington Quarterly*, 27:3, 25–50.

107 Savage (2004), op. cit., p. 46.

108 Betz (2003), p. 84–9; Mudde (2007), op. cit., p.85.

109 See chapter 5 by Goul Andersen.

contend, and whoever admits it into classrooms favours the establishment of a parallel Islamic society, the ultimate aim of which is to set up an Islamic theocracy.¹¹⁰ Pim Fortuyn argued that Islam is a backwards culture that was diametrically opposed to all the norms and values of Dutch identity. He maintained that democracy, the separation of church and state, equality of the sexes, freedom of thought, and religious freedoms were not compatible with Islam.¹¹¹ The LPF called for a stop to all Muslim immigration, pushed for stronger assimilation of immigrants and wanted to stop the Geneva Refugee Convention and prevent all economic migrants from entering the country.¹¹² The VB favours the introduction of an immigration and asylum policy that would make use of a list of ‘unsafe countries’ and believes the EU should take steps to amend the Geneva Conventions to include a territoriality principle which would allow only Europeans refugee status.¹¹³

The fear of Europe losing its religious identity has led to a remarkable reaffirmation of Europe’s Christian identity. The AN argues that there should be an acknowledgement of Christian roots inserted into the European Constitution.¹¹⁴ The VB and the LN as well as the Polish *Radio Marya* stress the incompatibility of Islam with their Christian beliefs. The Bulgarian *Ataka*, the Party of Great Romania (PRM) and the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (LDPR) all view their nation as essentially Orthodox Christian.¹¹⁵ Indeed, for the populist radical right, Islam will not only change the European way of life but will pose political, cultural, economic and security threats to the point where the Europeans can lose the right to their own home.¹¹⁶ A *Republikaner* article entitled ‘Mohammed ad [sic] portas’, claims that the conflict in France over the wearing of the hijab portends a potential *Kulturkampf* in Europe, which could have the same dimensions as the conflict between the government and religious forces in Algeria, a conflict that threatens to engulf all of Mediterranean Europe.¹¹⁷

This suggests that although the ‘Muslim question’ is intimately tied to the larger question of immigration, it transcends the latter. To be sure, immigration control and the fight against insecurity are still at the centre of the populist radical right election campaigns. However, these issues no longer define the populist radical right. With the cultural turn of the 1990s, the populist radical right defines itself primarily as an identitarian movement, which derives its identity and political legitimacy from a new politics based on claims of recognition.¹¹⁸ In the process, the populist radical right has opened up a new line of conflict that no longer fits into the traditional left–right schema. As a *Lega Nord* politician put it during the LN’s campaign to have crucifixes displayed in all public offices, this new line of conflict runs between those who ‘are in favor of a battle in defense of the traditions and cultures of the peoples’ and those

110 *Der neue Republikaner* 9, 1999, p. 3; *Verfassungsschutzbericht* 1999, p. 41.

111 Scharenberg (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 95.

112 *Ibid.*

113 See chapter 4 by Swyngedouw et al.

114 See chapter 9 by Tarchi.

115 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 85–6.

116 *Verfassungsschutzbericht* 1994, p. 56.

117 ‘Mohammed ad portas. Fundamentalisten auf dem Vormarsch: Fällt Frankreich?’, *Der Republikaner*, September 1990, p. 6.

118 Betz (2004), *op. cit.*, p. 134–5.

who, 'on the contrary, are opposed to it, promoting instead the building of a globalized society, in which all identitarian symbols are banished'.¹¹⁹

These views tap into a wider European anxiety about their Muslim citizens and residents. The Belgian politician Willy Claes, during his tenure as NATO Secretary-General, already in the mid-1990s claimed that the new threat to the alliance was Islam.¹²⁰ Besides the perception of a security threat, Europeans also regard Muslims as a direct challenge to the collective identity, traditional values and public politics of their societies, as has been demonstrated by heated controversies over the hijab as well as outrage on both sides regarding the Danish cartoons scandal.¹²¹ Demographic dynamics in Europe have also raised fears. The US National Council projects that with continued immigration and high Muslim fertility rates, Europe's Muslim population will double by 2025.¹²² Other estimates predict that today's Muslim population, which amounts to five per cent of the Europe's population, could rise to 20 per cent by 2050.¹²³ Muslim populations more than doubled in the last three decades.

Moreover, Europeans have not been successful in integrating their Muslim communities. Experts have argued that even second and third generation Muslims growing up in Europe feel disenfranchised in a society that does not accept them. These Muslims are politically marginalized – they do not fit national definitions of minorities, which are based primarily on ethnic and racial criteria – as well as economically marginalized due to unemployment rates for foreign-born nationals, that are twice as high as for native born citizens.¹²⁴ This anger spilled over into the streets of Paris and nationwide in France during the riots in September 2005, which was widely perceived as a culture clash between nativists and their Muslim communities. This threat is considered the greatest in countries that have large Islamic communities such as France, the Netherlands, and Germany. Fear of a new domestic security threat has been exacerbated by instability in the Middle East, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, which have contributed to the radicalization of Muslim youths, many of whom view the 'war on terror' as a 'war on Islam' and claim common cause with Muslims in the Israeli-occupied territories, Iraq, Chechnya, and elsewhere.¹²⁵

Savage argues that, as it has done historically, 'the world of Islam may do more to define and shape Europe in the twenty-first century than the United States, Russia, or even the European Union'. He regards the challenge as twofold: Europe must find a way to integrate its ghettoized and rapidly growing Muslim minority and externally must devise a viable approach to the primarily Muslim-populated volatile states, stretching from Casablanca to the Caucasus. The problem so far is that Europeans are

119 See chapter 2 by Betz and chapter 9 by Tarchi.

120 Betz (2004), op. cit., p. 150.

121 Savage (2004), op. cit., p. 43.

122 Gallis, P. et al. (2005), 'Muslims in Europe: Integration Policies in Selected Countries', *Congressional Service Reports on Foreign Policy and Regional Affairs*, <<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33166.pdf>>, p. 3.

123 Savage (2004), op. cit., pp. 25–50.

124 According to the International Migration Report released by the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development in 2004 as cited in International Institute for Strategic Studies 2005.

125 Gallis (2005), op. cit., p. 4.

pursuing a status quo approach at home and abroad, and are unwilling to adapt and engage and redefine relationship in the way that the new situation requires.¹²⁶

The spectre of a growing Muslim threat in Europe has given new life to populist radical right parties in Europe. Several countries (Austria, Denmark, Italy, Norway and Switzerland) must rely on the support of parties with anti-Muslim views within their coalitions to remain in European government.¹²⁷ As with the immigration issue, the populist radical right appear to have had an impact on wider European attitudes towards its Muslim citizens. The influence of the rhetoric of the populist radical right on more moderate mainstream parties is evident in new legislation to restrict immigration.¹²⁸ For some European countries the words ‘Muslim’ and ‘immigrant’ are virtually synonymous. Not only have their been tougher immigration laws but there is also now increased emphasis on national interests in EU policy debates.¹²⁹

The impact of Islamophobia is also visible in new religious practices. Thirteen of the 37 countries in Europe do not recognize Islam as a religion, even though it is at least the second-largest religion in 16 European countries.¹³⁰ In Denmark, a recent book entitled *‘Islamists and the Naïve’* has become a bestseller.¹³¹ The book compares Islam to Nazism and communism with the argument that they all represent a totalitarian ideology, and argues that those who underestimate the threat Islamists pose to Danish values are naïve since they underestimate the radicals’ zeal in achieving the ‘Islamization’ of Europe.¹³² The authors of the book are former social democrats; one of them, Karen Jespersen, was the former Danish Interior Minister in charge of immigration issues. In Denmark, the DPP has been successful because a growing number of Danes are against immigration from countries that do not have the same European culture and way of life.¹³³ Another example of populist radical right influence is so-called ‘Muslim tests’ which are designed to discourage Islamic immigrants from applying for citizenship. Since May 2006 would-be immigrants who want to settle in the Netherlands must take a language exam and watch a video that shows, among other images, two gay men kissing and a topless woman emerging from the sea. The message of this civic integration exam is obvious: those who cannot support the Dutch liberal lifestyle need not apply.

Anti-Semitism

No other issue recalls the populist radical right’s historical pedigree more than the continued importance it places on anti-Semitic rhetoric. Contemporary European populist radical right anti-Semitism is composed of four main themes: outright

126 Savage (2004), op. cit. See also Ash, T.G. (2002), ‘The Price of Parsley’, *The Guardian*, July 25, pp. 7–16; Davies, N. (1996), *Europe: A History* (Oxford University Press), pp. 251–8.

127 Savage (2004), op. cit.

128 Ibid, p. 41.

129 Ibid.

130 Ibid.

131 *Islamists and the Naïve* (2006) by Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittlekow.

132 Bilefsky, D. (2006) ‘Danish Wake-up Call on Islam’, *International Herald Tribune*, <<http://www.iht.com/articles/2006/09/25/news/denmark.php>>.

133 See chapter 5 by Goul Anderson.

Holocaust denial, attacks on the taboo of anti-Semitism (such as anti-racism laws), conspiracy theories that portray Jews as in charge of government, business and media, and finally sentiments that cross the line between objective criticism of Israeli policies and anti-Semitism.

After 1945, as a result of the Second World War and the Holocaust, domestic manifestations of anti-Semitism were less prevalent and were largely not considered *salonfähig* in most Western European states. As a result, some populist radical right parties have remained wary of embracing anti-Semitism too openly. In Central and Eastern Europe, the presence of anti-Semitism varies: in some countries, such as the Czech Republic and Slovenia, it barely exists, while in others, such as Hungary, Lithuania, Bulgaria, Poland and Russia, anti-Semitism has become widespread. Mudde has noted that in Hungary and Lithuania, almost a quarter of the population can be classified as anti-Semitic, and in Poland almost half the population has negative views towards Jews and Israelis.¹³⁴ In Hungary and Russia, nationalism is also strongly xenophobic, based on strong anti-Semitic sentiments.

Holocaust denial has become one of the most common modern forms of anti-Semitism, despite the fact that it is punishable by law – in ten European states, denial of the Holocaust can lead to fines or prison time.¹³⁵ During its EU presidency in 2007, Germany has sought the adoption of a European law on racism and xenophobia, including Holocaust denial. However, the laws have not forced Holocaust denial to disappear; instead, and perhaps as a result of these laws, Holocaust denial has gained in currency as a primary manifestation of anti-Semitism and as a means of demonstrating a willingness to break taboos. This was most recently revealed in a recent 2007 Holocaust denial conference in Tehran hosted by Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which was attended by 67 delegates from 30 countries.¹³⁶ Many attendees attempted to argue that mass murder was simply a myth.¹³⁷ Holocaust denial in this case is linked with the Israeli–Palestinian crisis: by denying the Holocaust as a myth, conferees attempted to discredit Jews in general and Israel in particular.¹³⁸ Among the populist radical right, there are a number of Holocaust sceptics and reductionists, including the DVU's Gerhard Frey, the NPD's Horst Mahler, the FN's Jean-Marie Le Pen and Bruno Gollnisch, and the LDPR's Vladimir Zhirinovskiy.

Linked to Holocaust denial is so-called 'secondary anti-Semitism', broadly defined as any form of attack on the taboo of expressing anti-Semitism. Broder described this type of anti-Semitism as embodying the sentiment that 'Germans will never forgive

134 Mudde (2007), *op. cit.*, p. 81.

135 Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Lithuania, Poland, Poland, Slovakia, Switzerland.

136 Conference participants included American David Duke, a former KKK leader and white supremacist, Australian Fredrick Toeben, jailed in Germany for incitement and insulting the memory of the dead, Frenchman Robert Faurisson, convicted in France under Holocaust denial laws, and Frenchman Georges Thiel, convicted in France under Holocaust denial laws.

137 Schorr, D. (2006), 'Iran's Holocaust-denial Conference: a Community of Hate', *The Christian Science Monitor*, <<http://www.csmonitor.com/2006/1222/p09s03-cods.html>>.

138 For Muslim extremists, Holocaust denial is also an attempt to force the West acknowledge the need to limit free speech, which they feel should apply to 'blasphemous' comments regarding Islam.

the Jews the existence of Auschwitz'. Secondary anti-Semitism is a mechanism to cope with Holocaust guilt. The FPÖ, *Republikaner*, the DVU, and the NPD use this strategy to turn the tables of German war guilt by maintaining that there is a Jewish conspiracy that attempts to weaken Germany by keeping Germans shackled to their past and in a permanent state of apology. The populist radical right interpretation of German history rests on relativizing German responsibility and actions during the Second World War and blaming other nations for provoking the war and committing atrocities. In their quest for a useable past, they cast Germans as victims of both the Nazis and Allied power designs, and blame the Jews for starting, supporting and being victimized by the war.¹³⁹ Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, who is currently senior parliamentary official and leader of the ultranationalist LDPR, also blames the Jews for starting the Second World War, provoking the Holocaust, sparking the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia – and destroying the country ever since. He has maintained that '[y]ou will always find Jews where war is raging because they realize that money flows where blood is spilled.'¹⁴⁰ Finally, he blames Jews for the rise of Nazism in Germany on the eve of the Second World War because 'there were too many Jews'.¹⁴¹

The populist radical right also peddles more traditional anti-Semitic canards. One is the claim that Jews control government, business and media, which they are using for their own designs, and that they are therefore responsible for society's woes.¹⁴² In some countries, especially in Eastern and Central Europe, the populist radical right laments that Jews have too much influence over the government. However, in a newer, more globalized context, Jews are now mostly vilified abroad, where they are represented as agents of foreign interests and powers.¹⁴³ Most anti-Semitic rhetoric is directed against the Jews who reside in the United States and Israel. One of the most common conspiracy theories perpetuated by the populist radical right is the belief that Jews have control over US government policy, and, by extension, global politics.

Finally, the Israeli–Palestinian conflict has also become an important issue around which anti-Semitic ideas have developed. Ever since the Jews formed their own state, they have been considered even more powerful by the populist radical right. Goldhagen argues that the image of the sly, stealthy and corrupting Jew – Shylock – has been largely replaced by the image of the 'Rambo' Jew, who through military and political power has become a subjugating, brutalizing killer. He either does the work himself, as in Israel, or employs others to do it for him, including the White House or the American 'East Coast' establishment.¹⁴⁴ The notion of militarized Jews controlling world institutions has led the populist radical right to maintain that the second Iraq

139 Liang, Christina (2002), *German Far Right Ideology in the Decade of German Unification*, thèse no. 641, IUHEI, Geneva.

140 Krichevsky, L. (1998), 'Russian Right-winger Gives Long Anti-Semitic Tirade', *Jewish News Weekly*, <http://www.jewishsf.com/content/2-0-/module/displaystory/story_id/8483>.

141 Ibid.

142 Department of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on International Relations (2004), *Report on Global Anti-Semitism*, US Department of State, <<http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/40258.htm>>.

143 Scharenberg (2006), op. cit., p. 101.

144 Goldhagen, D. (2004), 'The Globalization of Anti-Semitism', *Christian Action for Israel*, <<http://christianactionforisrael.org/antiholo/globalization.html>>.

war was orchestrated by Jews in a plot to take control over global finance, supported by the media under the influence of Jewish plutocrats.¹⁴⁵ For example, German radical populists maintain that ‘there is no war of the US against terrorism. We are witnesses of a global reign of terror which comes from the US under Jewish influence.’¹⁴⁶ István Czurka, leader of the MÍEP, suggests that there is a global conspiracy driven by American and Jewish capital that oppresses global interests via the IMF and the World Bank.¹⁴⁷ Czurka even celebrates the perpetrators of the 11 September 2001 attacks as ‘those who represent the oppressed people who have brought down the bastion of globalization to soot and ashes’.¹⁴⁸

Another example is Horst Mahler, the infamous left-wing militant of the *Baader-Meinhof* gang and who is now a celebrated member of the German NPD. Mahler is an aggressive anti-Semite and has openly declared that one of his main political and ideological goals is to destroy Judaism. For him the symbolic meaning of 11 September 2001 was that it represents a ‘war of extermination of the globalists by those who are attempting to protect the cultures of the peoples ... and which produced for the first time a military defeat on the American soil’. He also maintains that 11 September 2001 marks the beginning of a long Islamic war against the West to unseat the Jews from power.¹⁴⁹ This rhetoric no longer has anything to do with criticisms of Israeli foreign policy: as in the past, the Jews serve as a useful scapegoat upon whom to blame conflict in the Middle East, US imperialism, and the economic woes of globalization.¹⁵⁰ It should be noted that anti-Semitism is not a universal manifestation among all the populist radical right. Some parties have realized that this issue is toxic and could alienate them from less extremist voters. Others have reconsidered their perception of the militarized Jew as a potential ally in their fight against Islam in Europe. As Betz points out in a following chapter, *Vlaams Belang*’s DeWinter has become a staunch philo-Semite. A clash between Arabs and residents in the Jewish quarter of Antwerp on 3 April 2002 led DeWinter to take on the role as the protector of the Jewish community by insisting that there be more police protection in the area.¹⁵¹ DeWinter’s anti-Islamic remarks and support for Israeli foreign policy sit well with part of his new electorate, a large community of Hassidic Jews who have been supporting his candidacy in the latest elections.

DeWinter’s apparent philo-Semitism of course is rooted in an ethno-pluralist worldview. Israeli defence policy is lauded as a resolute defence against Islamic extremism, not because of respect for Jewish life and culture. Similarly, while

145 ‘What we have commonly accepted as democracy is Jewish authority, arranged through the authority to dispose over the global financial- and currency system and through the media power of the Jewish plutocrats.’ *Ibid.*, p. 101.

146 Weitzman, M. (2006), ‘Antisemitismus und Holocaust-Leugnung: Permanente Elemente des globalen Rechtsextremismus’, in Greven, T. and Grumke T. (eds.) (2006) *Globalisierter Rechts-extremismus? Die extremistische Recht in der Ära der Globalisierung*, (Wiesbaden : VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), *op. cit.*, p. 60.

147 Scharenberg (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 101–2.

148 *Ibid.*, p. 102.

149 *Ibid.*, p. 59.

150 *Department of State to the Committee on Foreign Relations and the Committee on International Relations (2004)*, *op. cit.*

151 Scharenberg (2006), *op. cit.*, footnote 17, p. 97.

Muslims are mostly perceived as a threat to the European way of life at home, they are praised for their ethnic struggle against Americans and Jews abroad. The Islamic fundamentalists' code of exclusion and conservatism sits well with many aspects of the populist radical right's vision of the world. Some populist radical right parties, while condemning the killing of civilians, embraced the 11 September 2001 attacks as a brave action against the ideology of America and the West and as a sign that US globalization and ideological hegemony will come to an end.¹⁵² Le Pen, who has made numerous anti-Semitic statements, recently shifted to become more philo-Islamic in order to gain votes from the disgruntled inhabitants of the French *banlieue*, which the FN believes might be a source of protest votes against the French political system.¹⁵³

Conclusion: Towards a Common Foreign Policy of Globalized Nationalism

Will the many strands of populist radical right foreign policy – anti-immigration, nativism, anti-globalism, anti-Americanism, anti-Zionism, anti-Semitism, and anti-Islamism – lead to a common foreign political outlook? Will their inherent nationalistic interests allow for transnational cooperation? Nationalism and internationalism are not mutually exclusive categories for today's populist radical right, as Grumke has rightly pointed out.¹⁵⁴ As was indicated earlier, they can be defined as globalization's greatest critics. However, in their struggle against globalization, they have managed to find universal themes that bind them with other radical right groups in Europe and across the globe. Grumke argues that they have created a transnational network which is supported by a collective identity and international compatible ideologies. Their collective identity is perpetuated by a racial and a cultural community based on Greek, Roman and Christian civilizations. Their compatible ideologies include pan-Arian racism and anti-Semitism.¹⁵⁵ They also share a core doctrine based on ethno-cultural pluralism whose main characteristic is a highly restrictive notion of nation, society, citizenship and democracy, which are seen as intricately tied to a culturally and ethnically homogenous community. Moreover, the enemies of the nation, once seen as primarily internal, are now increasingly seen as part of global networks themselves, be it radical Islamic terrorist groups, US-Israeli conspiracies, or elitist Eurocrats. This ethnopluralist thinking has united the populist radical right and inspired global cooperation and in the setting of increased economic, political and cultural globalization, has led to a common foreign policy outlook which can be described as globalized nationalism.¹⁵⁶

152 'Republikaner bekunden Mitgefühl mit den Opfern.' December 2001@ www.republikaner.de.

153 Gurfinkiel, M. (2006), 'Le Pen France's Le Pen To Strike a Deal With Muslims', *New York Sun*, <<http://www.nysun.com/article/27822>>.

154 Greven, T. and Grumke, T. "Enleitung: Die globalisierte Anti-Globalisierungsbewegung der extremistischen Rechten?" chapter in Greven, T. and Grumke T. (eds.) *Globalisierter Rechts-extremismus? Die extremistische Recht in der Ära der Globalisierung*, (Wiesbaden : VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften), *op. cit.* p. 9.

155 Grumke, Thomas. 'Die transnationale Infrastruktur der extremistischen Rechten', in Greven, T. and Grumke T. (eds.) (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 130.

156 Greven, T. (2006), 'Rechtsextreme Globalisierungskritik: Anti-globaler Gegenentwurf zu Neoliberalismus und Global Governance', in Greven and Grumke (eds.)

After the Second World War, the Nazis and other European fascists already cooperated in helping war criminals escape to Latin America and the Middle East – they even held small international gatherings. Oswald Mosley, the veteran British fascist leader, unsuccessfully attempted to organize a Europe-wide fascist party. Many more attempts at creating international far-right organizations ensued with little or no success.¹⁵⁷ Today, globalized nationalism has gained momentum in the instantaneous media world of the Internet and television, which can transmit far-right populist ideology via satellite across the globe. Some of the stories that originate in Europe are sent to the Middle East where they are further embellished and are sent back to Europe, the Americas, Asia and Africa. The populist radical right have been influenced by Antonio Gramsci's theory that the Left could only achieve its political aims by creating a 'cultural hegemony' of political and social discourse in order to shape a particular social and political reality. The *nouvelle droite* of the 1960s seized this idea and developed the strategy of '*metapolitics*', which sought to influence people by spreading right-wing ideology through mass media; today, the populist radical right has successfully implemented this idea via the Internet, including through websites, music downloads as well as 24-hour blogging.

As a result, globalization's greatest critics have become globalization's biggest political beneficiaries. Leaders of populist radical right groups meet together to discuss international cooperation, and organize international marches, rallies, Volksfests, rock concerts and conferences. As previously mentioned, the European Parliament's Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Party has managed to launch itself on the European stage. The populist radical right is increasingly taking advantage of the interdependent world in which global issues have an ever-stronger domestic dimension and domestic politics have an ever-stronger global dimension.

As will be discussed in Chapter 7, other extremist groups, including the neo-Nazi NPD, have come together to create a European National Front, which promotes networking and mutual support among far right groups in almost all European countries.

This shared vision of a struggle between globalized nationalism versus internationalist multiculturalism point to the fault lines in the larger ideological battle looming in the globalized economy. In his celebrated article 'End of History,' Francis Fukuyama argued that society had reached its endpoint in its ideological evolution with the end of communism and the emergence of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government. Several years later, in his equally celebrated article on the 'Clash of Civilizations,' Samuel Huntington criticized Fukuyama's vision and argued that the fundamental source of conflict in the twenty-first century would not be ideological or economic but in fact cultural. Joseph Nye has pointed out that both scholars oversimplified their positions, arguing that ethnic and cultural conflict tends to rise when national identities are under threat. Nye argues that we are actually marking a 'return to history', as the end of the Cold War replaced communism with ethnic, religious and national communalism as the chief ideological rivals to liberal capitalism.¹⁵⁸ As Filip DeWinter of

(2006), *op. cit.*, p. 16.

157 For a good historical overview see chapter 14 by Ahlemeyer.

158 Nye, J.S. (2000), *Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History*, 3rd edition. (New York: Longman Publishing Group) p. 266. See also Smith, A.D. (1995), *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity); Kaldor, M. (2004), 'Nationalism and Globalisation', *Nations and Nationalism* 10:1–2, 166–77; (1999),

the *Vlaams Belang* has argued, the exhaustion of the left–right conflict between Marxism and Liberalism that dominated the post-war period has led to a new cleavage between ‘identity versus multiculturalism’.¹⁵⁹

As in the past, this identity is strongly expressed in the populist radical rights’ foreign-political conceptualizations of their nation, Europe, and Europe’s place in the world – a vision that conceives a confederation of European peoples battling both the developed superpowers and much of the developing world in a bid to retain nativist notions of cultural identity and the welfare state. It has also become a defensive reaction to neoconservative or neoliberal globalization and neo-imperialism. There are also growing fears of new security threats, including the threats posed by Islamic migrants, fears of homegrown terrorists, organized crime and future global insecurities brought on by the on-going wars in the Middle East. As subsequent chapters will explore, the formulation of this foreign political vision varies greatly at the local level and in response to national political developments. Nonetheless, at the collective level, globalized nationalism has allowed these parties to cooperate at the international level. The populist radical right in Europe have developed for the first time a coherent foreign-political message – ‘Europe for the Europeans’ – and it remains to be seen how the European electorate will react.

Acronyms

AN	<i>Alleanza Nazionale</i> (National Alliance)
AE	Alternativa Española (Spanish Alternative)
AS	Azione Sociale (Social Action)
AS	Alternativa Sociale (Social Alternative)
BNP	British National Party
DF	<i>Dansk Folkeparti</i> (Danish People’s Party)
DPP	Danish People’s Party
DVU	Deutsche Volksunion (German People’s Union)
COMECON	Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
EU	European Union
FF	<i>Fianna Fáil</i> (Soldiers of Destiny)
FN	<i>Front national</i> (French National Front)
FPÖ	<i>Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs</i> (Austrian Freedom Party)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
ITS	Identity, Tradition, Sovereignty Group
LDPR	Liberal Democratic Party of Russia
LN	<i>Lega Nord</i> (Northern League)
LPF	<i>Lijst Pim Fortuyn</i> (Pim Fortuyn List)
LPR	<i>Liga Polskich Rodzin</i> (League of Polish Families)
MÍEP	<i>Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja</i> (Hungarian Justice and Life Party)
MS-FT	<i>Movimento Sociale-Fiamma Tricolore</i> (Social Movement-Tricolor Flame)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

‘The Nation: Real or Imagined’, Mortimer, E. and Fine, R. (eds.), *The Meaning of Ethnicity and Nationalism* (London: I.B. Tauris & Co.), pp. 41–2.

159 Betz (2004), *op. cit.*, chp. 2.

NPD	<i>Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands</i> (National Democratic Party of Germany)
NS	National Party (Czech Republic)
ÖVP	<i>Österreichische Volkspartei</i> (Austrian Peoples' Party)
PiS	Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice)
PRM	Partidul România Mare (Party of Great Romania)
REP	<i>Republikaner</i> (The Republicans)
RPR	Rassemblement pour la République (Rally for the Republic)
RWA	Right Wing Authoritarianism
SPR-RSČ	Sdružení pro republiku-Republikánská strana Československa (Association for the Republic-Republican Party of Czechoslovakia)
SVP	<i>Schweizer Volkspartei</i> (Swiss People's Party)
UDF	Union for French Democracy
UEN	Union for Europe of the Nations
UN	United Nations
VB	<i>Vlaams Blok</i> (Flemish Block)
<i>VB</i>	<i>Vlaams Belang</i> (Flemish Interest)
WTO	World Trade Organization

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