

# WINNING HEARTS AND MINDS FOR EUROPE

## The Impact of News and Symbols on Civic and Cultural European Identity

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This article empirically explores the impact of symbols of European integration and good or bad news about Europe on individuals' European identity. The analysis is based on a distinction between civic and cultural components of identity, which enables testing of the model in a way that could not be done with existing survey instruments. The model depicts these two components as conceptually and empirically distinct and responding differently to various cues in the environment. The findings show that many respondents identify with Europe and the EU, mostly in civic terms, and explain how citizens and institutions interact to nurture identities. They show the strong impact of symbols and news on European identity. Other findings include the predominant effect of symbols on cultural identity and news on civic identity. The results have profound implications for our understanding of European integration, political behavior, and minority integration in multicultural societies.

**Keywords:** *European Union; European integration; European identity; political identities; political communication; media*

### POLITICAL IDENTITIES, POLITICAL COMMUNITIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL LEGITIMACY

When Brussels started its revolution against the Dutch occupation in July 1830, demonstrators were happily carrying French flags, and the heavily censored media were keen to dismiss the very idea of Belgium, which had not existed as a distinct political community since 57 B.C. A few days

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before the official declaration of independence in September 1830, a group of young revolutionary bourgeois decided that the Belgian revolution would not be successful unless they managed to create the sense of a distinct Belgian identity among the largely antioccupation Belgian population. They decided in favor of the traditional flag of the old Duchy of Brabant—defunct for more than 5 centuries—and had several of them made in small shops and distributed to demonstrators. Then, one of the young revolutionaries, an actor called Louis-Alexandre Déchet, also known as Jenneval, wrote in a few hours the words of the Brabançonne, which became the Belgian national anthem. After the successful revolution, the new government also made sure that the new Belgian identity would be further reinforced by cooperative newspapers and by a unifying influence of the Catholic Church.

All new political systems have been highly conscious of this need to generate a new mass political identity and have wondered how they could promote it. In the context of European integration, criticized for its democratic deficit, this need seems to be even more pronounced. Indeed, European integration, becoming more and more political after having achieved most of its purely pacific and economic goals, would ideally progress and assert its legitimacy on the basis of both a fundamentally democratic character and its relation to a mass European identity. A certain legitimacy can be maintained in the absence of one of these elements but probably not of both. Hence, there exists the repeated desire of the European elite to create or reinforce a mass European identity over the past 50 years.

The relationship between the top-down messages sent by the elite and how citizens respond to them has been both fascinating and puzzling for policy makers, political oppositions, and political observers alike. Whether in the context of European unification, the integration of ethnic or immigrant minorities in Western democracies, or the creation of new states, one of the most significant—and unresolved—puzzles of the study of states and nations has been to understand how political institutions can influence the level of political identification of citizens with their political systems.

Whereas recent scholarly literature has shown that political identities can and should be conceived of as multiple and complementary (Licata, 2000; Scharpf, 1998), little has been done by political scientists to understand whether the political identities of an individual can evolve. In the same way, even though political sociology has long supposed that political identities (as opposed to political attitudes) are also affected by political communication (Anderson, 1991), the effect on the formation of political identities of political institutions and the media through political communication, symbolic campaigns, and news messages has not been assessed empirically. This is, of course, in many respects, a matter of crucial importance. It may, indeed,

require policy makers to modify their ideas about what should be done to create or modify attitudes toward a new political community (such as the European Union or a new democracy) and to integrate new or different human groups in a polity (such as new immigrants and ethnic minorities) and have them accepted by the dominant communities.

Fundamentally, political identities involve how individuals perceive and define who are the “us” and therefore, by contrast, who are the “them”, or the out-groups that are implicitly excluded from a community. In turn, the definition of this symbolic boundary may help in the emergence, modification, or development of a new political identity, which have long been felt to be necessary for the legitimacy of newly created political communities (see, e.g., de Tocqueville, 1835; ). This may also be considered essential for the success of these new states, as those failing to create a mass political identity have often experienced massive problems of lack of civic cohesion and exclusion (see, e.g., Wodak, 1999, on Austria).

This article seeks to understand how political identities in general, and European identity in particular, are affected by top-down messages, whether they are the development of institutional symbols of a political system or the news conveyed by the mass media to inform citizens about the political system in question. It begins by discussing how symbols of European integration and news on Europe may be expected to affect citizens’ levels of European identity. The article then develops a more sophisticated understanding of what European identity is and how it can be measured. This understanding is based on the distinction between two major components of identity, cultural and civic. The model is then tested using a three-country comparative experiment with 212 participants. The final sections go on to explore the implications of the evidence for our understanding of the emergence of a European identity, its main components, and the way the civic and cultural components of identity react to symbols of and news about a united Europe. Finally, the article turns to the general political, public policy, and political science implications of our results.

### **THE RESEARCH QUESTION: CAN MESSAGES AND SYMBOLS INFLUENCE CITIZENS’ LEVELS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY?**

#### **GOOD AND BAD NEWS ON EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

Traditional studies of political communication have primarily focused on the influence of the mass media on citizens’ perceptions and attitudes in an

electoral context (see Iyengar, Peters, & Kinder, 1982; Norris, Curtice, Sanders, Scammell, & Semetko, 1999). The effect of political communication on deeper levels of citizens' perceptions, however, has remained unexplored. Historical and psychological studies have long suspected the existence of an effect of political persuasion—from traditional newspaper articles to propaganda—on citizens' belief systems in terms of ideology, prejudices, and fundamental values (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1987; Meinhof & Galasinski, 2000; Thiesse, 1999). Similarly, several recent studies have assessed the effects of the way the media treat Europe on citizens' attitudes toward European integration (e.g., Semetko, de Vreese, & Peter, 2000). Nevertheless, no empirical study of the effects of political communication has explicitly targeted political identities *per se* or explored the possibility that repeated and consistent top-down messages might end up modifying people's very perception of who they are and what political communities they belong to. This is, in large part, because many scholars have assumed that political identities were either unique and incompatible or at least fixed and unlikely to evolve under the effect of any form of external stimulation.

Yet traditional studies based on the effects of political socialization (Greenstein, 1969; Inglehart, 1990; Miller, 2001) as well as works studying the interrelationship between specific and diffuse support toward political institutions, particularly in the European context, suggest that what consistently modifies specific perceptions and appraisal of policies and institutions may, in turn, affect the deeper beliefs and, ultimately, the very identity of an individual. To expect that good and bad news about Europe will affect the citizens' sense of identification with Europe seems to be all the more consistent with what we know of citizens' perceptions of the main nature of European integration. Authors have shown that this nature remains extremely complex, variable, and sometimes unclear (Bruter, 2000; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Gabel, 1998).

Our first expectation is, therefore, that systematic exposure to good news on European integration is likely to increase a citizen's sense of identification with Europe, whereas systematic exposure to bad news may threaten a sense of European identity. What has often been identified as "short-term factors" in studies of political behavior (Campbell, Converse, Miller, & Stokes, 1960) may influence not only the spontaneous attitudes and behaviors of citizens but also their fundamental beliefs and identities in a process of continuing political socialization. Thus pro-European or Eurosceptic media will be expected to have an effect on citizens' European identity.

**SYMBOLS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION  
AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

Whereas news represents a direct form of political communication that is largely controlled by the mass media, states and institutions have long been suspected of using indirect forms of political messages to try to modify citizens' perceptions of their political community. Historians and sometimes geographers have studied the political use of state symbols by the elite to define a given community by means of imagery and symbols and maps, both in the case of national or subnational communities (e.g., McCartney & Bryson, 1994). The political nature of conflicting maps and images of Europe has also been addressed (Black, 1997; Lewis & Wiggen, 1997; Pastoureau & Schmidt, 1990; Wintle, 1996). Structuralist theorists were the first, however, to clearly identify the potential impact of these political symbols of states and systems on citizens' perceptions (e.g., Castoriadis, 1975; Habermas, 1996), but they did so without providing any thought on the actual link between perceptions of political communities and processes of identification. Their work is also more theoretical than empirical.

In the context of European integration, it is clear that central institutions, imitating traditional states, have made strong efforts to try to provide the European political community with a set of proper national symbols. These include a flag, an anthem, a national day, a purposeful European-only design for Euro banknotes, and so forth. The implicit rationale of the efforts of European institutions to provide the European Union with a comprehensive set of symbols was the idea that it would reinforce the citizens' sense of belonging to their new political community. This goal of European policy makers is, in fact, quite explicitly mentioned in several official documents of the European Communities (to mention only two examples, see European Commission, 1993; European Monetary Institute, 1996).

We can thus take the insights of structuralist theory and the assumptions of European institutions further and formalize them theoretically. We theorize that exposure to symbols of a political community, beyond modifying popular perceptions of what this community is, will also affect its citizens' sense of identity. In the context of European integration, this statement can be rephrased as the expectation that exposure to symbols of European integration reinforces the citizens' sense of European identity, complementing our expectation that good and bad news about Europe will impact the level of European identity of citizens (as shown in Figure 1).

Yet in order to measure whether the messages about Europe (whether citizens are exposed to good or bad news) or the symbols of European integration have an effect on European identity, we need a clear understanding of




Figure 1. Model of the influence of news and symbols on European identity.

what European identity is. Such an understanding should also provide us with ways of measuring political identities. Indeed, current ways of measuring and understanding political identities do not enable us to test the impact of top-down messages on citizen identity in any efficient way. The next two sections, therefore, propose a conceptual and empirical framework, which will allow us to measure directly and specifically an individual's level of European identity using innovative survey instruments, and present the research design that will be used to test the two hypotheses developed above.

### WHAT IS EUROPEAN IDENTITY?

The question of what defines Europe as a consistent political, cultural, and social community has attracted enormous attention in the fields of political science, history, sociology, and anthropology. The process of unification of the European continent in the second half of the 20th century has indeed raised questions about what unites people from Greece to Sweden and from the United Kingdom to Austria in terms of cultural heritage and social and political values (see, e.g., Habermas, 1992; Shore, 1993; Wintle, 1996). Similarly, significant progress has been made by political scientists in understanding the attitudes of public opinion toward European integration and differences in support for the European project. The work of authors such as Eichenberg and Dalton (1993), Franklin and Wlezien (1997), and Gabel (1998), to mention just a few, has largely contributed to a better knowledge of what makes citizens support European integration.

By contrast, the emergence of a mass European identity and the causes of differences in citizens' levels of European identity have been seriously under-studied by political scientists, particularly in empirical terms. Many authors have implicitly tended to just equate empirically, if not conceptually,

European identity and support for European integration (Dalton, 1996; Inglehart, 1990). Others have based their studies on potentially problematic empirical evidence (Duchesne & Frogner, 1995) because traditional instruments of analysis of public opinion in Europe, such as Eurobarometer, provide scholars with extremely poor and inadequate instruments to measure European identity; they have clear validity problems. The main Eurobarometer questions (European Commission, 2001) used by scholars to measure European identity are, indeed, highly problematic. First, most ask respondents about their European identity only in relation to their national identity by employing questions such as, "Do you feel British only, British and European, European and British or European only?" Such questions ignore the fact, now well-established in the literature, that European and national identities tend to be positively correlated rather than opposed (Bruter, 2001; Licata, 2000). Second, the questions are problematic because they ask respondents how they "see themselves in the future" (European Commission, 2001), thus creating a huge ambiguity between identity and prediction. However, even perfecting these questions would not be enough. Indeed, a purely self-claimed political identity remains, as put by Burgess, a "prisoner of language."<sup>1</sup> When two individuals claim to "feel European," they might mean totally different things in terms of both the intensity of the feeling they describe and the imagined political community they refer to. This implies problems of comparability that greatly limit the type of research questions that can be answered with these indicators. What is needed is to capture some more specific dimensions of what we call European identity, if only to understand what people mean when they claim to feel European or not. The absence of such indicators has made it impossible for scholars to close the debate on whether or not a mass European identity now exists. It is therefore necessary to specify a conceptual and analytical framework that may allow us to further understand the emergence of a European identity.

As explained, a conceptual framework designed to understand European identity must clearly integrate it into a system of multiple political identities. Citizens will not necessarily be expected to feel European *or* French (or Spanish *or* Catalan), but they will be able to cumulate, at different levels of intensity, a variety of political, social, and personal components of their identity. One could feel British and English and European and Black, or none of those. As a consequence, the intensity of the various components of an individual's identity should be understood to vary independently, which undermines the assumptions underlying some of the main questions put forward by Eurobarometer designers to try to capture European identity.

1. Round table on institutions and identity. Florence, EUI, June 9-11, 2000.

### CIVIC AND CULTURAL COMPONENTS OF A EUROPEAN POLITICAL IDENTITY

The second purpose of a conceptual framework of study for European identity is to understand the complexity of how people may perceive the nature of their attachment to their political community. As explained above, one of the main difficulties in comparing individuals' levels of European identity is that *identity* and *Europe* have no common definition across individuals as a political community. In other words, it seems difficult to make sense of differences across levels of European identity without understanding better what people can mean when they explain that they do feel European and without identifying some systematic components of political identities. The measurement model proposed here ties components of political identities to traditional definitions of what makes a nation. Principally, three main theories defining what nations are have been used by political scientists since the 18th century. The French Revolution provided the first significant conception of a nation based simply on citizenship (Bernstein & Milza, 1994) when the Revolutionary army shouted "Vive la nation!" at the Valmy battle of 1792. German thinkers of the 19th century (Fichte, 1845; von Herder, 1913) proposed a counterdefinition to the universalistic French perspective by stating that nations were based on a common culture (and particularly a common language). Finally, Renan (1882) tried to unify the two contradictory definitions by stating that nations were simply based on a common desire to live together, leading to the legal international concept of the right to self-determination in the 20th century.

Based on these three definitions, we propose to target, in addition to the spontaneous evaluation of one's identity, two separate components of political identities, which we call civic and cultural.

The European civic identity of respondents can be understood as the degree to which they feel that they are citizens of a European political system, whose rules, laws, and rights have an influence on their daily life. It is relatively close to Habermas's (1992) idea about the emergence of a "constitutional patriotism" in political systems. To put it yet another way, civic identity refers to citizens' identification with their political system as an institutional frame, that is, their state. Civic identifiers will identify with European integration as a political project whether they feel a sense of commonality (cultural, normative, philosophical, etc.) a priori with the other citizens of the European Union.

The European cultural identity of citizens is best described as individuals' perceptions that fellow Europeans are closer to them than non-Europeans. That means that cultural identity refers to their identification with their politi-

cal community as a human group, regardless of the nature of the political system. Similarly, when talking about the possibility of a cultural identification of the citizens with Europe, we recognize the diversity of the common features that can be identified by individuals as creating a bond among Europeans. The perception of a shared European heritage, regardless of so-called objective historical reality, might include any form of common history; moral, religious, or ethnic traditions; philosophical, political, or moral norms and values; and so forth.

This distinction underlines why it is not possible to refer to political identities as simple examples of social identity. Whereas the cultural component of political identity—this definition of who are the “us”—may be understood as a social identity, this is not the case for what we define as civic identity. Indeed, as defined above, civic identity remains independent of the social group ruled by a political system.

It is of particular interest to examine whether the spontaneous or general self-perception of an individual’s European identity is closer to either of its two objective components—that is, what individuals mean when they say that they feel (or do not feel) European. It is also very important to try to identify which of the two components of a European identity is dominant, if the components react similarly to political communication and other forms of stimulation, and what decides whether a citizen will privilege the civic or cultural component of European identity.

Based on these criteria, we used 12 variables to measure the three components of the European identity of every participant to the experiment. Six of the variables are designed to measure the European civic identity of respondents. Four of the variables target the cultural component of their European identity. Finally, two very direct and open questions measure the general European identity of the participants. The questionnaire concerned with the measurement of the dependent variable also includes scaling controls in the form of occasional questions about the national and subnational identities of citizens. The questionnaires and the measurement strategy they embody are set out and discussed in Appendix A.<sup>2</sup>

2. Note that Appendix A also explains what questions correspond to the variables referred to as General 1 and General 2, Civic 1 through Civic 6, and Cultural 1 through Cultural 4 in the corpus of this article.

## RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODS OF INVESTIGATION

The research design for this study is experimental. Scholars specializing in the study of the effects of political communication have long realized that the very nature of the hypotheses they try to test requires a break from the main techniques, such as mass surveys, used by behavioral political scientists. Almost all scholars have, in fact, chosen to use experimental techniques imported from psychology (Iyengar et al., 1982; Norris et al., 1999). Experiments allow a very precise capture of the dynamics of citizens' reactions to specific stimuli while controlling for other factors. Any other technique would be fragile, largely because it would be impossible to monitor precisely and comprehensively what news individuals are exposed to in a natural context.

For exactly the same reasons, an experimental design also seems to be the most appropriate way to analyze the effect of symbols of European integration on citizens' European identity. The experimental design proposed here, although fairly simple, attempts to answer some of the doubts usually raised about experiments done by political scientists. First, it is comparative, with three samples from France, Britain, and the Netherlands. Second, without being true representative samples, the participants are drawn from a variety of age groups, locations, and social and economic backgrounds, although it includes a high proportion of young people.<sup>3</sup> In total, 212 people participated in the experiment across the three countries, which is also far more than is usual with such designs.<sup>4</sup>

The experimental stimulus took the form of a fake newspaper extract on Europe, comprising several articles and several photographs. There were two versions of the articles, one in which all the articles reported good news on Europe (e.g., good economic news, international and diplomatic successes

3. The respondents were recruited in the university areas of the cities visited; hence, there is an overrepresentation of students. The respondents, when asked to participate, were offered an incentive in a form of a drink voucher in a café of a value of about 1 pound sterling or equivalent (about £1.60). To that extent, the respondents were all voluntary. To respect ethic concerns without biasing the results of the experiments, when asked to participate, the respondents were told the study was on "the media and Europe." All three samples were balanced gender-wise and varied in regard to most social, demographic, and geographical variables, none of which has a significant impact in any of the experimental equations. Whereas respondents' ages varied between 18 and 63, with 18- to 30-year-olds representing close to half of the sample, age does not have a significant impact in any of the experimental equations.

4. For comparison, Iyengar, Peters, and Kinder's (1982) experiments were conducted on less than 30 participants each, about 30% of which were unemployed, and all coming from New Haven, Connecticut.

for the EU, etc.) and the other in which all the articles reported bad news on Europe (e.g., news on bureaucratic chaos, poor economic performance of the Euro, etc.). Similarly, there were two versions of the photographs included in the newspaper. One of them was a set of photographs representing or including symbols of European integration (flag, passport, etc.), and the other set included placebo photographs (landscapes, people, etc.).

The respondents in each location were randomly divided into four groups receiving the four possible types of newspapers, that is, one with good news and symbols, one with good news and neutral photographs, one with bad news and symbols, and one with bad news and neutral photographs. To be able to control for a number of variables, the respondents were asked to answer questions before the experiment. We evaluated their economic, social, and demographic background; their political preferences; and their level of European identity before being handed the newspaper. Pretest European identity was measured by a proxy variable that targeted support for European integration. A few hours after the experiment, the participants were asked to fill in a second questionnaire that measured their level of European identity and its general, civic, and cultural components as described above. One of the aspects of this measurement strategy is that it allowed us to tie our specific questions on European identity to more traditional Eurobarometer questions. In turn, this enables us to replicate the findings of the experiment using time-series mass survey data.

## **RESULTS: SYMBOLS, NEWS, AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

### **THE NATURE OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

The experimental findings first confirm the prevalence of an identity with Europe among the respondents. Table 1 shows that a majority of respondents tend to identify with Europe in terms of what it means to them as citizens. This means, for example, that they would feel aggrieved if they saw someone burning a European flag, they approve of a common European passport, they want to see the European flag next to national flags when a head of state makes a public allocution on TV, and so on. Similarly, the 212 citizens surveyed, on the whole, also identify with Europe culturally; that is, they tend to feel relatively closer to fellow European citizens than to non-Europeans. A majority of them believe that there is such a thing as a certain shared European heritage, and, in fake sports events, tend to systematically favor the victory of European teams over non-European teams of all sorts (North Ameri-

Table 1  
*Breakdown of the Sample in Terms of Positive and Negative Identifiers*

	Whole	France	The Netherlands	The United Kingdom
Civic ID				
Positive	69.6	85.6	62.0	50.0
Negative	30.4	14.4	38.0	50.0
Cultural ID <sup>a</sup>				
Positive	68.1	82.5	66.0	46.7
Negative	31.9	17.5	34.0	53.3
Cultural ID <sup>b</sup>				
Positive	73.4	87.6	70.0	53.3
Negative	26.6	12.4	30.0	46.7

*Note:* Entries are percentages of the total sample. Negative represents the proportion of respondents with an index score of 0.5 or lower. Positive are all respondents with a score greater than 0.5. The index score of 0.5 is the score that a respondent would obtain if he chose the *indifferent* option whenever possible and the *don't know* option in all remaining cases.

a. Index excludes the *games* variable. Please see Appendix B for detail on the measurement.

b. Index includes the *games* variable. Please see Appendix B for detail on the measurement.

can, African, Asian, Arabic, etc.). Particularly striking are the results for this last variable. Overall, more than 80% of the respondents across countries have chosen systematically all 5 European teams; this says something about the underlying level of European identity that often seems to go unnoticed when one only uses the traditional Eurobarometer measures of European identity.

This confirms that in both civic and cultural terms, there seems to be such a thing as a fairly widespread European identity; it may vary across individuals and time and is therefore worth studying carefully. Again, Table 1 shows that, on the whole, an overwhelming majority of respondents (about 70%) situate themselves on the high end of the range of strength of European identity. Moreover, a positive correlation of .17 between general European identity and national identity indicates how misleading questions opposing European and national identities are. When the two are measured separately, respondents tend to show high levels of identification with both. This positive correlation between national identity and level of overall European identity of .17, proves that national identifiers also tend to be European identifiers. This finding is complemented by other positive correlations of similar amplitudes between European and regional (.13) and local (.07) identities, respectively, although the latest coefficient is not statistically significant.

We also see, as shown in Appendix B, that civic and cultural identities are distinct and well-measured by the questions posed in the survey. A factor analysis of the nine items measuring the civic and cultural dimensions of

European identity gives a clear two-factor solution. All six civic items load primarily on a civic factor and all three cultural items load on a second cultural factor as shown in Table B1. The only real exception is the first cultural variable (games), which, as explained earlier, is so skewed that it does not correlate well with the other cultural indicators and is therefore excluded from most of the analysis.

Finally, we see that political identities, although robust, also vary over time. This is shown by the effect of the experimental stimuli and by the time-series confirmation run by Bruter (2001). Indeed, the very fact that the experiment shows an evolution of citizens' identity before and after the stimulus confirms the aggregate-level findings of evolving political identities. However, we will now evaluate more precisely the specific potential impact of political messages and symbols on the feelings of European identity of citizens.

#### **HOW POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND ELITES INFLUENCE POLITICAL IDENTITIES**

Is identity with Europe likely to be influenced by messages from the media and the use of symbols aimed at winning over public support? The results of the experiment suggest that it clearly is. Regression analyses were performed to assess the intensity of the effect of being exposed to good or bad news on Europe and of being exposed or not to symbols of European integration, controlling for any external influence, and particularly for the factors that we identified above. The regressions were run for the whole sample and individually for the three-country subsamples. Their results are presented in Tables 2, 3, and 4. Each table includes effects of the two experimental independent variables and of the pretest variable (i.e., the level of European identity of respondents before reading the newspaper extracts). They also include the control variables that were significant—or nearly significant—in the general model or in at least one of the country regressions.

The most important finding is that, as mentioned above, all three regressions show that European identity can, and does, vary over time as a result of media communication and exposure to symbols of European integration. In all three models, the regression coefficients, which assess the influence of the variable on European identity, of both news on Europe and symbols of European unity are statistically significant and unexpectedly high. That shows that elite and institutional messages have a very clear impact on citizens' identity.

This is reinforced by the relatively low regression coefficient associated with the pretest variable in all three models. Moreover, all three models show

*(text continues on p. 1164)*

Table 2  
*News, Symbols, and European Identity*

Variable	General			France			The United Kingdom			The Netherlands		
	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$
News	0.82	0.13	0.38**	0.70	0.17	0.36**	1.13	0.28	0.44**	0.74	0.24	0.35**
Symbols	0.63	0.12	0.29**	0.73	0.17	0.38**	0.50	0.27	0.20*	0.51	0.23	0.24*
Languages	0.02	0.08	0.02	0.01	0.13	0.00	0.10	0.14	0.09	-0.25	0.17	-0.16
France	0.28	0.16	0.13*									
The Netherlands	-0.07	0.19	-0.03									
Pretest	0.36	0.06	0.32**	0.18	0.09	0.18*	0.48	0.16	0.37**	0.52	0.12	0.48**
Constant	2.77	0.17		3.09	0.26		2.81	0.18		2.74	0.14	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.38			0.28			0.48			0.38		

*Note:* Entries are unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients.  $N = 212$  (France = 97; the Netherlands = 60; the United Kingdom = 55).  
 \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .10$ .

Table 3  
*News, Symbols, and the Civic Component of European Identity*

Variable	General			The United Kingdom			France			The Netherlands		
	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$
News	1.00	0.11	0.51**	0.94	0.23	0.47**	1.04	0.16	0.52**	0.94	0.20	0.48**
Symbols	0.63	0.10	0.32**	0.41	0.21	0.21*	0.81	0.15	0.41**	0.45	0.19	0.23*
Life in Europe	0.12	0.09	0.07	0.12	0.11	-0.13	0.05	0.12	0.03	0.22	0.15	0.16
Languages	0.06	0.06	0.04	0.05	0.21	0.03	0.11	0.13	0.06	0.27	0.15	0.18*
Pretest	0.20	0.05	0.20**	0.46	0.12	0.46**	0.09	0.08	0.09	0.26	0.10	0.26**
Constant	-0.94	0.13		-0.57	0.21		-1.06	0.24		-1.31	0.32	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.45			0.48			0.44			0.48		

*Note:* Entries are unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients.  $N = 212$  (France = 97; the Netherlands = 60; the United Kingdom = 55).  
 \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .10$ .

Table 4  
*News, Symbols, and the Cultural Component of European Identity*

Variable	General			The United Kingdom			France			The Netherlands		
	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$	<i>b</i>	<i>se</i>	$\beta$
News	0.45	0.11	0.23**	0.50	0.24	0.25**	0.46	0.15	0.24**	0.30	0.22	0.16
Symbols	1.08	0.11	0.55**	0.77	0.25	0.39**	1.24	0.15	0.63**	0.91	0.21	0.48**
European origin	0.09	0.14	0.04	0.51	0.38	0.17	0.13	0.19	0.05	-0.14	0.29	-0.05
Languages	0.01	0.06	0.01	-0.12	0.12	-0.13	-0.04	0.12	-0.03	0.12	0.15	0.09
Pretest	0.17	0.05	0.18**	0.41	0.14	0.40**	0.03	0.08	0.03	0.26	0.11	0.27*
Ideology	0.10	0.03	0.18**	0.10	0.09	0.14	0.07	0.04	0.14*	0.16	0.08	0.24*
Constant	-1.16	0.18		-0.93	0.38		-1.06	0.27		-1.36	0.48	
Adjusted $R^2$	0.43			0.39			0.47			0.41		

*Note:* Entries are unstandardized and standardized regression coefficients.  $N = 212$  (France = 97; the Netherlands = 60; the United Kingdom = 55).  
 \*\* $p < .01$ . \* $p < .10$ .




Figure 2. Effect of exposure to good versus bad news on levels of European identity.

very high levels of variance explained, on the whole, by exposure to news on Europe and symbols of the European Union. The  $R^2$  values of all three models are between 0.38 and 0.45 for a fairly large sample of 212 respondents, and a limited number of variables entered in the equation. These results are especially encouraging since behavioral models, especially those using experimental designs (Norris et al., 1999, Iyengar et al., 1982), do not generally tend to explain such high levels of variance. Let us now see more precisely what these models tell us about specific effects of media communication and the use of symbols on European identity, addressing each in turn.

#### GOOD NEWS, BAD NEWS, AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY

As is very clear from Figure 2, the most striking result of these analyses is that exposure to good or bad news on European integration matters in terms of its effects on an individual's European identity. Persistent good news on Europe—its achievements and its successes—modifies citizens' perceptions

of the unification process and, in turn, clearly influences their likelihood of identifying with Europe. Conversely, being systematically exposed to bad news on European integration—its failures and its threats—damages citizens' perception of Europe's record and, in turn, also makes them less likely to feel part of Europe.

It is also very clear from Figure 2, however, that the effect of news is far stronger on the civic component of European identity than on its cultural component. The standardized regression coefficient of the news variable is 0.51 in the civic identity model and only 0.23 in the cultural identity model. The news variable has, by far, the main effect on citizens' civic sense of European identity. This means that what affects citizens' specific support for European integration clearly ends up modifying their perception of being citizens of a European political system, and the sense that this system is relevant to their everyday life only marginally influences their perceptions of relative closeness to fellow Europeans.

This is an expected result, given the distinction between the civic and cultural components of European identity. On the whole, news on Europe and the record of the European Union are bound to more strongly affect the part of European identity that has to do with institutions than the part that has to do with cultural commonalities and perceptions of a shared European heritage. Moreover, whereas civic identity is more likely to refer to the European Union, cultural identity may, for many, refer to a European civilization at large, which is less likely to be affected by specific news on the European Union. At the same time, the strong effect of news in the general identity model confirms that when asked whether they "feel European," citizens predominantly consider the institutional, rather than the cultural, factor in their answers.

Another very interesting finding is related to the comparative analysis of the results or, rather, the overall lack of comparative differences in the way good or bad news influences European identity. One could have expected the news factor to be predominant in polities in which the European question is less salient, and, therefore, the citizens' sense of European identity is more vulnerable to short-term factors and more flexible. However, and in spite of marginal differences, this is not clearly the case.

#### **SYMBOLS OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

The results concerning the effect of exposure to symbols of European integration on the European identity of citizens are equally striking. All three models point to the conclusion that being consistently exposed to symbols of




Figure 3. Effect of exposure to symbols of Europe on levels of European identity.

European integration does, indeed, reinforce a citizen's sense of identification with Europe—consistently with our model, inspired by structuralist theory, and with the hopes of the European elites alike, as clearly shown in Figure 3.

As opposed to the effect of news, however, it is clear that symbols of European unity have a much stronger effect on the cultural component of European identity than on its civic component. Symbols are clearly the predominant factor having implications on the cultural component, with a standardized regression coefficient of 0.55 against 0.32 in the civic identity model. On one hand, symbols of European integration are symbols of a political system. A flag, an anthem, a national day all participate in the attempt to develop the European Union along the traditional model of the state, provided with all the traditional symbolic attributes of any national political system. On the other hand, the contents, or perceived messages of the symbols of the European Union, based on such values as "peace," "unity," "friendship," "harmony," and so forth (Bruter, 1998; European Commission, 1993; Euro-

pean Monetary Institute, 1996) directly stress the desire of European institutions to present Europe as a natural human community. Indeed, when trying to understand why symbols of European unity seem to affect the cultural rather than civic components of citizens' identities, it is interesting to remember that the European flag was not created by or for the European Communities but for the Council of Europe, a highly cultural institution, in the 1950s. These findings show, once again, how complicated the relationship is between the intended and the perceived meaning of the symbols of a political community. They also show, however, that although symbols may help to redefine popular perceptions of who are the "us" (i.e., the definition of a political community in terms of a human group), institutional legitimacy and institutional identification require more of an actual positive record of the political system as opposed to a simple, direct definition of institutional symbols.

Another interesting finding with regard to symbols is that, this time, the comparative differences in the effects of symbols on European identity are somewhat more marked than in the case of news. Indeed, the effect of symbol exposure seems much stronger on the French sample than on the British sample, the Dutch sample lying somewhere between the other two. This suggests that differences of political context or socialization might make people more or less receptive to symbols of European unity in the first place.

Nonetheless, the effect of being exposed to symbols of European unity remains surprisingly high on the whole. In terms of the cultural identity of citizens, symbols play a greater role than news on European integration. This shows the importance of symbols and institutionally designed images in the framing of citizens' perceptions of what their political community is, what it means, and, ultimately, who it includes.

#### **DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION: OPENING NEW RESEARCH TERRITORIES**

Arising from the main findings presented above is the following idea: On one hand, the media, which informs people of the failures and achievements of a political community, will particularly modify the attachment of citizens to this political system and their perceptions of its relevance to them. In other words, good and bad news will primarily affect what has been identified here as a distinct civic component of political identities. On the other hand, the institutional formation of mass political symbols has a predominant effect on the identification of citizens to a political community, conceived as a human grouping, and their perception of the stretch of their political community. In

other words, symbols have a very strong effect on the distinct cultural aspect of political identities.

This suggests that the civic and cultural components of a European identity primarily react to different stimuli, the way the media inform us on Europe for civic identification, and provisions of symbols of European unity for cultural identification. The conceptual and empirical disentangling of European identity into civic and cultural components and the contrast between the two opens the way for further findings.

#### **WHEN CIVIC AND CULTURAL IDENTITY DO NOT GO TOGETHER**

First, we can see from Table 5 that in the French and Dutch samples particularly, a majority of respondents have a predominantly civic European identity as opposed to a cultural one. This means, following the discussion of the two components at the beginning of this paper, that although those participants tend to identify quite strongly with the European Union as a relevant political community and a source of political authority, they tend to be less convinced that Europe as a whole shares some cultural and value-based proximity. This might result, in turn, in problems of political legitimacy when the governments of existing member-states try to convince their polities of the necessity to enlarge the European Union, especially if we give credit to the idea that enlargement of the European Union might pose a risk of slowing down the process of political integration of the Union. In that case, indeed, the civic and cultural components of citizens' European identity would be in tension when assessing the prospect of further enlargement.

We also see that the balance seems to be reversed in the British case, where a majority of citizens tend to have a predominantly cultural European identity, mostly due to civic European identity being lower in the British case. This can probably be explained, in large part, by the United Kingdom staying out of two of the main avenues of further European integration in the last 15 years, that is, the Schengen agreements, which symbolically concretized freedom of movement for citizens in the Schengen area, and the European and Monetary Union, which, across Europe, has been largely understood to be the main direction of further European political integration in the 1990s.

#### **AN ARTIFACT OF THE EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN?**

It is reassuring to see that these results seem to be largely confirmed using a time-series analysis of Eurobarometer surveys since 1970 (Bruter, 2001) in which European identity is operationalized as a residualized variable derived from traditional questions about support for European integration that are

Table 5  
*Civic and Cultural Predominance of Citizens' European Identity*

	Whole	France	The Netherlands	The United Kingdom
Predominantly civic identity	55.1	60.8	53.3	46.0
Equal	0.5	0	0.5	0
Predominantly cultural identity	44.4	38.1	46.1	54.0

*Note:* All items have been converted on 0 to 1 scales. The means of the converted scores for all civic and all cultural items have been calculated. Respondents identified as *predominantly civic* identifiers are those whose civic index score is higher than their cultural index score.

asked in every Eurobarometer. Nevertheless, the use of an experimental design that allows more precise measurement and manipulation calls for additional information on the robustness of the findings. One of the interesting tests that suggests that the tests are fairly robust is that the news and symbols variables do not only have statistically significant effects for national subcategories but also when the sample is split by other basic variables such as gender, age groups, or ideology.

Similarly, although the time elapsed between the two parts of the experiment was relatively short, as compared to the types of lasting identity effects we would ideally like to measure, the findings need to be considered with another element in mind. Indeed, the disproportion between this experimental time scale and real life only matches the other clear disproportion between the stimuli respondents were exposed and the likely effects of being exposed to symbols of European integration on a regular basis in everyday life. The same rationale applies when comparing the three short articles respondents read in the context of the experiment to being exposed to the same Eurosceptic or pro-European newspaper every day for years.

#### ACADEMIC AND POLICY-RELATED CONSEQUENCES

The two hypotheses proposed in the earlier part of this paper have been largely confirmed by the experimental analysis. The experiment has shown, beyond any doubt, that political communication can affect the political identities of citizens—in both their civic and cultural dimensions—and that the media (using the news) as well as institutions (through symbolic campaigns) have the power to encourage or impede the formation of new mass political identities, such as a European identity.

The consequences of these findings are quite numerous. The role of good and bad news on the civic identity of citizens suggests that European integration only has a limited reservoir of political legitimacy. Continuous doubts

about the specific outcomes of European integration in some areas could therefore result in a never-emerging identity, which would, in turn, threaten the whole support for a true political unification of Europe in such countries as the United Kingdom. At the same time, the findings also suggests that what we know of perceptions of European integration in some countries (Bruter, 2000; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993) has already led to the emergence of a strong level of mass European identity in several member states, as confirmed by times-series analysis (Bruter, 2001). Identification with Europe, to that extent, has probably already largely paved the way to continuing support for European political integration in a majority of European Union countries.

At the same time, the findings regarding the role of symbols in the development of new political identities are even more interesting. The very fact that symbols seem to affect the cultural component more than the civic component of political identities suggests that the use of symbols may help make citizens feel more clearly a part of a given system. They may also be used to enhance the acceptance of ethnic or cultural minorities in countries affected by integration problems.

Avenues opened for further research are considerable. A number of controversial debates among political scientists have been, or could be, partly solved using these results. We know now that there is such a thing as a European identity, which is certainly developed by a significant part of the European polity and is more widely held than has often been supposed. European identity and political identities in general cover two related but distinct components, a civic and a cultural one, each dominant for certain individuals in a pattern that differs by country and, presumably, over time. We need to understand what explains the dominance of either component for different citizens. Although it has been shown by political scientists that European and national identities are not contradictory, it would still be interesting to understand whether either of the two components of European identity is more or less likely to be perceived as contradictory with a sense of national pride and allegiance. This has consequences on the relative perceptions of further political integration and enlargement of the European Union.

Finally, we have shown that political identities in general and European identity in particular can evolve and be encouraged or impeded by the information conveyed by the media and the efforts of institutions to provide polities with symbols of their community. A large amount of work still needs to be done in order to understand what have been the effects of different editorial lines of the mass media across European Union countries in terms of the unbalanced formation of a mass European identity in a comparative perspective. Exciting possibilities are also related to the use of symbols that could be used by political institutions in a national context to try and favor a sense of

reinforced identification of citizens, integration of minorities, and acceptance of minority groups by dominant segments of the population.

Our findings have very clear implications in terms of public policy making. Indeed, it shows that the most efficient line in terms of the integration policy would probably be the opposite of what is usually chosen by most Western countries. Many states choose to favor the sense of integration of newcomers by initiating them to the symbols of their new state (the United States, with its highly symbolic and organized process of induction of new citizens, is a caricature). Similarly, most attempts to fight racism and xenophobia of preinstalled populations usually use rational or scientific messages. Our findings suggest that, in an exactly opposite way, symbolic campaigns would be far more efficient at changing citizens' perceptions of who are the "us," whereas trying to appeal to citizens' reason would generate a far greater sense of civic identity—and therefore of political allegiance—among newcomers, thus favoring their integration.

Of course, these results also give European institutions, national governments, and pressure groups some guidelines on how to impede citizens' identification with Europe, or, on the contrary, how to win hearts and minds for European integration (or, indeed, for any emerging state and political community). As explained, what has often been branded as a democratic deficit of the European Union makes it even more necessary to develop a sense of European identity among citizens to give a sense of legitimacy to the European project in a period of intense political integration. From the balance between the civic and cultural components of citizens' European identity, we can also derive implications in terms of the preferences of citizens for further integration or enlargement of the European Union. The civic predominance in our findings, which still needs to be verified using mass surveys, might make it more difficult for governments to "sell" enlargement to their citizens than to promote further European integration. This might even explain some of what we know about Europeans' attitudes towards enlargement, especially if enlargement is perceived as a threat to deeper integration.

More generally, for political science, this study has confirmed that in terms of the emergence and evolution of new political identities, as in many other questions, there is a need to understand the constant interaction between citizens and institutions. Institutions can influence, in somewhat predictable ways, patterns of political behavior. However, the way institutional messages are perceived by citizens remains, in some occasions, largely surprising. Whereas the power of symbols (largely understood by structuralist theorists) and the power of the media (common knowledge for political scientists) have been confirmed by this study, these results also contradict simplistic interpretations of these links. They have shown explicitly

that the link between the messages elites intend to convey to citizens and the way they are received remains largely misunderstood by policy makers and by our discipline.

## **APPENDIX A**

### **Questions Measuring European Identity and Its Components**

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Throughout the article, we refer to the questions measuring the general, civic, and cultural components of European identity. In this appendix, we report these questions in extenso in order to facilitate the understanding of our results.

Each question is presented with the following corresponding 'code' used throughout the article: General 1 and 2 for general identity measures, Civic 1 to 6 for the civic identity variables, and Cultural 1 to 4 for the cultural identity variables.

#### **QUESTIONS MEASURING GENERAL (SELF-ASSESSED) EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

General 1: In general, would you say that you consider yourself a citizen of Europe? (Please, choose ONE ONLY)

1. Yes, very much.
2. Yes, to some extent.
3. I don't know.
4. Not really.
5. Not at all.

General 2: On a scale of one to seven, one meaning that you do not identify with Europe at all and seven meaning that you identify very strongly with Europe, would you say that you . . . ? (Please, circle ONE NUMBER ONLY)

1. (Do not identify with Europe at all)
- 2.
- 3.
- 4.
- 5.
- 6.
7. (Identify very strongly with Europe)

PLEASE, NOTE THAT CONTROL VARIABLES ASSOCIATED WITH GENID2 WERE INCLUDED IN THE QUESTIONNAIRE WHICH MEASURED NATIONAL, REGIONAL, AND LOCAL IDENTITIES OF RESPONDENTS USING THE SAME SCALE.

**QUESTIONS MEASURING THE CIVIC  
COMPONENT OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

Civic 1: Since 1985, citizens from all the countries of the European Union have had a common 'European' passport on which both the name of their country and 'European Union' is written. Do you think that this is a good thing? (Please, choose ONE ONLY)

1. Yes, a very good thing.
2. Yes, a rather good thing.
3. It doesn't matter at all.
4. No, a rather bad thing.
5. No, a very bad thing.

Civic 2: What would best describe your reaction if you saw someone burning a European flag? (Please, choose ONE ONLY)

1. I would be shocked and hurt.
2. I would be shocked but not hurt.
3. I would not mind.
4. I would be happy.

PLEASE, NOTE THAT THE SAME QUESTION IS ASKED  
REFERRING TO THE NATIONAL FLAG FOR CONTROL PURPOSES.

Civic 3: A group of athletes from all the countries of the European Union has proposed that at the Sydney Olympics, whenever an athlete/team from the European Union wins a gold medal, the 'Ode to Joy,' the European anthem, should be played after and in addition to their national anthem. Do you think that this would be a good idea? (Please, choose ONE ONLY)

1. Yes, a very good idea.
2. Yes, a rather good idea.
3. Neither a good idea nor a bad idea.
4. No, a rather bad idea.
5. No a very bad idea.

Civic 4: When the heads of state/government of a European Union country (such as Queen Elizabeth II, Tony Blair, the French President, or the German Chancellor) make a speech on TV, both the national flag and the European one appear behind them. Do you think that this is a good thing? (Please, choose ONE ONLY)

1. Yes, a very good thing.
2. Yes, a rather good thing.
3. Neither a good thing nor a bad thing/It doesn't matter at all.
4. No, a rather bad thing.
5. No, a very bad thing.

Civic 5: Does being a 'Citizen of the European Union' mean anything for you?  
(Please, choose ONE ONLY)

1. Yes, it means a lot.
2. Yes, it means something.
3. No, it does not mean anything.

Civic 6: If you answered yes to question 13, would you say that, among other things, it means . . . ? (Please, choose AS MANY AS APPLY)

1. xxx
2. The right to vote in the European Parliament elections.
3. Common institutions.
4. xxx
5. A common European flag, European anthem, European passport.
6. The right to travel to another EU country without passing through customs.
7. The right to travel to another EU country without having to show your passport/ID.
8. xxx
9. xxx

[Civic 6 corresponds to the number of 'civic items,' mentioned above, selected by the respondent.]

#### **QUESTIONS MEASURING THE CULTURAL COMPONENT OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY**

Cultural 1: Here is a list of some of the games that will be featured at the next Women's Volley-Ball World Championship in June. Could you say which team you would rather win each of these games? (Please choose ONE team for each of the four games)

A—Ghana vs. Denmark

1. Ghana
2. Denmark

B—Italy vs. USA

1. Italy
2. USA

C—Spain vs. China

1. Spain
2. China

D—Saudi Arabia vs. Republic of Ireland

1. Saudi Arabia
2. Republic of Ireland

E—Finland vs. Fiji

1. Finland
2. Fiji

[The score for Cultural 1 is determined by the total number of European teams chosen by the respondent for this question. Please, note that as explained in Appendix B, this variable is then dropped from the index for most of the analysis because its lack of variance implied very poor correlations with the other items and therefore harmed the factor analysis results. Indeed, about 90% of the respondents across all three countries chose the European team for all five games.]

Cultural 2: Some say that in spite of their numerous differences, Europeans share a ‘common heritage’ that makes them slightly closer to one another than they are to, say, Japanese or Chilean people. Do you . . . ? (Please, choose ONE ONLY)

1. Strongly disagree with this view.
2. Somewhat disagree with this view.
3. Neither agree nor disagree with this view/I don’t know.
4. Somewhat agree with this view.
5. Strongly agree with this view.

Cultural 3: If you answered yes to question 13 [Civic 5], would you say that, among other things, it means . . . ? (Please, choose AS MANY AS APPLY)

1. A shared European heritage.
2. xxx
3. xxx
4. A common European history.
5. xxx
6. xxx
7. xxx
8. Some common ideals.
9. To be a member of the ‘European family.’

[Respondents’ scores for Cultural 3 corresponds to the total number of cultural items, as outlined above, selected by the respondent]

Cultural 4: Would you say that you feel closer to fellow Europeans than, say, to Chinese, Russian, or American people? (Please, choose ONE ONLY)

1. Yes, strongly.
  2. Yes, to some extent.
  3. I don’t know.
  4. No, not really.
  5. No, not at all.
-

## APPENDIX B

### Measurement Model

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As can be seen from the variables<sup>5</sup> described above, many of the questions used are quite innovative and specific to the field of European identity. The questionnaire concerned with the measurement of the dependent variable tries to achieve a certain balance between very direct questions (principally the two general identity questions) and other items, whereby we try to indirectly trap the level of identity of respondents (e.g., the *games* variable).

The next task is to verify whether the measurement strategy described above is validated by respondents' answers. In other terms, it is important to verify that one can identify distinct general, civic, and cultural components of a European identity and that the 12 items used to measure them not only correspond to the component they were initially intended to capture but do so efficiently. This is easily verified using an exploratory factor analysis of the 10 objective items. Fundamentally, the 2 items that capture the general, or spontaneous, level of European identity of citizens are different from the other 10 to the extent that their object is open and clear. It is expected that this general assertion on one's overall level of identification with Europe will correlate more or less with the civic and cultural components of a European identity, which are captured using indirect, or objective—for lack of a better characterization—survey questions.

Table B1 summarizes the results of this exploratory factor analysis. As can be seen from the table, the factor loadings almost perfectly confirm the measurement hypothesis except for the first cultural variable (the *games* variable), which does not have enough variance to correlate strongly with any of the other indicators. As explained earlier, about 90% of the entire sample across all three countries have chosen systematically all five European teams. This clearly tells us something about European identity; it suggests that a massive majority of respondents systematically prefer a European team to win against a non-European team in a sport for which they presumably do not have any specific team preference.<sup>6</sup> Moreover, the spontaneous nonresponse rate on this question ("do not care" was not offered as a direct possible answer, but respondents were authorized not to answer questions) was less than 3%. However, in the context of a factor analysis (a covariance-based statistical technique) that included a variable that, not being normally distributed, was, by definition, poorly correlated with the other variables, the overall result could have been damage. Therefore, while indexing the cultural variables using the factor scores of the cultural items, we ran the model twice, once with all four variables and the other time excluding Cultural 1. Most tables and results use the second index because it excludes less variance within the variables on the whole. The index is referred to is always specified, however, and it

5. The British questionnaire is reproduced here. Translations (with minor, but essential, textual differences) were used in France and the Netherlands.

6. It is unlikely that many respondents know enough about international women's volleyball to have specific preferences for a given team.

Table B1  
*Exploratory Factor Analysis of the 10 Civic and Cultural Identity Items*

Eigen value and percentage variance explained		
Factor 1	0.42	44.2%
Factor 2	2.13	21.3%
Factor 3	0.94	9.4%
Factor Loadings Matrix (Factors 1 and 2)		
Civic 1	0.70	0.07
Civic 2	0.53	0.14
Civic 3	0.70	0.25
Civic 4	0.75	0.22
Civic 5	0.82	0.09
Civic 6	0.80	-0.05
Cultural 1	0.56	0.39
Cultural 2	-0.02	0.88
Cultural 3	0.35	0.66
Cultural 4	0.31	0.64

*Note:* Extraction method: Principal Axis. Rotation method: Varimax. Factors kept when eigen value is greater than one.

should be remembered that the second index slightly underestimates the true level of cultural identity of respondents as it excludes the “softest” indicator of cultural identity.

On the whole, however, the results of the factor analysis are extremely clear and suggest that there are distinct civic and cultural components of a European identity and that the questions included in the questionnaire capture these two dimensions very distinctly. Separate factor analyses were run for the civic items and the cultural items, and factor scores for each respondent were used as their civic identity and cultural identity scores in the analysis.

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