Defining American identity in the 21st Century: How much "there" is there?*

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Abstract

This study examines whether the increasing ethnic diversity of the United States is changing how the normative content of American identity is defined. It relies on a wide ranging set of norms to test the claim that an increasingly multicultural America will engender a multicreedal America. In addressing this claim, the study provides an empirical assessment of the "multiple traditions" theory and develops more accurate measures of how Americans view the content of American identity than has typically been included in public opinion research. The results confirm the multiple traditions perspective, showing that a broad range of constitutive norms define being American. A complex and contradictory set of norms exist, and it is difficult to reduce them into a single measure of "Americanism." The results further show that most Americans, regardless of their ethnic or immigrant background, share this complex view of the norms that constitute American identity, though there are signs of divergence to monitor.

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As streets in cities across America filled with activists rallying to support immigrants in the spring of 2006, renewed attention was drawn to the question of whether the rapidly changing ethnic demography of the United States is changing what being American means. A central concern is one raised recently by Samuel Huntington (2004) – that a multicultural America will become a multicreedal America. Conservative icon Phyllis Schlafly, for example, warns (2006) that many immigrants today threaten our cultural norms, including our economic norms and the rule of law (also see Bauer 2006; Farmer 2006; Wilson 2006). Even more extreme commentators who explicitly link their concerns to national ancestry justify their position by arguing that immigrants reject the norms and values that define being American (Buchanan 2006).

This study provides an empirical assessment of such concerns. It relies on a wide ranging set of norms to generate survey data allowing a thorough and generalizable test of the claim that we are losing our long-standing consensus on the norms and values that constitute American identity. In doing so, it provides an empirical assessment of the "multiple traditions" theory (Smith 1997) and develops more accurate measures of how Americans view the content of American identity than has typically been included in public opinion research. Previous examinations of opinions about American identity (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Frendreis and Tatalovich 1997) have been hindered by measures that focus on only two components of American identity: liberalism (America as a land of freedom and opportunity) and ethnoculturalism (America as a nation of white Protestants). While analysis of additional dimensions of American identity have animated political science literature in recent years (e.g., Smith 1997), empirical investigations into the dynamics of a multidimensional "Americanism" have been lacking. Two often overlooked elements of American identity are

civic republicanism (America as a vibrant participatory democracy with dutiful citizens) and incorporationism (America as a diverse nation of immigrants). Moreover, previous studies generally focus on whites, leaving the study of how non-whites define American identity under-developed.

This study overcomes these limitations with a new national telephone survey with oversamples of blacks, Latinos, and Asians. The analysis confirms the multiple traditions perspective, showing that a broad range of constitutive norms define being American. A complex and contradictory set of norms exist, and it is difficult to reduce them into a single measure of "Americanism." The results also show that concerns about national disintegration have little merit at this juncture. Most Americans, regardless of their ethnic or immigrant background, share this complex view of what being American means, though there are signs of divergence to monitor, with some social groups in American society less likely than others to see the norms of cultural assimilation and cultural maintenance as mutually exclusive. I find that whether a person strongly identifies with the American people, as well as one's partisanship and ideology, are often more potent determinants of how the content of American identity is defined than ethnicity or nativity.

Why content?

The analytical focus of this study is on the content of identities, or "the meaning of a collective identity" (Abdelal, Herrera, Johnston, and McDermott 2005, 3). One key aspect of identity content is the set of "constitutive norms" that provide "formal and informal rules that define group membership" (Abdelal et al. 2005, 3). These rules dictate normative guidelines about behaviors and processes that are valued and ideally followed by group members, leaders,

and institutions (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Schildkraut 2005). To understand the power of political identities we need to study what people think these constitutive norms are.

Constitutive norms of identity content emerge from an amalgam of elite-driven forces, counter-elite contestation, and eventually acceptance among citizens (Smith 2003). They provide rules regarding acceptable behaviors and practices, demarcate the boundaries of membership, and dictate what people expect from other group members and from their political institutions. Constitutive norms generate ideal types that serve as information shortcuts; they set expectations for group members for how we should look, sound, think, act, and worship. As with any information shortcut, these ideal types lead to accurate as well as inaccurate expectations. For example, many people assume that someone with an accent is not American. Many people also assume that Americans are active participants in their political system. In both cases, violations of the ideal abound, yet the ideal continues to shape how Americans approach their surroundings.

As noted above, prominent commentators center their arguments on the norms and values that delineate American identity. And public opinion scholars have confirmed that beliefs about identity content are powerful forces that shape policy attitudes. Yet scholars and pundits alike have too often confined their attention to only a subset of the potent norms that constitute American identity. Centering this analysis on identity content and expanding the scope of norms under investigation is important for at least three reasons. First, given that today's heated rhetoric of disintegrating creedal consensus can exacerbate ethnic tensions, providing a thorough test of whether such rhetoric describes reality accurately is imperative. The concerns at the heart of this rhetoric are valid ones to have. Any nation experiencing rapid ethnic change should examine them. But the data needed to test their validity adequately are rarely invoked. Whether a common set of norms and values can be enough to unify a diverse nation has been debated for years

(Barone 2001; Buchanan 2006; Miller 1998; Pickus 2005; Schlesinger 1998). The challenge now is to examine if such commonality even exists.

Second, beliefs about identity content shape how people feel about contentious policy issues, such as language policy, immigration policy, and government spending on race-related programs (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Schildkraut 2005; Theiss-Morse 2006). The academic study of public opinion on such policies would therefore benefit from measures that go beyond liberal norms regarding political tolerance and ethnocultural norms regarding race or religion. Only with properly tailored measures can we study *which* components of American identity matter *when* and for *whom*. Note that this inquiry is different from studies of people's core values and how those core values shape policy attitudes (Feldman 1988). Rather, the concern here is the values and norms that people think uniquely and rightly constitute the meaning of American identity. It is the power of the associations people make between the values and the identity, and not just the values themselves that interests scholars of identity politics. We know that such associations are strong influences over policy attitudes, but we need more accurate assessments of what those associations are if we strive for a deeper understanding of their power.

Third, such an investigation will provide a snapshot of the dimensions of conflict or consensus at a given point in time. This baseline will be valuable for uncovering the dynamics of identity contestation and change, processes that are difficult to isolate but that are of increasing concern (Abdelal et al. 2005; Gerstle 2001). Given the slow pace at which such change takes place, tracking this cross-sectional data over time is a valuable endeavor.

The content of American identity: More than liberalism and ethnoculturalism

Recent scholarship has identified complex and often competing components of American identity that are rooted in the widely accepted *liberal* tradition, the under-studied *civic*

republican tradition, the contested *ethnocultural* tradition, and the equally contested

incorporationist tradition (Glazer 1997; Hackney 1997; Higham 1993; Hollinger 1995;

Schildkraut 2005; Smith 1997). This perspective has been termed the "multiple traditions"

(Smith 1993) or multiple conceptions model of the content of American identity.[1]

     Liberalism and ethnoculturalism merit the least amount of explanation here; both have

been examined in detail and at many levels of analysis. Liberalism, in short, is the image of

America that comes most easily to mind when people think about what it means to be American

and is widely seen as *the* defining essence of American political culture (Hartz 1955). It stresses

minimal government intervention in private life and promotes economic and political freedoms

along with equality of opportunity. Countless studies have documented its enduring influence

over elites, masses, and institutions (e.g., Citrin, Haas, Muste, and Reingold 1994; Feldman

1988;; Lipset 1963; McClosky and Zaller 1984). The normative boundaries liberalism places on

membership in the American community are that group members endorse liberal principles, that

they not infringe upon the political and economic rights and freedoms of others, and that they try

to achieve the American Dream through hard work. Liberalism is the normative tradition

Huntington invokes when he writes of the creedal component of American identity.

     Ethnoculturalism, though less celebrated than liberalism, has also been a defining

element of American identity. It is an ascriptivist tradition that sets rigid boundaries on group

membership. In its extreme, ethnoculturalism maintains that Americans are white, English-

speaking Protestants of northern European ancestry (Smith 1997). Over time this tradition has

been increasingly discredited, but it is far from breathing its last breath. Since 9/11, elites and

masses have endorsed restricting the full range of citizenship rights to people of certain ethnic

and religious backgrounds (Davis and Silver 2004; Lichtblau 2003; Malkin 2004; Schildkraut

2002). Others decry racial and ethnic exclusions while promoting linguistic and religious ones. Huntington, for instance, writes that non-Christians are outsiders in America, a status they should accept given the country's history of religious tolerance. And for many people who genuinely reject such exclusions, ethnoculturalism still operates beyond their awareness. We have all heard stories, for example, of Asian Americans being asked about where they are from even after insisting they are American. American-born historian Ronald Takaki (1999) writes of one such encounter, when he is told his English is "excellent" and is asked how long he has been in America. He notes that people of all backgrounds, even fellow academics, ask him when he came to the United States, showing they do not see him as American. As with liberalism, many studies have documented ethnoculturalism's past and present (Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; Devos and Banaji 2005; Gerstle 2001; Mills 1997; Schildkraut 2005; Smith 1997).

That, however, is generally as far as quantitative examinations of how people conceive of American identity have gone. Other conceptions of American identity in the "multiple traditions" perspective have garnered less analytic attention from public opinion scholars. Civic republicanism emphasizes the responsibilities, rather than the rights of citizenship. It advances the notion that the well being of the community is more than just the sum of individualistic pursuits of private gain. Rather, a vibrant self-governing community needs individual members to act on its behalf (Banning 1986; Held 1996). In this view, we should all be involved in social and political life and pursue ends that serve the public good. As Tocqueville noted, pursuing the public good engenders pride and patriotism, which further motivate people to "labor for the good of the state" (1835 [1990, 243]). Indeed, seeing oneself and the political community as inseparable is a key part of the civic republican ideal (Dagger 1997; Petit 1997). Huntington and other immigration critics are particularly concerned about this aspect of civic republicanism.

Civic republicanism thus set boundaries on American identity by making demands on group members to be an informed and involved presence in public life, to prioritize the collective entity, and to see the community as a central component of their own identity.

Studies of the role of civic republican principles in American political culture have proliferated with the ever expanding attention to social capital (e.g., Putnam 2000). This scholarship often focuses on the extent to which Americans fail to be good civic republicans through their own lack of political involvement or civic engagement. Recent scholarship also examines whether people of diverse backgrounds see themselves primarily as American (Pearson and Citrin 2006). Much less attention has been given to whether people value civic republican ideals and see them as constitutive of American identity. Yet valuing the ideal and living up to it are different since one's normative attachments can shape one's interpretation of political issues even if one's own behavior violates those norms through, for example, political apathy.

Incorporationism is a more recent addition to the set of norms that constitute the content of American identity. The seeds of this tradition were planted nearly a century ago with cultural pluralism (Kallen 1924), and only in the past few decades have both elites and citizens come to endorse this notion that America's unique identity is grounded in its immigrant legacy and in its ability to convert the challenges immigration brings into thriving strengths (Glazer 1997; Higham 1993; Tichenor 2002). Ethnoculturalism continues to exist, but it does so alongside an incorporationist challenge that has grown stronger over the years due to many factors, including rights-based movements of the 60s and 70s and the political incorporation of immigrants and their descendants. As David Hollinger notes, the end of the twentieth century saw the "sheer triumph" of "the doctrine that the United States ought to sustain rather than diminish a great variety of distinctive cultures carried by ethno-racial groups" (1995, 101). Yet the extent to

which triumphal consensus indeed exists on incorporationism has yet to be examined adequately with a national sample; such an examination will be provided here.

The simplicity of incorporationism – the idea that the United States is a nation of immigrants – belies complex beliefs about the balance between unity and diversity. While there are people who advocate one extreme of complete assimilation and others who reject the premise of assimilation altogether, most Americans do not fall at these extremes. Incorporationism celebrates our ability both to assimilate and maintain difference. As Citrin (2001) has posited, many Americans do not view these alternatives as mutually exclusive (also see Schlesinger 1998). The boundaries that incorporationist norms place on group membership involve individual responsibilities to assimilate to American culture to some hard-to-define degree while also maintaining pride in one's ethnic heritage and continuing to observe its traditions. It also places demands on people to value or even celebrate that living in the United States means that one will continually encounter, get along with, and learn from people from a multitude of backgrounds. Day-to-day politics often pits assimilation and diversity against one another, yet many Americans believe that in the ideal, a balance between the two can be reached, and it is this ability that forms the core of this view of what uniquely distinguishes the United States from other countries (Schildkraut 2005; Tyack 1999; Walzer 1996; Zolberg and Woon 1999).

The constitutive norms under investigation here, derived from theoretical and historical analyses, suggest guidelines regarding appropriate state action in response to political conflicts and provide expectations about the political, civic, and cultural beliefs and practices of one's compatriots. They are implicated in contemporary debates about immigration, and research has shown the power of liberalism and ethnoculturalism to shape policy views. It is for these reasons that this set of multiple traditions drives the present analysis, as opposed to other, generally

apolitical, elements of American identity, such as a love of baseball or apple pie. Yet despite the move away from the long-standing view that American identity is primarily liberal in nature, empirical investigations of a multidimensional "Americanism" are still rare (exceptions include Citrin, Sears, Muste, and Wong 2001 and Schildkraut 2005), with existing measures of how people define American identity focusing on liberalism and ethnoculturalism (e.g., 1992 National Election Study (NES), 1996 and 2004 General Social Survey (GSS)). Civic republicanism and incorporationism are often overlooked, or respondents must choose between assimilation and the maintenance of diversity rather than being allowed to accept both. Qualitative studies, though limited in their geographic scope and generalizability, have provided the primary means for analyzing a broader range of identity content, for demonstrating that civic republicanism and incorporationism shape how Americans define American identity, and for examining links between these views and policy preferences (Conover, Crewe, and Searing 1991; Schildkraut 2005; Waters 1990). To study the content of American identity adequately and to investigate controversial claims about potential threats to that identity, we need our measures to catch up.

Additionally, previous studies are often restricted to examining whites, leaving the study of how non-whites define American identity under-developed. A few exceptions have suggested that on some measures, evidence of national disintegration is lacking (e.g.; Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin et al. 1994; Citrin, Wong, and Duff 2001; de la Garza, Falcon, and Garcia 1996), though more thorough investigations are warranted given either the age or geographic concentration of prior data sources, the narrow range of items gauging the content of American identity, or the low numbers of non-white respondents.

Measuring the content of American identity

The present study addresses the limitations of existing scholarship with the 21st Century Americanism survey (21-CAS), a national random-digit-dial (RDD) telephone survey with oversamples of blacks, Latinos, and Asians.[2] It has 2800 respondents: 1,633 white, non-Hispanic; 300 black; 441 Latino; 299 Asian.[3] Two features of the 21-CAS improve upon existing measures of how people define the content of American identity. First, measures in the 1996 and 2004 GSS, ask: "Some people say the following things are important for being truly American. Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is?" Then they ask about a handful of ideas that tap into America's liberal and ethnocultural traditions. This wording makes it impossible to know if respondents are saying what they normatively believe to be important characteristics for Americans to have or if they are simply acknowledging that particular characteristics have been influential in making someone American. For example, I might say that being a Christian is very important in making someone a true American because I recognize that non-Christians have often felt excluded from the American mainstream. I may deplore this reality, but I may still agree that Christianity has played a central role in defining American identity. The 21-CAS addresses this conflation of acknowledgment and normative approval by asking respondents: "I'm going to read a list of things that some people say are important in making someone a true American. The first one is _____. Would you say that it *should* be very important, somewhat important, somewhat unimportant, or very unimportant in making someone a true American?"[4] This wording allows for a greater likelihood that respondents' answers reflect their own American ideal. This change indeed yields lower levels of approval across comparable items (see notes below). Second, the list that follows this introduction includes items that need to be added to develop a more accurate assessment of the

content of American identity. Table 1 lists each item, the tradition it was intended to measure and the percentage of respondents that says the item is either very or somewhat important.[5]

[Table 1 About Here]

The first two ethnocultural items (being born in America, being a Christian) are from the GSS while the last two (having European ancestors, being white) more directly capture ethnoculturalism's exclusivity. As table 1 shows, endorsement of ethnoculturalism is still at a notable level. Combining "very" and "somewhat important," over half of the respondents say being born in America should define Americanism, 35% say the same about Christianity, 17% say the same about having European ancestors, and 10% say the same about whiteness.[6]

The first liberal item (respecting America's political institutions and laws) is from the GSS and is included here primarily for continuity. The problem with this item is that it fails to describe explicitly the essence of liberalism: political and economic freedom and opportunity. Qualitative studies confirm that Americans strongly associate such freedom and opportunity with the United States and strongly value such association (Conover, Crewe, and Searing 1991; Schildkraut 2005). I therefore introduced questions aimed at each of these ideals (pursuing economic success through hard work, letting other people say what they want no matter how much you disagree with them). Table 1 shows that strong majorities see all of these items as important constitutive norms, though there is more variation on the newer measures.[7]

Four of the five civic republican items are new, with content derived from theorists noted above and with wording derived from qualitative studies (Conover, Crewe, and Searing 1991; Schildkraut 2005). The one older item is from the GSS and asks whether true Americans should "feel American," yet it is not clear what exactly people are being asked to assess here. I suspected it was aimed at gauging whether people endorse the civic republican call for seeing

oneself as part of the political community. To provide more specificity, the 21-CAS asks if it should be important for Americans to think of themselves as American. The bivariate correlation between "feeling American" and "thinking of oneself as American" is 0.51.[8] For both items, over 90% of respondents think such self-perception should be very or somewhat important, confirming that Americans see this civic republican norm as constitutive of American identity.[9] The remaining items ask about doing volunteer work in one's community, being informed about local and national politics, and being involved in local and national politics. Support for volunteering and being involved is weaker than support for being informed, yet when combined with "somewhat" important, majorities see volunteering (86.2%) and being politically involved (80.9%) as important aspects of American identity.

Rather than ask people if they see particular aspects of the incorporationist tradition as American norms, previous inquiries have asked respondents if they think immigrants should blend into the larger society *or* maintain their cultural traditions (Citrin, Sears, Muste, and Wong 2001; Frendreis and Tatalovich 1997). One problem with this format is that it fails to overtly tie the norms in question to the content of American identity. Another problem is that it does not allow respondents to endorse conflicting ideas about the role of immigration in shaping American identity. Though difficult to achieve in practice, many Americans believe a balance between assimilation and cultural maintenance can be reached and that such a balance uniquely characterizes the United States (Citrin 2001; Schildkraut 2005; Tyack 1999; Zolberg and Woon 1999). The items in the 21-CAS address these problems. As with the civic republican items, the content was derived from theorists noted above and the wording was derived from qualitative research. The first item (carrying on the cultural traditions of one's ancestors) asks people whether keeping one's "hyphenated" self alive is a hallmark of Americanism. The next item

(respecting other people's cultural traditions) is designed to see whether people are wary of too much pressure toward assimilation, regardless of whether they themselves maintain or shed signs of a distinct ethnic heritage. Incoporationism also recognizes that some amount of assimilation is necessary, albeit an amount that is difficult to specify; the third item (blending into the larger society) is designed to capture this recognition. The last item (seeing people of all backgrounds as American) is designed to capture the relatively new American norm of disentangling ethnicity from national identity. Support is highest for items that ask about respecting other people's choices and rejecting ascriptivism. Support is more equivocal for endorsing cultural maintenance or assimilation. That said, when "very" and "somewhat" important are combined, 72.7% say maintaining the cultural traditions of one's ancestors should be important to being American and 73.4% say the same about blending into the larger society. The correlation between these items is 0.16; while not going hand-in-hand, they do not oppose one another either.

Finally, people were asked, for continuity with the GSS, if speaking English and having American citizenship should be important in making someone a true American. Both are widely seen as constitutive norms, yet arguments could be made for considering each one an element of more than one tradition. For instance, citizenship is a minimal boundary, one that nearly anyone can cross (liberalism), yet acquiring citizenship is both a step toward incorporation while also being a participatory act (incorporationism and civic republicanism). Likewise, a person might think a common language is essential for successful self-governance and, for practical reasons, that this common language should be English (civic republicanism) while another person might think that English itself is particularly important (ethnoculturalism). I rely on factor analysis (discussed below) to guide which – if any – tradition is tapped by these items.[10]

How many "Americanisms"?

Does the average American think that these normative elements of American identity "go together" the way academics do? Can internal contradictions be ignored such that a single measure of "Americanism" can be employed? Or is the range of constitutive norms too varied to use scales at all? Answering these questions will prove useful for deciding whether to use individual items or combined scales when testing the claim that a multicultural America has wrought a multicreedal America and when assessing the "multiple traditions" theory.

I used a combination of factor analysis and examinations of Cronbach's α to examine the extent to which the items tap into distinct conceptions of national identity.[11] The results (see appendix) justify three – rather than four – underlying dimensions, using rotated factor loadings of 0.4 as the cutoff and with several items failing to cohere well with any dimension. I then created summated rating scales for each of the three dimensions supported by the factor analysis. I added responses to each item and divided by the total number of questions on the scale the respondent answered. Then I constrained each scale to run from 0 to 1, where 0 means the respondent said all items on the scale were "very unimportant," and 1 means the respondent said all were "very important."

The first dimension, ethnoculturalism, contains all 4 ethnocultural items from table 1 (α = 0.72, mean = 0.30, s.d. = 0.26, average inter-item correlation = 0.40). The second dimension represents the "informed and involved" tenets of civic republicanism and consists of thinking that being informed about, and involved in, national and local politics, including volunteering, should be defining elements of American identity (α = 0.62, mean = 0.78, s.d. = 0.19, average inter-item correlation = 0.20).[12] The third dimension represents the self-perception components of civic republicanism and consists of thinking that having American citizenship, thinking of oneself as American, and feeling American should define American identity (α = 0.62, mean =

0.86, s.d. = 0.18, average inter-item correlation = 0.18). I find, in other words, two dimensions to civic republicanism, not one. The first represents how people act; the second represents how people think of themselves vis-à-vis the national community, with "having American citizenship" as a marker of identity.[13] For all three scales, the average inter-item correlation exceeds 0.15, as is recommended (Clark and Watson 1995). Bivariate correlations among all items (see appendix) show that items correlate within scales more than across them, suggesting construct validity (Paxton and Mughan 2006). Across the three scales, item-rest correlations range from 0.30 to 0.56.

Even though most respondents support both liberal and incorporationist elements of American identity, those survey items do not cohere into scales that provide more information than the individual items on their own. Scholars recognize the ideological linkages between these concepts, but Americans seem to view them as distinct aspects of the national character. In remaining analyses, I examine the causes of liberal Americanism by treating economic freedom and political freedom separately, with "respecting American institutions and laws" left aside due to its aforementioned distance from the core elements of the liberal tradition. Likewise, though assimilation and carrying on the traditions of one's ancestors are both central components of incorporationism, those questions do not represent a single construct, so I examine the causes of support for these constitutive norms through these two measures separately. I focus on these measures of incorporationism for the remaining analyses and leave the other two incorporationist items aside because the kept items have greater variation (Paxton and Mughan 1996) and because they make stronger normative demands.[14] In short, the constitutive American norms used in remaining analyses are captured through scales for ethnoculturalism, action-oriented civic republicanism, and identity-oriented civic republicanism, and through single items for

economic freedom, political freedom, carrying on cultural traditions, and assimilation, for a set of 7 constitutive norms.[15]

Importantly, separate factor analyses and Cronbach's α assessments for whites, blacks, Latinos, and Asians (results not shown) produces remarkably similar results across groups, with just a few differences to note. First, "being born in America" loads weakly on ethnoculturalism for black and Asian respondents, while "having American citizenship" loads weakly on identity-oriented civic republicanism for Asian respondents. Second, identity-oriented civic republican items overall have low factor loadings for Latino respondents. This is not to say, however, that Latinos do not endorse these constitutive norms. To the contrary, 64% of Latinos say that thinking and feeling American should be very important components of American identity, and 76% say the same about having American citizenship. Cronbach's α on identity-oriented civic republicanism for Latinos is 0.61, with an average inter-item correlation of 0.21 and item-rest correlations all above 0.32. Together, these diagnostics suggest identity-oriented civic republicanism is a unique normative dimension of American identity for Latino respondents, but that its components are not as strongly linked together as they are for other respondents. A similar pattern exists with action-oriented civic republicanism among black respondents. Lower factor loadings are combined with high support for each individual item (55% say volunteering should be very important, 76% say being informed should be very important, and 52% say being involved should be very important), along with a Cronbach's α of 0.57, an average inter-item correlation of 0.17, and item-rest correlations that range from 0.32 to 0.48. In sum, I find more similarities than differences across ethnic groups with regard to their overall attitude structure, but with weaker associations for identity-oriented civic republicanism among Latino respondents

and action-oriented civic republicanism among black respondents, and with less emphasis on nativity for black and Asian respondents.

Based on the full sample analysis, using a single measure of "Americanism" is not the way forward. But neither is using four neatly demarcated scales. In some cases, Americans link idea elements together the way academic reasoning suggests they "should" be linked while in others, they do not. The lack of such linkages does not mean that the norms and values associated with each tradition are irrelevant. Each liberal norm, for example, is overwhelmingly endorsed as "American" by the public. Rather it means that we will gain more insight into opinion dynamics if we treat them on their own terms.

A multicreedal America?

The previous section shows there is a great deal of consensus on the norms, values, and behaviors that constitute American identity. It also demonstrates the validity of the "multiple traditions" theory of American identity while highlighting some limitations on the extent to which the multiple theoretical constructs match mass attitude structures. The next step is to investigate more thoroughly whether people of different backgrounds define American identity differently, paying special attention to Huntington's concern that, "a multicultural America will, in time, become a multicreedal America, with groups with different cultures espousing distinctive political values and principles rooted in their particular cultures" (2004, 340). The values and principles he reveres involve a blend of liberal and ethnocultural norms and identity-oriented civic republicanism. He is concerned about the rise of incorporationism and would no doubt find some of the patterns in table 1 troubling. He also writes that "Mexican-Americans feel increasingly comfortable with their own culture and often contemptuous of American culture" (255). I examine here whether the incorporationist view of American identity is held primarily

by the groups that concern him – the foreign born and their descendants, and Mexicans– and whether those groups are less likely to endorse economic and political freedom and the importance of seeing oneself as American.

In addition to nativity, ancestry, ethnicity, and generation, I examine two more factors in this section: whether respondents identify as American and whether they belong to civic associations, both of which can be seen as whether respondents are "good" civic republicans, with the former tapping identity-oriented principles and the latter tapping action-oriented ones. Given the prominence of civic republicanism in how American identity is defined, it makes sense to consider whether endorsement is affected by one's own civic orientation. Moreover, recent work by Elizabeth Theiss-Morse (2003, 2005) shows that people who strongly identify with the American people are more likely to set both exclusive and inclusive boundaries on American identity than people who weakly identify with the American people. Examining the causes of one's strength of identification is an important part of assessing the consequences of the nation's changing demography, but it is not the central focus here. Rather, such measures are included because of their demonstrated role in shaping how boundaries are drawn.

Tables 2 and 3 show bivariate relationships between background characteristics and how people define the content of American identity (see appendix for question wording). For this examination, I created trichotomous variables for ethnoculturalism and the two variants of civic republicanism and examined whether respondents ranked in the top third of each scale (table 2). For the liberal and incorporationist items, I examined whether respondents said each item was very or somewhat important (table 3). All results are statistically significant except where noted. In most cases, however, statistical significance does not correspond to substantive significance. The story across both tables is generally one of similarity more than it is one of difference.

[Tables 2 and 3 About Here]

With respect to race and ethnicity, blacks and Latinos are more likely than whites and Asians to endorse ethnoculturalism.[16] Latinos are more likely than whites to endorse action-oriented civic republicanism but less likely to endorse identity-oriented civic republicanism, suggesting a view in which "actions speak louder than words." Whites are less likely than everyone else to value the incorporationist norm of carrying on the cultural traditions of one's ancestors, which could be a sign that racial divergences might indeed be on the horizon. Today, however, more than 60% of whites endorse this incorporationist view of American identity; that endorsement is noticeably less than all other racial groups, but it is still a majority. In fact, in no case does a majority of one racial group come to a different substantive conclusion about the constitutive norms of American identity than a majority of another racial group.

Looking at nativity and generation also reveals more similarities than differences. Like Latinos, immigrants are more likely than the native-born to endorse action-oriented civic republicanism – hardly a cause for concern – and less likely to endorse identity-oriented civic republicanism – more troubling from Huntington's perspective, though even here, 75% of the foreign born rank in the top third on this scale. Immigrants are less likely to endorse political freedom and more likely endorse both the assimilationist and diversity components of incorporationism. Thus, newer members of the polity are more likely to think that both blending and the maintenance of difference are sustainable and central to the idea of being American. It is important for future analyses to track whether this split between newer and older Americans becomes even more noteworthy over time, or whether subsequent generations converge. That most of the differences in tables 2 and 3 are between the first generation and everyone else

suggests the latter scenario is most likely, but only time will tell. At present, strong majorities of the native born and the foreign born (and of each generational cohort) agree with each other.

Just under 9% of the respondents say they (or an ancestor) are from Mexico; roughly half of them were born outside of the United States. Tables 2 and 3 examine native-born and foreign-born Mexicans separately. As with race, nativity, and generation, the story is largely one of similarity. Foreign-born Mexicans are the most supportive of an action-oriented civic republicanism, the least supportive of political freedom, and the most supportive of both kinds of incorporationism. But again, well over a majority in each category agrees with the others.

To gauge if respondents identify strongly with the American people (i.e. if they are "high identifiers"), they were asked if they agree that "I feel strong ties to the American people" and "being an American is important to the way I think of myself as a person." These measures form an abridged version of the "strength of identification" scale used by Theiss-Morse (2005). They were combined into a $0 - 1$ scale (Cronbach's $\alpha = 0.56$) and divided into thirds (high, medium, low). Seventy-six percent of respondents are high identifiers, 19% medium, and 5% low.[17] Tables 2 and 3 show that, as Theiss-Morse has argued, the strength of one's identification is clearly associated with supporting a wide range of boundaries on American identity. The only exception is political freedom, with high, medium, and low identifiers equally likely to say it constitutes an American norm. The differences between high and low identifiers are especially noteworthy with civic republicanism and with assimilation. People who view their own identity as strongly tied to the collective are more likely than others to endorse such ties as important components of the identity itself. They are also more supportive of behaviors that reinforce such identification, such as community involvement and assimilation. These differences are the only cases across both tables in which a majority of one category differs with a majority of another.

Finally, respondents were asked if they belong to any civic associations and if so, how many. Forty-six percent of respondents say they belong to at least one civic association. Of those, 76% say they belong to more than one. Yet tables 2 and 3 show that such civic activity fails to translate into differences with regard to how people define the content of American identity, even with civic republicanism, confirming that whether people value a particular ideal and whether they emulate it are not identical.

I find little support for concerns that different ethnic and immigrant groups define what being American means differently. Incorporationism does provide a more popular set of constitutive norms for the "new guard," but a substantial majority of the old guard endorses incorporationism as well. Whether this divergence portends a multicreedal America remains to be seen. And perhaps to Huntington's chagrin, while there does not appear to be support for his claim that non-Christians "have little alternative but to recognize and accept America as a Christian society" (p. 101), one of the groups most likely to agree is foreign-born Mexicans.

Why people define American identity as they do

Examining if the differences in tables 2 and 3 persist when the influence of other factors is controlled is the focus of this section. To see how individual-level characteristics shape how people define the content of American identity in a more rigorous fashion, I used ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis when the summated rating scales served as dependent variables (using the full 0 to 1 scales) and ordered probit analysis when the single-item norms served as dependent variables. Based on the previous section, I included among the independent variables race (with "white" as the omitted category), nativity, whether the respondent is of Mexican origin, and strength of identification with the American people (using the 0 to 1 scale). I omitted generation because nativity and generation produced such similar patterns and most

differences were between the first generation and everyone else. Likewise, I omitted whether

respondents belong to civic associations because of the lack of noteworthy differences in tables 2

and 3. Other independent variables include: age, education, gender, political ideology, partisan

identification, and whether English is the only language spoken in the home, with all non-

dummy variables ranging from 0 to 1. Results are in tables 4 (OLS) and 5 (ordered probit).[18]

[Tables 4 and 5 About Here]

As table 4 shows, age, education, and strength of identification with the American people

outweigh factors related to race or immigration in shaping support for ethnoculturalism, with

older and less educated respondents and high identifiers more likely to show endorsement.

Though as in table 2, small yet statistically significant racial differences exist. Likewise, with

action-oriented civic republicanism, age and strength of identification outweigh factors related to

race and immigration for the most part, with older respondents and high identifiers more likely to

endorse this tradition. Yet the difference between U.S. born and foreign born respondents from

table 2 remains, with foreign born respondents and Mexican respondents more likely to endorse

active citizenship as a constitutive American norm.[19]

The significant predictors of identity-oriented civic republicanism are small in

magnitude, but the pattern is important given the centrality of identity-oriented norms to current

debates about the impact of ethnic change on American identity: Latinos, Asians, people of

Mexican origin, and the foreign born are *not* significantly more or less likely than their white,

U.S. born counterparts to think that true Americans should think of themselves as American. The

only powerful predictor in this model is strength of identification, with high identifiers more

likely to endorse identity-oriented norms than low identifiers. One notable conclusion emerging

from these results is the need to examine the factors that alter a person's strength of identification

and whether Huntington's concerns about immigrants have more validity in this regard.[20] Doing so fully is beyond the scope of the present analysis, but a bivariate examination finds few differences when it comes to race or nativity. Seventy-nine percent of whites are in the top third of the "strength of identification" scale, compared to 78% of Latinos, 70% of Asians, and 65% of blacks – sizeable majorities in each case. Regarding nativity, 76% of U.S. born respondents are in the top third of the scale as are 81% of foreign born residents (also see Pearson and Citrin 2006).

Table 5 shows that strength of identification and ideological conservatism emerge as the strongest predictors of support for the norm of economic freedom and opportunity. The foreign born, blacks, and Asians, are more likely than the U.S. born and whites to say that pursuing economic success through hard work should be an important boundary of Americanism. Latinos, Mexicans included, do not differ from whites on this issue. This set of findings provides a particularly compelling rebuke to the claim that immigrants and their descendants fail to accept the "Protestant work ethic" as an essential ingredient of being American (see, for example, Huntington, chs. 4, 8, and 9).

Political freedom stands out from all other components of American identity in terms of the factors that dictate support. It is one of the only constitutive norms to be more widely supported among the young, men, whites, and liberals and to be unaffected by the strength of one's identification the United States. Overall support for defining American identity in terms of political freedom is high, but at the margins, that support is driven by a unique set of factors. Moreover, these results indicate it is not the case that some respondents are simply more willing to agree with all of the items presented to them in the survey. Respondents are able to make meaningful distinctions among the sets of norms analyzed here.

Why don't political and economic freedom "go together?" Why do they have such different antecedents? Though these findings were not expected, it is important to remember what Converse (1964) argued decades ago: how reality is experienced can affect how people make sense of the world more so than logic. Logically, the classically liberal view of minimal government intervention applies both to the pocketbook and the podium. Yet in our age, conservatives generally defend the pursuit of economic gain while political liberals are more likely defenders speech rights, rights that have become more salient during the "war on terror." That ideas are experienced together can dictate the associations we make more so than logic, Converse argued, and the results here support that view. Our long-standing political orientations shape how we define American identity, and contemporary contestation between conservatives and liberals appears to yield divisions over the relative centrality of economic and political freedom to the very idea of American identity itself.[21]

Turning finally to incorporationism, the results show mixed support for the claim that Americans do not see cultural maintenance and assimilation as mutually exclusive constitutive American norms. Again, support for both is high, but at the margins, older respondents, conservatives, and Republicans have a harder time imagining such coexistence, choosing to prioritize assimilation. Likewise, younger respondents, liberals, and Democrats choose to prioritize the notion that true Americans should carry on the cultural traditions of their ancestors. Note that none of these latter categories of people draw explicit ire from Huntington or from contemporary critics of immigration reforms currently being proposed by President Bush.

The people most likely to think that we can "have it all" – people whom we might say are most supportive of the full range of incorporationist norms – are blacks, Latinos, and "high-identifiers." There are also people that endorse one element of incorporationism while not being

more or less likely than their counterparts to endorse the other. For instance, the foreign born are more likely than the U.S. born to endorse the normative demands of assimilation, but the U.S. born and the foreign born do not differ in their support for the maintenance of cultural traditions. Asians and people who speak a language other than English at home are more likely than whites and people who only speak English to support the maintenance of difference. Huntington and other critics of immigration might look to this result as support for their concerns, but they would have to acknowledge that Asians and whites, English speakers and non-English speakers, are equally likely to say that assimilation should be an important element of being a true American. Few characteristics promote true incorporationist sentiment. But few characteristics promote only difference while diminishing assimilation (or vice versa) – and the ones that do map onto to traditional, long-standing political cleavages in the United States, such as ideology and partisanship, rather than new cleavages that result from immigration or ethnic change.

Conclusion

The central aim of this study was to provide a broad test of claims that the increasing cultural diversity in the United States in terms of race, ethnicity, ancestry, and nativity is threatening the longstanding consensus on meaning of American national identity. Using a national survey with oversamples of traditionally under-sampled groups and examining a wide range of norms theorized to constitute American identity, I find little evidence to support this fear. It is important to remember, however, that contestation over group identities is a constant element of political life. The future may indeed bring more contestation over how to reconcile multiple visions of American identity, and we should be equipped to gauge whether such contestation occurs. This study provides tools for such vigilance.

My analysis suggests that the primary lines of contestation at this point are the ones that are constant sources of political conflict in the United States: partisanship and ideology. Education and strength of identification as American also provide consistent dividing lines. While Huntington says little about partisan threats to national identity, he does express concern that the educated elite rejects his version of Americanism. But he spends most of his energy on immigration and ethnicity. Though some racial and ethnic differences do emerge in this analysis, they are at the margins, and they largely fail to show one group directly opposing another.

In testing claims about constitutive American norms, I offer empirical evidence that supports the multiple traditions theory of American identity and provide the first look at the extent to which people consider a range of civic republican and incorporationist norms to be part of what being American means. I also show, however, that public opinion is not necessarily organized into four distinct traditions even as the norms that comprise those traditions are widely endorsed. Ordinary Americans, it seems, have not read their Louis Hartz, their Michael Walzer, or their Rogers Smith. These multiple traditions have a long history in American political culture (some longer than others) and have been promoted at various times at all levels of government. Most Americans think liberal and civic republican norms should dictate boundaries of American identity. They also think the United States should be a society that converts the challenges of immigration into strengths, and feel that Americans should form a common identity while preserving the diversity that makes America so different from all other countries. And there are still Americans that think that the content of American identity should be white and Christian.

In addition to testing claims of immigration critics and assessing whether mass attitudes match the multiple traditions theory, this study also provides a snapshot of the norms and values Americans look to when they assess the meaning of their national identity, when they form

expectations about how their fellow Americans will and should act, and when they try to determine appropriate responses to new political controversies. Such snapshots are essential for tracking how Americans will continue to define being American as today's immigrant population changes, as immigrants bear children on American soil, and as new waves of immigrants arrive.

In the end, we have a complex set of survey questions that we are just beginning to understand. They do not all form coherent scales, nor can they be reduced to a single measure of "Americanism." But this complexity also brings insight. The implications of how people define American identity should continue to be studied with this complexity in mind. One important next step is to examine more fully the causes and consequences of the strength of one's personal identification with the United States and its people, since such identification emerged as a significant predictor of opinions here. Another important step is to look at how different normative assessments of American identity shape how people feel about ethnicity-related policy debates, such as whether government documents should be provided in multiple languages and whether racial profiling is an acceptable counter-terrorism tactic. In such investigations, we will learn about the conditions under which different kinds of constitutive norms shape what people think policy debates are even about, let alone their preferred solutions. When we understand which aspects of American identity animate policy debates and drive opinions, we learn about the kind of America that people want to preserve.

APPENDIX

Table A.1: Bivariate correlations among American identity items

	amborn	amchri	ameuro	amwhit	amresi	amcit	amsucc	amsay	amvol	amthin	amfeel	aminf	aminv	amcult	amresc	amblen	amall	ameng
amborn	1.00																	
amchri	0.42	1.00																
ameuro	0.36	0.44	1.00															
amwhit	0.32	0.41	0.52	1.00														
amresi	0.09	0.13	0.06	0.04	1.00													
amcit	0.24	0.22	0.16	0.12	0.22	1.00												
amsucc	0.21	0.26	0.17	0.12	0.20	0.24	1.00											
amsay	-0.04	-0.12	-0.05	-0.04	-0.01	-0.02	-0.01	1.00										
amvol	0.15	0.23	0.18	0.14	0.17	0.15	0.30	0.00	1.00									
amthin	0.14	0.15	0.11	0.07	0.26	0.29	0.25	0.04	0.17	1.00								
amfeel	0.19	0.20	0.14	0.10	0.24	0.27	0.27	0.00	0.21	0.50	1.00							
aminf	0.11	0.13	0.09	0.06	0.20	0.19	0.27	0.06	0.31	0.20	0.21	1.00						
aminv	0.09	0.16	0.11	0.08	0.17	0.12	0.19	0.08	0.33	0.19	0.19	0.44	1.00					
amcult	0.12	0.18	0.19	0.15	0.04	0.04	0.19	0.01	0.34	0.06	0.10	0.19	0.22	1.00				
amresc	-0.07	-0.06	-0.02	-0.05	0.08	-0.01	0.08	0.11	0.17	0.05	0.02	0.17	0.10	0.24	1.00			
amblen	0.19	0.22	0.22	0.18	0.22	0.20	0.27	0.01	0.25	0.23	0.28	0.26	0.23	0.16	0.06	1.00		
amall	-0.15	-0.08	-0.07	-0.09	0.04	0.01	0.04	0.15	0.09	0.14	0.09	0.14	0.12	0.11	0.18	0.07	1.00	
ameng	0.29	0.28	0.21	0.17	0.22	0.34	0.32	-0.05	0.23	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.15	0.14	0.00	0.34	-0.04	1

Table A.2: Rotated Factor Matrix (varimax rotation)

	Factor 1	*Factor 2*	*Factor 3*
Born in America	0.16	**-0.51**	0.04
Being a Christian	0.15	**-0.61**	0.12
Having European ancestors	0.07	**-0.67**	0.09
Being white	0.03	**-0.64**	0.03
Respecting America's political institutions and laws	0.37	-0.03	0.18
Pursuing economic success through hard work	0.31	-0.20	0.32
Letting other people say what they want	0.06	0.11	0.11
Doing volunteer work in one's community	0.15	-0.20	**0.53**
Thinking of oneself as American	**0.63**	-0.07	0.12
Feeling American	**0.60**	-0.14	0.13
Being informed about local and national politics	0.24	-0.04	**0.53**
Being involved in local and national politics	0.17	-0.08	**0.51**
Carrying on the cultural traditions of one's ancestors	-0.01	-0.22	0.45
Respecting other people's cultural differences	0.02	-0.09	0.36
Blending into the larger society	0.32	-0.23	0.30
Seeing people of all backgrounds as American	0.17	0.17	0.23
Being able to speak English	0.32	-0.26	0.21
Having American citizenship	**0.40**	-0.18	0.09
Eigenvalue	3.24	1.24	0.71

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

Survey question wording and coding

Nativity: "Were you born in the United States?" 1 = yes; 0 = no.

Generation: "Were your parents born in the United States? Thinking about your grandparents, how many of them were born in the United States?" Respondents were categorized as first generation (1) if they were not born in the United States, as second generation (2) if they were born in the United States but their parents were not, as third generation (3) if they were born in the United States along with at least one parent but did not have any grandparents born in the United States, and as "fourth plus" generation (4) if they were born in the United States and have at least one parent and one grandparent that was also born in the United States.

Mexican: Respondents were coded as having Mexican ancestry if they mentioned being born in Mexico or having any ancestors from Mexico. 1 = Mexican; 0 = other.

Strength of identification: Scale formed by combining two questions: "Please tell me if you strongly agree, somewhat agree, somewhat disagree or strongly disagree: I feel strong ties to the American people. Being American is important to they way I think of myself as a person." Scale runs from 0 to 1; 0 = strongly disagree on both items, 1 = strongly agree on both items.

"Good" civic republican: "As you know, people can belong to various organizations or associations such as labor unions, professional associations, fraternal groups such as Lions or Elks, hobby clubs or sports teams, groups working on political issues, community groups, and school groups. Of course, there are lots of other types of organizations, too. Not counting membership in a local church, synagogue or mosque, are you a member of any of these kinds of organizations?" 0 = no; 1 = yes.

Level of education: "What is the highest grade of school or year of college you have completed?" 1 = less than high school diploma; 2 = high school graduate; 3 = trade/vocational school; 4 =

some college; 5 = BA or BS; 6 = some graduate school; 7 = graduate level degree (recoded to run from 0 – 1).

Race: Respondents were asked, "Are you of Hispanic or Latin origin or descent?" Then they were asked "What race do you consider yourself to be?" (open-ended). These questions were used to construct a race variable that places each respondent in only one racial or panethnic category. A person was categorized as white if he said his race was white and that he was not Latino. A person was categorized as black if he said his race was black and that he was not Latino. A person was categorized as Asian if he said his race was Asian and that he was not Latino. A person was categorized as Latino if he said he was Latino. Note that 62% of respondents who said that they were of Latin origin or descent also said their race was Latino or Hispanic, 17% said white, and 10% said "other." Of those who said "other," nearly all mentioned a Latin American country when asked to clarify (ex: Mexican, Dominican). In other words, around 72% of respondents who are of Latin origin or descent identify racially as Latino as well.

Ideological orientation: "Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as conservative, moderate, or liberal?" 0 = liberal; 0.5 = moderate; 1 = conservative.

Partisan identification: "Generally speaking, do you consider yourself a Republican, an independent, a Democrat, or something else? (if R or D) Would you call yourself a strong Republican/Democrat or a not very strong Republican/Democrat? (if something else) Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican or Democratic party?" 1 = strong Democrat; 2 = Democrat; 3 = leans Democrat; 4 = Independent; 5 = leans Republican; 6 = Republican; 7 = strong Republican(recoded to run from 0 – 1).

Language spoken at home: "What is the primary language spoken in your home?" 1 = English; 0 = other.

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[1] Smith's "multiple traditions" model includes liberalism, ethnoculturalism, and civic republicanism only. For more on why and on the rise of incorporationism, see Schildkraut, 2005, ch. 3.

[2] Data collection was conducted from July 12 – October 8, 2004 by the Social and Economic Sciences and Research Center (SESRC) at Washington State University and was funded by the Russell Sage Foundation. Any U.S. resident over 18 years old and living in a household with a telephone was eligible for selection in the sample. Counties with higher percentages of black, Latino, and Asian residents were targeted more heavily with RDD for the oversamples. The cooperation rate, the ratio of interviews to interviews plus refusals, was 31.2%. While a higher rate would be preferable to a lower rate, recent studies challenge whether the cost of extensive refusal conversions are worth the effort (Curtin, Presser, and Singer 2000; Keeter et al. 2000). A Spanish version of the survey was available and was used by 137 respondents. The average interview length was 26 minutes. Comparisons between the 21-CAS and the 2000 Census show nearly identical breakdowns regarding age, nativity, and race. The survey population is more female, more educated, and has more households earning over $100,000 than the U.S. population, but the median household income compares favorably. Such differences are typical (e.g., Lien, Conway, and Wong, 2004).

[3] The remaining respondents either identified as mixed race, Native American, or answered the race question in a way that could not be incorporated into this breakdown (e.g., "human."). These respondents have been dropped from all analyses.

[4] "Should" is italicized here for emphasis. It was not emphasized during the interview.

[5] Percentages are weighted with the population weights provided by the SESRC. To minimize respondent fatigue, the American identity series was randomly divided into two halves. The first half was asked early in the survey; the second half was asked later. The items within each half were rotated randomly.

[6] The 2004 GSS, which uses "is" rather than "should," shows that 56% of respondents say that being born in America is a very important element of American identity and 49% say the same about being a Christian (using the 2004 weight provided by the GSS). These results are higher than the 21-CAS by 32 and 29 percentage points, respectively. These differences are considerably larger than differences on other comparable items (see notes below), which is not surprising given that these are the items most likely to suffer from the conflation of acknowledgment and approval. Comparison with the 1996 GSS yields similar differences.

[7] The 2004 GSS shows that 75% of respondents say that respecting American institutions and laws is a very important element of American identity, 6 percentage points less than respondents in the 21-CAS. This is the only comparable item that garners more support on the 21-CAS than on the GSS.

[8] Bivariate correlations for all American identity items appear in the appendix.

[9] The 2004 GSS shows that 69% of respondents say that feeling American is a very important element of American identity, 7 percentage points more than respondents in the 21-CAS.

[10] The 2004 GSS shows that 83% of respondents say that both speaking English and having American citizenship are very important elements of American identity, 12 and 7 percentage points more than respondents in the 21-CAS.

[11] This portion of the analysis used unweighted responses.

[12] Factor analysis (table A.2) suggests that "carrying on the cultural traditions of one's ancestors" might load onto this factor as well, with a loading of 0.45. This item was left off, however, because doing so yielded a higher Cronbach's α. A look at all diagnostics, combined with "theoretical sense" (DeVellis 2003, p. 115) led to this decision. With all other factors, retaining the items that exceed the 0.4 factor loading also yielded the highest α.

[13] The correlation between the "action" and "identity" scales is 0.28. To put this correlation in context, the correlation between the "identity" scale and the ethnoculturalism scale is also 0.28, while the correlation between the "action" scale and ethnoculturalism is 0.24.

[14] A more exploratory oblique factor rotation (results not shown) confirms that neither liberal item ("pursuing economic success" and "letting other people say what they want") loads onto any other latent factor, nor does the incorporationist item on "blending into the larger society." "Carrying on the cultural traditions of one's ancestors" and "respecting other people's cultural differences," on the other hand, load weakly with action-oriented civic republicanism, similar to the varimax results.

[15] When all 18 American identity items are scaled together, the resulting α is 0.76. A high α, however, is not necessarily indicative of unidimensionality. Factor analysis is needed to shed light on how many dimensions can be justified (Clark and Watson 1995; Cortina 1993; DeVellis 2003; Floyd and Widaman 1995). As DeVellis writes, "A factor is considered interpretable to the extent that the items associated with it appear similar to one another and make theoretical and logical sense as indicators of a coherent construct" (115). In this case, the 3 factor model described here is more appropriate. A combination of factor loadings, a scree plot of eigenvalues, and theoretical

and logical sense were used to arrive at this conclusion. Also note that the factor analysis confirms that "speaking English" fails to cluster with any broad conception of national identity.

[16] It has been suggested that this pattern results from the degree of religiosity in black and Latino communities (Citrin, Reingold, and Green 1990; Citrin et al. 1994; Schildkraut 2005; Theiss-Morse 2005). Indeed, a simple regression (not shown) of each ethnocultural component on whether a respondent is black or Latino shows that the coefficients on the racial dummy variables in the model for "being a Christian" far outweigh the size of the coefficients for any of the other three ethnocultural regression models and are almost three times the magnitude of the coefficients in the model for "being white."

[17] Note, these questions were asked of American citizens only.

[18] I did not include household income because of the high refusal rate on that question. Including income does not affect the results in tables 4 and 5 and income itself turns out to be statistically insignificant in nearly every case.

[19] The correlation between the Latino and Mexican dummy variables is 0.7. Fifty-four percent of Latinos in the sample have some Mexican ancestry. Running the models with only the Latino dummy variable (results not shown) renders the Latino measure significant with action-oriented civic republicanism (positive) and political freedom (negative), which replaces the significant coefficients for Mexicans. All other results are the same.

[20] The strength of identification questions were asked of citizens only, which means only citizens are included in the analysis in tables 4 and 5. In separate models (not shown), the identification scale was omitted and was replaced with a dummy variable to distinguish citizens from non-citizens. The coefficients on age, education, and ideology increase in magnitude. The "citizen" dummy variable itself matters little. Other results remain the same.

[21] What about blacks, Mexicans, and Latinos being less likely than whites to say political freedom is important? My suspicion is that such respondents might conjure up potentially threatening images of racist or discriminatory language when this survey question is posed. As Gibson and Gouws (2003) show, tolerance of speech rights becomes less revered in the presence of threat. Understanding why an antecedent such as age would lead one to be more likely to endorse economic liberalism and less likely to endorse political liberalism demands further investigation beyond the scope of the present inquiry.

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Table 1: American identity items

Intended tradition	Question	% very important	% somewhat important	N
Ethnoculturalism	Being born in America	24.2	27.1	2768
	Being a Christian	19.3	15.6	2745
	Having European ancestors	7.0	10.4	2707
	Being white	3.8	6.1	2747
Liberalism	Respecting America's political institutions and laws	80.9	15.9	2764
	Pursuing economic success through hard work	69.0	21.7	2760
	Letting other people say what they want, no matter how much you disagree with them	65.9	21.9	2698
Civic republicanism	Doing volunteer work in one's community	44.3	41.9	2773
	Thinking of oneself as American	68.9	24.3	2763
	Feeling American	62.1	28.0	2678
	Being informed about local and national politics	65.3	29.7	2770
	Being involved in local and national politics	37.1	43.8	2761
Incorporationism	Carrying on the cultural traditions of one's ancestors, such as the language and food	35.7	37	2751
	Respecting other people's cultural differences	80.1	16.8	2773
	Blending into the larger society	36.9	36.5	2683
	Seeing people of all backgrounds as American	73.1	19.6	2717
Contested/multiple	Being able to speak English	71.0	23.1	2787
	Having American citizenship	76.0	17.7	2773

Note: Weighted results. "Don't know" and "no answer" excluded.

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

Table 2: Background characteristics and American identity (summated rating scales)

	Ethnoculturalism	Civic republicanism ("action")	Civic republicanism ("identity")	N (raw)
Race/Ethnicity				
White	6.5	62.0	82.4	1633
Black	17.0	76.7	80.7	300
Asian	5.1	62.3	68.2	299
Latino	12.7	67.7	75.7	441
Nativity				
Born in U.S.	8.0	63.1	81.7	554
Not born in U.S.	10.6	73.5	75.4	2118
Generation				
1st generation	10.6	73.5	75.4	554
2nd generation	8.5	57.6	71.3	164
3rd generation	5.1	59.1	79.2	178
4th+ generation	7.8	64.0	82.5	1726
Mexican				
Mexican, US born	8.8	62.1	73.8^	123
Mexican, foreign born	16.1	76.3	73.7^	118
Rest of sample	8.1	64.4	81.2^	2431
Strength of identification				
High identifier	10.2	68.9	87.8	2035
Medium identifier	2.6	52.2	62.1	517
Low identifier	1.0	44.6	38.0	121
"Good" civic republican				
Belongs to civic assocations	3.9	64.7^	80.6^	1183
Belongs to no assocations	11.9	64.4^	80.7^	1466

Note: cell entries are percentage of respondents in top third of summated rating scale.

All entries are statitically significant at $p \leq 0.05$ except where noted (^).

Weighted results. "Don't know" and "no answer" excluded.

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

Table 3: Background characteristics and American identity (single survey items)

	Economic Freedom	Political Freedom	Maintaining Difference	Blending into Larger society	N (raw)
Race/Ethnicity					
White	90.1^	90.1	67.1	72.1	1633
Black	92.5^	84.7	87.1	77.2	300
Asian	92.8^	82.8	78.7	77.8	299
Latino	92.1^	77.7	86.0	79.9	441
Nativity					
Born in U.S.	90.1	89.1	70.4	72.0	554
Not born in U.S.	94.7	79.2	84.0	85.4	2118
Generation					
1st generation	94.7	79.2	84.0	85.4	554
2nd generation	89.2	84.5	74.2	72.1	164
3rd generation	88.2	88.8	75.1	70.3	178
4th+ generation	90.2	89.5	69.8	72.0	1726
Mexican					
Mexican, US born	91.5^	83.7	82.5	72.0	123
Mexican, foreign born	95.5^	60.9	91.4	88.6	118
Rest of sample	90.6^	88.7	71.5	73.5	2431
Strength of identification					
High identifier	93.3	89.5^	73.8	78.9	2035
Medium identifier	83.4	87.0^	67.2	61.7	517
Low identifier	78.0	87.7^	70.00	41.7	121
"Good" civic republican					
Belongs to civic assocations	89.9^	88.8	68.1	71.6	1183
Belongs to no assocations	91.7^	86.7	76.2	76.0	1466

Note: cell entries are percentage of respondents saying each item is very or somewhat important

All entries are statitically significant at $p \leq 0.05$ except where noted (^).

Weighted results. "Don't know" and "no answer" excluded.

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

Table 4: Antecendents of America's ethnocultural and civic republican traditions, OLS

Independent variable	Ethnoculturalism	Civic republicanism ("action")	Civic republicanism ("identity")
Age	**0.22****	**0.13****	**0.06****
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Education	**-0.28****	**-0.05****	**-0.05****
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Male	-0.002	**-0.03****	**-0.03****
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Born in U.S.	0.01	**-0.06****	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)
Black	**0.16****	**0.10****	**0.03****
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Asian	**0.06****	-0.02	-0.003
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Latino	**0.07****	0.01	-0.01
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Conservative	**0.09****	**0.02***	**0.06****
	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Republican	-0.008	-0.01	**0.02****
	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Only English spoken at home	-0.04	-0.03	0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Mexican	-0.02	**0.05***	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)
"High identifier"	**0.18****	**0.17****	**0.36****
	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Constant	0.16 (0.03)	0.68 (0.03)	0.53 (0.02)
R-squared	0.28	0.12	0.30
F	65.54	22.67	72.31
N	2044	2044	2044

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; standard errors in parentheses;

Dependent variables re-coded to range from 0 to 1, where 1 = highest level of adherence

All non-dummy variables re-coded to range from 0 to 1

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004

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Table 5: Antecendents of America's liberal and incorporationist traditions, ordered probit

Independent variable	Economic freedom	Political freedom	Cultural Maintenance	Assimilation
Age	**0.39****	**-0.30****	**-0.48****	**1.08****
	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Education	**-0.39****	0.13	**-0.43****	**-0.30****
	(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Male	-0.08	**0.18****	**-0.20****	-0.03
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Born in U.S.	**-0.42****	0.01	-0.16	**-0.46****
	(0.14)	(0.12)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Black	**0.34****	**-0.18***	**0.71****	**0.46****
	(0.10)	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Asian	**0.27***	**-0.36****	**0.21***	0.10
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Latino	0.05	-0.02	**0.29****	**0.30****
	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.31)	(0.14)
Conservative	**0.52****	**-0.37****	**-0.16****	**0.12***
	(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Republican	-0.01	-0.13	**-0.16****	**0.21****
	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Only English spoken at home	0.08	**-0.38****	**-0.29****	-0.14
	(0.15)	(0.14)	(0.13)	(0.12)
Mexican	0.11	**-0.30***	0.19	-0.07
	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.18)
"High identifier"	**1.01****	0.07	**0.68****	**1.08****
	(0.14)	(0.15)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Cutpoint 1	-1.06 (0.21)	-1.64 (0.21)	-1.76 (0.19)	-0.66 (0.18)
Cutpoint 2	-0.61 (0.21)	-1.10 (0.20)	-0.99 (0.18)	0.18 (0.19)
Cutpoint 3	0.29 0.21)	-0.33 (0.20)	0.09 (0.18)	1.27 (0.19)
Chi-square	207.06	83.65	238.90	282.38
N	2029	1997	2016	1967

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; standard errors in parentheses;

Dependent variables re-coded to range from 0 to 1, where 1 = highest level of adherence

All non-dummy variables re-coded to range from 0 to 1

Source: 21st Century Americanism Survey, 2004