

1 Violations, Opportunities and Power along the Jordan River: Security Studies Theory Applied to Water Conflict

Mark Zeitoun

PEng, PhD

King's College – London

Email: zeitounm@yahoo.com

Next the statesman will invent cheap lies, putting the blame upon the nation that is attacked, and every man will be glad of these conscience-soothing falsities, and will diligently study them, and refuse to examine any refutations of them; and thus he will by and by convince himself that the war is just, and will thank God for the better sleep he enjoys after this process of grotesque self-deception.

Mark Twain (2004 [1916]: 228). "History of War", in: Twain, Mark: *The Mysterious Stranger* (New York: Harper & Brothers).

ABSTRACT

This chapter examines the applicability of recent developments in the field of security studies to water conflict issues in the Jordan River basin. Neumann's contribution to the Copenhagen School of security studies, particularly the concept of the 'violization' of politics, is discussed alongside Warner's contribution of the concept of 'opportunitization'. Both concepts incorporate the insight garnered through consideration of the guiding rationale of the state and non-state actors. It is shown that a combination of these concepts results in an expanded security continuum (non-politicized – politicized – securitized/opportunitized – violated) that is directly relevant to the analysis of water conflict issues between Palestine and Israel. Warner identifies the prime concerns, goals and power of actors in different security sectors to develop the concept of 'security sector goals'.

Two case studies from 2002 are considered: the water infrastructure damages in the West Bank and the Wazzani River dispute between Lebanon and Israel. Dynamics revealed by the application of the theory include a split on positions between actors normally considered aligned on one side of a conflict (for example between sub-national level Palestinian water professionals and their national level representatives); the ability of governments to obscure or enhance water conflict issues to suit other unrelated political interests; the varying position that a conflictual issue can take along the security continuum in relation to time and circumstance and, perhaps most notably, the effect of power asymmetries between competing actors active in issues that have become violated.

Keywords: security, conflict, water, violization, opportunitization, Palestine, Israel, Jordan River

1.1 Introduction

The end of the Cold War signaled the beginning of a new way of thinking about state security. This cognitive evolution has matured, has been tested and is

now deeply ingrained in the public psyche. It is widely recognized that a weak economy is as dangerous as a military adversary for the stability of a state. Few would question that the protection of identity and the environmental services of water are also important as-

pects of life that are ‘worth fighting for’. In addition, most citizens understand that their state’s perceptions and concerns about its security in these sectors is governed in part by its relationships with other states crucial to its foreign policy. These concepts have been clarified and theorized by security studies theory, chiefly by ‘the Copenhagen School’ of Buzan, Wæver, de Wilde (1998) and others (Neumann 1998; Warner 2000).

The theory helps to explain why the Jordan River basin may be one of the least secure areas in the world and yet is very highly ‘securitized’. Insecurity comes about due to the conflict over land between Palestine, Israel and Lebanon. Just as water is an integral part of the land, however, water-related issues form an integral part of the conflict. On the ground in the region an observer can simultaneously witness excessive amounts of rhetoric, wanton destruction of infrastructure, skewed analysis and yet cooperation between the actors in the water sector (Selby 2003; Jagerskög 2003; Allan 2001). A better understanding of these apparent paradoxes requires a deeper look into international relations theory, hydrology, social science, political ecology and, of course, political science. “If we are to increase the solution-space in water management, we’ll have to recognize that there is no single actor, no one best way, no single knowledge base that can do the trick” (Warner 2000: 2). The theory of security studies presented in this chapter will help with the trick.

1.2 Security Studies Theory

Forced by global historic events to depart from the traditional ‘narrow’ military understanding of security, Barry Buzan’s theoretical conception of different security ‘sectors’ effectively captures the wider view of security studies. Each of Buzan’s five security sectors – political, military, economic, societal and environmental – can be analyzed at any or all of four levels: international, regional, national and sub-national. The concept of ‘security complexes’ assists further with the analysis. Defined as “a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot reasonably be analyzed or resolved apart from one another” (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998: 12), the concept contributes to explanations of actions and dynamics that occur between interacting states.

Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) furthermore note that power asymmetries define the parameters of

the complex, and they are in constant flux. Changes thus developed can impact on the complex in four manners: *maintenance of the status quo* (the change does not undermine the structure of the complex), *internal transformation* (the change affects relations and asymmetries within the complex), *external transformation* (the change affects relations with states previously outside of the complex), and *overlay* (where an actor external to the complex imposes its own power asymmetries upon the indigenous security dynamic).

The theoretical framework is itself quite complex. As in molecular or anatomical studies, analysis of the dissected elements is relatively easily understood (the eye can be proven to send some form of impulse to a specific part of the brain) but the more important and most difficult task is to understand the whole (why did that impulse not elicit the person to react as expected, and what did she really see, anyway?). After all, “states approach security as aggregate security, not as five different fields” (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998: 170). Nonetheless, analysis of a single security issue between several actors in a specific sector, at a particular level, within a broader security complex, is a necessary step in the analytical process.

1.2.1 Prime Concerns and Rationales of Security Sectors

At this microscopic, dissected level, specific actors’ actions and reactions could be expected to vary according to each actor’s constitution (the structure and members forming the actor) and motivation (the force driving the decisions and actions of the actor). A particular actor’s *constitution* can be quite diverse, with representation from some combination of the government, civil society or the private sector. Analysis of a heterogenic state behaving as a collective actor is always a complex task (Benvenisti 2002: ch. 3). The American actor in the economic security sector at the international level, for example, would be composed of the U.S. government representatives at the World Trade Organization, domestic production unions, special-interest groups, etc. Given the myriad of possible combinations, generalizations about the make-up and structure of each actor are ineffective. The analysis is best-advanced on a case-by-case basis.

The *motivations* of each actor, on the other hand, are more generally predictable. Within the ‘liberal realism’ perspective of Buzan, rational actors – if they don’t always make rational decisions – at least follow certain rationales to achieve their objectives (and to

Figure 1.1: Buzan’s Security Diagram as Enhanced by Warner. **Source:** Warner (2000). Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder

Security Sector → Level	Physical	Political	Economic	Socio-cultural	Environmental
International system					
Macro-region					
Unit (state)					
Sub-system					
Prime Concern	integrity	stability, legitimacy	wealth	identity	health
Rationale	goal	legitimacy, power-base	cost-benefit ratio	social values, habit, instinct	adaptation

ensure their own survival). Warner (2003) incorporates this concept into security studies theory, identifying the *guiding rationale* of individuals and institutions involved in each sector. According to Kant, these fall into the category of either ‘goal rationality’ (concerned with material values) or ‘value rationality’ (concerned with processes). Warner further identifies that each sector has a *prime concern* - that is the state of being which, until achieved, means serious security and survival concerns for actors within that sector.

These enhancements to the theory overlaid onto the amended Buzan security diagram (adapted to change the ‘military’ domain to ‘physical’ in order to accommodate water and raw material acquisition, and augmented to include each sector’s *prime concern*) presents us with an augmented tool of analysis (figure 2I.I).

The rationale categorization used in figure 2I.I seems accurate and useful in at least so far as each domain’s guiding rationale closely mirrors its prime concern. Recalling that these dynamics occur within an established security complex, the previously-discussed complexity of the model is evident and unavoidable. This complexity is compounded further when one considers the very different *capacities* of each actor to achieve their prime concern, or the power asymmetries and relativities that exist between the actors. The discussion could be taken further yet to examine the *methods* available or used by the actors in each domain. We shall now concentrate on the motivations of the various actors.

Strong actors could be expected to attempt to reach (and to probably achieve) their prime concerns, through various methods. An example of this type of competition is that of a successful businessman franchising out his business while smaller independent businesses close in his wake. Moderately strong actors would be consistently aware of their position, ever on

the lookout to improve it. An example in politics is where a political party ruling with a fragile coalition faces an upcoming election. Weak actors, on the other hand, may hold their prime concern only as a goal perhaps never to be attained, and they are forced to deal with the much dirtier daily struggle for their own *survival*. One thinks of those attempting to manage natural resources in the scorched earth circumstances of the West Bank.

1.2.2 Base Values and Aspirations: First, Second and Third Order Goals

Depending on the power asymmetries of the various actors, there can be substantial gaps between the strong actors (seeking to go much further than their ‘prime concerns’) and the weak actors (desperate to achieve their ‘prime concerns’). In theorizing this phenomenon, Warner conceives of the notion of *first- and second-order goals*. With the addition of the higher-yet third-order level, these motivations may come to be known as ‘security sector goals’, whose characteristics are defined in figure 2I.2.

First order goals are essentially the ‘prime concerns’ themselves and are characterized by the notions of “base values” or “bottom-lines” “which if allowed to fall below may trigger defense-mechanisms” (Warner 2000: 4). The actors who have not been able to achieve this first order goal are forced to deal regularly with real threats to their security. The overriding characteristic governing behavior is *protection*, or the continued attempt to ensure survival. Actors who *have* achieved the first order goal, particularly those who have struggled laboriously for it, would tend to take a conservative approach to maintaining their achievement.

Figure 1.2: Basic Security Sector Goals. **Source:** Warner (2003). Reproduced with permission of the copyright holder

Security Sector → GOALS	Military	Political	Economic	Societal	Environmental
First-order goal* (protection)	physical integrity	political legitimacy	self-sufficiency	identity	integrity
Second-order goal* (accumulation)	<i>lebensraum</i> (room to grow)	power, influence	wealth, development	fulfillment of potential	sustainability
Third-order goal (supremacy)	meta-control	hegemony, domination, independence from international community	super-stability, independence of global treaties	spread of culture, conversion	deep ecology

Second order goals can be considered more beneficial, higher risk achievements. Because a certain amount of risk would normally be required to achieve this higher order, the goals can be considered “rational maximums”, or “risk-ceilings” as Warner (2000: 4) puts it. The conditions necessary to achieve this order would be normally available only after a period of careful and calculated maintenance of an actor’s position or else following “emblematic events” as identified by political ecology theory (Allan 2001). The dominant characteristic governing behavior at this level is *accumulation*, or the acquisition of resources, allies, tactics, etc. enabling an improvement of or consolidation in position.

Third order goals may be considered “irrational maximums”, where an actor attempts to gain distinction. This can be considered beyond risky to cocky, beyond influence to worship. Examples include state empires such as colonial Britain or else megalomaniac media conglomerates set on global dominance and perpetual growth, calling themselves ‘empires’ in the process. The overriding characteristic governing behavior at this level is *supremacy*, where the goal of preservation of an actor’s position is seen to justify the means used against and suffering endured by competing actors.

1.2.3 Threat – Defense and Opportunity – Offense

Warner goes on to state the very important point that “if the baseline value [first-order goal] is violated, a security logic may be invoked” by the actor who is being violated (Warner 2000: 3). That is, the actor is essentially obliged (by virtue of the reaction to the violation by the different constituents that form the actor) to react in some way to the violation, possibly through physical action. This is the *challenge-resistance* (Ara-

dau 2001a) or *threat-defense* (Warner 2000) mechanism identified by the Copenhagen School.

Neumann, a major Copenhagen School exponent, elaborates on this idea arguing that the crucial addition of the “use of force” is a *violation* of politics, leaving little use or room for talk (Neumann 1998). The issue therefore becomes “violized” and a “violation logic” rather than a “security logic” will be invoked for decision-making. Decisions made under a “violation logic” would not be expected to be particularly rational, except perhaps under the wisest of leaders or the most resilient and tested of structures.

Taking this argument further, one would expect that if an actor’s position (or goals achieved) are threatened (or perceived to be threatened, but not quite violated), a ‘security logic’ may be invoked by the actor under threat. This actor may react to counter the threat (or perceived threat) by mobilizing the support and resources required to act. The issue at hand becomes ‘securitized’ and the dynamic allowing this process of mobilization is known as the speech-act of ‘securitization’. An incomplete but accurate idea of securitization can be identified by considering that it “functions as a technique of government which retrieves the ordering force of the fear of violent death by a mythical replay of the variations of the Hobbesian state of nature. It manufactures a sudden rupture in the routinized, everyday life by fabricating an existential threat which provokes experiences of the real possibility of violent death” (Aradau 2001a citing Huysmans 1992). As stated above, this form of ‘sabre-rattling’ applies not only to war (and violence) but to the other four security sectors of politics, economy (and currency), environment (and health), society (and identity). The concept has been extensively developed by the Copenhagen School and will be referred to again.

While the term ‘securitization’ may not be known by most politicians, their understanding of its con-

cepts is exemplified by their experience with its language. Indeed, its familiarity is such that some are sounding warning notes: “do we really want security to become, as Waever eloquently puts it, ‘a synonym for everything that is politically good or desirable?’[then] the processes of politicization and securitization suddenly become rather complicated due to the fact that the two processes cannot be distinguished on the grounds of distinctive features” (Ostraukaite 2001).

This blurring between politicization and securitization is highlighted by examining another phenomenon: namely the similarities in the dynamics involved in defending security or capitalizing on opportunities. Referring back to figure 2I.2, it can be shown that if there is an opportunity for an actor to achieve a higher order goal, an ‘opportunity logic’ may be invoked by the actor presented with the opportunity. An example of this is an expansionist state implementing a land grab while the otherwise-restricting international community is focused on more dramatic events elsewhere. If the opportunity is presented through negotiation or seized through various power asymmetries (coercion, deception, etc.), the issue “may be promoted with the same sense of urgency as a security issue would” (Warner, 2004: 12) and could be considered ‘opportunitized’ (in Warner’s opinion, shared by this author – a term unfortunately as inelegant as ‘securitized’). Opportunitized can thus be considered the flip-side of securitized and instead of a *threat-defense* mechanism, an *opportunity-offense* mechanism would be at work. Correspondingly, an ‘opportunity logic’ would be invoked for decision-making, most likely coupled with the use of a tired metaphor. Rather than the defensive security logic of ‘we’re under attack’ or ‘they walk amongst us!’, offense-speak would be heard: ‘let’s strike while the iron is hot’ and ‘we may never be presented with such circumstances again, let’s do it now!’

1.3 Integrating ‘Violated’ and ‘Opportunitized’

The concepts can be applied to a very useful conceptual continuum developed by Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998). The continuum applies universally and in particular to issues of conflict encountered in the politics of dynamic societies:

non-politicized → politicized → securitized

A *non-politicized* issue is defined as ‘the state does not deal with [the issue] and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision’ (it is a non-issue to the actors involved). *Politicized* means that ‘the issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation’. *Securitized* is used when “the issue is an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” Buzan et al. (1998: 23).

Neumann, as mentioned previously, takes note of the different dynamics and reactions which occur when a conflictual issue actually goes beyond the sphere of talk and rhetoric to ‘war’. At the point where violence is used, politics becomes violated and the issue itself becomes “violized” (Neumann 1998: 8). The implications are significant, particularly in the Jordan River Basin. For example, Palestinian scientists and managers attempting to manage Palestinian water resources under Israeli dominance, prior to the 2002 re-occupation of the West Bank, were desperately trying to achieve their first order goal of sovereignty over the resource, or ‘integrity’. Subsequently faced with a complete military occupation of their land, the destruction of much water infrastructure and inability to leave their homes due to curfews or roadblocks, their will for cooperation that existed prior to the act of war and the corresponding trust built with their Israeli counterparts had been violated.

This builds directly on Clausewitz’s famous phrase of ‘war being the continuation of politics by other means’. While the distinction is valid and accepted following its real world testing, some fine-tuning of the definition is suggested. Is it only ‘the use of force’ that characterizes violation? Neumann gives the example of one group denying recognition of its constitutive stories: the group denied has three choices – to accept the stories told about it by the other, to abandon their own stories, or to maintain their stories and even force their stories upon the other. This last choice involves *action*. He invokes Ringmar (1996) on reasons a state may “go to war” in order to gain some particular recognition – one reason is due to “a series of occasions under which recognition was denied under humiliating conditions ... the group suffered and the failure of recognition was indeed experienced as a loss of dignity, worth and ‘face’” (Neumann 1998: 6). One could imagine the humiliated group acting in various other manners were it unwise for them to ‘go to war’ (as is the case for the Palestinian water managers, whose political representation lacks both the political support and military might to declare war on Israel

and who are thus consigned to death with their Israeli counterparts through complaints, pleading or silence). This touches upon the concept of state *identity*, which may be composed of corporate and social components that affect a state's interests in debatable but very real ways (Aalto 2000). Hourani (1991) pulls together these concepts of identity, violation and humiliation, within the previously-mentioned asymmetric power relations that shape events in Buzan's security complexes to note that the effects are not always apparent to the more powerful actor: "Defeat goes deeper into the human soul than victory. To be in someone else's power is a conscious experience which induces doubts about the ordering of the universe, while those who have power can forget it, or can assume that it is part of the natural order of things and invent or adopt ideas which justify their possession of it" (Hourani 1991: 300).

Considering these subtleties, a violation of politics could be a result of something between 'the use of force' (violent conflict) and 'talk' (politics); it is suggested that 'confrontational action' be taken as the defining limit of violization; action rather than just words. Politics and politicized issues can be violated by confrontational action. 'Action' can here include war, forced disarmament, political assassinations, occupation, destruction of infrastructure and other actions. It does not by definition necessarily include death, but it does include some form of humiliation, trauma or other outcome eliciting a reaction from the receiver of the action.

Tighter boundaries can thus be given to each of the components of the continuum, which then extended becomes:

non-politicized → politicized → securitized → violized

We see that the definition of violized ('violated' preferred) thus depends partly upon the reactions and logic of the dominant decision-makers amongst the actors on the issue. Will their reaction be mute, or violent? This is close in spirit and concept to the consideration of the rationale and first, second and third order goals of actors within the security sectors as discussed above. The corresponding concepts of 'opportunitized' and the 'opportunity-logic' also beg to be included in the continuum. Recalling that in terms of dynamics and motivations it is the flip-side of the securitization logic, opportunitized can be coupled with it on the continuum, which then becomes:

non-politicized → politicized → securitized/opportunitized → violated

Every conflictual issue of concern, particularly in terms of any of Buzan's five security sectors at four different levels, will be located somewhere along this continuum. The exact location would be expected to change in response to changing internal and external pressures and circumstance, ultimately modifying the security complex in whose space they are taking place. Once categorized, the actors involved in the issue could be expected to deploy a corresponding logic, yielding perhaps corresponding and somewhat predictable outcomes. Figure 21.3 is an attempt to define and exemplify the terms of the expanded continuum.

1.4 Water and Security in the Jordan River Basin

The Jordan River Basin contains the Palestinian territory of the West Bank bordering Israel and Jordan which in turn have Syria and Lebanon as neighboring riparians. In this highly-charged political and military environment, stunted economies and a ravaged ecological environment, ideologies flow much more readily than water. While the root of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is control over the land, issues surrounding water-sharing form an integral part of the conflict. The concepts and analytical frameworks identified in the preceding discussion can be deployed to analyze the dynamics involved in this conflict.

The issue of water-sharing between Palestinian and Israeli actors touches upon all of Buzan's security sectors directly, perhaps surprisingly less so in the environmental sector than the others. From a military perspective, water could be (or has been) used as a weapon (through contamination), while access to the scarce resource places it squarely in the economic sector. The relationship of water and the land to both the harmonious traditional Palestinian use of the land as well as in the founding elements of Zionist ideology sets it firmly in the political (in terms of potential political gain) and societal sectors (especially in terms of pride and identity). A level of complexity higher than most analysts would care for is thus unavoidable. To complicate the issue further, and depending on the particular issue under analysis, there are usually at least two actors from each side involved in each of the five sectors.

The power asymmetries that exist within the current security complex are extreme. Israel, the regional hegemon, enjoys superpower political support, powerful armed forces and a broad-based and dynamic

Figure 1.3: Definitions of the Adapted Security Studies Framework of ‘Politicization’ and ‘Securitization’.

Security Continuum	Definition	Example
Non-politicized ↑	“The state does not deal with [the issue] and it is not in any other way made an issue of public debate and decision” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23). A “non-issue”.	Illegal immigrants finding a ‘silent’ labor market (SE Asian clam-pickers in the UK 2004 (prior to the tragic drowning of 15 workers).
↓ Politicized ↑	“The issue is part of public policy, requiring government decision and resource allocation (Buzan et al., 1998: 23)	Organized crime, traffic congestion, international relations with friendly neighbors
↓ Securitized /	“The issue is an existential threat requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure” (Buzan et al., 1998: 23)	Carbon dioxide emissions, imperialism, ‘terrorism’, weapons of mass destruction, expansionism.
↑ Opportunized ↓	The issue offers such an opportunity to improve a situation that it justifies risks and actions outside the normal bounds of political procedure (Warner 2000: 12)	Off-shore oil deposits leading to a unilateral expansion of a state’s perimeter; foreign policy alignment with U.S. to reap political rewards (Spain, UK for war on Iraq).
↓ Violated	The issue has escalated in intensity to the point that ‘confrontational action’ is employed and the normal conventions of politics are violated (adapted from Neumann 1998: 3)	Land-grabs while international attention is diverted (Israel’s Separation Barrier); opposition leaders being arrested under government-declared state of emergency (Aung San Suu Kyi).

economy. The partially formed, occupied state of Palestine enjoys little effective political support, has no armed military and has an economy that is either completely contained by, or a client to, Israel’s (Khan 2004). The relative influence of Jordan, Lebanon and Syria fall somewhere between these extremes. The driving rationales behind each state’s actions, furthermore, are just as varied.

The great variety in the way that the actors involved can spin or conceal the nature of water conflict issues means that the issue can fall at many different points on the adapted security continuum. A few examples at this point suffice to confirm the argument.

1.5 Case Study 1: Damages to the West Bank Water Infrastructure

Repeated Israel Defense Forces (IDF) incursions into the West Bank in early 2002 culminated in the effective ongoing military occupation. The worst of the tank-and-bulldozer activity has thus far damaged an estimated US\$ 73 million worth of water infrastructure and US\$ 71 million of wastewater infrastructure (IMG 2004). For example, consider the water departments of the municipalities of the typical West Bank cities (Bethlehem, Nablus, Hebron or Jenin). Having had one or two of its main transmission lines cut by the IDF military activity, one quarter of its customers

were without any piped water for several weeks (World Bank 2002; EWOC 2002). The head engineer of the water department or the mayor of the city would consider the issue beyond securitized - that is to say ‘violated’. They would find themselves at odds with the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian Water Authority on how to deal with the situation. These latter actors may not want to jeopardize the actual cooperation they undertake with their Israeli counterparts, and preserve the subordinate as it may be relationship that they have. The Palestinian Authority would thus attempt to keep the issue simply politicized or, preferably, non-politicized, unless there were some political gain to be gathered from it, perhaps in the arena of negotiations (in which case the issue would become quickly securitized). In contrast, the IDF, having accomplished its mission, would find the issue non-politicized, a position that the Government of Israel (GOI) may also seek, in order to avoid creating domestic dissent. Figure 21.4 attempts to represent a summary of the case.

The competing interests and power asymmetries that exist within the security complex result in a situation whereby the destruction that occurred can be of no importance (a ‘non-issue’) to one actor (the IDF) but of the utmost importance to another (in terms of pride or financial loss, for example to the municipality).

Figure 1.4: Security Study Theory Applied to Case Study 1

Issue: 'Destruction of municipal water infrastructure by Israeli military activity'				
Actors → Security Sector	Palestinian Goals		Israeli Goals	
	Palestinian Municipality	PWA/PA	IDF	GOI
Military	survival (<1)	n/a	victory (3)	dominance (3)
Environmental	sustainable resource (<1)	sustainable resource (<1)	n/a	n/a
Political	sovereignty (<1)	sovereignty (<1)	n/a	hegemony (3)
Economical	cost recovery (<1)	n/a	n/a	n/a
Socio-cultural	pride (<1)	pride (<1)	n/a	n/a
Position on Security Continuum	violated	non-politicized	non-politicized	securitized

Security Sector Goals achieved: less than first (<1), first order (1), second order (2), third order (3).

PWA = Palestinian Water Authority; PA = Palestinian Authority; IDF = Israel Defense Forces; GOI = Government of Israel.

Notwithstanding the absence of other actors involved in the case study (Israeli water-professionals, Palestinian NGOs, Israeli academics), the analysis provided by figure 21.4 reveals at least two other interesting dynamics. *Firstly*, a difference in stances is revealed between different actors from the same 'side'. The Palestinian municipality may feel as much violated by the silence of the PA as from the actions of the IDF, perhaps even more so as an element of trust is also violated. Future relations between the two Palestinian actors could be expected to be volatile, irrational and compromising to any future negotiations between them. Similarly, the IDF has much less concern about the effects of its actions than does the GOI, which is directly dealing with other players within the regional security complex, as well as at the international level. The GOI is therefore forced to regulate IDF behavior and be directly involved with the establishment of the 'rules of engagement', itself a potential source of sub-conflict.

Secondly, figure 21.4 reveals significant difference in the level of the 'security sector goal' achieved or aspired to by the different actors. Both of the Palestinian actors have not achieved their first order goals (<1) while the Israeli actors have achieved the highest order goal (3) in each relevant sector. The GOI in particular, as a regional hegemon, has every interest to ensure that the IDF's actions, which are taking place within the security complex contribute only to the maintenance or improvement of the *status quo* of the complex, and to avoid any internal transformation of it. This follows Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde's descrip-

tion of the dynamics that exist within security complexes, as previously discussed. The resultant attitudes, decision-making logics and reactions on the Palestinian side (desperation, irrationality, resentment, submission) and on the Israeli side (dismissal of the issue, denial) are entirely predictable. It is a classic case of strongly-established hegemony, but that is another story.

1.6 Case Study 2: The Wazzani River Dispute

The short-lived but very vocal near-war between Israel and Lebanon in autumn 2002 over a water development project on the Wazzani tributary of the Hasbani River is another case in point. Having recently gained access to the land which had been occupied for over 20 years by the Government of Israel (GOI), the Government of Lebanon (GOL) and international donors invested in a small scale drinking water delivery project on the Wazzani River. The Wazzani empties within Lebanon into the Hasbani River which crosses the border into Israel to form one of the main sources of the Jordan River. .

Prior to the resolution of the dispute, Israeli and Lebanese politicians and their media quickly had their constituents and clients in a state of confrontational fervor (IMFA 2002; Ha'artez 2002; New York Times 2002), with the Israeli people feeling their source of life was threatened and the Lebanese people fearing for their actual lives from the 'unavoidable' Israeli air strikes. In practice the volume of water in question

Figure 1.5: Security Study Theory Applied to Case Study 2. **Source: ??**

'Water-Development Project on the Wazzani River'		
Actors →	Government of Lebanon Goals	Government of Israel Goals
Security Sector		
Military	physical integrity (1)	dominance (3)
Environmental	n/a	sustainability (<2)
Political	sovereignty (1)	hegemony (3)
Economical	development (1)	development (2)
Socio-cultural	pride (1)	pride, identity (2)
Postition on Security Continuum	from Non-politicized → Securitized	from Politicized → Non-politicized

Security Sector Goals achieved: less than first (<1), first order (1), second order (2), third order (3).

(3.5–8.5 million cubic meters per year) posed no threat to Israel nor presented a great opportunity to Lebanon, and had much more to do with the highly charged political atmosphere where any actors' unilateral actions are scrutinized by the neighbors (Luft 2002). Upon the peaceful arbitration (but not resolution) of the dispute through U.S., UN and EU intervention, the politicians and the media in Lebanon spoke of victory. Their counterparts in Israel kept silent so that the Israeli public remains largely unaware of the dispute's resolution. Figure 21.5 presents a summary of the issue.

Figure 21.5 reveals three interesting dynamics. *Firstly*, that the competing actors have the same goals in certain security sectors. For example, both actors covet the river partly in order to develop their economic situation, and both feel the denial of the right to exploit the resource in the socio-cultural terms of pride and identity. Where common goals exist, solutions to conflict can usually be found. Were this commonality somehow to spread to the other security domains and the resultant aggregate approach to security even partly the same to warring governments, political resolution of the conflict would be theoretically achievable. This would be a case exemplifying how a conflict over water resources positively affects the broader political conflict. The fact that it has not occurred says a great deal about the limited influence that the issue of water typically has compared to 'higher-politics' issues such as sovereignty, the status of Jerusalem and the return of the 1948 refugees (Jagerskög 2003; Lowi 1993).

Secondly, the figure reveals the asymmetric influence over public opinion between politicians and the mass media on one hand and that of political scientists or water professionals on the other. Israeli ana-


lysts' accurate and sober analyses of the GOI's use of the water issue to conceal other concerns (water management inefficiencies or else principles of unilateral action (Newman 2002; Zisser 2002)), for example, had much less effect on public opinion than the more sensational and more prevalent radio, television and newspaper attention paid to the subject.

Thirdly, figure 21.5 reveals how the location of the issue can vary on the 'security continuum'. The Wazzani water development issue on the Israeli side spanned the security continuum from politicized → securitized → non-politicized. On the Lebanese side it spanned from non-politicized politicized → securitized politicized. The respective footprints of the Government of Lebanon and the Government of Israel are presented graphically in figure 21.6.

Notwithstanding the absence of lesser actors involved in the case study (Israeli and Lebanese water professionals, academics, NGOs, etc.), the importance of figure 21.6 is that it shows that an issue can vary with time and circumstance. It is no coincidence that the level of public concern on both sides directly reflected the intensification of the issue as seen by the respective governments; indeed, that was their goal. The intensification was required in order for their people to allow their governments the mobilization required to act outside of the normal uneasy relationship between the countries, or else to conceal other issues. According to security studies theory, both governments have an interest to present "an argument with a particular rhetorical and semiotic structure [to] achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have to be obeyed" (Buzan/Wæver/de Wilde 1998: 25). The theory of the dynamic applied to the sharing of transnational resources is best put by Benvenisti: "Often gov-

Figure 1.6: Issue: WaterDevelopment Project on Wazzani River as Seen from the Governments of Lebanon and Israel, 2002.

	August	September	October	November
GOL	Non-politicized →	Politicized →	Securitized →	Politicized
GOI	Politicized →	Securitized →		Non-politicized



resolution of dispute

GOL = Government of Lebanon; GOI = Government of Israel

ernments find it opportune to respond to their domestic public's demand for a larger share, not by allocating less to the powerful small groups [within their own societies] but by presenting a tougher stance on the international scene, thereby mobilizing public opinion against the neighboring states" (Benvenisti 2002: 51).

An unfortunate but noteworthy aside to this case is the fate of the project following the Israeli-Hizbollah war in summer 2006. As with the previous case of extensive destruction of Palestinian water infrastructure, the Wazzani project - like water infrastructure throughout southern Lebanon - was heavily targeted by IDF forces. The partial destruction of the project includes damages to the hydraulic rams, booster station, reservoirs and associated treatment plant. The guiding rationale and intent of the Israeli side can only be guessed at at this stage, but merits further investigation.

1.7 Conclusion

While thorough analysis of water conflict issues in the Jordan River basin necessitates a full range of interdisciplinary theory, this chapter has shown that security studies theory can provide useful insights. Using Buzan's security diagram as a foundation, Neumann's concept of violization and Warner's concept of opportunitization have been integrated. The expanded 'security continuum' has been linked with the concept of 'security sector goals', and tested on two conflictual water issues in the Jordan River Basin. The application has revealed the complexity of the issues, highlighting the very real split on positions between players normally considered aligned on one side of a conflict; the limited potential of common goals shared by competing actors; the variability of a position of an issue along the 'security continuum' as a

function of time and circumstance and, perhaps most notably, the effect of power asymmetries between competing actors.

This piece of analysis, however, falls short of revealing the whole story. The limits of these analytical tools are evident in that they do little to explain the rationale of different actors or the prediction of their behavior. Nor do they consider the methods available to or used by different actors to achieve their goals. Security studies theory does quite naturally lead, however, to other theoretical frameworks that can make analysis complete, and these should be pursued. One thinks immediately of the lead-in to cultural theory, international relations and actor-network theory for further insights into the dynamics of the players involved. Risk theory is a more scientific approach to the concept of security study goals; political ecology can bring the abstract security world back to the natural one. Mass communications theories will shed light on the most efficient use of 'speech-acts', while within security studies itself, there is a lot to be gained by the application of the concepts of de-violization and de-opportunitization. These topics remain to be explored with vigor while the conflicts on the ground continue.

REFERENCES

- Aalto, P., 2000: "The Saviour and Other Europes - Identity, Interests and Geopolitical Images of Europe in Estonia", Paper given at the ISA 2000 conference, Los Angeles, 14-18 March, 2000; see at: <<http://www.isanet.org/archive/aalto.doc>>.
- Allan, J.A., 2001: *The Middle East Water Question - Hydro-politics and the Global Economy* (London: I.B. Taurus).
- Aradau, C., 2001a: "Beyond Good and Evil: Ethics and Securitization/Desecuritization Techniques", in: *Rubikon E-Journal*, December 2001; at: <<http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/claudia2.htm02/02/2004>>.

- Aradau, C., 2001b: "Migration: The Spiral of (In)Security", in: *Rubikon E-Journal*, March 2001; at: <<http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/audia1.htm02/02/2004>>.
- Benvenisti, E., 2002: *Sharing Transboundary Resources – International Law and Optimal Resource Use* (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press).
- Buzan, B.; Waever, O.; de Wilde, J. 1998: *Security – A New Framework for Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner).
- EWOC, 2002: *Water and Wastewater Situation in the West Bank Governorates During and Following the IDF Re-occupation March, April 2002 – Draft Interim Report* (Jerusalem: Emergency Water Operations Center (UNDP, USAID, Oxfam), June).
- Ha'aretz, 2002: "Sharon Warns Against Diversion of Water Sources in Lebanon", in: Ha'aretz Newspaper, 11 September.
- Hourani, A., 1991: *A History of the Arab Peoples* (New York: Warner Books).
- IMFA, 2002: "Cabinet Communique – 13 October, 2002" (Jerusalem: Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Cabinet Secretariat communique, 13 October).
- IMG, 2004: *IMG Damage Assessment and Reconstruction Management in the West Bank and Gaza Strip Database*. International Management Group, European Commission Representative Office in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, at: <<http://www.ecwbg.info/first.asp>>.
- Jäkerskog, A., 2003: *Why States Cooperate Over Shared Water: The Water Negotiations in the Jordan River Basin* (Linköping: Linköping University).
- Khan, Mushtaq (2004) "Evaluating the emerging Palestinian state: 'Good governance' versus 'transformation potential'", in: Khan, M.,: *State Formation in Palestine: Viability and governance during a social transformation*. (London: RoutledgeCurzon).
- Lowi, M., 1993: *Water and Power – The Politics of a Scarce Resource in the Jordan River Basin*, (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press).
- Luft, G., 2002: "The Wazzani River Dispute: More Tension Along the Israel-Lebanon Border", in: *Peace Watch*, No. 397, 20 September, at: <<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/peacewatch/peacewatch2002/397.htm>>.
- Mason, S.; Bichsel, C.; Hagmann, T., 2003: "Trickling-Down or Spilling-Over?" Exploring the links between international and sub-national water conflicts in the Eastern Nile and Syr Daria Basins", Paper presented at the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops Edinburgh, Workshop 9: "Geography, Conflict and Cooperation", 28 March–2 April.
- Medzini, A., 2001: *The River Jordan: Frontiers and Water* (London: School of Oriental and African Studies).
- Neumann, Iver B., 1998: "Identity and the Outbreak of War: or Why the Copenhagen School of Security Studies Should Include the Idea of 'Violisation' in its Framework of Analysis", in: *International Journal of Peace Studies*, 3, 1 (January): 1–10.
- Newman, D., 2002: "The Wazzani and Our Water Problem", in: *The Jerusalem Post*, 18 September.
- New York Times, 2002: "In Israel and Lebanon, Talk of War Over Water", in: *New York Times*, 10 October.
- Ostrauskaite, R., 2001: "Environmental Security as an Ambiguous Symbol: Can We Securitise the Environment", in: *Rubikon E-Journal*, December; at: <<http://venus.ci.uw.edu.pl/~rubikon/forum/rasa2.htm02/02/2004>>.
- Ringmar, Erik, 1996: *Interest and Action: A Cultural Explanation of Sweden's Involvement in the Thirty Years' War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).
- Selby, J., 2003: *Water, Power and Politics in the Middle East – The Other Israeli-Palestinian Conflict*, (London: I.B. Taurus),
- Sherman, M., 1999: *The Politics of Water in the Middle East – An Israeli Perspective on the Hydro-Political Aspects of the Conflict* (London: Macmillan).
- Warner, J., 2003: *Images of Water Security: a More Integrated Perspective* (Middlesex University, Flood Hazard Research Centre).
- Warner, J., 2000: "Plugging the GAP – Working with Buzan: the Ilisu Dam as a Security Issue", Paper presented at McGill University, Montreal, Canada, April.
- World Bank, 2003: *27 Months of Intifada, Closures and Palestinian Economic Crisis* (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, May).
- Zisser, E., 2002: "Israel and Lebanon: The Battle for the Wazzani", in: Heller, M. (Ed.): *Tel Aviv Notes – An Update on Political and Strategic Developments in the Middle East*, No. 50 (Tel Aviv University, Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Jafee Center for Strategic Studies, October); at: <www.tau.ac.il/~jcss/>.

