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PAPERS IN CULTURE RESEARCH

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INTRODUCTION

This book is a collection of papers in culture research, mostly written since 1993. Although my basic theoretical framework has remained cultural heterogeneity, the specific subject matters that I have turned to, as well as the range of questions that have become part of a larger scientific agenda, are definitely quite different from those I used to deal with when my central attention was dedicated to studying processes and products involved primarily with verbal activities. As a result, the major bulk of this book is dedicated not to further advancements in polysystem theory, but to exploring new avenues of complexity and heterogeneity in socio-cultures.

[The rest of the Introduction is to be soon available]

Heterogeneity and
Dependencies

CULTURE AS GOODS, CULTURE AS TOOLS

Two major concepts of "culture" are widely used in everyday and official parlance, and in academic traditions: (1) culture as-goods, and (2) culture-as-tools. The "culture-as-goods" concept characterizes mostly official and everyday use, as well as various sections of the "humanistic traditions." The "culture-as-tools" concept, on the other hand, has characterized all academic disciplines which have worked with the idea of "culture" from at least the end of the 19th century. I am referring here to anthropology and sociology on the one hand, and to cultural semiotics on the other.

It is my view that the "culture-as-tools" conception is more useful and allows greater analytical and research versatility for developing research and understanding – and eventually also practical tools for policy-making – in the field of culture. Moreover, "goods" can be fully investigated within the tools-framework, while the opposite is not true.

1. Culture-as-goods

In the "culture-as-goods" conception, culture is considered as a set and stock of evaluable goods, the possession of which signifies wealth, high status, and prestige. The possessor of such a set of goods can use it for a variety of purposes, which all perhaps obey the simple principle of gaining power by displaying riches. This is therefore a procedure (a strategy) which can be adopted by an individual as well as by an organized collective of individuals, namely a social entity.

Clearly, the formulation "culture-as-goods" does not reflect the attitude of the people-in-the-culture themselves. For those who practice this conception, these goods are viewed, and sensed, as "values." A whole stock of words has been invented to distinguish these valuable items – objects, ideas, activities, and artifacts – from less valuable ones. They are labeled "original," "artistic," "aesthetic," "spiritual," and more. They are treated as givens, and a whole set of institutions have emerged along the ages with the purpose of cherishing them, enhancing their value, and securing it.

The possibility to view these valued and valuable items as cultural goods has been developed in a wide range of disciplines, from anthropology to archaeology, from history to sociology. A considerable

impetus to this method has been Bourdieu's contribution to the under-standing of the nature and mechanism of the exchange of these goods. (Bourdieu 1971, 1979a, 1979b, 1984, and more.)

The term "evaluable" stands for a bundle of procedures involved with the transformation of any goods to desirable, successfully marketable ones. It also comprises the complex set of comparisons arising from competition between human groups and communities, that is, from the aspiration of different bodies, or individuals who dominate them, to acquire status on a larger-than-the-domestic scene. This aspiration is not an abstract pursuit of some vague sense of respectability, but a concrete sentiment which has always worked in endeavors for surviv-al and achieving deterring power.

1.2. The nature of cultural goods.

Cultural "goods," often discussed as "properties" (cf. Bourdieu's "bi-ens symboliques"), may be both material and semiotic (problematical-ly called "symbolic" in some traditions) – that is, both "tangible" and "intangible." It really matters little, from the point of view of their respective function, whether the goods in discussion are lapis lazuli, a high palace, running water, a car, a computer, or a set of texts, a group of text producers ("poets," "writers"), a collection of pieces of music, a collection of paintings, sculptures, a theater, etc. Once a de-fined set of such goods acquires the condition of evaluability by mu-tual recognition, in an established market (or Stock Exchange), it is assigned a specific value. Goods which cannot be evaluated by such a market cannot have value, and therefore are not marked as "culture." Therefore, social entities may be stigmatized as "having no culture" by other social entities, if diagnosed as not being in possession of the required and acknowledged set of goods.

1.3. Shifts of value.

The relevant set of goods is of shifting nature. What may have had a high value in one period may have acquired a low value in some other period, or even become obsolete. The mechanisms regulating such shifts are the contacts one social entity maintains with others entities, in addition to domestic dynamics which characterizes any social enti-ty, large or small. However, these contacts are basically constrained by the domestic dynamics. (For further discussion and bibliography see "Laws of Cultural Interference" in this collection.)

1.4. The possessors of goods.

The possession of cultural goods has never been equally distributed among social groups. Clearly, it is the privileged that not only have access to such goods, but also act with authorization to define their value in the first place. These restricted dominating circles thus have the double capacity of both possessing the goods and preventing others from having them. For a ruler, or the ruling strata at large, such goods could be part of what I elsewhere (Even-Zohar 1996b) suggested terming *the indispensabilia of power*. Along history, rulers propagated the idea of their superiority, distinguishing themselves from the rest of society or from "lesser" rulers, as it were.

As Gentili (1984: 153) puts it – discussing Greece in the sixth and fourth centuries B.C. –

"attraverso l'opera dell'artista, il ricco signore o l'aristicratico della città e sopratutto il tirano miravano a nobilitarsi e a consolidare il proprio potere politico." [Through the work of the artist, the rich lord or the aristocrat of town, and above all the tyrant, aimed at ennobling themselves and consolidating their political power.]

It is only in later periods, sporadically in ancient Greece, but overwhelmingly only since the Modern Era (the late 18th Century, to be more precise), that a growing portion of society is allowed to some extent to have a growing share of the goods that previously were restricted to a more limited group. Thus, ordinary people may have some access to books, paintings (perhaps in the form of cheap reproductions), sports, the theater, cloths, foods, music, or perfumes (now in mass production). When not accessible as private possessions, these can be declared to be in the public domain through state schools, museums, and other displays (for example, the Paris metro stations). Such goods, and in particular those now labeled "works of art" begin, since the 19th Century, to be propagated as the common property of "nations," to become a common "heritage" or "patrimony." The term "heritage" normally refers to the accepted canon of precious goods, thus designating distinction and a useful benchmark for competition. It thus normally works as a tool for validating the effectiveness of an established repertoire (i.e., historically accumulated), and for securing its perpetuation.

1.5. The producers of goods.

For the potential producers of cultural goods, to have their products recognized as valuable clearly has meant gaining benefits and privileges in accessing the desirable resources normally known as "success." To have one's products (and consequently one's total activity) admitted into the canonized set of valued goods therefore has meant, throughout human history, an achievement one would not easily give up. What is usually described in the various sciences of man as canon formation and canon struggles represent, more often than not, contests and conflicts about shares and access to social privileges and benefits.

2. Culture-as-tools

In the "culture-as-tools" conception, culture is considered as a set of operating tools for the organization of life, on both the collective and individual levels. These "tools" are basically of two types:

2.1. Passive tools.

"Passive" tools are procedures with the help of which "reality" is analyzed, explained, and made sense of for and by humans.

This perspective is in fact based on the hermeneutic tradition: it views 'the world' as a set of signs which need to be interpreted in order to make some sense of life. The idea of a modeling system, developed by Ivanov, Lotman, and other Soviet semioticians, is above everything else a coherent set of procedures with the help of which 'the world makes sense'.

Perhaps this is best formulated by Lotman and Uspenskij (1971: 146-147; 1978) as follows:

The main "work" of culture [...] is the structural organization of the surrounding world. Culture is a generator of "structuredness" and it creates social sphere around man which, like biosphere, makes life possible (in this case social and not organic). (Translation by Segal 1974: 94-95)

2.2. Active tools.

"Active" tools are procedures with the help of which both an individual and a collective entity may handle any situation encountered, as well as produce any such situation. As Swidler puts it, culture is "a repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action'" (Swidler 1986: 273). This aspect, unlike that of the passive tools, is therefore mostly linked with notions

of 'acting' rather than with 'understanding.' Evidently, 'understanding' is indispensable for 'acting,' but the main point here is the making of active decisions and performing, rather than 'make sense' of given situations.

3. Tools vs. goods as cultural organizers.
While tools, either "passive" or "active," function as organizers of "life," "goods" may be considered as "organizers" only indirectly, that is, when converted (or transformed), into tools. That is, when they may help those who possess them to convert the signified value into a workable tool. This conversion entails the making of models, for either understanding or acting, from symbolical values. It is basically analogous to what Renfrew (1986) has suggested as the (diachronic) transformation of materials from symbols to usage. In our case, however, the goods do not necessarily lose their function as signifying values even when converted to tools for practical actions.

4. Repertoire and other parameters in culture.
Tools, "passive" or "active," are not a random pile of options, but a complex set, an array of interrelated components. The term "repertoire" has been suggested for this array in various traditions of culture analysis, both semiotic (e.g., Jakobson) and anthropological (e.g., Swidler 1986).

Two key concepts in the theory of repertoire need be underlined: (a) "relations," a concept that expresses the view that none of the hypothesized components in a set is an ontological unit working *per se* (this is basically the systemic or "relational" thinking); and (b) "clusters," a concept that expresses the view that the "units" always work, are acquired, understood, and used in ready-made bundles ("combinations," "models").

These, and other concepts of system and theories of repertoire in relation to culture, are discussed in more detail in the other papers in this collection.

4.1. Conversion and transfer.
Procedures of conversion seem to be most consequential when they take place in the framework of transfer. Through the competition between people and societies, items may indeed more likely be transferred as goods before these goods are converted to work as models

for generating situations in the life of people. Usually, it takes more time to change a repertoire of a culture than absorb a definite quantity of goods. For example, to acquire a number of paintings from some external source does not necessarily nor immediately engender domestic production of painting, nor does it put the activity of painting as such as an accessible option to people. Moreover, it does not make painting a tool for "modeling the world." However, it may be a preamble to such a development. The very act of seeking and acquiring such goods may engender repertoire change.

FACTORS AND DEPENDENCIES IN CUTURE[1]

The question of the "necessary factors" for the assumed totality of cultural phenomena has been enlarged by dynamic functionalism far beyond the pairs of *langue–parole*, code–message, paradigmatics–syntagmatics, etc. Jakobson, in his turn based on Bühler (1934) and the Prague Structuralists, ambitiously wished to integrate into his model of language "the constitutive factors in any speech event, in any act of verbal communication" (Jakobson 1960: 353; also 1980 [1956]). His major contribution to functionalistic system analysis has been his insistence that every single event is not a simple relation between an assumed code and an implemented message, but that both are conditioned by a complex set of interrelated factors. Rather than an idealized unilateral code-to-message relation, Jakobson suggests a whole array of combinatorial axes, involving all aspects responsible for every given act of communication. His celebrated scheme of factors for verbal acts of communication can therefore be adapted, I believe very fruitfully, to the analysis of culture events in general.

1. A Scheme of the Factors Operating in Culture

The following scheme may thus be produced for the constitutive factors involved with any socio-semiotic (cultural) event:

INSTITUTION

REPERTOIRE

PRODUCER——————CONSUMER
MARKET

PRODUCT

Beyond differing particulars,[2] it is Jakobson's frame of mind that is most pertinent to my suggestion in its general terms. What counts here above all is Jakobson's general approach: Jakobson's life-long view throughout was that "language must be investigated in all the variety of its functions" (Jakobson 1960: 353). This statement unequivocally distinguishes Jakobson's linguistic, literary, and semiotic endeavor from various other trends of our time. Its presuppositions reject the reduced models (perpetuated for quite some time) for which a sign system is a pure structure (or at least can, or must, be studied as such). In those reductive views, all possible constraints that may govern a semiotic mechanism are viewed as "external factors," "background" or "environment." Therefore, if you eventually arrive at a point where you inevitably realize that pure structures are inadequate for explaining the semiotic mechanism, e.g., if you are prepared to consider the role of the relationship between a producer and a consumer of a product, you may do that only by adding one more branch to "the discipline proper," for example, in the case of linguistics adding "pragmatics" (or "socio-linguistics" and "psycho-linguistics"). For Jakobson, contrariwise, studying "language" already includes both awareness and consideration of all of these factors, to be investigated in their mutual relations rather than as discrete occurrences.

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[2] Jakobson's scheme has "context," "code," "channel/contact," "message," and "addresser" and "addressee." The "context" means "the CONTEXT referred to ('referent' in another, somewhat ambiguous, nomenclature), seizable by the addressee, and either verbal or capable of being verbalized;" An ADDRESSER (e.g., "speaker") and ADDRESSEE (e.g., "one spoken to") may have "a CODE fully, or at least partially, common" to exchange messages between them, and this message needs some CONTACT or CHANNEL to come across. All of these concepts are expressed in my proposed scheme, too, with the exception of "context," which, I believe, is implied by the relations between producer and consumer via repertoire and market. On the other hand, the constraints of institutions on the nature of communication lie beyond the scope of the Jakobsonian conception (and perhaps of "classical semiotics" at large).

This framework requires no a priori hierarchies of importance be-
tween the surmised factors. It suffices to recognize that it is the inter-
dependencies between these factors which allow them to function in
the first place. Thus, a CONSUMER may "consume" a PRODUCT
produced by a PRODUCER, but in order for the "product" to be gen-
erated, then properly consumed, a common REPERTOIRE must ex-
ist, whose usability is constrained, determined, or controlled by some
INSTITUTION on the one hand, and a MARKET where such a good
can be transmitted, on the other. None of the factors enumerated can
be described to function in isolation, and the kind of relations that
may be detected run across all possible axes of the scheme.

Let me now explore in some detail the major concepts suggested in
the scheme.

1.1. Repertoire.
"Repertoire" designates the aggregate of rules and materials which
govern both the making and handling, or production and consump-
tion, of any given product. The communicational term adopted by Ja-
kobson, CODE, could have served the same purpose were it not for
existing traditions for which a "code" applies to "rules" only, not
"materials" ("elements," "items," i.e., "stock," or "lexicon"). The
same holds true for Saussure's langue, or for such terms as "paradig-
matics" or "axis of selection."

In the case of making, or producing, we can speak of an active opera-
tion of a repertoire, or, as an abbreviated term, an active repertoire. In
the case of handling, or consuming, on the other hand, we can speak
of a passive operation, or a passive repertoire. The terms suggested
here are for convenience only; the repertoire is neither "active" nor
"passive," but can be used in different modes in two different cir-
cumstances, as described above, namely, in an event where a person
produces something, in contradistinction to an event where a person
"deciphers" what others produce.

What does a culture repertoire consist of? If we view culture as a
framework, a sphere, which makes it possible to organize social life,
then the repertoire in culture, or of culture, is where the necessary
items for that framework are stored. As Swidler puts it, culture is "a
repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people
construct 'strategies of action'" (Swidler 1986: 273). This is an ade-

quate description of what I labeled above active repertoire. To paraphrase Swidler's formulation for the passive repertoire, it may then be defined for culture as "a tool kit of skills from which people construct their 'conceptual strategies'," i.e., those strategies with which they "understand the world."

The idea of a repertoire suggests not only systemicity, i.e., dependencies between the assumed items of that repertoire, but also the idea of sharedness. Without a commonly shared repertoire, whether partly or fully, no group of people could communicate and organize their lives in acceptable and meaningful ways to the members of the group. In other words, there will be no shared framework to bind them together as a group and provide them with any strategies at all. Naturally, the larger the community which makes and uses given products, the larger must be the agreement about a repertoire.

Students of culture often tend to identify "culture" almost exclusively with a repertoire. I would like to emphasize, in contrast, that the approach propounded here suggests that it would be more fruitful to think of "culture," or any socio-semiotic activity thereof, as the network that obtain between all of the factors interdepending (interrelating) with the repertoire.

While the nature, volume, and amplitude of a repertoire certainly determine the ease and freedom with which a producer and/or consumer may move around in the socio-cultural environment, it is not the repertoire itself which determines these features. Rather, it is the interplay with the other prevailing factors in the system that determines these features, primarily institution and market. For example, the existence of a specific repertoire per se is not enough to ensure that a producer (or consumer) will make use of it. It must be not only available, but also legitimately usable. The constraints of legitimate usage are generated by the institution in correlation with the market. Moreover, the availability of a repertoire may often be an idealized state from the point of view of an individual producer. For many members in a society, large parts of a repertoire, most importantly the dominating one, may not be accessible due to lack of knowledge or competence (such as lack of education, etc.).

1.1.1. Repertoire and repertoires.

Given the hypothesis of heterogeneity in socio-semiotic systems, there is never a situation where only one repertoire may function for each possible set of circumstances in society. Concurrently different options constitute competing and conflicting repertoires. As suggested in "Polysystem Theory" and "System, Dynamics, and Interference in Culture," often one repertoire manages to establish itself as dominating, thus excluding the others, or at least making their use either inefficient or unrewarding. On the other hand, the alternative repertoires may be in full use in different social clusters, where the dominating repertoire may be rejected as undesirable, and hence unrewarding, too. Eventually, however, a rejected repertoire may push itself to domination.

The more proliferated the repertoire, ideally the more available the resources for change. Often, this is linked to the age of a given culture. When the culture is in its inception stage, its repertoire may be limited, which may render it more disposed to using other accessible cultures. When it has accumulated more options, it may have acquired a proliferated repertoire, and may thus be more likely to attempt recycling repertoremes during periods of change rather than seeking extraneous repertoires. However, even when a culture is working with a proliferated repertoire, a deadlock may occur by blockage of all alternative options. It is then that adjacent, or otherwise accessible repertoires, may be used for replacing the ones people wish to reject. This is how interference becomes a strategy of a culture to adapt itself to changing circumstances.

1.1.2. The Structure of the Repertoire.

In general terms, one can analyze the structure of the repertoire on two distinct levels: individual elements and models.

(1) The level of individual elements. This includes single disparate items, like morphemes or lexemes. Pike's "behavioreme" (Pike 1971) may encourage us to suggest terms like "repertoremes" as a general term for any item of any repertoire, while using "culturemes" for culture repertoremes. The borders of this culture unit may be less obvious than the borders of morphemes, or even lexemes, and is often debatable. However, even if we accept that the way people acquire these items, produce them, or understand their value, is always via the clusters in which they are embedded, i.e., whole models, individual

units may be there not only as a abstraction but also as a working items for making new strings.

It is questionable whether culturemes are ever deciphered or acquired as isolated entities. However, I do not think we can do either logically or empirically without this level. There may be some use for the idea of culturemes as distinctive features. On the other hand, no doubt culturemes may at least be identified as discrete and distinct entities within a larger flow.

In addition, units may cluster not only horizontally to create strings (and eventually models) but also vertically, i.e., in various conceptual vicinities. For example, the concept of ego, "I," cannot function without that of "you," "he/she," and "they." This well established hypothesis in all sciences of man has made it possible to think of sets of units as structured options rather than as a disorderly inventory.

(2) The level of models. Analytically, models are the combination of elements + rules + the syntagmatic ("temporal") relations imposable on the product. If the case in question is an "event," then the "model" means "the elements + rules applicable to the given type of event + the potential relations which may be implemented during actual performance." For instance, if one possible type of relations is the network of positions into which the various elements are inserted, then the "model," from the point of view of its potential producer, includes some sort of pre-knowledge pertaining to these positions. A knowledge of order (sequence, or succession) is therefore an integral part of a model. It tells the producer what to do when. For example, it is not sufficient to know that certain sentences should be said when addressing someone; one ought to know at what order these sentences should be said.

Of course, in the actual circumstances of producing, people normally do not employ models analytically. Evidence tend to show that they must have learnt them as wholes. But the more proficient the producer, and the more specific the product, analytical knowledge may be quite regular. An artisan or a cook may have acquired their know-how synthetically, but a modern industrialist may have fuller explicit knowledge of the models in terms of their components and combination rules both in time and space.

For the potential consumer, the "model" is that pre-knowledge according to which the event is interpreted ("understood"). Perhaps it should be noted here that the models used for producing need not overlap–and as a rule do not–with the models required for understanding, or any other usage on the consumption end. Again, while "understanding" may occur as a simultaneous act of deciphering, it may also be a series of attempts made by decomposing the actual product to its ingredients, which are then analyzed in relation to their positions in a known repertoire. Thus, explicit understanding, such as verbalized interpretation, is a regular activity in all cultures.

There is no need to attempt classification according to the class, or size, of the model. There may be models in operation for a whole possible event, yet there may also be specific models for a segment, or portion, of this whole.[3] For instance, there may well be a model for "a meeting," but there will also be one for "conversation" during a meeting, etc.

The idea of the model is by no means new, nor is it confined to theoretical analyses of culture. It is often used by people in the culture who assume positions of instruction-givers or educators. It is only that it has become a concept avoided since Romanticism because it was attempted, on any level of culture, to create the image of the freedom of individual action, unconstrained, as it were, by directives. In the Romantic view, "creation" means law-free action, and hence original and unprecedented. Boundness is therefore considered as a negative constraint on freedom. Thus, a "true creator" (in literature and life in general), a "free spirit" cannot be bound by extant "models." Thus, it became obligatory to attribute actions taken by individual producers to non-systemic "inspiration," and those taken by mass anonymous

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[3] Some traditions, especially in linguistics, tend to consider limited strings, i.e., combinations roughly equivalent to a collocation in language, as a separate level. For example, "how do you do," or 'shaking hands' may be considered such strings. This level can be dropped altogether, to be viewed as a segment of "models."

producers to "the spirit of the collective" (such as community or na-tion). It is perhaps not far fetched to interpret some trends of indivi-dualistic bias in psychology within this Romantic tradition.

The model hypothesis is strongly supported by contemporary work in very diverse areas of culture research, not only in classical anthropol-ogy but also in memory studies, cognitive studies (with its concept of "schemes"), and various areas concerned with linguistic and textual competence, such as translation studies. In addition, practical tasks like editorial work, or the teaching of style and composition at school, produce accumulated information about models-in-work. Also, the growing awareness of the degree of givenness of everyday types of discourse (such as conversation and everyday storytelling) in various socio-linguistic and semiotic studies has contributed a lot to our libe-ration from the Romantic concepts of "unconstrained production."

Historically, however, attitudes which had been current prior to the Romantic Age did not have any problems with the idea of dictated life. Not only was the act of producing then understood in the context of implementing known models, but the very notion of achievement in any field, even the prestigious field of text making, was connected to the producer's capacity to successfully implement such models. As Zink (1980: 73-74) succinctly formulates it (apropos medieval poe-try): "Cette poésie est une poésie formelle qui dans tous les domaines, tire ses effets, non de son originalité, mais de la démonstration qu'elle fait de sa maîtrise d'un code qu'elle applique minutieusement et qu'elle soumet à des transgressions calculées et menues." The same may hold for the consumer's capacity to decipher such models.[4]

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[4] Remarkable evidence of norms prevailing in connection with both the making and understanding of "poetry" in everyday life is the story about the Icelander Gisli Surs-son who, relying on the obscurity of the poetical model he was able to use, takes the liberty of impertinently telling the whole world, at a very crucial moment of his life, that it was he who had killed his adversary, something "which he never should [have said]" ("er æva skyldi"), as comments the narrator. (*Gísla saga Súrssonar* [in Íslenzk fornrit VI (Reykjavík: Hið íslenzka fornritafélag), 1943, 3-118], cap. 18). As ex-

A significant contribution to the link between the socially generated repertoire and the procedures of individual inculcation and internalization is Bourdieu's habitus theory. Bourdieu supports the hypothesis that the models functionalized by an individual, or by a group of individuals, are not universal or genetic schemes, but schemes conditioned by dispositions acquired by experience, i.e., time and place dependent. This repertoire of models acquired and adopted (as well as adapted) by individuals and groups in a given milieu, and under the constraints of the prevailing system relations dominating this milieu, is labelled habitus. It is "a system of internalized embodied schemes which, having been constituted in the course of collective history, are acquired in the course of individual history and function in their practical states, for practice (and not for the sake of pure knowledge)" (Bourdieu 1984: 467; originally in Bourdieu 1979: 545).[5]

1.1.3. The Dynamic Parameters of Repertoire Usage.
In view of the heterogeneity hypothesis, for any production or consumption event, there is no way to predict the exact trajectory of the interaction between the participating factors. Clearly, there are cases with high predictability, such as the more repetitive models used by people, like daily and other rituals. These may appear like ready-made scripts, well-defined flow-charts, hermetically contoured batches. On the other hand, most cases are not like that, but rather of varying degrees of predictability. How much fixedness is required for each sin-

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pected, nobody understands his message, with the exception of one single person, his sister, Thordis, who happens to be his adversary's wife. She "got the verse by heart from the one hearing, and goes home, and by then she has worked out its meaning," only to reveal it a short while later to Gisli's foes. Yet even she needed some time to perform her deciphering ("Þórdis nam þegar vísuna, gengr heim ok hefir raðit vísuna," cap. 18; English translation, *The Saga of Gisli* 1984: 26). In the particular case of Gisli, and medieval Icelandic culture in general, "poetry" is of course not an out-of-the-ordinary sort of action, but a fully usable product for regular interaction.
[5] For more about the notion of habitus see Accardo 1987, Accardo and Corcuff 1986. For a discussion of "model" and "habitus" see Sela-Sheffy 1997.

gle event, or how much leeway is allowed for maneuver depends on the combinability of various models. The latter, in turn, depends on the power of the institution and the position of every single member in the culture vis-à-vis the institution, and in relation to the ability of accessing repertoire resources.

Consequently, it seems inadequate to conceive of the relations between repertoire and implementation in terms of fixed execution of a non-modifiable set of commands. Flexible implementation must be recognized as a real option, i.e., one which allows combinations from various sources, as well as errors. It could be helpful to think of the execution of a model along the situation described by Boyd & Richerson (1985, p. 83), as inspired by Pulliam & Dunford (1980):

[...] investors can give their brokers a set of initial instructions, which cannot subsequently be changed or canceled. Some investors might wish to give their brokers detailed instructions about which stocks to buy and sell at each future time. In an unpredictable environment like the stock market, such an investment strategy is likely to be disastrous. Wiser investors would give their brokers a flexible set of instructions.

This means that a model qua set of instructions is not conceived of as a hermetically closed batch, but as an open chain with various possible branchings. These are made possible because the actual mise-en-oeuvre of a repertoire is a dynamic negotiation between known options and the details of the ongoing event. To quote Boyd & Richerson again (1985, p. 83):

Humans modify their behavior in response to environmental changes through a variety of mechanisms. These mechanisms range from the simple conditioned responses that are studied by behavioral psychologists to the cognitively complex processes of rational choice studied by cognitive psychologists and economists.

1.1.4. The Making of Repertoires.
Since we hardly know of any society without an established repertoire, we tend to take such repertoires as the accumulative output of generations of anonymous individuals. Repertoires are thus conceived of as spontaneous creations of "society."

This view is incontestable in the sense that we cannot really trace "who generated what" along human history, although it is quite com-

mon among historians to attribute certain repertoires to the making of specific societies. For example, school is attributed to the Sumerians, whose *é-dubba* is thought to be the erstwhile model for all sorts of schools and academies, as well as their manifold products, like textual canons. Similarly, "democracy" is attributed to the ancient Athenians.

On the other hand, there is incontestable evidence about the deliberate action of individuals in the making of repertoires, whose success can also be witnessed along history. True, mythical, or hardly verifiable figures, such as Moses or Kadmos, are taken with suspicion as to their actual role in the making of the repertoires attributed to them by the literary traditions. But there is an impressive accumulation of evidence about individuals whose role can be verified, who have initiated, elaborated, and successfully inculcated repertoire innovations.

Such evidence is available for various levels. Even in matters considered to be the general creation of large groups, like "language," the making of the specific repertoire required for a language can often be traced to named individuals. This is the case of Goethe and Gotschalk for German, Lomonosov, then Pushkin, for Russian, Vuk Karadžić for Serbo-Croatian, Ivar Aasen for New Norwegian, and so on. Such examples even allow us to be less skeptical of figures like King Ramkamhaeng of Sukhothai Kingdom, the believed founder of Thai alphabet (and possibly more parts of the Thai culture), or Constantine the Philosopher, called Cyril, the believed founder of the Slavic alphabet and initiator of the Slav's Christian culture.[6]

The same holds for the variety of culture repertoires which may have proliferated, modified or augmented due to the deliberate work of individuals.

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[6] Some scholars, however, contend that a similar script had already been in use in the Thai area long before the supposed invention by the king. The same holds for Cyril's case. This does not change the possible fact that both, even via moderate modifications, have been momentous in the crystallization of a major repertoire.

The origins of repertoire need therefore be viewed under different perspectives. While they may be anonymous, they need not always be conceived of as spontaneous; nor need they be viewed as un-interfered with by the deliberate desires and aspirations of individuals.

1.1.5. The Making of Repertoire and the Institution.
The groups and individuals who are interested in controlling, domi-nating and regulating culture often are also active in the making of its repertoire. It may be argued, however, that rather than producing new repertoires, these groups–to which we refer here under the common term of "institution"–are more inclined to stick to extant repertoire rather than initiate new options. On the other hand, contenders, i.e., those who struggle for achieving control and domination, may have to do that by offering a new repertoire. In periods where the circums-tances are favorable to repertoire shifts and competition (such as times of crisis of whatever cause), such individuals and groups may then become highly involved with the making, not only perpetuation, of repertoire.

1.1.6. Repertoires and identities.
It is a common procedure in human groups to extract certain conspi-cuous items from a prevailing repertoire for demarcating the group as a distinct entity. This is described as creating a "sense of self," or "collective identity." This aspect of culture was already highlighted by Sapir who claimed that "Emphasis [in this aspect] is put not so much on what is done and believed by a people as on how what is done and believed functions in the whole life of that people, on what significance it has for them" (Sapir 1968 [1924]: 311).

The selected items may be drawn from any area. The size of the item may be as minute as that selected by the ancient Arabs as a feature of distinction, the peculiar emphatic d sound, known by the letter Dâd. Thus, they let themselves be known as "those who pronounce the Dad," (with the plausible insinuation, "nobody can pronounce that sound except us"). Certain foods, cloths, scents, bodily features (like beards or whiskers or wigs) and gestures, or general preferences for coziness, cleanliness, or order, are only few of the items widely used.

1.2. Product.
By "product" I mean any performed set of signs and/or materials, i.e., including a given behavior. Thus, any outcome of any action, or activity, can be considered "a product," whatever its ontological manifestation may be, be it a semiotic or a physical "object": an utterance, a text, an artifact, an edifice, an "image," or an "event." In other terms, the product, the item negotiated and handled between the participating factors in a culture, is the concrete instance of culture. Obviously, a culture product is any implemented item of the repertoire of culture.

1.2.1. Product vs. Repertoire
Products cannot be made without a repertoire. No one is able to make completely new rules and stock for every individual product while in the process of producing it. New items, including new combination options ("rules"), can be generated only in connection with available repertoire. This does not mean that a product is only an implementation of a model. The repertoire allows more than one possibility of combining both discrete items and ready-made models. Therefore, any instance of producing falls between meticulous implementation of known and established models on the one hand, and innovation on the other. Innovation, in its turn, may be the result of either plain lack of competence, or, contrariwise, of high degree of it. In the case of lack of competence, "errors" may occur, and, with the suitable market conditions, these errors may create new repertoire options. On the other hand, high competence may allow deliberate combinations which eventually may be accepted as new options.

Hence, the status of a producer vis-à-vis a repertoire should not be viewed as always confined to re producing ready-made options exclusively. Inasmuch as producing is an implementation of options, it is also, permanently and inherently, a dynamic negotiation with these options.

1.2.2. Activities and products
It is not a simple matter to determine what products certain activities, or "fields of action," produce. Activities normally consist of complex sets of events, thus naturally able to generate diverse products. However, it is in specific products that their raison d'être normally lie. For example, banks are institutions for handling money, but what is it that they actually produce? It is not "money" (even in those cases when a

bank literally prints money bills or make coins), but perhaps "the serviceability of financial exchange."

Ultimately, the answer depends on the level of analysis. For instance, it is definitely acceptable to argue that the most evident (and obvious) product of speech is "voice" (or "voiced material"), or "sound(s)." Nevertheless, we conventionally regard "voice" as merely the vehicle of some other, more important, product, i.e., the verbal message, "language" in the sense of "communication." Similarly, to take a different example, the product of schools may be defined as "students." Again, this is not an unacceptable answer, in the sense that officially, and visibly, it is students who engage the energy of schools. We talk about the number of students (and society calculates budgets in accordance with them), the life and treatment of students at school, the relations between teachers and students, etc. But even the most conventional views of schools normally conceive of students as vehicles, and/or targets, of some other products for which schools are supposed to be responsible, i.e., a certain body of desirable knowledge, and a certain body of desirable norms and views. In this sense, "students" are analyzed only in relation to these products. The success of these issues is evaluated in relation to the ability of schools to inculcate them in their students, and the extent of distribution and perpetuation in society that the students manage to accomplish.

Organized activities like "literature," or "the arts" in general, can be analyzed along similar lines. Even in those periods in which the major effort of literary activities was oriented towards producing "texts," the status of these "texts" was, for all intents and purposes, analogous to that of "voice" or "students" in the examples quoted above. This does not mean that "texts" are transparent in any sense, but only that as an entity for consumption, different levels of texts must be considered. For instance, from a literarological point of view it may suffice to analyze the patterns of composition and "story," moods and craft manifested in a "text." However, "literature," conceived of in its turn as a field of action, a complex activity which can be analyzed in accordance with the modified Jakobsonian scheme, produces many more products than "texts." For example, it produces also "writers," who in their turn behave in accordance with models gradually established in culture at large. Such writers, often an obligatory commodity of power (see "The Role of Literature" in this collection), are often also major distributors and supporters of the repertoire endorsed by power. In

addition, or alternatively, they may become major producers not only of new "literary," but also of general culture repertoire. They thus function as "entrepreneurs" who "try to interfere in the social process" (Roseberry 1982: 1026).

Moreover, "texts" circulate on the market in a variety of ways, and hardly ever, especially when highly canonized and eventually stored in the historical canon, as integral texts (i.e., the way "literary critics" prefer to see them). Thus one may also argue that textual fragments (segments) for daily use are a very widely used product. Quotations, short parables, and episodes readily referred to are some instances of such fragments. Indeed, in certain cultures, such as the French, fragments are almost all one gets at school from the inventory of the national canon. Hardly ever does one have any contact with integral texts before having reached a more advanced stage in one's schooling.

Further, as has been pointed out time and again (and most effectively by the "Tartu-Moscow" semioticians), the most consequential socio-semiotic product of literature lies on a completely different level, i.e., on the level of images, moods, interpretation of "reality," and options of action. The products on this level are items of cultural repertoire: models of organizing, viewing, and interpreting life. They thus constitute a source for the adopted models, habituses, prevailing in the various levels of society, helping to direct, preserve and stabilize it. These may be achieved not solely by the making of texts, but also, and often more so, by various aspects of institutional activities within literature.

The same argumentation holds for "the arts" in general, where the word "text" can be replaced by "a work (of art)" (sculptures, paintings, musical compositions).

1.3. Producer
A "producer," an actor, is an individual who produces, by actively operating a repertoire, either repetitively producible, or "new" products. While reproducibles may work successfully for a producer, if the relevant other parties (consumer, etc.) share at least major parts of the same repertoire, "new" products may risk to be inefficient, and consequently "unmarketable," or rejected by the target, as well as by the "institution."

In short, the common denominator of all manifestations of being a producer in culture is being in a mode of activating a product, in contradistinction to being in a mode of deciphering, or "understanding," the meaning /function of a product. The competence and know-how for producing is indispensable for any person in a culture, but the degree of competence, as well as the willingness to deviate from accepted repertoire, greatly vary.

While the notion of a producer is normally associated with performed products, it may also represent potential products, i.e., "models." Such models are produced either directly, i.e., by deliberate elaboration of items for a possible repertoire, or indirectly, i.e., through a procedure of extraction and inference from a performed product. In the latter case, a producer must proceed by first identifying certain features in the product which then can be transformed into models for direct production. This is probably the "normal" way of members in a culture to acquire culture repertoires in the first place.

In addition, individuals may act as arch-producers of repertoire, i.e., major makers of repertoires. For example, rulers may on the one hand become a source of repertoire through their actual actions. On the other, they are empowered with the task of supplying items of repertoire by direct directives and dictations. Other individuals may also acquire a similar status through institution and market relations along the ages. For example, intellectuals at large, and especially men of letters, have acquired in some societies a status of legitimate, even licensed, producers of repertoires for society at large. This means that they are often expected, and in any case allowed, to provide new options even when these are neither explicitly requested nor eventually followed.

1.3.1. Producer and Producers
Individual producers normally have no particular impact on a culture in the sense that their regular actions do not lead to change, i.e., modifications of a culture repertoire. Even if their actions may have led to such change, they may have remained anonymous and in no sense part of some power factor able to impose items of repertoire. On the other hand, there are individuals who get engaged in innovative production, and who, sometimes as part of an organized group of similar producers, are accepted, either in an established way, or ad hoc, as actual or potential providers of stock. The grouplike activity of such

producers, certainly the overt one, but also the more subtle one, constitutes some sort of "industry" whose products are more forcefully competing on the market than those unmarked products of casual producers. Along history, various groups have successfully institutionalized themselves as such industries: politicians, legislators, religion-makers and churches, intellectuals, artists (writers, poets, painters), magistrates and so on.

1.4. Consumer

A "consumer" is an individual who handles a ready-made product by passively operating a repertoire. "To passively operate" basically means to identify relations (connections) between the product and one's knowledge of a repertoire. In common language this is often described as to "understand," "know what it is about," "work out," or "decipher." Naturally, using these skills is relatively smooth when a consumer is confronted with recognizable products. It is less so when confronted with a "new" product which may then require higher skills of adapting and relearning.

1.4.1. Producing and consuming

Although any person-in-the-culture is normally both a producer and a consumer, the knowledge and skills required for production are not identical to those required for consumption. The higher the complexity or the expertise involved with the product, the more likely the disparities between the ability to produce and the ability to consume. In the plainest terms, the ability to interpret does not necessarily lead to, or overlap with, the ability to act.

1.4.2. Consumer and consumers

The aggregate of consumers is not an additive group of individuals, but a relational network of power which can determine the fate of a product. Actually, this network can be defined as a market. When a certain product, actual or virtual (i.e., a model which can serve for making a specific product), is targeted at an individual consumer, its efficiency can be checked immediately through interaction. On the other hand, when such a product is targeted at an anonymous group of actual or potential consumers, the parameters of success may vary greatly and there is normally no way to know beforehand what degree of efficiency can be achieved. The aggregate of these parameters, again, can be analyzed as the relevant market.

1.5. Institution

The "institution" consists of the aggregate of factors involved with the control of culture. It is the institution which governs the norms, sanctioning some and rejecting others. It also remunerates and reprimands producers and agents. It also determines which models (as well as products, when relevant) will be maintained by a community for a longer period of time. In rude terms, the institution may be viewed, like the market, as the intermediary between social forces and culture repertoires. But in contradistinction to the market, it is empowered with the ability to make decisions to last for longer periods of time. I am referring here not only to "collective memory" as a long lasting cohesion factor, but to the very basic task of preserving a canonized repertoire for transmission from one generation to another.

Official agents who are part of the administration may be the most conspicuous members of the institution. For example, all the agencies engaged in educational repertoires, like the ministry of education. Other ministerial offices and academies, educational institutions (schools of whatever level, including universities), the mass media in all its facets (newspapers, periodicals, radio and television), and more, may function as central institutions.

Nevertheless, it would be too unidimensional to conceive of the institution only as perpetuators, keepers of culture. The institution may also include, or otherwise give its support, to those producers who are engaged in the making of repertoires. These may be in a state of competition with other actors engaged in the same task, normally possessing, however, better positions from the outset.

Naturally, this enormous variety does not produce a homogeneous body, capable, as it were, of acting in harmony and necessarily succeeding in enforcing its preferences. Inside the institution there are struggles over domination, with one or another group succeeding at one time or another at occupying the center of the institution, thus becoming the establishment. But in view of the variety of culture, different institutions can operate at the same time for various sections of the system. For instance, when a certain repertoire may already have succeeded in occupying the center culture, schools, churches, and other organized activities and bodies may still obey certain norms no longer acceptable to the group who support that repertoire.

Thus, the "institution" in culture is not unified. And it certainly is no building on a certain street, although its agents may be detected in buildings, streets, and cafés (see, for instance, Hamon and Rotman 1981, with all due reservations; also Lottman 1981). But any decision taken, at whatever level, by any agent, depends on the legitimations and restrictions made by particular, relevant sections of the institution. The nature of production, as well as that of consumption, is governed by the institution; naturally, inasmuch as it may be successful in its endeavors, given the correlations with all other factors working in the system.[7]

1.6. Market

The "market" is the aggregate of factors involved with the selling and buying of culture repertoire, i.e., with the promotion of types of consumption. Like the institution, the market mediates between the attempt of a producer to make a product and the chances of that product to successfully reach a target (a consumer or consumers). It is thus responsible for the transformation of attempts into chances. This applies in actual circumstances to the efficiency or lack thereof of an actual product, but it is not the product as an object, or an implemented sequence, that is negotiated by the market, but the repertoire (model, etc.) which make such products possible. In the absence of a market there is no space where any aspect of the culture repertoire can gain any ground. The larger the space, the larger the proliferation possibilities are. Clearly, a restricted market naturally restricts the possi-

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[7] Bourdieu's formulation is very much to the point on this matter as a word of warning against a simplified explanation of reputations (Bourdieu 1977: 7):

Ce qui "fait les réputations," ce n'est pas, comme le croient naïvement les Rastignacs de province, telle ou telle personne "influente," telle ou telle institution, revue, hebdomadaire, académie, cénacle, marchand, éditeur, ce n'est même pas l'ensemble de ce qu'on appelle parfois "les personnalités du monde des arts et des lettres," c'est le champ de production comme système de relations objectives entre ces agents ou ces institutions et lieu des luttes pour le monopole du pouvoir de consécration où s'engendrent continûment la valeur des œuvres et la croyance dans cette valeur.

bilities of a culture to evolve. Hence, making the market proliferate lies in the very interest of culture promotion.

The market may manifest itself not only in overt merchandise-exchange institutions like clubs and schools, but also comprises all factors participating in the semiotic exchange involving these, and with other linked activities. While it is the "institution" which may try to direct and dictate the kinds of consumption, determining the prices (values) of the various items of production, what determines its success or failure is the kind of interaction which it is able to establish with the market. In the socio-cultural reality, factors of the institution and those of the market may naturally intersect in the same space: for instance, royal courts, or literary "salons" are both institutions and markets. Yet the specific agents playing the role of either an institution or a market, i.e., either marketers or marketees, may not overlap at all. A regular school, for instance, is a branch of "the institution" in view of its ability to endorse the type of properties that the dominating establishment (i.e., the central part of the institution) wishes to sell to students. But it is also the actual market which sells these goods. Teachers actually function as agents of marketing, i.e., marketers. The marketees, those to whom the goods are targeted, who willy-nilly become some sort of consumers, are the students. The facilities, including the built-in interaction patterns, which are made available by the school, actually constitute the market *strictu sensu*. However, all of these factors together may, for the sake of a closer analysis, be viewed as the "market."

POLYSYSTEM THEORY AND CULTURE RESEARCH[1]

System, or better: relational thinking has provided the sciences of man with versatile tools to economize in the analysis of socio-semiotic phenomena. It has allowed significantly reducing the number of parameters assumed to work in any given context, thus making it possible to get rid of huge nomenclatures and intricate classifications. Instead, a relatively small set of relations could be hypothesized to explain a large and complex array of phenomena. This explanatory power of relational thinking has been used with some success in various domains of the socio-semiotic disciplines.

The power of relational thinking does not stop, however, at the level of analyzing "known" phenomena, which is basically explanatory. It lies also and perhaps even more forcefully, in the ability to surmise un-recognized, yet unknown, objects, thus transforming it into a tool of discovery.

By hypothesizing a relation as an explanation for an object (an entity, a process, etc.), relational thinking can arrive at assuming the "existence" of some phenomena which have not been recognized before. The procedures of arriving at such conclusions are naturally less adequate than in disciplines with calculation capacity (like astrophysics or quantum mechanics). Nevertheless, the very pioneers of modern relational thinking have used in full this avenue when they suggested phonology to replace the older classification of sounds. Through hypothesizing relations between the sounds, a new entity emerged, the

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[1] Based on a paper delivered at the International Symposium, "Systems and Fields: Functionalist Approaches to Literature and Culture." Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 19-20 April 1996. A slightly varying version published as part I of Even-Zohar, Itamar 1997. "Factors and Dependencies in Culture: A Revised Draft for Polysystem Culture Research." *Canadian Review of Comparative Literature*, Vol. XXIV, Number 1 (March 1997), pp. 15-34.

phoneme. The series of sounds identified for so many centuries by generations of grammarians was thus transformed into something unknown, into a set of opposition-dependent sounds which, for quite some time were considered (and may be considered that way even today), as pure constructs, i.e., entities that cannot be directly perceived. Notwithstanding, one more step was taken in the 1920s by Sapir who argued that a phoneme is not only an explanatory construct but the actual cognitive sound unit, rather than the sound *per se* (Sapir 1968 [1933]). This way, what was "actual" sound and what was accidental sound changed positions. The traditional sound has become accidental, while the phoneme was analyzed as the actual sound, the sound unit analyzed by the human cognitive apparatus.

The phonology example, however, has not been followed by the majority of workers in system theories. There, the Saussurian example of chess seems to have been more inspirational. In this example, the object of scrutiny is marked for us, and is fully known, by our established cultural traditions. What relational thinking may have added is a versatile and economic analysis of chess, replacing an endless set of intricate descriptions. The same holds for more complex sets like language or literature, and perhaps also society and semiosis at large. In all of those approaches, system thinking provided a better rationale, and perhaps more sophisticated tools. However, the existence of the object of study as such is not contested or disputed, but on the contrary is taken for granted.

This lack of dispute about the object is typical of large areas of the humanities. It certainly has hampered, in my opinion, scientific practice in these areas. For, while the sciences, in their attempts to develop explanatory tools for nature and life have proceeded by constantly modifying and replacing the objects of study as the hypotheses relating to them developed, the humanities still entertain the belief that the explanations may change, but the objects can remain the same. This has become especially conspicuous in the study of human products and activities which have gained canonized status and hence have become established as indispensable for the dominating forces in various societies. I am referring mainly to "the arts," i.e., painting, music, literature, theater, dance, etc.

Russian Formalism, even at its most initial stage, displayed a surprising breach with this tradition. For, however reduced and textocentric

their view may have been, they attempted delineating a completely new object, which was to be at the same time the best providable explanatory hypothesis, namely "literariness" instead of "literature." This move, unfortunately never understood in methodological terms as it duly merited, at least opened the road for better attempts, and signaled the possibility of re-defining objects independently of the institutions which may have been established to uphold them. The hypothesis itself was later rejected, and it need not deter us here per se.

The later stage of this trend, which I suggested to call "Dynamic functionalism" (the later Russian Formalism, Czech Structuralism, Soviet semiotics, etc.), has, through the link it hypothesized between system heterogeneity and change on the one hand, and between change and structure on the other, also made it possible, at least since Tynjanov, to disconnect entirely between a manifest set of features and a set of actions which eventually may have managed to establish itself as a field of action in society. Tynjanov's formulation of the shifting borders of literature, as an institutionalized field of action, where the specific features that operate in, and by, this field of action are constantly changing, has made it possible to be liberated from a commitment to objects marked by the institution of society.

Polysystem theory is basically a continuation of dynamic functionalism. Its concept of an open, dynamic and heterogeneous system is perhaps more able to encourage the emergence of favorable conditions to allow the discovery power of relational thinking. The disposition to consider a multiplicity of parameters at any given instance is definitely a procedure which may create deadlock situations more quickly than is the case in static system thinking. Such deadlock situations are instances where the explanatory or heuristic power, of the surmised relations is insufficient because the answers it allows may appear too limited.

I would therefore like to contend that Polysystem theory has made it almost unavoidable, already close to its embryonic inception in the nineteen twenties, to develop conceptual tools for a large complex of phenomena. I am referring here first of all to works by Bogatyrëv and Mukařovský in cultural semiotics, but also to later contributions by the Moscow-Tartu school. It is not a wonder that all theories of "literature" were replaced very quickly by theories which aspired at ex-

plaining the conditions which enable social life in general, of which textual production is only one restricted facet, and factor. It would not be difficult to sketch a rough conceptual itinerary that leads from the recognition of alternative products – a basic assumption in the history of literature or any other activity – to the conditions under which competing producers wish to take control of the power institution which enables them to market those products they wish to promote. Hence, it is not a complicated way to probe into the source of power of these products which are the target of struggle. Lotman and the Moscow-Tartu school, although still moving within the confines of humans as readers (even though as reader of the world, not of texts only), provided us with the concept of modeling the world, of the semiosphere, all of which together constitute a culture, an ensemble of comprehension tools which enable social life.

In short, relational thinking, especially in connection with dynamic systems, has led almost everybody to studying culture as an overall system, a heterogeneous set of parameters, with the help of which human beings organize their life. The semiotic approach, as developed in the most sophisticated way by such researchers as Lotman, Uspenskij or Ivanov, is however only one alley which opened at the juncture of polysystem thinking and hypothesized semiotic phenomena. The built-in machine of Polysystem theory quickly suggests that organization of life may be not only a matter of more or less passive need for orientation, i.e., understanding the world, but perhaps more convincingly is a matter of active action, of which understanding is just one factor.

On the meta-theoretical level, the question whether an assumed observable "belongs" to a certain assumed set (cluster, "field," or "system"), or is "relevant," or "relatable" to it, depends on our ability to hypothesize "fruitful" (net of) relations for it. Hence the set is not conceived of as an independent "entity in reality," but as dependent on the "relations one is prepared to propose." No advanced system theory accepts an a priori set of "observables" to be necessarily, or "inherently," part of "a system." Advocating the inclusion into or the exclusion of certain occurrences from the "system" is not an issue of the systemic analysis of an assumed set of observables, but is a matter of the greater or lesser "success" that can be achieved by one procedure vs. another from the point of view of theoretical adequacy.

Naturally, "theoretical adequacy" is not a simple concept. However, the general principle normally followed in this matter is succinctly formulated by Machlup:

> The choice between taking a variable as exogenous or making it an endogenous one, a variable determined by the system of functions, is a matter of relevance and convenience (Machlup 1980: 4).

The actual consequences of this methodological approach lead to the development in science, generalized by Elias in the clearest possible terms:

It happens quite often in the development of a science, or of one of it branches, that a type of theory which has dominated the direction of research for some time reaches a point where its limitations become apparent. One begins to see that a number of significant problems cannot be clearly formulated and cannot be solved with its help. The scientists who work in this field then begin to look round for a wide theoretical framework, or perhaps for another type of theory altogether, which will allow them to come to grips with problems beyond the reach of the fashionable type of theory (Elias 1993: 189).

In studying culture, workers in dynamic functionalism have found, I believe, that "wide theoretical framework, or perhaps [...] another type of theory altogether," to which Elias is referring. This framework does not obliterate the attempts to better understand, describe, and analyze any previously held framework, if the latter is analyzed as a factor of culture. In other words, the polysystemic approach is expected to serve as the theoretical environment for the study of culture allowing it to develop versatile tools which will enable dealing with heterogeneity and dynamics along the same principles that have led to the furtherance of the cultural framework.

POLYSYSTEM THEORY (REVISED)[1]

1. System and Polysystem in Modern Functionalism: Statics vs. Dynamics

The idea that socio-semiotic phenomena, i.e., sign-governed human patterns of communication (such as culture, language, literature), could more adequately be understood and studied if regarded as systems rather than conglomerates of disparate elements has become one of the leading ideas of our time in most sciences of man. Thus, the positivistic collection of data, taken *bona fide* on empiricist grounds and analyzed on the basis of their material *substance*, has been replaced by a functional approach based on the analysis of *relations*. Viewing them as systems, i.e., as *networks of relations that can be hypothesized for a certain set of assumed observables* ("occurrences"/"phenomena"), made it possible to hypothesize how the various socio-semiotic aggregates operate. The way was subsequently opened for the achievement of what has been regarded throughout the development of modern science as a supreme goal: the detection of the laws governing the diversity and complexity of phenomena rather than the registration and classification of these phenomena.

Nevertheless, in spite of common premises, the functional approach has never been quite unified. Roughly speaking, two different and *incompatible* programs have been circulated. I will refer to the respective programs as "the theory of static systems" vs. "the theory of dynamic systems." The theory of static systems has wrongly been identified as the exclusive "functional" or "structural" approach, and is usually referred to as the teachings of Saussure. In Saussure's own writings and in subsequent works in his tradition, the system is conceived of as a static ("synchronic") net of relations, in which the value

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[1] A revised version (written 1997) of "Polysystem Theory," in *Polysystem Studies* [= *Poetics Today*, 11:1] 1990, pp. 9-26. First version was published in *Poetics Today* 1979 I, 1-2, pp. 287-310.

of each item is a function of the specific relation into which it enters. While the function of elements as well as the rules governing them are thus detected, there is hardly any way to account for change and variation. The factor of time-succession ("diachrony") has thus been eliminated from the "system" and ruled to lie beyond the scope of functional hypotheses. It has therefore been declared to be extra-systemic, and, since it was exclusively identified with the historical aspect of systems, the latter has been virtually banished from the realm of linguistics.

The advantages of introducing the concept of system to replace the empiricist collection of data are evident. Even the reduction of the system to a-historical, extra-temporal aspect, as it were, is not *per se* indefensible. The linguistic scene of Saussure's time, with its heavy concentration on historical change, conceived of in non-systemic terms (to put it mildly), clearly constituted an obstacle to discovering not how language differs in different periods, but how it operates in the first place. By means of reduction, an adequate level of abstrac-tion could be achieved, and the principal mechanisms of language functioning were thus laid bare. Obviously, from the point of view of such an abstract model, the possible concurrent existence of different options within one system at a given moment need not necessarily be considered if these are, in principle, reducible. As is well known from other fields of inquiry (e.g., thermodynamics), it is more efficient from the methodological point of view to start by developing a theory of closed systems.

Thus understood, the static approach really accomplishes its ultimate design. However, if taken for what it is not, namely, a model which aims at a closer account of the conditions under which a system op-erates in time, it can disturb scientific inquiry. There is a clear differ-ence between an attempt to account for some major principles which govern a system outside the realm of time, and one which intends to account for how a system operates both "in principle" and "in time." Once the historical aspect is admitted into the functional approach, several implications must be drawn. First, it must be admitted that both synchrony and diachrony are historical, but the exclusive iden-tification of the latter with history is untenable. As a result, synchrony cannot and should not be equated with statics, since at any given mo-ment, more than one diachronic set is operating on the synchronic axis. Therefore, on the one hand a system consists of both synchrony

and diachrony; on the other, each of these separately is obviously also a system. Secondly, if the idea of structuredness and systemicity need no longer be identified with homogeneity, a socio-semiotic system can be conceived of as a heterogeneous, open structure. It is, therefore, very rarely a uni-system but is, necessarily, a Polysystem – a multiple system, a system of various systems which intersect with each other and partly overlap, using concurrently different options, yet functioning as one structured whole, whose members are interdependent.

If the static, synchronistic approach emanates from the Geneva School, the dynamic approach has its roots in the works of the Russian Formalists as well as the Czech Structuralists. The synchronistic approach, falsely interpreted, triumphed. For both layman and "professional," "structuralism" is still, more often than not, equated with statics and synchronism, homogeneous structure and a-historical approach.

2. Polysystem: Processes and Procedures

2.1. General Properties of the Polysystem
Seen against such a background, the term "polysystem" is more than just a terminological convention. Its purpose is to make explicit the conception of a system as dynamic and heterogeneous in opposition to the synchronistic approach.

It thus emphasizes the multiplicity of intersections and hence the greater complexity of structuredness involved. Also, it stresses that in order for a system to function, uniformity need not be postulated. Once the historical nature of a system is recognized (a great merit from the point of view of constructing models closer to "the real world"), the transformation of historical objects into a series of uncorrelated a-historical occurrences is prevented.

Admittedly, since handling an open system is more difficult than handling a closed one, the level of exhaustive analysis may be more limited. Perhaps more room will be given to "disorders," and the notion of "the *systemic*" will no more be erroneously equated with the notion of "the *systematic*." These are "disadvantages," to be sure, from the point of view of the theory of static systems. But from the point of view of dynamic systems theory they are nothing of the sort. Indeed,

synchronism can deal with the general idea of function and functioning, but cannot account for the functioning of any socio-semiotic system in a specific territory in *time*. One can of course reduce the heterogeneity of culture in society to the ruling classes only, but this would not hold once the time factor, i.e., the possibility of change and its governing mechanisms, is taken into account. The acuteness of heterogeneity in culture is perhaps most "palpable," as it were, in such cases as when a certain society is bi- or multilingual (a state that used to be common in most European communities up to recent times).

The polysystem hypothesis, however, is designed precisely to deal with such cases, as well as with the less conspicuous ones. Thus, not only does it make possible the integration into semiotic research of objects (properties, phenomena) previously unnoticed or bluntly rejected; rather, such an integration now becomes a precondition, a *sine qua non*, for an adequate understanding of any semiotic field. This means that any isolatable section of culture may have to be studied in correlation with other sections in order to better understand its nature and function. For example, official culture requires studying non-official culture(s); standard language can better be accounted for by putting it into the context of the non-standard varieties; prestigious types of texts can be related to less prestigious ones, and so on.

Further, it may seem trivial, yet warrants special emphasis, that the polysystem hypothesis involves a rejection of value judgments as criteria for an *a priori* selection of the objects of study. This must be particularly stressed for almost all aspects of "culture," where confusion between the promotion of options and research still exists. If one accepts the polysystem hypothesis, then one must also accept that the historical study of phenomena as polysystems cannot confine itself to the prestigious segments, even if some would consider them the only *raison d'être* of the relevant study (such as "literary studies") in the first place. This kind of biased elitism cannot be compatible with cultural history just as general history can no longer be the life stories of kings and generals.

Excluding the selection of objects to be studied according to the researcher's taste does not mean that either particular "values" or evaluation in general are excluded by any section of the sciences of man as active *factors* to be accounted for. On the contrary, without a study of

such evaluative norms, there is no way of understanding the behavior of any human system. I would therefore like to warn at this point against a misinterpretation of my argument; no "objectivist" program, in the naïve sense of the word, is preached here. As will become apparent from the following, the study of cultural norms lies at the very core of any functional stratification theory.

2.2. Dynamic Stratification and Systemic Products

Heterogeneity is reconcilable with functionality if we assume that rather than correlating with each other as individual items conferring to a single unified system, the seemingly non- reconcilable items maintain more than one set of systemic relations, thus constituting partly alternative systems of concurrent options.

These systems are not equal, but hierarchized within the polysystem. It is the permanent tension between the various strata which constitutes the (dynamic) *synchronic* state of the system. It is the prevalence of one set of systemic options over another which constitutes the change on the *diachronic* axis. In this centrifugal vs. centripetal motion, systemic options may be driven from a central position to a marginal one while others may be pushed into the center and prevail. However, with a polysystem one must not think in terms of *one* center and *one* periphery, since several such positions are hypothesized. A move may take place, for instance, whereby a certain item (element, function) is transferred from the periphery of one system to the periphery of an adjacent system within the same polysystem, and then may or may not move on to the center of the latter.

Traditionally, we have often been faced with the results of such transfers either without realizing that they have occurred, or ignoring their source. Since in practice, the tendency has been to identify the (uni-) system with the central options exclusively (that is, official culture as manifested in canonized repertoire of the dominating groups), peripheries have been conceived of (if at all) as categorically extra-systemic, a view which coincides of course with the "inside view" of the "people- in-the-culture" (cf. Lotman et al. 1975; Voegelin 1960). This attitude has led to a number of problems. First, there was no awareness of the tensions between strata within a system, and therefore the value (function, "meaning") of a variety of items went undetected; these items stood in clear opposition to other concurrent items, the existence and nature of which were ignored. Secondly, as already

stated, the process of change could not be accounted for: changes were continuously explained in terms of the individual inventions of imaginative minds or as mysteriously resulting from "influences" from an external source (often from an isolated distinguishable item), or from direct responses to "the spirit of the age." At any rate, the materially manifested changes often remained un-interpreted, since their nature was concealed from the observer's eye.

Why transfers take place in the first place, the reasons for specific transfers, and how they are actualized (performed) are questions with which Polysystem theory has been increasingly occupied in direct proportion to the growing number of instances where it has been put to the test during recent years.

One thing has become clear: the polysystem constraints are interdependent with the procedures of selection, manipulation, amplification, removal, etc., taking place in actual products pertaining to the polysystem. Therefore, even those interested not in the *processes* taking place in a culture, or any institutionalized activity (field) in it, but in the "actual" constitution of culture products (e.g., any repeatable events, or, on a more particular level, lingual utterances, texts), cannot avoid taking into account the state of the particular polysystem with whose products they happen to deal. Naturally, when only official products (recognized or institutionalized events, or complexes of events, such as normative behaviors, standard language utterances, literary "masterpieces") were treated, the work of the polysystem constraints often could not be detected. As the researchers failed to see the connection between the position of products and models (properties, features) within the structured whole (by which they are constrained), on the one hand, and the decisions made while producing them, linked with the constraints on the activity of producers, on the other, local, isolated explanations became their only possible refuge. (For a more detailed discussion of repertoires and products see "Factors and Dependencies" in this collection.)

2.2.1. Canonized vs. Non-Canonized Strata
The hypothesis that certain components of a cultural repertoire tend, in any given time, to cluster around certain social statuses has been suggested in a variety of fields of study. The various institutions of culture, in permanent endeavor to promote their preferred repertoires, naturally often propagated the idea that undesired options are "essen-

tially" pertinent to some lower status, basically denying them any status at all. For example, if the recognized repertoire is presented as "the culture," then any rejected one is simply not recognized at all, often referred to as "non culture,," (or "not cultural" in the popular parlance).

A pioneer in stratification thinking in the field of "the arts" was Viktor Shklovskij, who, in the early 1920's, formulated the opposition between "canonized" and "non-canonized" options as an explanation for literary dynamics. Actually, he seems to have done more than that, i.e., he conceptualized the *socio-cultural distinctions* of text production in terms of stratification. In such a view, "canonized" would mean those norms and works (i.e., both models and products) which are accepted as legitimate by the dominant groups within the literary institution. On the other hand, "non-canonized" would mean those norms and products which are rejected by these groups as illegitimate and whose products are often forgotten in the long run by the community (unless they change their status). In this view, canonicity is therefore no inherent feature of any activity on any level, but the outcome of power relations within a system.

Similar hypotheses have been suggested by workers in the field of semiotics. Both Bakhtin and Lotman, for example, have developed the distinctions between "official" and "non-official" strata in culture.

The tendency to view official culture as the only acceptable one in a given society has resulted in massive cultural compulsion affecting whole nations through a centralized educational machine and making it impossible even for students of culture to observe and appreciate the role of the dynamic tensions which operate within the culture for its efficient maintenance. This regulating balance is possibly manifested in the stratificational oppositions. The normative repertoires of any activity would very likely stagnate after a certain time if not for competition from non-normative challengers. Under the pressures from the latter, the normative repertoires may not be able to remain unchanged. This guarantees the evolution of the "system," which, paradoxical as it may sound, is the only means of its preservation. If no such interplay of repertoires is possible, we often witness either the gradual abandonment of a repertoire and movement to another (e.g., a complete replacement of a system, for instance of language, instead of partial transformations of components only), or even the total collapse

of a polysystem (the totality of interrelated factors disappear, e.g., the disintegration of the ancient Assyrians).

It seems that when there are no effective "sub-cultures," or when exerting real pressures on canonized culture is not permitted, there is little chance of there being a vital standard culture. Without the stimulation of a strong "sub-culture," any canonized activity tends to gradually become petrified. The first steps towards petrification manifest themselves in a high degree of boundness and growing stereotypization of the various repertoires. The span of play among the various factors working in a culture is also greatly reduced. For the system, petrification is an operational disturbance: in the long run it does not allow it to cope with any possible changing circumstances of the society in which it functions. If one conceives of this incapacity in terms of cultural inadequacy–a concept barely explicated as yet–then there are various possible manifestations of it.

It should be noted that this use of the idea of canonicity (and the corresponding adjective "canonized") – inspired by Shklovskij's initial conceptualization – has less to do with questions concerning the formation and preservation of persistent canons (i.e., their consolidation, consecration and durability as well as their effectiveness in the ongoing mutating dynamics of the polysystem, as is often the concern of discussions of "the canonical")[2]; in my conception of canonicity I refer rather to the promotion of concurrent repertoires as the accepted normative standards for a certain polysystem. Accordingly, the center of the whole polysystem is identical with the most prestigious canonized repertoire. Thus, it is the group which governs the polysystem that ultimately determines the canonicity of a certain repertoire. Once canonicity has been determined, such a group either adheres to the properties canonized by it or alters the repertoire of canonized properties in order to maintain control. On the other hand, if unsuccessful in either the first or the second procedure, both the group and its cano-

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[2] For a detailed discussion see Sheffy 1985, 1990, 1992.

nized repertoire may eventually be pushed aside by some other group, which makes its way to the center by canonizing a different repertoire. However, established repertoires may be perpetuated as long as they may be useful to any group for organizing its life, its position in the system included.

While repertoire may be either canonized or non-canonized, the system to which a repertoire belongs may be either central or peripheral. Naturally, when a central system is the home of canonized repertoires, one may speak in abbreviated terms of canonized vs. non-canonized systems, in spite of the imprecision thus introduced into our jargon. While some of these rules and materials seem to be universally valid since the world's first cultures, clearly a great many rules and materials are subjected to shifting conditions in different periods and societies. It is this local and temporal sector of the repertoire which is the issue of struggle in any socio-semiotic system. But there is nothing in the repertoire itself that is capable of determining which section of it can be (or become) canonized or not, just as the distinctions between "standard," "high," "vulgar," or "slang" in language are not determined by the language repertoire itself, but by the language system–i.e., the aggregate of factors operating in society involved with the production and consumption of lingual behavior. The selection of a certain aggregate of features for the consumption of a certain group is therefore extraneous to that aggregate itself. Obviously, canonized repertoire is supported by either conservatory or innovatory elites, and therefore is constrained by those cultural patterns which govern the behavior of the latter.

2.3. Systemic Inter-Relations
The principles and properties, hypothesized in the above paragraphs for the intra-relations of the polysystem, hold true for its *inter*-relations as well. These inter-relations involve two kinds of adjacent systems: (a) a larger whole belonging to the same community, and (b) a whole, or its parts, which belongs to other communities, either of the same order (sort) or not.

In case (a), such a view is based on the assumption that any socio-semiotic activity (or field) is a component of a larger (poly)system – that of "culture," and therefore is inevitably correlated (or constantly liable to correlation) with other systems pertaining to the same whole.

As for case (b), i.e., the correlations a system maintains with systems maintained by other communities, the same principle is valid. Just as an aggregate of phenomena operating for a certain community can be conceived of as a system constituting part of a larger polysystem, which, in turn, is just a component within the larger polysystem of the "total culture" of the said community, so can the latter maintain systemic relations with other systems organizing the "cultures" of other communities. In history, such "units" are by no means clear-cut or forever finalized. Rather, the opposite holds true, as the borders separating adjacent systems shift all the time, not only within systems, but between them. The very notions of "within" and "between" cannot be taken either statically or for granted.

In short, it is a major goal, and a workable task for the Polysystem theory, to deal with the particular conditions under which a certain culture may be interfered with by another culture, as a result of which repertoires are transferred from one polysystem to another. For instance, if one accepts the hypothesis that peripheral properties are likely to penetrate the center once the capacity of the center to fulfill certain functions (i.e., the repertoire of the center) has been weakened, then there is no sense in denying that the very same principle operates on the inter-systemic level as well. Similarly, it is the polysystemic structure of the cultures involved which can account for various intricate processes of interference. For instance, contrary to common belief, interference often takes place via peripheries. (For a discussion of interference see "Laws of Cultural Interference" below.)

2.4. Stability and Instability; Volume of the System

For a socio-cultural system to be able to operate without needing to depend on extraneous systems (for instance, parallel systems of other communities), several conditions must be fulfilled. For instance, there is good reason to believe that heterogeneity is one of these conditions. Here the law of proliferation seems to be universally valid. This law simply means that in order to operate and remain vital a system has to be always enhanced with a growing inventory of alternative options. Hence, inter-systemic transfers, in whatever constellation or volume, are inevitable, and are carried out in spite of resistance.

It would naturally be highly desirable, and indeed a great advancement of our theories, to know how large "a sufficient stock" need be in order for a system to function adequately. Such knowledge, of

course, can only be speculative, although an attempt can be made at defining "minimal" repertoires, without which any cultural system would not be able to work. Studies of the emergence of all kinds of repertoires have shown that from the moment a culture is observed as functioning for a community, no culture functions with a small repertoire. In other words, it seems to be reasonably substantiated that once a system starts, (the law of) proliferation is activated.

However, this does not mean that instability is a normal or desirable state for a system. *Instability* should not be identified with change, just as *stability* should not be identified with petrification. In other words, stability or instability of *repertoire* do not reflect, or necessarily generate, stability or instability of the *system*. A system which is incapable of maintaining itself over a period of time and is often on the verge of collapse is, from the functional point of view, unstable; while a system undergoing permanent, steady, and well-controlled change may adequately be considered stable simply because it perseveres. It is only such stable systems which manage to *survive*, while others simply perish. Therefore, "crises" or "catastrophes" in a polysystem (i.e., occurrences which call for radical change, either by internal or external transfer), if they can be balanced by the system, are signs of a vital, rather than a degenerate, system. The system may be endangered only when change becomes unbalanced and hence unmanageable. Naturally, from the point of view of position holders in the system, on whatever level, any change which they cannot control endangers *their* positions, but not necessarily the system as such. There are of course cases in history where endangered repertoire puts the whole system in danger, but this is more often than not the result of preceding long stagnation which has not allowed "normal dynamics" in the first place.

Interference and Transfer

LAWS OF CULTURAL INTERFERENCE[1]

Are we in position to formulate general laws, or at least some demonstrable regularities, of cultural interference? Thousands of works dealing with a large number of particular cases of relations between societies and cultures have been produced, but there are very few endeavors to generalize on the basis of this vast accumulated knowledge. This paper is one of those endeavors, basically a reshuffled version of previous attempts, which the current author initiated back in 1978 (Even-Zohar 1978) for the narrower domain of literary theory and has gone re-writing since. As in the previous versions of this sketch, what I desire to achieve is not some definitive list of "laws," but the very possibility of formulating and investigating repetitive patterns and regularities.

I. Contacts and Interferences

Contacts can be defined as a relation(ship) between cultures, whereby a certain culture A (a source culture) may become a source of direct or indirect transfer for another culture B (a target culture). Once this possibility is realized, interference can be said to have occurred. Interference is thus a procedure emerging in the environment of contacts, one where transfer has taken place.

This kind of relations has always been part of the historical existence of human societies. And most human societies around the globe have come into being, survived and changed thanks to interference. Isolated societies – in as much as they have existed – have encountered,

on the other hand, many difficulties, even if they have managed to survive (and many have not). Naturally, a precondition for interference must be some kind of contact – whether direct or indirect – but the opposite is not necessarily true: contact may occur without generating any substantial interference. Hence, "interference" and "contacts" are distinct processes, definitely interconnected but not fully overlapping. They may have different histories and at any rate they need to be dealt with by different sets of questions.

One of the manifestations of contacts is an exchange of goods. Whether unilaterally or multilaterally imported, such goods may become important items in the culture of the importing society. However, only if they are converted to generative models – namely to active components in the domestic repertoire – do they become a clear case of interference. Thus, while human societies may depend on each other's resources for a variety of tasks and purposes, it is only when such resources are domesticated by a culture to be locally produced that we are allowed to speak of interference. Naturally, the "borders" between cases of active contact (i.e. a strong presence of imported goods) and interference are not clear-cut. Nevertheless, the basic principle here is the separation of the transferred item from the exporting source and its ensuing independence: once the source is no longer needed for the making of the item-of-repertoire in question, it is justified to regard the case as interference. Once interference has taken place, the question of source/origin is no longer relevant. For the majority of the members of a community, once introduced into their repertoire, the fortune of an item in terms of success or failure becomes a domestic matter.

Different kinds of contacts may create different kinds of interference, depending chiefly on whether contacts are direct or indirect. In the case of direct contacts, a source culture is available to, and accessed by, members of the target culture without institutionalized intermediaries. For example, in the case of minority groups physically living among majority groups, being exposed daily to the culture of the majority, interference may be much more powerful than in those cases where the target can to some degree avoid the source. On the other hand, in the second type, contacts are intermediated through agencies, such as various kinds of importers. Though in both cases import may be a major channel for actual transfer, it is obvious that when intermediaries are indispensable, its role as an institutionalized distinct

procedure is more indispensable. In such cases we often deal with a small group of agents who operate as entrepreneurs in and for a target culture. Clearly, massive exposure can significantly support the impact of interference. But such an exposure per se is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for interference to take place.

Conditioned by our modern tradition, we tend to think about the societies involved in contacts and interferences as well demarcated entities, mostly distinct ethnic or national, being in possession of well-defined cultural repertoires. This is, however, an unduly restricted view of the subject. Interference functions for all sizes and levels of social configurations: families, clans, tribes, "classes," ethnic groups, geographically organized groups, as well as nations, or groups of nations. There is therefore no need to make a theoretical distinction between so-called intra-systemic and inter-systemic contacts and interferences, although in practice they may be carried out through different procedures, or rather different options within the same procedures.

II. Laws of Interference
Three groups of aspects can tentatively be distinguished:

General principles of interference.
    1. Interference is always imminent.
    2. Interference is mostly unilateral.
    3. Interference may be restricted to certain domains.

Conditions for the emergence and occurrence of interference.
    4. Contacts will sooner or later generate interference if no resisting conditions arise.
    5. Interference occurs when a system is in need of items unavailable within its own repertoire.
    6. A culture becomes a source by prestige.
    7. A culture becomes a source by dominance.

Processes and procedures of interference.
    8. Interference may take place with only one part of the target culture; it may then proceed to other parts.
    9. An appropriated repertoire does not necessarily maintain source culture functions.

1. General Principles of Interference

No. 1. Interference is always imminent.
The ubiquity of interference is not always obvious. Since the channels of actual transfer may be on the periphery, and hence not "visible" (from the point of view of official culture), and since it is often the case that we are confronted with the later, domesticated results of interference rather than with the initial stages, it seems "natural" not to hypothesize interference as a first option for given cases. Yet research has demonstrated that probably all systems known to us have emerged and developed with interference playing a prominent role. There is not one single culture which did not emerge through interference with a more established culture; and no culture could manage without interference at one time or another during its history. It has been substantiated that interference is the rule rather than the exception, whether it is a major or a minor occurrence for a given culture. It is only when the invisible processes of interference are discovered that its overwhelming presence can be fully recognized and estimated.

One implication of this recognition is that when one must choose for a certain case between the hypothesis of separate development vs. the hypothesis of interference, unless refutable on very clear grounds, in spite of our accepted inclinations, priority ought to be given to the interference hypothesis. The meaning of this is that a researcher is thus encouraged to look for interference as a highly likely option, and reject it only if a non-interference solution can be shown to be stronger.

It is true that we lack evidence of interference for some cultures which currently seem remote and isolated. But in the light of the overwhelming evidence of interference for the majority of the cultures of the world, the lack of evidence in particular cases may suggest that the evidence is not yet accessible rather than that there has been no interference. What seemed only a century ago to be disparate civilizations now have been shown to have been interrelated and connected. Such cases as the non-invention of the wheel by the Incas surely supports the hypothesis of lack of contacts, yet on the other hand it also demonstrates the central role interference must have played in the diffusion of such inventions.

The fact that we do not know for the moment how Sumerian – the world's most ancient known culture – emerged is no proof of non-interference. Some scholars have already adduced evidence which suggests that some more ancient civilization lay at the background of Sumerian. But even supposing we accept Sumerian as the progenitor of world culture (which means that we are willing to take it as an un-interfered culture), for almost all other cultures there is abundant evidence of interference.[2] Moreover, for the majority of these cultures one can demonstrate descent from or lineage with Sumerian. There is no doubt about Akkadian (Assyro-Babylonian) being the first and most conspicuous heir to Sumerian. Indeed, the processes that can be reconstructed for the Sumerian-Akkadian case are strikingly similar to many other cases which occurred in various cultures in the course of later history.

The prominent features in this case are (1) an adoption of the Sumerian writing system, (2) a partial adoption of the Sumerian language by the Akkadians, to be maintained for quite a long time side by side with the Akkadian as a highly revered language, (3) interlinear translations (into Akkadian) in major Sumerian texts borrowed by the Akkadians, (4) regular translations, (5) adaptations and elaborations of

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[2] It is true of almost all cultures of the Western Hemisphere. As for the Eastern Hemisphere, admittedly, Chinese is still a riddle as regards its emergence and early development. Suggestions about the possible link between Sumerian and Chinese, or between Egyptian and Chinese, have not been seriously substantiated, though it is not unlikely that this may yet become a fruitful direction. At any rate, if we are willing to accept for Chinese what we have been willing to accept for Sumerian, interference with a large number of Asian cultures has been the rule here, too. The role played by Chinese is very much similar to that of Sumerian vs. Akkadian (indeed, in the Chinese-Japanese case this would be a strikingly parallel case), or of Latin vs. all other European cultures in the Middle Ages. But even as far as relations with the Western Hemisphere are concerned, it is quite obvious that China was not all that isolated, and exchange on a variety of levels was definitely present in certain periods. (See Needham 1981; also for bibliography.)

Sumerian texts, and (6) new texts based on the new repertoire that had emerged and developed in Akkadian through interference with Sumerian.

The rest of the cultures of the Fertile Crescent definitely owe their repertoire, as well as other components of their cultural system, to Akkadian. For each of the cultures written in Ugaritic (?-1200) and Hittite (1650-1200 B.C.), not only affinities in repertoire can be shown, but also much direct and indirect evidence about the possible conditions that must have generated interference between them. Ancient Hebrew culture, available to us through the books of the Old Testament (which, though surely only a portion of what has been produced in this culture, is still much more than what is left to us from Phoenician), is linkable not only to Akkadian (and to Sumerian via Akkadian), but evidently also to Ugaritic (as has been demonstrated by Ginsberg [1936, 1946], Cassuto [1958, 1972], Gordon [1977], Caquot et al. [1974]; see also Avishur 1979).

From Ugaritic, Phoenician, and Hittite the road goes to Greece. There is no dispute about the Phoenician origin of the Greek alphabet, and there is large agreement about the Middle Eastern origin of some major features of Greek mythology. That no clear-cut evidence about the Homeric case can be provided is no wonder. The Homeric texts are obviously produced by an already advanced domestic repertoire. Although it can remind us of its external precedents (possibly through the intermediation of Hittite renderings of the classical texts of Mesopotamia, at least as far as regards the contacts with the ancient Ionians and Achaeans),[3] it obviously also has its own particularities which cannot be traced back to any external source.

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[3] It would not be adequate to attribute the emergence and perpetuation of relations between Eastern and Greek cultures to the Hittites, although the role of the latter in being an intermediary to the classical Mesopotamian tradition has become to some extent more substantiated. The Hittite empire collapsed, however, around 1200 B.C. and there emerged an era of relations between the Greeks in the mainland and the

No. 2. Interference is mostly unilateral.
There is no symmetry in cultural contacts. A target culture is, more often than not, interfered with by a source culture which may ignore it. There are also cases when there may be some minor interference in one direction and a major one in another.

No. 3. Interference does not necessarily occur on all levels of culture.
In the case of two communities either geographically contiguous or mixed, or otherwise linked ("geographical links" can be trade routes as well as some established awareness of "the existence of the other"), interference can take place on a variety of levels but not necessarily on all levels of culture. However, it seems hard to provide evidence for cases when interference would be restricted to one sector of culture only, while all the other sectors remain intact. At the same time, with communities geographically separated from one another, partial interference is fully conceivable.

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Phoenicians, which chiefly resulted in the transfer of the Phoenician alphabet (including the names of the letters) to Greek (and subsequently to Etruscan and Latin), as well as parts of the Phoenician ("Canaanite") mythology.

There is much additional evidence clearly supporting the hypothesis of large-scale transfers across the Mediterranean of "Semitic" culturemes. Here are some details: (1) The vast Phoenician colonization of the Mediterranean (Cyprus, Sicily, North Africa, Spain, and Provence [with Masilla – Marsilia/Marseille – as the center]); (2) the perseverance of an archaic variety of the alphabet, closer to the original Phoenician one, among the Etruscans (who persevered in writing from right to left and using some letters that had been eliminated by the Greeks from the originally adopted Phoenician alphabet); (3) the evidence of the knowledge of Phoenician even in places where no Phoenician colonies existed, such as Anatolia (as reflected in Karatepe inscription; see Tur-Sinai 1954: 66-80; Bron 1979), or Etruscan Italy (Etruria). The Etruscan-Phoenician golden plates found in the ancient site of Pyrgi (near Cerveteri; now kept at Villa Giulia, Rome) also are evidence of the knowledge of Phoenician culture, being a dedication to the Phoenician goddess Astarte (Aštart) of a "sacred place" in the Etruscan sanctuary of Pyrgi early in the 5th century B.C. See Pallottino 1981.

It is precisely because of the heterogeneous systemic structure of culture that a target culture may have contact with and transfer from only some sections of a source culture. A target culture is never exposed to the totality of some source, even when geographically close to it or mixed with it. Studies on immigration, acculturation, and assimilation provide ample evidence supporting this.

2. Conditions for the Emergence and Occurrence of Interference

No. 4. Contacts will sooner or later generate interference if no resisting conditions arise.
Contacts between communities do not necessarily generate interference. Communities may exchange any kind of goods, information, political support, or tourism without subsequently being affected. Spreading information received from the source, getting acquainted with the political structure of the source in order to be able to cope with it (as is probably often the case of smaller vs. larger nations), and bringing souvenirs from a trip do not necessarily generate interference. Moreover, communities may live side by side, even mixed with one another, seemingly without interfering.[4]

It is not an easy matter, however, to determine at what point we would agree that interference has started to take place. Durable con-

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[4] The very integration of goods of whatever nature in a target system clearly makes them an occurrence of interference even though not locally produced. If Americans buy shirts made in Hong Kong, this does not make Hong Kong culture interfere with American culture. But suppose Hong Kong shirts are different from the American ones, and at first not immediately accepted yet gradually are fully adopted by the Americans. Although that would not involve change in the repertoire of American shirt factories, the American repertoire would have actually changed by this adoption. Of course, when the Americans themselves would go over to producing shirts the Hong Kong way, there is no doubt that unambiguous interference would indeed have taken place.

tacts, while not producing conspicuously visible interference, may, however, generate conditions of availability, which will facilitate interference. Certain widely accepted attitudes towards probable contacts, and subsequently interference, may affect actual behavior when interference becomes imminent. Sometimes, highly nationalistic societies reject any interference, because it is felt to be a threat to national integrity. At other times, the desire for change may promote a favorable attitude towards occurrences in another society, with the help of which, if transferred, one can hope to get away from an undesired situation.

In the last third of the nineteenth century, when Paris had become an international center, various French intellectuals (or perhaps "makers of public opinion") both perpetuated and reinforced xenophobic attitudes. For instance, Zola, Daudet, and the Goncourts (to name just a few) violently objected to the introduction of any high-culture products from abroad, trying to demonstrate the incompatibility of foreign culture with "the French spirit." Zola, whom we normally remember as the humanistic defender of justice, combined his literary credo with his unfavorable attitude to foreigners in criticizing French writers who located their scenery in some non-French site.[5]

On the other hand, other communities do not resent so violently borrowing from the outside, and one may observe some kind of cultural openness towards other cultures (and the multiplicity of cultures in

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[5] In a review of a play by Ernst Blum, Zola says: "Aussi, quelle étrange idée, d'être allé choisir la Suède, qui compte si peu dans les sympathies populaires de notre pays. Ce choix malheureux suffit à reculer l'action dans le brouillard. On raconte que M. Ernst Blum a promené son drame de nationalités en nationalités, avant de le planter à Stockholm. Il a eu ses raisons sans doute; mais je lui prédis qu'il s'en repentira pas moins d'avoir poussé le dédain de nos préoccupations quotidiennes jusqu'à nous mener dans une contrée dont la grande majorité des spectateurs ne sauraient indiquer la position exacte sur la carte de l'Europe. Nous rions et nous pleurons où est notre cœur" (Zola 1928: 187). See also Ahlström 1956: 164-165 and Nyholm 1957/59.

general). In other societies, "anything that comes from abroad must be good," so saying that "this is already current abroad, why are we lagging behind" is quite accepted. With closer, more intimate contacts between communities, like those between Polish and Ukrainian populations in the Eastern Austro-Hungarian Empire, one wonders whether separatist national ideologies have not blinded us to the interference that has in fact taken place. Yet the difficult question here remains whether we are justified in concluding that contacts are sooner or later (and whether desired or not) likely to generate some kind of interference. If one argues that such interference could have taken place because of some kind of vacuum, indifference, or lack of resistance in the target – that would amount to the same hypothesis.

Consequently, although a community can resist interference even in cases of unavoidable contacts, it cannot resist it on all levels of its or for a long period of time. So the question evidently is when interference becomes a major factor in a culture, not whether interference operates in a culture or not, i.e., in the case of contacts. In the light of our understanding of stratification it would be quite plausible to hypothesize, for instance, a durable interference on the periphery of culture. This can incubate for quite a long time, even for a number of generations, before it surfaces, as it were, in the sphere of official or dominant culture. But it surfaces or fails to surface subject to the conditions prevailing in the center, which may either encourage interference or neutralize resistance to it.

If we expect contacts to generate interference under any conditions, we are likely to be puzzled by cases which look "anomalous." For instance, one wonders how it is that after so many years of coexistence, various ethnic or national groups on such a relatively small territory as Europe still keep themselves largely apart, in spite of a common cultural heritage and intensive contacts (as well as massive interferences on a variety of levels). Switzerland alone could be a case for puzzlement, but even France – the most centralized and seemingly homogenized state in Europe – still has both small and large minorities who have resisted interference on a variety of cultural levels, like the Bretons and to some extent the Occitans (over 16 million people).

Here are some brief remarks on a number of cases:

(1) *Jewish vs. Hellenistic-Roman culture in Palestine 100 B.C-600 C.E.* It took 200-400 years for certain features of Hellenistic culture to be accepted by the Jews after Hellenistic culture had been powerfully resisted. Only after they became neutralized items could they no longer constitute a possible threat to the domestic culture.[6]

(2) *Hebrew vs. Arabic cultures in Mesopotamia after the Muslim conquest of that territory in the 7th Century.* The new language was rapidly adopted by the local population, although not at the cost of the total elimination of the in-group vernacular.[7] But it took almost three hundred years for Jewish culture to make use of the adjacent high Arabic culture in its central cultural modes of production (Drory 1988, 2000).

No. 5. Interference occurs when a system is in need of items unavailable within itself.
A "need" may arise when a new generation feels that the norms governing the system are no longer effective and therefore must be replaced. If the domestic repertoire does not offer any options in this

[6] These involved a variety of culturemes, not only in architecture and clothing, but even burial patterns and language. The discovery of Hellenistic pictorial artistry in a number of synagogues, in the Galilee and Syria (the most famous one in Dura-Europos), has been a real surprise to historians. (For an account see Kraeling 1956.) The gradual absorption of Greek components in the Aramaic language of Roman and Byzantine times in Palestine is an acknowledged phenomenon. Yet it is quite astonishing to discover, in later Palestinian Jewish Aramaic, such keywords in the life of the Jewish Palestinian community as "kyrios" (God) and "angelos" (angel)! (See Heineman 1973.) For a discussion of architectural items as actual culturemes see Tsafrir 1981, 1984.

7 Actually, the Jews (as well as the Christians) of Mesopotamia (Iraq) adopted a linguistic variety which later disappeared in Muslim society, while fusing it with their previous Aramaic vernacular to create particular respective vernaculars of their own. (See Blanc 1964 and Blau 1965, 1967, and 1988 for both Judeo- and Christian Arabic.)

direction, while an accessibly adjacent system seems to possess them, interference will very likely take place.

It might be asked whether such a "need" can indeed emerge not as a consequence of some internal development in a culture, but rather as a result of the existence of certain options in an accessibly adjacent culture. This must remain an open question at this stage.

No. 6. A culture becomes a source by prestige.
A culture may become a source because it is considered a model to emulate. Various factors contribute to making a culture prestigious. Establishedness, and highly visible presence in a world network, which create a high degree of interconnectedness, are among the factors of prestige. Political and/or economic power are not necessary conditions for acquiring prestige per se, but are certainly indispensable for creating high visibility/presence which in its turn late create prestige. In addition, a political power position, which helped in an initial stage to create visibility/presents, they no longer be needed after prestige has been achieved. Thus, a politically superior power may borrow massively for sectors of culture that have not been created or advanced domestically from a politically inferior power that has established cultural prestige for those sectors. This is clearly the case of Greek culture in Rome.

Taking another case, that of French culture, it is not at all clear whether we should attribute its prestige for several centuries among European cultures to the political power of France. While this may be true for some periods, it is not altogether so for others. The diffusion of French cultural models and products (both material and semiotic) during the High Middle Ages (1000-1400) cannot be divorced from the centrality of France due to its position in the Carolingian Empire; yet it was only later that France achieved her position of power and could exercise power politics with repercussions on the level of cul-

tural consumption. I believe we have to recognize that its prestige had been established – on cultural premises – much earlier than its days of great power, and persisted long after this power had declined.[8]

What France could offer from a relatively early stage was establishedness. It had already developed many accessible institutions on a large variety of levels when other cultures just started organizing themselves. Like England, and before that Ireland, it could offer, for example, various kinds of expertise (linguistic, theological, artisanal) that was involved with the newly accepted religion in vast territories of Europe, which had not been part of the Roman Empire. In Bourdieu's terms it would be appropriate to recognize that besides its worldly riches (which had so strongly tempted the periphery people during the ninth and tenth centuries), France had accumulated an immense cultural capital that no entity that wish to organize itself along the world of network of competition and parity could afford to ignore. This is why we see French culture play a role for the Nordic societies, or for Germany and Russia in various points of their history.

Although the model of Christianity adopted in Iceland and Norway mainly derived from England, French culture played an important role for them both. It seems that France hosted one of the founding fathers of Icelandic culture – Sæmundr the Learned (1056-1133) – thus legitimizing further contacts and creating awareness of French culture as a permanently available source and resource for various central measures taken by the Icelandic church. (For sources and further details see Gelsinger 1981: 135-140.) It seems also that France could have supplied experts who were needed to teach in the newly established

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[8] The role of a powerful organizing world vision like religion in making interference work through prestige is evident in all kinds of ideologies. There is no difference in this respect between the role Christianity played in the High Middle Ages and the role played by later ideologies, such as the French – and more recently the Russian – Revolution.

Northern school of Hólar certain major skills of European culture (see Turville-Petre 1975: 111).[9] Moreover, French religious artifacts, especially from Dinant, Limoges, and Rheims, were imported into Iceland and had quite an impact on local art (Björnsson 1975: 270). There is no evidence, however, that these were brought directly from France. (Gelsinger, for instance, strongly favors the idea that rather than direct ties, Norwegians have acted as intermediaries between Iceland and France.)

Thus, the position of France in Nordic (particularly Norwegian-Icelandic) high official culture had been established long before it started playing a more decisive role for other sections of this culture. For with the French-Latin exegetic sources there also came an abundant quantity of French chivalric imagery that created a whole repertoire of new attitudes. In the local creation of written texts – an activity highly central for the crystallization of the Nordic societies in the

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[9] The school of Hólar was founded 1106, when Jón Ögmundarsson, just consecrated as Bishop in Lund, returned to Iceland. "Among the teachers whom Jón employed was Gísli Finsson, from Gautaland (Sweden), who was headmaster and taught Latin. Another teacher was called Ríkini, and he is described as a Frenchman. He taught singing and verse-making, and was himself a skillful exponent of both" (Turville-Petre 1975: 111). In *Jóns saga helga* (The Life of Saint John), written during the first years of the thirteenth century by the monk Gunnlaugr Leifsson (died 1218), quite a lengthy paragraph is dedicated to Ríkini. This saga was originally written in Latin and later translated by the author to Icelandic, the only surviving text. Although written in the regular stock style of standard European hagiography (Boyer 1986: 63), the amiable description of this Ríkini at least partly and indirectly bears witness to the high appreciation of his exceptional skills. Although his fellow foreigner from Sweden was nominated headmaster, singing and verse-making seem to definitely have had more appeal to the students than Latin ("Grammatica"), and Ríkini probably both liked people and was liked by them (Jóns saga helga [eldri gerð], 1953, etc.: 42). Of course the presence of Ríkini is per se no evidence of any massive transfer of French culture into Iceland, but coupled with other factors of interference, both direct and indirect, it is definitely a token of an awareness towards French culture at the time.

new world of the Middle Ages – this imagery was mostly transferred via translation, but soon was appropriated for the making of local texts. In a remarkable number of the later Icelandic sagas, the chivalric model of the world, which is believed to have penetrated the larger field of popular attitudes (Sveinsson 1953) become very conspicuous. (Hallberg 1962; Turville-Petre 1975: 82 [and references there]; Gelsinger 1981; Lönnroth 1965, 1976; also Stefánsson 1975). [10]

No. 7. A culture becomes a source by dominance.
A culture may be selected as a source culture when it is dominant due to extra-cultural conditions. Naturally, a dominant culture often has prestige, but the dominant position does not necessarily result from this prestige. A current case in this category is a culture made "unavoidable" by a colonial power, which imposes its language and texts on a subjugated community. For example, the fact that English and French dominated many cultures under their political influence is simply due to this influence. The same seems to be true basically for most cases of minority groups.

Colonial or imperialist powers do not always seem to have the same interest in inculcating their cultures in the subject people, but the results may eventually be almost the same. The respective behaviors of France and England vis-à-vis this question have been dissimilar. Yet English has succeeded in taking root in such countries as India, Iraq,

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[10] The perpetuation of cultural power in spite of political decline is well attested. Conquered people often transmitted their culture to their conquerors by virtue of this ineradicable prestige. Thus, the conquering Germanic tribes adopted the most fundamental components of their official culture from the conquered Gaelic and Italic peoples. Colonizers may also behave like such conquerors, as is probably the case with the Akkadians who adopted the culture of the Sumerians and cherished the formers' language and heritage for ages. Hellenistic culture was respectfully treated by the Romans, and the Roman cultures of Italy and Gaul by their respective Germanic invaders.

or black Africa almost as fully as French has in Northern Africa, Lebanon, and Indo-China.

Power dominance of the imperialistic kind thus forces contacts on a system and may therefore engender interference in spite of the system's resistance. Yet in cases when the target system is not yet established – or in crisis – it might not develop any rejecting mechanism. Such a mechanism may, however, evolve at a later stage, when many supposedly appropriated repertoremes turn out to have been merely temporary ones.

3. PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES OF INTERFERENCE

No. 8. Contacts may take place with only one part of the target culture, then proceed to other parts.
Even when appropriations are "heavy," there is not necessarily an overall interference. Usually certain sections remain untouched, while others undergo massive invasion, or are literally created by appropriations. For example, a model which did not exist in a target culture may be introduced and incorporated in it through appropriation.

Similarly, interference can be confined to only one stratum, e.g., to the center or to the periphery of the target culture. A source culture repertoire may thus first interfere with a lower or a higher stratum of a target culture, then go over to other strata. Although initially generated by interference, when such a repertoire "goes over," it is no longer an issue of direct interference, but already an internal process within the target culture. Since in traditional cultural studies interference – understood in terms of "influence" – is taken to be a matter of superiority vs. inferiority, it is not likely to be accepted that the "influencing" party may be of a less "sophisticated" nature than the "influenced" one.

Many peripheral cultures appropriate features of commonly accepted cultural repertoire after these are well established in the central cultures of a time. This is not necessarily then carried out by appropriation from a major source, but often occurs via secondary intermediaries, who have elaborated more schematized and possibly digestible models in terms of appropriability.

No. 9. An appropriated repertoire does not necessarily maintain source culture functions.
The hypothesis about the regularity of mutation of a function transferred from its original position within a system, as can be formulated on the basis of Tynjanov's work (especially Tynjanov 1929), is sufficiently supported by interference studies. Any item appropriated from a source may assume, in view of the superiority of the domestic constraints, a different function within the target.

If taken within a larger structure, any culture – which may have evolved as either a full-fledged or a partial polysystem – may acquire certain items of repertoire (or other elements of the system) long after these may have succeeded to institutionalize themselves in the first instance. From this point of view, the products generated in any target culture at a later stage than its first instance are in all probability of a secondary nature when compared with the primary ones in the initiating system. This, however, is of no importance to either, since what counts is the position assumed by such items within the target, not their comparable items within whatever source. It is only when a situation of reciprocity occurs, even a minor one (e.g., through peripheral translations) that such a state of matters reveals itself. This is definite evidence for the system-dependent value of any items within a given culture.

This implies that a target culture frequently ignores the contemporary elements of a source culture and goes back to an earlier diachronic phase, often outdated from the point of view of the center of the source culture. But while in certain instances the direction of interference may be a single homogeneous line, at other instances various competing and non-congruent attempts may be carried out by different groups within the target culture. Contemporary features may thus be mixed with those of earlier phases. This clearly implies that the systemic position of particular items in the source is not necessarily of consequence to the target. This position in the source must then not be taken for granted when the problem of the possible status of the item in the target is discussed. If in a specific case this position is of relevance, this relevance must be strongly supported by defensible evidence.

At the present stage of interference theory it does not seem possible to conclude under what conditions a target culture would tend to use a

repertoire outdated or novel in the source. Members of a minority group, often remote from the centers of innovation (generally capital cities), acquire their knowledge of a source culture in a more traditional way than their more centrally situated contemporaries. But the very opposite may sometimes be true, too. It would not therefore be justified to generalize on the basis of restricted cases. At least we must admit that much research need be carried out on a sufficiently large scale in a large number of cultures to allow us solidifying our temporary generalizations.

THE MAKING OF CULTURE REPERTOIRES AND THE ROLE OF TRANSFER[1]

In this paper I suggest a set of hypotheses for handling the relations between the making of repertoire and transfer. It is particularly in the context of the study of translation in its accepted sense that I wish to underline the socio-cultural juncture where transfer plays a role. This role may far exceed the range of events with which students of translation normally are concerned, as it sometimes becomes a major factor for the fate of societies and cultures. However, even at times when its role is minor, it is nonetheless present and for a more encompassing theory of translation a non-dismissible parameter.

The culture repertoire. The major concept in the theory of culture I employ is that of "repertoire." The culture repertoire is the aggregate, or the accepted stock of options utilized by a group, and by its individual members, for the organization of life. The size of the group may be variable. From the point of view of culture research, since these groups *always* depend on specific culture repertoires for the organization of their life, they are by definition cultural entities.

The two aspects of organization of life. "Organization" subsumes at least two aspects which, although possibly complementary, are different. One can namely speak of a *passive* and an *active* aspect of

the organization of life, and consequently of "passive" and "active" repertoires.

The passive aspect. For the *passive* aspect of the organization of life -- which should probably better be labeled '*organizedness*' -- the 'world', as it were, acquires, from the point of view of any individual and group, an organized form. This acquired form imparts 'meaning', makes 'the world' comprehensible rather than chaotic. This view has very strong roots in various theories of culture, especially in the semiotics of culture, as well as in some sorts of what nowadays is being labeled 'cultural studies' emanating mainly from traditional literary criticism. This perspective is in fact based on the hermeneutic and exegetic tradition: it views 'the world' as a set of signs which, as Lotman (1978) puts it, bombard us daily, and therefore need to be interpreted in order to make life possible. The idea of a modeling system, developed by Ivanov, Lotman, and other Soviet semioticians, is above everything else a coherent set of procedures with the help of which 'the world makes sense'. Perhaps this is best formulated by Lotman and Uspenskij (1971: 146-147; Lotman 1978) as follows:

The main "work" of culture [...] is the structural organization of the surrounding world. Culture is a generator of "structuredness" and it creates social sphere around man which, like biosphere, makes life possible (in this case social and not organic). (Translation by Segal 1974: 94-95).

The active aspect. The *active* aspect of organization can be defined as a set of procedures an individual may take to handle any situation encountered, as well as produce any such situation. As Swidler puts it, culture is "a repertoire or 'tool kit' of habits, skills, and styles from which people construct 'strategies of action'" (Swidler 1986: 273). This perspective is therefore mostly linked with ideas of 'acting' and 'activity' rather than with the ideas of 'understanding'. Evidently, some 'understanding' is indispensable for 'acting' as well, but the main point here is making active decisions and perform rather than 'make sense' of given situations.

The making of repertoires. Culture repertoires, although sensed by the members of the group as given, and mostly taken by them for

granted, are neither generated nor inherited by our genes, but need be made, learned and adopted by people, that is the members of the group. This making is permanent and continuous, although with shifting intensity and volume. It may take place *inadvertently,* or "spontaneously," that is by anonymous contributors, whose names and fortune may never be known, or *deliberately*, that is by known and sometimes remembered members who openly and dedicatedly are engaged in this activity.

The acceptance of repertoire. Whatever the source of repertoire might be, the crucial factor is whether it is accepted by the targeted group as a tool for organizing life. This depends on an intricate network of relations, which may be labeled for brevity "the system of culture," which includes such factors as market, power-holders, and the prospective users serving as a dynamic interface between them. Clearly, out of an enormous quantity of potential items for a repertoire on whatever level, only a small number eventually becomes established and instrumental.

The procedures for making repertoire: *Invention and import*. In the making of repertoires, independently of the circumstances, the major procedures seem to be *'invention '* and *'import*.' These are not opposed procedures, because inventing may be carried out via import, though it also may relate to the labor involved in the making within the confines of the home system *without* any link to some other. Even in cases of inventiveness which cannot be traced back to a simple source, import may have been present. In short, import has played a much more crucial role than is normally admitted in the making of repertoires, and hence in the organization of the life of groups, as well as the interaction between groups.

From "import" to "transfer". There is a permanent, quiet, as it were, flow of import at any moment in the history of groups. At times it may almost dwindle to nil but at other times it may be lively and ample. When goods -- material or semiotic -- are imported, if they are successful on the target market, they may gradually become integral part of the target repertoire. This occurs if we can observe that they may have become obvious, self-evident, for the target group, indeed indispensable for life. Such indispensability is manifest not necessarily in any explicit stand, but in the integration of

the goods or the repercussions of their absence. This state of integrated importation into a repertoire I would like to call "transfer."

Naturally, not all imported goods result in such "transfers." On the other hand, not all transfers that do occur play a major role in the target repertoire. The volume and effectiveness of transfer normally varies from one period to another in the history of groups, as well as in the various fields of activities held by the group. For example, while they may be powerful in the field of construction, they may be non-extant in the field of language. There are also moments when such transfers constitute the central and most important procedure for creating the options to organize group and individual life, thus intimately linked with the very survival of the group.

When a successful transfer occurs, it is not only the goods themselves which become domesticated, but rather the *need* for those goods. Obviously, for example, in order for black pepper to become an indispensable ingredient in a diet, a need for making food spicy in a specific way is necessary or must be created by advocacy and promotion. Similarly, when those who import texts from one culture to another, for instance via translation, may be performing a successful act of transfer if they may have managed to make the semiotic *models* of these texts integral parts of the target repertoires on various levels of socio-cultural activities (from the writing of texts to managing situations in life).

The causes of import and the trajectory of transfer. The most obvious case of import seem to be that of bringing in goods to fill in certain functions which are absent in the target. That is, import may occur whenever the goods that are imported are not available on the target market and a willingness to consume them is somehow aroused among the members of the targeted group. This applies to the so-called "material" as well as to "semiotic" goods. For example, importing black pepper, certain fabrics, or food, may be as complicated, from the point of view of marketability, as importing hygienic habits, explicit laws, tellable stories, and the like.

Naturally, the key concept here is the hypothesis of the "willingness to consume new goods" which is not so simple to trace in the

complex situation of societies. However, even if the regular situation in societies might be considered that of opposition to import, and hence transfer, clearly there are instances when this resistance may become weaker. Thus, it may become weaker when new situations are introduced (which may in themselves be instances of import) and there is no, or a slight, domestic repertoire to handle them. For example, once a society without an army accepts the function of an army, it may be willing to adopt a large portion of repertoires for maintaining an army which may have no connection to any current or past repertoires. This occurs because the only practical way to do that is to adopt existing accessible models of military organizations.

Resistance to transfer may also become weaker when some ingredients of repertoire (or an entire one) become undesired. When this occurs, there may be no time to gradually make replacements, and therefore extant alternatives are reached and transferred. Examples are abundant, with sweeping cases such as introducing a new religion or a completely different codex of law (for instance, medieval Iceland, modern Turkey), and less sweeping cases as adopting the literary model of the sonnet, or the poetical principle of rhyming.

Transfers may succeed, however, not because of any emerging or extant disposition, but simply via the very occurrence of contacts with some other culture. Such contacts may raise a sense of insufficiency, especially if the other repertoire is richer, more prestigious among many groups, or may even promise "a better life." In such cases, the simple principle of "why don't we have what our neighbor has already got" is set in motion. Of course, such a principle may be just a justification and rationalization rather than the actual cause of transfer, but there are, on the other hand, many cases of genuine marketing of items whose necessity may not have emerged otherwise.

Degrees of the role of transfer

On the level of passive repertoire, i.e., the screening tools that serve to view the world, transfer can plant images of the world that will at least be compatible, or tolerated, by the prevailing culture. But this can go much further. For example, if there is no competi-

tion on the international scene between various repertoires of tele-
vision films, then two or three industries, located in two or three
countries, can gradually make their models, their images of the
world, internationally accepted. These models may be crucial fac-
tors for the organization of life of the group(s) involved, because
they, whether realized as films or written texts, refer to matters of
basic human life, such as human interaction, life and death, good
and evil, love and hate.

On the level of "active repertoire," i.e., the tools available for *act-
ing* in life, the transferred repertoire may have direct consequences
for the way people begin to act in their immediate environment.
The "goods" transferred will therefore be a new set of hidden in-
structions not for how to perceive the world, but for how to act in
it.

The labor of agents as items of transferred repertoire. The concept
of "goods" (and "products") also encompasses in my view the im-
ages projected into society by the *people* engaged in the making of
repertoires, who are in the particular case of transfer *agents of
transfer*. The labor of these agents may introduce into the network
of cultural dispositions certain inclinations towards repertoires en-
gaged by them. In other words, the new repertoires are not re-
stricted in such cases to the items imported as goods -- or not nec-
essarily to them alone -- but what plays a role in the culture is the
persons, the agents themselves who are engaged in the business.
For example, people may not have read poems by poets who may
have introduced new items from an extraneous repertoire (either
via direct translation or via direct adoption), but they may "accept"
as it were those products by acknowledging the persons involved
as sources of instruction, of leadership, or admonition to certain
actions.

In the case of many makers of new repertoires, their personality,
the story diffused about them, often shadows the concrete products
they have proposed. In other words, the products, the goods, the
items of repertoire have become identified with them. For exam-
ple, states of mind and encouragement to act for "freedom", "he-
roism", "patriotism," "equality," or less stirring acts like "cleanli-
ness," "order," or "good food," are not derived from "writings," but

from what one has heard of the "writers / activists" which often falls into the category of myth.

This can be expanded a bit and generalized in some way to suggest that the making of repertoires via transfer should be evaluated not only by observing things recorded (directly or indirectly), but also by trying to understand the *volume of activity* that the transfer may have stimulated. For example, if there are many textual producers at some time, and the business of translation is a major one for them, then this preoccupation *per se* may create certain inclinations to adopt other repertoires.

This generalized principle will work on various other levels which may go from imported materials to imported skills and tasks. I am thinking of a huge variety of matters like organizing the economy, designing buildings, instructing the military, preparing food, taking a "familiar" or "reserved" tone in interaction, using a "simple" or "refined" language, using less audible or more audible voice, etc. In short, when thinking about transfer, what may eventually count for adoption or rejection is the nature and volume of activity of the agents.

To sum up, an adequate study of transfer in the context of repertoire making cannot stop at comparing transferred items with their sources, or at analyzing their nature and the processes of adaptation they enter in a target system. What need be studied is the complex network of relations between the state of the receptive system, the nature of the transference activity (e.g., whether it is if the "permanent flow" type, or the "deliberately engaged" type), and the relations between power and market, with a special attention to the activity of the makers of repertoire who are at the same time agents of transfer.

The Making of Culture

CULTURE PLANNING[1]

ABSTRACT

Throughout history, deliberate initiatives have generated change in the life course of societies. Such initiatives, called in short "culture planning," in particular when carried out on an intensive scale, have frequently been tightly connected with actions for the creation or maintenance of groups, large and small. This paper attempts to illustrate the connections between the invention, codification, and diffusion of culture repertoires and the ability of groups, societies and nations to survive.

1. Introduction

Planning a culture is an instance of deliberate creation of new options for social and individual life. The generally accepted view is that such options somehow emerge and develop through the anonymous contributions of untold masses. These contributions are normally described as "spontaneous," i.e., as products, or by-products, of the very occurrence of human interaction. Items emerging under conditions of spontaneity are believed to be random. Moreover, the way by which the items accumulate, get organized and develop into accepted repertoires is supposed to be the result of free negotiations between market forces. The complex

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[1] This is a revised version of a paper delivered at the Dartmouth Colloquium, "The Making of Culture", Dartmouth College, 22-27 July 1994, with a followup presented to the seminar "Literatura Galega: ¿Literatura Nacional o Subalterna?" Mondoñedo, Galicia, 3-5 September 1994. Most important for a further advancement of this set of questions have been several contributions subsequently made by Gideon Toury (Toury 1999, 2001, 2002), who also applied various hypotheses for the field of Translation Studies, refining some and putting other to a typically thorough scrutiny. I have benefited a lot from his discussion of culture planning in revising this text for inclusions in this *Festschrift* in his honor.

mechanism through which, out of the free negotiation between these forces, certain groups adopt or reject specific repertoires is the chief question on the agenda of all the human and social sciences.

However, this view needs several modifications; not by eliminating the ideas of spontaneity and market negotiations, but by recognizing that these very negotiations may unavoidably lead to acts of planning. This happens because negotiations inherently result in selection – choosing between alternatives. Thus, once any body, either an individual or a group, in whatever capacity, starts to act for the promotion of certain elements and for the suppression of other elements, "spontaneity" and "deliberate acts" are no longer unrelated types of activities. Any deliberate intervention to establish priorities in an extant set of possibilities (often discussed out-of-context as "codification," "standardization," or "legislation") must therefore be recognized as a basic instance of "planning." If, in addition to acting in favor of priorities, a given individual or a group not only supports but is actively engaged in devising new options, then planning is unmistakably at work.

Why certain individuals or groups become engaged in culture planning, what they expect to achieve by it, and what practices they use, are among the questions I intend to deal with in the following.

2. Planning is a regular cultural procedure.

If "planning" is conceived of as deliberate intervention in an extant or a crystallizing repertoire, then this brings us to my *first hypothesis*, namely that culture planning is a regular activity in the history of collective entities.

From the very dawn of history, a major preoccupation of groups and individuals in the context of social organization has been the introduction of order into what may have emerged as a disorderly set of options. That is, they have been engaged in continuously transforming non-structured *inventories* into structured *repertoires*. By the very act of such a structuration, new relations were established for extant categories. Through combination, analogy, and contrast, new components were introduced as well. Clearly, how-

ever, any such acts could not just stop at the level of introducing some order or priorities into an extant, ready-made set, modifying it through whatever sorts of manipulation.

Culture planning definitely was at work, to judge by the evidence, in the very first organized human group that documented itself, that is the old Sumerian civilization in Mesopotamia. In this and subsequent phases of known human history, i.e. Akkad, Egypt, Babylonia, and Assyria, the Hittite Empire, and various other politically organized entities in the Fertile Crescent (such as Mari, Ebla, or Yamhad), planning was kept in the hands of those few who held physical control of the groups in whom they attempted to inculcate organized culture.

The conspicuous interest in culture planning expressed by rulers of those entities is clear evidence of their awareness of the insufficiency of sheer physical force for successful domination. The emergence of centralized religious institutions and practices (in contradistinction, perhaps, to local cults), we are told by historians, can best be explained in terms of imparting social cohesion via cognitive allegiance through persuasion. Clearly, by adhering to the same codified set of cults and beliefs (anachronistically called religions), people were told what reality was, and which options of what repertoires are available to them, or indispensable for them. Students of ancient Egypt have suggested an explanation for the enigmatic preoccupation with the burial monuments known as pyramids. In their view, the whole enterprise was dictated by the need to invent a common project for the population to accept a certain repertoire of social order and individual identity. Even in Assyria, whose disrepute was gained by cruelty and use of extreme force, rulers displayed remarkable interest in promoting themselves by propaganda (Tadmor 1981; 1986). Singing one's own praises

for having provided the good life to the people seems to have become a cliché used by rulers on their inscriptions all around the Fertile Crescent (Azitawadda of Karatepe and Kilamuwa of Sam'ál are two examples that come to mind).[2] And the early schools of Sumer, with the rich options they created in terms of writing systems and a textual canon, are the world's oldest prototype for education systems, academies, and canon-dictating institutions – all serving as the most readily available instruments for the implementation of desired or preferred repertoires.

In short, there is nothing modern in rulers taking deliberate action to create repertoires that would be accepted by at least part of the population under their domination. Nor is the recruitment to that end of people to undertake the planning.

It seems, however, that it is only in ancient Israel, and later in ancient Greece, that we first witness attempts carried out not by power-holders but by self-nominated persons removed from the circles of power to take upon themselves the task of offering alternative repertoires, or parts of such repertoires, and to publicly work for their acceptance, often in opposition to power. I am referring to the prophets in Israel who, defying both political and cultural rulers (the latter generally personified by the clergy), often by risking their own necks (the most famous case being that of Jeremiah),

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[2] Azitawadda (8-9th century BC) boasts repeatedly in the inscription found at Karatepe (Cilicia, Anatolia) that in his time, "all over the Adana valley from sunrise to sunset [...] there was plenty of food and good life and long life and enjoyment to all the Danaeans and the whole Adana Valley" (Tur-Sinai 1954: 70). Kilamuwa of Sam'al (south-central Turkey, 12th century B.C.) boasts that "[...] to some people I have been a father, and to others a mother, and to others a brother. People who have not seen the face of a sheep I have made owners of a cattle, people who have not seen the face of a bull I have made owners of a herd [...]", and so on (Donner & Röllig 1971, No. 24). For both texts, and various other of the same vein, see also Green 2003. (All translations are mine.)

struggled for repertoire replacements. The same holds true of the Greek philosophers and other *literati*. Both groups can be seen not as agents hired to render services to demanding rulers but as arc-haic types of intellectuals. The absence of evidence about such in-dividuals or groups in the other ancient societies (though glimpses of possible cognates do emerge, such as the case of Imhotep in 2630-2611 BC) does not necessarily prove that they did not exist, only that the evidence was not preserved, which by itself is not an insignificant piece of information about the relevant society.[3]

Since the beginnings of the Modern Age, towards the end of the 18th century, rulers and other power-holders have been more and more inclined (although not necessarily willingly) to resort to cul-ture planning, making growing use of the repertoires provided, di-rectly or indirectly, by culture producers. Culture planning has def-initely accumulated vigor, intensity and momentum, having be-come a major factor in the shaping, reshaping, and maintaining of large entities.

3. The implementation of planning provides socio-cultural co-hesion.

The implementation of planning provides cohesion to either a fac-tual or a potential entity. This is achieved by creating a spirit of allegiance among those who adhere to the repertoire thus intro-duced.

By "socio-cultural cohesion" I mean a state where a widespread sense of solidarity, or togetherness, exists among a group of people, which consequently does not require conduct enforced by power. I think the key concept for such cohesion is the mental dis-position that propels people to act in many ways that otherwise

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[3] See "Intellectuals in Antiquity" below.

would have been contrary to their "natural inclinations" and vital interests. Going to war prepared to be killed would be the ultimate case, amply repeated throughout human history. To create shared readiness on a fair number of issues is something that, although vital for any society, cannot be taken for granted. For example, no government can take for granted that people will obey "laws," whether written or not, unless people are successfully persuaded to do so. Obedience achieved by force or intimidation, applied by the military or the police, can be effective for a certain span of time. However, sooner or later such obedience will collapse, partly because few societies can afford to keep a large enough corps of law-enforcement agents.

Classical sociological thinking has recognized the powerful role of what they called "persuasion" for the "successful control" of a dominated population. As most succinctly put by Bartoli, these mechanisms consist

di persuasione alla conformità e di interiorizzazione di modelli culturali che la classe o i gruppi al potere ritengono necessari per i mantenimento dell'equilibrio del sistema sociale e che, in particolare nelle società fortemente stratificate, determinati altri gruppi o classi sociali pongono al centro di una strategia di organizzazione del consenso attorno ai propri obiettivi e attorno alle proprie definizioni della realtà. (Bartoli 1981: 4)[4]

It is not easy to assess the level of cohesion in any society. However, it seems worthwhile to develop some clear categories for such assessments. These categories make it clear what we may mean by

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[4] "Of persuasion to conformity and of internalization of the cultural models (patterns) that the dominating classes or groups deem necessary for maintaining the equilibrium of the social system and which, especially in highly stratified societies, certain other groups or social classes put in the center of a strategy of organizing the consensus about the appropriate objectives and the appropriate definitions of reality."

a "high level" – which in its turn can be re-translated to "success" from the point of view of planning – or a "low level," which in its turn can be re-translated to "failure." When, for example, territories are subjected to the domination of external powers, and the local population sticks to the repertoire with which it had crystallized as an entity, we may speak of a high level of cohesion. One could think of such cases as the Jews in Roman Palestine, the Polish under the domination of Germany, Russia, and Austria, or the Icelanders under the domination of Denmark. On the other hand, we have evidence of low levels of cohesion in the seemingly rapid collapse and disappearance of the Assyrians as both a distinct organized entity and a group of identifiable individuals. This is an especially striking example because of Assyria's notorious *esprit de corps*, imparted by brutality and terror.

4. Cohesion is a necessary condition for the creation or survival of large entities.
Socio-cultural cohesion may become a necessary condition for creating a new entity, and/or for the survival of an existing entity.

The large entities discussed here are social units such as "community," "tribe," "clan," "people." or "nation;" they are not "natural" objects. They are formed by the acts of individuals, or small groups of people, who take initiatives and are successful in mobilizing the resources needed for the task. The most vital element among those resources is a cultural repertoire that makes it possible for the endeavoring group to provide justification, contents and *raison-d'être* to the separate and distinct existence of the entity.

Various methods can be observed for the creation of large entities, especially those known as "nations," where we witness a search for a repertoire suitable to support the existence of the entity and secure its perpetuation. The most conspicuous seem to be the following:

(1) A group takes control of some territory by force and dominates its inhabitants. If the enterprise is to hold, there is a chance that the members of the controlling group will eventually realize that for the maintenance and survival of the entity, they had better do something to achieve cohesion. Many cases in history where a

relative minority invades or otherwise takes control over a majority territory would provide good examples: the Franks in Gaul, the Swedes in Kievan Rus, the Swabs and Visigoths in the Iberian Peninsula, or the Ostrogoths in Italy.

(2) A group of individuals organize themselves and become engaged in a power struggle to rid themselves of control they wish to reject. Once they succeed, they may find themselves at sea vis-à-vis the entity they created which, now that the struggle is over, may disintegrate for lack of cohesion. This may have been the case of Holland after the so-called rebellion against Spanish rule. According to Schama,

The most extraordinary invention of a country that was to become famous for its ingenuity was its own culture. From ingredients drawn from earlier incarnations, the Dutch created a fresh identity. Its manufacture was in response to what would otherwise have been an unbearably negative legitimation: rebellion against royal authority. Unlike the Venetians, whose historical mythology supplied a pedigree of immemorial antiquity and continuity, the Dutch had committed themselves irrevocably to a "cut" with their actual past, and were now obliged to reinvent it so as to close the wound and make the body politic whole once again. On a more pragmatic level, it was imperative that popular allegiance be mobilized exclusively in favor of the new Fatherland. What was required of a northern Netherlandish culture, then, was that it associate all those living within the frontiers of the new Republic with a fresh common destiny, that it stigmatize the recent past as alien and unclean and rebaptize the future as patriotic and pristine. (Schama 1987: 67)

And further:

Dutch patriotism was not the cause, but the consequence, of the revolt against Spain. Irrespective of its invention after the fact, however, it rapidly became a powerful focus of allegiance to people who considered themselves fighting for heart and home. No matter that heart and home more obviously meant Leiden and Haarlem than some new abstraction of a union, the concept of a new patria undoubtedly gave comfort and hope to citizens who might otherwise have felt themselves desperately isolated as well as physically beleaguered. It is not surprising, then, to find that it was in the period of the great sieges of the 1570s that the first signs of national identity became visible on coins and medals. (Schama 1987: 69)

(3) An individual or a group engage in devising a repertoire to justify the establishment of an entity over a certain territory that does not necessarily overlap with their home territory. This is often

connected with the successful so-called unification of different territories. The same method, however, can work in the opposite way, i.e. it can make it possible for a certain territory to secede fully or partly from a larger entity (Hechter 1992).

Conspicuous examples for the first type ("unification") may be the cases of both Germany and Italy, two states founded around almost the same time (1860-1870). In both cases, the work of planners preceded the actual political course. In Germany, as pointed out by an accidental observer, "Bismark hätte die politische Einheit nie schaffen können, wenn nicht vorher von unsern Klassikern die geistige Einheit begründet worden wäre" (Goldstein 1912: 20).[5] In Italy, if there had not been such a repertoire the tiny and in many minds ridiculous kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia could not have succeeded in unifying the whole of the Italian peninsula including Sicily.

Examples of the second type (secession) are all cases of states and provinces created by separating from a larger state, such as Czechoslovakia after World War I, or Slovakia in 1993, or any of the "autonomous communities" of Spain, most conspicuously Catalonia and Galicia.

(4) A group that cannot survive, either culturally or physically, as an entity in one territory (where they may be a persecuted or an underprivileged minority) emigrates to some other territory and there puts to use the repertoire they could not implement in their home country. This could apply to the emigration of the Nordic groups who founded Iceland in the 9th century, or the English Pu-

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[5] "Bismarck would have never been able to create the political unity, had our Classical writers not founded prior to it the spiritual unity."

ritans' emigration to New England, or the emigration of Jews to Palestine towards the end of the 19th century.[6]

In all of the varieties of the emergence and crystallization of entities, it thus becomes apparent, whatever the pace, that the maintenance of an entity over time is certainly a primary concern for those who are interested in its existence. The larger the entity, the greater the difficulty in maintaining it without some consent of its members. (For more about consent see Dodd 1986, esp. p. 2.)

The more consent is achieved through cohesion, the more this interest will become a concern of larger numbers of individuals. If not achieved, or not even attempted, it will naturally remain an interest of the very privileged few, who may be the only ones drawing benefits from the existence of the entity. This may nevertheless endanger the survival of the entity in the long run and put in peril the vested interests of the privileged group itself.

By *collapse* I do not necessarily mean the physical disappearance of a collective of individuals, although such an event may also follow violent shifts in power. The examples of such events are too numerous and too obvious to quote. Rather, what I mean is the termination, whether permanent of temporary, of the separately identifiable entity qua entity. This involves the adoption by the relevant individuals of a different repertoire, which they can no longer use to identify themselves as "distinct" from all the others.[7]

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[6] About culture planning in British-ruled Palestine see "The Emergence of a Native Hebrew Culture in Palestine", below..

[7] Quite recently, Jared Diamond (Diamond 2005) dedicated a whole book to cases of collapse.

5. Planning needs a power base.
What thus matters for planning are its prospects of being success-fully implemented. Accordingly, planners must have the power, get the power, or obtain the endorsement of those who possess power.

The purpose of this hypothesis, trivial and self-evident as it may seem, is to draw attention to the fact, often neglected in both the humanities and the social sciences, that to be engaged with reper-toire production *per se* is only a necessary condition for a desired planning to be implemented.

Power can be achieved on various levels, and is by no means a simple notion in relation to culture producers. Often the engage-ment of intellectuals with repertoire production seems to be noth-ing else than sheer sport. With the emergence of self-nominated producers, i.e. those whose services are not engaged by power-holders, the products they deliver may not reach more than a li-mited circle. People who produce texts in a language that is not acceptable to the dominating groups, or who invent or re-invent the language involved, or become engaged in long and infinite discus-sions about the desired nature of the entity about which they may be dreaming, or about the nature of the members who will be born in that entity, or the kind of lifestyle which will replace the current one, and so on – may all look pitiable and pathetic to their contem-poraries, who may regard what they do as wasting life on futile endeavors. However, once the product gets somehow to market, a larger circle may be created to eventually become the power base needed for action that will introduce the desired shifts. The situa-tion then may change dramatically, transforming the erstwhile helpless culture producers into powerful agents.

A planning activity that may develop into a full-scale endeavor for repertoire replacement can start with seemingly harmless products. Indeed, many new entities can trace their roots to such products, be they epics allegedly written down from the mouths of villagers in the primordial forests of Karelia (I am thinking of course of the Finnish *Kalevala*) or lyrics written in a no longer prestigious lan-guage by a fragile woman living in half-seclusion in Santiago de Compostela (I am referring of course to Rosalía de Castro). The

epic in Finland, like the lyrics of Rosalía, became cornerstones for new repertoires that impart a different sort of cohesion. In Spanish Galicia, the small circle including Rosalía and especially her husband Manuel Martínez Murguía organized the innocent *Xogos florais* (a poetry competition; literally: Floral Games), the first of which was held in La Coruña in 1861. This created the public channel for the new options to be offered to the potential market.[8] In Italy before unification, Verdi's operas must have served a similar role, with libretti censored when their text seemed too dangerous to the contemporary rulers. Incidentally, Verdi's very name has become politically subversive as it was punningly interpreted as an acronym for the phrase "Viva Emmanuele re di Italia" (Long live Emmanuel, King of Italy).

The *xogos florais*, and a variety of associations and societies bearing such harmless names as "Language Brotherhoods" (*Irmandades da fala* in Galicia) or "Literary Societies" (the Icelandic Hið íslenska bókmenntafélag in Copenhagen), are often the primary, or even crude, instruments for creating power bases for the implementation of culture planning. Although they may eventually develop into full-scale political bodies such as parties and mass organizations, I cannot think of any case where their endeavors have made real progress until coupled with either actual or potential holders of power. Culture planning could have been carried out for who knows how long by the Italian culture entrepreneurs without reaching their goal, which was to create a new Italy and new Italians – not only politically disengaged from the Austrians and the Spaniards, but also positively following a new set of directives for

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[8] For the sake of precision, however, it should be noted that the *Xogos florais* of Galicia followed the Catalan *Jocs Florals* of 1859, which in their turn followed the tradition of the *Jeux floraux* of Occitania (Languedoc, Provence), which have never led to any success faintly similar to those of Catalonia and Galicia. The *Jocs florals* of Barcelona are still held as an annual poetry festival.

life. It was the coupling of their aspirations with the political ambitions of the prime minister of Piedmont, Count Cavour, that made it all possible, almost suddenly. Hopeless ideas, like the revival of the Italian literary language, could at last start with the establishment of the Italian state. Similarly, more than a hundred years of the lingering venture to create a unique Galician entity did not bring about the same result as did some seven or ten years of local government. Although belatedly, that government did "discover," as it were, that it could successfully make use of the rich repertoire already created, most particularly the rejuvenated Galician language and its by-products, to provide optimal justification for the political identity of Galicia, needed to secure the continuation of its autonomy.

6. Effective planning may become an interest of an entity.
Numerous studies show that power-holders and planners may both acquire, through successful implementation, the domination, or control, of a given entity. To return to Bartoli's formulation, which I find representative of the socio-historical tradition, such domination is the ultimate goal and purpose of the enterprise of culture planning from the point of view of power-holders. Obviously, the latter wish to reinforce their positions by making an accommodating repertoire acceptable to larger sections of the population, while culture producers may turn into power-holders through the acceptance of their products, or obtain the support of those already in power. In any of the possible consequences of a successful implementation of planning, both may profit.

This type of analysis makes perfect sense for quite a few cases: at least one can hardly find a trace of other conspicuous interests in those cases. For an agglomerate of individuals inhabiting some territory, the benefits of establishing an organization that is larger than their own immediate environment are not at all self-evident. On the contrary, such an organization may even constitute a threat to their liberties and force upon them unwelcome burdens.

It is only when there is awareness that there may be profits from the founding of a large organization, or when there is awareness that losses will be incurred without it, that people may display passive or active consent. This does not mean that in practice every-

one then gives a hand to those who take it upon themselves to carry the load of the enterprise, but it definitely allows the latter to carry on with fewer impediments.

No wonder, therefore, that in suggesting an alternative repertoire the propagators often refer to matters such as discrimination or humiliation which, it is then claimed, can be cured only if a current repertoire is overthrown. For example, if those who dominate us mock us and discriminate against us because we have not mastered the language they master best, then an alternative can be found, that is, to use "our own language" instead. This "own language" is often presented as a natural resource, equally and painlessly accessible to members of the addressed group. In fact, this is hardly ever the case, since more often than not the language must be rehashed from some non-standardized state, thus losing its immediacy for the targeted speakers. In many other cases (for instance, Italian), the language is not anyone's actual language at all. The same holds for any other possible items of a repertoire such as daily customs, dress and food, interaction routines, and so on. However, in all cases, whether painlessly accessible or acquired by learning, what counts is not the real state of the alternative repertoire as "native" or "indigenous," but its ability to function as dissimilar to the current options. If a different repertoire can provide the options otherwise barred, then persuasion is undoubtedly looming.

The same factors certainly apply to the much more clearly institutionalized state where an entity is already well-established. In such cases we can expect some higher degree of socio-cultural cohesion, which makes the members of the entity prone to resist undesired repertoires whose imposition upon them is attempted. In such cases it makes perfect sense to argue that resistance to an alien repertoire, or an interest in promoting home repertoires, should become a common sentiment, if not well-spread awareness, among the members of the entity. It is indeed their only way to survive as an entity, a status through which their privileges are guaranteed.

Naturally, there is a lot of room here to discuss to what extent this awareness is a consequence of actual privileges enjoyed by people, or of manipulatively successful inculcation, i.e. an effective persuasion carried out by agents of the power-holders. I would like to

contend that this is a matter of interpretation for each particular case. I would hasten to reject any one-sided or biased analysis: (a) the one that may fall into a romanticizing trap, describing such involvements as supported by all members of the community who, devoted to the cause, as it were, are said to have realized how much their deepest "values" are at stake, and (b) the one that analyses the enterprise as a basically cynical machination whose only goal is to bring profits to the exploiters of common credulity.

7. Market factors do not easily accommodate themselves to new repertoires.

Since, by definition, the implementation of culture planning entails the introduction of change into a current state of affairs, the prospects of success also depend on an effective utilization of market conditions. The chance for the planning to be frustrated may therefore be constantly expected. In addition, where resisting forces are strong, failure – either partial or complete – may ensue.

The "market" is the aggregate of factors involved in the selling and buying of products and with the promotion of types of consumption. This includes all factors participating in the semiotic ("symbolic") exchange involving such transactions, and with other linked activities (Bourdieu 1971). While it is the aggregate of the culture "institution" that may try to direct and dictate the types of consumption, and establish the values of the various items of production, what really determines its success or failure is the kind of interaction that it is able to establish with the free market. In the socio-cultural reality, factors of the cultural institution and those of the market may naturally intersect in the same space: for instance, literary "salons" are both institutions and markets. Yet the specific agents playing the role of either an institution or a market, i.e. either marketers or marketees, may not overlap at all. A regular school, for instance, is a branch of "the institution" in view of its ability to sell the type of properties that the dominating establishment (i.e. the central part of the cultural institution) wishes to sell to students. Teachers actually function as marketing agents. The marketees, who willy-nilly become some sort of consumers, are the students. The facilities, including the built-in interaction patterns, which are made available by the school, actually constitute

the market *strictu sensu*. However, all of these factors together may, for the sake of a closer analysis, be viewed as the "market."

The implementation of culture planning is therefore obviously a matter of successful marketing carried out among other means by propaganda and advertising. It can be argued that this might be a simplification, since one's willingness to buy a certain merchandise does not necessarily organize one's life in the sense that a culture repertoire does; that is, products do not dictate one's view of reality and, hence, all behavioral components derivable from it. I do not support this argument, because there seems to be considerable agreement regarding the role of modern consumption in the view of reality held by the members of the so-called consumer society. The distinguishing line between various modes of inculcation lies elsewhere, namely, not in the profundity and weight, as it were, of the products that are promoted, but in their degree of internalization.

As we know, the inculcation of a repertoire can only *appear to be* successful. People accept it either because there is no alternative, that is, if it is imposed, or because the surrounding milieu requires it, or because this was the only option they were raised with. Public adherence to such a repertoire renders obvious profits, such as becoming a member of the Communist Party in the U.S.S.R, or one exonerated from being deported to gulags. If this entails negation of divinity, any overt practices of religion may be wiped out from the life of people. However, on the morrow of the collapse of the old U.S.S.R, young people in post-communist Russia who may have had no apparent previous access to religious cults eagerly embraced the Orthodox religion, an alternative cultural repertoire completely contrary to their whole way of upbringing.

Let me reiterate that for a repertoire to be wiped out and replaced by another there need not be a repertoire shift within the same societal group. If a position shift occurs within society, whereby the group adhering to one repertoire is pushed towards the periphery of the overall structure of society, the repertoire may lose its primary position. Such processes are prevalent in any society, a hypothesis that reminds us to admit that if we accept the market hypothesis, then any established products are always at risk of overthrow by

contenders. In culture, such contenders may be those who were defeated in some previous round. If we accept the polysystem idea (Even-Zohar 1979, 1990), then any time we allow ourselves to observe some "new phase" in a system, what we are actually observing – as was long ago clearly hypothesized by Tynjanov (1929) – is the success of some new repertoire in pushing its way to the center. This success does not necessarily obliterate the older repertoire: it may only dethrone it. The defeated may at that moment be too weak to frustrate successful implementation of the new repertoire, but they may grow strong enough in time to have such an attempt.

I would therefore like to stress that we are too often tempted, for the sake of elegance of description, to accept neatly finalized states. In matters of culture planning, as with all matters of culture analysis, neat states are only temporary, and even then visible at only some sector of the overall network of relations we call "society" or "culture." Accordingly, at the very moment when a given enterprise, the implementation of a certain repertoire fought for by dedicated individuals, has reached its peak, it may already be on its way towards disintegration and irrelevance for the emerging new circumstances, those which would call for another, different repertoire.

8. The consequences of failure of culture planning are not the entity's collapse, but a creation of energy.
When partial or complete failure ensues, planning and the activities it engenders do not necessarily create negative consequences for the welfare of the entity involved, although it may of course be detrimental for the particular persons involved with the planning.

I contend that where a planning activity has taken place, regardless of the consequences, the relevant entity – or the agglomerate of people – may have achieved improvement of life, although not necessarily according to the planners' design or in terms of satisfying the goals and ambitions of their partners in power. Moreover, I am more and more convinced that for the maintenance of any such socio-cultural human entity, the planning activity *per se* eventually creates motion of some scale, an enhancement of vitality which makes it possible for the entity involved to access options from

which it may have been previously barred. I suggest the term "energy" to cover this bundle of events, at least until a better term is found.

It can, of course, be argued that the engagement with planning is a result of energy rather than the other way around. Where there is social action, people also write texts and develop ideas, and engage very energetically in creating and implementing new repertoires. However, in all of the cases that served as input for my culture planning hypotheses, the engagement with planning began at a very low state in the welfare of the population. This does not mean that they all were equally humiliated or terribly underprivileged, but that they all had less access to resources than did others, or at least so it seemed from their own point of view. For example, in comparison with France and England, the 18th and 19th-century German provinces had inferior possibilities. Similarly, provinces such as 19th-century Galicia had not become out-of-the-way localities because of their geographical position on the Iberian Peninsula. On the contrary, Galicia was the first developed Roman province on the peninsula, and it kept its primary position almost until the political unity of Castile and Aragon in the second half of the 15th century. Its decline was a consequence of a deliberate policy of ostracism by the central government. The slow and non-coordinated steps towards a reinvention of Galicia, carried out throughout the 19th century, became the only chance for the province to establish itself as an entity with a proper culture that would allow it not to be confined only to options that are available and permissible in the center. After all, this is a nutshell a definition of the relations between "periphery" and "center": a periphery is allowed only to follow what is already available in the center, while the center is free to offer new options daily. What I have come to label "energy" allows a certain agglomerate of people, or an entity already established to some extent, to take on the privileges of a center. By doing so, local welfare increases remarkably. In contrast, if nothing is done, the place is often doomed to a peripheral state.

It is not always a simple question to determine when the results of some enterprise of planning are to be considered a success or a failure. One of the reasons for this is that for the planners and en-

trepreneurs, the content of a repertoire may eventually become more important than the purpose of that repertoire as described by its propagators. For example, if reintroducing the Galician or the Italian language became a *sine qua non* for the respective so-called "Revival Movements," then the potential failure of Galician at a time when the ultimate goals of the Galician entity may have reached their peak, might be disappointing for those who had attached their worldview and self-identity to the language, although what the language was meant to serve was to improve, not worsen, as might have been the results, the chances of people to better their access to social, political and economic resources.

The reason for such – perhaps sad – occurrences lies in the very nature of the planning enterprise. Once planners and power-holders begin to collaborate, it may take only a short time for the enterprise to advance quickly. However, if planners must create a power base and toil for the creation of a repertoire that will appear attractive enough to entice power-holders, then the span of time between planning and its outcomes may be long, sometimes over a century, as the Galician case is. In such cases, the alternative planned repertoire, designed under the initial conditions and thus fitted with solutions relevant to those conditions, may already be cruelly dated by the time of implementation. For example, if it still seemed possible, three decades ago, to pull the Galician population from its misery by legitimizing what one called "its own language," it has since dawned upon many modern Galicians that if they confine themselves to this, the now fully legitimized official Galician language, they are more likely to make losses than gains. The results are that while you see the language on all the public signs on roads and buildings, and on all bureaucratic forms, schoolchildren and their Galician-speaking parents are more and more inclined to prefer Castilian, a language described in the Galician patrimony as the

source of all evil.[9] Without the language as a central ingredient in the new Galician repertoire, one undoubtedly could not have achieved the current socio-political success of Galicia. However, with the language as a major vehicle of socio-cultural interaction, Galicia may be doomed to backwardness. In spite of all that, without the conflicts about this and other components of repertoire, Galicia would have definitely created no energy. This conflict of interests is in itself a generator of energy, as painful as it may be for the individuals involved.[10]

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[9] For data and analysis see Fernández Rodríguez & Rodríguez Neira1994, 1995, 1996. The current situation is described and analyzed by Beswick 2002 and O'Rourke 2003.

[10] See "Dated solutions" below.

CULTURE PLANNING AND CULTURAL RE-SISTANCE IN THE MAKING AND MAINTAIN-ING OF ENTITIES[1]

ABSTRACT

This paper suggests investigating the prospects of culture planning – that is, its chances for failure or success – as constrained by both collective and individual possibilities of accessing resources and exercising mobility which it offers to the targeted group. The paper maintains that resistance to culture planning may grow when the targeted, or affected, populations cannot increase their socio-cultural wealth in adopting the proposed new repertoire of options. In such situations, a whole range of alternative repertoires may be propagated in replacement. This does not necessarily mean that culture planning has been a failure, if sufficient energy is produced to create more options for access to resources.

1. Purpose

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the relations between socio-cultural planning endeavors and the ensuing processes of acceptance and resistance, otherwise called "market conditions."

2. Hypothesis

I suggest that the vector of culture planning initiatives can better be followed and explained when analyzed in its relations to access-to-resources and mobility.

3. Culture planning

Culture planning is conceived of as a deliberate act of intervention, either by power holders or by "free agents," into an extant or a crystallizing repertoire. Hence, it entails the introduction of change into a

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current state of affairs. Its prospective success depends on an effective undertaking.

3.1. Culture planning and the making of entities. Since antiquity, but definitely with augmented vigor since the 18th Century, culture planning has become a major factor in the making, re-making, and maintaining of collective entities. In this process, the role of "free agents," mostly people without direct access to power, has become more and more decisive.

The entities referred to here, i.e., such social units as "people," or "nation," are – we all seem to agree – not "natural" objects. They are formed by the acts of individuals, or small groups of people, who take initiative and are successful in mobilizing the resources needed for the task. The most vital element among those resources is a cultural repertoire that makes it possible for the endeavoring group to provide not only effective models, but also justification to the (separate and distinct) existence of the entity.

3.1.1. Making. The "making" of units is manifest on the socio-political level in a variety of ways, and on various levels.

(1) New Units are created where they did not exist as such before. Examples: Germany (by unification of various other units, 1870) Italy (same, 1860), Norway (by secession, 1905), Yugoslavia (same, 1918), Israel (by partition, 1948), Spanish Galicia and Catalonia (by autonomization).

Each of these cases has had a different history, but what they all share in common is the more or less intensive cultural planning work that not only preceded and accompanied their making, but also partly – if not primarily – made it possible in the first place.

(2) Extant units gained more cohesion. Example: France, Sweden (throughout the 19th and 20th Centuries).

While the most conspicuous cases are those of nations and states, there is no reason to restrict this concept to them alone. Rather, making may refer to any initiatives taken in order to create a social formation on whatever scale. Such processes are universal, but at some periods thus may be more vigorous on the larger scale than in other pe-

riods. For example, during the 19th and the 20th centuries, the option for making large entities has been more forceful than for several centuries before.

3.1.2. Re-making and maintaining. By "re-making" I refer to all of those cases where political, social, and cultural entities have been transformed in some way and eventually are re-made, or re-constructed, via deliberate endeavors. Cases that belong here may include entities that had lost their separate ("independent") existence (such as Poland before 1914), or have adapted themselves to an exogenous repertoire thus altering their erstwhile culture (such as Finland until the late 19th Century). In all of these cases, for re-making the entity, efforts were invested in making, or re-making, the necessary repertoire for augmenting the level of belonging and affinity of the population to the made entity.

Among the indispensable ingredients of any made repertoire there is normally an established subset with the help of which the group's distinct entity is demarcated. This marked subset is perceived as creating a collective as well as individual identity. For both made, re-made, and maintained entities, this subset becomes a major vehicle for the making and preservation of the entity.

4. Cultural labor as a source of energy. I contend that where a planning activity takes place, regardless of the consequences, the relevant entity – or the agglomerate of people who form it – may have achieved better access to resources, which means an improvement of their standard of life.

Moreover, from the point of view of the maintenance of any collective human entity, the labor involved with the making of repertoires is in itself an advantage because it eventually creates motion of some scale, i.e., a socio-cultural energy. This alone increases the chance that members of this entity may attain access to options from which they have been previously deprived or barred.

It can, of course, be argued that the engagement with cultural labor is a result of energy rather than the other way around. Wherever there is social action, people react to and reflect on it. They may also write texts and develop ideas, and thereby contribute very lively to creating new repertoires.

However, in all of the cases which served as input for my work on culture planning, one could clearly observe that preoccupation with planning began at a very low state in the welfare of a population. This does not mean that they all were equally humiliated or underprivileged, but that they all had less access to resources than what were their expectations.

4.1. Energy and wealth. I would like to propose the use of the term "wealth" for the relation between socio-cultural energy and the accessibility of resources, first and foremost on the level of the collective, but in a more detailed analysis also on the level of individuals. As a rule, wealth in economic theories must eventually be manifest in such parameters as GNP. While this parameter is not irrelevant to the concept of wealth suggested here, the decisive concept in my approach is the access to resources on a more encompassing level. I am thinking of Bourdieu's notion of cultural capital which may be enlarged to apply to entities as wholes, in addition to its validity for the life of individuals. That such capitals may eventually surface in terms of GNP, as well as in material wealth of individuals and defined groups, goes without saying. The point is here, however, to get relatively liberated from this restrictive view in order to allow for other, less technical parameters of wealth, such as the positions that can be acquired, mutual aid between members of the collective, the scope of allowed activities, the sense of self-confidence, access to enterprising options, and more.

5. Success and failure of initiated repertoires

Planned repertoires may succeed, wholly or partly. It is not a simple task to determine when the results of repertoire making are to be considered a success or a failure. Often, what seems to be a failure in the eyes of the people involved with the enterprise appears to be a success in terms of its effectiveness in the long run. One of the reasons for this discrepancy is that for the entrepreneurs, the content of a repertoire may have become – throughout the years dedicated to its making and distribution – more important than the function of that repertoire for what was described as its ultimate goal.

5.1. For example, if re-introducing a language is considered a sine qua non for the making, or re-making, of an entity, then in a case where this language does not prevail in the successfully made entity, this

will be considered a disappointment for those who attached their worldview and self-identity to the language. The fact that their initiatives may have created real energy will then be no consolation at all.

5.2. The reason for such – perhaps pathetic – occurrences lies in the very nature of the cultural enterprise. Success of a cultural enterprise may be achieved in a short time once culture entrepreneurs and holders of power begin to collaborate. However, if repertoire makers must create a power base and persevere for making their labor attractive enough to entice power holders, then the span of time between labor and its outcomes may be long, sometimes over a century. In such cases, the advocated alternative repertoire, designed under the initial conditions and thus fitted with solutions relevant to those conditions, by the time of implementation may already be cruelly dated.

6. Resistance to planned repertoire
A partial success, or failure, means that some – or even major – bulks of the made repertoire(s) fail to be accepted and implemented by the targeted group. Among the crucial factors that determine the rate of success in the targeted group I would like to point out cultural resistance, both passive and active.

Any kind of resistance is a form of unwillingness towards the advocated, or inculcated, repertoire. I am not referring here to what Pujol (1979: 35) calls "[la] non-participation ouvrière aux institutions socio-culturelles," where "institutions" denote organized activities in the restricted sense only, e.g., "the arts." I am referring to a much wider repertoire, covering the wide range of organizing tools from daily habits to the image-of-the-self.

6.1. With a passive resistance, people do not engage themselves with working covertly against the new options. They simply ignore them. If they cannot avoid the options proposed for – or already current in – the public domain, they at least can avoid those meant for the homes.

For example, people may learn to speak a language in public, but do not necessarily make it their home vernacular. (In Italy, for example, it has taken almost over a century for Italian to become a domestic language. [De Mauro 1984: xvii]).

6.2. With an active resistance, people do more than avoidance. They may engage themselves in a more or less overt and straightforward struggle against the planned repertoire. This may take place at any stage of the active endeavors to implement the planned repertoire, i.e., while implemented, or when implementation seems to have been fully done.

7. The problem of resistance
Resistance seems to need no explanation when repertoire is imposed by force, as means of political action, against the explicit culture of the targeted population. Throughout history, people resisted conversion, reforms pertaining to beliefs and time-honored habits. Under totalitarian regimes, people often kept their culture concealed from the public eye, but returned to practicing it the moment it became feasible. In all these cases, cultural resistance may be only a form of an overt political resistance.

However, what may be puzzling in understanding cultural resistance are all of those cases where a seemingly common cause has been served by culture planning, or at least where culture planning appears as coinciding with the interests of the targeted group.

In such cases, the self-image of the concerned entity, and the ensuing official history written by the advocators of endeavor, do not recognize any such prospective unwillingness. The parameters of such cultural resistance may not be complicated or enigmatic at all, but to the best of my knowledge, they have not been sufficiently discussed, certainly not in the framework of culture planning.

7.1. Resistance and access to resources. I would like to contend, fully aware of the crudeness of this hypothesis, that it would be necessary for all of these cases of cultural resistance to understand the conditions and terms of access to resources prevailing in the relevant society.

For example, the working class in France refuse to participate not only in the "socio-cultural institutions" of the dominant bourgeoisie, like the theater and literature. They also refuse to eat, talk, drink, marry, walk and wash like them, as so amply demonstrated by a host of researchers (most conspicuously, of course, by Bourdieu (Distinction, 1984 [originally 1979]). This seems to take place partly because, as

suggested by Pujol (1979) and Swidler (1986), acquiring a different repertoire is painful and risky. That is, it is not an easy learning, especially when one is from the outset unequal to others, who may already be more familiar with the new repertoire. But this also makes it clear that people know that even if they try to learn the alternate repertoire, they will not be able to master it with the same ease as others, and hence would have little to gain by it.

7.2. Cases of culture planning coupled with unestablished entities seem to be different. In these cases, such as Italy, Germany, Galicia, Norway, or Israel (to name just a few), the very rationale for making new repertoires, as propagated by their advocators, was to achieve improvement of life for the targeted collective. Theoretically, none of the people in the targeted group had any advantageous position vis-à-vis the new repertoire, and hence its acquisition was to be open to everybody on equal terms. The skepticism and sense of discrimination usually involved with the adoption of a repertoire of a dominant group (as is the case of the French working class) are not present, as it were, in these cases.

In view of the current situation in most of the cases mentioned above, this assumption seems to be a fallacy. It is true that for a short span of time, everybody can adhere to the new repertoire and gain better position and access to better life if the new entity succeeds in getting established and maintained. However, the distribution of the triumphant repertoire has not, and cannot, be even among the population. If, as a result of the triumph of the repertoire, the endeavors towards its continued implementation decrease (because it may be believed that it has been fully accepted), all those members of the entity who never really adhered to the enterprise, or begin to feel unable to learn the new repertoire, or begin to identify the repertoire with discrimination, may develop ever growing resistance. The situation that emerges can be summarized to be one where either for lack of learning or competing ability, the planned, new repertoire does not lead to a successful access to resources.

7.3. *Resistance in Spanish Galicia*. In the Galician case, the adoption of the refurbished Galician language by the masses in contemporary autonomous Galicia seems to be perceived as disadvantageous. Today, it seems that only those members of the entity who have acquired satisfactory proficiency in Castilian are prone to adopt and advocate

the new Galician. As matters stand now, it seems that the majority of the Galicians who are in the process of urbanization do not encourage their children to use the new Galician. Rather, it is with mastering Castilian that access to resources appears to be more promising even in the framework of the by now separate Galician entity. If this observation is correct (it still needs to be supported by more research), then what has been a most crucial item in the new Galician repertoire, one which has been a flag for the Galician enterprise, may disappear in the course of a few decades to be fully replaced by a language which up to a certain point was identified with all evils.

7.4. Resistance in Israel. In Israel, a quite radically invented repertoire managed to establish itself by 1948. The masses of ensuing immigrants, however, needed some forty years to bring their resistance to this repertoire to a level of overt cultural struggle, involved with political repercussion of quite a large scale.

In this case, the Hebrew language, an essential part of the new repertoire, which was beginning to become a living vernacular towards the end of the 19th Century in Ottoman Palestine, has been a tremendous success. In contradistinction to the Galician case, there has been no other language capable of replacing it. However, many other ingredients of the new repertoire are now becoming more and more questionable. Be the level one chooses to discuss "high" (such as "identity" and "self-image"), or "low" (such as food, drink, and mobility habits), there will be one segment defending one repertoire, and another defending a different repertoire, with little ability to compromise. Again, if this observation is correct, then either a state of multiculturalism is eventually accepted, or a bitter *Kulturkampf* will endanger the whole entity.

8. Summing up

It is definitely not my contention that the questions of access to resources and mobility are the magic clue to understanding cultural resistance and, on a more general level, the chances of any particular culture planning to succeed. But it seems that the analysis of resistance in the context of culture planning and the making of entities provides better explanations of the function of this cultural procedure than the discussion of the ideas involved with the propagation of repertoire, the nature of the ingredients involved, or the abstract pros-

pects of models of collective figurations, such as small communities or nations.

THE ROLE OF LITERATURE IN THE MAKING OF THE NATIONS OF EUROPE[1]

[...] in the spring of 1971 the two first and most celebrated manuscripts arrived [from Denmark to Iceland]. These were the Book of Flatey and the Codex Regius of the Eddic poems, and they came to Reykjavik in a Danish warship accompanied by a delegation of Danish ministers and members of parliament. On the morning of the 21st April the ship drew in to the quay in Reykjavik [...] Thousands of people had gathered to the quayside, and along the roads by which the visitors were to drive through the town children stood with Danish and Icelandic flags [...]

This is how Jónas Kristjánsson (1980: 89-90), the one-time director of the Arnamagnean Institute in Reykjavik, describes the triumph of the Icelanders in the manuscript war with Denmark; he would later observe (1982: 25) that since then, "more manuscripts have been steadily arriving, and now some 900 have come home, together with numerous other documents." This manuscript dispute between Iceland and Denmark was preceded by similar wars between Denmark and Sweden some 300 years before. In the seventeenth century, however, unscrupulous competition on the matter of acquiring these manuscripts was not unheard of, and even such belligerent acts as sinking a ship loaded with manuscripts sometimes occurred. In Iceland itself, however, people did not care much for such cultural items at this time: As Kristjánsson (1982: 24) notes, the pages were "cut out of the vellums and used for various purposes," and were even used to deco-

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rate clothing. It is certainly clear that neither the seventeenth- nor the twentieth-century manuscript quarrels had much to do with the vellums as artifacts. It was not the physical objects as such that were really sought. In the seventeenth century, it was generally their textual content which was so uniquely desirable; for in them each of the Scandinavian kingdoms expected to find precious historical information that could reinforce its claim to greatness and power. Similarly, in our century, reclaiming the manuscripts meant, for the Icelanders, the ultimate stage in legitimizing and confirming their national independence. It seems evident that in both periods, the heated quarrels touched deep feelings of self-identity, or more precisely, of "collective identity."

This story, although singular in its details, is not unique as a manifestation of socio-semiotic structures. On the contrary, it is a magnificent illustration, as this paper attempts to show, of the function of literature in the making of many nations, and other culturally-organized groups, in Europe. In this sense it may, however, be a phenomenon that is peculiar to European history.

Is "literature" in this sense in fact unique to Europe? This is not an easy question. There are perhaps no known organized societies which do not have some sort of "literature," or in other words, an activity during which texts are recited or read, to or by their members, either publicly or privately. It is true, however, that certain societies have had a reputation which would seem to make them more qualified than others to create and transmit such texts. For instance, in the Medieval Middle East, Arabs were considered to be "gifted" in respect to this occupation, as it were "by birth," while in Northern Europe, it was the Icelanders who were taken to be "born" writers and story-tellers.

Caliphs and Kings, Emperors and Czars, as well as "simple people," were all known to attend performances of verse and prose literature in numerous times and places. Moreover, in such states as China, writing poetry according to accepted models was a mandatory qualification required for an administrative position.

Yet none of these examples amounts to the creation of "literature" in the sense of our study. For they do not contribute to making literary activities function in the way they eventually did in European history. So while activities of a literary nature as such are not unique to Eu-

rope, it is our argument that the roles played by such activities in organizing European life may indeed be unique. Wherever they are observed in non-European countries during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they are not so much a continuation of the previous literary activities of those countries as a new activity borrowed through contact with European nations.

It would be appropriate to clarify here what "Europe" refers to in this study, in particular what its spatial and temporal borders are taken to mean. It would be tempting to confine this discussion to the eighteenth and later centuries, as this chapter in European history seems to be conspicuously clearer with regard to our subject. Nevertheless this easier path will not be taken, and although I will examine that period in some detail, this discussion will begin with the birth of Western civilization. It is my belief that we are discussing here a very salient feature of World history, and this history could in fact have taken a completely different route than its actual outcome.

It would serve no purpose to attempt to suggest a definitive answer to the question regarding whether or not textual activities are universal in the sense that they would have emerged under any circumstances, or whether they are the consequence of some accidental development which took place in the making of the World's first civilizations. In modern socio-semiotic theory, including the economic and historical fields, one is inclined nowadays to eschew deterministic generalizations. However, once a feature can be detected, analyzing it from the first link in a long chain of events is now accepted practice. Along these lines, whether the emergence of "literature" was inevitable, or occurred by chance at the dawn of civilization, is a question that may be impossible to resolve. What can be observed, however, is what has happened since it emerged. Thanks to developments in historical and archaeological research, we can now reconstruct at least some of the major links in Western literary history.

The first literate and literary civilization we know of is the Sumerian aggregate of city states in Mesopotamia. Features invented in, or introduced by, Sumerian civilization can be detected for millennia in cultures which gradually, in what seems to be a chainlike process, seem to have "inherited" them. The preoccupation with texts, both written and recited, figured prominently in Sumerian culture. While elite groups had the exclusive privilege of accessing these texts direct-

ly as both new producers (writers) or perpetuators (performers), at least some segments of the masses were exposed to these texts on various festive occasions. While even the rise of multiple stelae (with Hammurabi's Code of Law, and the detailed self-laudatory descriptions of achievements recorded by almost all rulers) cannot serve as evidence to accessibility and operationality of texts, it can at least bear witness to the intention of these rulers to perpetuate and to propagate texts about themselves.

Most importantly, by establishing and consolidating schools (*é-dubba*) as an institution of power, Sumerian culture also introduced the socio-semiotic institution of the canon. Both school and canon served to organize social life basically by creating a repertoire of semiotic models through which "the World" was explained by way of a cluster of narratives, *inter alia*, which were naturally tailored to the liking of the ruling groups. These narratives turned out to be very powerful in imparting feelings of solidarity, belonging and ultimately submission to law and decrees which consequently did not need to be enforced by physical means alone. Thus, Sumerian culture was the first society to introduce both textual activities as an indispensable institution, and the utilization of this institution for creating socio-cultural cohesion.

Lest the term "socio-cultural cohesion" seem vague or empty, let me explain here that it refers to a state in which a widely-spread sense of solidarity, or togetherness, exists among a group of people, which consequently allows a non-physical means of imparting behavioral norms. It seems that the basic key concept to such socio-cultural cohesion is readiness, or proneness. This phenomenon is a mental disposition which propels people to act in many ways that otherwise might be contrary to their "natural inclinations." For example, going to war, being prone to die in combat, would be the ultimate case, and is amply repeated throughout human history. To create a large network of readiness (or proneness) on a significant number of issues is something that, although vital for any society, cannot be taken for granted. For example, no government can take for granted that people will obey "laws," whether written or not, unless they are successfully persuaded to do so. Achieving obedience by physical force, such as military and police efforts, can be effective in the short run, but sooner or later such measures will become ineffective, partly because few socie-

ties can afford to keep a large enough body of law enforcement individuals.

It is thus my contention that it was "literature" which served as an ever-present factor of socio-cultural cohesion in our society. This does not mean that it always was the major or sole factor, but perhaps it was the most durable one, and probably one which was most often combined with others (for instance, accompanying certain rituals or other physical performances, like constructing edifices or performing dance and music). Its ubiquity and longevity may be attributed to its institutionalization and conspicuousness, since we find it over and over again in those cultures which gradually superseded Sumer, namely the Akkadian and the Hittite, as well as in Egyptian society, which certainly developed somewhat separately. The term "Akkadian" is here a general term for many different societies where variants of the Akkadian language and "literature" were used, obviously including early Akkadian society as well as the Babylonian and Assyrian states, but also the cultures of a large variety of organized states between the Euphrates and the Mediterranean, such as Ebla and Mari, Yamhad, Ugarit and Canaan. None of these, with the exception of Canaan or Phoenician culture, abandoned the Sumerian-Akkadian system of writing, although it was gradually, and in various degrees, simplified by all of them.

The hidden link between all these societies and "Europe," which has been covert for many centuries, is becoming more and more evident with our improving knowledge of these cultures. The Phoenician origin of the Greek alphabet, also reported by the Greeks, is not contested. Even the very name Europe, which, according to Greek mythology has to do with the city of Tyre, may have derived from the Phoenician-Hebrew word `ereb', meaning both "evening" and "west." In the context of the institution of "literature," however, with all of its components, this link cannot be presented as indisputable. Nevertheless, it can be claimed today, with all due reservations, that it seems more plausible than not, in view of the evidence gathered by the deciphered documents of these cultures, that "literature" found its way from Mesopotamian through Hittite (and perhaps Luvian) intermediators to Greek culture, whence it spread, in a chainlike process, from one European society to another through the ages.

This hypothesis will not be examined in detail here; nor shall we attempt to ponder literature in the court of such rulers as Ashurbanipal, with his library of 25,000 clay tablets. Suffice it to iterate that textual activities, the totality of which I call "literature" for the sake of convenience, persist throughout the history of all of the above-mentioned cultures. A few words of reservation are however required here. Despite the compelling power of the Sumerian-Akkadian model, evidenced by the obvious success of a repetitive repertoire of beliefs and customs, we must not fall into the trap of anachronism. It is not easy to assess the level of socio-cultural cohesion in these societies, and the contribution of textual activities to its success, in more than general terms. There is, on the other hand, evidence of more than one failure. For example, the seemingly rapid collapse of Assyrian culture may perhaps be attributed to a rather low cohesion, which in this case clearly suggests a failure of the socio-semiotic textual culture.

Nevertheless, even where its power in imparting cohesion may have been less than crucial, literature never relinquished its hold as a signifier of power and distinction, which possibly has been its primary function as an organized activity. By adhering to the habit of perpetuating textual activities, rulers propagated the idea of their superiority, distinguishing themselves from the rest of society, or from "lesser" rulers, as it were. Possessing a "literature" belonged to the indispensabilia of power. But what does "possessing a literature" mean, and what in fact are the indispensabilia of power?

This is perhaps the right moment to state explicitly that the concept of "literature" used here does not necessarily coincide with the popular notion of "a collection of accepted texts, produced by and for individuals to read," which is more or less a modern image. Here "literature" signifies a whole aggregate of activities, only part of which are "texts to be read," or "to be listened to," or even "to be understood."   In short, these activities include production and consumption, a market

and negotiational relations between norms. When a ruler maintains these activities this means that he has to spend resources on the upkeep of agents of production of both written and oral texts, often sung or recited with musical accompaniment rather than merely read aloud, as well as agents charged with accumulating and storing such products. The Assyrian emperor Ashurbanipal invested considerable resources in copying the Babylonian inventory of canonized texts.[2] Having "literati" in court (Tadmor, 1986) was, without doubt, a token of power and prosperity. It is not insignificant that such commodities should figure among the obligatory repertoire of tributes from minor to major rulers. The Assyrian king Sennacherib, for example, boasts of the reciters, both male and female, he forced Hezekiah, king of Judah, to pay him as part of a bountiful tribute. [3]

"Possessing a literature" is thus undoubtedly equivalent to "possessing riches appropriate for a powerful ruler." It is therefore an important item of what I have called "the indispensabilia of power." Semioculturally speaking, "to be" some distinct "person-in-the-culture" (Voegelin 1960), at whatever level, always involves employing and having a distinct repertoire of commodities and procedures. For example, to be "a Frenchman" is likely to entail a preference for drinking wine rather than water at mealtimes. To be a great king or emperor has similarly, since time immemorial, necessitated possessing edifices of some magnitude, with sculptures and wall-paintings or reliefs, and much more. If these commodities do not yet exist, it then follows that their creation must be undertaken. It also necessitates various other ingredients, actually too many to be described here in detail, among which engaging the services of reciters or "poets," or dancers

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2 In this process the Babylonian gods were also converted – notably in *Enuma Eliš*, The Epic of Creation – to their Assyrian counterparts, thus appropriating the texts, rendering them as it were Assyrian rather than Babylonian. (The author is grateful to Itamar Singer for this observation.)
3 For more about political ideology in Assyrian inscriptions see Tadmor 1981.

and singers, or an ensemble of performers called "a theatre," is included. The Andalusian Khalif `Abd ar-Rahman III kept ministers who also could entertain by reciting Mozarabic poetry (alternating Arabic with Romanic; Ramón Menéndez Pidal, (1926, 552) while Al-Mansur was fortunate enough to have Ibn Darraj al-Qastali compose a laudatory poem in honor of his conquest of Santiago de Compostela in 997.[4] Harald the Hard-Ruler (eleventh century) kept nearly 500 poets, some of whom accompanied him, like the Caliph's most valued poets, on many daily tasks (Turville-Petre 1968), as well as to war. In short, clearly a "checklist" of indispensabilia with more or less the same items is perpetuated throughout the history of Western civilization. "Literature" almost always figures, in one form or another, among the most prominent items of these indispensabilia.

While the ancient cultures of the Fertile Crescent and Egypt only hint as to how large a portion of the population textual activities could impart socio-cultural cohesion, it seems that for the first time in World history we witness some clear evidence of such a function in Greece. We may, naturally with due caution, perhaps call it a shift, or perhaps even "the Greek contribution," which could not have emerged, however, without the invention of the alphabet in Canaan. Without delving here into a discussion of the difference between Athenian and other Greek communities, clearly what we have at the dawn of Hellenistic times is a shift from a repertoire possessed by rulers and their entourage to one possessed by "the people," although "the people" would include only a select segment of the population at large. The textual activities now taking place outdoors are not confined to public hymns, or stelae with inaccessible inscriptions, but are more and more reaching large audiences. They even allow social criticism and a less than reverent treatment of rulers (in particular within tragedy and comedy).

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4 Ibn Darraj al-Qastali. Diwan. Mahmud Ali Maki, ed., Damascus: Al-Maktab Al-Islami 1968: 314-320.

Moreover, stories of yore, gradually forming a widely accepted canon, become basics of schooling, and self-distinction, for ever larger groups. It could even be said that for a member of the Greek community, and certainly for a member of a Hellenistic community, there is already a clear-cut cultural repertoire, intimately linked with textual activities, and internalized to such a degree that it constitutes part of the individual's self-image, and sense of identity, distinguishing him from the rest of the world, the *barbaroi*.

In addition, through these texts, the Greek *Koine* had become far more successful than any preceding language. (The Assyrian case, in comparison, was rather a failure; when the Empire collapsed, hardly anybody continued to speak Assyrian: most of the population had already gone over to speaking Aramaic). Perhaps it was in Greece that a model was established through which, in addition to imparting socio-cultural cohesion via texts, a literary language succeeded in gradually superseding local variants. Contrary to the popular image which sees a causality chain from "inborn identity" as it were to "language," and only finally to "texts" (literature), the Greek case already displays a different course, from texts to identity and language.

Another crucial "shift" ought perhaps to be attributed to Greece, namely the clear proliferation of cultural and "literary," systems. While texts in Sumer, even those recited at public occasions, were composed by members of the elite, and texts in Babylonia, Assyria, or the Hittite and Egyptian Kingdoms were composed by the literati, Greece provides us with both elite and "popular" textual cultures. It is in Greece, moreover, that we can witness the emergence of multiple channels of propagation. On the one hand, there is the written product, aimed at the few, but eventually also marketable to the many; on the other hand, the oral product, such as the Platonic dialogues, aimed at the many, but often based on products made for the few. The source of the modern notion of "literature" as something connected with written texts clearly derives from Greece. The institutionalization of the book (though "book" in Greek, byblos, derives from the name of the Phoenician city of Gebal [*Gubl]), as Gentili remarks, generating this cultural cleft. While he points out that "la scrittura fu sentita per la prima volta come vero e proprio atto letterario, letteratura *tout court*" (1984, p. 222), he also writes:

Accanto a questa cultura più propriamente letteraria ed erudita, che fiorì nell'ambito ristretto delle corti e dei cenacoli, patrimonio esclusivo di una élite di intellettuali, ebbe vita autonoma un'altra forma di cultura, che con termine moderno potremmo definire popolare o di massa, nel senso che era destinata a larghe fasce di fruitori e trasmessa oralmente in pubbliche audizioni, da parte di recitatori, cantori (rhapsoidoi, kitharoidoi, auloidoi) e attori itineranti (tragoidoi, komoidoi, ecc.), che esercitavano la loro professione ottenendo compensi ed onori e nelle feste istituite dalle diverse città del mondo ellenizzato. (1984, p. 228)

What the repercussions of such a situation could have been for deviating from accepted norms (that is, in matters of accepted themes and forms as well as accepted ideas) is a different question. Obviously, both literati and performers could hardly express dissent, or engage in forms contradicting an accepted orthodoxy. In Greece, independent literati did emerge who had the courage to speak out differently, although, as is shown by the case of Socrates, they had to pay dearly for it. No such occurrences are known to us in more ancient cultures, with the exception of the Hebrew prophets. Jeremiah, for example, was punished nearly to death by the king (Jeremiah, 38: 6-13).

Throughout world history, models created in one culture could find their way to other cultures, if there was a reason for the other culture to wish to match itself with the culture from which the model was adopted. We are given ample evidence of contacts leading to "borrowings." Any group of people who match themselves seeking to measure up to any other group may always ask themselves: "Why don't we have all of these commodities and traditions?" For example, if in some institution recognized as reputable we find that everybody is equipped with advanced computers and related accessories, we naturally would consider ourselves to be deprived of something we should possibly possess ourselves if we wish to live up to the standards of that institution. This basic pattern of the relation between "possessing" versus "not-possessing" functions on any socio-cultural level, and for any number of people. It is my strong conviction that the repertoires just discussed were not invented in each culture individually or domestically. When a new institution was "needed" in a society, the idea of having it, as well as the repertoire involved with it, usually came from an outside source.

One defined "being a king" for example, by looking at some accessible source, such as contemporary neighbors. One did the same when kingship was already established, but it then naturally had to be matched with some permanent standard. The story in Samuel I:8, about the establishment of kingship among the Israelites, is highly instructive in this context.

The elders of Israel come to the prophet Samuel and say: "[...] now make us a king to judge us like all the nations." Samuel, giving a speech in the people's Gathering, attempts in vain to deter them from such an idea, describing the undesirable behavior a king was likely to display:

And he said, This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you: He will take your sons, and appoint them for himself, for his chariots, and to be his horsemen; and some shall run before his chariots. And he will appoint him captains over thousands, and captains over fifties; and will set them to ear his ground, and to reap his harvest, and to make his instruments of war, and instruments of his chariots. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, and to be cooks, and to be bakers. And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants. And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers, and to his servants. And he will take your menservants, and your maidservants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his work. He will take the tenth of your sheep: and ye shall be his servants. And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king which ye shall have chosen you; and the LORD will not hear you in that day. (Samuel I, 8:11-18).

But the Elders are not convinced; they, too, know something about the obligations of a king: "Nay, but we will have a king over us; That we also may be like all the nations; and that our king may judge us, and go out before us, and fight our battles." (Samuel I, 8:19-20).

One could argue that the Kingdom of Judah was a small and insignificant province; therefore it always looked to measure itself up to some external standard. But comparisons of this kind readily occur between equal groups. It is even plausible that the more powerful the group, or the higher its aspirations, the more likely it is to place itself in competition with other groups which happen to possess items that are not yet available to it. The efforts invested by several Egyptian Pharaohs to obtain an adequate quantity of the precious lapis lazuli certainly are connected to the fact that the Mesopotamian kings had this stone in

abundance (see the Tell El-Amarna correspondence). Since lapis lazu-li is no longer held to be a very prestigious commodity in our modern world (though still sought in Central Asia), these efforts may seem ridiculous today. But so too may the elephant skins that a certain king of Judah (Hezekiah) is forced to send as tribute to the Assyrian Empe-ror according to the Annals of Sennacherib I mentioned above, or an-ything that seems to lack concrete value. Along the same lines, even the xenophobic Egyptians could not afford to be unaware of the cul-ture of Mesopotamia. They thus taught the Akkadian language and a formal canon of Akkadian texts in their elite schools.

There are numerous channels by which knowledge about the indis-pensabilia of another culture is acquired. They unfortunately lie beyond the scope of this study. This knowledge, however, may often be quite intimate, and therefore not of a second-hand nature. In such cases, it may play a decisive role in the making of a culture, i.e. of the indispensabilia through which it works and can be acquired and inter-nalized.

While the respective roles of Mesopotamian, Phoenician, and Egyp-tian cultures in the making of the Greek, if any, are often the subject of heated debates, no one contests the role of Greek for either Etrus-can or Roman, and subsequently for all European cultures, both East-ern and Western. It seems that the kind of relationship we could ob-serve between Sumerian and Akkadian has been repeated in the rela-tionship between Greek, or rather Hellenistic, and Roman cultures.

While Hellenistic culture was appropriated as part of dominant Ro-man culture, it produced a domestic Roman repertoire – both com-modities and patterns of behavior. Thus, although Greek texts were adopted, domestic works were produced along the same lines. It is evident that it might never have occurred to Virgil to produce his Aeneid had the Homeric text not been established as a distinctive fea-ture of "a great society."

The compelling presence of both Greek and Roman models goes on to have a decisive impact on the acts of organizers of society through-out the Middle Ages and the Modern Age. Although the ethnic variety of Europe was almost as large during the Middle Ages as it is nowa-days, the inheritance of the Roman Empire, and the unificatory inter-ests of both rulers and the Church, did not encourage the emergence

of local entities. As Várvaro so succinctly puts it, referring to the fifteenth century, "[...] *non può certo parlarsi di una precisa diffusa coscienza di distinte identità nazionali*" (Várvaro 1985: 10). In what would eventually become Germany and the Scandinavian countries, with the conspicuous exception of isolated territories like Iceland (and to some degree Norway), the acceptance of Christianity delayed the development of local separate cultural entities for centuries. When the success of a local insurrection could not be secured, however, without attracting the consenting spirit of larger segments of the population, Europe begins to create its new nations. And to do that, old sets-of-operations are utilized with skill, as if they had been acquired through formal schooling.

There is no need to expand here on the reasons why Alfonso X "the Wise" should have decided to impose Castilian by decree (although he himself preferred using Galician (or Galego-Portuguese) for his own poetical writings). This was immediately linked with the making of indispensable texts, such as a translation of the Scriptures (which had been carried out before, by Jews, but without any major implications for the larger community), and others. Without Castilian, the socio-cultural cohesion imparted through texts which carried beliefs to be shared by all, a unified Spanish nation would not have emerged. This is, of course, not a clear-cut case, since the rulers of Spain, in order to accelerate this process of cohesion, expelled all those segments of the population which could not be assimilated into the new national identity.

Spain is among the first cases of success in imparting socio-cultural cohesion to a large population which had long been divided. This success is fully evidenced through the ventures of the Spaniards in the New World. The relative unity of Spanish in Latin America is a testimony to this. Other cases have not been so successful: When emigration takes place from France to the New World, a unified French culture is not really successfully implemented. Although they kept their separate ethnicity after the British occupation, the Quebec inhabitants of French origin were "brought back," as it were, to become part of the new French nation only through the endeavors of French missions in the nineteenth century. Even today, this acculturation enterprise has not integrated the French Quebec people with continental France. In the Italian case, emigration to the Americas, even during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, turns out to have

taken place before socio-cultural cohesion was successfully imparted to the population of the Italian peninsula. Most so-called "Italians" did not yet consider themselves as "Italians," and more often than not had no access to the newly invented identity of the national "Italian," which was expressed in attempts to speak a "dead" Italian language (De Mauro, 1984).

In short, French, German and Italian identities, or "nations," from the point of view of socio-cultural cohesion, are late inventions. In making them, the time-honored set-of-operations was mobilized and utilized, naturally augmented and adapted to local circumstances. Texts, produced together with a new or a re-standardized language, functioned in all of these cases as a major vehicle of unification for people who would not necessarily consider themselves as "belonging to" a certain entity.

In the French case, the turning point was the French Revolution. Everything that had previously belonged to the court and the aristocracy was now appropriated by the bourgeoisie. The "common people" had to wait quite a long time before they enjoyed full access to the commodities and socio-cultural items of the defunct aristocracy, except during the several chaotic years of revolution, when attempts were made to draw this segment, too, into sharing the general identity. However, the bourgeoisie, who nevertheless constituted a relatively large percentage of the population, especially since it merged with the old aristocracy (Mayer, 1983) by perpetuating and expanding the repertoire of its predecessors, and by enlarging the school system, giving literature, both as an institution and a major generator of socio-cultural cohesion, its prominent position in the French socio-cultural organization. Let us remember that, just as in pre-*reconquista* Spain, the large majority of the people living within the confines of France did not even speak "French" until around the end of the eighteenth century. They had to be persuaded gradually to acquire this knowledge, which could not have become possible without the many texts that have been instrumental in this enterprise, and in which many of the ideas necessary for persuading people were explicitly introduced. This process of integration went on throughout the nineteenth century, and was set in motion each time a new piece of territory was gained by France. It was even implemented in the distant colonies in Africa, where children in school read about "*nos ancêtres les gaulois*," like their continental French counterparts.

One can easily claim that under different circumstances, such a region as Savoy, annexed by France only towards the end of the nineteenth century, could have become Italian. On the other hand, Northern Italy could have become French, had there been no *Risorgimento* in Italy.

In the German, Italian, Bulgarian, Serbo-Croatian, Czech and perhaps even the Modern Greek cases, "literature" has been even more indispensable for the creation of the "nations" under these names. In each of these cases, a small group of people, whom I would like to call "socio-semiotic entrepreneurs," popularly known under various titles, such as "writers," "poets," "thinkers," "critics," "philosophers" and the like, produced an enormous body of texts in order to justify, sanction, and substantiate the existence, or the desirability and pertinence of such entities – the German, Bulgarian, Italian and other nations. At the same time, they also had to bring some order into the collection of texts and names which in principle could be rendered instrumental in justifying what their cause.

In order to understand just how literary German identity is, we need only reflect on such a case as the Duchy of Luxembourg. Such duchies existed all over the current German territory; and their inhabitants each spoke their own local language. There was nothing "natural" in their consent to be united with Prussia in order to create the German union, nor was there anything "natural" in their acceptance of the language called "High German" (*Hochdeutsch*), unilaterally standardized, with a dose of fabrication, by Gottsched and his followers (see Blackall 1978; Guxman 1977). But it was the reputation of the texts produced in this language by the generation of Goethe, Schiller and others which eventually created the new German nation. The idea of the nation, aspiring at integrating the inhabitants of a certain politically fragmented territory, struck roots with great success.

It is by now widely accepted that there would have been no German nation without the German literature, which could not, in its turn, have become unified without a well-defined and standardized language. This package deal, consisting of a nation, a language, and a literature, was not, strictly speaking, new. As Goldstein (1912: 20) states, "Bismark hätte die politische Einheit nie schaffen können, wenn nicht vorher von unsern Klassikern die geistige Einheit begrändet worden wäre" [Bismarck would never have been able to

create the political unity, had our Classical writers not founded prior to it a spiritual unity]. However, in the German case, it had to be deliberately planned and implemented, rather than achieved through unguided development. This implicated, as in the French precedent, ignoring and even banning anything that did not conform with the unified institutions. Thus, all linguistic alternatives which did not conform to the new standard were reduced to the dubious status of "dialects" (in Germany), or "patois" (in France, where a "patois" is not even considered to stem from the "authentic" French language).

For the new socio-cultural cohesion aspired at by the entrepreneurs of such an undertaking, the act of establishing a national language, and a national literature, is equivalent to the act of acquiring self-identifying, and self-edifying commodities, typical in other periods of ruling groups only. The sentiment of the ruler had now moved, or perhaps more accurately, had been moved, from the individual ruler, or aristocrat, to the whole anonymous body called "the nation." Each member of this body, by virtue of participation in "the nation," had now earned the right to claim a share in the acquired goods. Thus, demonstrating the suitability of the German language for any spiritual and intellectual task clearly meant, from the point of view of the Germans, "we no longer need to feel inferior to the French, or any other nation" (Blackall, 1978). To have a literature capable of competing with other literatures, because it has acquired such admirable exponents of the stature of Goethe and Schiller, is clearly with "a great nation." The stature of such figures as Goethe is a complex outcome of the combination of his activities as an *intellocrat*, to borrow Hamon's & Rotman's (1981) term, and the effect of his writings.

For any individual in a community, the greatness of the nation is also capable of conferring individual greatness: "I am great, because I belong to a nation which has generated Goethe." This is not at all different from the kind of sentiments involved in any competition: "I am great because I belong to a nation whose basketball team has won the European championship." It simply "pays" to be member of such a nation, and this bonus becomes a very powerful factor in strengthening and nourishing the sentiment of "belonging."

The Italian enterprise, although it culminated at almost the same time as the unification of Germany (1870-71) with the creation of the Italian state (1861-1870), already had both the French and the German

precedents as possible semio-cultural models. Indeed, there was noth-
ing inherent that would have convinced the population of Italy to be-
come "Italians," members of a nation called "Italian," had there not
been entrepreneurs, who like their German counterparts, used the rep-
utation of texts written in a language hardly anybody actually spoke,
to popularize the same kind of package deal which had crystallized in
Germany, i.e. the packaging of a language with a "nation," whose ex-
istence was substantiated, justified, motivated, and defended by
coupling the wealth of narratives about its alleged common "past,"
generally a somewhat distant one, with the glory of the linguistic tool
developed at some time by some of its members.

The language we now call "Italian" was perhaps in even a poorer state
than French or German from the point of view of its actual distribu-
tion. It was *una lingua morta*, as Tullio de Mauro (1984) states in his
classic *Storia linguistica dell'Italia unita*. Out of the approximately 22
million inhabitants of the peninsula, about 600 000 persons could un-
derstand Italian. Even the major writers in this language, like Manzo-
ni, used French more fluently at the time the Italian state was
founded. However, it was due to the literary and intellectual efforts
made by Manzoni and a group of intellectuals, gradually supported
and mobilized by the clever prime minister of Piedmont-Sardinia, Ca-
vour, that the idea of an Italian "nation," based on the language used
by the great founders of its literary tradition, Dante, Bocaccio and Pe-
trarca, successfully gained ground among ever-growing parts of the
population. However, the unification of Italy was only the first step
towards the creation of the nation. Not only were there discussions
about which inhabitants would join the new nation, but it indeed took
many years, until the 1980s, or more than a hundred years after the
political unification, that Italian actually became the spoken language
of the majority of Italians. As De Mauro states in the Introduction to
the second edition of his book, (1984: xvii): "L'italiano era ancora
vent'anni fa la lingua abituale d'una minoranza. Oggi è la lingua
abituale della maggioranza degli italiani, anche tra le mure
domestiche, dove più hanno resistito i dialetti.*"* There were of course
those who were not happy with the inclusion of all inhabitants of Italy
into the new nation. Some would have preferred to have it based, for
example, only on the middle classes. Others, like Cavour himself,
were not at all happy with the exploits of Garibaldi, who brought the
South and Sicily on a golden plate to the monarch. Cavour would
have preferred a state without the South, but could not reject what

popular ideology, devised by "literature," already presented as a national cause.

As was the case in Germany, no actual vernacular could be made into the common tongue. Italian, although historically based on the Florentine language as tamed and standardized by Dante and followers, was no longer identical with the kind of language actually spoken in Toscana, and more specifically Florence, at the time of the unification. Manzoni, whose official task was to make recommendations about the language to be adopted by the state, while briefly entertaining the idea of adopting the contemporary Florentine variant as a basis for the modern tongue, withdrew from this idea, to support a hybrid fabrication, based on selecting and combining several local norms.

In both Germany and Italy, both prior to the political unification and after it had been achieved, thousands of agents had to be recruited to popularize the texts of the few initiators, and to spread the language they used in these texts. The main burden fell on school teachers, and the Italian intellectuals produced texts to provide these teachers with the entire necessary arsenal for their task. Texts prepared for children, like D'amici's *The Heart (Il Cuore)*, or Collodi's Pinocchio, were deliberately tailored for, and served as perfect imparters of, socio-cultural cohesion. Clearly, Italy simply did not exist as a coherent entity without its new language and re-established literature. No wonder that doubts and discontent with this entity, especially after the strong policy of the fascist government against the dialects, have led to various symbolic upheavals against the unified language, which, in the eyes of dissidents, has led to the destruction of local cultures. Literature in the vernacular was created as an act of protest, as is evidenced in the case of Pasolini, who accuses the official Italy of having committed cultural genocide. On the 8th of October 1975, a short time before he was murdered, he published a piercing article in *Corriere della sera*,

where, about the presentation of his film Accatone on television, he
says:

Tra il 1961 e il 1975 qualcosa di essenziale ha cambiato: si ha avuto un
genocidio. Si ha distrutta culturalmente una popolazione. E si tratta
precisamente di uno di quei genocidi culturali che avevano preceduto i
genocidi fisici [...]" (Reprinted in *Lettere Luterane*, Torino 1976: 154).[5]

It will be necessary to omit detailed consideration of the other cases
specified above, such as the Czech and Bulgarian ones, although each
of these cases brings more nuances to our understanding of the func-
tion of literature in creating the nations of Europe. This would require
a much longer presentation than can be offered here. Instead, to con-
clude this somewhat serpentine excursion, I would like briefly to dis-
cuss the function of "the European model" for non-European cultures,
and what seems to be its conspicuous absence in some cultures.

The highly-established nature of the "European model" is evidenced
by its repeated and successful use in one culture after another in Eu-
rope itself. But it is also corroborated by cultures which did not estab-
lish themselves on European soil.

The first such example is the case of the Hebrew nation, now estab-
lished in the State of Israel. The creation of this modern nation, which
began to plant itself in Palestine towards the end of the 1800s, was
initiated in Germany around the beginning of that century, almost at
the same time as the German nation. Throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury, in a laborious process, the new identity, which also generated a
new socio-cultural and ultimately political entity, was generated
through a newly developed literature and a reorganized language –
Hebrew adapted to new objectives.[6]

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[5] I am grateful to Alon Altaras for this quotation.

[6] For the Hebrew case see Shavit (1987), Even-Zohar (1990).

The second example is the making of the modern Arab nations. This case also displays many of the ingredients recognizable from the European model. The so-called "revival" of Arabic language and literature, first in Egypt and Lebanon during the nineteenth century, although it clearly made use of materials available of old, was a different entity. The nature of the new literature, the position held by its agents, its impact on the acts of the people, first the intelligentsia, and later gradually among larger groups, is of European origin. It is of course not a simple case of export, as it were, but it certainly is an adaptation of the European, primarily French, model to local conditions. It also combines a whole set of operations carried out deliberately by both rulers and intellectuals to attain the status of "a modern state." These are not disparate ideas about this or that literary genre, but rather touch on the very structure of the activity of texts. Needless to say, this also entailed the gradual adaptation of the old literary language to the new objectives. Although it has never become a uniformly spoken language like German and Italian, Arabic has liberated itself from ossified traditions to become a flexible tool in the implementation of the intellectual project of forming the modern Egyptian and other Arab nations.[7]

The third and final example of export of the European model may seem out of order, but I believe that it is a rather perfect demonstration of the established nature of the model. When Lazaro Ludoviko Zamenhof created the Esperanto language in 1887, among his first and major concerns was to set up literary activities. Literature has become a major preoccupation for this international community, which rapidly produced translations of the masterpieces of Western literature and original works. Zamenhof, whose acts as a creator of literature were mocked by the competitors, i.e. movements for the promotion of other international languages, seems to have fully internalized the Eu-

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[7] For more details about the making of modern Egyptian nationhood see Gershoni 1986, Mitchel (1989).

ropean model for the creation of nations in order to create an international community united through a similar, if not identical, sentiment of cultural cohesion. Words used in Esperanto like "esperantistaro" for "the community of Esperanto speakers," "Esperantujo" for "the home of the speakers of Esperanto" are perfect equivalents to names of a nation and a country in the "national" languages. Nothing like this was initiated by other synthetic international languages. Perhaps this might be a partial explanation for the relative success of Esperanto and the failure of all the others.[8]

Finally, it is likely useful to note that this model of the making of nations was not utilized in the United States of America. This North American nation was born out of rebellion against Great Britain, but it did not attempt to detach itself from the English literary or linguistic traditions. It is true that textual activities, mostly of popular and less institutionalized nature, have been instrumental in distributing stories, myths and images that made "the American spirit," creating a growing sentiment of distinction. However, this did not affect elite literary production which sought to be accepted in the British center almost as far as the beginning of the twentieth century. And although it had to distinguish itself from its motherland and previous oppressor, this new society had no trouble using the same literary language. Change on the linguistic level did not occur as it did in Norway, where a Norwegian language basically identical with the Danish was distinguished from the Danish through a series of planned reforms. Americans, though they developed their own styles and preferences, never really attempted any heavy reforms, nor have they ever sought to replace English by some other language. Change occurred in the American variant of the English language as the realities of language use in the United States gradually found their way into stylized literary language, through a lengthy negotiation between norms and tastes. The

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[8] See also Lieberman 1979.

American nation is thus not a creation of or through its literature, nor of or through its language, but was rather unaffected by them. The "European model" is thus not universal, but I hope to have demonstrated that the image of literature in contemporary Europe is based on longstanding and concrete realities.

LANGUAGE CONFLICT AND NATIONAL IDENTITY[1]

Language is not only a vehicle of interaction and intercommunication, not only a practical tool for state administration in modern or in ancient times. It is also a vehicle of symbolic value. By adopting a certain language, a certain population or a certain group in society declares what identity it wants to show to itself as well as to the rest of the world.

There is, of course, a considerable difference between the first and the second case; a language that exists as a vehicle of communication is a language used bona fide, as it were, by various groups, individuals, and peoples on a large variety of territories. But the language that becomes a vehicle of semiotic ideology has, more often than not throughout history, actually constructed additional cultural matter. Thus the standard language is not identical to the spoken language anywhere on earth. Most people, even those who do speak a standard under certain circumstances – as is the case with France, England, to a certain degree the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Scandinavian countries – do not do so normally in daily life. In this context the question that interests a semiotician of culture is: What is the hierarchy of factors operating in culture, and how can the relationships among social, economic, and political mechanisms be related to other semiotic mechanisms? In plainer words, what interests a semiotician of culture is the interaction between the material and semiotic processes in culture.

I would like to relate to a rather large number of language cases, in order to illustrate some broad generalizations. These include Hindi versus Urdu, Hebrew versus Yiddish, Norwegian Riksmål versus Landsmål, Serbian versus Croatian, French versus Occitan, High German versus Low German, French and Russian orthography after the French and Russian revolutions, Spanish and Guaraní, Danish and Jutlandic, and so on.

Most cases of language conflict display broad similarities. To begin with, they are all disagreements among groups within one nation or one state about what languages should be obligatory to that nation or that state. As a result, a certain language, or a certain variety of it, is supported by some and rejected by others.

The state of language diversity prevailing in most societies makes it possible for different linguistic options to be available in the first place. Yet it is not actual language diversity that generates conflict. Whether the diversity becomes activated through language conflicts or remains a peacefully accepted fact of cultural reality depends on whether higher-level semiotic organizers of culture enter into a state of conflict. Such higher-level organizers are ideologies that determine the goals of a society through its conception of itself. In modern times, at least since the eighteenth century, nationhood and national identity have become the most powerful such ideology. To be able to materialize, this ideology has made use of whatever cultural elements have been available, such as religion, food, dress, and habits.

Language, which far back in early antiquity began to be coupled with a sense of collective identity, has been mobilized as a major vehicle for a successful implementation of national identity among often rather heterogeneous sorts of populations. As long as no disagreement has arisen with regard to the propagated or imposed identity, even the most blatant linguistic diversity has never encouraged language conflicts. These geographically adjacent languages may be either contiguous, that is, of a rather close structural nature, or discontiguous, that is, remotely related if at all. It is only when there have emerged doubts and disagreements around the question of identity that language, having become the most marked carrier of that identity, has become an issue of often violent conflict. When such a situation occurs, everything linguistic becomes a burning issue for the conflicting

parties, including the most minute details of language structure that otherwise would have interested only a small group of specialists.

Spelling, pronunciation, grammatical declinations, word order, and vocabulary may all become semiotic carriers for one or another sense of identity promoted by one group and rejected by another. If no sufficient linguistic materials are immediately available as alternatives, they may be supplied from any resource, close or remote, or from a wholly or partly invented source.

Once the dissident group manages to organize its activities, language conflicts may go on as long as the ideological conflict is not solved. They may then become part of political struggle, dragging the state to interfere, and end with geographical and/or political separation between the groups. Indeed, they may not end at all.

This admittedly condensed summary of a long chain of arguments may be easier to grasp if we now try to shed some light on several major cases and aspects of the hypothesis. One of our main points is that language diversity per se does not necessarily have to lead to conflict. For example, in Paraguay there is a peacefully harmonious relationship between Guaraní, an Indian language that practically everybody speaks in everyday life, and Spanish, which is the only official language of the state and o f society. With very few exceptions, nobody has tried to standardize Guaraní and transform it into the official language of Paraguay.

Paraguayan identity is, of course, strongly felt by the population. But it is not manifested through any sort of rivalry between Spanish on the one hand and Guaraní on the other. It is the ideal situation of what Ferguson years ago, in relation to Arabic, called diglossia, that is, the perfect division of labor between different vernaculars or even different languages within the framework of the same society and on the same territory. Guaraní is the language of everyday life, of intimate interaction, while Spanish is the language of official circumstances, the written language of the state.

Of course, there is poetry in Guaraní, and there are anecdotes in Guaraní. People say that Paraguayans would not even try to tell a story, anecdote, or joke in Spanish, because Spanish is such a "highfalutin" language. But on the other hand, it would be rather strange for them

to make Guaraní the language of law and of parliament – if and when these institutions exist, of course, in the country.

Now, the Guaraní-Spanish case is held to be rather unique: their division of labor is associated with their being discontiguous languages, that is, languages that belong structurally to different groups and that are not mutually comprehensible. But there are other cases in which we do have contiguity between a certain number of varieties and the standard, while a similar division of labor is nevertheless maintained. In principle, then, we should not make any major distinction between the Italian and Paraguayan cases, or the German.

In the case of German, the so-called German dialects – and of course, the very term dialect is a matter of ideology, because otherwise any dialect could have been transformed into a language, or at least be labeled a language – are not mutually comprehensible. Even today, in the Federal Republic of Germany, not all persons can without difficulty understand the dialect of their neighbors. Of course, the language of the closer neighbor is more comprehensible than the language or the dialect of the remote neighbor. But a Bavarian would not immediately understand Plattdeutsch, let alone Silesian. When Gerhart Hauptmann in the 1880s put on the stage his famous plays in the local dialect of Silesia, people protested and required translation into High German, because the text was utterly incomprehensible to them.

If we look even at a small country like Denmark, which has two islands and one peninsula – Jutland, Fyn, and Zealand – we realize that there are three major dialects or three major languages, and they are not mutually comprehensible. People speaking Jutlandic (Jysk in Danish) do not automatically, without any preparatory education, understand Zealandic. Or people born in Stockholm (and Sweden is one of the most linguistically unified countries in the twentieth century) do not automatically understand either the dialect, or language, of the north or the dialect of the south.

Foreign students in Paris do not automatically understand Parisian, either, even though they know *français* perfectly well. Of course, from the point of view of French culture, there are no dialects. While the Germans recognize that some contiguity exists, French ideology does not allow for that contiguity, because it makes a very clear-cut distinction between *Français* on the one hand and patois on the other.

And patois is something that is utterly not French. But those born in Bordeaux do no t speak French, and they are not supposed to understand it. (Their native language is some sort of Gasconian, and they can understand Judeo-Español much better than the French of the Loire, which is the basis of literary French standard.)

If we follow the biographies of writers in the highly developed civilized countries of the Western Hemisphere, we discover that many of them never used their real mother tongue while writing their texts. To varying degrees many Swedish, Norwegian, Danish, German, Italian, French, and Spanish writers spoke a different mother tongue than the one they had to pick up at school, at a later stage, and very often they never managed to get rid of their home pronunciation, which denotes their geographic origins.

In certain countries where there exists a peaceful harmony among language varieties, having one's own pronunciation, even not speaking one's own dialect, even speaking standard, is a matter of either indifference or pride. A member of Parliament in Norway who does not speak with a dialect pronunciation is considered to be a phony of sorts. But there is no pride in having a dialect pronunciation in Britain. One is not supposed to use a Yorkshire pronunciation when speaking in Parliament, let alone Scottish, which is beyond the border of proper English. And, in Paris, one is really not supposed to use the Occitan or the Provençal southern French pronunciation.

To return to our major point, a society requires cultural organizers in order to make language into something that it is not in the first place, or that it was not meant to be. Unless this coupling between identity and language occurs, people are indifferent to the matter of language and there will be either no conflict at all, or, when clashes do take place, they will be of secondary importance; that is, our difficulties will be no more than personal or social difficulties. If we do not know the standard , or if our mother tongue does not happen to be the standard in a certain country, we are underprivileged, in the sense that our access to social opportunity does not happen to be the same as for people coming from the center of people who naturally speak the standard. Thus we have to learn that standard. But we do not found a party in order to fight against the standard, change social order, separate the state into two states, and so on – as long, of course, as we have no alternative ideology on the national level.

As soon as we do have this kind of alternative identity, this alternative ideology with regard to nationhood or nationality, then language, as well as everything else in the material repertoire of culture, can be transformed into a very powerful vehicle o f struggle.

Here we may take the case of Hindi versus Urdu. The linguistic difference between Hindi and Urdu is minute. Originally, the only major distinction was with regard to the alphabet. Before its disintegration, Yugoslavia, too, had what was presented as language, Serbo-Croatian, which was written in two alphabets: one Latin, one Cyrillic. And for at least a few decades there was at least an illusion of peaceful harmony. Thus we may infer that different alphabets per se are no reason for conflicts. But in the case of Urdu, once the ideology of a separate Muslim nation arose in northern India, Urdu became a vehicle for that ideology. And in order to make it a more convincing vehicle of struggle for national identity, for a separate national identity against the Hindi and Hindustani speakers and Hindu religionists, the Urdu people deliberately began gradually to change their language.

This is a case where the linguistic difference between the languages was minute. They were perfectly mutually comprehensible in speaking and, if you knew two alphabets, even in writing and reading. But in order to make them powerful vehicles for clashing identities, Urdu had to be changed. So the result is now that, while Hindi went on to adopt more and more elements from Sanskrit, to invent new words, and to "purify" itself from Arabic and Persian elements, Urdu has gone the opposite way: it has adopted more and more Arabic and Persian glosses and purified itself from Sanskrit as much as possible. Still, those who know Hindi and some Arabic can probably still understand Urdu without much difficulty. But Hindi has deliberately coined new words, current words, in order to distinguish itself clearly from Urdu.

This beautiful case is by no means a unique one, namely where, in the absence of linguistic diversity, one creates it: a diversity of languages is invented where one does not have it in the first place. It is therefore not because of language diversity that conflicts emerge; rather, it is because of national conflicts that diversity is created or mobilized.

Two additional cases are of particular interest, because they allow us to observe the consequences of some very slow process in history through which a certain conception, a certain ideology, somehow emerges. One can fairly clearly follow their history from the very moment they emerge. These are the Hebrew versus Yiddish case and the case of the Norwegian languages.

First, let me briefly examine the case of Yiddish versus Hebrew, or the emergence of a native Hebrew culture in Palestine after the 1880s. The following is an anecdote (no. 2636) published by Alter Druyanov in his collection of anecdotes which will illustrate the case:

Tel Aviv, Herzl Street. (It happens before World War I – I.E-Z). A group of children pour out of the Herzlia Gymnasium. Two famous Yiddishists [zealous of Yiddishist ideology], are passing by, having come to visit Palestine and the elder one says to the other: "The Zionists boast that Hebrew is becoming a natural tongue for the children of Palestine. I will now show you that they are lying. I will tweak one of the boy's ears, and I promise you that he will not cry out "Ima" [i.e., mummy in Hebrew] but "mame" in Yiddish.

So saying, he approached one of the boys and tweaked his ear. The boy turned on him and shouted: "hamor" [donkey, in Hebrew]. The Yiddishist turned to his friend and said: "I'm afraid the Zionists are right." (Druyanov 1945)

Of course, the point here is not that Hebrew had become a living language, but that the Zionists had been successful in transforming the identity, the very nature of the people. The fight between Yiddish and Hebrew was not only over language. It was over the desirable nature of the nation. The Hebraists offered a linguistic alternative that stood for all the characteristics they wanted for the future nation. This is a case where an old language was replanned, reshuffled and reshaped for new purposes, along the same lines as it Italy. More significantly, the entire character of the nation was supposed to undergo extreme changes, and did so rather successfully, at least until 1948 (see "The Emergence of Native Hebrew Culture in Palestine, 1882-1948" in this collection [=Even-Zohar 1990]). That the project was successful in implementing Hebrew and the ideology that went with it is beautifully illustrated by the anecdote. That is, a nation cannot be tweaked by the ear and cry "mother," that is, run for help to its mother. The "Jewish mother" thus had become culturally incomprehensible. Of course, this has changed a lot since 1948. We in Israel have been re-Judaicized since.

The rivalry between Hebrew and Yiddish at one point became very violent. But Yiddish and Hebrew had been living in harmony – the way Guaraní and Spanish are now living – for centuries, until World War I. Back in Eastern Europe, Yiddish and Hebrew had a very harmonious division of labor, as Arabic and Hebrew had in the Middle East, Spain and North Africa, and other languages had before – Aramaic and Hebrew, Greek and Hebrew, and so on. Living peacefully together meant that one language was used for certain purposes and the other for other purposes. Yiddish was the language of current everyday low culture, and Hebrew for high culture and official culture.

But the moment, when, in Eastern Europe, Jews wanted a different, modernized nation, Hebrew looked archaic to them. They did not accept the Hebraist ideology, let alone the Zionist one, which came a little bit later, and the struggle began.

Many believe that Yiddish lost the battle because of the Holocaust. Actually this is not true. Yiddish, as we now know, began to lose the battle much earlier due to very heavy assimilation in both Eastern Europe and the United States. But it is interesting to note that in the United States today Jewish youth now seem to study Yiddish much more than Hebrew. Certainly in U.S. universities this is so. Nor should this be surprising – Yiddish, after all, can offer U.S. Jews a different identity. They can be both Jewish and non-Hebraist or non-Israeli. They do not have to sympathize with Israel; they do not have to identify with Jewish history. Their collective memory need not go back to King David and Solomon and the Maccabeans. But it can go three generations back to the grandfather or the great-grandfather in the shtetl, and it is that that has been revived as a semiotic element. One can be Jewish through that Yiddish identity, as someone, in a folkloric scene, can be Italian in the United States through some pasta.

The other case, that of Norwegian, is detailed most interestingly in a book by Einar Haugen, *Language Conflict and Language Planning: The Case of Modern Norwegian* (Haugen 1966). The Norwegians lost their independence in the Norwegian wars in the fifteenth century and became part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Previously they had their own, highly developed language, which they had been using throughout the Middle Ages. Now, under conquest, they gradually lost their

language. Danish became the vehicle of high culture in Norway, and gradually even the spoken language of the upper classes. That is, a Norwegian used to write Danish and to pronounce it in a Norwegian way. This difference between spelling in Danish and pronouncing in Norwegian was by no means more complicated o r remote than the discrepancy between English spelling and English pronunciation. On the contrary, even with the Danish spelling the Norwegian pronunciation came much closer to the orthography than in the English or French case. (Of course, in very few languages can spelling and pronunciation match, because pronunciation does change very quickly, and spelling cannot be reformed and reshuffled every seventh year.)

By the beginning of the nineteenth century, Norwegians began again to think of themselves as a separate nation. As the century progressed, Norwegian national ideology took on such momentum that, of course, someone had to fall on the idea that a language w as needed to make this separate national identity more conspicuous and efficient. Here one might have expected to encounter the Urdu syndrome – in this case, changing the orthography of Danish as it was spoken by the Norwegians to make it the official vehicle of Norway, introducing words from the vernacular, adapting grammatical declensions to approximate the spoken language, making pronunciation more blatantly Norwegian, and so forth. Thus writers like Ibsen definitely contributed to Norwegizing their Danish, but in a very moderate way because they did not want to lose their Danish public.

A person named Ivar Aasen, however, thought that this was a rather mild way of creating a Norwegian identity. Accordingly, he made up a new language, which he called Landsmål, that is, "the language of the country." He made it up in the sense of creating a synthesis of a variety of Norwegian dialects, which he considered the relics of the old authentic Norwegian language, introducing features from mediaeval written Norwegian. He made a new language in the same way as Gottchalk, and Luther before him, made Hochdeutsch, and as Lomonosov made Russian (actually, Lomonosov just introduced more systematization into Russian). But Ivar Aasen created almost a completely new language in the sense that his new standard written language was not similar to any of the dialects on the basis of which he made hi s language.

All this could have been taken by the Norwegian elite as just a curiosity, something of no importance, some game by a philologist. There is such a case in Scotland, where a group of writers headed by the poet Hugh McDiarmid made up a synthetic Scots that never gained much acclaim or support from the population or the intelligentsia.

Ivar Aasen, however, was extremely successful in recruiting a small nucleus of the intelligentsia. Gradually his language became a social and, toward the end of the nineteenth century, a powerfully political issue in Norwegian politics. It gained even more power after 1905, when Norway separated itself almost violently from Sweden. Since then, the case of Landsmål against the older language has become not just a matter of free liberal discussion among intellectuals, philologists, professors of language, and so on, but rather a matter for political conflict. Many hundreds of hours and pages have been dedicated to the case of the rivalry between the languages. The state has created all sorts of committees to decide what kind of language should be used.

Toward the end of the 1930s, the state created a committee to make a third language, which they called Samnorsk – joint Norwegian – by taking elements from Riksmål (the old-Dano-Norwegian language), which was the language of the majority, and uniting them with elements from Landsmål, the language of Aasen. A committee of two university professors, two politicians, and one clergyman discussed what the verbs should look like, how pronunciation should be structured, which orthography should be followed by schoolchildren, and so forth. But before they even began to succeed, World War II broke out and in came the Quisling government, which was even more extreme about the affair than the former government. Since the war the debate has continued, so that to date, and since 1907, Norwegian has been reformed at least seven times with regard to spelling. No Norwegian can know today precisely what language should be used or how words should be spelled. University students have to be able to express themselves in two languages. But each of these languages, due to the proliferation of government committees, now has at least three to five varieties. That is, there is a moderate variety, a less moderate one, an extreme one, and so on, for each of the two official languages of Norway.

The Norwegian committees have even deliberately changed the names of the languages. The old Riksmål is now officially called Bokmål, that is, the language of the book. And the other one is called Nynorsk, meaning New Norwegian. If you open the conservative newspaper in Oslo, *Aftenposten*, you read one language; if you open the Social Democratic journal, *Dagbladet*, you have another language. It has become a burning political issue because, almost immediately after World War I, the new language – that is, the new "anti-Danish," anti-high-society, kind of national nature of identity – was supported by the Labor Party, which made it far more than a cultural issue.

The situation today is absolutely bewildering. Here is a nation that was to be deliberately planned, with a certain deliberately constructed identity that had to be coupled with a certain language. Since that language did not exist, they invented it. The moment they wanted to bring some peaceful harmony into that torn society, the government had no better idea than to set up a committee to make a third language, in order to give the nation a unified vehicle. But today in Norway nobody uses the "common Norwegian language," and the language conflict continues to rage with alternating intensity. Ask Norwegians how many languages they know, and they will reply, "Twelve: Swedish, Danish, and ten Norwegian."

THE EMERGENCE OF A NATIVE HEBREW CULTURE IN PALESTINE, 1882-1948[1]

During the hundred years of new Jewish settlement in Palestine, the starting point of which is conventionally assigned to 1882 (and commonly called "the First *Aliya*"),[2] a society was produced whose nature and structure proved to be highly fluid. The periodic influx of relatively large groups of immigrants continually disrupted or disturbed the apparent ad hoc stability of the community insofar as its structure, demographic consistency, and salient characteristics were concerned. Each new wave resulted in a restructuring of the whole system. It is, however, commonly accepted that around the time of the establishment of the State of Israel, in 1948, a relatively crystallized Jewish society existed in Palestine with a specific cultural character and a high level of self-awareness, as well as established social, economic, and political institutions. It differed, culturally and otherwise, from

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[1] This is a slightly revised version of "The Emergence of a Native Hebrew Culture in Palestine, 1882-1948" published in *Polysystem Studies* [=*Poetics Today* 11: 1] 1990, pp.175-191. First version appeared in Hebrew in *Cathedra*, 16 (1980), pp. 165-189, based in its turn on a paper presented at Yad Yitzhak Ben Zvi, Jerusalem, November 12, 1979. A previous draft was presented at the Tel Aviv Conference "Poetics and History of Hebrew Literature in Palestine," organized by The Porter Institute for Poetics and Semiotics, Tel Aviv University, June 27, 1978. Subsequent English versions have been published in Studies in Zionism No. 4: 167-184, in *Serta Gratulatoria in Honorem Juan Régulo Pérez*, I (Filología) (La Laguna: Universidad de La Laguna), 1985, pp. 247-261, and in *Essential Papers on Zionism*, Reinharz, Jehuda & Shapira, Anita eds. (New York & London: New York University Press), pp. 727-744.

[2] "Aliya" in Hebrew literally means "ascending." It indicated going (up on the mountain) to Jerusalem during the high holidays in Biblical times, and in later times going to (the Land of) Israel. In Modern Hebrew, it simply means immigrating to (the Land of) Israel, basically having lost its metaphorical or elevated connotations. "The First *Aliya*" is the name given to the groups of immigrants who founded the first modern colonies in the 1880s.

the old Jewish, pre-Zionist Palestinian community, and from that of Jewish communities in other countries. Moreover, this distinctiveness was one of its major goals, involving the replacement of the then-current identifications "Jew" and "Jewish" with "Hebrew."[3] But with the founding of the State of Israel and the massive immigration which followed, what appeared to have been a "final," stabilized system was again subjected to a process of restructuring. The distinction between Jewish and Hebrew cultures has become secondary and eventually obsolete. Hebrew culture in Palestine has become Israeli, and although the latter definitely springs from the previous stage, it seems very different from it. Thus, as a working hypothesis for this study, it would be convenient to accept 1948 as a more or less imprecise termination of the period which had started in 1882. An adequate description of the development subsequent to the establishment of the state will not be possible without first providing a description of the longer and more complicated period which preceded, and thus laid the foundations for what followed.

The early waves of the new Jewish immigration to Palestine, at least until the early 1930s, seem to be different from other migrations in modern times, including those of later periods. From immigration studies we know that the cultural behavior of immigrants oscillates between two poles: the preservation of their source culture and the adoption of the culture of the target country. A rather complex mechanism eventually determines, for any specific period in the history of an immigrant group, which option will prevail. The value images

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[3] Thus, during the period under consideration, "Hebrew," as both noun and adjective, had a very precise meaning within the emerging culture, a meaning which no longer carries much weight in contemporary Israel. It was used in the sense of "a Jew of the Land of Israel," that is, a non-Diaspora Jew. One spoke of the "Hebrew (not Jewish) Community [Yishuv]," of the "Hebrew workers," of the "Hebrew army," etc. In Israel's Declaration of Independence, the Arab states are urged to cooperate with the Hebrew nation, independent in its land, while the State of Israel appeals to the Jews in the Diaspora.

of the target country as compared with those of the source country can constitute an important factor in determining the direction of cultural behavior. Most migrations from England tended to preserve the source culture. European immigrants to the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, on the other hand, left their home countries with the hope of "starting a new life in the new world" – a slogan of highly suggestive potency. Its effect was to encourage the replacement of the "old" by the "new" and often engendered attitudes of contempt towards the "old." Such replacement assumes, of course, the existence of an available cultural repertoire in the target country, and when this is the case the major problem of the immigrants is how to authenticate acquired components so that they will be considered "not foreign" by members of the target community.

What actually takes place in the process of acquiring target cultural patterns cannot be discussed at length here. It would suffice to emphasize the necessity of the existence of an *alternative repertoire*, that is, an aggregate of alternatives, and it is precisely here that the case of the Jewish immigration to Palestine stands in sharp contradistinction to that of many other migrations. A decision to "abandon" the source culture, partially or completely, could not have led to the adoption of a target culture since the existing culture did not possess the status of an alternative. In order to provide an alternative repertoire to that of the source culture, in this case East European culture, it was necessary to *invent* one. Thus, the main difference between many other migration movements and that of the Jews to Palestine lies in the deliberate, conscious activity carried out by leading groups among the immigrants themselves in replacing constituents of the culture they brought with them with those of another, newly invented one.

Zionist ideology and its ramifications (or sub-ideologies) provided the major motivation for immigration to Palestine as well as the underlying principles for cultural selection, that is, the principles for the crea-

tion of an alternative culture. A schematic examination of the period in retrospect will reveal that the governing principle at work was "the creation of a new Jewish people" and "a new Jew" in "the Land of Israel,"[4] with emphasis on the concept "new." At the end of the nineteenth century, there was sharp criticism of many elements in Jewish life in Eastern Europe. Among the secular or semi-secular Jews, who were the cultural products of sixty years of the Jewish Enlightenment, the *Haskala* movement, Jewish culture was conceived to be in a state of decline, even degenerate. There was a notable tendency to dispense with many of the traditional constituents of Jewish culture. The assimilationists were prepared to give up "everything"; the Zionists, in the conceptual tradition of the *Haskala*, sought a return to the "purity" and "authenticity" of the existence of the "Hebrew nation in its land," an existence conceived according to the romantic stereotypes of contemporary (including Hebrew) literature, exalting the primordial folk nation.

It is interesting to note that both assimilationists and Zionists accepted many of the negative Jewish stereotypes, promulgated by non-Jews, and adapted them to their own purposes. Thus they accepted at face value the ideas that Jews were rootless, physically weak, deviously averse to pleasure, averse to physical labor, alienated from nature, etc., although these ideas often had little basis in fact. Among the numerous ways manifested for counterposing "new Hebrew" to "old Diaspora Jew" were the transition to physical labor (mainly agriculture or "working the land," as it was called); self-defense and the concomitant use of arms; the supplanting of the old, "contemptible" Di-

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[4] The expression "The Land of Israel" ("Ereç Yisrael" in Hebrew ["ç" is normally pronounced "ts"]) is the time-honored regular name for the territory later called "Palestina" by the Roman Emperor Hadrian (135 BC). It is not normally used in Hebrew, and although the British government of post-World War I Palestine decided to use for its Hebrew texts the spelling "Palestina" on documents, bills and coins, it nevertheless consented to often add the acronym EY in parenthesis to somewhat appease the Jewish community.

aspora language, Yiddish, with a new tongue, colloquial Hebrew (conceived of at one and the same time as being the authentic and the ancient language of the people), adopting the Sephardi rather than the Ashkenazi pronunciation;[5] discarding traditional Jewish dress and adopting other fashions (including the Bedouin-Circassian, notably among the youth of the First *Aliya* and members of *Ha-shomer*, the Watchmen's Association); dropping East European family names and assuming Hebrew names instead.

The decision to introduce Hebrew as the spoken language of the community was not accepted or agreed upon as a self-evident measure even by those most active in the creation of modern literary Hebrew. Nor did it immediately appeal to members of the First *Aliya*. On the contrary, there were objections to giving Hebrew pride of place in the new colonies, and practical knowledge of the language was quite limited. Furthermore, the adoption of Sephardi pronunciation cannot be explained either by the fact that Sephardi circles in Jerusalem supported the idea of Hebrew as a spoken language or that Eliezer Ben

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[5] "Sephardi" (sefaradi in Hebrew, from Sefarad, the traditional Hebrew name of Spain) means Hispanic, referring to the large Jewish communities originating in Spain and Portugal (and having spread throughout North Africa, the Balkans, Turkey, Palestine, England, The Netherlands, etc.). The pronunciation current among these communities–and others which have adopted it–differs quite considerably from the pronunciation(s) that have prevailed among the Central and East European communities, commonly called "Ashkenazi" (from Ashkenaz, originally referring to medieval Germany), as well as other communities, such as the Yemenite community, which have perpetuated a similar tradition. It has always been considered "superior" by non-Jews, as well as by the Jewish intelligentsia of the Enlightenment movement, though without immediate implications. It was not at all a commonly accepted decision to adopt Sephardi rather than Ashkenazi pronunciation in the 1880s. (The names of Jewish settlements founded in those years, still pronounced with salient Ashkenazi rather than Sephardi features, is a relic of this indecisiveness.) The Ashkenazi pronunciation, probably originating in a different geographical part of ancient Palestine, is still current among non-Israel Jews opposing the State of Israel, or is used in combination with Sephardi features. It is thus identified by Jewish Israelophobes as "Israeli" rather than traditionally "Sephardi."

Yehuda was convinced by a Christian priest (while he was lying ill in a French hospital on his way from Russia to Palestine) that Sephardi pronunciation should be preferred. The fact is that even in Eastern Europe, the Sephardi pronunciation was considered to be the "correct" one among the non-Orthodox, but this did not prevent any Hebrew poet from the late nineteenth century until the early 1930s from using the Ashkenazi variant, even in Palestine itself, where it persisted as a literary norm until the mid 1930s, long after Hebrew had become a real spoken tongue. The most important element in the twin decisions to speak Hebrew and speak Sephardi Hebrew stemmed from their qualities as *cultural oppositions:* Hebrew as against Yiddish, Sephardi as against Ashkenazi; in both cases, new against old. This outweighed any principle or scholarly discussions about "correct" pronunciation (although the latter were often conducted in such terms).

Thus, the establishment of the new Jewish community in Palestine involved a series of decisions in the domain of cultural selection, and the ideology which permeated this project (i.e., Zionism) made explicit decisions compulsory. It was urgent to provide at least a few conspicuous components for an alternative repertoire, for an aggregate of new functions. In some instances it was not even *alternative* extant functions that were needed, but *new* ones, dictated by new conditions of life. A long retrospective view seems to point to the fact that experiments were continuously carried out in Palestine to supply the components necessary for the fulfillment of the basic cultural opposition *new Hebrew–old Jew*. It was not the origin of the components which determined whether or not they would be adopted, but their capacity to fulfill the new functions in accordance with this opposition. Green olives, olive oil and white cheese, Bedouin welcoming ceremonies, and *kaffiyehs* – all acquired a clear semiotic status. The by now classical literary description of the Hebrew worker sitting on a wooden

box, eating Arabic bread dipped in olive oil,[6] expresses at once three new phenomena: (a) he is a worker (that is, not a middleman); (b) he is a "true son of the land" (that is, close to earth); (c) he is not eating in a "Jewish" way (he is not sitting at a table and has obviously not fulfilled the religious commandment to wash his hands). Or we have the typical village elder in Yitzhak Dov Berkovitz's novel *Days of the Messiah* (1938). He builds a house for himself which he considers to be like a *khata* (in Russian – a peasant's hut) "painted white, with small windows, a yard, a gate and a small bench by the gate."[7] His neighbors in the same village, actualizing the same function for themselves, construct houses like those of "Polish noblemen, with high windows." The village elder dreams of Hebrew farmers who will eat "kasha and sugar," and deplores the fact that he cannot obtain "crude galoshes, like those worn by our Ukrainian farmers." The Baron de Rothschild's version of the Jewish farmer in Palestine, on the other hand, was the "authentic" French model: a semi-literate who kept only the Bible on his table. The dominion of such components was in many cases short-lived and they gave way in the course of time and in the wake of experimentation to other cultural options. As I argued above, their survival or disappearance depended on their ability to fulfill a function in accordance with the new ideology of national revival.

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[6] For the Arabs, this was the regular sort of bread produced, consequently called khubz, the normal word for "bread" in Arabic. In Hebrew, however, a new word had to be invented. As with many other cases, the Aramaic equivalent – pita – was introduced as a new designation. The adoption of this item has been so thorough that the hebraicized Aramaic word has now become known in the West, rather than the originally authentic Arabic one, probably through the propagation of food items by Israeli emigrants in the United States and Western Europe. (Other popular items, however, such as humus, tahina, or falafel, still bear their original Arabic names.)

[7] In the opinion of Benjamin Harshav, the notion of the khata here stems not from the reality of village life in Russia (or rather the Ukraine), but rather from literary descriptions

Specific materials often mislead those observing them years later. For instance, what precise meaning can be attached to the adoption of items of food and clothing from the culture of the Bedouins and fellahin, first by members of the First *Aliya*, and later by those of the Second, most notably among them the tight-knit Watchmen's Association, *Ha-shomer?* There can be no doubt that nineteenth-century Romantic norms and "Oriental" stereotypes (including the identification of Bedouin dress with that of the Jews' Biblical ancestors, so readily inferred from numerous illustrations of the time) were central factors.[8] They constituted a ready-made model for generating positive attitudes towards these items and, further, for identifying them with the realia of the population and the landscape. All this notwithstanding, this was not a case of non-mediated contacts with a neighboring culture. It was rather a case of reality being filtered through a familiar model. Certain components of that model were fairly well known through the general stereotypes of the "Orient" (through Russian poetry and, subsequently, Hebrew poetry as well). But in fact, one could say that what was taking place was an act of "translating" the new reality back into an old, familiar, traditional cultural model, specifically that which had crystallized in Russia towards the end of the nineteenth century. In this manner, the data of the new reality and the new experience could be understood and absorbed. For neither Bedouin nor fellahin was an unequivocal concept: on the one hand, they were heroes, men of the soil, dedicated to their land; on the other, inferior and almost savage. Again – on the one hand, their food, dress, behavior, and music expressed everything alien to the Jew and hence desirable to "the New Jew": courage, natural nobility, loyalty, roots; on the other hand, these expressed primitiveness and cultural backwardness. This example offers us a simple, uncomplicated "translation" of a familiar East European model, in which old functions, namely, the Ukrainian peasant and the Cossack, are transferred

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[8] On romantic stereotypes of this period, see Gorni 1979 (an abridged version of Gorni 1966, in Hebrew).

to new carriers. The "heroic Bedouin robber" replaces the Cossack and the fellah the Ukrainian peasant. The *kaffiyeh* takes the place of crude galoshes and the Palestinian Hebrew song "How Beautiful are the Nights of Canaan" – adapted from a local Arabic tune – that of a sentimental steppe song of the Don Cossacks.

I have contended that the source of the constituents is of secondary importance in the new cultural repertoire-in-the-making. This does not mean, however, that the material aspect of the constituents themselves is neutral. From the point of view of the mechanism which either accepts or rejects them, they may (in principle) be considered neutral. But this is not the case with regard to their availability. The desire to actualize a cultural opposition generates the search for alternative materials able to fulfill the desired functions; but "the-people-in-the-culture" (Voegelin 1961: 60) can seek alternatives *only where they are likely to find them*, which means, generally, in nearby or accessible contexts. This is what made the transfers from adjacent repertoires possible: from the Russian, Yiddish, Arabic, or any construct (imaginary or credible) formulated, at least on an ideological level, as an option within culture. For instance, the desire to discard Yiddish (i.e., to give it up as a spoken language) has led to selecting Hebrew as a replacement. But Hebrew, of course, had been an extant, established component within Jewish culture during *all* the centuries of dispersion. It was only the option of *speaking* it that had not been actualized and even seemed impossible. Similarly, the desire to discard the most conspicuous features of the European Diaspora led to a decision to drop Ashkenazi pronunciation: it reminded one too much of Eastern Europe and Yiddish. Hence the popularity of the Sephardi pronunciation. But the latter had been an *existing* option even in the repertoire of *Haskala* culture in Eastern Europe; only it had never been actualized in Hebrew *speech*. The desire to dress as a "non-Jew" popularized the *kaffiyeh* and the *rubashka* (a Russian shirt) adorned with a cartridge belt; these were the options that an adjacent, accessible culture provided. However, accessibility alone could not have determined the selection. For example, constituents belonging to the English culture were at the time gradually becoming accessible in Palestine, but they were not adopted by the local Hebrew culture because they could not fulfill the functions needed for the cultural opposition.

The deliberate struggle for the massive adoption of new constituents does not, however, ipso facto annihilate all the constituents of the "old" culture. And no repertoire which maintains an uninterrupted existence is able to replace all its constituents. Normally, even a deliberate decision to change behavioral constituents will lead to changes only in constituents of which there is a high degree of awareness. But in areas in which awareness is low and not easily governed by deliberate control, such as body relations (proxemics, for example), even deliberate decisions may fail to produce change. Nevertheless, since "culture" is not merely one repertoire attaching to a homogeneous group, but rather a heterogeneous system, one section of a culture may be impelled by certain factors, while another is not. Yet both exist simultaneously and are unavoidably correlated with each other within the same polysystem. Thus, only a pseudo-historical idealization would confer on the First *Aliya* homogeneity capable of creating "a new Hebrew people" according to the tenets of a specific ideology. Recent studies and numerous documents from this period clearly demonstrate that there were very few among the first settlers who were even familiar with this ideology and even fewer who identified with it and took it upon themselves to actualize the cultural opposition.

In other words, side by side with the penetration of new constituents, there remained a substantial mass of "old culture." The perseverance of old constituents, both items and functions, is no less important for the dynamics of a system than the penetration of new ones. Established constituents will hold on as long as possible against pressures which try to force them out of the center onto the periphery or out of the system altogether. Many constituents persevered in this way inside the new cultural repertoire in Palestine, either in their original form or by transferring their functions to new forms. For example, with regard to the perseverance of form, Hebrew became institutionalized rather painlessly in the registers of formal, public, and non-

intimate communication. But in intimate, familiar, or "popular" language, even among fanatic Hebraists, Yiddish (or rather fragments of Yiddishisms) persevered. As late as the 1940s and 1950s it was still relatively simple to record macaronic discourse in colloquial Hebrew. In the 1970s one already was forced to reconstruct it, partly from written testimony, partly from the macaronic speech observable among old-timers then still alive.[9]

The cultural opposition of the "new Hebrew" must therefore be viewed as both conditioned by and correlated with other factors operating within the polysystem, some of which supported it, while others neutralized it to a greater or lesser extent. Among other factors which determined the penetration of new constituents into the repertoire and its reorganization at each subsequent phase, the following should be considered:

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[9] This kind of macaronic language is characterized by the insertion of Yiddishisms when the Hebrew elements are felt by the speaker to be insufficient or inadequate to express emotivity. Thus, even such phrases as "vos iz dos" (literally "what is this"), meaning "what does it mean," "what is the meaning of all this," may be considered more expressive than "ma ze" ("what is it") or "ma perusho shel dabar" ("what is the meaning of this"). Also, established narremes may also under such circumstances be considered more effective than their Hebrew equivalents, conceived of as detached and "high" by the originally Yiddish speaker. Thus "zogt er/zi" ("he/she says") as an interpolated reporting speech device in daily narrative can be heard rather than "hu omer"/"hi omeret," their established literary equivalents. On top of this, a host of unique Yiddish expressions (such as nebekh, gevald) or morphemes (mostly for diminutives: -le, plural -lakh) penetrated more massively, some to stay, at least in some registers. Such familiar designations as aba for papa and ima for mama were introduced from. Aramaic, since the Hebrew words ab (father) and em (mother) belong to the more official register (i e., "father and "mother"). But even these often were felt as stilted, subsequently taking the Yiddish diminutive suffixes, thus generating such forms as aba-le and ima-le. (The Russian papochka and mamochka – diminutives of papa and mama – may also have served as a model in such cases.) It is indeed very unfortunate that the living performers of such a macaronic speech are still not recorded. By the time these lines are re-edited (2003), this phenomenon has become almost completely obsolete.

1. The predominance of constituents from one particular source over the entire society. (An example of this would be the surmised predominance of the Lithuanian high norm of intonation and vowel quantity over the official norm of Hebrew. For more explanations see below.)

2. The penetration of constituents from other cultural repertoires as a result of "normal" rather than deliberately initiated contacts (such as the continued penetration of Russian models into official, "high" Hebrew culture up to the 1950s, at least).

3. The neutralization of certain features as a result of the impossibility of unilateral domination (for instance, on the phonetic and intonational features of spoken Hebrew).

4. The emergence of local, "native," constituents as a result of the dynamic operation of the repertoire that was beginning to crystallize, in accordance with the three foregoing principles (e.g., new body movements, neologisms, verbal constituents with pragmatic functions, development of various linguistic registers, such as slang, etc.).

The inertia of established constituents can also explain behavioral differences between various sectors of the emerging culture. There were certain areas, for example, where new functions were needed not to replace old ones, but simply to fill slots where there were no old functions to begin with. Here the complex play between selection factors from existing repertoires and the element of creativity was less constrained than in those highly established areas where quick replacement was impossible because those principles were not valid for them. We can see this at work in the case of language and literature. The canonized patterns of Hebrew literature and the Hebrew language which had crystallized in Eastern Europe maintained their central positions in these activities throughout the entire period discussed in this article and even later. The new, "native" constituents, which could have provided alternative options, were forced to remain at the periphery of these systems, penetrating the center only in the late 1950s.

Let us look a little closer at these matters. The process by which Hebrew became a modern language during the nineteenth century and the dominant native tongue later in Palestine illustrates many of the

points mentioned above. Hebrew had to mobilize all of its resources to meet the need which arose for writing secular poetry, narrative prose, journalistic nonfiction, and scientific prose. At the same time it had to maintain the existence of the cultural oppositions emerging from the respective ideologies of each phase of development. At the beginning of the *Haskala*, the need to create a language in counterposition to rabbinical vernacular resulted in the rather fanatical reduction of Hebrew exclusively to its Biblical variety. When that need weakened in the face of the greater need to counterpose the accepted form of early *Haskala* prose, many features of rabbinical language were reintroduced, though now with different functions. This process was particularly notable in the language of literature, and was determined by literary requisites. For Mendele Mokher Sfarim (1836?-1917; a founding father of modern Hebrew and Yiddish literatures), for example, the language of the most appreciated writer of the Enlightenment period, Abraham Mapu (1807-1867), was stilted and artificial, especially in dialogue, and totally incompatible with the type of reality he was interested in describing (Mapu's novels described life in ancient Biblical times). Consequently, he re-introduced into Modern Hebrew literary prose various constituents of post-Biblical Hebrew. Moreover, Mendele unhesitatingly turned to Yiddish for further options. It was socially, though not linguistically, the repertoire closest to Hebrew. He borrowed from the Yiddish not words, not even calques, but those linguistic patterns of which there is a very low level of awareness: syntax, sentence rhythm, and intonation. By doing this he achieved an unprecedented effect of naturalness of speech in a language which was confined to writing, thus opening the way for the later development of both literary and spoken languages. The effect of naturalness can be understood only if we keep in mind that Mendele's readers were at home in *both* languages and thus able to appreciate his singular achievement by juxtaposing them.[10]   Other writers followed suit.

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[10] For a discussion of this issue, see Perry 1984; also Shmeruk 1978 and Even-Zohar 1990.

In observing the history of new *spoken* Hebrew (for which, unfortunately, we have only partial documentation),[11] two things become clear: first, an enormous revolution was needed to turn it into a secular tongue for daily use; secondly, the linguistic and paralinguistic phenomena which perforce accompanied its revival had no connection whatsoever with any kind of ancient historical situation. I refer here to those linguistic features the conscious control of which is very difficult, even impossible, and whose penetration into the repertoire of spoken language is absolutely unavoidable: voice quality, the quantitative and qualitative characteristics of sounds, sentence rhythm and intonation, paralinguistic phenomena accompanying speech (hand and head gestures), onomatopoeic sounds and interjections. In all these areas, Yiddish and Slavic features massively penetrated Hebrew, dominated it for a long time, and could still be observed in part when this paper was first written (1978). Clearly, the so-called Sephardi pronunciation actualized by natives of Eastern Europe was quite different from that employed in Palestine by non-Europeans. What was actualized, in fact, was only the minimum necessary to establish it in opposition to Ashkenazi pronunciation. Yet one of the most conspicuous phenomena in the area of pronunciation was the gradual rejection of the various foreign linguistic and paralinguistic features and their replacement by a very characteristic and unmistakable native-Hebrew sentence intonation.

The most drastic departure from the effects of the interference of other language systems probably took place in the area of voice quality and verbal sounds. Furthermore, contrary to expectations regarding language acquisition, the pronunciation of native Palestinian Hebrew speakers was not in imitation of their parents' pronunciation but appeared rather to follow a neutralization procedure: it sought the com-

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[11] A collection of official and public documents is available in English (Saulson 1979).

mon denominator of all pronunciations (of those brought from Eastern Europe, not from Middle Eastern countries!) and rejected all exceptional features. No existing norm could have dominated the actual speech of native Hebrew speakers (although it could and did dominate the canonized pronunciation of specific sectors, such as the Hebrew theater [see below]). This is a common procedure for a lingua franca. Clearly no new inventory of *sounds* has been created but rather a local *phonological* system. Neutralization on the level of sound *per se is* not a defensible notion. One must say rather, and at a higher level of abstraction, that whatever was *unnecessary* for the phonological system in terms of phonetic oppositions was in fact eliminated. [12] How did the development of "native Hebrew" influence Hebrew culture in Palestine? It turns out that in spite of the ideology of "the new Hebrew person" and the subsequent adoration of the nativeborn *sabra,*[13]

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[12] We must recognize, however, at least as a theoretical option, the possibility that rather than through an internal process of neutralization it was the adoption of a ready-made repertoire that actually took place in reality. Such a repertoire seems indeed to have been there, namely the so-called Lithuanian norm. This norm is markedly different from all the rest of East European norms in its middle-length vowels, which, moreover, are very similar to the Sephardi ones, and its relatively even intonation (in contradistinction, for instance, to the conspicuous "sing-song" of Galician Yiddish or even "rural Lithuanian"). If this is true, the process here termed neutralization did not occur in Palestine, but had been finalized in Lithuania. Unfortunately, there is no research available which would justify our preferring this hypothesis over the neutralization hypothesis. It is, however, clear that the Lithuanian norm, already considered superior prior to the Palestinian development, might have contributed to preferring the kind of neutralized features which might have developed. One could argue that, had it been the other way round, a non-neutralized, sing-song norm could have been considered "better" or "more beautiful" rather than the "dry" accepted one. (Obviously, the "neutralized" norm is aurally "poorer" than the non-neutralized ones from the point of view of variety of features.)

[13] A popular appellation during this period of (Jewish) Palestinian-born people, borrowed from the Arabic word denoting cactus tree. The idea was the image of the sabra, who, like the cactus, is prickly on the outside but sweet on the inside. The word sabra has been replaced with the Hebrew sabbar (pronounced "tsabbar"), now almost obsolete.

all of whose linguistic "inventions" were zealously collected, neither native phonetic norms nor the majority of other native verbal phenomena were accorded *official* recognition. [14] They did not become central to the cultural system, nor did they constrain the norms of its written texts. Ultimately, they began to penetrate the center through the classical process by which phenomena on the periphery move towards the center, and even then, arduously and without "official" sanction. Thus, when the Palestinian Broadcasting Service was opened to Hebrew broadcasting, no "native" pronunciation was heard there. What one heard was either a "Russian-Yiddish" Hebrew or an attempt at "Oriental" pronunciation, i.e., actualizing some of the guttural consonants as they were *supposed* to be pronounced–in imitation of the equivalent *Arabic* sounds. Both endeavored to maintain the canons of classical Hebrew morphology, that is, in accordance with the canonized "vocalization" system (the so-called Tiberian tradition which crystallized in the city of Tiberias by the Sea of Galilee in the tenth century), as interpreted by later generations. Similarly, until the 1940s native Hebrew did not have any position in the language of the theater, since the latter was an official cultural institution. The acting

14 The native-born Hebrew "sabra" evoked–and perhaps still does–an ambiguous response: on the one hand, he is strong, brave, somewhat coarse, and outspoken; on the other hand, he is gentle, childish, and uncultivated. Alter Druyanov collected anecdotes and jokes in Jokes and Witticisms (Jerusalem 1945), among which is the following (no. 2636): "Tel Aviv, Herzl Street. A group of children pour out of the Herzlia Gymnasium. Two famous Yiddishists are passing by, having come to visit Palestine [probably just before or after World War 1], and the greater Yiddishist says to his junior colleague: 'The Zionists boast that Hebrew is becoming a natural tongue for the children of Palestine. I will now show you that they are lying. I will tweak one of the boys' ears and I promise you that he will not cry out ima ["mother" in Hebrew], but mame [Yiddish].' So saying, he approached one of the boys and tweaked his ear. The boy turned on him and shouted: 'Idiot!' [hamor ("donkey") in Hebrew]. The famous Yiddishist turned to his friend: 'I am afraid that the Zionists are right.'" The point of this anecdote is not only that the "children of Palestine" were actually speaking Hebrew rather than Yiddish, but that they reacted not at all in the manner supposedly typical of Jewish children. This is, of course, a double disappointment for the famous Yiddishist, as the "new language" also represents a "new (and not familiar) behavior."

and textual models of the Hebrew theater in Palestine were perfectly compatible with the conventions of Russo-Yiddish pronunciation. This included quite a large range of phenomena: phonetic features pertaining to vowels and consonants and voice quality (tone, timbre, stability of voice vs. vibration), rhythm, fluency of speech, and intonation. The *Habima* theater, founded in Moscow in 1918 and transferred to Tel Aviv in 1926, perpetuated Russo-Hebrew speech the same way it perpetuated Russian acting conventions and *mise-en-scènes*, at least until the beginning of the 1960s; only with the foundation of the *Cameri Theater* in Tel Aviv in the early 1940s did one get the opportunity to hear a different kind of Hebrew–not exactly native, but relatively liberated from Russo-Yiddish features. Actually the characteristics of native spoken Hebrew were not only ignored, but even strongly opposed. Native Hebrew was–and still is in certain areas of the establishment–conceived of as an ephemeral phenomenon, which if ignored would gradually go away. This attitude is further reinforced by the school system at all stages by its emphasis on "correct" usage and classical grammar. The various functions required by a colloquial Hebrew and therefore introduced into the language by native speakers, either through transfers or exploitation of indigenous "reserves" of Hebrew, were conceived of as errors.

The official guardians of the language appeared to be impervious to the needs of a living language. To sum up, one may say that native Hebrew assumed in fact the position of a non-canonized, non-official system. Only through a complicated and prolonged process did it begin moving into official culture. Naturally, the generation shift contributed to the acceleration of this process, but the generation shift *per se* is not sufficient to explain this. The acceptance of canonized norms totally opposed to those of common usage is quite common in most cultures. In Palestine, native speakers learned to speak in *Habima* (and the other theaters imitating it) with a Russian accent; on the radio

they acquired the habit of pronouncing many features completely absent in their actual speech. [15]

Let us turn now to a consideration of the system of written texts. This is the most highly institutionalized system within culture and as the bearer of official recognition has the central function of generating textual models. Within this system, "literature" often assumes a central position. In modern Hebrew culture, literature definitely had such a position and such a function, and it makes no difference whether the models adopted by society came directly from Hebrew literature or were mediated by texts such as social, political, and critical writings. The fact that Hebrew developed into a modern language during the nineteenth century in a written form, and further that its long tradition had been primarily literary, enables us to understand why written models had priority over any alternative oral options which might have crystallized during that period. The system of Eastern European Hebrew literature in Palestine functioned in a manner similar to that of architectural and paralinguistic phenomena by resisting the penetration of native cultural constituents. At least until the end of World War I, the canonized literature produced in Palestine was peripheral to the mainstream of Hebrew literature in other parts of the world; the various types of texts published in Palestine, whether "high" literature or sketches, poems, letters, diaries, etc., disclosed a very strong affinity to earlier stages in the history of Hebrew literature and not to what was the dominant norm at the time in Europe. Therefore, in Palestine not only were new models for Hebrew literature not generated (neither "native" nor any other kinds), with the potential of providing an alternative option; Palestinian Hebrew literature constituted rather a

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[15] Some of the most conspicuous features of this kind are still two gutturals ([ʿ] and [h]), dental [r] (rather than native velar), shifting stress, and [e] ("schewa mo bile"), where speech has a consonant cluster. (For instance, such forms as "kfarim," "pqidim" are thus pronounced "kefarim," "peqidim.")

conservative sector within the totality of literary taste and literary activities. On the other hand, when the center of Hebrew literature was transferred to Palestine by means of immigration in the 1920s and early 1930s, it was already an institutionalized system with clear decision-making mechanisms, i.e., clear procedures for employing existing options or finding new ones.

The contacts with Russian literature as the available source for alternative options at critical junctures were perpetuated in Palestine at least until the middle of the 1950s. The gradual rise of Sephardi stress as the metrical norm for Hebrew poetry illustrates the extent to which the institutionalized literary models were closed to the penetration of existing native constituents. For several decades after Sephardi pronunciation dominated spoken Hebrew in Palestine, it still had no impact on the norms of poetic language. Sephardi stress in poetry began to appear in the official sectors only at the beginning of the 1920s; it became the central, dominant norm only at the beginning of the 1930s. This was the case not only with the older generation, but even with poets partly educated in Palestine before World War I, such as Avraham Shlonsky (1900-1977) and his generation. Similarly, when the new "modernist" school of Hebrew poetry emerged in the late 1920s, the models they employed as alternatives to those of the previous generation were based on a massive adoption of Russian constituents, including the rhythm, intonation, word order, rhyming norms, vocabulary, inventory of possible themes, etc., most of which had little connection with local, native constituents. As noted before, the Hebrew poetry created in Palestine before the rise of modernism as well as the Hebrew prose which had made a certain attempt to deal with the local scene on the thematic level were not considered – nor could they have been – alternative options for introducing change in the literary norms. It was a literature based upon models too old-fashioned for the tastes of the new writers. Even in the narrative prose written by native Hebrew speakers towards the end of the 1940s, writers who hardly knew any foreign language and who were assuming positions at the center of the literary system, one finds amazingly few constituents of native language.

Much of the work of that generation was based on Russian-Hebrew models in accordance with those traditional decision-making procedures which had established themselves in the Hebrew literature of Eastern Europe before the migration to Palestine. Thematic structure,

modes of description, narrative composition, segmentation and transition techniques, in short, the entire narrative repertoire of the texts of this generation leaned heavily on both classical Russian and Soviet Russian models. One may say with justification that in all these areas a vacuum existed in the Hebrew system, and the young writers found the model they needed in the profusion of prose translated from Russian, especially by Shlonsky and his school. Naturally, these texts are not monolithic, and the so-called Russian-Hebrew principles prevailing are not homogeneous; certain local elements are recognizable. But what is decisive here is the fact that the role of native Hebrew was by no means dominant. The conception of what a story would be, the elaboration of narrated reality, the ways of reporting the speech of characters all were linked to a very strong literary tradition, by no means native, the result of the penetration of constituents through contacts with another literature. Only in later texts did native language penetrate narrative prose written by some of the writers belonging to "the generation of the 1940s." Even there it was not quite authentic. Others, who probably had difficulty moving from traditional stylized literary Hebrew, eventually found it easier to write historical novels: in such novels they could employ the "make-believe" literary language with more apparent justification. Furthermore, these phenomena were not exclusively characteristic of the generation in question; they appeared among other groups of writers at the opposite end of the ideological spectrum, the so-called "Canaanites," who favored the total separation of native-born Palestinian Hebrews from the Diaspora Jews.

This clearly illustrates the principle that institutionalized options within a cultural system are often stronger than ideologies. True, some of these "Canaanite" writers objected strongly to "non-native" literary Hebrew, and subsequently introduced new language into their journalism. But this was not the case with their literary prose or poetry. Again, we see that new constituents can penetrate the periphery more easily than they can the more official sectors of a system. Finally, it would be interesting to observe what took place in literature aimed at Hebrew-speaking children. It would be naive to suppose that the situation here would be radically different. Children's literature usually assumes a non-canonized position within the literary polysystem, adopting models that have undergone simplification, or perpetuating models which occupied the center when they were new. Hebrew children were obliged during the period under consideration to read

literary translations in an elevated, sometimes pompous literary language, some of which was a stylized Russian-Hebrew, some of which employed the norms of previous stages in the history of literary Hebrew, norms long and far removed from the center of adult literature. These included various components of the literary model such as strophic matrices, composition techniques, thematic and plot models, and so on.

The mild attempts of certain writers to alter the language of children's books were considered almost revolutionary, and never became generative for the production of textual models for children. So, the idea of the "new nation" notwithstanding, there was no room for native constituents in the various sub-systems of the culture. Native constituents which could have constituted alternative options found their way only into the periphery. Here, at least, there was not too much opposition. Here conventional constraints which prevailed in canonized literature hardly applied, or did not apply at all. In these texts, often written by amateurs, various native constituents did penetrate, not homogeneously, but as part of a conglomerate of diverse and contradictory features. The texts best known to us of this kind are the short detective novels and the dime novels of the 1930s (see Shavit and Shavit 1974), but there were other peripheral texts. As for canonized literature, it was only in the mid-fifties that a change took place, and it took place first in poetry where the option of employing the existing and available repertoire of the native system was introduced. The Russian-Hebrew word order, rhythm, and intonation were replaced, in varying degrees, by local Hebrew features. Changes also occurred on more complex levels of the poetic model, such as the phonetic structure, the use of realia materials, and so on. Analogous processes took place in narrative prose too, but these were much more gradual, and have hardly been finalized to date. (For some recent discussions of these problems see Gertz 1983; Shavit 1982.)

WHO IS AFRAID OF THE HEBREW CULTURE?[1]

In recent years, there has been an intensively growing debate in various public forums in Israel – in the newspapers, on television, in conferences and colloquia, periodicals and books – about the status of the Israeli collective identity. This debate may be of interest to only a small group of people in Israel, but it also seems to gradually infiltrate an ever larger range of social strata, eventually likely to influence the "Israeli sentiment," which in its turn may possibly generate various consequences of some importance in the sphere of public and individual decisions. This state of affairs certainly justifies that we pay it some attention.

What characterizes a remarkable part of this debate is a brand of discourse that is highly critical of what it labels "the melting pot policy" allegedly carried out by the state of Israel in its inception years. This "melting pot" concept and the idea that its cure, or the better alternative, is "multiculturalism" is clearly an intellectual import rather than a locally developed state of mind. "Multiculturalism" is certainly a laudable idea, and those who support it surely imagine a situation where all cultures that exist in a certain state territory enjoy equal status, so that no discrimination is created between the people who belong to these various cultures. The trouble is that things are never like that in reality and probably can never be. What appears as a positive talk about multiculturalism in such countries as the United States indeed allows people openly belong to various ethnic groups. At the same time, however, it encourages the powerful groups in society to continue preclude the weaker groups from accessing resources by acknowledging their need to stick with their cultures of origin.

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[1] A revised version of Even-Zohar 2002a.

In Israel, the promoters of this discourse stipulate that Israeli society, particularly "the old elites," must now recognize all cultures brought by the many groups who have arrived in the country, thus atoning for the sins of the melting pot policy, which, as they claim, has repressed, humiliated and liquidated those cultures. Obviously, it is difficult to argue with sentiments of discrimination and repression, especially since actual if not intended discrimination has indeed been a historical fact, though it certainly started long before 1948. However, one does not need sophisticated tools of inquiry in order to realize that such sentiments – like anything else in human culture – are not necessarily inborn or spontaneous. While there always may be a justification for such sentiments wherever there is inequality, as small as it may be, between human beings, they do not have to unavoidably develop into 'a set of instructions for daily behavior'. Whether they do depends on initiatives to create such a set, something which is generally carried out by image producers, those actors who normally are called "intellectuals" in popular parlance. On the other hand, a lack of interest to create such a set is not necessarily evidence of the disappearance of discrimination or repression. For example, in France, where, since the French revolution much energy has been put to work in order to affiliate all the residents of the state to one single culture, there has not crystallized a central discourse of repressed people, in spite of widely expressed rejection sentiments for that particular single culture. Particularly among intellectuals the replacement of the non-recognized culture in favor of the promoted one has mostly been adopted as an improvement, personally and socially, rather than as a sort of discrimination.[2] In contradistinction, such a stance would not have been accepted favorably elsewhere. For example, in such countries as contemporary Spain, where the position of different local cultures has been recognized to such an extent that even in areas where there are no conspicuously different cultures to the "general Castilian," some pressure has begun to emerge for their creation in order to be set apart

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[2] This may be now changing, however, with the growing clashes between this promoted culture and the Moslem immigrant community.

from the dominating culture (including the making of new languages where none have actually existed before, such as the *Bable* language in the Autonomy of Asturias).

In short, the success of the public position of a certain culture, or the feeling it must be opposed, are often created, and at any rate mediated, by intellectual labor. A "success" in one society or a "failure" in another does not mean that in reality unity has been reached in the first or plurality in the second. Even in the seemingly unified and homogenized state of France there is a great variety of cultures, while in the abovementioned Spanish state, with its official division into semi-independent autonomies, with at least two or three languages different to Castilian (Catalan, Galician, and Basque) having indeed grained ground, there is much unity between the various groups as regards large parts of their actual management of life. True, "the explicitly formulated status" of a culture is important, but it is not clear to what extent it can really promote the interests of the group whose culture enjoys such a status. Often, "the explicitly formulated status" can reinforce rather than alleviate actual discrimination, while "the lack of an explicitly formulated status" can enable more equality as well as actual plurality. Thus, the strategy of distinction – including the making of different socio-political entities – does not universally and unequivocally produce improvement in the situation of weak groups. Even in those cases where it seems that marginal groups have been successful in generating local intellectuals who can speak on behalf of their "unique culture," it seems that the success of those intellectuals is conditioned by whether they have been accepted by the central culture. The dominant intellectual traditions (including academic work) have been successful in baffling these complex relations between images linked to a culture and the social status of the human beings linked with it.

This dynamics is however not new in human history. In contradistinction to popular doxa and still circulating textbooks, in no political entity, from the dawn of history until today, there has ever been one ethnic homogeneous group living by one single culture. Rather, there has always been a mosaic of groups among which a dynamics of coexistence normally had to emerge if they wished to survive and thrive. In every such historical entity centers of power have gradually been created, whose owners used various strategies to spread the culture they wished to make universal, at least in those areas of life that have

been considered important, plausibly in order to reinforce and justify, or otherwise make possible, the continued existence of the entity and often their domination of it. These principles have not changed in modern times, nor in our own so-called "globalization era," though evidently the specific ways of implementing them have changed from place to place and from one period to another.

Particularly intensive – or at least so it seems because of the abundance of materials – has become the impact of these principles since the 18th century, first in the West, and then in the rest of the world. In these historical events one can observe, on the one hand, (a) an increased effort by powerholders to inculcate a specific culture into a heterogeneous population. For that purpose, the services of those who own the skills how to produce or present the components of such a culture have normally been hired, i.e., intellectuals and other expert groups. On the other hand, one can observe (b) a growing number of "voluntary cultural entrepreneurs," namely people with no power, and who often pay a high personal price for their endeavors to produce and/or disseminate new options, the volume of which may sometimes be as much as "an entire culture." The activities of actors of type (a) can explain how an increased cohesion might have been created within extant nation-states like France (Weber 1976). In the events of type (b), new entities could be created, such as the state of Italy or the Spanish autonomies. Whatever the case, it is evident that even if we do not accept the extreme interpretation by some theoreticians of nationalism, according to whom nations are imagined entities, there is no doubt that without the work of culture producers and culture distributors (whether "hired" by power or "free entrepreneurs") the modern nations could have neither emerged nor existed.

The Hebrew, or Israeli, case since the 1880's, is entirely part and parcel of this historical development. Here, too, without the work of culture producers there would have never developed an immigration of Jews to Palestine of a completely non-traditional secular nature. Without the invention and the dissemination of new components of culture among those immigrants – and especially among their native offspring – there would never have emerged in the country a group possessing the nature of a nation, namely an entity with some cohesion. Without these new components of culture, even with an improbable secular modern immigration, the immigrants would have organized their life along the same old patterns applied all along previous

centuries, namely, as Jewish communities loosely connected and undoubtedly even lacking the most basic agreements among them, such as an agreement on a common daily language.

The producers of Hebrew culture had no power at the outset to impose their stock, and in this respect they were not different to the majority of culture inventors throughout history who were not powerholders in their own right. They did not have at their disposal at the initial stages of their activity any organizational tools that could secure the enforcement of the culture they had produced and tried to disseminate. On the contrary, the options of opposition and rejection against this culture by the targeted population were quite numerous, and they were widely implemented, whether in Jerusalem, where the Orthodox acted aggressively against Ben Yehuda (such as refusing to bury his children, or denouncing him to the Turkish Ottoman authorities thereby causing his imprisonment), or in the colonies of "The First Immigration," such as Rishon le-Ziyon, which expelled a prominent teacher of Hebrew, because he had gone too far in their view in his attempts to promote the Hebrew language. It is definitely incorrect to conceive of the first decades of the new Jewish community in Palestine in terms of the coercion of a new culture. As already maintained, the population had many other alternatives to the newly invented Hebrew culture. Moreover, among the producers and the entrepreneurs of the new culture themselves there was never full consent, harmony, or trouble-free cooperation. From the very outset and throughout heterogeneity was a real option even within the new culture, not only during its initial stages.

Obviously, the ability of the culture producers to establish organizational frameworks in constant expansion (such as unions, schools and kindergartens, settlements, committees, or economic organizations) has enabled them to disseminate the new proposals more efficiently. From humble beginnings in the period until World War I there emerged after the war organized bodies that became more and more institutionalized. Hebrew speaking schools turned from a minority to a majority, although they became the only option for the Jewish populations only after the foundation of the state, not necessarily by state coercion, partly because other options no longer looked to the majority of the parents as promising as they used to be in the previous decades (when French speaking schools, for example, were quite an attractive alternative) and partly because they simply no longer existed.

This process thus involved both the amplification of the range of production of new culture components (from a new language to a new hygiene) and ever-increasing possibilities of disseminating them. Without ignoring the decisive attempts made by the first entrepreneurs, that is until 1905, and by those new and energetic enterprises that the new wave of immigrants after 1905 (called "The Second Immigration Wave") brought with it, all activities became more intensive during the period between 1920 and 1948, namely since the Jewish community under British Mandate was recognized as a semi-autonomous entity in possession of powerful institutional tools.

Characteristic of this massive enterprise of culture production was the keenness of those involved to propose new options in a very large variety of spheres of life. These had to do with almost every part of life of which the contemporary generations could be aware, from the treatment of the body, its health, cultivation, upkeep and improvement, through foods and clothing, to designing personal and collective spaces. In each one of these domains, I would like to reiterate, different competing options have been put forward, so that actual life got its relatively established concrete nature only after a great deal of negotiation had taken place between the proposals turning up and their targeted population. In no one of these areas – the Hebrew language, the change of attitudes towards nature and the animals, foods and clothing, domestic management and personal and general hygiene – has any producer or marketer ever been able to impose unilaterally his or her products. It is true that one can say that eventually the efforts to introduce the Hebrew language have become "a success story," unsustainably conceived of today by many Israelis as a unique case in history, but for many years Hebrew did not drive the immigrants' languages out of the homes of people, nor has it taken shape according to the wishes of its initiators. Even where Hebrew was accepted as the central linguistic option, there were areas with little agreement on some grammatical, lexical and pronunciation standard, until the realities of life gradually determined the course. For example, decades after Ben Yehuda – the most outspoken champion of the vernacularization of Hebrew – and his colleagues had decided in favor of the Sephardi (Spanish-Portuguese) pronunciation there were still debates going on (among those who claimed to have the authority to design the linguistic behavior of the population), attempting to legitimize the continued usage of the Ashkenazi (European) pronunciation, and actually only towards the middle of the 1930's the dispute

finally ended when the last Mohicans of literary Ashkenazi pronunciation, the younger generation of poets, definitively renounced it in favor of the living vernacular. Since the 1930's, the use of this pronunciation was reduced to a viable option among the Orthodox community alone, which anyway never accepted the new culture.

The Hebrew language was not only a central mold of activity in the making of the new culture, but also a central symbolic component within it. The relatively long period that was required in order to reach an agreement on one formal standard in the domain of language characterizes the process of crystallization of many other patterns of culture, even such that had a less central and a less symbolic position. For example, many years were needed in order to inculcate a different relation to nature, the animals, domestic gardening, or to change the perception of the body in general or in sportive activities in particular, or change patterns of the human physical environment (the house, the courtyard, or the street).

These changes were considered both vital and necessary for the culture entrepreneurs in order to reach their goal, which was changing the nature of life in Palestine to be different from what was then conventionally considered as Jewish life in the Diaspora. It is correct to think that many new options of action have been put forward out of the desire to get disentangled from what was conceived of as the old culture. Because the majority of the culture entrepreneurs were Eastern Europeans, obviously everything that could be presented as fully divergent from Eastern European culture was "new" and desirable. For this reason even the word "Hebrew" was preferred to "Jew" ("A Hebrew State, Free Immigration" was the slogan vociferated in street demonstrations by children who later became soldiers in the Hebrew Army, and probably members in the General Federation of the Hebrew Workers). The gist of Hebrewness, the Hebrew language, made it imperative to make many decisive choices, such as which of the traditionally historical pronunciation standards should be adopted for the spoken language. In that debate, the Sephardi pronunciation indeed was presented as "the more correct" (though without any linguistic-historical basis), but its main appeal emanated not from its pretended believed "correctness" but from its being "non-Ashkenazi." Similarly, the romantic attitude towards the Arabs – the fellahin and the Bedouin – at least until British Mandate times, emanated from the tradition which presented them as reminding the ancient Hebrews, as

"a people close to nature," gifted with important qualities, such as courage, and a source of many desirable skills, such as cattle and horse breeding or the use of arms. Naturally, completely opposite images for the same romanticized Arabs were also current at the same time.

The all-encompassing endeavor to eradicate the old Diaspora Jewish culture and replace it by a New Hebrew one characterized the entire pre-State period. It would be interesting to inquire to what extent the immigrants who arrived in Palestine, and later in Israel, have indeed gone over to managing their life with a culture that was different from their cultures of origin. To what extent can we really claim that the new culture has taken over, that a "Hebrew" or an "Israeli" culture has indeed replaced the "Jewish" or "Diaspora" one?

Already during the first decades of the new Jewish settlement in Palestine, the local community created a culture of its own, which was different in many areas from that of their relatives in other countries. The natives (which later were nicknamed "cactuses")[3] developed repertoire of their own already at the very early stage in the history of the community, as has been demonstrated by Elboim-Dror (1996). Spoken Hebrew, which was still at its infancy until World War I, became a real vernacular after the British occupation, and generations of young people – both native and immigrant – used it in speech and writing as their natural daily tongue. Great changes have taken place in the patterns of life, the types of professions, the organization of the day, homes and public spaces, the attitude towards urban and rural animals, brands of food (especially vegetables and fruits), eating habits, clothing, or the treatment of the body. People who came to Palestine from any other Jewish community, perhaps already towards the end of the 19th century, but certainly since the 1930's, did not feel at

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[3] First the Arabic name for a cactus plant was used – *Sabra / Sabre* (and "*Sabras / Sabres*" in the plural) – and then the Hebrew *Tsabbar* (plural *Tsabbarim*) gradually replaced it before it completely faded away.

ease with the new society. Undoubtedly, many even felt complete alienation, like the old apple selling woman at the beginning of the 1950's, who – in the collection of anecdotes collected by Salcia Landmann (1962) – addresses the passers-by in a Tel Aviv street with broken Hebrew, and, when asked by a Yiddish speaker who happens to be around "Grandma, why twist your tongue, speak plain Jewish [Yiddish]," replies: "what can we do, uncle, we are after all in exile!."

On the other hand, not all immigrants came from an explicit or actual Jewish culture. Many had already lost most components of "Jewish life," and therefore often could adapt unproblematically to the new culture. As put by Boas Evron:

Many of the figures of 'The Second Immigration Wave" [1905-1914] already arrived imbued with "the Land-of-Israel culture," which meant that they had undergone transformation already in Russia. The most basic meaning of this transformation has been the untying of the psychological and cultural bond with the Jewish caste community and the adoption of territorial self-consciousness, even non-Jewish, either in the form of "assimilation" or in the form of national non-religious self-perception and transition to territorial self-identification. In this manner, part of the "assimilated" German-Jewish youth, too, who were far removed from any acquaintance with Judaism and felt themselves before as first and foremost in all respects national Germans, have become the best sort of Land-of-Israel fighting pioneers after their immigration to Palestine. They did this by simply transferring their previous identification with the German nation and soil to identification with the Land-of-Israel nation and soil – without any "spiritual Jewish values" (Evron 2002, p. 217; translation mine).

Whatever their origin and background, in 1947, after the United Nations decision on the partition of Palestine, while hundreds if not thousands of young people had fled away, many others among these immigrants volunteered to the fighting forces, because a collective solidarity of a modern national society had already been created. It was founded on cultural patterns that were historically new, but which have already become "natural" and sufficiently strong to create a feeling of common identity, different and distinct from the "Jewish identity" as known in the Diaspora.

This new culture, these far-reaching changes in the life of the people, partly emanated from the labor of the cultural entrepreneurs. Out of utopia and writing table dreams, imagined components became actual patterns of action in life, although hardly ever fully as imagined. At

the same time, however, various other components failed, that is to say – were rejected by the people. The Hebrew calendar which was put forward by Ben Yehuda and his group, calculating from the year of the destruction of the Second Temple (70 CE) has never achieved more success than its French Revolution predecessor. Changing surnames, mostly Eastern and Central European ones, has been only partly successful. And these are only a few examples out of a large stock of part-successes and part-failures. After all, people had other options than remodeling their life in accordance with the invented components of culture. One option was to insist on preserving the old culture, which meant rejecting the new one in a passive manner. Another was to oppose, in an active manner, the invented culture. A third one was to maneuver among the various alternatives, thus creating a middle-way new repertoire, a combination of various sources. This entailed partial acceptance, partial rejection and local initiatives stemming from everyday social negotiation. The realities of life, basically no different to anywhere else in the world, have always been heterogeneous. This means movement of human beings from one place to another, which makes the blocking of divergent positions almost impossible. Therefore, neither during pre-State or State period does it make any sense to talk about the exclusive dominance of the New Hebrew culture over the entire population.

In other words, the invention of a culture, even if helped by an institutionalized entity such as a state, cannot compel people to accept every new item, even when people can be pressured to pretend they do. Naturally, an individual who happens to fall into a certain framework from which it feels as if there is no escape does not feel like that. However, at the disposal of the population at large – whether immigrant or native – there existed more than one single repertoire of culture. Such was the case not because different "sets of culture" have been offered by different, and sometimes opposing, entrepreneurs, but simply because of the fact that side by side with numerous components of culture that enjoyed full attention, with many attempts to replacing them by others, there existed at least as many other components for which there was no awareness at all, and perhaps no possible replacements. A trivial example for this would be speech intonation. In spite of all the concern, often obsessive, with matters of pronunciation, the new speakers of Hebrew were not at all able to hear how far they were implanting speech intonation from their previous languages, mainly Russian and Yiddish. For this reason, intonation

has never become the subject matter for planning, controversy, or distinction, the way other language components have. A more complex example than intonation would be the covert set of instructions that is employed for the management of inter-human face-to-face relations, or in short: human interaction. This has never been treated by the cultural entrepreneurs, save of several forms of politeness, such as the new forms for "thank you" and what is the equivalent of the French *Je vous en prie.* Likewise, attitudes and practices in matters of finding a match, raising children and household, matters of birth and death – all these have remained to a great extent, in spite of all the new enterprises in matters of hygiene, health, "healthy food," fresh air, washing at home and bathing at sea, a perpetuation of the old cultures. This is why it has been so usual that there should be great differences in the same house, on the same street or in the same neighborhood, between people who could not agree with the culture of the neighbors, but on the other hand could not offer any alternative innovation.

The conviction that it is possible and even desirable to change the culture of humans through deliberate actions for a large range of matters has gradually weakened, contrary to what one might have believed, after the foundation of the state of Israel, namely precisely in that period when it popularly is believed that the "melting pot" compressor has been the most powerful. Towards the middle of the 1950's there is already a feeling of fatigue with many Hebrew culture initiatives, probably partly because people began to believe that now that statehood had been achieved, there was no longer need for deliberate enterprises and that the new culture would "naturally" gain grounds through the daily interaction between the veteran and the new Israelis. The deliberate endeavors, especially in the educational system, to inculcate "Hebrew culture" have gradually faded away. Thus, in contradistinction to the French state, which never tires of vigorously impose the secular French framework and secure the position of the French language – the cornerstone of that culture – by legislation and legal coercion methods, the Hebrew state has renounced such practices, thus leaving the new immigrants to cope on their own with the competition over resources, often from positions of inferiority. In other words, the renunciation of integration and the "melting pot" policies rather than adhering to them is perhaps the source of the large social gaps in contemporary Israel. Obviously, from the point of view of the new immigrants, who had no understanding for the cultural distinctions that were prevailing in the country, there was not much dif-

ference between the foreign and incomprehensible "Hebrew culture" and the "culture of the Europeans," namely the social group which was holding the majority of power positions in society and state in 1948, and in whose management of life there remained many ingredients persevering from the cultures of origin. This misunderstanding dominates even today the space of popular images, in which the culture of the Jewish community during British Mandate times is presented as "Eastern European," while at leased many ingredients of the alternative culture were complete opposites to the cultures brought by the immigrants from any part of Europe.

Immigrants to British Mandate Palestine, or later to the state of Israel, haven't been different in any sense from any other immigrants anywhere else. Every single immigrant is always faced with the choice between preserving his or her original culture and adopting the culture of the group among whom they have come to dwell. Whether an immigrant succeeds in carrying out his wishes depends not only on the accidental life circumstances, but also on the particular immigrant's culture and his or her personal abilities. It seems, however, that the Jewish immigrants considered themselves different to any regular immigrants around the globe. They did not consider themselves as foreigners who must become part of a host country and who must make efforts in order to achieve that. Because they considered themselves as equal from the outset to the veteran population, being "by natural right," as it were, members of the same group, the same people, they did not consider those who preceded them and who founded the place as owners of rights that preceded theirs.

The dynamics of life has led the culture of the Israelis into various directions, making the new invented Hebrew culture to be only one single component in a mosaic of ingredients stemming from various different sources, heterogeneous, non-unified and incompatible. The early entrepreneurs of the Hebrew culture, had they been still alive, probably would have considered that a failure. But one cannot ignore the fact that the more research is carried out the more it becomes apparent that the common grounds among Israelis are actually getting larger in spite of the outspoken sectorial positions. The management of Israeli life, the Israeli home, the models of interaction between people, and a long series of preferences Israelis have in common in contradistinction to members of other cultures – all these are gradually growing, side by side with the preservation of that heterogeneity

that has existed anyway during all times, even in the golden era of the "melting pot." Therefore, those who are afraid of that Hebrew culture – perhaps with the exception of the Orthodox, although even they have adopted quite much from the new culture (such as speaking Hebrew to some extent) – are not really interested in doing away with it and replacing it by components from the older – now lost – cultures. Criticism against the invention of the Hebrew culture, and against "Hebrewness" versus "Jewishness" (more often now replaced by "Jewishness" versus "Israeliness"), when it does not emanate only from feelings of anger and hostility, it certainly stems from the legitimate need of people who already have made this mixed culture their own to demand that it open up for components they believe have been unduly ignored.

Paradoxically, it appears that both institutionalized Zionism and its critics today basically agree about, though have opposing evaluations of, what has taken place. In their respective views, the population of immigrants was willing – or otherwise compelled – to adopt a new culture, and give up – or otherwise lose – their old culture. In the eyes of the supporters, a new successful nation with a distinctive character has emerged, while in the eyes of the challengers, a foreign synthetic culture has been imposed on the immigrants (and their offspring), which detached them from their good old successful roots. It seems, even if the research material currently available still leaves much to be desired, that both positions are right and wrong at the same time. It is high time for a sober observation, recognizing the complexity of the making of the New Hebrew culture and the versatile ways of its development through its contacts and clashes with the other cultures that were, and still are, different or opposing to it.

Intellectuals and Success

THE MAKING OF REPERTOIRE, SURVIVAL AND SUCCESS UNDER HETEROGENEITY[1]

1. A central question in theories of dynamic systems is how systems persevere, that is, how they manage to maintain themselves over time. Of course, this is an abstract, or perhaps a metaphorical, formulation of a very tangible matter. In the context of the semiotic sciences this could mean how networks of interdependencies, or otherwise "repertoires," manage to persist for groups of people who are dependent upon them. In culture research carried out with socio-semiotic tools, the question must be reversed, namely: how groups of people manage to persevere through the use of certain repertoires.

2. In various current research traditions, the connection between repertoires and groups has been conceived of as an inherent relation, meaning that a certain identifiable repertoire is conceived of as built-in into the very "nature" of a certain identifiable group. Such a view, even if not always formulated in such explicit terms, characterizes not only the earlier stages of anthropology, but even later parts of sociology on the one hand and "the history of mentalities" on the other. In simplistic terms, this stand actually hypothesizes "one indivisible repertoire for one group."

3. However puzzling this may seem to the semiotically thinking community, this is not a far cry from some central semiotic traditions. The brands of system theories developed in the disciplines which have inspired modern semiotics heavily inclined to adopt the assumption about the monopoly of single repertoires not as a matter of a

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theoretical alternative, but without even hypothesizing any. We all know that system theories have emerged in our domain as part of the search for economical explanations of unmanageable or what appeared as disorderly phenomena. Indeed, these theories have gained a high level of simplicity, which was helpful in developing conceptual and investigatory tools for discovering regularities. But this was carried out at the expense of reducing complexity to homogeneity, while the symptoms of complexity were regarded as disorder, and hence non-pertaining to system analysis.

4. I am using here the term "symptoms of complexity" because it would be wrong to attribute any recognition of complexity to the system theories that emerged. There was no room in these theories for recognizing complexity as such, or as pertaining to system analysis. System thinking had to undergo radical change in order to recognize complexity not as a possible variable of systems, but as an indispensable built-in feature. And indeed this radical change was beginning to take place already towards the late twenties (with Tynjanov and Jakobson), and accumulated some momentum during the thirties with the works of Prague Structuralists, mostly in the field of language interference. Ever since the early seventies, a number of researchers, myself included, have attempted to develop a theory of heterogeneous systems under the name of "polysystem theory" which has drawn some attention and has been tested on various fields. The various aspects of this theory are widely discussed in the literature, and need not deter us here. (See Even-Zohar 1990; Even-Zohar 1997; Lambert 1997; for a recent introduction see Iglesias Santos 1999.)

5. In the field of culture research, what seems to me most important in dynamic systems thinking is the separation it can make between human beings and repertoires. This means that groups and repertoires are conceived of as maintaining functional multidimensional rather than inherent relations to each other; and that these relations are generated by historical and accidental circumstances, rather than by hereditary continuity. Such a seemingly trivial generalization is, however, neither self-evident nor universally acknowledged. Thus, while classical anthropology undoubtedly believed in innate repertoires, this is no longer bon ton in modern anthropology. James Clifford stated with astonishment, back in 1988, that Margaret Mead, who had in 1932 typically "found Arapesh receptivity to outside influences 'annoying'" would not change her view as late as 1971 (1988: 232f.). Thus, "ex-

pectations of wholeness, continuity, and essence" (ibid: 233) are indeed no longer held by the discipline. On the other hand, such stands, believed to have long been discarded, are daily bread in the "history of mentalities." They also seem to characterize economic research done by social scientists who work on non-Western societies. At least this is what quite recently Rupert Hodder (1996) criticized with great outrage, going as far as claiming that in view of the failure of the social sciences to properly analyze multidimensional and complex societies, no "scientific" approach could any longer be acceptable. While Hodder's criticism is entirely justified, it is both frustrating and distressing to realize how theories of heterogeneous systems are still being completely ignored where they seem to be most needed.

6. To hypothesize a relation between heterogeneity and persistence is therefore elementary in any theory of complex systems. The gist of the argument is that since it is the multiplicity of repertoires which co-exist as permanent competitors that makes it possible for a system to change; and since change is necessary because systems necessarily clash and conflict with other systems, heterogeneity allows systems to carry on.

7. With this framework as a working hypothesis, I have been engaged, since a number of years, in an ongoing attempt to study the parameters of initiatives ta- ken with cultural repertoires in relation to processes of change in the history of collective entities. Gradually, evidence has accumulated to suggest that the massive labor invested in the making, and the endeavors of distributing and inculcating of new repertoires may eventually have created a whole array of results, a high and intensive level of activity, which can be termed "energy" (Even-Zohar 1994). It was my contention therefore, though I would rather like to call it "conjecture" at this stage, that it is this "energy" that has made it possible for the groups studied to stand reasonably well in competition with the contiguous world.

8. In the beginning of my work, the very awareness that cultural repertoires, comprising even basic items of collective sentiments, could be explicitly invented by individuals was a revelation. It was only natural that the study of the features of such repertoires has taken most of my attention. However, in all of the cases I have studied – such as pre-state Israel, Italy, Spanish Galicia, Iceland, Québec and Catalonia – this engagement with the making of repertoire was

launched in the context of an attempt made by the makers of these repertoires to break off from some contemporary circumstances and create new living conditions for the group of people they considered to be a legitimate target for these repertoires, thereby in fact either aspiring at, or in reality creating a new group for that repertoire. And in spite of different geographical and historical circumstances, there is more resemblance than disparity between the tools and ingredients used in all of these, and many other cases, as if they all had followed a hidden script which somehow was made available to them from some source. As a matter of fact, there is no mystery here about the possible source, although it is not at all certain that the infiltration of knowledge, or information, has been explicit or direct. Although such scripts can be traced back to antiquity, so there need be no illusion they are exclusively "modern," it was the French revolution which has set the example of how to launch new repertoires for every- body in modern times. And it was the aftermath of the Revolution, most conspicuously the Napoleonic wars, which has made it possible for disparate and various, often relatively marginal, groups to get in touch with these new cultural initiatives, which probably inspired them to think, fantasize and act in ways not imaginable before.

9. What kind of new repertoires were being created and what kind of "options" they engendered?

No doubt the entrepreneurs, those who were engaged in great intensity in making new repertoires, had always in view some vision of improving the situation of the group for whom they targeted the repertoires. Whether the "actual situation" indeed justified their enterprises or not is not a fruitful question as long as it can be shown that they were convinced of their understanding of the situation they have come to correct. (Typically, such doubts are normally cast in cases of controversial outcomes, like that of Newfoundland.[2])

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2 The endeavors of Smallwood in 1948 and 1949 to make Newfoundland part of Canada are typically either hailed or strongly criticized as a conspiracy against the

The new suggested practices were not explicitly directed at devising strategies for accumulating material wealth. Material poverty may have been a strong drive, and it surely helped to create positive reverberations among the targeted public (such as having Sicilian peasants vote for the Italian Union), but the public discourse focused predominantly on saving the group from persecutions and humiliations, or even from perishing; putting the group on an equal footing with other groups (normally described as the more advanced); restoring the grandeur of the group in the past, and the like. The repertoires devised in congruence with these views may appear today as belonging to areas that have nothing to do with parameters of prosperity. These may seem a whole battery of odd gismos, such as opening windows to let sunshine and fresh air in, or using unreputable or non-spoken languages, or walking out in nature, or planting trees in great ceremony once a year, or getting up early to go to work, and the like.

10. Theoretically, we may then distinguish two different kinds of projects in all of the modern cases of repertoire making. One is the making of new repertoires, as well as the efforts to distribute them. The other is the creation of new sociopolitical entities where these repertoires would prevail. Would it make sense then to ask which came first, or which of the two projects was the stronger drive? As far as the motives of the people involved, it could be interesting to make such questions. Here it can be helpful to analyze the different roles played by "intellectuals" – the makers of the repertoires – on the one hand, and the "powerholders," those who made use of the new semiotic products, on the other. And this would apply even to those cases where the "intellectuals" and the "powerholders" were the very same persons playing different roles, often before, but not infrequently even after, entities endowed with political power were born.

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people. The reason is perhaps the fact that Newfoundland is not doing very well from the point of view of "success" on any level. (See i. a. MacKenzie 1986.)

But from the point of view of the outcomes, the two projects were one single package on the levels of both discourse and action. Namely, the making of an entity with socio-political characteristics was often presented as both a necessary condition as well as a possible result, of the new proposed repertoires. For example, the creation of the modern Italian state was inseparable from the attempts to vernacularize the literary Italian language or the whole plethora of new other options devised by the handful of Italian repertoire-makers involved in that event. And although is was propagated that the expected outcome of this bundled project is achieving a betterment of life for the targeted group, it was also widely propagated that people should be prepared to accept that there might arise incongruities between individual and collective conditions. Therefore, even when members of the collective would starve, or get killed in a war, they would accept the premise that the collective may survive or even thrive by their actions.

11. These bearings may not apply at all to those cases where the making of nations and states has taken place without the making of new repertoires. In such cases, if people do not experience any positive change in their lives, on whatever level, they are more likely to reject the outcomes. They may experience the whole deed as superfluous and surely would accept "Acton's melancholic remark" (Pratt 1985) that nationalism "does not aim either at liberty or prosperity, both of which it sacrifices to the imperative necessity of making the nation the mould and measure of the State. Its course will be marked with material as well as moral ruin, in order that a new invention may prevail over the works of God and the interests of mankind" (Acton 1967; quoted from Pratt 1985: 196).

This only means that it is important to understand the circumstances of the emergence of entities in modern times. For many of them – whether social criticism is justified or not in terms of our current modern ideologies – we must not ignore the crucial fact that such projects may not have emerged out of unconstrained "free will" at all. If the people involved wanted to achieve equal footing with other groups of people, who may have achieved better conditions only because they had already been organized in socio-political entities, then they actually were driven to action by unavoidable intercultural competition. Analyzed from the point of view of business evaluations (that is: by the rates of investments to yields), the benefit of certain entities may indeed be questioned. But from the point of view of in-

ter-groupal competition, to follow or reject a certain ingredient of re-
pertoire has been a matter of choosing between perpetuated inferiority
or belonging to a new club with some new privileges.

12. My contention is therefore that the principle which worked in ac-
cepting an extraneous model (namely, getting organized as "a na-
tion") is not only that of "why haven't we got what the neighbor has?"
but often "We have got no alternative but to follow the example of the
neighbor." It is therefore that I suggest that the fruitful question here
would be: under what relations with the contemporary repertoires this
action takes place. If new repertoires are involved, even if their adop-
tion was a matter of political convenience rather than a desire to alter
socio-economic conditions for "the nation" (as so often is maintained,
e. g., in relation to such cases as the politics of Piedmont and Count
Cavour), a stalemate was thereby broken in a domestic repertoire.
Subsequently, even in case of a limited stock of innovations, the
doors opened to allow more options. Once it was made widely ac-
ceptable that the older ways of life could be at least in part replaced
by different ones, often there was no way for anybody to block the
surge of energy which followed as a result.

13. The moment when new options are made permissible in whatever
society is not an event that should be taken for granted. It is true that
new options are being produced every day by an untold number of
individuals. If you accidentally find out that you can cook your food
with some herb you may have accidentally acquired, you thereby de-
vise a new option, but there is no guarantee other people will accept
this option, and in some cases you may stand to trial for witchcraft
and end in unexpected places.

The basic reason for this is that repertoires are sets of options in-
vented by humans for conducting their lives. Once such repertoires
establish themselves in society, they become the agreed culture of that
society, that is, its recognizable way for handling life situations. It is
then not at all self-evident that people will be encouraged, nor even
supported, by the other members of a group in making additional – let
alone alternative – options to those already in use. Sticking to agreed
repertoires may often be stronger than the need to confront changing
circumstances. Groups, as well as individuals, are often willing to go
a long way – even risking their lives – in order to maintain the reper-

toire which may have become identical with their sense of orientation in the world.

For while the cultural entrepreneurs claimed that the only way for the group to extract itself from its misery was to introduce changes in its cultural repertoire, if not replace it completely, the opponents of such initiatives normally claimed the opposite was true. Clearly, the understanding of survival must have been very different for the opposing parties. Those who normally were and are in favor of maintaining a current repertoire unchanged frequently consider change as disruptive. From their point of view, the disappearance of the current repertoire – the repertoire they live by – would simply mean the disappearance of the group as such. Naturally, when force is involved, or even when perceived as forceful, new repertoires may be resisted actively or passively, depending on the power circumstances of the relevant case.

It therefore requires certain conditions for repertoire innovations to be suggested in the first place, before any attempt is ever made to implement these suggestions, if the aim is to have them accepted by at least a reasonable part of the targeted group. Seen from this point of view, the strategy of proposing the creation of a new group should also be considered as a way to make new repertoires more acceptable. That is, since they are not always presented as aiming at serving replacements for the current group as such.

14. When the dynamics of the making of new repertoire is set in motion, the very nature of the situation and the different backgrounds of the people involved often create alternative sets of new options. These may never be fully compatible in the long run, even in cases where certain levels of mergings or compromises have been achieved between the competitors. In all of the cases where new or renovated entities emerged, more than one agenda have been proposed in almost every domain of life. The alternative proposals cannot be characterized in general terms, but in some cases there has emerged incompatibility between "left" and "right," "religious" and "secular," or "republicans" and "royalists," and the like. Each of these may have proposed a different set of new options, and sometimes no final settlement has ever been reached.

In many of these cases, the new entity, now possessing political pow-er to impose repertoires, often made the decisions in one direction or the other. In the case of the Italian language, for instance, a committee was set up and its chairman, after many back- and-forth hesitations, finally decided in favor of a certain variety which subsequently was introduced into the newly established Italian schools. The Norwegian conflict in matters of language could not, however, be solved by such a governmental decision, so the compromise was that both alterna-tives (in that case – both Norwegian languages) were adopted. In the Israeli case, a status quo was seemingly agreed upon between the se-cular majority and the religious minority back in 1948 in matters of church and state. Such impositions or agreements have not necessarily lasted in the various cases. Resentment and rejection of new reper-toires have also taken place in the various cases partly because of the lack of a settlement between competitive agenda, but plausibly also because there always is a group that is not content with the outcome of certain actions. This lack of contentment, if developed into a pas-sive hesitance, normally seems to have functioned as a factor of sta-lemate. On the other hand, if it developed into a state of active oppo-sition, it seems to have created the necessary dynamics for a contin-ued struggle about the desirable repertoires.

15. The continuation of the normal lack of agreement on matters of cultural repertoire among the groups which may have accepted in principle the process of establishing a new entity therefore guarantees that there will be a continued struggle about those repertoires. This may guarantee the continuous dynamism which will allow the crea-tion of new options, and above all – the legitimacy of making new options. In this sense, the "energy" that was set free, or created, dur-ing the activities involved with the making of new repertoires, may be safe to continue at least for some time if not halted by yet another stage of immobile culture.

16. The same kind of energy, however, may generate the opposite re-sults. If disagreements exceed a certain level, the co-habitation of multiple repertoires in the frame of one entity, and the pre-occupation with the elementary, or "core" agenda, for the various groups who would rather live by the one rather than by the other repertoire, hete-rogeneity does no longer guarantee survival, or success, but disorder and failure. This is often discussed in the social and the political sciences in terms of instability. In these discussions, naturally the fo-

cus of attention is human interaction or political power relations. These may more often than not be only manifestations of the cultural discrepancies.

The problem here, and it is a problem for which I see no solution at this stage, is that we do not know what the limits of heterogeneity might be in terms of repertoire disagreements. Parameters such as "small" vs. "large," "having existed for long" vs. "having existed for a short time" may sometimes help on a heuristic, but not on a general level. We may perhaps understand why Switzerland can cope with four languages representing four at least partly different repertoires without falling apart. But would the same model be working in other places? A state like France surely believes that if this is allowed, it will no longer survive.

The problem of the limits of heterogeneity and its repercussions for the survival and success of groups is in fact one of the most burning practical problems of modern socio-political entities today. The debate that was going on between innovators and conservers in terms of making new repertoires is continuing today between such groups in relation with the legitimacy of claiming equal footing not to large entities, but to various groups within such entities, whose repertoires have been ignored or even oppressed in the past. The trouble is that our wisdom ends here. The only possible hope is perhaps more thinking, more study, and more research.

IDEA-MAKERS, CULTURE ENTREPRENEURS, MAKERS OF LIFE IMAGES, AND THE PROSPECTS OF SUCCESS[1]

ABSTRACT

This paper argues that for human societies to achieve a level of existence beyond survival and heading for success, it is necessary, often indispensable, to have dedicated individuals, or dedicated groups of individuals, who are able to produce ideas – or at least images – that can be converted to alternative or new options for the repertoire of culture by which the life of societies is shaped and organized. These individuals have been, in the course of human history, of various and different types, but the main core of their activity has lied in their being "idea makers." Whether mostly intellectuals or cultural entrepreneurs, or even makers of life images through poetry and fiction, they have been a necessary condition for achieving well-being and success. Societies where this type of individuals – or groups of individuals – is remarkably missing often harbor in perilous situations, where they either are reduced to survival strategies of existence or fall in danger of cultural and physical dissolution.

1. This paper is about the relations between idea-makers and the prospects of success of groups. My question is: are idea-makers – and possibly also makers of life images – necessary, or even indispensable, for the success of groups?

This is not a question that has emerged out of the blue, or through some philosophical speculation or theoretical deductions. Rather, it has only slowly and gradually suggested itself, as it were, as a possible direction of research, for a number of puzzling riddles encountered in my work on the connections between deliberate culture planning and the creation of new socio-political entities. However, my

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subject is not to justify the question, but to try and analyze it as a factor in a larger and more general context than that in which it has originally emerged.

2. *The success of groups*. What is the success of groups? Throughout history, the major endeavor, perhaps the major enterprise, of human groups has been to survive. Those who have not managed to do so, perished. Those who have not perished physically often perished culturally. In such cases, although part of the members of the group may have physically survived, the failure to survive as a group with its distinctive culture often has put the individuals – who had previously belonged to a vital group – in an inferior state, if not outright a state of peril. Should we then consider the tenacity of groups, the ability to survive, both physically and culturally, an instance of generic success?

Although logically acceptable, I believe this is not what most people, as well as professional thinkers, mean when they use the word. *Success* is understood as something that is a more advanced achievement than survival. While survival may be conceived of as a minimum condition for *success*, the latter is normally understood as a state of affairs in which there is a *proliferation of options*. The success of both groups and individuals is often expressed in terms of access to resources and the ability, as well as the possibility, to select a desirable course of life *among many*. It implies, of course, that the desirable course of life provide more options, yielding various types of capital, or riches, often economic, but not necessarily nor exclusively so. It does not imply, however, that the success of a collective entity is equally shared by all of its individual members. The opposite, on the other hand, may very well be true, i.e., without group success, there is hardly individual success.

3. *Success as a relative variable*. It is clear, and the vast literature is very explicit about it, that *success* is a relative variable. There could never be *a-priori* set of options, nor a set number for these options, to define a universal state or level of success. The volume of the inventory of options, or the rate of option proliferation, is dependent upon two variables, which may or may not be connected, or even mutually dependent, in any given situation. The first variable is *the handling of changing circumstances*, and the second variable is *the presence of options possessed and practiced by another group*.

3.1. *The handling of changing circumstances* means that when changes occur, if the affected group does not produce new options to cope with these changes, the repercussions might be quite negative for the group. It does not mean that the group would not survive, but it would definitely not prosper, i.e., would have no success. It is a somewhat popular belief that changes, especially of some weight and size, always force human groups to produce appropriate measures. However, human history is full of examples of entities which either have not been able, or have refused, to introduce new options into their way of life, that is to their culture. Many of these have not even managed to survive, let alone prosper, but others have simply been pushed into declining conditions of life. If they had been prosperous before the changes, they may have become less so after these had taken place.

This inability, or refusal, is not a simple matter to explain. The historical circumstances may be quite misleading, and our ability as researchers may be very limited in trying to understand them. For example, how are we to understand the situation of the Mamluks of Egypt, in 1516, when confronted with the danger of the victorious Ottoman army? According to most historians, the Mamluks – who had been the mightiest force in the Middle East for three hundred years (1258-1517) – refused to use cannons against the Ottomans because they considered the weapon to be "dishonorable." In other words, they are believed to have refused a measure necessary for the physical survival of the Mamluk entity in Syria and Egypt in favor of sticking to their traditional way of life (Braudel 1976: 667).[2] Howev-

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[2] "The Mamluks, who considered artillery a dishonorable weapon, could not withstand the fire of Selim's cannon on 24th August, 1516, outside Aleppo. Syria fell overnight into the hands of the conqueror who entered Damascus on the 26th September. When the new Mamluk ruler refused to recognize Turkish sovereignty, Selim's army advanced into Egypt. The Mamluk forces were again shattered by Turkish cannon in January, 1517 outside Cairo." (Braudel 1976, p. 667)

er, we cannot be certain that this is the correct interpretation of the circumstances. Perhaps the overwhelming superiority of the Ottomans derived from a much larger stock of advanced options, in which the cannon was just one – though major – component, that the Mamluks could not possibly have embraced. Here, the inability to generate or provide new options under change is definitely present, too, but to such a scale that the presence of cannons might not have altered the historical outcomes. As succinctly summarized by The *Economist*'s anonymous reviewer:

The 20,000 Mamluks relied on tactics and equipment perfected in the 13th century. The highly trained, horse-mounted archers at the core of their army were no match for Ottoman foot-soldiers wielding new-fangled arquebuses, nor for the Turks' deadly light artillery. The Ottomans' logistics, with separate corps for transport, engineering, food supply and surgery, enabled them to keep 60,000 men in the field. […] The Ottomans also represented *a new kind of thinking* [underline mine – I.E-Z]. The regimes they replaced were feudal and venal. In the Mamluk realm, non-Muslims had been tolerated, but only just. The Ottomans had a different vision. […] (*Economist*, 12.31.1999, Vol. 353 Issue 8151, p.68)

Even more puzzling may be the case of the Tasmanians who are believed to have lost their power of resistance because of their unwillingness – among other things – to eat fish when the white man barred their access to other basic resources (Diamond 1993). Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Tasmanians perished mostly because they were cruelly slaughtered by the colonial invaders. They did not even possess the tools and weaponry that were available at the time to the Australian aborigines, with whom they had lost all contacts ten thousand years before the arrival of the Europeans. The Newfoundland Beothuks are believed to have perished because of their lack of capability to establish exchange with the European invaders, or generate sustainable alternative resources to compensate for those they have lost (Pastore 1991, Marshall 2001). The comparison with other Native

American tribes, it is argued by the historians, demonstrates that the ability to quickly develop exchange relations is what probably has saved such groups as the Micmacs of Cape Breton.[3]

In any one of these, and a host of similar examples, various causes for the supposed deficiency can be provided. Some of these have nothing to do with cultural preferences as such, but even in some of those which are explained by the unwillingness of some leaders of groups to allow change of repertoire for some whimsical reason, there is an aspect of cultural survival if the new component was identified as a menace to the contemporary state of the culture. On the whole, it seems that we have been too little aware of the sometimes extreme efforts invested by groups to prevent their disintegration into a collection of individual members who do not share at least a partly-overlapping repertoire of culture. While in quite a few cases this can be explained, either seriously or cynically, in terms of the ongoing endeavor to maintain power, in many other cases sticking together maintaining group solidarity, which is often based on a shared culture, has proved itself as the only way to survive.

To sum up, *success* is the ability of groups to provide, or generate – with the help of any accessible means – new or alternative options.

3.2. *The presence of options possessed and practiced by another group* means that if a group is actively exposed to options practiced by some other group, the more linked to a better access to resources these options are, the more likely it is that the exposed group would have to adopt them. There are many factors governing the chances of transfer of options from one culture to another (cf. Even-Zohar 2001), but basically what counts most is whether the options practiced by

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[3] This view is contested, however, by some recent historians. According to Holly Jr., "[…] a careful reading of historical documents and the archaeological record suggests that the Beothuk were actively seeking a means of adaptation throughout the historic period." (Holly Jr. 2000: 78)

another group may put the exposed group in a perilous situation of inferiority. In the view of most researchers, the sort of relations that takes place under such situations is a state of competition. While some states of competition may be of no further consequences, other may contribute to sometimes a quick deterioration of the exposed group.

For the ancient Egyptians, to take one conspicuous example from world history, the forceful introduction of horses and chariots by the Hyksos (17th century B.C.) constituted a real turning point in their history. Obviously, as Benette puts it "The old chariots pulled by mules or oxen did not stand a chance against the swift new horse-vehicles" (Bennette 1997). The import of the horse and chariot thus enabled *to maintain a competitive balance with other groups,* most notoriously with the Hittites and Mesopotamians. It eventually allowed the Egyptians the ability to avoid defeat by the Hittite formidable army of 2500 chariots in the battle at Kadesh (ca 1275 B.C.), an event considered by the Egyptians as a victory (see Redford 1992: 184-185). This allowed, though only some eleven years later, to finally come to terms with the Hittites, signing a memorable peace treaty with them which put the age-old strife behind them.[4] No less importantly, the adoption of the horse (and chariot) carried with it a whole array of new options, having to do with new professions that required new skills. These included knowledge about horses, chariot and wheel construction (Rovetta et al. 2002), and generated various new agricultural crops.

Transfers of repertoire from one group to another as means of proliferating (the repertoire of) domestic options have always been a major

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[4] The implications of the peace are succinctly summarized by Redford as follows: "The fifty years following the Egypto-Hittite peace treaty were halcyon days for the entire Near East. In the Levant, borders were now open from Egypt to the Black Sea, and from the Euphrates to the Aegean; and inter-national trade flourished as never before." (Redford 1992, p. 241.)

process in human history. As Diamond puts it, "competition between human societies that are in contact with each other is what drives the invention of new technology and the continued availability of technology." (Diamond 1999); the word "technology" can easily be replaced here by the more general term of "repertoire." Of course, being "in contact," in contradistinction to a state of isolation, is a precondition for any movement and flow of options between human groups.

To sum up, success denotes the ability to maintain a competitive balance with other present groups through the proliferation of the repertoire of options available to the group.

4. *Who has got the ability to proliferate options by putting forward new ideas.* What does it mean, in practical and concrete terms, that a group has or does not have the ability to generate and provide new or alternative options? Whose ability is it?

In everyday life, the overwhelming majority of people in any group do not engage in deliberately creating, or thinking about, new options for either themselves or the group. The major concern of "ordinary people" is to go on with their lives with the help of the options of the culture that they are already familiar with. Certainly, the repetition and reiteration of a given repertoire is a re-confirmation of its validity, and therefore people can be said to participate in a daily re-creation of their culture by permanently negotiating it among themselves (Davis 1994). Undoubtedly, to master a current repertoire in a satisfactory manner is not a simple matter, since many individuals never manage to do that, let alone generate new items for that repertoire. For ages life has been – and still is for a vast number of people around the world – sticking to the known and familiar. As Bernard Reilly's puts it in his description of life in Mediaeval Spain:

The overwhelming majority of people, then, lived in three mental worlds. The first was constituted by the nature to which they lived so close. It was the vegetative round of life, death, and life again that provided their sustenance, conditioned their everyday life, and dominated their mental images. In it everything was in motion but nothing ever changed permanently. (Reilly 1993: 153)

Against the background of this, when in need of new options, along the variables described in the previous passages, *most people are not*

equipped with the necessary capabilities to provide them. It has always been the task of a "small dedicated group of thoughtful" people (to use Margaret Mead's famous expression) to get engaged in the business of thinking, generating or providing alternative or unprecedented new options. These had to do with such disparate elements as family relations, gender roles, social hierarchies, principles of government and social management and organization, methods of writing and the making of texts, as well as the domestication of animals and crops.

This category of a "small group of people," who are involved with thinking about and providing or generating new options, undoubtedly emerged at the very dawn of history. There is much indirect evidence to that, at least since humans became sedentary. However, it is only in closer, historical times, beginning roughly with the 3rd millennium B.C., that we begin to learn more specifically about groups and individuals who get a stronger say than others on what shape might take the life of other people than themselves. More often than not, these are people who, by assuming power – normally as part of a group, even when power eventually concentrated in their own hands – have been able to carry out their ideas. These ideas often touched upon many aspects of life, and if they were involved not only in exercising power, but also in designing unprecedented or alternative options, they surely can be viewed as dedicated makers of future practices, thereby proliferating the stock of options made available to their group and contributing to its success. As such, they certainly contributed to the making of the cultures that shaped life for the groups under their control. They also made it their business to laud themselves for these acts, even when the ideas did not necessarily originate from their own heads. Interestingly, these efforts have often been successful, as we can detect accepted ideas in the common lore of many groups around the globe about the contributions of these outstanding – sometimes legendary – individuals. It is only dimly sensed sometimes behind the available explicit records that these individuals had in their group people with the privilege of criticizing them and suggesting new options to them. It is in this context that the story about Jethro, Moses' father-in-law, who takes the liberty of criticizing Moses' performance, seems to me to be very instructive. Here is how it is recorded in the *Book of Exodus*:

And it came to pass on the morrow, that Moses sat to judge the people: and the people stood by Moses from the morning unto the evening. And when

Moses' father in law saw all that he did to the people, he said, What is this thing that thou doest to the people? Why sittest thou thyself alone, and all the people stand by thee from morning unto even? And Moses said unto his father in law, Because the people come unto me […] When they have a matter […]; and I judge between one and another […]. And Moses' father in law said unto him, The thing that thou doest is not good. Thou wilt surely wear away, both thou, and this people that is with thee: for this thing is too heavy for thee; thou art not able to perform it thyself alone. Hearken now unto my voice, I will give thee counsel […] Thou shalt provide out of all the people able men, such as fear God, men of truth, hating covetousness; and place such over them, to be rulers of thousands, and rulers of hundreds, rulers of fifties, and rulers of tens: And let them judge the people at all seasons: and it shall be, that every great matter they shall bring unto thee, but every small matter they shall judge: so shall it be easier for thyself, and they shall bear the burden with thee. If thou shalt do this thing, and God command thee so, then thou shalt be able to endure, and all this people shall also go to their place in peace. So Moses hearkened to the voice of his father in law, and did all that he had said. (*Exodus*, Chapter 18: 13-24; King James Bible version)

Jethro, a token-representative rather than a historical person, was not unique, however, in historical terms. Gradually, more audacious people who came from outside the dominant group, or at least did not constitute part of the immediate entourage of power-holders, have emerged. These people joined in the activity of making ideas with the purpose of shaping the culture of the groups they belonged to, or creating new or modified groups in the first place. The novelty about them was that they did not aspire to take power themselves, though obviously without some sort of power, and perhaps a power of a different sort, they might have remained completely obscure to us. Their activity eventually led them into conflicts with the power-holders, with possibly costly consequences for them, such as losing life, property, or family. My contention is that these were the first wholly dedicated self-appointed idea-makers in world history, not commissioned by anyone to provide their goods.

I believe that the first figures of that kind we know of are the Hebrew prophets, people known to us by names, such as Amos and Isaiah – eighth century B.C., or Jeremiah – seventh and sixth centuries B.C. In spite of their audacity, they had to legitimize their subversive ideas by claiming to be agents of some higher authority, the invisible ruler of the universe, but in making that claim they also had to increase the power of that authority far beyond what was the contemporary common belief. The local god of the group was transformed to a universal

ruler whose authority extends beyond the boundaries of the national territory. It was certainly a new conception that had far-reaching consequences for what could be considered right or wrong.

The next group of idea-makers, making their appearance in Greece of the late fifth century B.C, emerged with Socrates (470?–399) as its leading and exemplary figure. They already forestall the modern brand of idea-makers, because they no longer needed divine legitimization. Instead, they were ready to take all responsibility upon themselves, believing in their ability as human beings to create their own ideas with critical categories that can be created and negotiated by the individual human brain.

5. *Makers of ideas which are convertible to options.* At various stages of my work, it seemed to me that the familiar term "intellectuals" could be used, with some modifications, to denote that particular brand of people who are capable of designing new options by brainwork. The trouble is that such usage is not compatible with some vernacular or academic habits. In both, the term mostly refers to "people with learning," "scholars," or "people in the academic institutions," or even as synonymous with "scientists." In yet other contexts, the term is used, especially in combination with the word "public," to denote people who publicly express ideas already sanctioned as "preferred." Often, the word is used to loosely denote any kind of people who do any kind of brainwork as their major occupation or engagement. This is of course not what I was attempting to describe in the previous passages. Obviously, there are so many kinds of people normally called "intellectuals" who definitely do *not* have the mental capabilities of producing ideas that may be converted to new or alternative options for the cultural repertoires of social groups. This does not mean that such people have not had these capabilities, or played that role, in some past – a possible reason for the continuous belief that they still carry on – but they often have ceased to be or do so at some remote or recent past.

In much of the traditional discussion of intellectuals, much emphasis has been laid on the first part of my formulation, that is, the "mental capabilities of producing ideas," but little to no attention has been paid to the qualification of these ideas as spiritual products that "may be converted to new or alternative options." I would like to argue that, whatever the label we put on such people, we take both parts of

my formulation as necessary conditions identifying them among many other types of brainworkers. This will make, I hope, the connection between certain ideas on the one hand and the cultural and social realities on the other more apparent. In view of this, people who display great knowledge and scholarship, who excel in scientific work, or who give magnificent expression to some shared sentiments of the groups to which they belong, though often recognized as intellectuals, do not belong in the category of idea-makers-as-options-devisers unless what they produce generates unprecedented processes. The historical fact that many types of brainworkers often endure hardships may be an unavoidable outcome of their activity in some societies, but hardships cannot serve as a criterion for identifying the type of idea-makers I am discussing here. It is therefore that I suggest leaving the term "intellectuals" to the market use, and henceforth refer to the type of actors I am discussing here by the hardly elegant yet clear term "idea-makers-as-options-devisers," or "idea-makers" for short.

6. *Idea-makers-as-options-devisers and cultural entrepreneurs*. To what extent idea-makers have been engaged in basically producing ideas rather than promoting them? If by "promoting ideas" we mean talking about them and trying to spread them around, no doubt most idea-makers we know about have done that either by themselves or through some close agents. Although no doubt world history may also be full of reclusive thinkers, these cannot be considered to be idea-makers in our sense. On the other hand, if we mean by promoting ideas some sort of activity towards implementing them, that is, making them not only heard and accepted, but also converted to socio-cultural reality by implanting them into the active repertoire of the relevant group, then we would find that idea-makers are clearly divided throughout history to those who are mostly engaged in producing and preaching their ideas and those who in addition also become active in attempts towards their implementation.

This latter brand of people, whom we may call "active idea-makers," actually also assume the role of *entrepreneurs*. Since they are engaged in the creation of new or alternative ideas for the repertoires of culture, it would be adequate to call them *cultural entrepreneurs*. This is not a current term in the human sciences. "Entrepreneur" is mostly used in economics for describing and analysing people engaged in generating new ideas and taking actual steps to implement them for solely economic purposes. Although an old concept (probably dating

back to the French Physiocrats of the eighteenth century [Formaini 2001]), it had to slowly break its way into the mainstream of theoretical economic thought. As late as 1986, Marc Blaug complains that,

It is a scandal that nowadays students of economics can spend years in the study of the subject before hearing the term "entrepreneur," that courses in economic development provide exhaustive lists of all the factors impeding or accelerating economic growth without mentioning the conditions under which entrepreneurship languishes or flourishes, and the learned comparisons between "socialism" and "capitalism" are virtually silent about the role of entrepreneurship under regimes of collective rather than private ownership. (Blaug 1986: 229)

Similarly to the lack of recognition of the vital role of idea-makers in various traditions of social and historical research, major traditions of economic analysis have rejected this concept. Marxian economic theories could obviously not accept the role of individuals as major generators of change in any domain of social life. "[…] for Marx," says Schumpeter, one of the founding modern theoreticians of entrepreneurship, "the business process runs substantially by itself, the one thing needed to make it run being an adequate supply of capital" (Schumpeter 1950: 556).

There seems to be no longer a dispute today among economists about the usefulness of the concept of entrepreneurship as an adequate tool of analysis. Entrepreneurship is also taught as a practical profession. This conceptual change, however, is attributed not to any development in academic thinking, but to the "profound change in the competitive environment," as Gary Hamel put it, a change which has created the situation, according to him, where,

In industry after industry, it is the revolutionaries – usually newcomers – who are creating the new wealth. […]. The point seems incontestable: in a discontinuous world, strategy innovation is the key to wealth creation. Strategy innovation is the capacity to reconceive the existing industry model in ways that create new value […]. Strategy innovation is the only way for newcomers to succeed in the face of enormous resource disadvantages, and the only way for incumbents to renew their lease on success. And if one redefines the metric of corporate success as share of new wealth creation within some broad opportunity domain – e.g., energy, transportation, communication, computing, and so on – the innovation imperative becomes inescapable. (Hamel 1998: 7-8)

Although a very encouraging development from my point of view, there are two flaws, or at least two weaknesses, in the argumentation put forward by Hamel and many similar analyses.

The first weakness is that what seems to us as an exciting and speedy change of gear may look to next generations far less dramatic, the way we often look back at events that have taken place in some remote past that seems to us incredibly slow. As I have been trying to argue throughout this paper, without the inventors of new or alternative options, nothing would have happened in world history. The dramatic introduction of grains and animals, the invention of the sickle (between 13,000 and 10,000 B.C.), or the introduction of writing systems has been no less dramatic than modern human and technological inventions. Moreover, it is now the view of most prehistory scholars that these innovations did not occur slowly and gradually, but were introduced rapidly and during very short periods of time, a view supported by archaeological evidence, and which is more compatible with the hypothesis of entrepreneurship than with the idea of spontaneous impersonal emergence of new options. In short, "strategy innovation," which can unproblematically be replaced with "initiating/visioning new options," is plausibly more intensive in certain periods than other, but has always been a major factor in the dynamics of human societies.

The second weakness is that viewing economic entrepreneurship only in economic terms hides from sight too many parameters which actively participate not only in the environment of entrepreneurial activities, but also figure as built-in features of the comportment of the entrepreneur. The inventory of available options is intimately linked with any clues for replacements, which makes the connection between the larger context of culture and the capabilities of a prospective entrepreneur an indispensable factor for any adequate analysis. Moreover, what might have been launched as an economic enterprise eventually may produce more consequences in the larger socio-cultural context. On the other hand, economists have deplorably ignored the overwhelming consequences for the proliferation of options, including clear-cut economic innovations, of the work carried out by idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs.

Some criticism of the narrow definition of entrepreneurship and success has already been vociferated by inner circle members of the

trade. For example, in a study by Paula Kantor on women entrepreneurs in South Asia, she says in a very clear voice:

Most studies of enterprise performance measure success through economic outcomes alone [...]. The measures include size of firm, change in number of employees, growth in sales or income, productivity, and returns. This narrow definition of success highlights only economic motivations for entering into self-employment, which tends to fit the male model of self-employment [...]. It does less well in reflecting women's motivations for starting a business, which include a desire for greater income as well as creating more opportunities for advancement than in the labor market, improving a family's livelihood position, self-fulfillment, and a greater ability to balance work and family roles […] Amongst poor women in both developed and developing nations, self-employment also is perceived as a means of empowerment through which women can reduce their dependence on the state or on male family members by gaining control over their own income [...]. (Kantor 2002: 132-133)

I believe that Kantor has been swept away too far by her distinction between the aspirations of males and females. The desire, attributed by her to women, "[...] a desire for greater income as well as creating more opportunities for advancement [...]" perfectly applies to the gist of intellectual and entrepreneurial labor throughout history. But this is not the main point here; the main point is Kantor's recognition of the fact that the purpose of entrepreneurial labor and part of its consequences are not entirely in the economic domain. This means that the notion of entrepreneurship in economic theories should and can be extended to encompass the socio-cultural context. In concrete terms, this may mean that economic analysts understand that not only what seems to be just economic enterprise may have consequences beyond economy, but that the intellectual labor at large, which is not targeted towards economic enterprises, may constitute a factor in the economy at least on two levels. The first is the idea-makers' direct activity in creating ideas convertible to options; the second is the general socio-cultural consequences of intellectual labor, which often play a part in creating the necessary environment, the milieu and the ambiance, that can enable entrepreneurship in the first place. On the other hand, it is also high time that the study of intellectuals be not confined only to students of the History of Ideas.

7. *Makers of life images.* While both idea-making and entrepreneurial labor is manifest, more often than not, in explicit and direct ideas, the making of new options has also been carried out throughout history

through images, metaphors, and the depiction of alternative, different, or new models of life. Such semiotic products already emerged in writing at the dawn of historical times. While many of these products certainly have served the purpose of reinforcing socio-cultural control by promoting preferred interpretations of life circumstances, other turned out to be at odds with the prevailing preferences. Like many types of intellectual products, these images could then clash with the contemporary accepted options of life by possibly showing that there might be there some other possibilities. I am of course referring to the vast activity that is nowadays called "literature," and to the variety of texts we habitually refer to as poetry, fiction, and drama. It can easily be extended to similar and parallel media like motion pictures.

From the point of view of the subject I am discussing here, these products can be most adequately described as "life images." One of the major achievements of the so-called Russian semioticians – such as Lotman, Uspenskij or Ivanov – was their analysis of literature as a major contributor of "potential models of life." They have shown us the way to conceive of the literary activity as a major industry capable of providing tools for both understanding and operating in actual life. That is, products such as fiction and poetry texts provide not only explanations, justifications and motives, but also – or sometimes in the first place – plans (or "scripts") of action. The people who read or watch these products not only get from them conceptions and coherent images of what is supposed to be "reality," but can also extract from them practical instructions for daily behavior. Thus, the texts propose not only how to behave in particular cases, but how life should be organized: whether to execute, and in what ways, various options. For example, fall in love, eat profusely or scantily, get married, have children, work or avoid working, feel happy for dying for the fatherland.[5]

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[5] For a more detailed discussion see "The Role of Literature," above (Even-Zohar 2002).

The validity of this function goes, of course, only up to a certain limit; as providing these tools cannot be taken to always be the major purpose of this industry, cases of complete misunderstanding have not been rare. Cervantes' *Don Quixote* and Flaubert's *Madame Bovary* are only two too famous examples of such *bona fide* misunderstandings. The same holds true of the status of the producers, who sometimes, in particular in more modern times, have been confused with idea-makers and accorded all the latter's privileges as well as hardships. It is because of some historical coincidence since the Italian Renaissance, that the makers of life images have been identified throughout with intellectuals, and the latter with idea-makers-as-option-devisers. Like the case of philosophers and other thinkers who may or may not have functioned as idea-makers, so it is with the case of the makers of life images – writers, poets, painters, composers, film directors and others. It is our task to examine in each particular historical period whether their labor has produced such images that served as a source for ideas that could be converted to the creation of new or alternative options. However, even if these images may have served to only promote, encourage, make more practicable, or more understandable, the sometimes abstract proposals of idea-makers and entrepreneurs, then their status and function as at least part-time generators of proliferation of options need be recognized, too.

In periods of great oppression, when intellectuals of various kinds often must either hide or go in exile, the makers of life images, lyrical poets and storytellers, who are not identified by the oppressor as dangerous, can still engage in their indirect activity of devising different options. Criticism against a ruler can still be expressed in disguise. In poems written for children on a crocodile, a flea, and cockroaches, all criminally oppressing society, the Russian poet Kornei Chukovski – to take one of thousand examples – could still hint that tyranny would not last for ever, and that a brave new world may shine beyond the horizon. Many of the most vital national movements of the 19th and 20th centuries started with poetry as their only alternative for expressing new preferences. Often, the poets themselves, such as Rosalía de Castro of Spanish Galicia, have become symbols of those implicit ideas that only at a later stage would be formulated more expressedly and compellingly by intellectuals or entrepreneurs. On the other hand, there are also many examples of poets and writers who have become active cultural entrepreneurs, often using the so-called

symbolic capital they had accumulated through their imaginative writing as convertible assets towards efficient entrepreneurship.[6] This does not mean that such people have always escaped the fate of being put in jail even for what we would consider today humble suggestions for a different world. And the more colorful the person, the more likely is it to witness dramatic measures taken against him, as might illustrate the infamous case of Alexander Pushkin, whose killing in a duel was concocted and orchestrated by the tsar of Russia and his army's chief-of-staff (Jakobson 1975).

8. *The industry of ideas and who are those who assume roles therein.* The aggregate of activities engaged by idea-makers, cultural entrepreneurs, and makers of life images can be conceived of, in view of its function and consequences for the life of individuals and groups, as an industry. I have argued that it is not some negligible, but a major industry, which I have claimed to be a pre-condition for societies to exist and be able to compete with other societies. It can be labeled "the industry of ideas for the proliferation of options." I would like to emphasize that, much because of the established historical images, clearly created and promoted by the various professional lobbies of intellectuals and artists, we tend to confuse people who may have assumed roles in some periods through specific types of activities, with those who still are carrying on with the same activities, but no longer function, nor create any consequences, for the cultural repertoire in terms of option proliferation. I may be taking a completely wrong direction here, but I believe that, similarly to any industry, if people go on producing ideas or taking initiatives without any consequences for success, then they no longer work within the industry, or that the industry they are engaged in does no longer produce effective products. I am referring to the simple situation where those who engage in those professions historically connected with intellectuals and cultural en-

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[6] On the role of literature in contributing to the making of entities see "The Role of Literature," above (Even-Zohar 2002).

trepreneurs may no longer be those who devise and generate the visions for new and alternative options. I would argue that they may still create a certain amount of "noise" which often leads to the creation of "general energy" without which a group may fall into various degrees of stagnation (cf. Even-Zohar 2000: 49), but they no longer contribute to success. Perhaps they even may belong to the forces that reject new options and abhor change.

Its is therefore our task, as culture researchers, to try and trace down, in each particular group, and in each particular time, who are the people in the industry. We know that in the course of the 19th century, people engaged in talking about grammar and spelling of some language not yet in use, philologists and historians, philosophers and other thinkers, sometimes amateur scholars, have intensely participated in manufacturing new options, which indeed changed the state of affairs – and subsequently the lives of many individuals – in many territories and societies. This, however, does not make it an automatic matter to limit our observation to only this group of people, and their likes, in search of those who actually assume the roles today. Not only these may no longer be people in the so-called cultural industries – thinkers, philosophers, writers, artists – but they may hide somewhere far from the public eye, devising the new options or getting involved in enterprises that either gradually or dramatically change the lives of people, through completely different channels to those we have been able to witness or observe in the past. In such cases, the role of idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs should more adequately be attributed to them than to those who simply perpetuate some established activities that were efficient in some near or distant past. In various countries, such as Catalonia, Scotland, or Iceland, where intellectuals certainly have led towards success during late 19th and early 20th centuries, it seems to be no longer the traditional type of idea-makers who created modern success. Some other, not yet fully or well identified small group of people, seem to have been functioning more recently as such crucial idea-makers and entrepreneurs.

9. Perhaps the connection between the industry of ideas and success is most visible in those places where it hardly exists. It is the combination of the presence of the industry in the successful cases and its absence in the less successful ones that can serve to support –at least as circumstantial evidence – the hypothesis of the necessity, or even indispensability, of the industry. In their book, *Living on the Edge*,

Lawrence Felt and Peter Sinclair analyze the strategies of survival with the help of which communities in Newfoundland manage to carry on with their lives. They name the Newfoundlanders' ability to employ these strategies a "successful adaptation […] based on flexibility, substitution and co-operation" (Felt & Sinclair 1995: 210). The words of "a former fisher turned truck driver" describe this kind of life:

What do I do for a living? I guess anything that comes along. I fished, worked in the woods, built the high school in Plum Point and been driving this truck for five years. Round here, you do whatever is available.

These heroic strategies for survival are definitely no success in the sense of option proliferation. When the existence is made possible only through maneuvering – as clever as it may be – between the few options that are available, we have a clear state of lack of success. It is my argument that the fact that idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs have been very active in such a place as Iceland, while almost completely absent in such a place as Newfoundland, has been a decisive factor in the success versus the non-success of the otherwise very similar groups. It belongs to a different paper to try and explain in more details the whats and the whys of these particular societies, but they certainly make us think that even incredible social solidarity of the kind described by Felt and Sinclair is not a tool that can push a society towards a competitive better quality of living. And no state *Economic Recovery Commission*, such as headed by Dr. Doug House (House 1999) in Newfoundland, even when its work is not obstructed by the local bureaucracy, can unfortunately alter that.

INTELLECTUALS IN ANTIQUITY[1]

In the epilogue to his exuberant book *Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times*, Donald Redford says:

The dominance of foreigners in the affairs of Egypt and Judah set the intelligentsia in both communities in a defensive posture. In Egypt, certainly from the Greek conquest, the temple personnel turned in upon themselves, and with the progressive loss of patronage and approbation by the authorities, began to consider themselves the last repository and bastion of the old ways of pharaonic times. In Judah, in a reactionary effort to hold the line, the sacerdotal mentors of the community linked orthodoxy with nationalism, and produced the intransigence of the Maccabees and the savagery of the zealots. (Redford 1992: 470)

I find these perhaps hastily formulated generalizations quite compatible with some hypotheses I have been trying to advance in my work on the problematics of subsistence in a framework of contact pressures in modern societies (see esp. Even-Zohar 2003). Redford's remarks encourage me to suggest the application of some of these hypotheses for discussing ancient societies. Admittedly, it seems a bit puzzling that at the very last accord of this overloaded work, a new category of people in the history of humanity – *the intelligentsia* – should suddenly make its grandiose appearance on the stage. Critically minded people might say that this is a slip of the tongue, perhaps something Redford could allow himself be written down without his customary meticulous elaboration, in an essayistic rather than exploratory tone, because it was put in the epilogue, that is, the place where some free tone is allowed. This, they might say, is but another instance of Redford's flamboyant style, a historical anachronism, a jargon that is more appropriate for discussing matters pertaining to the

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19th century and which therefore should be interpreted as having been meant to be a metaphor rather than a description of a real community of people playing a specific role in that remote moment in world history.

This is, however, not the way I would suggest understanding the quoted passage. I think that Redford is suggesting here, whether knowingly or unknowingly, a critical, however sketchy, explanation for the complex relations – or perhaps the Gordian knot – obtaining between power, success, and the role of idea-makers in the fate of communities. He is offering to discuss the inability of a community to allow innovations into its cultural repertoire as a growing failure to cope with intense changes generated by the more and more unavoidable presence of other cultural repertoires. He seems to suggest that this failure should be attributed to the specific community of people whose major preoccupation is with the production, distribution and the maintenance of ideas. This community is described to have practically replaced the political power-holders of ancient times, at least as far as the management of high cultural repertoire is concerned. It is argued that their ability to control the cultural repertoires makes them responsible for the gradual decline and the growing marginalization of these communities in a world they no longer fitted in, unlike the way their society is believed to have done in earlier, more successful times.

What I find interesting in these suggestions are basically the following points:

[1] The acknowledgement of the role of the intelligentsia as a decisive factor in shaping the life of communities.

[2] The suggestion that the factors governing the existence of communities have to do with inter-groupal relations. It is these relations that determine whether the community is successful, prosperous and influential, or the very opposite.

[3] The implied idea that the intelligentsia is above anything else the custodians of the *repertoire* they believe indispensable rather than the champions of the *community.* The maintenance of the repertoire thus takes precedence in the way they act over the interests of the community.

[4] The implied idea that by restricting the cultural repertoire to the exclusively established components, the implicated community eventually harbors in a situation where it lags behind the other communities possibly competing with it.

Is it adequate to assume that the intelligentsia emerged in world history in the sixth century BC? Perhaps it would be more plausible to suggest that the intelligentsia which became visible, or possibly surfaced, in the sixth century BC indeed crystallized as such during that century and not before. Whether operating as a coherent and coordinated group, or whether divided into conflicting parties, it basically functioned as a surrogate of political power as a source of decisions. In the history of the Jews, to follow Redford's example, especially after the destruction of Jerusalem by the Romans, no doubt the established intelligentsia took it upon itself to replace political power, directing the daily life of the community by devising a complex codex of substitutional laws for many centuries to come. However, even if this is indeed the case that the intelligentsia surfaced so late, I believe it would be completely wrong to assume that such a category of people could have assumed so strong a position in controlling the cultural repertoire, and through it the community which embraced it, had it not existed in some mode before.

I believe we only need to simply remind ourselves of what is common knowledge, namely, of the fact that groups of people capable of maintaining, handling and directing some formalized stock of life-instructions had existed since the dawn of history, and probably long before that. I am obviously referring here to the group of skilled workers in the industry of handling ideas, who have always been available to all sorts of power in the ancient world, as well as in every subsequent stage in history. This is a very heterogeneous group, which included among others managers and agents of cults and beliefs, as well as more technical workers in the professions of reading, writing, and deciphering ideas, texts and messages. While some of them were operating at the very core of power, thus under the immediate control of power-holders, others naturally were working more marginally, somewhat removed from power, a position which might have given them some opportunities for relative independence that the more centrally located workers could not entertain. It is not unlikely that this unavoidable state of affairs has given rise to the option of

assuming substitutional power by members of the intelligentsia at the later stages of ancient history, as hypothesized by Redford.

One can also ask whether it is adequate to consider all people whose major preoccupation has been with producing or maintaining ideas as members of an established intelligentsia. I am afraid I cannot trace in Redford's argumentation any hint to any other sort of people engaged with the business of ideas. In other words, Redford does not mention people not engaged in the maintenance of cultural repertoires. I am referring here to a category that seems to be far less evident for many historians, namely self-appointed idea-makers, people who were working not only as *critics* of the institutionalized worldview or contemporary politics and culture, but also as *producers of new alternatives*. I am fully aware of the fact that while we are familiar with this category of people in the modern era, where these have often been depicted in romantic terms, many of us might find the idea that such people might have existed already in antiquity a bit odd. Indeed, it is very hard to find traces of such people in the history of the large and powerful states of the ancient world. The only written tradition where they loom large is the Hebrew scripts commonly known as the Bible.

Edited at a later stage, thus certainly reflecting views and beliefs much closer to the sixth than to high antiquity, the Hebrew scriptures nevertheless contain information about individuals whose activity has not been contested as either fabricated or anachronistic. I am obviously referring here to the so-called Hebrew prophets, people known to us by names, such as Amos and Isaiah – eighth century B.C., or Jeremiah – seventh and sixth centuries B.C. In the texts attributed to them, as well as in the stories about their activities, they take the liberty of expressing attitudes, ideas and beliefs that sharply contradicted those of the established guardians of the cultural repertoires backed by contemporary power. One could argue that they cannot be equaled with really independent intellectuals since in spite of their uncontestable audacity they still needed to legitimize their subversive ideas by claiming to be agents of some higher authority, namely, the invisible ruler of the universe. Unlike Socrates and all those who followed in his footsteps, the prophets did not consider themselves personally responsible for their ideas. However, by attributing their ideas to a universal ruler who does not discriminate between humans, they were not simply using a recognized source of legitimization, but actually re-invented that source, going far beyond, and in contradiction

to what was the contemporary common belief. Transforming the local god of the community, the god who had "chosen his people," into a universal ruler whose authority extends beyond the boundaries of the domestic territory and for whom all human communities were equal, was in itself at least as dangerous an act as the scandalous teachings of Socrates.

The prophets, many of whom take particular care to spell out their relatively humble origin as positive credentials, would definitely not fit into Redford's description of the established intelligentsia. They are everything but keepers of an inherited repertoire that should not be changed. In this sense, they are indeed the most conspicuous forerunners of later time's idea-makers and dedicated intellectuals. The fact that we have not been informed about similar actors in neighboring communities is no proof of their absence. In view of the fact that deliberate changes have been initiated and implemented in all ancient societies, I believe it would be preferable to assume that they must have existed, although perhaps under different shapes and personalized by various people not necessarily carrying out overtly as contesters of established ideas and proponents of new ones. I believe we must not expect them to either look or act either like the Hebrew prophets or the people who emerged at later stages in human history, but instead look for people who, by disagreeing or contesting an established repertoire, have played a role in introducing innovations and change.

It is generally accepted that it is by the third millennium BC that we actually begin to learn more specifically about individuals who get a stronger say than others on what shape might take the life of other people than themselves. More often than not, these are people who, by assuming power are able to carry out their ideas about the shapings of life. In many cases, the act of assuming power was in itself part of the struggle for implementing certain ideas which had to do with changing the conditions of life for the community that these people were aspiring to rule. I believe it is obvious that if these people were involved not only in exercising power, but also in designing unprecedented or alternative options for the life of their human environment – whatever their motives or gains might have been – they surely can be viewed as initiators and makers of practices. Throughout antiquity, many such engagements were not carried out casually, but quite deliberately and often with great self-consciousness. This can be in-

ferred, *inter alia*, from the fact that many of these power-holders made it their business to laud themselves for their innovative acts. It is only dimly sensed sometimes behind the available explicit records that these individuals had in their closer or more distant entourage people with the privilege of criticizing them and suggesting new options to them. However, the fact that they functioned as power-holders does not make them unable of functioning as idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs, before they may at some stage switch over to mostly protect their innovations by prohibiting change. New contenders may then emerge to work for their removal, or succession, for the sake of implementing new life-management policies.

Long before some sixth century BC intelligentsia had substituted power in some ancient societies, the originators of ideas exercised power, assisted it, or clashed with it in a variety of channels either already available or newly created. This chapter in world history awaits its recovery, like a hidden Avaris salvaged from the shadows of the past by the admirable Manfred Bietak. I think it is high time, in spite of all the objective difficulties involved with such an endeavor, to look more thoroughly for these people in antiquity. Such a quest would help us bridge the conceptual gap between ancient and modern times.

INTELLECTUAL LABOR AND THE SUCCESS OF SOCIETIES[1]

Intellectual labor is a term that refers to many types of ideational activities, whose semiotic products range from images and narratives to explicit ideas about the management of human life. These products can be verbal, that is carried out through language, or non-verbal, that is carried out through other means, such as buildings, paintings, sculptures, music, or dance. Their efficiency depends very much on the status of the generating industry, which basically emanates from its particular degree of institutionalization and establishedness in the society in which it is embedded. These products enjoy vast consumption: they make the materials from which our ways of thinking, viewing the world, and acting in the world derive. Beliefs, feelings, sentiments and hopes, tools for evaluating everything that goes around, and for generating action – all derive from the products distributed by the intellectual industries. There is no way to evade the permeating presence of the intellectual products in any human society. Whatever the origins and the circumstances under which they have been made might be, their function as a blueprint for the management of both individual and collective life has been recognized by all students of society. As an aggregate, they constitute human culture, which according to Geert Hofstede's suggestion functions as 'software of the mind' (Hofstede 1997) – the hidden scripts, the "strategies of action" (Swidler 1986), with which humans manage their lives.

Is intellectual labor carried out by countless anonymous workers or by individuals who are more prominent than others? On the one hand, a handful of "great names" have been traditionally presented as those

who have indeed directed the course of things in all human societies. On the other hand, the flow of both repeated events and change in those societies have been presented as the outcome of anonymous forces, the consequence of "objective factors" that have little or nothing to do with the work of individuals. Without delving too deeply into the nature of these disagreements and controversies, which often divide groups of researchers and sets artificial frontiers and borders between different disciplines, I would risk being accused of shallowness by saying that unless one takes extreme positions there need not be any contradiction between the recognition of the indispensable work of individual producers on the one hand and the anonymous forces of society on the other.

The perpetuation of products, or otherwise the maintenance of the recurring repertoire of possibilities for life management, is not possible without a reinforced agreement on a daily basis. As John Davis has remarked, culture would not exist without the daily negotiation among the members of society, who actually produce and reproduce on a daily basis the necessary tools for social management:

[…] Every action and thought which involves other people is creative sociability, attempting to make a social world which is secure and stable to live in. It is continuous, pervasive, inescapable that we create as we go along: the words I utter reaffirm my commitment to a particular language which I re-create and modify as I speak. My spouse and children and I negotiate to create a family – one which is different, you may accept, from the family in which I am a child. This is a universal, popular and irrepressible activity: everyone is creating most of the time – a universal human propensity to make arrangements which we hope will be relatively stable and durable. (Davis 1994: 99)

In this sense, society operates as a marketplace, where the exchange of daily intellectual products is carried out anonymously by just about everyone. Societies with a high level of such successful daily exchange are "stable and durable" in Davis's formulation. It is generally agreed that societies strive to achieve the stability and durability, which in concrete terms means a high level of repetition of the options available for the management of life. However, Davis actually refers to a situation where he "re-creates and modifies as he speaks." This means that modifications cannot be avoided even when a strong tendency for avoidance of change is prevalent. This is basically so because people often deviate even from their repetitive habits. People

also make mistakes, that is, introduce modifications unintentionally. In addition, there cannot be a full transmission of culture from one generation to the next, partly because new generations not always are able to observe and learn everything they have been either shown or taught, partly because individuals have different learning curves, and last but not least, because at least part of the new generation do not really *want* to follow their predecessors.

Although the tendency for durability may be widely spread among the members of a group, and popularly supported in everyday life by generations of people, it normally becomes overt and acknowledged when manifest on an institutionalized level. There is always a group of people who take it upon themselves to keep the society for which they consider themselves responsible as a durable culture. These people, who may be engaged in a large variety of intellectual industries, generate the necessary ideas, images, artifacts, habits and measures to reinforce and reaffirm the repertoire of options that they want to protect against modification. In addition, at least part of them is also engaged in a host of activities where all of these are told to people. They may act in various and different fields as teachers, preachers, tribunes, or anyone in position to talk to people, tell them what to do or at least try and persuade them. These individuals are the preservers of the current order. They are the ones who create labels, standards, and canons, the "legitimizing discourse, a mode of persuasion which would secure consent" as Lawrence has put it (Lawrence 1996: 59). Undoubtedly, from the point of view of defending the interests of the group for which they stand, their contribution is not only substantial but indispensable for the continued existence of the group, for its coherence and eventually for its survival over time.

The standardizing agencies, those preservers of the current culture, can however become an obstacle on the way of a society to maintaining itself over time. It may look, if we observe the history of a society in a superficial way, as if the transition from a positive and indispensable role to a negative and damaging one is so quick that the people who happen to get caught in such situations cannot really understand what might be wrong with what they are doing. Normally, turning points or tide reversals take place abruptly, but the processes leading to such reversals may have taken a much longer time, un-remarked and unobserved even by the most trained eyes. In such situations, the majority of the members of a group, trained as they are to employ

durable strategies, are not likely to be able to know what to do, and that includes the very need to be aware and understand that something has changed that requires new measures, that is, that the established options of the current culture can no longer be helpful. A different type of intellectual products – ideas, images, anything that can tell people what to do differently – becomes necessary.

The type of producers that now may or may not emerge is different from the preservers of durability. These are people who must now produce *new* options, meaning new ways of thinking, new images, new ideas, new values, new procedures and strategies. They are often called "innovators," "inventors," "revolutionaries," "heretics," and many other labels, depending on the time and the territory, and on the way they are evaluated by their contemporaries. As it is the case with the providers of consent, some of these people can only make intellectual products but have no capacity to propagate them or create the means by which they can be implemented. Others, who often do not create any new options by themselves, may or may not emerge to be able to translate potential options to realities. The first category of people can be called "idea-makers," while the second is often called "entrepreneurs." It is not unlikely that idea-makers and entrepreneurs might be the same people, but this is not a general rule, which is why I suggest thinking about what they do in terms of roles rather than in terms of persons.

When we study a variety of historical cases, it becomes apparent that what we may have diagnosed as "change" is not at all identified by the contemporaries as such. Moreover, analyzed from an "objective" perspective (a general name for many methodologies), no change could be said to be imminent. It is therefore a permanent question in any theory of change whether the designers and the entrepreneurs of the new options are people who have sensed somehow that a crucial turning point has come about or whether the turning point is their own creation, something they have initiated, an enterprise that is not necessarily warranted by the "real" circumstances but emanates from some other sources.

While for specific historical situations one can argue in favor of the one rather than for the other explanation, on the level of generalization we should better recognize that the production of new options for the management of life can be a reaction either to some explicit, con-

spicuous and overt events, or to implicit, hidden and completely co-
vert processes, or, if you wish, some "floating options" that hover in
some environment in some close or remote vicinity.

In other words, at times irregular circumstances may emerge to be-
come pressuring factors that need to be urgently dealt with. These are
moments where everyone can be aware of the irregularity of the situa-
tion, and it may be relatively easier for people to accept that someone
should come with relevant suggestions for new options. A typical
case of this type are catastrophes and misfortunes, whether caused by
nature, such as drought, inundation, volcano eruptions and earth-
quakes, or caused by man, such as war, famine or ocean fish depletion
caused by overfishing. At other times, on the other hand, no visible
circumstances emerge to suggest that any steps should be taken in
order to solve some situation that is not even seen, sensed or recog-
nized. When certain idea-makers then emerge to suggest that steps
should be taken, their suggestions are more likely to be rejected even
though they may be arguing that if the recommended steps are not
taken there will be negative repercussions for the well-being and even
the very survival of their society. People may react to the suggestions,
the new proposed options, with either indifference or rejection. These
options would be taken to be unnecessary, uncalled-for, ludicrous,
utopian to the extreme, or outright conflicting with the established
order.

The success of any new proposed options naturally depends on a va-
riety of factors. Speaking in broad terms, if the nature of the proposals
has to do with some focused decisions that must lead to some action –
such as using thermal waters for heating a city or founding a new air
company such as *Loftleiðir* – then, again, depending on the extent and
range of that action, it is not likely to have success without the ability
to mobilize those people who have the power to implement decisions,
replace them or circumnavigate them in order to implement those de-
cisions. These options, however, may not be available to idea-makers
under all circumstances, which naturally leave them with only those
options that might be available, depending on the degree of risk, both
personal and collective, which they are prepared to take. Neverthe-
less, there is one more option, which often means in practical terms
very slow movement towards a target, but at times may be, on the
other hand, extremely quick. This option entails not a direct mobiliza-
tion of power-holders, but of the large masses, implementing not fo-

cused decisions but attempting to introduce a large-scale shift in major components of culture, that is the repertoire of life management options available to society.

Replacing any components of culture, as well as introducing new components, has never been a simple matter. However, inasmuch as culture is both perpetuated and modified by the mass of anonymous members of society, it is also interfered with by deliberate thinking and acting by specific individuals. Evaluated on a cross-cultural scale, societies appear to be different in their ability to on the one hand generate those individuals who would think and act in order to initiate change and innovation, and on the other to maintain a balance between the power given to those individuals and the options available to the masses. It is my contention that it is these two parameters that make the difference between failure and success of societies.

The range of states between failure and success is large. On the extreme, absolute failure simply means ceasing to exist. The Tasmanians or the Beothucks are just two such cases out of many. It would be much more difficult, on the other hand, to think of the meaning of "absolute success." Theoretically, an unlimited number of options available to as many members of a society as possible would be an adequate description, normally known under the name of "utopia." However, in between those extremes there is a whole series of possibilities. For example, famine, diseases, a high rate of mortality and a very restricted number of options for the management of life in general would obviously be universally evaluated as a state of affairs far removed from success. In contrast, some ability to access food resources and maintain the group across generations would be some success, obviously the lowest level of it, though no one thinks of it in these terms. More often than not, such a mode of existence is called "survival."

Survival certainly does not connote either success or prosperity, but it nevertheless requires basic proficiencies, skills, and some abilities of solution making. It requires the ability to maneuver with a restricted inventory of options. In their book, *Living on the Edge*, Lawrence Felt and Peter Sinclair even name this ability a "relatively successful adaptation […] based on flexibility, substitution and co-operation" (Felt & Sinclair 1995: 210). Analyzing the strategies of survival with the help of which communities in Newfoundland manage to carry on with

their lives, they thus point at the "clever maneuvering" carried out by the members of the group. This entails learning a large variety of skills that can be traded off with other members of the community, shifting turns with relatives in getting employment and unemployment payments alternately, and the like. However, even if we could trace more conspicuous idea-makers among those who are able of clever maneuvering, it is obvious that they are not able to either think of or implement any options that aren't already known and used.

The survivalism described by Felt and Sinclair as typical of life in Newfoundland is not accidental. In the history of modern nationalism, I do not know of many societies that renounced their independence as a strategy of solving what seemed at the time to be an insoluble situation. In the Newfoundland referendum, carried out on July 22, 1948, a narrow majority of 6,989 people voted in favor of joining the Canadian Confederation (78,323 voted for Confederation, while responsible government garnered 71,334 votes). In the contract signed with Canada, the Confederation government, which was then very eager to have control over Newfoundland, committed itself to certain obligations, such as providing the new province with certain supplies and services (among many other, guaranteeing for example a certain number of regular ferries from Nova Scotia to Porte aux Basques). I guess this sounds quite familiar to my audience here in Reykjavík, surely reminding them of what happened in 1262 in this country.[2] Indeed, what happened in Newfoundland after the unification does not seem to be very much different from what eventually took place in Iceland after 1262, although the span of time is not the same.

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[2] In 1262, the Icelanders accepted the sovereignty of the Norwegian king and ceased to be an independent entity. "In return the king agreed to preserve the domestic tranquility of the island and not to introduce new laws for Icelanders without their consent. Furthermore, he agreed that six ships were to sail to Iceland during each of the next two years, and afterward as many were to come as both the king and notable Icelanders should decide." (Gelsinger 1981: 178)

To cut a long story short, similarly to what happened in medieval Iceland, a short-term, immediate improvement of life conditions in Newfoundland gradually faded into a period of long deterioration. Again, similarly to what happened in Iceland, gradually the Confederation government lost interest in the province – though naturally for different reasons – and basically broke many of its commitments. The massive cash flow and the improvement of supplies, such as the so much propagated milk powder, undoubtedly not only improved conditions of life for a number of years, but probably even saved the lives of many people. There seems to have been a short period of great enthusiasm and a feeling that Newfoundland now finally joined the rest of the modern world. "[...] industries, office buildings, welfare services, commerce and consumer goods, the university, technical schools, and road construction" – all were transplanted to Newfoundland, as well as "A Chubby Chicken outlet, a billowing smokestack, a classical symphony, earth-moving equipment, supermarkets, pavement, and water and sewer pipes" (Crocker 2001: 86). In addition, many industries which were "most swiftly constructed, were born in a rapid explosion of industrial growth aimed at the production of consumer commodities – chocolate bars, optics, glue, leather goods, maps, car batteries" (ibid.: 87).

However, "few of these lasted more than a couple of years" (ibid.: 87). Gradually it has turned out that what was not available before the unification, namely the cultural resources indispensable for prosperity, did not really emerge after the unification in spite of the massive transplantation of products and production facilities. As a matter of fact, quite the opposite has taken place: many of the people who potentially could have become major agents in the industry of ideas have left the province to go to mainland Canada, where better prospects of life attracted them.

In the middle of this precarious existence, a severe setback took place when, towards the beginning of the 1990's a natural disaster, the depletion of the ocean entailed the Atlantic Groundfish Moratorium in 1992, "with an immediate loss of 30,000 jobs within the fisheries and the subsequent 'ripple' effect on the economy causing the loss of an additional 10,000 jobs" (Borgen at al. 2002: 117). This reduced dramatically the ability to perpetuate time-honored schemes of life management. People simply could not go on exerting their historically inherited professional skills, and subsequently could not maintain

their habits of life. Men could no longer work as fishermen, and women could no longer work in the abandoned fish plants. All of a sudden, a compelling turning point dawned on the people of New-foundland, to have never been met by any effective solutions in way of introducing alternatives. While on the one hand various subsequent committees, appointed by governments, have been trying to propagate the idea of socio-cultural reshuffling (see House 1999), aiming to lead to the creation of a new cultural infrastructure that would make the necessary grounds for the emergence of solutions, the population at large has not been offered any real choices.

As I have argued, the majority of people in such situations, unless there is an established infrastructure for intellectual labor, are not likely to come with new options. The actual ways out that have emerged in Newfoundland have therefore become survivalism as de-scribed in *Living on the Edge* on the one hand, and a relatively mas-sive emigration on the other. To quote Crocker: "Men and women abandon the fishing berths of rural Newfoundland for the language schools of South-East Asia and the chicken factories of Alberta. The villages they leave behind are turned into museums. Houses, root cel-lars, and furniture have lost their functional value." (Crocker 2001: 84.) In dry numbers, between 1992 and 2002, the population fell by about 60,700 people (*The Economy 2004*). The depletion of the popu-lation of many localities as a result of emigration has naturally wea-kened the prospects of getting out of the loop.

The similarity between medieval and to some extent 19th-century Iceland, and modern Newfoundland is not continued in the new era. On the contrary, Iceland and Newfoundland seem to constitute sharp mirror images of one another. At two similar turning points in their respective histories, they made two diametrically opposed decisions. While in crisis, the people of Newfoundland decided to renounce their independence, whereas the people of Iceland decided to proclaim it

back. Both communities were living on islands with more or less the same size, with large portions of their territories inhabitable, both counting very small populations – Newfoundland consisting of 335,000[3] and Iceland of 126,879[4] people – both living under tough natural conditions (though Newfoundland has the disadvantage of a worse climate), both extracting their main livelihood from the ocean, both constituting clear-cut ethnicities (though Iceland had the advantage of having a more homogeneous population), both offering the restricted range of options for life careers, and both quite poor, at least in terms of the rest of the Western world.

About sixty years after those diametrically opposed decisions were taken, the status of the two communities is likewise diametrically opposed. While territory size, hardships of nature and still relatively small populations have remained unchanged, in terms of quality of life and livelihood Newfoundland, in spite of its natural riches and several promising projects (the Labrador Voisey Bay, offshore oil plantation etc.), lingers far behind.[5] This is manifest in about 15% unemployment and a continuing trend of population loss (although last year, 2004, a small reversal was noted with a surplus of 300

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[3] *Historical statistics of Newfoundland and Labrador* 1970. St. John's: Government of Newfoundland and Labrador. There are no specific data in this publication for 1948, but the figure for 1949 is 345,000 and the figure for net natural increase for that year is 9413, so the rough calculation for 1948 would be 335,000 people.

[4] Hagstofa Íslands (http://www.hagstofa.is), *Lykiltölur mannfjöldans 1703-2003*. In the Icelandic referendum, carried out on May 24, 1944, 71,122 voted in favor of independence and 377 against it. 69,435 voted for the Constitution, which was approved June 17, 1944, and 1051 voted against it. (Gils Guðmundsson 1951: 200-201)

[5] Officially, a more optimistic view is however expressed by Canadian agencies. According to *The Conference Board of Canada*, "The province of Newfoundland and Labrador is expected to post the largest increase in provincial real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002. Thanks to offshore oil projects such as Terra Nova, White Rose and Hibernia, Newfoundland's GDP will grow by 5.8 per cent." (New Release, May 28, 2002)

people). Above all, it is manifest, however, in a continued state of a small range of options. The management of life with the help of survival strategies is not only a matter of livelihood, but a matter of the range of choices in general.

Strong discontent with the union is popularly expressed by people and in the media. Although the number of people who now advocate secession from the union and the creation of an independent state for Newfoundland are quite small, the idea that independence could have been a better solution for the country is still held by at least half of the population, as was the case back in June 1948. It is not my intention to argue in favor of secessionism, nor maintain that had Newfoundland taken a different path back in 1948, its fate today would have been quite different, namely more likely to be prosperous and successful. My contention is that the difference between Newfoundland and Iceland, although manifest, among other things, in making these diametrically opposed decisions, does not lie in the opposition between "independence" and "the lack of independence." Rather, it lies in the *capacities* that have propelled these two communities to make different choices. It is the different repertoire of abilities and options, and, in more concrete terms, the different volume of intellectual labor carried out by them that has made them different.

In both popular and academic conceptualizations, and probably unavoidably so, there is a recurrent fragmentation of events and processes into many different categories. These categories more often than not follow only what can be overtly observed and has been publicly institutionalized. Quite often, this prevents us from being able to adequately evaluate what is taking, or has taken place in the life of societies and people. It is not that I am contesting irrefutable facts, such as the fact that the Icelanders really struggled for independence, or that the Icelandic language has been salvaged from dying out through the organized and deliberate endeavors of dedicated people. Nor am I contesting the need to study these events and processes in as great detail as necessary, as an attempt to explain the circumstances and the factors that contributed to specific outcomes. Political structures, literature, architecture, the arts, urban planning, the planting of trees, education, health services, general construction, irrigation and agriculture, fisheries, industries, music and sports – all of these can, and have been dealt with as separate categories. Again, I'm not contesting the importance, or the usefulness of these categories, nor the

assumption that they have their own specific patterns and regularities, functioning in some autonomous way in relation to various other fields. Certainly, if one wants to understand something about, say, the planting of trees in Iceland, one must dig into the relevant historical documents and find out how it was made possible after so many years of deforestation, as well as study the necessary botanical and climatic parameters relevant to the case.

While not rejecting the study of all of the categories mentioned above as useful and revealing, my contention is that by having been engaged with all of these acts throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, the Icelanders have not simply created an array of disparate facts such as an independent state, certain industries, new social structures, electric power or transportation networks. My contention is that by doing all of these they have developed something more powerful, something that functions as an infrastructure for the modern Icelandic society – the intellectual industries, which generate an ever-growing amount of energy. It is this energy that has eventually led to an ever-growing proliferation of options, constituting collective success, which has become both manifest and visible in several conspicuously established fields, such as "the economy," understood in its narrow sense. It is subsequently also my contention that the historical circumstances in Newfoundland have obviously not made it possible for such an infrastructure to have been developed.

In conclusion, I am calling for a better understanding of the deep processes underlying overt actions and the apparent manifestations of institutionalized phenomena. It is my contention that what seems to distinguish between different groups is the amount of energy generated by intellectual labor, comprising a large variety of industries and different types of agents, such as idea-makers, image-makers, all sorts of entrepreneurs and agents of transmission. When the volume of intellectual labor grows, meaning that more and more people actually can be effectively active in the industries, the amount of energy leading to higher levels of success definitely grows accordingly. If one wishes to trace the roots of the lack of success one must therefore try and evaluate the status, the relative presence or relative absence, of intellectual labor. If there are no conspicuous signs found for such labor, in all likelihood these are the roots of non-success. If certain from-above bodies such as governments in times of distress decide, in order to set things in motion or salvage a situation, to pour financial

and other resources into a certain community, without dealing with the intellectual infrastructure, these resources will generate energy in the form of employment and possible revenues, financial and social, for only a short term. As we can deduce from the case of Newfoundland, and many other less successful communities around the globe, there will sooner or later ensue failure and decline.

I think this principle was formulated poignantly by Manuel Azaña (1880-1940), later to become the unfortunate last President (1936-1939) of the Second Spanish Republic before the Civil War, in a talk he delivered as a young thinker on the eleventh of February, 1911, at the *Casa del Pueblo* of Alcalá de Henares, where he discussed the roots of lack of success of Spain:

It would be an error to believe that by introducing electric light, traveling by railroad and talking on the phone, we are already in the same current of ideas that has produced those inventions; as it would be mistaken to assert that by having a law of universal vote and a Parliament and a Jury, we live in democracy. In the history of the applied sciences Spanish names are absent; none of those modifications and manipulations of the natural forces have been invented in our house; and this, not for natural inability that would be absurd to suppose, but for another simpler and more shameful reason: for the reason that the electric telegraph and the vapor motors and the vaccines and the electrical appliances and the mechanical looms, are not things that are made or discovered accidentally, nor by the inspiration of God, but rather they are the result of a special way of understanding and loving life, of a deeper current of ideas whose manifestation and definitive and practical crystallization, visible to the masse, are called the marvels of science. (Azaña 1990: 55-56; translation mine)

DATED SOLUTIONS AND THE INDUSTRY OF IDEAS[1]

In Memoriam Xoán Gonza-
lez-Millán (1951-2002)

ABSTRACT

While the industry of ideas is indispensable for any community to achieve a level of subsistence beyond survival, enterprises related to the making of separate distinctive cultures may eventually harm this goal when the industry malfunctions. This peril seems to be built-in into the nature of the enterprise, since reshuffling and implementing repertoire shifts is more complex than replacing machinery and production procedures (which is not a little matter either). The paper proposes a number of parameters for the malfunction of this vital industry.

Almost ten years ago, I believe it was on the 4th of September, 1994, I presented my paper on culture planning at the seminar "Literatura Galega: ¿Literatura Nacional o Subalterna?" organized in Mondoñedo (Galicia). The chairperson of my session was Xoán Gonzalez-Millán, and of course I immediately thought of that session when I was invited to come here and talk at this Memorial Day. At that stage of my research on culture planning and the implications of entrepreneurial endeavors for mobilizing collective activities, I could not avoid drawing what I believed were inescapable conclusions not about the success of such endeavors, but rather about the traps and problems they entail. From the point of view of a Galician champion, such as was Xoán, some of my conclusions understandably did not have a very agreeable ring. The text was subsequently published in Galician translation by another good friend whose departure I deeply deplore, Carlos Casares. I was thinking that as disagreeable as those conclusions might have been for such devoted *galeguistas,* they never daunted the

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[1] Paper presented at the Xoán Gonzalez-Millán Memorial Symposium, Graduate Center, City University of New York (CUNY), September 5, 2003.

challenge to enter into discussions about them, discussions of the fiery nature that was so typical of Xoán, or of the cool and humorous one that was so typical of Carlos. This text is an attempt to expand my 1994 conclusions with regard to later research. I have imagined it as a talk directed to Xoán and Carlos, both of whom I dearly miss.

My work on "culture planning," initiated in the late 1970s,[2] has actually been an attempt to analyze initiatives taken by various communities in order to establish themselves as capable of competition on an inter-communal level. In these communities, idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs evidently arrived at the conclusion that the interests of the community they belonged to – or that would be created through their endeavors – would best be served by making or consolidating a distinctive domestic repertoire. The view shared by most such actors in many such communities has been that such an endeavor would allow the community a better level of life through a two-head sort of strategy: on the one hand claiming political self-management, thereby allowing the members of the targeted community a free, as it were, access to resources; on the other – by exploiting domestic resources, liberating, as it were, the members of the community from the hard task of competing over non-domestic resources. Both domestic repertoire and self-management have been perceived as allowing easier access to those ingredients of both cultural and organizational repertoires that are necessary for a better handling of the tasks of life.

The idea that political self-management must be an improvement for any group of people has long become a universal commonplace, hardly contested by anybody, and still being universally aspired to. The cases where a community, especially one living in a well defined territory, has not claimed self-management for itself seem to be rare in modern history. As far as I know, in the period since World War II,

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2 My first investigation on the deliberate culture planning in Palestine in the period between 1882 and 1948 was presented at a conference in 1978, subsequently published in 1980, 1987 and 1990 (Even-Zohar 1990).

there has been only one such case, that of Newfoundland, where in a referendum back in December 1948 a slight majority decided to give up the option of an independent state and join the Canadian confederation instead. In contradistinction, the overwhelming majority of communities around the globe, at least more than a hundred since 1945, whenever the opportunity had become available to them, decided almost unhesitatingly in favor of the self-management principle.

The idea of using domestic resources for constructing or "preserving" a separate local culture has likewise become a universally accepted dogma. The need of many groups to use a culture that was not "their own" has been conceived of as a major obstacle to the ability of individuals to attain success on a competitive level with other individuals for whom that culture was more accessible. In almost all of the enterprises since the end of the 18th century, the making of cultures for the sake of communities whose "cultures" had not been institutionally codified, has been presented as the clue to a better handling of life tasks for the vast majority of people. Much effort has been invested in the making or re-making of cultures, which, as a consequence, often have become as remote from the targeted native individuals as the cultures that were to be replaced. Today, it has become a dogma that a person who is not allowed, as it were, to use his domestic culture under all circumstances is put in an underprivileged position and is discriminated by what is commonly called the "dominant culture."

In all of the cases where the industry of ideas has provided communities with means of distinction, the dilemma often has been how far to go. On the level of political aspirations, there have always been – like with any enterprise – moderates and extremists. The extremists have always been interested in a radical solution, namely the establishment of a completely separate entity, such as a separate Catalonian or Scottish state. Moderates, on the other hand, have always preferred what many students of political science have labeled "the pragmatic approach." In various communities, the enthusiasm of the zealots has been tampered down by people more inclined to "pragmatism." In the 1994 referendum carried out in Quebec, only 50,000 votes prevented the province from transforming itself into an independent state. In the case of Slovakia, it has been maintained that the secession from the Czechoslovak confederation, in relation to which there are already hints of repent, has not been decided with a regular voting procedure. In the Faroe Islands, where many activists have been pro-

moting the idea of independence until quite recently, it seems nowadays that the majority of the people are taking a more moderate path, one which would allow them to have self-rule without seceding from Denmark. In Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque country, only small groups of people are thinking of secession. This small group in the Basque country is indeed very strident, but it does not seem to have mobilized the people at large.

The extent of distinction through the making and/or the institutionalization of a culture, on the other hand, is much more complex. Here we are not dealing with an either-or choice. In the most heated moments of making a new repertoire for a community, it is obvious that the policy taken by both inventors and entrepreneurs tends to be far-going. However, even in the most radical or extreme cases, where powerholders, usually helped by intellectuals, have attempted to isolate the local culture as much as possible from the rest of the world (or at least from the most relevant neighbors), the enterprise in its entirety could not last for long. On the other hand, certain specific items, where separation could be implemented, sometimes have been implemented with great success.

The most conspicuous item on the repertoire of many such cases has been a language attached to the cultural and political enterprise. Language creators and standardizers, especially those who had to create languages by distinguishing them from other similar ones (such as Norwegian, Galician, or Urdu), have taken – more often than not – many ingenious measures on a linguistic level in order to make their creations as distinct and different as possible. When doing that, they often ended up distantiating the regulated and standardized (or "normalized") product from the domestic resource upon which it had been based in the first place. In Norway of the 19th century, "the language of the land" (Landsmål), devised by Ivar Aasen, had from the outset many ingredients that had nothing to do with the language of the land from where it was pretended to have been composed (mostly "dialects" in Western Norway). In the modern state of Norway, where this language (in various modified versions) is now officially called "New Norwegian" (Nynorsk), one can hardly find any native speaker of this most authentic indigenous language which was to replace the language of the foreign colonial Denmark. The same actually applies to various other languages, though in many other cases successful inculcation has been able to introduce the new creations into actual

common use. In France, Sweden, or Italy, the non-spoken variants of the respective literary languages introduced by the cultural entrepreneurs of the 19th century have almost become a daily reality. In other cultures, such as Iceland, the principle of extreme distinction, even though it was not an omnipresent feature of the domestic vernacular at the turn of the 19th century, has been successfully implemented.

However, in a more and more competitive world of the 20th and 21st centuries, the principle of maintaining highly separate and distinct cultures is becoming more and more problematic. This is not to say that this might not have been the case already at the time when the creation of these separate cultures was initiated in the first place. However, implementing this principle probably has been the only viable alternative for those involved in the enterprise of making cultures. In other words, it may not have been practical from a practical point of view, but it certainly may have been indispensable for gaining the necessary symbolic capital which would allow the targeted community to achieve the goals it had been striving for. In some communities, the awareness of this conflicting interests perhaps might have led to a less energetic endeavor to implement in the daily reality those items recognized as indispensable for gaining a symbolic capital. In Ireland, in spite of the most recent Language Act (passed on the 14th of July, 2003), "the state has moved Irish off the centre stage […] Irish is no longer required to join the civil service except in the Department of Foreign Affairs.," according to Tadhg Ó hIfearnáin (Ó hIfearnáin 2000, pp 98-99). In Scotland, now enjoying a recently established self rule, the attempts to revitalize "a synthetic modern Scots" (probably following the example of Ivar Aasen's Landsmål) died almost completely out already towards the end of the 1950s, evidently replaced by assigning a higher status to the local accent of Standard English. All over the world, from New Zealand to Black Africa, there are lots of symbolic items which have remained symbolic, often ending up in the shape of "folklore," that is, put in use only in specific festivities and other special occasions.

The question how far one needs to go in trying to make a distinct repertoire of culture in order to alter living conditions of a community cannot be answered without the necessary historical context. And here is the root of the catch which is built in into such endeavors. Most likely, at the very moment when a differing and distinct repertoire is absolutely indispensable for achieving the goals set for the communi-

ty, it is already beginning to stop rendering the results for which it has been devised. For decades and decades, communities around the globe have been competing about which has created the most distinct, "original," symbolic products and other items of repertoire that would allow them to justify, as it were, their separate mode of existence. Even technology has not fully escaped the race, with such items as TV broadcasting techniques completely different between, say, France and the rest of Europe, different measurements between most of the world and the United States, and many others stubborn relics of parochial standards (such as telephone and electricity sockets). In the course of the twentieth century, people have been trying everywhere to create, promote or reinforce distinct types of architecture, food, music, painting, or any other imaginable item (such as the Maori *ta moko* tattoo; see Pritchard 2000). One may ask: was it really necessary to create, to take one example out of many, "a distinct Icelandic architecture"? The answer might be: Probably no less than the need to keep and maintain a distinct Icelandic language from the point of view of the group of people interested in maintaining an Icelandic successful community. However, the endeavors towards that end have now tempered down, if not stopped altogether. It seems as if the point has been stated, and now people do not need it anymore, since everything that is created in Icelandic architecture is by definition distinctly Icelandic even when it shares many features with other instances of architecture around the globe.

What is it I'm actually discussing? The point I'm trying to make here has to do with the ability or inability of the industry of ideas to perform flexibly when the erstwhile conditions that have given rise to a certain enterprise eventually change in such a way which puts in doubt the usefulness of keeping that enterprise going unchanged. In concrete terms this may mean either modifying the components of the enterprise, or completely replacing it by a different one. In spite of the fact that ideas, in contradistinction to machinery and materials, are cheap and mobile, this is something that few individuals, let alone communities, are capable of doing. Since the industry of ideas has to move within culture, and culture consists of a complex repertoire of options inherited from previous generations and painstakingly inculcated into the minds of human beings, introducing major turns in that repertoire over a relatively short span of time is not an easy task. Moreover, cultures are not necessarily target-oriented, and the ability of the members of a culture to sense danger to the community em-

bracing that culture, in such a way that would instigate crying out for replacements, is not always ever present, to say the least. The industry of ideas, inasmuch as it exists in a certain community, may therefore – more often than not – malfunction in the course of its history as a provider of possible solutions for difficult or challenging situations. The repercussions of such situations may cause a lot of damage, unless a mass of balancing wills and acts by "ordinary people" is set in motion, something which simply doesn't often happen. Although it is very difficult to determine whether the origin of "public opinion" is popular interpretation of the industry of ideas or ideas produced "from below," media studies have shown very convincingly that it is the industry that tends to be the origin (see also Bourdieu 1983 [1972]). This may explain why malfunction among that social group can often be more significant than what could be considered as a general failure by "the population at large."

The circumstances under which the industry of ideas malfunctions probably have been investigated even less than the circumstances under which the industry achieves success. It is therefore very little I can offer on the basis of the literature. What I am able to offer, however, is a schematic description of two instances of malfunction which I have been able to observe in the cases I have studied:

1. Successful idea-makers and entrepreneurs cannot liberate themselves from the specific enterprise they have generated.
2. Second generation intelligentsia is normally capable of mostly perpetuating inherited enterprises.

1. Successful idea-makers and entrepreneurs cannot liberate themselves from the specific enterprise they have generated.
This type of malfunction is highly characteristic of great cultural enterprises taking place in times of socio-cultural turmoil involving national movements, revolutionary groups and often generating political shifts. In many of these cases, the goal is often set up towards the making of a separate socio-political entity, all efforts being targeted towards the achievement of this goal. In such instances, once the goal has been achieved, the members of the industry of ideas, who at least initially had no access to power, subsequently either get closer to power or become themselves imbued with power, as a result of which they often cease to be idea-makers or entrepreneurs in the sense they

were in the previous stages, having converted themselves to members of the establishment of the new entity.

This type of malfunction simply has to do with the fact that people who have been involved, often for many years, with activities that habitually entailed struggles and conflicts, are not likely at the moment of success – or even at a somewhat later stage – to be able to revise their ideas or their enterprises, trying to match them against the gained realities. The examples we can think of are any of the most conspicuous revolutions, such as the French, the Russian, the Chinese, or any one of the sweeping cases of political and socio-cultural change, such as the unification of Italy and Germany in the 19th century, the creation of the modern Turkish state after World War I, or the creation of the Spanish semi-autonomous entities like Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque country. In all of these cases, the ingredient of the industry of ideas has been highly important and very active. Although in history books, as well as in the analyses offered by political science, this ingredient is hardly ever given the attention it deserves, it is obvious that in the overwhelming majority of these cases idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs either took the lead, or made their products available to those who took the lead, typically power-holders who captured the opportunity of using them.

The amount of suggestions that had to be produced, the quantity of invention, and the energy invested in attempts towards implementation have all been quite enormous in all of these cases. A great deal of repertoires had to be introduced either to replace older ones or function where none existed before. Although in most of these cases the actual number of the individuals intensely preoccupied with the relevant activities has never been very high, they were the only ones available to the relevant societies for the task, at least for a while. Therefore, those of them who did not immediately feel disappointed, or often betrayed, normally invested most of their energies in helping implement what they had initiated in the first place.

For example, those who were suggesting the introduction of a new language for the relevant community – in Germany, Italy, Catalonia, Galicia, Jewish Palestine, or Turkey – as one major ingredient in the proposed set of solutions, often were actively involved in implementing this suggestion in the period after their success. In all of the new entities, the relevant cultural entrepreneurs continued their activities

by taking more steps towards implementing and consolidating the introduction of the relevant languages. Often, the new entity has naturally empowered them, giving them new possibilities and other conditions for implementing their suggestions. The Italian state nominated the writer Manzoni to chair a committee whose task it was to decide what sort of language would be adopted by the state and inculcated through its new educational system. In post World War I Turkey, the new leader, who definitely was a cultural entrepreneur himself if not an idea-maker, Mustafa Kemal (later officially titled "Ata Türk [Father Turk]"), invested much energy in propagating personally, by going by train from one village to another, the newly devised language, in conjunction with many other ingredients of the new repertoire he was interested in introducing (see Lewis 1968, Landau 1984).

Parallel examples can be provided for many other, perhaps less conspicuous, ingredients of the new repertoires. Each of these ingredients normally had its supporters and champions, who naturally preferred capitalizing on the success rather than developing critical minds as to whether the enterprise was useful or not from the point of view of the more general target of life improvement for the relevant community. In sociological terms one might say that they preferred converting their often profitless actions before the successful stage to profitable cultural capital rather than going through the same motions again.

2. Second generation intelligentsia is normally capable of mostly perpetuating inherited enterprises.
The inheritors of the enterprise, normally themselves either *intellocrats* (Hamon, Hervé & Rotman 1981) or institutionalized intelligentsia, are often no longer attentive to – or even aware of – the erstwhile circumstances which have given rise to the enterprise. Instead, they are more interested in keeping the institutionalized established repertoire as it is, protecting it from revisions or replacement. These people often emerge after some finalized stage in the course of some enterprise initiated, supported, or reinforced by the industry of ideas. They either replace the initiating cultural entrepreneurs by pushing them aside or eliminating them, as has been the case with most enterprises history calls "revolutions," or simply constitute the next generation, who already grew up when the new realities had been fully established. If these people did not become idea-makers themselves, which means that they are not inclined to criticizing and revising, it often turns out that the maintenance of the repertoire they have

inherited from previous stages, or previous generations, often be-
comes more important to them than the goals for which this repertoire
had been originally devised. The separation between cultural means
and cultural goals thus gives full priority to the means, without any
critical consideration of the question whether they are justified or jus-
tifiable in terms of such goals. This does not mean that in all of the
studied cases people never mention, or talk about, those goals, but
these are either not matched against the means with which they are
supposed to be achieved, or it is accepted that the institutionalized
means are indeed suitable for these goals.

I am naturally referring first and foremost to those ingredients in
those new repertoires which have to do with a more or less substantial
separation and distinction of the targeted communities. Rather than
develop flexible intellectuals tools for coping with the situation where
the targeted community is diagnosed to be in some risk, the estab-
lished intelligentsia often tends to enhance the enterprise initiated by
their forerunners. Such a position has been repeatedly taken in the
course of history. In most recent years, it has characterized the beha-
vior of repertoire-controlling establishments in big and small, strong
and weak communities, such as France with its language protective
laws on the one hand and the new Balkan states on the other (Green-
berg 2001). This behavior has even received a new impetus in mobi-
lizing fears against what is popularly called "globalization." Such
fears have been providing new possibilities for mobilizing groups of
activists, and justifying the cultivation of any cultural item that could
be presented as carrying a symbolic negation of globalization. A ra-
ther exceptional cooperation of political radicals and cultural traditio-
nalists has become the order of the day in many communities, where,
irrespectably of their purport, those marked items have been inserted
into the pantheon of "values," a term very much in use by cultural
establishments to denote those items of repertoire that are not allowed
to be changed.

The recent developments in Ireland could probably teach us some-
thing about what seems to be a quiet reversal of the steps taken by
several generations of culture builders, both innovative idea-makers
and cultural entrepreneurs and the intelligentsia of consecutive gener-
ations. Many students of modern Irish history have described the im-
mense burden laid upon the efforts to widely introduce the Irish lan-
guage into the population of the new Irish state. The knowledge of

Irish has been made a condition, as it were, for being Irish in the first place. However, this has changed, and with it I guess many other attitudes towards separatedness and distinctiveness. It would not surprise me at all to find out that this reversal, plausibly by a new group of idea-makers and cultural entrepreneurs, has been among the most conspicuous causes of the recent social and economic prosperity in Ireland.

When I conducted my first tentative pilot study in Galicia, back in summer 1993, I could not avoid noticing, almost immediately, that the most arduous champions of the standardized Galician language were those who could speak it out of choice rather than out of lack of sufficient knowledge of Castilian. As a matter of fact, as also pointed out by Sharon Roseman (Roseman 1995, 1997), many of the most outspoken champions for a separate Galician culture were people for whom Spanish was either their first language, or one they were very fluent in using. The socio-cultural and socio-political meaning of castilianization is obviously not a linguistic matter, that is, the question of knowing a language, but evidently a matter of social position. In these terms, my conclusion was that only people who have already acquired the necessary socio-cultural status could afford the luxury of using Galician. Others, still struggling to gain such a status, could find no use in Galician for achieving that goal. Of course, this is not an exceptional phenomenon in the history of movements of socio-cultural change; after all, few of the leaders of any modern revolution have been working-class people themselves. Later, I was able to find many indications for what one might call a quiet, but persistent and even stubborn, popular sentiment of resentment in Galicia against a distinctive Galician repertoire, whose most conspicuous component unsurprisingly has been the modern normalized Galician language. This does not necessarily mean that people do not subscribe *publicly* to what has been propagated for decades, and which had at the time a very strong symbolic power, especially under the Franco dictatorship.

The younger generations of Galicians display basically pragmatic attitudes towards their integration in society, in most cases fully encouraged and supported by their parents. The new circumstances can no longer display persecution, humiliation and exploitation of power given by a language not widely mastered by the majority of the population. The heartbreaking description in Castelao's *Sempre en Galiza* of "o neno galego [the Galician child]" who can have no future if

compelled to use his non-native tongue (and who would consequently be redeemed when allowed to use his indigenous language) does not conform any longer to the realities of life in nowadays Galicia. Similar conditions have similarly changed in various other similar communities, such as Ireland or the Faroes, where attitudes based on an already acquired sense of collective self-assuredness have been widely recorded. For example, according to Nauerby's report of a study conducted back in 1990 by a committee nominated by the Faroese Schoolboard,

In schools […] Faroese [is] being associated with a bygone age with which the pupils cannot identify (Jespersen & Mikkelsen 1990: 33f). Danish, on the other hand, has the appeal of a subject which deals with present-day and interesting topics. The *present*, in other words, belongs to Danish and the *past* to Faroese: "[...] pupils in Faroese schools become accustomed to identifying themselves with a foreign culture while regarding their own with an indulgent smile, as something that never really made it out of the Middle Ages" (ibid., p. 35). (Nauerby 1996, p. 128-129)

An even stronger testimony of resentment is expressed by Helen Kelly-Holmes, who also analyzes the case as a scholar. In her words,

The experience of being socialized into an ideal of a Gaelic Ireland through excessive and compulsory Irish language teaching […] has left me with an abhorrence of the over-ideologisation of language and the simplistic equation of language with identity. […] the fact that Irish is not now the language of everyday life in Ireland is in no small way due to the fact that the language was hijacked by ideologues and imbued with values, qualities, histories far removed from the everyday culture lived by individuals. […] Growing up in Ireland, the cultural imperialists lived in Dublin, not in London or Hollywood. This was not simply the feeling among many of my peers learning Irish as a second language at school; the resentment was at times perhaps stronger in the Irish speaking Gaeltacht: "The failure to reconcile romantic nationalism and nationalist myth with the realities of Gaeltacht life has been a conspicuous element in the failure to save the language. There is little common ground between Gaeltacht workers who see language as a tool, to be discarded for a better one when it becomes obsolete and nationalists who believe Irish people should speak Irish because they are Irish and regardless of utilitarian considerations. (Hindley, 1990: 212)." (Kelly-Holmes 1997, pp. 168-169)

My assessment of the Galician case is in fact fully supported by Henrique Monteagudo and Xosé Manoel Nuñez Seixas in a relatively

recent article (2001), although naturally not in any explicit terms. I find the following passage most crucial from my point of view:

Existe el riesgo de que el nacionalismo gallego del siglo XXI se convierta en un movimiento votado y apoyado por neoconversos al idioma gallego de lengua inicial castellana y residentes en zonas urbanas. Pero, dado que se trata de un idioma neolatino y de fácil adquisición para un castellanohablante, todo sigue siendo posible. Incluso que nuevas generaciones, imbuidas de nacionalismo, o sencillamente, de una consideración socialmente positiva de su identidad étnica, recuperen conscientemente el idioma que sus abuelos quisieron abandonar.
[There is a danger that Galician nationalism of the 21st century will be converted to a movement chosen and supported by new converts to the Galician tongue, people whose first language is Castilian and who dwell in urban regions. However, given the fact that this is a neo-Latin language which can easily be acquired by speakers of Castilian, everything continues to be possible. Even the possibility that new generations, imbued with nationalism or simply having a positive attitude towards their ethnic identity, might consciously recover the tongue that their grandparents wished to abandon]
(Monteagudo & Nuñez 2001, p. 65)

The discrepancy between the agenda of life of ordinary people and the visionary schemes devised by previous generations of idea-makers and supported by the intelligentsia of subsequent generations seems to be so manifest here that even such loyal people to the cause of the Galician language like the authors of this article, in their capacity as skilled and conscientious scholars, cannot ignore. As Galician language loyalists they perceive the fate of Galician in terms of "optimism" and "pessimism." In contrast, as researchers they fully understand the somewhat paradoxical situation, although by no means unique in the history of modern nationalism, namely that the most resolutely dedicated people to a certain cause might be those who had to be recruited rather than those for whom the whole enterprise was believed to have been initiated in the first place.

The choices and the tasks that decision makers on all levels and of whatever brand must face nowadays, especially in communities where cultural distances must become more flexible if those communities do not wish to fall into a dead end alley, are understandably difficult and often unbearable. It is very likely that they cannot be solved by any intelligentsia whose main task it is to perpetuate solutions inherited from their predecessors, which often have lost their validity. It is not unlikely, especially if one of the outcomes of the activity of the

industry of ideas has been the generation of energy that the ultimate solution eventually will be implemented without, or even in spite of, the endeavors of intellectuals and other people with invested interests in cultural capitals. The "generation of energy" means, in concrete and simple terms, that less and less people within a certain community are afraid of making decisions and taking responsibilities for their own life as well as for the life of those in their immediate environment. I guess that if this is what has taken place in Ireland, it is not unlikely that it also can take place in many other places.

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