Nonverbal Behavior and Self-Presentation

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Because of special characteristics of nonverbal behaviors (e.g., they can be difficult to suppress, they are more accessible to the people who observe them than to the people who produce them), the intention to produce a particular nonverbal expression for self-presentational purposes cannot always be successfully translated into the actual production of that expression. The literatures on people's skills at using their nonverbal behaviors to feign internal states and to deceive are reviewed as they pertain to the question of whether people can overcome the many constraints on the translation of their intentions into expressions. The issue of whether people's deliberate attempts to regulate their nonverbal behaviors can be detected by others is also considered.

The study of nonverbal behavior has a distinguished place in the history of science. Beginning with Charles Darwin (1872/1965), who wrote the ground-breaking piece, the Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, some of the most eminent scientific scholars, such as Wundt, Boring, Titchener, Gordon and Floyd Allport, and even Hull, have written about nonverbal expressive behavior (Goldstein, 1983). In the writings of some of these scientists, as well as in the work of many others who have contributed to the vast literature on nonverbal behavior, there is often a bias. Many of these scholars have been interested in nonverbal behaviors that are spontaneous and unregulated expressions of internal states, such as emotions and traits. Nonverbal behavior can reflect such states, and the accumulated wisdom of the field should indeed be informative about these matters. However, from a social psychological perspective, perhaps one of the most interesting aspects of nonverbal behavior is that it is only rarely totally unregulated. In social interactions, people more often exert some control over their nonverbal expressive behavior. This attempted control is not always conscious, and it is not always successful, but it is pervasive. In this article, a particular type of deliberate regulation is considered: the control of nonverbal behavior for self-presentational purposes.

Erving Goffman, of course, is one who did recognize the self-presentational significance of expressive behaviors. In his provocative analysis of the presentation of self in everyday life (Goffman, 1959), he pointed out that the behaviors that a person "gives off," expressive behaviors that are taken to be genuinely and unselfconsciously reflective of something about the person, can be purposefully controlled so as to convey particular impressions (see also Goffman, 1963, 1971, 1974). His analysis was based on many casual observations and anecdotes but not much experimental data. It is now possible, 3 decades later, to present a more systematic, empirically based account of the (nonverbal) presentation of self in everyday life.

The self-presentational perspective offers coherence to a vast literature on nonverbal communication that too often has seemed sprawling, amorphous, and atheoretical. The questions posed by those who study language without words have often been quite intriguing in and of themselves; unfortunately, however, they have too often remained by themselves rather than joining hands with other questions in an organized conceptual structure. In this review, the self-presentational perspective provides that structure. Dozens of studies that were generated from other frameworks or from no particular framework are reconstrued self-presentationally.

The study of nonverbal behavior, even when it has been pursued from a self-presentational perspective, has generally neglected what may well be one of the most important issues in the field: the question of when nonverbal behaviors can and cannot be willfully produced. Typically, it is assumed that the production of desired nonverbal expressions is nonproblematic. That issue, then, is bypassed, and the field moves along to other questions. An example of such a question is, "If aspiring executives want to convey nonverbally an impression of competence, how should they do so?" And the typical sort of answer is that they should (for example) speak in an unwavering tone of voice. And that is the end of it. But for the would-be executives, it is really just the beginning. They may care so deeply about sounding competent that their motivation to do so may itself undermine the firmness of their voice. Or, they may be so sure that they already sound confident, that they do not invest the effort necessary to make that ring of confidence loud enough for all to hear.

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1 This bias is usually not shared by those who view nonverbal behaviors from an ethological perspective (e.g., Mitchell & Thompson, 1986; Smith, 1985) or by those who have long maintained that nonverbal behaviors are learned and culturally patterned (e.g., Birdwhistell, 1970; Efron, 1941; E. T. Hall, 1959).
Motivation and confidence are just two of a wide array of factors that can undermine or enable the successful production of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes. Although there have been statements here and there about the difficulty of producing a particular nonverbal behavior (e.g., Ekman, 1985) or about a certain kind of psychological factor that can undermine nonverbal performance (e.g., Schlenker & Leary, 1982), nowhere is there an attempt at a comprehensive analysis of the potential difficulties involved in creating nonverbally the kind of impression one most wants to convey. That issue will be at the center of this review. Such a question, about the conditions under which people can purposefully regulate their nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes, leads directly to the complementary question of the conditions under which others can tell that nonverbal behaviors are being deliberately regulated. That issue is also addressed. But first, the parameters of the fields of nonverbal behavior and self-presentation are described, and the implications of a self-presentational perspective for the study of nonverbal behavior is specified.

Scope of This Review

The opening sections of this review delineate the fields of nonverbal behavior and self-presentation and their intersection. First, the key constructs of nonverbal behavior and self-presentation are defined, and examples of self-presentational uses of nonverbal behaviors are described. The question “why nonverbal behavior” or “why only nonverbal behavior” is also addressed. It is argued that there is a set of properties that characterize nonverbal behaviors more accurately than they characterize verbal behaviors and that these properties have important implications for the effectiveness with which self-presentational goals can be implemented.

Second, the scope of self-presentation is discussed. It is argued that the scope is quite broad, though not all-encompassing. The breadth of the self-presentational perspective derives from the range of targets of self-presentational attempts, the levels of awareness at which self-presentational strategies may be enacted, and the kinds of performances that can aptly be considered self-presentational. There are, however, nonverbal behaviors that are not self-presentational; those are discussed, too.

It is in the next set of sections that the key issue is discussed, namely, that the intention to regulate a particular nonverbal expression for self-presentational purposes cannot always be translated successfully into the actual production of that expression. It is proposed that there are three phases during which the production of self-presentationally relevant nonverbal behaviors can be disrupted. The first is the point at which intentions to regulate one's nonverbal behaviors are formed. It is argued that because of cultural or situational norms, intentions to produce certain kinds of nonverbal performances are rarely formed. The second and perhaps most important phase, which is discussed in greatest detail, occurs during the translation of self-presentational intentions into nonverbal behaviors. Sometimes intentions cannot be translated into nonverbal behaviors because the behaviors are too difficult to produce at will. Other impediments are more personal; for example, self-presenters may lack the requisite abilities or experiences, or they may be constrained by the structure of their face or the pitch of their voice or even by their own preferred styles of interacting. Constraints are also imposed by motivation and by emotion, by spontaneous expressiveness, and by lack of confidence. All of these are reviewed. The third phase occurs after the nonverbal performance has been completed; at that point, there are constraints on the effectiveness with which performances can be appraised and then modified in the future.

Can people overcome the many constraints on the translation of their intentions into actions and succeed at regulating their nonverbal expressions so as to achieve their self-presentational goals? This question is addressed in two sections. In the first, the literature on people's skills at using their nonverbal behaviors to convey particular impressions that may or may not be consistent with their actual feelings is reviewed. The second starts with the assumption that the kinds of factors that undermine (and enable) effective nonverbal performances are differentially characteristic of different kinds of people. Therefore, using the theoretical discussion of those factors, it should be possible to predict individual differences in the use of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes. Examples of individual differences that are especially germane to self-presentation, such as age, sex, physical attractiveness, and public self-consciousness, are discussed.

Much of the literature on nonverbal communication is about specific individual nonverbal behaviors, such as smiling or gaze, as opposed to the constellations of behaviors that make up nonverbal expressions, such as facial expressions of anger. The study of the role of individual nonverbal behaviors in the self-presentational process presents special challenges. Those challenges are considered, and to illustrate the major points, the literature on one particular nonverbal behavior (smiling) is reviewed in detail.

Next, the question of whether the reading of nonverbal behaviors (as opposed to the enactment of them) can serve self-presentational purposes is considered. Then, the important question of detectability of self-presentational attempts is addressed. This issue is approached at two levels. One is the aggregate level. The kinds of questions at this level are of the sort that are likely to be posed by experimental social psychologists. They ask whether people generally act differently, nonverbally, under different self-presentational contingencies. But detectability might also be addressed at a more micro or individual level, in a way that might be of special interest to clinical practitioners and to laypersons. The questions at this level are about specific nonverbal behaviors enacted by particular people at particular points in time, and the central issue is whether it is possible to know whether such behaviors are being deliberately regulated for self-presentational purposes.

Finally, the view of the relationship of emotions to nonverbal behaviors that is implicit in this review is compared with several other perspectives. It is argued that the present perspective is compatible with views of nonverbal behaviors as serving social motives or as ways of regulating person–environment interactions.
Nonverbal Behaviors and Their Special Significance for Self-Presentation

Nonverbal Behaviors and Their Self-Presentational Uses

Nonverbal cues are a motley crew. Examples include such diverse behaviors as facial expressions; bodily orientations, movements, and postures; vocal cues (other than words); aspects of physical appearance; interpersonal spacing; and touching. Some theorists (e.g., Knapp, 1978) also include attire and even the arrangement and decoration of rooms and other spaces. Nonverbal cues are sometimes called nonverbal expressive behaviors. Often, nonverbal expressions are taken to be expressions of emotions; indeed, among the important information that can be conveyed by nonverbal behaviors is information about emotion. But nonverbal behaviors can convey many other kinds of information, too, such as information relevant to opinions, moods, values, personality dispositions, psychopathologies, physical states such as fatigue, and cognitive states such as comprehension or befuddlement. Thus, people can use their nonverbal behaviors—or try to—to claim a variety of self-relevant characteristics.

Self-presentation is a matter of regulating one's own behaviors to create a particular impression on others (Jones & Pittman, 1982), of communicating a particular image of oneself to others (Baumeister, 1982), or of "showing oneself [to an audience] to be a particular kind of person" (Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). People can use many strategies to convey particular impressions to others that do not necessarily involve nonverbal expressive cues. For example, University of Virginia students who are proud of their association with the university and want new acquaintances to know that they are "U VA" students can simply mention this fact as they exchange pleasantries. Similarly, students who want to impress each other with their independence can slip into the conversation stories about eating dinner alone in crowded dining halls and feeling comfortable doing so (B. M. DePaulo, LeMay, & Epstein, 1991). If they want to get their favorite professors to like them, they can tell them what great lecturers they are or offer to run the projector for the next movie (E. E. Jones, 1964; E. E. Jones & Wortman, 1973). And an athlete who has just lost an important race but does not want to be seen as a talentless runner can tell the coach and the fans that his or her leg was really sore (e.g., C. R. Snyder & Higgins, 1988).

Many of these self-presentational goals can be accomplished nonverbally. Students who want to broadcast their association to the university, for example, can wear U VA sweatshirts and drink from U VA mugs. In fact, research has shown that this type of basking in reflected glory occurs more frequently after the hometown team has won than after it has lost (Cialdini et al., 1976). Students who want to ingratiate themselves to their professors can nod and smile and don an expression of utter fascination throughout each lecture (cf. Purvis, Dabbs, & Hopper, 1984; Rosenfeld, 1966). And athletes who want to claim that their legs are sore rather than slow can limp perceptibly as they leave the track (cf. Berglas & Jones, 1978; Jones & Berglas, 1978). Of course, verbal and nonverbal strategies can also be used together, as when the athlete winces in pain as she mentions the stiffness in her leg.

The Special Significance of Nonverbal Behaviors for Self-Presentation

There are numerous reasons why nonverbal behaviors should be of special interest to scholars of the dynamics of self-presentation. They include the following:

Nonverbal behavior is irrepressible. From a social psychological perspective, one of the most interesting properties of nonverbal cues in social interaction is that they are irrepressibly impactful. Try as they might, people cannot refrain from behaving nonverbally. If, for example, they try to be as passive as possible, they are likely to be perceived as unexpressive, inhibited, withdrawn, and uptight (cf. B. M. DePaulo & Kendol, 1989; see also J. A. Hall, Roter, & Katz, 1987). And even if they do succeed in quieting their dynamic nonverbal cues (such as their facial expressions and body movements and postures), their static nonverbal cues will still speak loudly. Relatively permanent physical features such as head size and shape, body build, physical attractiveness, and skin color have an immediate and important influence on the impressions perceivers form.

It is futile to hope, then, that one can manage to convey nonverbally no particular impression at all simply by interacting in blithe obliviousness to one's own nonverbal behaviors. Others will form some impression that is based in some manner on the nonverbal behavior they are observing, whether one wants them to or not and whether they want to or not (cf. K. Kleck & Strenta, 1980). The best one can hope for is to control the nature of that impression.

Nonverbal behavior is linked to emotion. Most major theorists of emotion and emotion expression (e.g., Buck, 1984; Ekman, 1972, 1977; Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1962) posit that there are hard-wired links between the elicitation of certain basic emotions and the triggering of facial muscles that produce expressions of those emotions. (Challenges to this point of view are discussed at the end of this article) When they suddenly become fearful, for example, people find that nonverbal indicators of fear begin to appear on their faces involuntarily. There is no analogous process whereby a particular, predictable set of words begin to be formed at the same time. For this reason, the kind of information that is conveyed by nonverbal behavior is sometimes more intensely and inescapably personal than is the information that is conveyed by verbal behavior. This is not to say that nonverbal behaviors convey emotions whereas verbal behaviors do not, for this is certainly untrue (e.g., Krauss, Apple, Morency, Wenzel, & Winton, 1981). Nor is it to say that nonverbal behaviors necessarily communicate emotions more often or even more efficiently than do verbal behaviors, though the latter is sometimes true. Rather, the point is that there may be certain automatic links between the elicitation of emotion and the expression of emotion that are present for nonverbal, but not verbal, behavior. Unless people can deliberately override those links (an issue that is discussed in more detail later), they will wear the emotions they are experiencing on their faces and in their voices.

Although there are other possible interpretations (e.g., Fridlund, 1991a), the fact that facial expressions of the basic emotions are fundamentally the same across cultures (e.g., Ekman,
develop odd or irritating nonverbal mannerisms of which they just the right impression. And over the long term, they may on-line information about the kinds of impressions they may be conveying. This may make it difficult for them to regulate the way others do, they are deprived of an important source of restraint. Because they cannot see their faces or hear their voices (Ekman & Friesen, 1969), people can glean further hints as to how their expressive behaviors appear to others. Interactions about how their nonverbal behaviors appear to others. But this feedback, too, is only indirectly informative. When people are trying to convey a particular movement, but these cues are only indirectly informative with whom they are interacting. They do have access to internal much about their own nonverbal behaviors as do the people they interact, they would see only a mirror image of their faces; this rule. People never see their own facial expressions exactly and they know it more directly, than others could ever know. Because of the mechanics of the situation (i.e., the sound waves of knowing how the actor feels. They may be unlikely to question either the genuineness of the actor’s expression or the trustworthiness of their understanding of that expression.

Nonverbal behavior is less accessible to actors than to observers. In most ways, people know more about themselves, and they know it more directly, than others could ever know. Awareness of nonverbal behaviors is an important exception to this rule. People never see their own facial expressions exactly as others do. Even if they were to stand in front of a mirror as they interact, they would see only a mirror image of their faces; they would not see their facial expressions in the exact same way that their interaction partner would. The tone of a person’s voice also sounds different to her or him than it does to others. Because of the mechanics of the situation (i.e., the sound waves travel a different route to the speaker’s ears than to the listener’s), this is necessarily true. In contrast, when speakers communicate with words, both they and their listeners ordinarily hear the exact same words.

In interpersonal interactions, then, people never know as much about their own nonverbal behaviors as do the people with whom they are interacting. They do have access to internal cues that others do not, such as feedback from their own muscle movements, but these cues are only indirectly informative about how their nonverbal behaviors appear to others. Interactors sometimes provide feedback about people’s expressive behaviors, either directly or indirectly (Ekman & Friesen, 1969), and through this “social biofeedback” process (Buck, 1988), people can glean further hints as to how their expressive behaviors appear to others. But this feedback, too, is only indirectly informative. When people are trying to convey a particular impression of themselves to others, this inaccessibility of their own nonverbal behavior provides both flexibility and constraint. Because they cannot see their faces or hear their voices the way others do, they are deprived of an important source of on-line information about the kinds of impressions they may be conveying. This may make it difficult for them to regulate their behavior on a moment-to-moment basis so as to convey just the right impression. And over the long term, they may develop odd or irritating nonverbal mannerisms of which they are completely unaware. Therein lies the constraint. However, the same inaccessibility provides people with a ready excuse for behaviors that create an undesired impression. For example, the admonition “Don’t look at me like that” can be countered with the incredulous “Like what? I don’t know what you mean.” And it may indeed be the case that the person was unaware of how his or her face appeared. However, it is also possible that the person knew quite well what impression his or her facial expression would convey but also knew that if challenged, he or she could hide behind a facade of ignorance.

Nonverbal behavior is off-the-record. Many nonverbal behaviors are off-the-record of the actor who produced them, because of the inaccessibility described above. But they are in other senses off-the-record to all parties to an interaction: the actor, the interaction partner, and any other observers. In commenting on an interaction, it is more difficult to describe a facial expression or a tone of voice than it is to recount the words that were spoken. Parties to a social interaction might ask each other to repeat their words, but they never ask each other to repeat their facial expressions, voice tones, or body movements or gestures. Furthermore, even if they did “catch” the nonverbal expression the first time and could hold it in their minds, they still could not seek further clarity about its meaning by looking it up in a dictionary. To the self-presenter, this elusiveness of nonverbal behavior contributes further to the flexibility with which it can be used. People might take a chance at expressing something nonverbally that they would be reluctant to express verbally; should pangs of regret set in, they can deny that the behavior ever occurred or that it had the meaning being attributed to it.

Nonverbal behavior communicates unique meanings. That words can communicate meanings that would be nearly impossible to convey nonverbally is hardly in doubt. (Imagine explaining Einstein’s theory of relativity using only your face.) Poets and novelists would have us believe that the same is true for nonverbal expressions: They can convey meanings and emo-

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2 Ortony and Turner (1990) have argued that the criteria that have traditionally been used for defining basic emotions are ambiguous and unconvincing. They propose that a necessary component of any emotion is a valenced appraisal (such as an awareness of an inescapable threat) and that biologically basic emotions are “those for which the connection between the valenced appraisal and some other response is hardwired” (p. 324). They discourage the search for basic emotions, though, and instead urge an emphasis on the components of emotions. From their perspective, it might be better to state that there are hard-wired links between components of emotions (such as particular appraisals) and components of expressions, rather than stating that the links are between an emotion (as a whole) and an expression (as a whole). Also, from their perspective, there are hard-wired links between internal states and components of expressions for certain internal states that are not emotions. The arguments presented here can be recast in the ways suggested by Ortony and Turner. The most important implication, however, remains the same: When there are hard-wired links between internal states (or components of them) and non-verbal expressions (or components of expressions), people’s ability to convey nonverbally expressions that differ from those states will be constrained, and their ability to work with those states and convey clear or exaggerated expressions of them will be enhanced.
tions that could never be adequately expressed in words. Should empirical research come down on the side of the poets, the implication for self-presentation will be that certain identity-relevant impressions can be conveyed only nonverbally.

Nonverbal behavior occurs quickly. Many nonverbal reactions occur almost instantaneously. When perceivers see someone get hurt, or hear someone say something that was clearly painful to disclose, they can convey an empathic nonverbal reaction immediately. In contrast, it would take a bit longer to formulate and convey an appropriately empathic verbal response. The quickness of the nonverbal reaction will probably underscore its sincerity (or perceived sincerity). The slower verbal mode is more vulnerable to perceiver attributions of deliberateness and disingenuity.

Not all of these special characteristics are equally apt descriptions of all nonverbal behaviors. For example, all of these characteristics are accurate descriptions of facial expressions, and most of them aptly characterize body orientations, movements, and postures and tone-of-voice cues. Interpersonal spacing, however, may be just as accessible to actors as to observers, and it may also be fairly easy to describe (i.e., it is not off-the-record except in that people's judgments of the distance between themselves and other people are imperfect). Analogously, touching is hardly irrepressible: Under ordinary circumstances, most people can refrain from touching others if they so desire. To cite just one more example, changes in physical attire can rarely be accomplished with the same speed that can characterize facial expressions or voice tones. Therefore, nonverbal behaviors vary systematically in the number of these attributes that characterize them. It may be—although this point is speculative—that the study of nonverbal behaviors characterized by more, rather than fewer, of these attributes will be most illuminative of self-presentational processes because the enactment and interpretation of such behaviors may be most problematic.

Note also that not all of the special characteristics of all nonverbal behaviors distinguish them from verbal behaviors. As noted above, verbal behaviors, like nonverbal behaviors, can communicate unique meanings, though the unique meanings conveyed by words may be different from those conveyed without words. Still, the package of attributes as a whole better characterizes nonverbal behaviors than verbal behaviors, and several of the attributes are never characteristic of verbal behaviors.

The special qualities of nonverbal behaviors should add up to an absolution of responsibility for the self-presenter. People are probably not held accountable for behavior that is irrepressible, that can be triggered quickly and automatically, that is inaccessible to them and elusive to others, and that has meanings that cannot be conveyed in any other way. Observers are not totally naive to the possibility that nonverbal behaviors can be deliberately regulated, but they seem generally to be more "taken" by the spontaneity and trustworthiness of such behaviors (Schneider, Hastorf, & Ellsworth, 1979). Direct tests of these assumptions should be conducted.

The second, and perhaps even more important, implication of the special characteristics of nonverbal behaviors for the self-presentational process is that many nonverbal behaviors are not readily or effectively produced or controlled. Sometimes, for example, people do not know which nonverbal behaviors to enact to convey a desired impression. But this limitation is equally characteristic of verbal behaviors: Sometimes people do not know which words to choose to convey a desired impression. There is a more fundamental level, however, at which verbal behaviors are almost perfectly controllable whereas many nonverbal behaviors are not. If a person wants to say a particular word, ordinarily he or she can simply and straightforwardly do so. Producing certain nonverbal behaviors (as is discussed more fully later) can be far more problematic. This characteristic is differentially applicable to different nonverbal behaviors; that is, nonverbal behaviors vary systematically along a continuum of controllability (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979a, 1979b). An open posture, for example, is easier to produce than is a high-pitched tone of voice. Those nonverbal behaviors that are difficult, but perhaps not impossible, to control may be most important to our understanding of the self-presentational process because of the special challenges they pose to self-presenters.

Scope of Self-Presentation

Targets of Self-Presentations

Self-presentation to target persons and observers. Typically, the person to whom the self is presented is the other person in the interaction. Thus, the aspects of self that are presented are edited in such a way as to create the desired impression on that particular person. An example comes from a study in which women were interviewed by a male employer who was known to be either traditional or liberal in his attitudes toward women (von Baeyer, Sherk, & Zanna, 1981). The women who interviewed with the more traditional man presented themselves in a more feminine way than did those who interviewed with the more liberal employer. Other research has shown that women (and men), when faced with no particularly strong self-presentational demands, convey nonverbally a degree of femininity that corresponds with their self-ratings of femininity (Frale, 1987; Lippa, 1978b). The von Baeyer et al. (1981) findings suggest that these expressions can be edited so as to appear even more feminine to a traditional male and less feminine to a liberal male.

Sometimes expressive behaviors that seem to be directed toward an interaction partner are actually performed for the benefit of others who are not part of the interaction at all but are simply observing it. Goffman's (1971) discussion of "tie-signs" describes just such a situation. Tie-signs are behaviors used by people in a relationship to make clear to others the nature of that relationship. Members of a couple who are attending a party, for example, might hold hands and gaze at each other; and if, during the course of the event, they drift apart from each other, they might periodically check back. All of these behaviors announce the "withness" of the twosome (Schellen, 1974) to others in the gathering.

Behaviors interpreted as tie-signs were observed in a naturalistic study of couples waiting in movie lines (Fine, Stitt, & Finch, 1984). The woman in the couple was approached by an
interviewer who proceeded to ask her either intimate or nonintimate questions. The behavior of the man of the couple was observed. When the interviewer asked the woman personal questions, the man was much more likely to gaze at the woman he was with and to orient his body toward hers than when the interviewer asked impersonal questions. And when the interviewer was a man, the male member of the couple was especially unlikely to orient away from the interaction. The authors hypothesized that the men were underscoring the couple's togetherness and that they were especially inclined to do so under the more threatening circumstances (i.e., when the interviewer was another man or was someone who asked personal questions).

Self-presentation to reference others and to the self. It can be argued that nonverbal behaviors that occur in private are unlikely to be self-presentational. But exceptions have been postulated. It has been suggested, for example, that even when people are by themselves, their behavior may be guided by the characteristics and values of people who are important to them (e.g., Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). A boy with a toothache, for example, might think about his father's admonition to be brave, and consequently, he might try to squelch his facial expressions of pain. This is an example of self-presentation to reference others, who are not physically present. This sort of self-presentation could even occur with regard to fictitious others, such as imaginary playmates. Self-presentation to self has also been postulated (e.g., Greenwald & Breckler, 1985; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989) and could occur if, for instance, the boy had internalized the importance of being brave and tried to do an expression of stoicism to convince himself that he was living up to his ideals.

Although the concepts of self-presentation to self and to reference others may at first blush seem difficult to operationalize, encouraging data have already been published. Baldwin and Holmes (1987) asked subjects to visualize the faces of different categories of significant others (e.g., either friends or parents) and found systematic effects on their self-evaluations and on their self-ratings of enjoyment of sexually provocative literary passages. Although expressive behaviors were not measured, it would be a straightforward extension of the research to do so. Muscle movements likely to be indicative of smiling (assessed by electromyographic (EMG) measures taken over the relevant facial muscles) were measured in two studies of implicit audience effects. In one (Fridlund et al., 1990), subjects who imagined enjoying themselves in the presence of other people showed more EMG activity than those who imagined enjoying themselves alone, even when levels of self-reported happiness were equated in the two conditions. Thus, subjects seemed to smile more in the "presence" of others, even when those others were present only in their imagination. In the other study (Fridlund, 1991b), subjects watching pleasant videotapes showed more facial EMG indicative of smiling when they knew that a friend of theirs was in a nearby room than when they were watching by themselves. Again, the implicit (though not physical) presence of another person augmented nonverbal expressive movements.

Self-presentation to intimates and nonintimates. That people often try deliberately to convey particular impressions of themselves when they first meet other people (especially people they regard as powerful or attractive) is not really in doubt. A study conducted in bars and restaurants cleverly captured a bit of this purposeful self-presentation as it occurs in newly developing relationships (Daly, Hogg, Sacks, Smith, & Zimring, 1983). Men and women were unobtrusively observed in restrooms, and the amount of time they spent preening (fixing their hair, straightening their clothes, looking at themselves in the mirror) was recorded. They were then interviewed about the nature of their relationship with the person they were sitting with in the establishment. These relationships ranged from first dates through marriages and long-term same-sex friendships. True to conventional folk wisdom, people in newer relationships spent more time preening than did people in more established relationships.

Does this mean that self-presentational considerations are less important in longer standing or more intimate relationships than in less developed relationships? Probably not. Although people may become less concerned with the superficial aspects of their self-presentations (such as their hairstyle) as their relationships deepen and become more secure, they may become more concerned with the images they convey of weightier aspects of themselves, such as their ability to be caring and committed over long periods of time. These kinds of self-presentations can be conveyed nonverbally, too. Over the long term, couples come to face different life tasks, such as parenting and caring for elderly relatives. As these transitions into new roles occur, the members may become concerned with conveying new images of themselves to their partner (e.g., the good mother). Even in the absence of major life changes, people may feel that they have changed or want to change in important ways. As this occurs, they may try to convey this new image of themselves to a partner who has become accustomed to an older image and may be resistant to the change. Self-presentational concerns may also become intensified in the face of a serious threat to the relationship, such as spousal infidelity. In such instances, the betrayed spouses may try to make themselves more attractive to their partner, or they may try to convey or even exaggerate the extent to which they feel hurt. Even in stable long-term relationships, with no immediate threats, changes, or transitions into different life roles, self-presentational considerations can be important, and they can be important even with regard to superficialities. If, for example, a wife becomes so unconcerned about her appearance in front of her husband that she neglects to brush her hair for days at a time, her husband might regard this as a disturbing comment on her regard for him and for their relationship. (See Schlenker, 1984, for a more extensive discussion of self-presentational considerations in relationships.)

Deliberate, Nondeliberate, and Once-Deliberate (or Once-Learned) Behaviors

When people unexpectedly experience a very intense stimulation (for example, when they accidentally step into an icy puddle), an emotional expression is likely to appear instantly on their face, and the intensity of the expression, at the moment when it first appears, is unlikely to be affected by the presence
of other people (e.g., Craig & Patrick, 1985). Another situation in which the presence of others is likely to have little impact on expressive behavior is when a person is completely absorbed in an interesting or challenging task (E. E. Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 1980). Subjectively self-aware people (e.g., Duval & Wicklund, 1972) become so wrapped up in the ongoing activity that it never enters their mind to monitor their expressive behavior to control the impressions that such behavior might convey. Their expressive behavior, then, is not deliberate and not self-presentational.

Or is it? It has been suggested (Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 1980) that there are many behaviors that were once produced deliberately but then after years of practice eventually became habitual. Girls from traditional families, for example, may be taught to "sit like a lady." For years, they might practice this deliberately, perhaps even looking at themselves in a mirror to ascertain that their posture is indeed sufficiently ladylike. Eventually, conscious monitoring is no longer necessary. Even when, 30 years later, the girl has grown into an astrophysicist who is alone in her study totally absorbed in a challenging intellectual puzzle, she will have automatically assumed the posture of a lady. At that point, the expressive behavior is no longer deliberate, but it is arguably different from other expressive behaviors that never were purposefully regulated.

Posture is a relatively discrete and circumscribed behavior; however, more extensive and dynamic patterns of nonverbal behaviors can also, after much practice, become habitual. Efron's (1941) classic study of the gestures of Italian and Jewish immigrants, and the ways in which those gestures changed as the immigrants became assimilated, is a suggestive example of this process. The Italians and Jews initially used very different styles of hand, head, and body movements in their conversations with others of the same ethnicity. The Italians, for example, used very expansive movements but rarely touched their conversation partners; the Jews, in contrast, used more constrained movements, but often touched the other person. A generation later, however, the offspring of these two sets of immigrants who had cut many of their traditional ties used conversational expressive styles that more closely resembled those of the American subgroups to which they had become assimilated than those of their parents. It is not clear from Efron's study, however, whether these first-generation offspring deliberately practiced the new gestures, and at first used them primarily in their interactions with Americans, or whether they were learned entirely out of awareness.

An important mechanism governing the deliberate management of nonverbal behaviors is what Ekman (1972) called display rules. Display rules are cultural norms governing the management of emotional expressions. They indicate which emotions should be conveyed, depending on the situation, the person who is communicating the emotion, and the person to whom the emotion is being communicated. For example, the ritual look of delight on the face of the first runner-up as the new Miss America is announced is a product of the display rule that dictates that losers should mask their sadness with an expression of joy for the winner. In studies of the readability of spontaneous and posed facial expressions, it has been found that positive emotions are generally easier to read from people's faces than are negative emotions (Buck, 1984; Wagner, MacDonald, & Manstead, 1986; but see also Gallois & Callan, 1986). Wagner et al. (1986) have suggested that this finding may be an example of the operation of a "residual display rule" (to communicate pleasant affects and suppress negative ones) that remains in evidence even when people believe that they are alone and unobserved.

Spontaneously produced nonverbal behaviors that never were consciously practiced or controlled may appear to naive observers to be quite similar to overlearned, habitually produced nonverbal behaviors. Yet the two classes of behaviors have different origins, different developmental histories, different elicitors, and different neurological substrates. In theory, then, they should be distinguishable. Examples of spontaneously produced nonverbal behaviors include those that result from the elicitation of the basic emotions. One implication of the hard-wired links that may exist between the elicitation of basic emotions and the triggering of the facial muscles associated with those emotions (discussed above) is that facial expressions of the basic emotions never need to be practiced nor do they even require any observational learning. These expressions appear whenever the relevant emotions are elicited, unless they are muted or altered by deliberate attempts at regulation. (As M. Lewis & Michalson, 1985, have suggested, it is possible that in infancy, the experience and expression of emotion are not synchronized from the outset. Some degree of maturation, for example, may need to occur first.) Although the particular events that elicit the basic emotions vary from culture to culture and even from person to person, the triggering of the facial muscles that occurs once the emotions are elicited does not vary (Ekman, 1972). Another characteristic of spontaneous facial expressions of the basic emotions is that they are often quite brief in duration. Unless the emotion elicitor is itself particularly long lasting or particularly intense, the facial expression triggered by the elicitor will appear and disappear rather quickly.

Nonverbal expressive behaviors that result from learning and practice are very different. The kinds of nonverbal expressive behaviors that will be deliberately practiced (or even picked up out of awareness) are not hard-wired and will vary with individual-difference and social learning factors such as reward and punishment contingencies and particular histories of observational learning. These behaviors bear the stamp of particular personalities and particular lives. For example, a teenager who admires a popular rock star might deliberately try to simulate his mannerisms. If practiced often enough, such mannerisms might take on the appearance of a personal style. Unlike genuinely spontaneous behaviors that appear and disappear quickly, these mannerisms may seem to be ever present. They may also appear to be occurring spontaneously and unselfconsciously. Yet these once-learned nonverbal behaviors are responsive to interpersonal contingencies in ways that genuinely spontaneous nonverbal behaviors are not. If, for instance, the teen were to spend an evening with peers from a different clique who think the rock star is dumb, the mannerisms might suddenly vanish. And over time, as the popularity of the rock star fades, so too will the teen's idolatrous mannerisms.
**Issues of Accuracy and Honesty**

The definition of self-presentation as a deliberate (or once-deliberate) attempt to convey a particular impression of oneself does not imply that self-presentations are necessarily deceptive (E. E. Jones, 1990; E. E. Jones & Pittman, 1982; Schlenker, 1980, 1984, 1987). To be sure, they can be. People can and do on occasion deliberately try to convey the impression that they are a different kind of person than they in fact believe themselves to be. Often, the attempt is to claim a more positive identity (such as a kinder or gentler one) than is deserved, but there can also be advantages to claiming negative images (such as more intimidating or dependent ones), and so these, too, are occasionally embraced (E. E. Jones & Pittman, 1982).

Probably vastly more common than the claiming of an image that people believe to be totally uncharacteristic of themselves is the editing of the images that are presented. Some people may, for example, believe that they are most accurately described as dependent in some ways but independent in others. In interactions with people who value independence and when in situations in which dependence is especially appropriate, they may choose to emphasize their independence; in other types of contexts, they might instead emphasize their dependence. In both kinds of situations, they can present aspects of themselves that are genuine. It is not that what they are presenting is feigned, but that it is only part of what they might have presented (Schlenker, 1984).

Ekman and Friesen (1975) have made similar distinctions with specific reference to the management of facial expressions of emotions. People can, they maintain, manage their facial expressions by outright falsification. But they can also use two milder management techniques: the qualification of an expression that is accomplished by adding an expression that comments on the expression just produced (e.g., showing a sad face, then smiling soon afterwards to indicate that the sadness is bearable) and the modulation of the intensity of the expression. In qualifying and modulating, people are not claiming different emotions than the ones they are experiencing; instead, they are merely editing the public presentations of their felt emotions.

In the absence of any clear reason to think otherwise, people seem to believe that others see them quite similarly to how they see themselves (B. M. DePaulo, Kenny, Hoover, Webb, & Oliver, 1987; Kenny & DePaulo, 1991). They assume that their personalities, as they construe them, are readily apparent to others, even when they have not made any special effort to make them apparent. But when it becomes especially important to them to come across as exactly the kind of person that they believe they really are, then the process is probably not left to chance. Instead, people try deliberately to make their identities, as they construe them, perfectly clear to others (cf. Cheek & Hogan, 1983; Hogan, 1982; Leary & Kowalski, 1990). The process is one of deliberate control of expressive behaviors for self-presentational purposes, but the goal is accuracy rather than dissimulation or exaggeration or shading of the truth.

There are other situations, too, in which people deliberately regulate their nonverbal behavior in an attempt to enhance the correspondence between their self-perceptions and their self-presentations. For example, models of self-awareness and self-regulation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972) suggest that when people direct their attention toward themselves, they become more aware of their own personal standards and values and more likely to try to behave in accord with those values. There are individual differences in the tendency to be inner directed rather than outer directed (e.g., Fenihrstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975), in the degree to which a self-image of autonomy is valued over a self-image of social conformity (Schlenker & Weigold, 1990), and in the importance that is attached to acting consistently with one's own values (e.g., M. Snyder, 1979). These, too, will be important predictors of whether deliberate attempts at self-presentation will serve to augment or to undermine the consistency between traits or other internal states and the nonverbal behaviors taken to be expressive of those states (see also Lippa, 1983).

**Uses of Nonverbal Behaviors That Are Not Self-Presentational**

The domain of self-presentation as defined thus far is quite broad. It includes presentations to self and to reference others as well as the more theoretically and empirically tractable presentations to target persons and observers. Similarly, it includes behaviors that were deliberately enacted and practiced until they came to appear spontaneous as well as behaviors that are being deliberately enacted at the moment without the benefit of much prior practice. Despite this apparent breadth of definition, there are important categories of nonverbal behaviors that are not self-presentational.

A few of these were mentioned previously. For example, initial reactions to intense stimuli are unlikely to be self-presentational. Nonverbal behaviors emitted in private settings (e.g., while watching television by oneself), along with those that occur while a person is involved in a very absorbing task, are also unlikely to be self-presentational. In these examples, though, the possibilities of self-presentation to self or reference others (e.g., Fridlund, 1991a, 1991b; Fridlund et al., 1990), as well as the possibilities that the behaviors are habitual remnants of those that were once produced deliberately, need to be ruled out.

In studies in which subjects watch mildly pleasant or unpleasant slides, their facial responses to the slides can be so indistinct that observers watching their faces have no idea whether the slides the subjects are viewing are pleasant or unpleasant. Yet electrodes attached to the subjects' face can pick up different EMG activity during the pleasant as compared with the unpleasant slides (Cacioppo, Petty, Losch, & Kim, 1986; see also Cacioppo, Martzke, Petty, & Tassinary, 1988). The behaviors picked up by the EMG recordings, which are too subtle to be noticed by untrained observers, are of no self-presentational significance, because observers cannot be impressed by behaviors they cannot detect. There are two exceptions. One would occur if a person were trying to convey a particular impression nonverbally but succeeded only in producing a behavior too weak or too fleeting to be identifiable by others. Another exception would be the nonverbal behaviors that occur as part of presentations to self or to reference others; these would not need to be discernible to observers to be self-presentational.
Other examples of nonverbal behaviors that are not self-presentational occur during conversations. Turn switching in conversations often proceeds smoothly and effortlessly. Each person seems to know exactly when the other person will stop speaking and yield the floor, yet neither person ever says, “Okay, you can speak now,” or “Wait, I’m not finished.” Instead, these wishes are communicated nonverbally, with behaviors known as turn signals (Duncan & Fiske, 1977) or regulators (Ekman & Friesen, 1969). For example, the person about to yield the floor typically stops gesturing, begins speaking a little less loudly, stretches out the last word, and looks toward the other person (Cappella, 1985; Duncan & Fiske, 1977). These nonverbal behaviors that serve as conversational traffic signals are not self-presentational.

Nonverbal behaviors can also be used to illustrate and clarify a verbal message, as when a person motions to the left while giving directions to a befuddled tourist (e.g., Cohen, 1977). Nonverbal behaviors called emblems (Ekman, 1976) have direct verbal translations and can be used in place of words, as when a friend asks his roommate from across a noisy room how the University of Virginia fared in the basketball game and the roommate holds up two fingers in the shape of a V to indicate that Virginia won. Nonverbal gestures can also be used in the service of a particular task (cf. Patterson, 1983), as when a batting coach, in teaching a Little Leaguer how to choke up, puts his or her hands over the child’s and moves them across the bat. All of these kinds of nonverbal behaviors are produced deliberately, but none of them are self-presentational.

People can deliberately regulate their nonverbal behaviors so as to simulate a particular personality or a particular cognitive process (such as comprehension) or even a particular pathology (e.g., Braginsky, Braginsky, & Ring, 1969), but those behaviors that are spontaneous and unselfconscious expressions of personality (e.g., Allport, 1937; Frable, 1987; Lippa, 1978b), cognitive processing (e.g., Kahneman, 1973; Kenner, 1984; Rinn, 1984), or psychopathology (e.g., Boice & Monti, 1982; Ellgring, 1986; Feldman, Philippot, & Custrini, 1991; Pitman, Kolb, Orr, & Singh, 1987; Scherer, 1979; Singer & Spohn, 1956) are not self-presentational.

Most examples of nonverbal behaviors that are not self-presentational, though, can take on self-presentational significance with just a little adjustment. For example, if the roommate wanted to convey not just the information that Virginia had won but also the impression that he was proud of this victory, he might produce Vs with both hands and shake them high in the air, Richard Nixon style, for all to see. And if the batting coach wanted not only to show the player how to choke up but also to convey that she or he was a no-nonsense coach, then the coach might communicate the instructions in a stern and mirthless manner.

Implications of the Self-Presentational Perspective

Numerous implications follow from the self-presentational perspective as it is construed in this review. Some of these implications depart importantly from those of other perspectives. It is predicted that the literature on nonverbal behavior, though often generated from perspectives other than the self-presentational one (or from no particular theoretical framework at all), will be consistent with these implications:

1. People try to regulate their nonverbal behaviors. They are rarely content to allow their nonverbal behaviors to be spontaneous and unselfconscious expressions of their dispositions or feelings or other internal states.
2. Attempts at nonverbal regulation are often guided by self-presentational goals. That is, people use their nonverbal behaviors in attempts to claim identities that they find desirable and that they think others will find believable (e.g., Schlenker, 1980; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989).
3. When contextual cues vary in self-presentationally relevant ways, nonverbal behaviors should vary also. For example, when people are dependent on others to achieve their goals, they should act differently toward them nonverbally than when they can get what they want completely independently.
4. The regulation of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes is learned. Therefore, nonverbal skills and strategies should vary systematically with important units of socialization such as culture, gender, and age. Similarly, personality differences that are of special self-presentational significance, such as differences in self-monitoring, need for approval, and public self-consciousness, should also be powerful predictors of nonverbal abilities and styles.
5. Adults generally have the skills necessary to regulate their nonverbal behavior successfully for self-presentational purposes.
6. Nonverbal skills are not homogeneous. Instead, patterns of skills should be predictable from self-presentational considerations. For example, there are many more occasions in social interactions [3] that people try to regulate their nonverbal behaviors than the self-presentational function as described here.
life during which people attempt to convey emotions or attitudes or evaluations that are more positive than they really feel or ones in which people attempt to convey appraisals that are more negative than they really feel. Therefore, it should follow that attempts at feigning positivity are more often effective than are attempts at feigning negativity. This prediction differs from one that might follow from component-skills models that are often proposed in developmental psychology and cognitive psychology. According to those models, the success of a performance can be predicted from the degree to which people have mastered the enactment and coordination of the individual components that constitute the performance. The argument here is not that the component-skills perspective is unimportant; in fact, the sections on factors that constrain and enable nonverbal performances are entirely compatible with such a model. Instead, the argument is that self-presentational considerations are important, too; in some instances, they offer explanations as to why particular components are unlikely to be practiced and developed.

7. People's success at using their nonverbal behaviors to attain self-presentational goals is attributable not only to their own skill but also, perhaps even more importantly, to perceivers' lack of skill or their willingness to go along with others' identity-relevant claims. In most domains, perceptions of reality become increasingly accurate over the course of development, so that by adulthood, people understand fundamental aspects of their world, such as space, time, and causality, in a reasonably insightful (though usually imperfect) way. Perceptions of certain self-presentational aspects of the social world differ dramatically from this accuracy model. As Goffman (1959) pointed out, people claim certain identities in their social interactions, and perceivers tend to honor those claims. They tend to take other people's self-presentations at face value, rather than trying to see through them, and they expect the same latitude in return (see also E. E. Jones, 1979).

Several predictions follow from this construal. One is that when people are feigning an affect or opinion or disposition that is at odds with their true internal state (as they view it), perceivers read whatever it is that people are trying to convey more than they read what is really true. Another is that this tendency to see what others want one to see rather than what is in fact true may in some instances be more characteristic of adults than of children. Thus, in the self-presentational domain, socialization can result in decrements rather than enhancements in accuracy of perception. Third, although one might expect spontaneous communications to appear particularly natural, veridical, and therefore readable, the prediction from the self-presentational perspective is that the contents of such communications (e.g., feelings of happiness or sadness) can be read more easily when they are posed than when they are expressed spontaneously. A fourth prediction (for which there are currently no relevant data) is that in the course of everyday social interactions, perceivers will often fail to realize that other people's nonverbal behaviors are being deliberately regulated. They will understand in the abstract that such regulation occurs but will often miss the signs of it during specific ongoing interactions. When asked directly to compare several behaviors, they may be able to tell that regulated behaviors appear somewhat less spontaneous than unregulated ones, but without such a prod, the distinction is likely to go unnoticed.

8. There will be important limitations to the kinds of identities that people can successfully claim. People can vary their self-presentations effectively, but only within a certain range. Many of the limitations will be imposed by social reality. For example, although any competent adult should be able to simulate extraversion, people who really are extraverts should be able purposefully to convey an impression of extraversion more effectively than can people who really are introverts. Analogously, people should be less successful at feigning an emotion that is at odds with the emotion they are actually experiencing if their experienced emotion is strong rather than weak. In general, then, the social world is more tolerant of the editing of conveyed identities, so that they depart only slightly from the social actor's actual experiences, than of the complete fabrication of new identities.

Linking Self-Presentational Intentions to Nonverbal Actions

One approach to the study of nonverbal behavior and self-presentation is to document the self-presentational meanings attributed by perceivers to various nonverbal behaviors and expressions. One could, from this perspective, review the nonverbal cues that are most likely to convey impressions of liking and of status, for example. Several extensive and insightful reviews of this nature have already been published (e.g., Burgoon, Buller, & Woodall, 1989; Edinger & Patterson, 1983; Schlenker, 1980). From these reviews, it is possible to glean answers to questions such as "if I want to try deliberately to convey to another person the impression that I really like him, which nonverbal behaviors should I use to do so?" In some instances, once the answer to such a question is learned, the translation of that knowledge into the actual enactment of the nonverbal behavior is straightforward. For example, if it were discovered that one way to convince a person that you like him is to show him the "A-OK" gesture whenever he suggests something, then anyone physically capable of making such a gesture could use it—and probably successfully—when trying to communicate liking. The same is true for most other instances of nonverbal emblems.

More interesting theoretically are the many instances in which the translation of self-presentational intentions into the actual production of nonverbal behaviors is not at all straightforward. One of the primary goals of this article is to provide a theoretical analysis and empirical review of constraints on the translation of self-presentational intentions into nonverbal actions. There are many reasons why self-presentational intentions cannot always be translated successfully into the desired nonverbal behaviors or expressions. Sometimes the expressions that people would like to enact are ones that they simply cannot produce. Other times, the expressions are ones that they could produce under optimal conditions, but the prevailing circumstances are undermining rather than enabling. For example, situations that arouse debilitating levels of motivation or emotion, as well as those that shake a person's confidence, can sever the link between self-presentational intentions and nonverbal
actions. Emotion is a particularly important constraining factor with regard to nonverbal self-presentations, because the hard-wired links that may exist between the elicitation of emotion and the expression of emotion pose particularly daunting challenges to those who would try to work against their emotions by feigning an emotion that differs from the one they are actually experiencing.

Nonverbal performances can be constrained even before self-presentational intentions are formed. This can happen, for example, if certain kinds of nonverbal self-presentations are so counternormative that intentions to produce such performances are unlikely ever to be formed. For instance, if a priest during a solemn ceremony were marrying a man he suspected to be a philanderer, he would be unlikely even to think of rolling his eyes or snickering as the miscreant said "I do." Even after a self-presentational intention has been translated into a nonverbal performance, there can be constraints on the accuracy of people's appraisal of their performance and on their ability to modify their current and future self-presentations in light of the outcomes of their prior performances. All of these constraints are reviewed next.

Constraints on the Use of Nonverbal Behaviors for Self-Presentational Purposes

The formulation of self-presentational intentions, the enactment of nonverbal behaviors, and the link between the two can be rendered problematic at several points. First, various factors can constrain the kinds of intentions that are formed. Second, many factors can disrupt the actual translation of intentions into actions. And third, some factors limit the effectiveness with which people evaluate and modify their performances. Although each factor is discussed under only one of these three phases, many are relevant to several phases. For example, knowledge of display rules governing the use of nonverbal behaviors is relevant not only to the kinds of self-presentational intentions that are likely to be formulated but also to the kinds of appraisals that are likely to be made of performances that have already been enacted.

Most of the factors that constrain nonverbal performances can also function in enabling ways, so that they enhance the likelihood of self-presentational success. For example, although motivation to create a particular impression can become so intense that it disrupts effective performance, it can also fuel efforts to learn more about the targets of one's self-presentation. Such knowledge eventually may translate into more precisely tailored, and thereby more effective, self-presentations. The focus of the present section is on factors that can limit self-presentational success; however, the ways in which these factors can enable effective performance are also discussed.

Constraints on the Formulation of Intentions to Enact Particular Nonverbal Self-Presentations

Cultural and situational norms or conventions can be powerful enough to prevent certain kinds of nonverbal self-presentations from ever being considered. Thus, they constrain the kinds of intentions that are formed. Individual differences in appreciation of these norms, and in knowledge of the ways in which different nonverbal self-presentations are likely to impact on others, can similarly guide or constrain the kinds of self-presentations that are likely to be selected.

Cultural or situational norms influence nonverbal behaviors in obvious ways when the norms refer directly to nonverbal expressive behaviors (as captured in the concept of display rules). But cultural and situational norms can also impact on nonverbal behaviors in more indirect ways, as for example when they dictate that the experiencing of certain emotions would be inappropriate in certain contexts; if these "feeling rules" (Hochschild, 1979) are taken seriously, then the overt expressions of the inappropriate feelings are less likely to be produced.

Cultural constraints. There are important differences across cultures in the degree to which expressiveness in general is expected or tolerated and in the more specific norms about who should or should not express which emotions or attitudes in which situations. This cross-cultural hypothesis posits a difference not in innate reactions to the elicitation of emotions, but in the kinds of overt expressions of emotions that are encouraged or allowed. This point was nicely demonstrated in a study in which Japanese and American participants watched neutral and stressful films while alone, then discussed those films with the experimenter (described in Ekman, 1972, and Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1982). When the participants were alone, the facial expressions of the Japanese and the Americans were very similar. But when the interview commenced, the Japanese were far more likely than the Americans to put on a happy face when discussing the distressing films.

Norms for expressiveness also vary within subcultures (e.g., P. Miller & Sperry, 1987), families (e.g., Halberstadt, 1991), and perhaps other groups as well, such as organizations (e.g., P. J. DePaulo, DePaulo, Tang, & Swaim, 1989). In each of these contexts, when norms prescribe certain kinds of nonverbal self-presentations, participants are less likely to consider attempting such self-presentations and more likely to feel uncomfortable if they do decide to attempt them. The long-term effects of such norms may even be that skills at enacting such self-presentations atrophy (if indeed they ever develop in the first place); participants then would not be able to produce the relevant nonverbal behaviors even if they did want to do so.

Situational constraints. Within cultures, some situations severely constrain the types of nonverbal behaviors that may appropriately be displayed. In Western cultures, for example, gleeful laughter is highly inappropriate at funerals, and tearful indignation would not be the expected response from the target of a surprise birthday party. In these kinds of situations, display rules dictate the nonverbal expressions that are appropriate. When people conform to these dictates, as most do, little is revealed about them as individuals (E. E. Jones & Davis, 1965). Certainly, there is room for maneuvering even within these strong situational constraints. People occasionally do, for example, deliberately dramatize the depth of their grief at funerals. But the opportunities for varied self-presentations are fewer than in most other situations.

Situations can also enable or indulge certain nonverbal self-
presentations. For example, at a crowded disco filled with frenzied dancers, someone who ordinarily is reserved might instead feel sufficiently disinhibited to try out a very different style of dancing wildly to the music.

Knowledge. To use nonverbal behaviors successfully for self-presentation, people need to have some basic knowledge of the relationship between nonverbal behaviors and internal states, of the kinds of nonverbal behaviors that are appropriate to use at particular times and in particular situations, and of the kinds of reactions and interpretations that particular nonverbal behaviors are likely to elicit from others. In some situations, people may not know what type of impression to try to convey; it may simply be unclear to them what type of self-presentational strategy would best serve their goals. The abstract understanding of display rules and of other regularities governing the use and interpretation of nonverbal expressive behaviors is separate from the ability to produce such behaviors. The latter factor, considered next, is also important.

Constraints on the Translation of Self-Presentational Intentions Into the Actual Production of Nonverbal Behaviors

Ability, practice, and experience. Once people know what impression they would like to convey, and also know (even if only implicitly) which nonverbal behaviors they need to produce to convey that impression, they still need to have a certain set of active abilities to succeed. For example, they need to be able to control the muscles involved in producing the desired expressions. For some types of muscles (see below), this can be difficult even under optimal conditions. Under more taxing circumstances, such as when people are experiencing an intense emotion that they are trying to hide, they may need to find a different way of approaching the task other than trying directly to control the relevant muscles. For example, they might try to modify their experience of the emotion itself, such as by mentally reliving emotional experiences that are inconsistent with the emotion being experienced (Hochschild, 1983; Stanislawski, 1948/1965). The abilities to generate alternative strategies and to enact them successfully are important skills that are likely to vary from individual to individual (e.g., Dodge, 1989; Harris, 1989; McCoy & Masters, 1990; Moore, 1984).

Many, though not all, nonverbal self-presentational abilities can be improved by practice and experience. For example, there is some evidence that experienced salespeople are very effective liars. In a study (P. J. DePaulo & DePaulo, 1989) in which salespeople delivered pitches for products that they liked and disliked, the same kinds of judges who were generally successful at detecting the lies of less experienced liars were totally unsuccessful at detecting the lies of the experienced salespeople. They were unsuccessful even when given hints that typically help people to detect the lies of inexperienced liars, for example, hints to pay special attention to the speaker's tone of voice (B. M. DePaulo, Lassiter, & Stone, 1982). There is also evidence that the reason these hints were not useful is that the salespeople were skilled at controlling their nonverbal expressive behaviors so that they did not reveal their true feelings (P. J. DePaulo & DePaulo, 1989). Politicians, too, seem to be adept at managing their facial expressions in ways that elicit favorable responses from their constituents (McHugo, Lanzetta, Sullivan, Masters, & Englis, 1983; Sullivan & Masters, 1988). There is anecdotal evidence that accomplished poker players are also especially talented at regulating their nonverbal behaviors (Hayano, 1980).

Constraints on the controllability of particular nonverbal behaviors and cues. Physical characteristics such as body type, physical attractiveness, head shape and size, skin coloring, and facial wrinkles can powerfully influence perceivers' impressions. These factors can be a source of enormous frustration to self-presenters, because there is so little that can be done to change most of them.

Research on some physical characteristics, such as attractiveness, is voluminous and is reviewed in detail elsewhere (e.g., Hatfield & Sprecher, 1986). A more recent example is the work generated from an ecological perspective on baby-facedness (Berry & McArthur, 1986). Adults vary systematically in the degree to which their face looks like the face of a baby (big, round eyes; small chin; high eyebrows, and so forth). It has been hypothesized that adults who have baby-type faces will be perceived as having baby-type traits. And in fact, in a study in which the presence or absence of baby-type features was systematically manipulated, perceivers thought the more baby-faced adults were more naive, more honest, warmer, and kinder (Berry & McArthur, 1985; see also Brownlow & Zebrowitz, 1990). In a study of the ramifications of baby-facedness in the legal system, it was found that more baby-faced defendants were less often perceived as guilty of charges of intentional criminal behavior and more often perceived as guilty of charges of negligent criminal behavior. Even when they were seen as guilty of negligent criminal acts, though, they were given lighter sentences (Berry & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1988). Similar kinds of effects have been documented for vocal qualities. For example, adult speakers with childlike voices are perceived as warmer, weaker, and less competent than speakers with more adultlike voices (Montepare & Zebrowitz-McArthur, 1987).

Although relatively permanent physical characteristics such as baby-facedness often constrain nonverbal self-presentations, they can also be enabling to people inventive enough to learn to make optimal use of them. For example, baby-faced people may learn, in response to a stinging accusation, to adopt a particularly poignant look of innocence that works far better for them than it ever could ever work for someone with a less babyish countenance.

In contrast to the relatively static physical characteristics, dynamic cues such as facial expressions and hand movements and gestures provide primarily for flexibility in the pursuit of self-presentations, because many of them are readily controlled. There are, however, important exceptions (Rinn, 1984). In his discussion of facial cues to deceit, Ekman (1985) pointed to several facial muscle movements that the vast majority of people cannot produce at will. An example is the raising and pulling together of the eyebrows that occurs reliably when people are afraid. Because fewer than 10% of adults can produce these movements deliberately, there will be limitations on the degree to which people can convincingly convey an impression of fearfulness when they are not really afraid. Fearfulness is just one
example of a larger category of emotions that people have difficulty feigning: the category of negative emotions. The problem that people have with expressing negativity is one that now has been documented across a variety of methodologies and subject populations (e.g., Morency & Krauss, 1982; Shennum & Bugental, 1982). This asymmetry in the ease of expression of positive as compared with negative affects is probably an example of the undermining effects of cultural and situational prohibitions on expressive abilities. Because there are so many more situations in which people are encouraged to feign positive emotions than in which they are urged to feign negative emotions and because people are reluctant to communicate harsh evaluations (e.g., Blumberg, 1972; Felson, 1980; Tesser & Rosen, 1975), skill at enacting the negative displays may never develop fully. This is just what the self-presentational perspective predicts.

Level and range of expressive cues. Most people are limited in the range of identities they can convincingly claim. An important aspect of this limitation is the constraint imposed by the level and range of expressive cues that a person can command. A man with a very high pitched voice, for example, may find it difficult to convey the impression of being a gruff taskmaster who barks orders at cowering subordinates. The example is not just hypothetical. Empirical work suggests that men with more dominant-appearing faces advance to higher ranks in the military (e.g., Mazur, Mazur, & Keating, 1984; see also Lee & Ofshe, 1981). Like physical characteristics, the level and range of expressive cues can also be enabling of effective self-presentations for people who appreciate the potential of their particular expressive profiles for the types of identities they can claim most convincingly.

There is ample empirical documentation of the constraints imposed by individual differences in expressive profiles. For example, in a study of the legibility of people’s facial expressions, it was found that people’s faces that were easy to read when they were watching one kind of pleasant slide were also easy to read when they were watching another kind of pleasant slide; observers could tell in both cases that they were watching something pleasant. However, when the same people were watching unpleasant slides, their faces were more difficult to read; observers often mistakenly thought the people were again watching pleasant slides (Zuckerman, Larrance, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1979). This effect has been replicated numerous times (e.g., Kraut, 1982; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986) and is now known as the demeanor bias. Some people simply have pleasant faces, and they tend to appear pleasant even under unpleasant circumstances. This is why the demeanor bias is a constraint: It limits the kinds of impressions that people can convey effectively.

There is also an honesty/dishonesty demeanor bias. Some people simply look like honest people, even when they are telling lies (Bond, Kahler, & Paolicelli, 1985; Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, & Rosenthal, 1979). Other people, such as those who are socially anxious, characteristically look dishonest, even when telling the truth (Riggio, Tucker, & Throckmorton, 1987). There is a demeanor effect for voices, too, for both pleasantness/unpleasantness (Zuckerman, Larrance, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1979) and honesty/dishonesty (Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, & Rosenthal, 1979). In fact, the honesty/dishonesty demeanor effect is stronger for voices than for faces (Zuckerman, Larrance, Spiegel, & Korman, 1981), and people have more trouble controlling their tone of voice than their face when they try to lie.

Personal style. Although Gordon Allport made some of the earliest and most influential contributions to our understanding of expressive behaviors (e.g., Allport, 1937; Allport & Vernon, 1933), he was not a great believer in successful regulation and control of such behaviors. He acknowledged that people might try deliberately to disguise their expressive behaviors, but he was willing to concede this only for specific behaviors or for short periods of time. When it came to what he referred to as “style,” or the totality and complexity of all of a person’s expressive behaviors taken together, he did not think that purposeful disguise was even a possibility. In Allport’s (1937) words, “Style . . . develops gradually from within; it cannot for long be simulated or feigned” (p. 493). Several studies (reviewed below) have shown that people actually can simulate a whole constellation of cues suggestive of a personality type very different from their own; Allport’s hypothesis, as yet untested empirically, suggests that they would not be able to maintain such a deception for long. Abraham Maslow (1949) has made much the same suggestion.

Personal style can also impose constraints on self-presentational performances in more specific ways. For example, certain kinds of people seem to favor certain styles of interacting with others. One of the best-documented examples of this is from the domain of social anxiety. People who are socially anxious often adopt defensive and protective social interaction strategies, especially under conditions of evaluative pressure (e.g., Arkin, Lake, & Baumgardner, 1986; DePaulo, Epstein, & LeMay, 1990; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Stine, 1985; Schlenker & Leary, 1982, 1985). This retreat to the comfort of one’s habitual style can be an impediment to self-presentational success in situations in which more assertive and acquisitive styles are more appropriate. More generally, to the extent that one’s preferred or habitual personal style constrains or conflicts with the goals of one’s immediate self-presentational attempt, the less successful that attempt is likely to be.

Motivational constraints. Even those people who can command a range of expressive behaviors and who understand when it might be most propitious to attempt to convey a particular impression will not convey that impression if they simply do not care enough to do so. Conveying the right impression at the right time and the right place can be an effort, and people sometimes are not motivated to make that effort. Motivation may be important at every point in the self-presentational process, from the acquisition of knowledge about nonverbal behaviors and the appropriate contexts for the display of such behaviors to the production of those behaviors and the pursuit of information regarding the effect that they had on others. People who are dispositionally motivated to use nonverbal behaviors effectively for self-presentational purposes may be especially successful at doing so, because they have sought much useful information and have diligently practiced and refined their skills.

However, motivation can instead be an impediment to self-
presentational success, as when motivated people become too emotional (see below) or when they try too hard to control all of their verbal and nonverbal behavior (e.g., B. M. DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; see also Baumeister & Scher, 1988; Heckhausen & Strang, 1988). For example, when people are especially motivated to succeed in getting away with their lies, their lies become, paradoxically, more obvious to observers (e.g., B. M. DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; B. M. DePaulo, Kirkendol, Tang, & O’Brien, 1988; B. M. DePaulo, Lanier, & Davis, 1983; B. M. DePaulo, Stone, & Lasliser, 1985b). The lies told by motivated liars are not revealed verbally, but nonverbally. The role of emotion may be important here, too. Motivated liars are emotional liars, and therefore they must grapple with the difficult problem of controlling the nonverbal cues to the emotions they are experiencing. Sometimes they try to do this by suppressing their behavior. These attempts can backfire, though, in that people who are trying to suppress their expressive behaviors sometimes look and sound like they have something to hide. Another strategy that motivated liars might use is to try deliberately to control all of their verbal and nonverbal behaviors. This strategy, too, is likely to fail, because the specific components of nonverbal performances are unlikely to be available to conscious awareness (cf. Polanyi, 1962). The strategy may be especially counterproductive when used by people who are characteristically not very self-focused, such as those who are low in self-consciousness (Baumeister, 1984; Baumeister & Showers, 1986).

Even when people are not trying to lie, motivation can sometimes be debilitating to effective nonverbal performance (e.g., B. M. DePaulo et al., 1990). This has been most compellingly documented in the literature on social anxiety. Social anxiety occurs when people are highly motivated to create a particular impression on others but insecure about their ability to do so (e.g., Leary, 1983; Schlenker & Leary, 1982, 1985). There are many nonverbal manifestations of this anxious yearning, including nervous behaviors such as fidgeting and stuttering, disaffiliative behaviors such as letting longer silences develop, and image-protective behaviors, which are behaviors that are sociable in a safe way, such as nodding and smiling and listening without interrupting (Schlenker & Leary, 1982). These are not the behaviors that are likely to characterize the performances of skilled impression managers.

*Emotional constraints.* Emotions can undermine self-presentational efforts because of the automatic links, described earlier, between the elicitation of the basic emotions and the nonverbal expression of those emotions. For example, a person who suddenly becomes very afraid will only with great difficulty convince an onlooker that he is actually quite calm and composed. He can try to suppress or mask the facial actions triggered by the fear, but fragments of these movements might “leak” out anyway (Ekman, 1985). He may try to speak in a steady manner, but his voice might quiver and his pitch might rise uncontrollably.

From an individual differences perspective, emotionality (or affect intensity) is an important dimension of temperament (e.g., Buss & Plomin, 1975; Goldsmith et al., 1987; Thomas & Chess, 1985; Thomas, Chess, & Birch, 1968). Dispositionally emotional people tend to respond to affect-provoking stimuli intensely and to experience emotions deeply (Flett, Boase, McAndrews, Pliner, & Blankstein, 1986; Larsen & Diener, 1987). In emotionally provocative situations, attempts to suppress the overt expression of emotions or to cover emotions with expressions of different emotions should be more problematic for people whose emotional reactions are characteristically more intense than for those whose reactions are typically more muted. At the same time, however, the strength of their feelings should be distinctly advantageous to affectively intense people who want to communicate their feelings to others either clearly and honestly or in an exaggerated manner.

The personality profile of affectively intense people indicates that such people tend to be extraverted, sociable, active, and arousable (Larsen & Diener, 1987). Thus, it is probably fairly easy for such people to convey positive impressions of outgoing friendliness in their interactions with others. Perhaps others notice that their emotions are apparent from their nonverbal behaviors and see this as indicative of an openness that invites gregariousness and maybe even closeness. At this point, however, this is purely speculative; the role of nonverbal expressiveness as a link between affect intensity and the impressions that are conveyed in social interaction is in need of empirical exploration.

Emotionality can be construed not just in terms of intensity of affect but also with regard to the range of emotions typically experienced (Sommers, 1981; Sommers & Scioli, 1986). The links between emotional range and nonverbal self-presentations have not yet been established, but it is likely that emotional range will function primarily as an enabling factor, so that people who typically experience more different kinds of emotions can more effectively convey a wider variety of impressions than can those who tend to experience a more narrow range of emotions. However, it is also possible that emotional range will constrain a person’s ability to convey a single impression or emotion unambivalently.

*Spontaneous expressiveness.* There are consistent individual differences in spontaneous expressiveness, which is the degree to which feelings and emotions are readable from nonverbal behaviors when people are not trying deliberately to convey their feelings (e.g., Buck, 1984; Notarius & Levenson, 1979). These can be measured by paradigms such as those used by

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*The definition of expressiveness in this article differs from that of Buss and Briggs (1984), who see expressive behavior as spontaneous, rehearsed, unshy, and informal. Expressiveness, in their conceptualization, is at the opposite end of the dimensions of pretense, shyness, and formality. The key difference from the present definition is the assumption that expressiveness and spontaneity co-occur. In the present conceptualization, in contrast, expressiveness is a continuum ranging from expressive (readable) to unexpressive (illegible), and it is measured in a context in which behavior is likely to be emitted spontaneously rather than deliberately regulated. (Typically, the context involves watching emotionally loaded slides when no one else is present.) Deliberate behavior can also range from expressive to unexpressive. As indicated in the section on posing, when people are instructed to try deliberately to convey certain emotions, the nonverbal behaviors of some people will seem expressive and legible, but the nonverbal behaviors of others will appear unexpressive and indecipherable. The present construal, then, is a two-by-two: Nonverbal behavior can be spontaneous or deliberate, and crossed with that, it can be expressive or unexpressive.*
Buck (1979, 1984), in which people are videotaped surreptitiously while watching emotion-evoking slides and those tapes are then shown to judges who try to discern the slides the people were watching, or by the use of various personality scales that tap this trait (Manstead, 1991). Whereas affect intensity refers to the ease with which emotions can be triggered and the intensity which they are experienced, expressiveness describes the link between the experiencing of an emotion and the nonverbal expression of the emotion. People who are spontaneously expressive are not necessarily more emotional (King & Emmons, 1990); in fact, such people may be dispositionally less physiologically reactive than those who are not so outwardly expressive (e.g., Buck, 1979, 1984; H. E. Jones, 1935; Lanzetta & Kleck, 1970; Prideaux, 1922). But the emotions that they do experience, regardless of how weak or intense, are more likely to appear on their face, and perhaps in their voice, than are the emotions of people who are less expressive.

Because the links between the elicitation of emotions and the nonverbal expression of those emotions are presumably stronger for people who are spontaneously expressive, the job of hiding those nonverbal expressions, when that is deemed desirable, is more difficult for them (cf. Kraut, 1982). An interesting example of this effect was reported in a study in which expressive and unexpressive people learned that they had just defeated two competitors (Friedman & Miller-Herringer, 1991). The participants heard this information either when they were alone or in the presence of the other competitors. Most participants looked much less jubilant when they were in front of their competitors than when they were alone. But the suppression of gloating was apparently more difficult for the expressive people; they looked much more gleeful than did the unexpressive people when others were present.

Although spontaneous expressiveness can be constraining, there are also many ways in which it can be self-presentationally advantageous. First, spontaneously expressive people tend to be skilled at posing emotions nonverbally. When they are experiencing no particular emotions, they can use their face and voice to convey the impression that they actually are experiencing certain affects and emotions (Buck, 1975; Cunningham, 1977; Tucker & Riggio, 1988; Zuckerman, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1976; Zuckerman, Larrance, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1979). They are also skilled at deceiving, when the deception task does not demand that they work against strong emotions (B. M. DePaulo, Blank, Swaim, & Hairfield, in press). They should also be skilled at conveying emotions that they really are experiencing in a legible or exaggerated way.

Second, expressive people are liked better than unexpressive people. This is a highly replicable finding, which has been documented for people who are spontaneously expressive (e.g., Sabatelli & Rubin, 1986), for those who are skilled at posing nonverbal expressions (e.g., Friedman, DiMatteo, & Taranta, 1980), for those who describe themselves as emotionally expressive (e.g., Friedman, Riggio, & Casella, 1988) or as extraverted (e.g., Riggio & Friedman, 1986), for people who are from expressive families (Halberstadt, 1984), and for people who have expressive facial features (Cunningham, 1986). It has also been documented in a study in which the measure of expressiveness was the frequency of socially oriented nonverbal behaviors exhibited by people in face-to-face interactions (Shrout & Fiske, 1981).

Third, across numerous studies, expressive people often appear more attractive than unexpressive people and never appear less attractive (B. M. DePaulo et al., in press; Friedman et al., 1988; Larrance & Zuckerman, 1981; Riggio, 1986; Sabatelli & Rubin, 1986). Perhaps they simply are endowed with greater physical beauty. But there may be more to it than that. When unexpressive people try to act in a particularly expressive way, they appear more attractive than when they try to act in a particularly inhibited way. Thus, their attempts to be expressive enhance their attractiveness. Expressive people, in contrast, appear just as attractive when they are trying to be expressive as when they are trying to be inhibited, and in both cases, they appear more attractive than unexpressive people. Expressive people, then, seem to know how to regulate their attractiveness so that they can manage to appear beautiful even under difficult conditions that make others look less physically appealing (B. M. DePaulo et al., in press).

Fourth, Buck (1989) has suggested that people who are expressive may "turn on" the expressive behavior of others. Their expressiveness encourages others to be open and expressive in return. Certainly, this is one of the rules of verbal expressiveness; one person's level of self-disclosure is generally matched or reciprocated by the target of that disclosure (e.g., Cappella, 1981; Cozby, 1973). Analogously, unexpressiveness dampens the expressiveness of others. For example, normal people who are interacting with schizophrenics, who tend to be expressively inhibited, are themselves less expressive than when they are interacting with other normals (Krause, Steimer, Sanger-Alt, & Wagner, 1989). Even infants appear to be more expressive when their mothers are facially expressive than when they are reserved (Kaye & Fogel, 1980; see also Jones, Collins, & Hong, 1991).

The salience of the nonverbal behaviors of expressive people probably also serves to elicit more explicit feedback about those behaviors and the internal states that they may or may not reflect (Buck, 1988). Through this mechanism, expressive people, by their very expressiveness, contribute to their own "emotional education" (Buck, 1989) and probably also to the further development and refinement of their nonverbal self-presentational skills.

Expressive people also seem able, unwittingly or unwittingly, to influence the emotions of others. In dyadic and group interactions, the moods of the less expressive people are influenced by the moods of the more expressive people (Friedman & Riggio, 1981; Sullins, 1991). Perhaps this occurs in part because expressive people are generally more noticeable than are unexpressive people (Sullins, 1989).

In the field of medicine, physicians who can pose emotions nonverbally are advantaged in that they tend to have more satisfied patients (DiMatteo, 1979; Friedman, DiMatteo, & Taranta, 1980). In education, expressive teachers are evaluated much more positively by their students than are unexpressive teachers (e.g., Abrami, Leventhal, & Perry, 1982; Basow & Distenfeld, 1985). In the domain of athletics, there are attributional advantages to being expressive. Athletes who are outwardly expressive are perceived as having exerted more effort than those who are not expressive, and after failure, the expressive athletes are seen
as having more ability and as being less responsible for their failure than are the unexpressive athletes (Rejeski & Lowe, 1980).

In many ways, then, spontaneous expressiveness is an powerful predictor of self-presentational outcomes. Its importance is also underscored by its stability across time and across situations (Notarius & Levenson, 1979). Reliable individual differences in expressiveness may be apparent even in infancy (Buck, 1984; Field & Walden, 1982). And in a longitudinal study of individual differences in inhibition (not specific to nonverbal inhibition), Kagan and his colleagues found evidence of inhibited and uninhibited styles that are consistent from age 2 until at least age 7 (e.g., Kagan, Reznick, Snidman, Gibbons, & Johnson, 1988). Moreover, the kinds of personality variables that are correlated with expressiveness are replicable from study to study and are similar in studies of children (Buck, 1975, 1977) and in studies of adults (Friedman, DiMatteo, & Taranta, 1980; Friedman, Prince, Riggio, & DiMatteo, 1980; Friedman, Riggio, & Segall, 1980; Riggio, 1986). These variables include extraversion, popularity, dominance, impulsiveness, and playfulness. Finally, although both expressive and unexpressive people can modify their overall levels of expressiveness so as to become more expressive or less expressive at will, expressive and unexpressive people each have their own domain of expressiveness. Unexpressive people, when trying to be expressive, are not able to appear as expressive as expressive people when the latter are acting naturally. Similarly, expressive people, when trying to be unexpressive, are not able to appear as inhibited as unexpressive people when the unexpressives are acting naturally (DePaulo et al., in press).

In summary, spontaneously expressive people create more favorable impressions on others, probably without even trying. When they do try to convey particular impressions, they are especially successful at doing so, as long as they are not trying to convey an impression that is at odds with a strong emotion that they are experiencing. The profiles of expressive people are similar to those of affectively intense people, although much more is known about the self-presentationally relevant correlates and consequences of expressiveness than of emotionality.

Confidence. People who believe that they can succeed in conveying the impressions they want to convey probably really will succeed more often than those who are less confident. This seems to be true both for people who are dispositionally confident (e.g., Leary, 1983; Schlenker & Leary, 1982) as well as for people in whom high expectations for success have been experimentally induced (e.g., B. M. DePaulo et al., 1991). It is not entirely clear why confidence has this effect, but several explanations seem plausible. For example, people who are confident may become less emotional in difficult situations, and their composure might then help them to convey their desired impressions successfully. Confidence might also help people to avoid self-defeating strategies. For instance, instead of paying close attention to their own nonverbal behaviors in challenging interpersonal situations, which can sometimes impair performance, confident people might instead pay attention to the reactions of others.

Confidence, then, will almost always be an enabling factor with regard to effective self-presentations. However, it can be come constraining or undermining at its extreme, in that people who are overconfident may not mobilize the effort necessary to convey just the right impressions (Schlenker & Leary, 1985).

Constraints on Appraisals and Modifications of Self-Presentations

The self-presentational process does not end with the production of a particular nonverbal performance. There are still possibilities for modifying that performance as the interaction continues and to learn from it after it has ended. On-line modifications in nonverbal communications are constrained by the limitations in awareness discussed earlier; that is, because people cannot see or hear their own nonverbal behaviors exactly as others do, it may be difficult for them to fine-tune their self-presentations. The appraisals of the effectiveness of their nonverbal productions may also be in error. Suggestive evidence for this comes from the finding that people think that they are more skilled at controlling their own expressive behavior while lying than most other people are at controlling theirs (Zuckerman, Koestner, & Driver, 1981). Even when people are correct in their intuitions about what their expressive behaviors look or sound like, they may still err in their guesses about how others might interpret those behaviors (cf. B. M. DePaulo et al., 1987; Kenny & DePaulo, 1991).

Skill at Conveying Impressions Nonverbally

Can people overcome the many constraints on the execution of their self-presentational intentions and manage effective nonverbal performances? By adulthood, do they have (for example) the necessary knowledge, ability, experience, and confidence to make successful nonverbal claims to the identities they value? The assumption of the self-presentational perspective is that they do. Many studies are pertinent to this question, including those that have assessed people's skill at communicating various emotions and attitudes nonverbally. These include studies of the ability to pose particular affective states as well as studies of skill at deceiving. Before those studies are reviewed, I consider the issue of the legibility of totally unregulated nonverbal expressions. Research on spontaneous expressiveness indicates whether people's nonverbal behaviors are likely to reveal their internal states even when they are not trying to control those behaviors. To the extent that spontaneous expressions are legible, the task of deliberately exaggerating those expressions is eased, but the task of muting those expressions or covering them with entirely different expressions is complicated.

Legibility of Spontaneous Nonverbal Expressions

The results of studies in which people are surreptitiously videotaped in emotionally impactful situations (e.g., Kleck & Mendola, 1990; Kraut, 1982; Wagner et al., 1986; Zuckerman et al., 1976; Zuckerman et al., 1979) are quite consistent. Typically, the affects or emotions that subjects are experiencing are apparent from their facial expressions. The spontaneous revealingness of nonverbal behaviors is not limited to expressions of
positivity and negativity nor of the basic emotions. Whether children understand a lesson or are confused by it, for example, is also evident from their faces (Allen & Atkinson, 1978). Amusement can be read from faces, too (Edelmann & Hampson, 1981). Nonverbal revealingness is not limited to facial expressions. Similarly accurate inferences about affects and emotions can be made from the tone of voice (e.g., Cunningham, 1977; Scherer, 1986; Zuckerman et al., 1979). And observers who can see people's body movements as well as their facial expressions can tell when those people are feeling embarrassed (Edelmann & Hampson, 1981).

Together, the studies of spontaneous expressiveness indicate that nonverbal behavior can convey information about people's experiences even when they are not trying purposefully to make their experiences evident to others. There are qualifications to this conclusion, of course. For example, in the Wagner et al. (1986) study in which happiness, anger, and disgust were communicated accurately, fear, sadness, and surprise were not. Also, there are certain spontaneously produced nonverbal behaviors (e.g., sneezing) that are unlikely to be valid indicators of any psychologically interesting process or state. The number of such behaviors, however, may be surprisingly small. Coughing, for example, appears to be psychologically meaningful (Pennebaker, 1980).

**Nonverbal Posing Skill**

Studies of people's ability to pose certain states nonverbally are very similar to studies of spontaneous communications, except that in the posing studies, people are instructed to try deliberately to convey the impression that they are experiencing a certain state, such as fear. Sometimes they really are experiencing that state (e.g., they are watching a scary movie); other times they are simply instructed to pose an expression that would convey an impression of fear. Virtually every study of this nature has shown that people can successfully make clear to others, using only nonverbal cues, the internal state that they actually are experiencing and that they can also convey to others the impression that they are experiencing a particular internal state when in fact they are not. A variety of nonverbal behaviors can be managed in this way, including facial expressions (e.g., Jaeger, Borod, & Peselow, 1986; Kraut, 1982; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986; Zaidel & Mehrabian, 1969; Zuckerman et al., 1976; Zuckerman, Larrance, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1979; Zuckerman, Lipets, Koivumaki, & Rosenthal, 1975), tone of voice cues (e.g., Apple & Hecht, 1982; Scherer, 1986; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986; Zaidel & Mehrabian, 1969; Zuckerman, Larrance, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1979; Zuckerman et al., 1975; see also Williams & Stevens, 1972), body movements and postures (e.g., Cunningham, 1977), and even gait (Montepare, Goldstein, & Clausen, 1987). Furthermore, when people are deliberately trying to convey an impression of a state that they are not really experiencing, their nonverbal behaviors convey that impression to others even more clearly and effectively than when they really are experiencing the state but are not trying purposefully to communicate it to others (e.g., Zuckerman et al., 1976; Zuckerman, Larrance, Hall, DeFrank, & Rosenthal, 1979). That is, consistent with the implications of the self-presentational perspective, people's posed expressions are more legible than their spontaneous expressions.

Buck (1984) has suggested that when people attempt to pose nonverbal expressions of emotions, they can tap into hard-wired structures that are already in place for the spontaneous expressions of those emotions. They do not need to learn to produce those expressions in the way that they would need to learn to form expressions of states that are not prewired. Such a mechanism could help to account for the success with which such expressions are produced.

**Skill at Deceiving**

Research on deception takes the posing results one step further and asks whether people can convey nonverbally the impression that they are experiencing something very different from what they really are experiencing. For example, can they take a taste of a bitter solution and lead observers to believe that they just sipped something sweet (e.g., Feldman, Jenkins, & Popoola, 1979; Feldman & White, 1980)? Can they smell something pleasant and convince another person that they the odor is actually disgusting (Kraut, 1982)? Can they listen to a totally incomprehensible lesson and assume a look of complete understanding (Allen & Atkinson, 1978)? Can they talk about someone they despise and still convey the impression that they really like that person (B. M. DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979; B. M. DePaulo, Rosenthal, Green, & Rosenkrantz, 1982; Zuckerman, Amidon, Bishop, & Pomerantz, 1982)?

When people can use nonverbal cues in concert with verbal cues to convey false impressions, people are generally successful at managing the impression that they are experiencing something different than what they really are experiencing. As predicted by the self-presentation perspective, then, perceivers generally believe the affects or attitudes that people are faking, rather than seeing through to the ones they are really feeling (e.g., B. M. DePaulo, Stone, & Lassiter, 1985a). There is some evidence that the same thing occurs when nonverbal cues are used alone to accomplish the deceit, but the evidence is more scarce and less reliable (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981).

Perceivers, though, are not totally hoodwinked. Although they tend to see others as basically honest, even when they are lying, they can see a difference in truthfulness between truths and lies. Lies seem less truthful to them than do truths. Furthermore, even though perceivers believe, for example, that a woman who is just pretending to like a man really does like him, they can tell that her liking is less intense than when she is honestly conveying her fond feelings for a man she really does like (e.g., B. M. DePaulo et al., 1985a).

When people try to assume an entire constellation of behaviors indicative of a wholly different personality type than their own, the results are quite similar. An example comes from a study in which extraverts and introverts tried to come across both as introverted and as extraverted in simulated teaching demonstrations (Lippa, 1976). Judges who viewed the videotapes of the lessons believed that the people who were just pretending to be extraverts were more extraverted than the people who really were extraverts but were pretending to be intro-
vert. Again, though, the perceivers were not completely fooled. They could tell that the people who were feigning extraversion were not as extraverted as the extraverts who were trying to make their extraversion apparent and that the people who were feigning introversion were not as introverted as the introverts who were trying to make their introversion apparent. These results are entirely consistent with the results of an analogous study of expressiveness (reviewed earlier), which showed that unexpressive people could not manage to appear as expressive as expressive people and the expressions could not manage to appear as inhibited as the unexpressives (B. M. DePaulo et al., in press). Both sets of results are supportive of the assumption of the self-presentation perspective that there are constraints on the degree to which people can claim identities that are different from their “true” identities as they perceive them.

In the Lippa (1976) study, as in most of the other studies of posing and deceiving, the participants were not involved in face-to-face interactions. The participants were pretending to be teaching, but no students were actually present. In contrast, Toris and DePaulo (1984) used a simulated job interview format in which introverts and extraverts tried to come across as introverted or extraverted in successive sessions with different interviewers. The interviewers’ task was to try to determine whether the applicants really were introverted or extraverted. The participants in this study were especially adept at feigning a different personality type. Interviewers believed that the applicants were the types of persons they were pretending to be, rather than the types of persons they really were. And they saw no difference in extraversion between genuine and dissimulated displays of extraversion nor between genuine and dissimulated displays of introversion. This study raises the possibility that perceivers are even more likely to be taken by people’s deceptive self-presentations when engaged in dynamic face-to-face interactions than when forming impressions in a more passive way, as when observing others from a distance or viewing them on a videotape. And in fact, Gilbert and his colleagues have found that cognitively “busy” perceivers, compared with more passive perceivers, tend to take others’ self-presentations at face value (Gilbert, Krull, & Pelham, 1988; see also Baumeister, Hutton, & Tice, 1989; Gilbert & Krull, 1988).

Across many studies, perceivers are quite consistent in their tendency to judge others as basically truthful and to believe the feelings or attitudes that others are trying to convey rather than those that they really do hold (B. M. DePaulo et al., 1985a). This occurs even though perceivers often know that the persons they are observing may be lying some of the time. Of course, in these paradigms, perceivers do not know when the people they are observing are lying and when they are telling the truth. Differentiating truth from deceit is a complex task and calling someone a liar (or even just suspecting, in one’s own mind, that another person is being deceitful) is an emotionally charged and interpersonally hazardous act (e.g., B. M. DePaulo, 1981). Perhaps it should not be surprising, then, that in these paradigms, perceivers give the people they are observing or interacting with the benefit of the doubt.

There is a related set of studies on the “correspondence bias” (see E. E. Jones, 1979, 1986, 1990, for reviews) that makes perceivers’ task even more straightforward. In some of those paradigms, perceivers read essays that were written by target persons. The essays were randomly assigned to the target persons; thus, the positions espoused in the essays bore no systematic relationship to the target person’s true attitudes. Furthermore, perceivers were told that the essays were assigned in this arbitrary manner. Still, they inferred that the target person’s true attitude was consistent with the attitude in the essay. Many artefactual explanations of this correspondence bias have been ruled out, and the effect has been replicated in countless paradigms (E. E. Jones, 1990). Ross (1977) calls the effect the “fundamental attribution error”; E. E. Jones (1990) believes that it is the most robust and replicable effect in social psychology. Goffman (1959) might say that it is a matter of honor; people honor each other’s identity claims. By adulthood, this inclination may be so habitual that, in the ordinary course of events, it is rarely undone. In fact, consistent with the implications of the self-presentation perspective, there is even evidence that the tendency to read people’s feigned feelings more than their felt ones may actually increase with age (B. M. DePaulo, Jordan, Irvine, & Laser, 1982).

There is some evidence that in simulating a particular personality disposition, what people do is to present an exaggerated version of the expressive behaviors that characterize such a disposition. For example, extraverts tend to speak more quickly than do introverts. When feigning extraversion, people speak even more quickly than do genuine extraverts, and when feigning introversion, they speak even more slowly than real introverts do (Feldstein & Sloan, 1984). An analogous finding has been described in the clinical literature. People who are trying to fake particular disorders sometimes adopt the strategy of presenting an even more extreme set of symptoms than would characterize someone who really was afflicted with the relevant malady (Pankratz, 1988). Other examples of overshooting the mark can be gleaned anecdotally. For example, Pankratz (personal communication, December 2, 1988) has pointed out that female impersonators seem almost to caricature what it is like to walk or talk or dress like a woman (see also McConnell-Ginet, 1978).

When people present themselves in a way that does not correspond to their self-concept, they generally want their false presentations to be believed. For example, people who see themselves as introverted might sometimes try to act extraverted because they believe that it would be advantageous in certain contexts to appear to be an extravert. Occasionally, however, people feel compelled to present themselves deceptively against their wishes. Examples of this from the political arena are mistreated hostages who are pressured to make videotapes in which they proclaim their well-being. Can people in such situations, while saying appropriately deceptive things, use their nonverbal behaviors to make it clear to others that they are lying? Can they similarly make it clear when they are telling the truth? The one study conducted on this topic did not involve hostages; however, the study did make it clear that it is possible, for undergraduates at least, to manage their own facial expressions and tone of voice cues in a way that purposefully betrays their own verbal deceptions (Zuckerman, DeFrank, Hall, Larrance, & Rosenthal, 1979).
Sensitivity in the Deployment of Skills

Much of the research on nonverbal self-presentational skills has involved paradigms in which participants are instructed to try to convey particular impressions. It therefore addresses the question of whether people can create such impressions when asked to try to do so. However, as Cappella (1988) has pointed out, there is much more to effective self-presentation than the mere production of the relevant behaviors on demand. Self-presentation most often occurs during social interactions; thus, issues of timing (e.g., Davis, 1982), appropriateness, and sensitivity to the context and to the motives of the other interactants are also important.

Research on motor mimicry provides an apt example of skill at producing nonverbal behaviors in a sensitive way. Examples of motor mimicry, such as cringing when other people are in pain and smiling when they are happy, have generally been regarded as indicative of processes such as empathy or vicarious emotional responding (Bavelas, Black, Lemery, & Mullett, 1986). The assumption has been that these responses are expressions of the internal state of the person doing the mimicking. In contrast, Bavelas and her colleagues (Bavelas et al., 1986) have argued that whereas motor mimicry may in part reflect internal states, it also has important communicative functions. In their research, an experimenter winced in pain after dropping a heavy object on his already-injured hand. Several seconds later, he turned either toward the participant or the other experimenter. Consistent with the hypothesis that participants’ facial expressions of pain serve a communicative function, those expressions increased over time in the condition in which the pained experimenter faced the participant and decreased in the condition in which he faced the other experimenter. The difference in the occurrence of pain expressions across the two conditions was especially striking at the exact point at which the injured experimenter did or did not look at the participant. Furthermore, when videotapes of the participants’ expressions were shown to judges who were unaware of the orientation of the experimenter, they perceived the expressions of the participants who ended up face-to-face with the injured experimenter as more knowing and more caring than the expressions of the other participants. It appears from this study, then, that people can regulate the timing and the qualitative aspects of their nonverbal expressions to fit the nuances of the interaction.

Skill at regulating nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes can include skill not only in regulating the expressive behaviors themselves but also in setting up the situation so that nonverbal behaviors will have their desired impact. This skill, too, requires exquisite sensitivity to contexts and to motives. It may be just this sort of skill at setting the stage that accounts for much of the success of con artists (e.g., Blum, 1972; Maurer, 1940). 5

In summary, the literatures on the abilities to pose expressions of internal states that may or may not be present, to feign states that are different from those actually experienced, and to time the production of these nonverbal expressions in context-sensitive ways suggest that people are often remarkably successful at managing their nonverbal self-presentations, despite the many potential impediments to their performances. There are, though, important individual differences in these skills. I review those next.

Predicting Individual Differences in the Use of Nonverbal Behaviors for Self-Presentational Purposes

By considering the factors that constrain and enable the use of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes (reviewed above) and the degree to which those factors characterize different kinds of people, it should be possible to predict individual differences in the degree to which people try deliberately to use nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes and in their success at so doing. Age differences and sex differences may be the most powerful individual-difference predictors of the use of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes; they are reviewed first. Then several other examples of important self-presentationally relevant individual differences are considered, that is, physical attractiveness, self-monitoring, need for approval, and public self-consciousness.

Age

With age come increases in several of the factors that facilitate, rather than constrain, the effective use of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes. These include knowledge, ability, practice, experience, and motivation.

As children grow older, they acquire more knowledge about the hows, whens, wheres, and whys of expressive behavior (e.g., Saarni, 1990). For example, they learn more about internal states and the nonverbal behaviors that typically correspond to those states. Importantly, they also show a rudimentary grasp, beginning as early as the preschool years, of the fact that people’s expressive behaviors do not always correspond to their internal states (e.g., Harris, Donnelly, Guz, & Pitt-Watson, 1986) and that one of the reasons they do not correspond is that people can purposefully control their nonverbal behavior so as to convey a misleading impression (e.g., Gnepp & Hess, 1986). With age, children’s comprehension of the complexities of this process becomes increasingly sophisticated (e.g., Gnepp & Hess, 1986; Saarni, 1988).

Over the course of development, children also learn more about the situational and cultural conventions governing the use of nonverbal behaviors, and they learn more about how different kinds of people are likely to react to different kinds of self-presentations. They undoubtedly acquire this knowledge in part because social punishments and rewards are increasingly meted out contingent on the deftness with which children adhere to expressive conventions and fine-tune their self-presentations to other people’s feelings and needs.

As children learn about the norms of expressiveness in contexts in which others care about their mastery of this cultural wisdom, their own motivation to practice these rules and to learn even more about them grows. Meanwhile, they become more skilled at controlling their facial musculature so as to produce an array of expressions at will (Ekman, Roper, &
ably conveyed fairly uniformly within a given culture, others are
should not be surprising, then, that studies of children indicate
these variations have important implications for the develop-
sive conventions vary systematically from family to family, and
this continues to be true even of adults (Buck, 1984).

The fact that the incidence of social smiling increases during
the preschool years (Cheyne, 1976), at least in Western cultures,
is suggestive evidence that children are not only understanding
more about the management of expressive behavior but also
attempting more of that management in their own interactions.
As they progress through the school years, children use display
rules more often, more spontaneously, and more effectively. For
example, on opening a brightly wrapped present and finding a
drab baby toy, older children (for whom the toy is especially
inappropriate) are more likely than younger ones to look and
sound pleased with their gift (Saarni, 1984; but see also Cole,
1986). Other suggestive evidence of children's use of nonverbal
behaviors for self-presentational purposes comes from studies
of the strategic use of crying (Burton-Jones, 1967), the use of
"winning" facial expressions in conflict situations (Camras,
1982) and in situations in which children might try to convey an
impression of competence (Zivin, 1982; see also Allen & Atkin-
son, 1978), and the deliberate suppression of expressions of
anger (Cummings, 1987).

When preschoolers are asked to try to pose with their faces
emotions that they are not actually feeling, girls become better
and better at this with age (Zuckerman & Przewuzman, 1979).
Throughout the childhood years, both boys and girls also be-
come more talented deceivers. Some interesting demonstra-
tions of this involved Feldman's drink-tasting paradigm, in
which subjects sample sweetened and unsweetened drinks
while trying to convince another person that they like both
drinks. At the youngest ages tested (first graders), children's
true reactions to the drinks leaked out: It was clear from their
faces that they were not enjoying the unsweetened drinks. Sev-
enth graders, in contrast, looked just as pleased with the uns-
weetened drinks as with the sweetened ones. College students
took this charade a step further: From their faces, one would
have thought that the sugarless samples were even tastier than
the sweet ones (Feldman et al., 1979).

The socialization of the expression of emotions may well
begin in infancy. Malatesta and Haviland (1982) have shown
that in mother–infant interactions, infants display expressions
suggestive of a wide array of emotions (see also Izard, Huebner,
Risser, McGinnes, & Dougherty, 1980); mothers, however,
model mostly just expressions of positive emotions. Perhaps it
should not be surprising, then, that studies of children indicate
that socially acceptable emotions are more readily read from
their faces than are less acceptable emotions (Buck, 1984; Mor-
ency & Krauss, 1982; Shennum & Bugenthal, 1982; see also
Ekman, Roper, & Hager, 1980). In fact, some studies find that
this continues to be true even of adults (Buck, 1984).

Although many of the lessons of socialization are presum-
ably conveyed fairly uniformly within a given culture, others are
more specific to particular subgroups, such as families. Express-
ive conventions vary systematically from family to family, and
these variations have important implications for the develop-
ment of expressive skills within the family unit. Children from
more emotionally expressive families, for example, are more
adept at expressing certain emotions nonverbally than are chil-
dren from less expressive homes (Halberstadt, 1983, 1986,
1991). Another telling example of subgroup variation in the
training of emotional expressiveness is the differential sociali-
ization of the sexes (see below).

In summary, then, the story of development is in most ways a
tale of ever-broadening opportunities. Children become more
knowledgeable, more skillful, and more motivated with regard
to the use of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational pur-
poses. This will usually mean that they can be more and more
successful in that domain when they want to be.

Age does, however, bring a few potential impediments to
expressive control. Over the course of the preschool years, girls
(but not boys) become more spontaneously expressive (Buck,
1977), which can make it difficult for them to feign emotions
that are different from the ones they are feeling. Also, children's
growing awareness of the norms and sanctions of social life
make them more prone to emotions that can prove disruptive
to effective self-presentations. For example, when older chil-
dren try to lie, they might experience more guilt and shame
than do younger children. They then face the challenging task
of concealing not only the lie itself but also the distress they are
feeling about telling the lie. Socialization also quite likely in-
hbits the development of certain skills, such as the ability to
communicate negative emotions (e.g., Morency & Krauss, 1982;
Shennum & Bugenthal, 1982). In addition, socialization sen-
tizes children to situational and cultural conventions in ways
that eventually will constrain the type and range of self-presen-
tations that children and young adults will attempt to convey.
As children develop a distinctive and stable personal style, that
too can constrain the kinds of identities that they will try to
claim nonverbally.

Little research exists on the continued development of non-
verbal self-presentational skills across later adult years. There is
evidence, though, that affect intensity decreases between the
ages of 16 and 68 (Diener, Sandvik, & Larsen, 1985). Perhaps
this decline helps to account for the findings that older women's
facial expressions are more blended and fragmented than those
of younger women (Malatesta & Izard, 1984) and that elderly
adults are more successful than are young adults at using their
facial expressions to fool others in the drink-tasting paradigm

Sex

Differences in ability, motivation, and spontaneous expres-
siveness all converge to produce what may be one of the most
pervasive and important of all individual differences in the use
of nonverbal behavior for self-presentational purposes: sex dif-
fences.

As early as 3 months of age, there are indications that girls
may develop differently than boys in the expressive domain.
For example, in interactions with their mother, infant girls show
more facial expressions that look like expressions of interest
than do boys (Malatesta & Haviland, 1982). By adulthood, a
myriad of cues suggest that women are, nonverbally, more in-
volved in their interpersonal interactions than are men (J. A. Hall, 1984, see also Exline, 1963). For example, women have more expressive and more legible faces than do men. They also smile more than men do, gaze at their listeners more, and are gazed at more. They approach others more closely and are approached more closely than others. They tend to touch others more and to be touched more (Stier & Hall, 1984; but see J. A. Hall & Vecchia, 1990; Major, Schmidlin, & Williams, 1990, for some qualifications). Their body movements are also more involved and more expressive. If women were purposely trying to convey the impression of being sociable, likable, and interested in the other person, they could hardly do better than this. Still, it is not clear from these data alone whether women try deliberately to achieve these effects, whether they try deliberately to do so early in their lives and then come to act that way habitually, or whether it simply feels more natural and more comfortable to them to behave that way for reasons that are not tied to self-presentational considerations and never were.

In addition to being more involved nonverbally than are men, women also are more open in the expression of their emotions and personality. At least three lines of evidence indicate this. First, studies of facial expressions show that women are more spontaneously expressive than are men (J. A. Hall, 1984; see also Buck, Baron, & Barrette, 1982; Buck, Baron, Goodman, & Shapiro, 1980). Women also describe themselves as more emotionally expressive than men in self-report studies (Brody, 1985). Second, research on deception indicates that when lying, women are less likely than are men to use the strategy of "hamming" (B. M. DePaulo & Rosenthal, 1979). Hams are people who, for example, when pretending to like someone they actually despise, will appear to like that person even more than someone they genuinely like. Observers tend to believe faked affects more than the genuine, covered-up ones (B. M. DePaulo et al., 1985a); thus, hamming is generally an effective way to deceive. In that women use this strategy less than do men, their true feelings are sometimes more accessible to others than are men's. Third, women's self-descriptions, particularly on the self-monitoring scale, also suggest greater openness. High self-monitors act like different people in different situations, whereas low self-monitors act more consistently with their own self-perceived personalities across situations (Snyder, 1979). Women tend to score lower on the scale than do men, suggesting, in effect, that they wear their personality on their sleeve (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979a).

An open and expressive style has many self-presentational advantages: Other people tend to find it endearing, and they often reciprocate the intimacy that it seems to offer (see above). The evidence to be reviewed next tentatively suggests that women may be especially concerned with self-presentational issues. Perhaps, then, there are motivational underpinnings to their open and involving nonverbal style. Women may realize, at some level, that it is interpersonally advantageous to be, or to appear to be, open, involved, and expressive.

There are indications that women may be more interested than are men in gaining social approval (Block, 1978; Huston, 1983; Millham & Jacobson, 1978) and in avoiding disapproval (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). They may be more likely to experience self-presentationally relevant emotions such as shame and embarrassment, and these differences are sometimes apparent even before the preschool years (H. Lewis, 1971; see also M. Lewis, Stanger, & Sullivan, 1989). Like men, women realize that punishments and rewards are contingent on the situational appropriateness of the emotions they express, but for women, these expectations are even stronger than they are for men (Graham, Gentry, & Green, 1981).

Behavioral evidence, too, suggests that women may in certain ways be more concerned with self-presentational considerations than are men. For example, they spend more time preening in rest rooms (Daly et al., 1983), they are more interested in clothes (Solomon & Schopler, 1982), and across the life span, they are more concerned about their body weight, physical appearance, and eating habits (Pliner, Chaiken, & Flett, 1990). When females are engaged in face-to-face interactions in the drink-tasting paradigm, it appears from their faces that they like the drinks more than males do, even though they appear to like the drinks somewhat less than the males do when they think that no one can see them (Feldman et al., 1979). In the disappointing gift paradigm, too, girls put on a happy face much more frequently than do boys (Cole, 1986; Saarni, 1984); this effect occurs even for 3-year-olds (Cole, 1986).

When women decide deliberately to use their nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes, they may have more of the relevant abilities at their disposal than do men. They can pose emotions with their faces more skillfully than can men (J. A. Hall, 1984), and they know it (Zuckerman & Larrance, 1979). They also speak less haltingly and with fewer speech errors than do men (J. A. Hall, 1984).

In summary, women are nonverbally more involved and more open in their interpersonal interactions than are men. Their faces are more spontaneously expressive, and when they want to use their faces to pose a particular emotion, they can do so more successfully. From an early age, their behavior suggests that they may be especially concerned with making good impressions and avoiding making bad ones, though certainly there will be exceptions. (Perhaps men, in contrast, are relatively more concerned with maintaining privacy and control.) Generally, these qualities probably serve women well in their interpersonal lives. But there are hazards as well. For example, in situations in which people are trying to create a good impression by lying, women's lies are more detectable from their nonverbal cues than are men's (B. M. DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; DePaulo et al., 1988). It is probably both their greater motivation to succeed in such situations and their greater spontaneous expressiveness that undermine their deceptive attempts. More speculatively, women might be at a disadvantage when it is socially appropriate to be distant and stern rather than open and engaging.

Physical Attractiveness

Physically attractive people are better at communicating emotions spontaneously with their facial expressions (Sabatelli & Rubin, 1986), and they are also better at posing emotions with their faces (Larrance & Zuckerman, 1981). When they care about telling an effective lie, they are more successful at controlling their nonverbal behaviors than are less attractive
people; that is, they are less vulnerable to the motivational impairment effect (B. M. DePaulo et al., 1988). The contributing factors seem to be confidence and ability. Attractive people have higher expectations for success in social situations (Abbott & Sebastian, 1981; Cash & Begley, 1976). They are probably also accustomed to being the targets of attention. Thus, they may be more practiced and skilled at controlling their nonverbal behaviors, and they may also be less self-conscious about those behaviors. Ordinarily, in emotionally charged situations, spontaneous expressiveness can be a hindrance to deception success. But for physically attractive people, who are confident, practiced, and unselfconscious, it seems not to get in the way.

**Self-Monitoring, Need for Approval, and Public Self-Consciousness**

High self-monitors are people who “monitor and control the images of self they project to a great extent . . . carefully observe their own performances and adjust their behavior to convey the desired image, acting like different people depending on the situation and their audience” (Snyder, 1987, pp. 4–5). Low self-monitors, on the other hand, “typically express what they really think and feel” (Snyder, 1987, p. 5). Both motivation and ability seem to be important components of self-monitoring. When they are about to lie to another person, high self-monitors will try to obtain more information about that person to construct a more effective lie, and they do this even when there are costs to procuring the information (Elliott, 1979). When it comes time actually to tell their lies, those high self-monitors who are especially skilled actors deftly control the pacing of their speech: They speak at the same rate when they are lying as they do when they are telling the truth (Siegmans & Reynolds, 1983). Self-monitors are also more skilled at posing emotions, both with their faces and with their voices (Riggio & Friedman, 1982; M. Snyder, 1974).

High self-monitors modify their own expressive behaviors more than do lows in social (compared with nonsocial) situations. For example, on learning that they have just defeated their competitors at a task, highs exude jubilation with victory gestures when they are alone, but they are much more subdued when the competitors are there with them; the expressive behaviors of the lows are more similar across the two situations (Friedman & Miller-Herringer, 1991). In contexts in which the appropriate behavior might be to act similarly across situations, then it is the high self-monitors, rather than the lows, who show more cross-situational consistency. For example, many teachers believe that they should convey to all students the impression that they expect them to succeed, even though those expectations may actually be true only of the smarter or more motivated students. One might, then, expect high self-monitors, compared with lows, to behave more similarly when interacting with students for whom they have high versus low expectations for success. And in fact, high self-monitors do convey to observers fairly similar impressions of their expectations for their students’ success, regardless of their actual expectations. In contrast, low self-monitors who are also dispositionally very expressive convey clearly to others their different levels of expectations for the different students they teach (Sullins, Friedman, & Harris, 1985; see also Lippa, 1978a).

There are some indications that high self-monitors are sensitive to global variations in the requirements of different situations, roles, and audiences, rather than being especially attuned to moment-to-moment variations in interpersonal contingencies (Dabbs, Evans, Hopper, & Purvis, 1980). The latter type of sensitivity may be more characteristic of people who score high on the Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1964). People who are especially sensitive to the approval of others rarely interrupt when others are speaking (Feldstein, Alberti, BenDeba, & Welkowitz, 1974, cited in Harper, Wiens, & Matarazzo, 1978), and they are not very adept at communicating negativity with their face or voice (Zaidel & Mehrabian, 1969). Moreover, when conversing with others, the intensity of their speech is especially likely, over time, to converge with the intensity of their partner’s speech (Natale, 1975).

Another individual-difference dimension of obvious relevance to self-presentation is public self-consciousness, which is “an awareness of and a responsibility to the impressions that are being made on others” (Scheier & Carver, 1981, p. 198; see also Fenigstein et al., 1975). The key component of high public self-consciousness is probably the motivational one; highs care more than do lows about the impressions they are conveying to others. This may be why people high in public self-consciousness blush more than lows, because blushing seems to have the effect of muting the negativity of others’ reactions to one’s own embarrassing behaviors (Leary & Meadows, 1991). The importance of the motivational component may also be evident in the findings that women who are high in public self-consciousness wear more makeup (L. C. Miller & Cox, 1982) and that both men and women who are publicly self-conscious are more interested in clothes (Solomon & Schopler, 1982). There is also suggestive evidence that people high in public self-consciousness have a more accurate appreciation of the kinds of self-presentation strategies that are (or are not) likely to create positive impressions (Holtgraves & Srull, 1989). Perhaps this understanding is born of their motivation to learn what impresses others. It is possible, though, that their motivation is at times too intense, and then serves to undermine rather than facilitate their interpersonal goals. It may be just this mechanism that accounts for the finding that highs appear less credible than lows when attempting to deceive (Riggio, Tucker, & Throckmorton, 1987; Riggio, Tucker, & Widaman, 1987).

**Specific Nonverbal Behavioral Cues**

**Limitations to the Study of Specific Nonverbal Cues**

Much of the discussion so far has focused on nonverbal expressions, which are complex sets of specific behaviors that can covary with particular emotions or states (e.g., vocal expressions of happiness, facial expressions indicating comprehension). But much of the literature on nonverbal communication concerns individual behaviors, such as gazing or smiling or leaning. From that tradition, much has been learned about the specific nonverbal cues that are correlated with (a) affects or attitudes, such as liking and dominance, (b) discrete emotions, such as
happiness and sadness, (c) cognitive states, such as exerting mental effort and paying close attention, (d) personality traits, such as extraversion and shyness, and (e) pathologies, such as anxiety and depression. Much has also been learned about the nonverbal behaviors that correlate with perceptions of these states. Thus, for example, it has been shown in this literature which nonverbal cues covary with actual liking and which ones covary with people's perceptions of liking.

The self-presentational significance of the correlates of perceptions is much clearer than is the significance of the correlates of actual states. If, for example, physicians were interested in learning about the specific nonverbal behaviors they could use to come across as likable, they would do better to learn about the behaviors that people take to be signs of liking than to learn about the behaviors that really do occur when one person likes another. Part of the ambiguity inherent in the literature on actual cues lies in the fact that it is often impossible to determine from the studies whether the cues were deliberately produced to convey a particular impression. For example, when people who claim to like the person with whom they are interacting are observed to smile, lean forward, and gaze into the other person's eyes, it is not clear whether they are purposefully behaving that way to make their liking clear to the other person or whether these are unmonitored and unselfconscious expressions of that liking.

There are other ambiguities, too, in the study of individual nonverbal cues (some of which also characterize the study of nonverbal expressions). Most important, perhaps, is the fact that there are no perfect one-to-one correspondences between particular nonverbal behaviors and specific states or meanings. For instance, although people who like each other often gaze into each other's eyes, they do not always do so; and though gazing is often interpreted as a sign of liking, it is not always construed in this way. Thus, the conclusions that can be drawn about the correlates of specific nonverbal behavioral cues will always be conditional and probabilistic.

Another limitation is that the relationships between particular behaviors and specific states or meanings are sometimes quite small ones. It might be possible, for example, to show that crossing the legs at the knees instead of at the ankles has an effect on people's perceptions, but the effect may well be trivial in magnitude, even if statistically significant.

From a self-presentational perspective, a more interesting limitation of the specific cues approach is that people rarely regulate their behavior at that level. Instead of trying deliberately to lean forward, smile, and gaze, people probably instead try to convey an impression of liking, with the leaning and smiling and gazing following from that, perhaps even out of their awareness. There are exceptions to this generalization, of course. During election years, for example, presidential candidates are sometimes coached on the precise regulation of specific nonverbal behaviors. (During the 1988 election, Roger Ailes, George Bush's media consultant, was quoted in Newsweek [Warner & Fineman, 1988, p. 19] as telling Bush, during rehearsal for one of the debates, "There you go with that f—ing hand again. You look like a f—ing pansy!" There is a risk to attempting to regulate behaviors at this level, which is that the regulated behaviors are likely to appear wooden and unnatural. Techniques such as those used by the Stanislavski school of acting, in which actors are urged to try to bring to mind an experience similar in affective tone to the one they are trying to portray, are more likely to be effective (cf. Ekman, 1985).

Knowledge of the shortcomings of the specific cues approach can be used constructively to select for study cues that are especially likely to prove illuminating about the processes of self-presentation. Cross-cultural research, starting with Darwin's (1872/1965) contribution and proceeding through the important work of Izard (1971) and of Ekman (1972) and to the more recent studies of Keating, Ekman, and their colleagues (Ekman et al., 1987; Keating et al., 1981), provides insights into the kinds of behaviors that are likely to be used and interpreted consistently across cultures. In fact, some of the behaviors that show cross-cultural regularities also exhibit intriguing parallels even across species (e.g., Zivin, 1985). Behaviors that exhibit such stability are likely to be worthy of further study.

Other behaviors are likely to provide productive avenues for research because their hypothesized relationships to particular mental states and to particular perceptions are firmly rooted in theory. For example, in their model of social anxiety (as mentioned earlier), Schlenker and Leary (1982) predicted that three different kinds of behaviors should be characteristic of the socially anxious: nervous behaviors such as fidgeting and speaking disfluently, disaffiliative behaviors such as contributing infrequently to conversations, and image-protecting behaviors, which are innocuous behaviors such as nodding, smiling, and listening attentively.

Still other behaviors are worthy of special scrutiny because they are likely to be particularly reliable indicators of certain conditions or states. For example, Ekman (1985) has argued that certain facial muscles are rarely subject to willful control. Thus, the movement of such emotion-relevant muscles is more likely to indicate the presence of the corresponding emotion than is the movement of other muscles that covary with the emotion (and perhaps even have hard-wired links to components of the emotion) but can be controlled voluntarily.

To illustrate the study of a specific nonverbal behavior from a self-presentational perspective, research on smiling will be reviewed. Smiles meet the requirements outlined above, in that there are demonstrated cross-cultural regularities in the interpretation of smiling, there are theoretical formulations predicting the use of smiling, and there are reliable facial muscles that produce smiling when the appropriate emotion is present but that are less likely to be active when it is not.

**Smiling and Self-Presentation**

*Salience of smiles.* Smiles occur with great regularity in social life, and they are very salient signals. Darwin (1872/1965)
believed that the expression of smiling became associated with happiness because it is so different in appearance from the expression of negative emotions. In fact, compared with other emotional-relevant behaviors, smiles are especially easy to recognize, even when they appear only very briefly and when the smiler is far away (Hager & Ekman, 1979; see also Simpson & Crandall, 1972).

**Power of smiles.** Smiles are also very potent interpersonal cues. In a study of people's emotional responses to videotapes of President Reagan's expressive displays, McHugo and his colleagues (McHugo et al., 1985) found that when Reagan put on a happy or reassuring face, he moved his viewers—even the anti-Reaganites—to smile in return. For other politicians, too, their happy facial expressions seem to engender in their electorate more positive emotional responses and more favorable attitudes (Sullivan & Masters, 1988). The smiles of those who talk about the candidates appear to be similarly effective. For example, a network broadcaster who smiled more frequently when discussing Reagan than Mondale during the 1984 presidential campaign had viewers who were more likely to vote for Reagan than Mondale; the same voting pattern did not occur for the viewers of the other two network broadcasters, who did not smile differentially on any one candidate (Mullen et al., 1986).

In legal contexts, smiles can soften the evaluations made of transgressors; especially when the infractions are minor, transgressors are judged more leniently when they smile than when they do not (Forgas, O'Connor, & Morris, 1983). And in many mildly uncomfortable situations in everyday social life, smiles can be used to apologize, neutralize, and appease (e.g., Elman, Schulte, & Bukoff, 1977; Goldenthal, Johnston, & Kraut, 1981; Mackey, 1976; vanHooff, 1972). But smiles can also enrage instead of mollify. For instance, married couples who use smiles and other seemingly positive visual behaviors in combination with very negative tone of voice cues tend to be more poorly adjusted than couples who communicate less often in this manner (Noller, 1982).

**Responsiveness of smiling.** Smiling is exquisitely responsive to moment-to-moment variations in the social context. Smiles that are reciprocated, for example, differ markedly in duration from those that are not; reciprocated smiles persist, whereas nonreciprocated ones vanish almost instantly (Duncan, 1983). Bugental (1986) has reported a similar effect in a study of women's interactions with unresponsive and responsive boys: the women's smiles were more consistent with the verbal content that is negative, whereas fathers' smiles occur more selectively in combination with congruent verbal content (Bugental, Love, & Gianetto, 1971). However, in a study of college students who were describing intense emotional experiences, the women's smiles were more consistent with the verbal content of their descriptions (Halberstadt, Hayes, & Pike, 1988).

**Cross-cultural consistencies in interpretations of smiling.** With regard to the impressions it conveys, smiling seems to have a pervasive primary meaning. The meaning, of course, is happiness. It is a meaning that is shared panculturally (Ekman, Friesen, & Ellsworth, 1972; Izard, 1971; Keating et al., 1981). This is, unsurprisingly, likely to be an accurate interpretation, as there is evidence that the wearer of a smile is often happier than someone who is not smiling, even when both are thinking similarly positive thoughts (e.g., McCauley & Anderson, 1987; see also Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980; for a different perspective, see Fridlund, 1991a).

**Multiple meanings of smiling.** Although happiness may be the "first" meaning of smiling, there are many other kinds of smiles in addition to smiles of genuine happiness (e.g., Keating, 1985). Ekman (1985) has described 19 varieties. Several of these are smiles indicative of emotions other than happiness, such as fear and contempt. Other kinds of smiles are distinctly interpersonal; these include flirtatious smiles, compliance smiles, coordination (cooperative) smiles, and listener response smiles. The social aspects of smiling are quite striking (Fridlund, 1991a). In fact, Kraut and Johnston (1979) forwarded the argument, on the basis of a series of studies, that smiles are more reliably associated with social motivation than with emotional experience. For example, they found that bowlers who had just rolled a strike or a spare smiled less when facing the pins and watching them fall than when they turned to face their friends. Similarly, they found that an emotional variable—pleasant versus unpleasant weather—was a less potent predictor of a pedestrian smiling than was a social variable—whether the pedestrian was alone or with another person. Of course, social and emotional experiences are often intertwined, as many emotional experiences occur in the presence of others and are occasioned by their actions or by the smiler's attempts to influence their actions or affects (cf. Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990).

**Multiple interpretations of smiling.** Just as the production of smiles is governed by different emotions and different goals, so too is the interpretation of them qualified in many ways. For example, although smiling transgressors are generally evaluated more generously than are nonsmiling transgressors (Forgas, 1987; Forgas et al., 1983), smiling transgressors who are also very physically attractive (compared with those who are less attractive) are held more responsible for their transgressions (Forgas, 1987). Another example concerns the finding (mentioned above) that mothers' smiles are less reliably associated with positive verbal messages than are fathers'; children seem to be sensitive to this, for when they are interpreting inconsistent combinations of verbal and nonverbal cues, they are
more likely to discount a woman's smile when it contradicts other cues than a man's (Bugental, Kaswan, & Love, 1970; Bugental, Kaswan, Love, & Fox, 1970).

Self-presentational uses of smiling. The salience of the smile, its potency in interpersonal interactions, and a set of meanings characterized by considerable consistency but not inconsiderable subtlety and ambiguity together suggest that as a self-presentational strategy, smiling has great potential.

Is that potential realized? That is, is there any evidence that smiling is used deliberately for self-presentational purposes? Dale Carnegie (1936) certainly believed that it should be. One of his six rules for winning friends was a simple one-word suggestion: “Smile” (p. 72). More recently, Hochschild (1983) has suggested that smiling is a very important component of the job of flight attendants, who note that both management and passengers seem to expect (and want) this from them.

With regard to the empirical literature, some of the evidence for the self-presentational use of smiling is merely suggestive. For example, people who are motivated to have warm and close interactions with others smile more than do those whose intimacy motivation is lower (McAdams, Jackson, & Kirsthnit, 1984). This could suggest that such people are using smiling as a way of conveying to others that they are the kinds of people who favor intimate exchanges. But they could instead be spontaneous, unregulated expressions of those desires.

Another example comes from a study involving women who attributed their caregiving outcomes either to ability or to luck; in interactions with children, the women who felt relatively powerless (subject to the vagaries of luck) flashed smiles onto their faces much more rapidly than did the women who felt more powerful (Bugental, 1986). Bugental speculated that the more rapid onset of smiles may have been indicative of an ingratiating self-presentational style, which these women used to acknowledge their own feelings of powerlessness.

Also interpretable from a self-presentational perspective are two studies in which participants interacted with partners who were expected to be either friendly or unfriendly (in one study) or similar or dissimilar to the participants (Ickes, Patterson, Rajecki, & Tanford, 1982). Participants tended to smile frequently both when their partners were expected to be friendly and when they were expected to be unfriendly (compared with a control condition of no expectations), and they also smiled frequently regardless of whether they expected their partners to be similar or dissimilar to themselves. In the friendly and in the similar conditions, participants’ smiles may have been unconscious expressions of their genuine liking. In the unfriendly and dissimilar conditions, however, participants may have been using smiling strategically to convince the other person of their own friendliness and likability and to elicit similar friendliness in return.

More direct evidence of the use of smiling for self-presentational purpose comes from studies in which participants were led to believe that they should try to ingratiating, and those in which participants were directly instructed to try to gain (or avoid) the approval of others. In an example of the former type of study, participants either were or were not told that they would soon have to ask another person for help (Lefebvre, 1975). Those who believed that they would have to try to obtain the other person's help smiled more at that person than did those who had no help-seeking expectations. Similarly, participants in a different study who were told directly to try to gain their partner's approval smiled more at that person than did the participants who were instructed to try to avoid their partner's approval (Rosenfeld, 1966).

Also relevant to the question of whether people use smiling for self-presentation is the issue of whether people smile when they are lying, especially when they are lying to cover negative feelings. A meta-analysis of 19 studies in which smiling was assessed during deceptive and truthful communications suggested that liars do not smile any more frequently than truth tellers and, in fact, may even smile slightly less (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). However, in those studies, smiling was usually treated as a unitary category, and different types of smiles were not identified. More recently, Ekman and his colleagues (Ekman, Friesen, & O'Sullivan, 1988) have argued that smiles indicative of genuine enjoyment can be distinguished from other false smiles. In a microanalysis of their earlier study (Ekman & Friesen, 1974) in which nurses watched pleasant or gruesome films while trying to convince an interviewer that all of the films were pleasant, Ekman and Friesen found that the nurses who were trying to cover up their negative reactions to the gruesome films did indeed show relatively fewer genuine enjoyment smiles and more false smiles than did those who were honestly describing their reactions to the films that really were pleasant. To discriminate these smiles, however, requires special training. Laypersons cannot do so on their own. Instead, they often seem to believe that people who are smiling in any way are less likely to be lying than are those who are not smiling (e.g., Ruback, 1981; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981; however, see also Riggio, Tucker, & Widaman, 1987). Smiling can, then, be used effectively to convince others of one's own truthfulness.

Self-Presentation and Skill at Reading Nonverbal Cues

The study of the deliberate use of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes is primarily a study of the production of nonverbal cues. It is possible that the interpretation of nonverbal cues also serves self-presentational purposes, but that is more difficult to establish convincingly. For example, aggressive boys are biased toward seeing negativity and dominance in their interpretations of ambiguous nonverbal messages (Nasby, Hayden, & DePaulo, 1980). By declaring that seemingly innocuous communications really are hostile or threatening, these boys may be underscoring their cynical view of the world. However, other interpretations of this result are equally plausible.

In another suggestive study (B. M. DePaulo, Brittingham, & Kaiser, 1983), people were helped either appropriately or inappropriately and soon thereafter had an opportunity to reciprocate to their helpers. People who were helped appropriately were especially sensitive to the nonverbal need cues of the person who had helped them and thus were able to reciprocate the help in an appropriate way. Their accuracy in reading the helper's cues (which they did not evidence when they were helped inappropriately) may have been a way for them to con-
vey to the helper the impression that they were grateful and sensitive people. Again, however, many other interpretations are plausible, too.

A final example, which may be somewhat more compelling than the others, comes from the research on sex differences in nonverbal decoding skills. Women tend to be more accurate interpreters of nonverbal cues than are men (J. A. Hall, 1984), but the degree to which they outperform men varies systematically with the kinds of cues they are trying to interpret. Women are especially more skilled than men at decoding overt cues that other people probably want them to understand (such as facial expressions that are not intended to be deceptive) but are not any more skilled than men at detecting covert cues (such as discrepant and deceptive messages) that others might prefer that they not detect (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979a, 1979b). One interpretation of these results is that by their pattern of nonverbal decoding sensitivities and insensitivities, women are conveying to others their desire to be interpersonally accommodating, that is, to see what others want them to see but not what others do not want them to see. They are, in Goffmanesque style, going along with other people's self-presentation. Although this interpretation is speculative, it is bolstered by a variety of related findings. For example, this pattern of apparent nonverbal accommodatingness becomes increasingly evident throughout the adolescent years (Blanch, Rosenthal, Snodgrass, DePaulo, & Zuckerman, 1981), suggesting perhaps that women are being socialized to read cues in this way. Also, women who are more personally and interpersonally vulnerable (e.g., lower in self-esteem and social adroitness, uncomfortable with hostility and with asking for help) are especially likely to show this pattern of reading overt cues better than covert cues (Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979a). Perhaps these kinds of women are especially motivated to convince others that they are accommodating and "easy" interaction partners.

Can the Deliberate Use of Nonverbal Behaviors for Self-Presentational Purposes Be Detected?

Detectability of Self-Presentational Efforts:
The Aggregate Level

The question of whether self-presentational uses of nonverbal behaviors can be detected can be addressed at two levels. First, at the aggregate level, one can ask whether people's nonverbal behavior is generally different when self-presentational motives are likely to be differentially operative. The strategies include (among others) the same ones described above for ascertaining whether smiling is used deliberately for self-presentational purposes. One can, for example, examine nonverbal behavior as a function of individual-difference variables that are likely to be relevant to self-presentational motives. This approach was discussed earlier. Or one could investigate whether people's nonverbal behavior is different in private than in the presence of others and whether differences in the characteristics of the particular others who are present will affect the types of nonverbal behaviors that are displayed. One could also create situations that vary systematically in the self-presentational motives they are likely to elicit, or most directly, one could simply manipulate experimental instructions so that different participants are told to try to achieve different self-presentational goals. These aggregate level approaches are discussed in this section.

In this section and the next, the focus will be primarily on methods of discerning deliberateness that have already been applied directly to the nonverbal domain. Other approaches are also possible. For example, the literature on automatic and controlled processes raises the possibility of examining the relative effects of attentional load on nonverbal performances hypothesized to vary in the degree to which they are being deliberately regulated (e.g., Paulhus, Graf, & van Selst, 1989; Schlenker & Weigold, 1989). From systems theory comes the notion of equifinality, suggesting that if a nonverbal behavior is being regulated in the service of a self-presentational goal, then if that approach to achieving the goal is blocked, some other approach will be attempted (e.g., von Bertalanffy, 1968). Research on equilibrium models of nonverbal interaction indirectly suggests that such an approach could be promising (e.g., Argyle & Dean, 1965; Burgoon et al., 1989).

Nonverbal behavior in private and in public. In numerous studies, the presence, involvement, or visual accessibility of another person or persons has been manipulated, and the effect on the subject's expressive behavior has been observed. In all but a few such studies (Craig & Patrick, 1985; Feldman, Devine-Sheehan, & Allen, 1978), these manipulations have had noticeable effects on nonverbal expressions.

In some studies, another person (or persons) sits next to the subject, or else leaves the room, while the subject performs a task such as trying to imitate the expressions shown in photographs (Kilbride & Yarczower, 1980; Yarczower, Kilbride, & Hill, 1979) or watching slides and forming impressions of them (Yarczower & Daruns, 1982). The other person does not perform the task, and the subject's performance is in no way relevant to that person. In these studies, subjects' facial expressions are typically less intense, more ambiguous, and more difficult to read when another person is present than when the subject is alone, except when the other person is a friend (Fridlund, 1991b). A study by Kraut (1982) differed from these in that the other person was always present and was engaging in the same task as was the subject (sniffing different kinds of odors). Visual accessibility was manipulated by separating half of the subjects from the other person by a translucent screen; thus, the two people could see each other's gross movements but not the details of one another's face. In this study, too, greater accessibility of another person dampened subjects' facial expressiveness. Subjects were also less facially expressive when they believed they were being observed by another person who was behind a

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7 This study also included a condition in which subjects were to convey deliberately impressions that were consistent and inconsistent with their experience. That is, they sometimes tried to appear as though they were sniffing an unpleasant odor and other times tried to make it clear that they were sniffing a pleasant odor, when in both cases they really were sniffing something pleasant. They did the same for the unpleasant odors. Because the consistent and inconsistent communications were analyzed together, however, the results cannot be interpreted unambiguously.
NONVERBAL BEHAVIOR AND SELF-PRESENTATION

one-way mirror than when they believed that no such person was present (Kleck et al., 1976). However, because the subjects were male undergraduates who were receiving electric shock and the observer was described as a female peer, the observer's presence was probably more psychologically meaningful to these subjects than to the subjects in the previously described studies. Chapman and Wright (1976) used a paradigm in which children listened through headphones to humorous materials in the presence of another child who was believed to be also listening to the materials (coactor) or not listening to them (audience). The confederates (coactors and audiences) were trained to display different levels of mirth in different conditions. In this study, the confederate's mirth facilitated the subject's nonverbal expressions of mirth, particularly when the confederate was a coactor and displayed high levels of mirth. In a similar study, Foot, Chapman, and Smith (1977) showed that the facilitation of mirth was especially pronounced when the coactors were friends rather than strangers. In a study involving groups of adults (Freedman & Perlick, 1979), the confederate's mirth facilitated the subject's nonverbal expressions of mirth when the groups listened to the humorous tapes in small (high-density) rather than large rooms.

The psychological dynamics are also likely to be different in studies in which the other person is the target of the subject's expressive behaviors, rather than a bystander, observer, or coactor. In the Feldman et al. (1979) drink-tasting study, for example, subjects were instructed to convey the impression that they liked both the sweetened and the unsweetened drink to an interviewer with whom they interacted either face-to-face or by speaking into an audio tape recorder. When subjects really did like the drinks, and communicated that to an interviewer who was physically present, their facial expressions were especially positive.

In still other studies, the other person is not just a passive target of the subjects' expressions but has some stake in the information the subject is conveying. For example, in one study (Feldman, 1976), teachers were instructed always to praise their students, even though the students sometimes performed well but other times performed poorly. In one condition, the teacher and student interacted face-to-face; in the other, the student was behind a one-way mirror and could not see the teacher, although the teacher could see her. Once again, facial (and bodily) expressions of positivity were augmented in the condition in which the teachers expressed praise in a face-to-face interaction with a student who really had performed well.

Negative facial expressions can also be augmented by manipulations involving another person, as indicated by the results of a study in which an experimenter either did or did not make eye contact with a subject right after dropping a heavy monitor on his already-injured hand (Bavelas et al., 1986). When the experimenter established eye contact, the subject conveyed more intense expressions of pain.

When the socially appropriate response would be to dampen one's expressive behavior, then subjects do just that. In one study, for example (Cole, 1986), subjects received a disappointing prize from a person who remained there as the prize was conferred or left immediately. Subjects suppressed their expressions of disappointment when the person was there to observe them, and these subjects were only 3 or 4 years old. Suppression is also the socially appropriate response on learning that one has just defeated one's rivals. In fact, subjects stifle their expressions of exuberance in such situations when the defeated rivals are in the same room, compared with when they are in a different room (Friedman & Miller-Herringer, 1991).

In summary, expressiveness is dampened by the presence of other people who are not the targets of one's expressions. But when one's expressive behaviors are relevant to others, then those behaviors are regulated in socially appropriate ways in the presence of the relevant target persons. These kinds of data do not constitute definitive evidence for the operation of self-presentational dynamics, but they are consistent with that perspective.

Characteristics of the audience. A variety of studies indicate that people behave differently, nonverbally, when addressing different target persons or audiences. For example, in telephone conversations with men with whom they had either intimate or casual relationships, women talking to the intimate partner sounded more approachable, sincere, submissive, scatterbrained, feminine, and babyish to judges who heard only the women's parts of the conversations and were unaware of the relationship status of the male listeners (Montepare & Vega, 1988). In another study of telephone conversations (Steckler & Rosenthal, 1985), subjects spoke to either bosses or peers. Women's voices sounded relatively more competent when they were talking to bosses, whereas men's voices sounded more competent when they were talking to peers. On television talk shows, both men and women sound more businesslike, condescending, dominant, and unpleasant when talking to a man than to a woman (J. A. Hall & Braunwald, 1981). In a study of verbal and nonverbal communications in the courtroom, Blank, Rosenthal, and Cordell (1985) found that judges appeared warmer, more professional, more open-minded, and less dominant when in the presence of older, more-educated jurors than in the presence of younger, less educated ones. And in a study in which participants lied and told the truth to clinical students described as experts or nonexperts at the detection of deception, the participants maintained more eye contact with the experts (Pugita, Hogrebe, & Wexley, 1980). Perhaps they believed, as do many laypersons (e.g., DePaulo et al., 1985a), that gaze aversion was a cue to deception and that expert lie detectors would be especially attuned to that cue. Even infants are sensitive to audience characteristics; when playing with toys, they were more likely to turn around and smile at their mother when she was attentive than inattentive (S. S. Jones et al., 1991; S. S. Jones & Raag, 1989), and when another adult (a stranger) was also present, they were less likely to smile at her than at their mother (S. S. Jones & Raag, 1989).

It is not clear from these studies and others like them (e.g., B. M. DePaulo & Coleman, 1986, 1987) whether the systematic differences in participants' nonverbal behaviors as a function of different audiences were the result of deliberate efforts to convey different impressions to different audiences, whether the differences were habitual remnants of behaviors that were once deliberately regulated, or whether they resulted from some other mechanism (e.g., the women really did feel more feminine when conversing with their intimate friends and were simply
expressing this spontaneously). However, it is clear from these kinds of studies that people's nonverbal behaviors do sometimes vary systematically with the characteristics of the audiences and that these variations in nonverbal cue usage have implications for the ways in which the people exhibiting those cues are perceived by others.

**Self-presentational relevance of the situation.** In the discussion of smiling, it was noted that when people are in a situation in which they anticipate having to ask for help, they smile more than when they have no such expectation (Lefebvre, 1975). Smiling, though, is just one of a constellation of nonverbal behaviors that people use when they want to come across as likable and attractive. For example, in the Lefebvre study, participants expecting to have to ask for help also looked at their partner more frequently. And in another study in which participants had an opportunity to seek help from their partner, their posture mirrored those of their partner to a greater degree than did that of participants for whom the possibility of seeking help was not salient (LaFrance, 1985).

In some organizations, employees are explicitly encouraged to use nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes. In a chain of neighborhood grocery stores in which the clerks were urged to interact positively with the customers to convey a positive organizational image, those clerks who wore more of the symbols of the organization (e.g., name tags, smocks) also displayed more positive emotional expressions (including smiling and eye contact) when interacting with customers (Rafaeli, 1989). These data illustrate in a suggestive way the impact of self-presentationally relevant cues (such as symbols of an organization that encourages friendliness) on nonverbal expressive behavior.

**Explicit self-presentational instructions.** Smiling is also just one of a set of nonverbal behaviors that are affected by direct instructions to try to gain the approval of another person. Under such instructions, women gesture more, men nod their heads in agreement more, and both men and women make it especially clear that they are listening attentively by using certain "backchanneling" responses, such as "mm-hmm" (H. M. Rosenfeld, 1966). Approval seekers also sit closer to the targets of their attention (H. M. Rosenfeld, 1965) and spend more time gazing into their eyes (Pellegrini, Hicks, & Gordon, 1970). Seating position is used not only to elicit liking but also to convey likability. In a study in which participants were instructed to select a seat at a rectangular table that would convey a warm and friendly impression to the other group members, participants who were the second to arrive sat right next to the first person, and those who were the first to arrive chose one of the two middle seats (Riess & Rosenfeld, 1980). In both cases, participants were decreasing the distance between themselves and the others. Analogously, participants instructed to try to appear cold and unfriendly chose seats that created the greatest possible distances between themselves and the other group members. Those instructed to come across as leaders chose one of the head positions, and those instructed to convey the impression that they were not interested in participating chose seats far away from the head position and less visually accessible to people in that position (e.g., a corner seat farthest away from the head position).

Another important self-presentational goal is self-promotion, which is an attempt to come across as extremely competent (e.g., E. E. Jones & Pittman, 1982). Subjects instructed to create an impression of competence put on noticeably different nonverbal performances than did those instructed to elicit liking. The self-promoters were less inclined than were the ingratiators to act nonverbally attentive to their partners, by nodding, smiling, and gazing, and they were more inclined to act in ways that might draw attention to themselves, such as by sitting up straight and gesturing confidently (Godfrey, Jones, & Lord, 1986). Furthermore, judges viewing videotapes of these interactions formed impressions in line with these differences. They thought that the self-promoters (compared with the ingratiators) seemed to be trying to attract more attention to themselves and to give less attention to others. These kinds of studies provide the most direct evidence that people can and do use nonverbal behaviors in their attempts to create particular impressions on others and that these differences in behavior can be detected at the aggregate level.

Tetlock and Manstead (1985) have reviewed findings from a variety of domains (such as dissonance, reactance, and group polarization) in which attempts have been made to distinguish impression-management interpretations from intrapsychic explanations. The paradigms used in such studies include several that were considered here (e.g., manipulations of the publicness of the interaction or of the characteristics of the audience). Their conclusion is that alternative explanations of the findings from these and other paradigms can always be generated and that ultimately, then, neither purely intrapsychic nor purely self-presentational explanations can ever be definitively established for any given phenomenon. As an alternative to conducting critical tests of intrapsychic versus impression-management explanations, they suggest that researchers focus on delineating processes common to both perspectives, with the goal of developing a unified framework. The Tetlock and Manstead position is, of course, open to debate. For example, it could be argued that the kinds of intrapsychic explanations posed as alternative interpretations of the impression-management studies are more diverse and therefore less parsimonious than are the impression-management accounts of the intrapsychic studies. It could also be maintained that competitive theory testing helps to delineate the range of easy application of each perspective and to uncover the themes that the major perspectives share. As applied to the present article, the implication of the Tetlock and Manstead position is that all of the findings that have been presented as evidence of the self-presentational use of nonverbal behaviors can be reinterpreted from an intrapsychic perspective. For example, the motor mimicry finding that participants who face an injured experimenter show more expressions of pain on their own faces was interpreted by Bavelas et al. (1986) as a deliberate communicative act by which participants conveyed to the injured person that they are like him and feel the same way he does. Alternatively, however, participants who are directly facing an injured person, compared with those who have a less direct orientation, might experience more distress themselves. Their more negative facial expressions, then, would simply be a direct manifestation of the amount of distress they actually were experiencing. Although it may in fact be possible to concoct these kinds of alternative explanations for all of the relevant findings, at least some of them would probably be strained. Regardless of the ultimate utility or validity of the Tetlock and Manstead position, there are numerous questions addressed by this article that are not challenged by their position. For example, the questions of whether people can deliberately regulate their own nonverbal behavior
Detectability of Self-Presentational Efforts: The Individual Level

The second way of addressing the question of whether nonverbal behavioral attempts at self-presentation can be detected is the more difficult one. It asks whether, for a particular nonverbal behavior or expression, attempts at managing that behavior can be detected. That is, can an observer watch a particular person at a particular point in time and determine whether that person's nonverbal behavior is being deliberately regulated for self-presentational purposes? The fact that spontaneous facial expressions have different neurological underpinnings than posed expressions (Buck, 1984, 1985; Rinn, 1984, 1991; see also Cacioppo et al., 1986) lends plausibility to the prediction that there will be observable behavioral differences as well. However, the issues are complex.

Determining whether a nonverbal behavior or expression has been spontaneously produced or deliberately managed is similar in many ways to the task of ascertaining innocence or guilt in a courtroom. The relevant evidence will come from a wide variety of sources, ranging from relatively objective evidence, which can be gathered and evaluated only by trained experts, to more subjective evidence, such as global impressions offered by untrained observers. Although the latter kind of evidence is often on the mark, in many instances it is not, and the observers' feelings of confidence are rarely good predictors of when their judgments are or are not valid (e.g., B. M. DePaulo & Pfeifer, 1986). From case to case, the collection of evidence will vary greatly in definitiveness, and few cases will be open-and-shut.

In evaluating nonverbal behaviors, the task is especially complex because the alternatives are actually more numerous than just spontaneous versus deliberate. For example, when a woman has a pleasant facial expression and tone of voice, is smiling and nodding and gazing into a man's eyes, and is leaning toward him, it is possible that she is spontaneously and unselfconsciously expressing genuine liking for him (e.g., Mehrabian, 1972). However, it is also possible that she is: (a) trying deliberately to make clear to him just how much liking she really does feel, (b) trying to exaggerate the amount of liking that she feels, (c) trying to communicate less liking than she feels, (d) trying to convey the impression that she likes him, even though she feels neutral toward him (posing), (e) trying to convey the impression that she likes him, even though she dislikes him (lying), (f) communicating liking cues by mistake, when she had actually intended to communicate something else.

Perceivers who are trying to distinguish among the many possible interpretations of a particular communication can, as with most judgmental tasks, draw from base-rate information about the person and the situation. For example, they can ask themselves how this particular person is likely to feel in this particular situation, whether she is the type of person who is likely to try to convey a particular type of impression, and if so, whether she would have the necessary skill to do so successfully. They can also ask whether the situation is one that calls for a particular type of self-presentation and whether there are rewards and punishments attendant on the successful communication of that impression (in which case people might be especially likely to be trying deliberately to convey that impression, cf. E. E. Jones, Davis, & Gergen, 1961; Kraut, 1978).

More germane to the topic of this article is the potential usefulness of the nonverbal behavioral cues themselves and the ways in which they are interpreted, in revealing information about how they were produced. The relevant evidence is reviewed next.

Spontaneous communications. Evidence has been accumulating that at least for expressions of happiness, spontaneity and genuineness can indeed be discerned. Enjoyment smiles, indicative of truly experienced happiness, differ in a variety of ways from other smiles, such as those donned by people who are simply pretending to be happy. Enjoyment smiles are produced by two particular facial muscles working in concert: the zygomatic major, which pulls the corners of the lips up, and the outer strands of the orbicularis oculi, which surrounds the eye. When enjoyment smiles occur, the orbicularis oculi "raises the cheek and gathers skin inward from around the eye socket" (Ekman & Friesen, 1982, p. 242). Although the zygomatic major can be moved voluntarily, it is rare for people to move that muscle and the outer strands of the orbicularis oculi when genuine enjoyment is not being experienced (Ekman et al., 1990; see also Ekman, Friesen, & Ancoli, 1980).

Enjoyment smiles may also differ from other smiles in symmetry, location, duration, onset time, and offset time (Ekman, 1985; Ekman & Friesen, 1982). Spontaneous facial expressions are likely to be symmetrical, whereas deliberately produced expressions are relatively more likely to be asymmetrical and (if produced by a person who is right-handed) stronger on the left side of the face (Hager, 1982; Rinn, 1984). Enjoyment smiles, Ekman and Friesen (1982) suggest (though more data are needed), rarely last less than ½ s or more than 4 s. Other smiles, in contrast, might last either for a longer or a shorter time than that. Smiles that are not spontaneously expressive of genuine enjoyment sometimes appear on the face or leave the face too abruptly or irregularly. They may also appear too quickly or too slowly in relation to the experience that should have engendered the enjoyment (e.g., the punch line of a joke).

Ekman and his colleagues have also documented specific facial actions that characterize spontaneous expressions of certain negative emotions, such as disgust (Ekman et al., 1980), but in general there has been little research on the detectability of spontaneity for expressions other than those of enjoyment. However, the same types of variables that have proved useful in the study of enjoyment might also prove useful in future investigations of other emotions and states.

Clarifying, dampening, exaggerating, and posing. When people are trying deliberately to communicate accurate, exaggerated, or deintensified expressions of the internal state that they really are experiencing, their expression can be, in part, a re-

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So as to convey particular impressions, should they choose to do so, is orthogonal to the issue of whether they ever do choose to do so. Additionally, studies in which self-presentational motivation is manipulated by direct instructions (e.g., participants are told to seek or to avoid approval) are less convincingly interpretable from alternative perspectives.
flection of that experienced state. Particularly with regard to accurate and exaggerated communications, people are working with, rather than against, their internal state. Still, once they have superimposed willful movements on those that may have appeared naturally, the new expressions will probably differ in discernible ways from the completely spontaneous versions of those same expressions. The dimensions of difference are likely to include those already described above, such as the particular muscles involved, the symmetry of the expression, and its timing, location, and duration.

Deintensified versions of expressions may be easier to detect than exaggerated or purposefully accurate versions, because it is necessary, to some extent, to work against the experienced state. With regard to enjoyment, Ekman (1985) has described a “dampened smile,” which may be characterized by lips that are pressed together, lip corners that are tightened or pulled down, or a lower lip that is pushed down. Any of these movements would result in a smile that is potentially distinguishable from a genuine enjoyment smile.

When people are trying to deintensify the expression of an internal state, discrepancies may develop between different nonverbal cues or between nonverbal cues and verbal cues. This might happen because it is difficult for people to dampen all behaviors to the same degree. Alternatively, people who are trying to convey a deintensified version of their experience may choose deliberately to do so by using some cues, but not others, to convey that experience. For instance, a tennis player who has just scored a stunning victory over a much loathed opponent may allow himself a smug smile while purposefully suppressing his inclination to leap high in the air and emit a jubilant yelp. A discrepancy has developed, but it was intended.

Posed smiles, produced by people who are experiencing neutral affect, are unlikely to be accompanied by the movement of the muscles around the eyes, and they may differ in timing, duration, and location from enjoyment smiles. People’s subjective impressions of whether an expression was posed versus produced spontaneously may be more accurate than would be expected by chance. Still, perceivers might tend to see most expressions as spontaneous, just as they tend to see most communications as truthful (even in paradigms in which half of the communications they observe are actually lies). The relevant data have not yet been collected but could be quite readily. Data relevant to a related question have been reported, and they show that naive observers can discern at least some difference between expressive performances that vary in the degree to which they were deliberately regulated (B. M. DePaulo, Lanier, & Davis, 1983). Participants were videotaped while answering questions that were or were not revealed to them in advance. When judges observed the participants, either on a videotape without sound or in other kinds of presentations that included words, they were more accurate than chance at distinguishing the planned responses from the unplanned ones. They thought that the planned responses seemed more rehearsed and less spontaneous than the unplanned responses.

Posed and exaggerated expressions may also be more intense than are spontaneous expressions of the same states. In addition, when people are deliberately posing or exaggerating an internal state, the expression of that state may be conveyed more consistently across various nonverbal and verbal channels than would the unregulated spontaneous expressions of those states.

Deceiving: When smiles are used falsely to mask a negative affective state such as fear, anger, or distress, they will have many of the characteristics of posed smiles, such as asymmetry, irregularities in timing, duration, and location, and lack of involvement of the muscles around the eyes. In addition, there may be leakage of facial movements indicative of the negative affect. This leakage may be especially likely to occur in the forehead region but may also blend in with the smile that appears in the lower part of the face (Ekman, 1985).

Dozens of studies have been conducted in which specific nonverbal behaviors were measured while participants were lying and telling the truth. Meta-analyses of these findings (DePaulo et al., 1985a; Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981) have pointed to a variety of behaviors that distinguish lies from truths. Probably because it is often more arousing to lie than to tell the truth, liars blink more, hesitate more, and make more errors when they are speaking. They also speak in higher pitched voices and have more dilated pupils. The speech hesitations and the pupil dilations are also consistent with the fact that lying is usually a cognitively more demanding task than is telling the truth. So is the finding that people about to tell a lie take longer to plan their communication than do people who are about to tell the truth.

Liars often feel guilty or anxious; these states may be partly responsible for the findings that liars fidget more, speak more hesitantly and less fluently, and make more negative and more nonimmediate (distancing) statements than do truth tellers. The tone of liars’ voices sometimes sounds more negative, too. Liars may be reluctant to commit themselves to their untruths, and this is reflected in the fact that liars sometimes have less to say than truth tellers and that what they do say is distancing and overly generalized.

The meta-analyses of cues to deception are summaries of lies that differ in many theoretically relevant ways. For example, lies that masked positive affects were not distinguished from lies that masked negative affects, and lies that people may have felt very badly about telling were not differentiated from lies that they did not feel as badly about telling. In the face of this diversity, it is impressive that any reliable cues to deception emerged. Summaries that are more sensitive to such moderator variables might uncover even stronger relationships.

An exception to the tendency to summarize across all types of lies is a summary that classified lies according to the liar’s motivation to succeed at the lie (Zuckerman, DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). According to this summary, liars who are especially concerned with telling an effective lie try too hard to control their expressive behavior. Their communications appear rigid and inhibited. For example, compared with those who are less highly motivated to lie successfully, more highly motivated communicators give deceptive responses that are shorter than truthful ones and spoken more slowly and in a higher pitch. Motivated communicators, when lying, also gaze less, move their heads less, shift around in their seats less, fidget less, and even blink less. Perhaps they believe that this suppression of behavior makes it harder for others to know that they are
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lying. In fact, though, it probably makes it easier (e.g., B. M. DePaulo & Kirkendol, 1989; B. M. DePaulo et al., 1988).

Another feature that distinguishes lies from truths is the occurrence of interchannel discrepancies (e.g., B. M. DePaulo et al., 1985a). Such inconsistencies may develop because liars are not able successfully to control all of their verbal and nonverbal behaviors simultaneously, and because certain behaviors are less amenable to deliberate control than are others (e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1969; Rosenthal & DePaulo, 1979a, 1979b). When verbal and nonverbal behaviors conflict, it will often be the nonverbal behaviors that are more revealing of the liars' true feelings or attitudes and the verbal behaviors that are more reflective of the affects that they are trying to feign. For example, in their study of communications in the courtroom, Blanck et al. (1985) found that judges who expected the defendant to be found guilty appeared wiser and fairer to people who could hear the words they used when delivering their instructions to the jurors, but they appeared less wise and less fair to those who could see only their visual behaviors or hear the tone of their voice. Nonverbal revealingness has also been documented in research on marital interactions. When distressed and nondistressed couples were instructed to try to act happy, the distressed couples could not be distinguished from the nondistressed by their verbal behavior, but they could be distinguished by their nonverbal behavior (Vincent, Friedman, Nugent, & Messerly, 1979; see also Gottman, Markman, & Notarius, 1977). Suggestive evidence of nonverbal revealingness has also been reported in studies of cross-racial interactions (e.g., Weitz, 1972; Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974).

Finally, another source of evidence relevant to the question of whether deliberately false self-presentations can be detected is observers' judgments. Although untrained laypersons are far from perfect in their attempts to discern when lying is occurring, their intuitions do tell them that deceptive communications are indeed more deceptive than are truthful ones. Observers' impressions of dimensions that are related to deceptive-ness also discriminate lies from truths. For example, when watching or listening to people who are telling lies, observers think that those people seem more ambivalent and indifferent than they do when they are telling the truth (B. M. DePaulo, Rosenthal, et al., 1982).

Conveying mistaken impressions. Although there has been some discussion of the mistakes people make when lying (e.g., Ekman, 1981, 1985), much less has been said about the kinds of mistakes people make in their nonverbal communications when they are not trying to lie. It is probably rare, for example, for people intending to convey disliking to produce a whole constellation of nonverbal behaviors all of which ordinarily suggest liking. Instead, what might happen is that they convey a variety of cues that together add up to a confusing and ambiguous message.

Emotional and Social, Expressive and Regulatory Bases of Nonverbal Behaviors

Recently, theorists such as Fridlund (1991a; see also Smith, 1977, 1985) have begun to argue that there is no necessary emotional basis for nonverbal behaviors (which they prefer to call "displays" or "signals"). Fridlund (1991a) suggests, for example, that hard-wired affect programs may not exist and that displays may be based primarily, or perhaps even solely, on social/communicative motives. An example of research cited as consistent with this point of view was described earlier, that is, Kraut and Johnston's (1979) studies showing stronger and more reliable covariations of smiling with social factors (such as facing or talking with other people) than with emotional factors (such as bowling a strike or experiencing pleasant weather).

It is beyond the scope of this article to address in detail each of the arguments for the social motive point of view. However, the most central lines of evidence are discussed. To discredit the emotional perspective, one of the most compelling lines of evidence that must be reinterpreted is the corpus of studies (reviewed above) showing that people produce recognizable facial expressions of emotions when viewing emotion-laden stimuli materials while totally alone. Fridlund's (1991a) explanation of these findings is that people's displays can be implicitly social even when they are alone. For example, people may grimace to others who are present only in their imaginations, and they may even treat themselves as social interactants, as when they talk to themselves. In his empirical research, Fridlund (1991b; Fridlund et al., 1990) has shown that people's facial actions can in fact be responsive to implicit audiences. However, showing that this can occur is not sufficient evidence that it always does occur. That is, he has not shown (and probably cannot show) that every time people smile while alone, they are smiling to implicit audiences. For example, in instances of sudden intense stimuli (such as noticing that a huge tree is about to come crashing through the window where one is sitting in solitude), an emotional expression is very likely to occur, and it is very unlikely to be produced for the benefit of an imaginary audience.

Even in the studies that Fridlund cites as especially supportive of the social motive perspective (e.g., Fridlund, 1991b; S. S. Jones & Raag, 1989; Kraut & Johnston, 1979), there is clear evidence for emotional as well as social bases for nonverbal behaviors. Furthermore, his arguments do not convincingly dismiss the growing body of physiological data that are consistent with the emotional perspective (e.g., Davidson, Ekman, Saron, Senulis, & Friesen, 1990; Ekman et al., 1990; Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990).

The Fridlund point of view is most inconsistent with the spirit of the present article when it attempts to pit the social motive perspective against the emotional perspective. Instead, the argument here is that both are necessary and important. This article is about nonverbal behaviors as they are regulated with and against each other in the drama of social interaction and psychic life (perhaps even becoming conceptually inseparable at times) and not which of the two is more deserving of the best actor award.

Another related challenge to the emotional perspective has
been issued by those who view emotions in terms of regulation. For example, Campos, Campos, and Barrett (1989) define emotions as "processes of establishing, maintaining, or disrupting the relations between the person and the internal or external environment, when such relations are significant to the individual" (p. 395). They decry the emphasis in classic theories on emotions as intrapsychic feeling states and the insufficient attention in such theories to processes such as people's evaluation of the significance of events for their own goals and strivings.

The present article, though it draws in ways from traditional emotion perspectives, is hardly incompatible with the regulatory perspective. According to the present argument, people are quite frequently (though not always consciously) evaluating the significance of events for a particular class of goals: self-presentational ones. They then regulate their nonverbal (and other) behaviors in ways that they believe will facilitate such goals. The contribution of the traditional emotional perspective to this argument is its delineation of the ways in which the emotion system can enable and constrain the attainment of self-presentational goals.

Summary and Conclusions

Whenever people are motivated to convey a particular impression of themselves to others in social interactions, they are highly likely to try to do so in part by managing their nonverbal behaviors. Attempts to regulate nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes occur in interactions with intimates, as well as with strangers, acquaintances, and friends. Although the deliberate control of nonverbal behaviors can be undertaken with the goal of trying to deceive others, more often it is used to edit the images of oneself that are conveyed to others, in such a way that they are at least partially veridical. Deliberate regulation is also used in the service of accuracy and honesty, as when people use their nonverbal behaviors to try to make their true feelings about themselves perfectly clear. There are situations in which people are unlikely to be attempting to control their nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes, for example, when they are totally absorbed in a task. Even then, however, their nonverbal behavior might bear the stamp of attempts at regulation that were undertaken deliberately in the past but have long since become habitual.

Nonverbal behavior is of special significance to the dynamics of self-presentation for a variety of reasons. First, it is impossible to regulate nonverbal behavior in such a way that no impression at all is conveyed. Thus, with regard to its attributional implications, nonverbal behavior is irrepressible. Nonverbal expressions of the basic emotions may be especially difficult to suppress because there may be hard-wired links between the elicitation of those emotions and their expressions. People's feelings, then, tend to appear on their face, and perhaps in other expressive behaviors as well, unless they try deliberately to mask or mute the expressions of those feelings. Nonverbal behaviors are also of special self-presentational significance because they are more accessible to the people who are observing them than to the people who are producing them; thus, with regard to their nonverbal self-presentations, people cannot know themselves as well as others can. Nonverbal behaviors are elusive and off-the-record in that they are difficult to describe or to repeat, and it is impossible to look up their meanings in a dictionary. Nonverbal behaviors can occur very quickly, and it is possible that they convey certain meanings that cannot be communicated in any other way.

One of the most important implications of the special characteristics of nonverbal behaviors is that those behaviors cannot always be regulated successfully. There are important constraints on people's success at translating their self-presentational intentions into the actual production of the relevant nonverbal behaviors. The hard-wired substrate of the emotion system may be one of those constraints. In addition, there are constraints imposed by people's demeanors (which can make it difficult for them to convey particular impressions), by their characteristic level of expressiveness, by their personal style, by the range of expressive cues that they can command, by the amount of practice and experience they have or have not had at regulating their nonverbal behaviors, and by their (lack of) confidence. Also, certain nonverbal behaviors are difficult for most everyone to control, and others that can be controlled under optimal conditions can become less tractable under suboptimal conditions, as when the level of motivation to succeed in conveying a particular impression becomes debilitatingly high.

There are also constraints on the kinds of self-presentational intentions that people will form. These are imposed by knowledge of cultural, situational, and other norms regulating nonverbal expressive behaviors. Finally, there are also constraints on the accuracy with which people can assess the effectiveness of their own nonverbal performances and modify those performances accordingly.

Can people overcome the many factors that can undermine the regulation of nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes? Much of the relevant data come from studies of people's nonverbal "posing" abilities. These are studies in which people are asked to try to use their nonverbal behaviors to try to convey particular affects or emotions or states that they are not necessarily experiencing at the time. People are reasonably skilled posers when using their face and voice; they also seem to be able effectively to regulate their body movements and postures and even their styles of walking, although the database for these conclusions is less substantial. People can also on occasion use their nonverbal behaviors with some measure of success to convey the impression that they are experiencing something very different from what they really are experiencing. That is, they can use their nonverbal behaviors to lie. They can do so not only for affects and emotions but also for dispositions. Extraverts, for example, can convincingly come across as introverts and vice versa, at least in short-term interactions.

Can perceivers tell when other people are deliberately regulating their nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational ends? This is, in a way, the flip side of the question of whether people can control their nonverbal behaviors for self-presentational purposes, especially when deception is involved. When one person succeeds at using nonverbal behaviors to lie, another is taken in by the lie. What results for both the self-presenters and the perceivers is an amelioration of success, particularly for the self-presenters, as well as a generous sprinkling of failures. This
is perhaps as it should be. It would be neither desirable nor useful to have a social system in which anyone could successfully claim any image at any time. Nor would it do to have a system in which no one could ever succeed at conveying anything other than their genuine feelings. As it is, it appears that people can succeed in claiming nonverbally many, though not all, images and that they are best at claiming those identities that are closer to their "true selves," as they perceive them. There is much potential, throughout the life-span, for all interactants to develop and refine their abilities to regulate their own nonverbal behaviors and to discern others' attempts to do the same. This is part of the richness, flexibility, and intrigue of social life.

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