

Journal of Peace Research

<http://jpr.sagepub.com>

The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies

Anna Leander

Journal of Peace Research 2005; 42; 605

DOI: 10.1177/0022343305056237

The online version of this article can be found at:
<http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/abstract/42/5/605>

Published by:

 SAGE Publications

<http://www.sagepublications.com>

On behalf of:



International Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Additional services and information for *Journal of Peace Research* can be found at:

Email Alerts: <http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/alerts>

Subscriptions: <http://jpr.sagepub.com/subscriptions>

Reprints: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsReprints.nav>

Permissions: <http://www.sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav>

Citations (this article cites 19 articles hosted on the SAGE Journals Online and HighWire Press platforms):
<http://jpr.sagepub.com/cgi/content/refs/42/5/605>

The Market for Force and Public Security: The Destabilizing Consequences of Private Military Companies*

ANNA LEANDER

*Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of
Southern Denmark*

This article explains how it is possible to arrive at the paradoxical conclusion that an increased reliance on private actors (in the guise of private military companies) could consolidate public peace and security in the weakest African states. It argues that this conclusion can only be reached if the dynamics of the market for force are neglected. The basic claim is that the market as a whole has effects that cannot be captured by focussing on single cases. The article analyses these effects, departing from the empirical functioning of supply, demand and externalities in the market for force in order to spell out the implications for public security. More specifically, the article shows that *supply* in the market for force tends to self-perpetuate, as PMCs turn out a new caste of security experts striving to fashion security understandings to defend and conquer market shares. The process leads to an expansion of the numbers and kinds of threats the firms provide protection against. Moreover, *demand* does not penalize firms that service 'illegitimate' clients in general. Consequently, the number of actors who can wield control over the use force is limited mainly by their ability to pay. Finally, an *externality* of the market is to weaken existing security institutions by draining resources and worsening the security coverage. This gives further reasons to contest the legitimacy of existing security orders. In other words, the development of a market for force increases the availability and perceived need for military services, the number of actors who have access to them and the reasons to contest existing security orders. This hardly augurs well for public security.

Introduction

Over the past decade, an instructive and interesting debate about the state in Africa has developed. Terms have been invented and explanations found to communicate the idea that African states are of a different kind. African states have been described as 'fragile' (Clapham, 1996) 'quasi-states' (Jackson, 1990) with 'pathologies' tied to their design (Herbst & Mills, 2003: 39). They are associated with notions of 'occult

power structures' (Bayart, Ellis & Hibou, 1997) and warlord politics (Reno, 1998). They have become the prime examples of 'pre-modern' or 'failed' states (Cooper, 2002). This article is primarily concerned with these states.

In the accounts of the peculiarity of African states, the breakdown of public security, that is, the endemic violence resulting from the blurring of the boundaries between crime and law enforcement as well as between war and peace, figures prominently. The consequences are serious as conflicts spill across borders with refugees and

* Correspondence and comments are most welcome to anl@sam.sdu.dk.

armed troops/groups, the lack of territorial control opens space for terrorist groups (Menkhaus, 2004), and the human costs keep rising. The 1998–2003 war in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) left an estimated 3 million dead, and the unravelling humanitarian emergency in Darfur has displaced at least 1.5 million persons so far. It is therefore not surprising that how to create or restore order, how to restore some form of public security, has become a prime political and academic concern. It is also the central concern of this article.

The seemingly obvious and simple solution that African states need to be strengthened and their public monopoly control on the use of force re-established (Ayoob, 1992) is intensely contested. The worst violence is perpetrated by, or with the approval of, states. Strengthening them is therefore not an obvious solution (Clapham, 2002). It might 'be better to try to redesign at least some African states rather than simply trying to prevent disaster and then attempting to resurrect them after profound failure' (Herbst, 2000: 258). More radically, some question the adequacy of statehood as such. 'Sovereignty' – and the state monopoly on the legitimate use of force central to it – are the root causes of violence and insecurity, not solutions. A better understanding of politics and political organization in Africa, combined with a profound reconsideration of the pro-state bias in the policies towards them, is called for (e.g. Duffield, 2002; Reno, 2000).

This shows that state control over the use of force does not equate to public security. Public security (or the relative absence of violence in the public sphere) can be provided by private as well as by public agents. Inversely, public forces may be major sources of insecurity. Most pertinently, in most weak African states, the boundary between the two is blurred. In this article, there is therefore no assumption to the effect

that the arrangement that underpins public security, the security order, is necessarily based on a state monopoly of the use of force or that a state monopoly on the legitimate use of force equates to public security. This blurring of public and private in African security orders does not reduce the importance of the question of how to move towards greater public security.

This article deals with one concrete, but paradoxical, answer to this question, namely, that creating/restoring public security in the weakest African states might be helped by encouraging private actors – and more specifically private military companies (PMCs)¹ – to play a more active role. The article argues that the paradox is clear. Reliance on PMCs does not enhance public security. The market for force created by increased reliance on PMCs weakens the foundations of public security. A market for force increases the supply of military services and the number of actors who can buy the services, and it undermines the consolidation of public security structures. The consequence is that insecurity and violence are likely to increase even further. Before making this argument, the article presents the case for increased reliance on PMCs.

The Case for Private Military Companies in the African Context

'Write a cheque and end a war' is how Brooks (2000b) summarizes his view on the role PMCs should play in Africa. Elsewhere, he argues that private military companies have more in common with the Messiah

¹ PMCs will in this text refer to firms providing consultancy, logistics and direct support for security operations. PMC (rather than, say, private security firms) has become the standard term used by those interested in the study of the rapidly growing private market for force (Isenberg, 2004b: 15; Singer, 2003b). The heterogeneity of firms and activities covered by the term reflects the close linkage (and often blurred distinctions) between the different segments of the market for force (Leander, 2004a: ch. 3; Zamparelli, 1999).

than with mercenaries (2000a), and he devotes considerable energy to lobbying for an increased role of PMCs in peacekeeping operations as he directs the lobby organization International Peace Operations Association (<http://www.ipoaonline.org>). However, Brooks does not advocate an unregulated market. The cheque should be written to a respectable company following national and international regulations (that need improving). The company should preferably not be involved in direct combat, but focus on backing up, consulting and training public forces. This position has become rather mainstream. As pointed out already in 1997 by Enrique Bernales Ballesteros (the former special rapporteur on mercenarism who was replaced by Shaista Shameem in July 2004), 'attitudes appear to be changing towards the mercenary issue' (UN General Assembly, 1997: §97). This is partly because 'influential sectors in the corridors of power of important States insist on denying or minimizing the existence of mercenaries in contemporary society' (UN General Assembly, 1997: §83). However, it is also because those arguing that PMCs could promote public security make a forceful and persuasive case. This section presents the four pillars on which it rests.

Breaking Cycles of Violence

The first pillar supporting the case that PMCs would be helpful in restoring public security in African states is that they make it possible to break vicious circles of violence. They could do this either by working as 'force multipliers' for African forces or by providing troops for outside interventions.

The importance of providing troops is often argued with reference to the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. The international community was deeply involved prior to the genocide. It controlled some 80% of the Rwandan budget. It (and particularly France) was equipping and training the

Rwandan military. The international community was monitoring the implementation of the Arusha peace agreement through a UN force (UNAMIR) in the country. This involvement made the international community morally responsible for developments in Rwanda. However, not only did it fail to limit racial policies, laws and propaganda, but signals about the coming genocide were ignored and obfuscated. When the genocide began, UNAMIR was ordered not to act. Following the killing of ten Belgian soldiers, the bulk of UN troops were withdrawn, leaving between 500,000 and 1 million people to be killed (Barnett, 2002; Uvin, 1998).

The reasons for the failure to intervene in Rwanda are varied, controversial and complex. For the purpose of this article, the failure is significant because Rwanda has come to epitomize situations where PMCs could be used to break cycles of violence: a situation marked by widespread agreement around the necessity of outside intervention, but an equally widespread unwillingness to provide troops (Adams, 1999; Gantz, 2003). In such a situation, those suggesting that PMCs could be used to enhance security argue that they could make up for the lack of willing and qualified troops. They ask, 'Who or what will respond to tomorrow's Rwanda?' (Shearer, 2001).

They also point out that PMCs could be deployed as 'force multipliers' by governments who cannot tip the balance to their favour in an armed conflict and who cannot obtain the help needed from outsiders. PMCs could 'multiply' local forces quite literally by operating together with them, by training locals and/or by taking over non-military tasks, hence freeing up local troops for military operations. To illustrate how PMCs might play such roles, the reference point is the 'successes' of the South African firm Executive Outcomes (EO) (closed in 1998) in ending the cruel and costly (in

terms of human lives and limbs) conflicts in Angola and in Sierra Leone (e.g. Zarate, 1998).

In Angola, EO was hired in 1993 to retake control of the oil facilities in Soyo and then train government soldiers. The EO guidance brought UNITA to the negotiating table, which eventually produced the 1994 Lusaka peace protocol. In Sierra Leone, EO was hired in 1995 to defeat the RUF, which it did. It retook the Kono diamond area and trained a local ethnically based army unit, the 'Kamajors', to take over security. EO brought the RUF to the negotiating table and paved the way for the 1996 presidential elections. In both places, EO played a pivotal role in breaking long and protracted conflicts, stabilizing the governments and setting the stage for civilian politics.

As their defenders point out, the potential (and proven capacity) of PMCs to break vicious circles of violence weighs heavily in their favour. This is widely acknowledged. Kofi Annan, for example, stated that 'in the face of mass murder' the use of private contracts 'is an option that cannot be relinquished' (quoted in Shearer, 2001). Similarly, there seems to have been interest in establishing an expert panel looking into the potential of private firms in peacekeeping operations (*Financial Times*, 2003), even if David Harland, head of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, has declared that the 'privatization of peacekeeping is not on the agenda' (Deen, 2004). It certainly is the case that the scale of the tragedies in places such as Rwanda, Sierra Leone and Angola makes worries about the private-sector status of those that might assist ending them seem minor – or, worse, immoral.

PMC Respectability

A second pillar supporting the idea that PMCs could be used to enhance public security in Africa is that (at least some)

PMCs are respectable. If this was not the case, encouraging their development and relying on them would be foolish. It is therefore essential to show that PMCs do not behave like Machiavelli's 'whores of war', that they are not 'traditional mercenaries'.

The term 'private military companies' was launched and energetically marketed by Tim Spicer partly for that reason. It created a new label that could replace the tainted mercenary one that put PMCs and the rogue, individual, free-floating and ultimately unreliable contemporary mercenaries like Bob Denard or Wild Mike Hoare into one basket (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 2002). As advocates emphasize, PMCs are different from individual mercenaries. They are corporations. Moreover, many PMCs have roots in para-public defence industries; many employ highly qualified retired personnel from armed forces. The term underlines that the PMCs are corporations similar to other corporations. Some of them operate as multinational businesses, are traded on stock markets, have headquarters in tax havens and operate professional advertising and public relations departments. However, being a corporation is no guarantee of respectable behaviour, as underlined by the Enron, WorldCom and Parmalat scandals. Therefore, more is needed.

There is more. Those arguing that PMCs could enhance security point out that their employees are military professionals. They have no more motivation to maltreat civilians than public soldiers (Taulbee, 1998: 159). They may well be less inclined to do so than public soldiers precisely because their motivation is pecuniary and not ideological or rooted in loyalties to a nation, group, clan or tribe (Lynch & Walsh, 2000). Moreover, industry advocates point out that the highly politicized market for force makes it essential for PMCs to behave respectably. 'The fastest thing that would get us out of business is

human-rights violations' (Nic van Den Bergh of EO, quoted in Spearin, 2001: 30). They also argue that PMCs have a pro-state bias. PMCs 'like stable not fragile states. In that respect, their interests and those of the state are usually the same. They have never sought to challenge states' (Coker, 1998: 111).

According to those arguing for an expanded role for PMCs, this presentation of the firms is confirmed in practice. Firms have behaved respectably where they have been involved. They are professional and do a good military job. PMCs are 'strategically effective' (O'Brien, 2000a). They have the possibility and flexibility to put together a team with the military training, local knowledge and equipment that is needed to act effectively in any given conflict. PMCs often stress that their staffing policies are strictly based on professional qualifications and that they have serious vetting procedures to ensure the reliability of their employees. 'We can muster more generals than the Pentagon', boasts Ed Soyster of MPRI (Wayne, 2002). It is also underlined that, as professionals, PMC employees behave well in action. They even do humanitarian work, such as EO coordinating the reopening of schools in Sierra Leone (Zarate, 1998: 97). When they have fulfilled their contract, they withdraw (Spicer, 1998). Those arguing for increased PMC involvement in establishing security see critique of the industry as rooted in prejudice rather than in the observance of actual PMC behaviour (Isenberg, 2000: 16).

The Fallibility of African Forces

The third pillar upholding the claim that PMCs help sustain public security in weak African states is the patent insufficiency of many African forces. The argument is that, when discussing the use of PMCs, it is important to compare with the most likely alternative: that is, the deployment of local forces. It is said that PMCs stand out as far more professional and efficient, and even as

potentially contributing to improving African forces.

The lack of professionalism of African forces is a recurrent preoccupation of regional scholars and not only PMC advocates. It is ranked by some as the main problem in African politics (e.g. Howe, 2001). Even the continent's stronger and more cohesive armed forces lack training, equipment and resources (Clapham, 2000; de Waal, 1998; Luckham, 2003). Public armed forces have looted, racketed and abused civilians to the point of being the key perpetrators of violence on the continent. Army response to threats has often been disproportionate and unjustifiably focused on civilians. The fallibility of African armed forces is reflected also in the extensive criticism of their contribution to regional operations through, for example, the Economic Community of West Africa Monitoring Group (Adebajo, 2002; Reno, 1998: 103–109).

Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that PMCs can be presented as a more efficient and more attractive alternative (Fisher-Thomson, 2004). The undeniably poor record of public African forces sharpens the image of PMC professionalism. More importantly, it undermines the idea that reliance on PMCs is inherently undesirable because the firms are private. Implicit or explicit contrasts with public African armed forces driven by private interests, behaving as mercenaries, and with despicable human rights records, undermines arguments building on the assumptions that publicly controlled uses of force are preferable. Characteristically,

before MPRI entered the picture . . . Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International linked ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative) trained battalions to murders, rapes and beatings. . . . MPRI is at the top of the military training field. 'Committed to ethical business practices' is written prominently on the firm's promotional pamphlet. (Burton-Rose & Madsen, 1999)

Even more strongly, advocates often present PMCs as one possible remedy for the lack of professionalism in many African forces. They can provide the training and equipment that international allies no longer supply since 1989. This PMC role is not hypothetical. MPRI runs ACRI (the African Crisis Response Initiative) and Kellogg, Brown and Root trains Rwandan troops, to mention just two examples. Reliance on private security firms has become one of the key strategies used by African leaders to respond to the lack of professionalism of their own forces, either by buying services they need from outsiders or by using them to upgrade the local forces (Howe, 2001: 2). This points straight to the final pillar of the case for using PMCs to stabilize the security situation in weak African states.

Pragmatism, Practice and Regulation

PMCs are already so extensively involved that any reasonable approach must be pragmatic. Regulation is necessary and feasible, while banning blocks discussions about how to deal with an important question (Brayton, 2002). Therefore, the continued ban and condemnation of mercenarism is counter-productive and the term had better be dropped altogether (Shearer, 1998a: 89–90).

The point of departure for this argument is the increased involvement of PMCs in weak African states. Even if it is hard to document, specialists working on African conflicts and aggregate indicators confirm the trend. One compilation of available information on 'mercenary activity' in Africa from the 1950s onwards lists 15 conflicts involving mercenaries for the 40 years spanning 1950–89 and 65 for the period 1990–98 (Musah & Fayemi, 2000). Similarly, the recent Foreign and Commonwealth Office Green Paper (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002a: Annex A) lists 15 conflicts involving mercenaries for the period 1950–89 compared to 80 for the period

1990–2000. The impression is corroborated by the increase in annual revenue of the private military industry (including also the rapid expansion of the security industry in Western Europe and the United States) from \$55.6 billion in 1990 to \$100 billion in 2000, and it was expected to double again and reach \$202 billion by 2010 (International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 2002: 4).

Moreover, PMC advocates point out that many of the activities undertaken by foreigners in Africa depend on PMCs. Western governments are outsourcing tasks of training, consulting and logistics – that is, the implementation of military support – to private firms. They rely on PMCs to back up military operations and provide the security necessary for their physical presence. Similarly, other outsiders rely on PMCs to compensate for the absence of effective state control over violence. Firms have to protect their installations and their personnel. Aid workers need protection from racketeering, kidnapping and attacks. In contexts where the public armed forces and police are either unavailable, ineffective or involved in the activities against which protection is needed, private solutions are the only ones available (Spearin, 2001).

The PMCs fill a 'security gap' (Mandel, 2002). This gap cannot be banned out of existence. Attempts to ban are counter-productive: 'not using legitimate private firms will probably lead to a resurgence of uncontrollable individual freelance mercenaries who will flock to satisfy the profitable demand for military expertise, but who have far less regard for the legitimacy of their clients' (Brooks, 2000b: 138). Moreover, there is no political support for a ban. 'Most states find PMCs useful for implementing their own foreign and military policies and oppose efforts to restrict, let alone prohibit them' (Isenberg, 2004b: 12).

Instead of sticking to an obsolete ban on mercenarism – penalizing legitimate security

services – a revision of international and national regulations of PMC activities is the only realistic option, the advocates argue. Developments seem to confirm their view, as regulation is being adapted to the expanding sector. At the national level, concerned military hierarchies and policymakers are pushing change according to their own national concerns. The UK, for example, has passed the ‘Sponsored Reserve Act’ to make it possible to integrate private contractors in military operations while allowing them to keep their private firm salary and status. Inversely, France has imposed stricter limits on the activities of private contractors (Sénat, 2002). In the United States, the US National Defense Authorization bill is likely to result in stricter vetting procedures for PMC personnel, partially under public oversight, following private contractor involvement in Abu Ghraib (Isenberg, 2004b).

At the international level, the former UN special rapporteur on mercenaries, although sticking to the term, has proposed a far-reaching redefinition and specification of ‘mercenary’ (UN General Assembly, 2003: annexe). Proposals for extending regulation also to cover the logistics and consultancy firms are emerging; for example, negotiations regarding the proposal for a ‘Convention on the Use of Armed Non-Military Contractors by an Occupying Force’ (Isenberg, 2004b: 72). Finally, there have been initiatives to extend international human rights legislation also to PMCs. Some of these involve profound changes of international legal practice, such as the suggestion to place PMCs under the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice (Singer, 2003b). Most, however, are based on self-regulation and codes of conduct, such as the generic ones adopted by the UN Global Compact (which can be read at <http://www.un.org/Depts/ptd/global.htm>) or more specific conducts adopted by NGOs concerned directly with security and human rights

(Amnesty’s ‘specific recommendations for security arrangements’ are available at <http://www.amnesty.org.uk/business/pubs/hrgc.shtml#6>), the industry organizations such as the IPOA (its code is available at <http://www.ipoaonline.org/code.htm>) or the firms themselves (the ‘human rights policy’ of the now closed firm Sandline can be viewed at <http://www.sandline.com/site/index.htm>).

To sum up, there is a strong and well-argued case for the need to revise existing conventions condemning the use of ‘mercenaries’ to make it possible for PMCs to play a more extensive role in Africa and elsewhere. This section systematized the main arguments on which it rests for two reasons. One is to clarify why so many scholars and policymakers arrive at the conclusion that a private market for force will enhance security in weak African states. The second is to do justice to the ideas against which the remainder of this article is directed.

The Dynamics of the Market for Force: Demand, Supply and Externalities

The argument that a regulated space for PMCs in the weakest African states could enhance security and public control over the use of force sounds persuasive. However, essential parts of the story are omitted. If these are taken into account, the case becomes less clearcut and less persuasive. One omission is the difficulties involved in ‘governing contracts’, that is, in ensuring that the terms of contracts are respected, that firms and their employees can be held accountable when they are not, and that costs remain under control. This has been persuasively explored elsewhere (e.g. Singer, 2001/02). This article will therefore concentrate on another omission, namely that of the dynamics of the market for force. The claim is that the expansion of the market for force

resulting from the increased reliance on PMCs has effects that are larger than the sum of its parts. The expansion of the market changes the price and availability of military services. It alters the understanding of threats and of how they should be met. The creation of a market for force changes the rules of the game and the starting points of the players in a way that seems unlikely to enhance public security in weak African states.

Expansionary Supply

In the market for force, supply creates its own demand. The conventional explanation for this has been racketeering. Suppliers threaten buyers into paying for their services. However, even for the Sicilian mafia racketeering may not be central. Voluntary mechanisms are far more important and pervasive than usually allowed for (Gambetta, 1993). For PMCs in Africa, racketeering is even less significant. It is not impossible that racketeering occurs, of course. But even less respectable firms are unlikely to get most contracts at gun point.

Rather, the self-perpetuation of supply is better understood in terms of another particularity of the market for force. This market is 'inscrutable': neither the seller nor the buyer can be certain of the quality and value of a service offered (Gambetta, 1994). There is no way of measuring how important a threat really is, nor how important it is compared to other threats. Threats are, by definition, things that may occur. It is inherently difficult to know which threats will be followed by action. Is a sabotage or kidnapping the most imminent threat to the operations of a firm? Moreover, it is difficult to imagine a common standard for evaluating which consequences are most serious. How would one compare material damage to a managing director's life? Relatedly, it is difficult to assess the centrality and the quality of the services offered by any one PMC.

The consequence is that PMCs (like other

actors in the market for force) adjust strategies to market their product. It becomes essential for PMCs to shape the understanding their clients have of threats and how they can best respond to them. First, PMCs have to convince clients that the threats they are specialized in dealing with are the most imminent, the most real and the most important threats. This is also what firms are increasingly doing. As privatization increases the competition for market shares and expands the market for force,

the key to corporate survival resides increasingly in a political or even a cultural capacity; the ability to influence future customers and suppliers. . . . The leading defence company of the future will be primarily a manipulator of opinions, in a diversity of markets, rather than the familiar engineering enterprise of the past. (Lovering, 2000: 167–168, 174)

PMCs can no longer content themselves with being mere technical experts. They become security experts shaping understandings of and decisions about security. The competition for market shares pushes PMCs to become lobbyists, security advisers and public-opinion-makers (Leander, 2005). In other words, an inbuilt market logic makes PMCs contribute to the 'securitization'² of a variety of issues. They create a demand for the services they offer by making clients aware of the many threats they need protection against. Whether or not PMC representatives do this cunningly, or because they genuinely believe in the threats they depict and the solutions they suggest, is secondary to the argument here. The point is that market logic pushes PMCs to establish themselves not only as providers of security services but as security experts defining which services are needed.

Moreover, it is important for PMCs to

² Securitization is the process of turning something into an existential threat justifying exceptional measures, including the use of force (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998).

persuade potential clients that their response to the real and imminent threats is the best available. This makes an image of success and effectiveness essential. Nothing sells like success. A good reputation and symbols are crucial (Gambetta, 1991). The extent to which PMCs in the context of weak African states have established for themselves such a reputation for success is rather impressive. Many accept PMCs as security experts. Their presence is increasingly taken for granted and often favourably compared to the public alternatives, sometimes by public officials. In a speech on military operations in Africa, Theresa Whelan (former US deputy assistant secretary of defence for African affairs) praised PMCs because according to her they are efficient, have great local sensibility and competence, and are rapid and strategically effective. She found it visibly difficult to add anything positive about public forces (Whelan, 2003).

In most other markets, the idea that the supplier of a service (or product) is also the expert responsible for evaluating present and future needs of the clients would seem slightly odd. It would seem to be a recipe for sharp increases in these 'needs'. If, in addition, the supplier was also responsible for setting the price of the contract and evaluating the service provided (as is often the case with PMCs; Singer, 2003a: 357–360), an exponential growth of demand and costs would seem almost certain. It is hard to see why the market for force should differ in this respect.

The tendency for supply in the market for force to expand is per se not a sufficient reason to claim that public security is adversely affected by the market for force. It has been argued that it would be likely to increase 'securitization', that is, the sense of insecurity. But this would not necessarily translate into more violence (Neumann, 1998). However, it would increase militarization. Whether or not 'more arms'

increases insecurity and violence is a perennial, unresolved controversy (Krause, 1992: 7–8). If it were the case that the expanding supply of military services was channelled primarily to rulers who used it to centralize and assert public authority on their own territories, the market for force might increase public security in the long run (though possibly at the cost of very high levels of violence in the short run). However, as a closer look at the logic of demand reveals, this is not the case.

Demand: Satisfying a Multiplicity of Clients

Everyone, including those who argue that PMCs could enhance security, insists on the importance of controlling the clients of PMCs. It is agreed that sales to illegitimate clients should be banned. However, the market for force is such that drawing the line between legitimate and illegitimate clients is difficult; and, even if this difficulty could be overcome, it is close to impossible to imagine that regulation could settle which demand by what clients is 'legitimate'. If considered in combination with the expansion of supply, this has far-reaching implications for public security in the weakest African states.

The basic difficulty is that deciding who is the legitimate authority (and consequently a legitimate buyer of military services) is a (or the) central stake in most conflicts in weak African states (Holsti, 1996). Therefore, it is impossible to fall back on some *a priori* blanket statement (such as that of the OAU Convention) that states are legitimate clients and non-state actors are not (Kuofofor, 2000). In the northeast of the Democratic Republic of Congo, a variety of militias, many of whom claim to represent 'a state', have been fighting each other and the population over the last decade (UN, 2001). Who represents 'a state' and which states are legitimately involved in the conflict are contentious questions. Moreover, the fact

that states are so often blatantly illegitimate undermines the possibility for a blanket answer. The governments in Kigali and Khartoum were hardly legitimate clients at a time when they were tolerating and encouraging the Interahamwe and Janjaweed militias, respectively.

The difficulty is accentuated as many conflicts are initiated and prolonged by the interests of local and foreign firms. To protect their employees from racketeering and kidnapping and to secure their installations, foreign firms often end up making payments that finance and prolong conflicts. Firms are even more likely to make such payments in 'resource' wars – where the control over natural resources (such as coltan, diamonds, timber, gold or coffee) is central – as the firms have an interest in defending and perhaps extending their exploitation rights (Ballentine & Sherman, 2003; Le Billon, 2000). Consequently, whether the demands for protection services on behalf of firms (or others defending their interests) are legitimate or not is exceedingly contested. This is articulated in the controversies surrounding the UN 'global compact' and more generally surrounding firms' involvement in conflict zones (Haufler, 2004). For some, the security demands related to firms' interests, NGO protection and foreign governments' policies are merely a new phase of capitalist exploitation, an extension of markets at the expense of human rights and local autonomy (Francis, 1999). For others, it is part of the legitimate process of defending private property rights and the openness of international markets.

Even assuming that some process for settling the legitimacy of various demands for PMC services could be agreed upon, it remains hard to imagine an effective mechanism that would prevent private firms from also satisfying 'illegitimate' demand. Self-regulation through the market cannot be counted on. It is simply not the case that

a reputation for working for illegitimate clients is a disadvantage for firms.

For many PMCs, it is unimportant whether or not the market sanctions working for illegal contracts. Some firms will make one operation and then withdraw. This is a viable strategy as the markets are fluid. Firms are created, dissolved, branched, merged and moved from one location to another, and hence can be very difficult to trace. Many firms are loose virtual creations, little more than websites from which networks are coordinated (O'Brien, 2000b: 61). These networks are not likely to be affected by regulation. Moreover, regulation might have an impact on established international firms. It is unlikely to have much effect on the franchises, joint ventures and spin-off firms created in the wake of their operations. For example, employees staying on to establish their own operations are unlikely to be affected by regulatory efforts (e.g. Neall Ellis and Carl Alberts in Sierra Leone; see Musah, 2002: 926).

But, more profoundly, for firms with a long-term market presence, the reputation for working for illegitimate clients, or at least being willing to do so, may be a competitive advantage, a 'trade mark', so to speak. Part of the market serves these clients. For example, Sakina Security (tied to TransGlobal Security International), which offered 'Jihad Challenge' packages to radical groups in Chechnya and Afghanistan, and other similar firms were 'discovered' and closed, but only after 11 September 2001 (Singer, 2003a: 270). Presence in the shady/illegal part of the market is facilitated by the virtual, network-like structure of many firms. For example, many of the 80 military contractors arrested in March 2004 for their plans to overthrow the government in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea, were former EO employees (BBC, 2004). EO was officially closed down in 1998, but its network seems to be outliving it well enough.

More significantly, though, it is not only

in the eyes of shady, private employers clearly operating outside national and international law that responding to (some) 'illegitimate' demand can count as an advantage. In Western countries, a main reason for relying on private contractors is that they make it possible to evade procedures ensuring public scrutiny (Bigo, 2004). States (including those claiming the moral high ground) are not likely to see the willingness of private firms to take on this demand for services of dubious legitimacy as a drawback. Nor have they changed their attitude towards firms who have worked for 'illegal' clients. DynCorp International FZ-LLC, for example, does not seem to have fallen out of favour with the US government, despite its alleged work for and dealings with right-wing paramilitaries in Colombia (Bigwood, 2001; Novak, 2003; Singer, 2003a: 335–336). The firm continues to win major public contracts, including the contracts to protect Afghan President Karzai and to train the police in Iraq (Barnett, 2003; Isenberg, 2004a).

There is little evidence that the market for force will (or can be harnessed to) cater exclusively for the demands of a limited number of state or state-supported clients. On the contrary, the market makes military services available to a larger number of clients. The main limitation seems to reside in the capacity of potential clients to make interesting offers. In resource-rich African states, that capacity – including through the selling of future war booty (Ross, 2003) – is bound to remain large. Moreover, as the number of firms in search of clients expands, the threshold for clients falls, at least at the lower end of the market. This leads to the worry that 'the return of proxy wars could become a nightmarish reality were well-equipped foreign private forces are allowed to continue propping up opposing parties in today's conflicts' (Musah, 2002: 928).

Increasing the number of actors that can

wield control over the use of force (by buying it on the market) weakens the state monopoly on the use of force. It does so by definition. According to the *Oxford English Reference Dictionary*, a monopoly is 'the exclusive possession or control of trade in a commodity or service'. The question is whether it also undermines public security. The answer to that question depends on how force is used. In weak African states, where the legitimacy of existing public orders is weak, there is good reason to think that it will be used to contest those orders and establish new ones (Holsti, 1997). The result is likely to be more violence. Since the externalities of the market contribute to further weakening state institutions, this conclusion seems even more likely.

Externalities Weakening Public Institutions

Those arguing that PMCs could bolster public security in the weakest African states do not probe the effect of PMCs on political processes and public institutions. The reason they give is that PMCs can be asked to level the ground but not to be architects and construction workers. 'Military companies can claim success in achieving immediate strategic objectives. But these companies are unable to address the underlying political or social issues that prompted conflict in the first place' (Shearer, 1998a: 10). *Prima facie* this sounds reasonable. At closer inspection, the argument does not stand up well. The market for force produces significant 'externalities' for political process. Two of these – the weakening of public armed forces and the perpetuation of a 'Swiss cheese' security coverage – are discussed here because they make both violence and violent contestation of security orders more likely.

A first externality of the market for force is to weaken public armed forces, making it easier to contest established security orders. The market diverts financial and human

resources that might otherwise have gone into constructing public security institutions into the private market. The constantly growing pressure for slimmed budgets and reduced military spending on behalf of donors, lenders and investors makes relying on foreign firms rather than home-grown professional armies tempting (Luckham, 2003). This is not necessarily because PMCs are cheaper and less likely to make coups than local armed forces. Rather, giving a greater role to private security forces makes it possible to displace the burden of financing security (Duffield, 2001: 170–187; Reno, 1998: 58–72). Companies and persons who can pay for their own security have to do so, directly. They can also be induced to pay for security provided by public forces. Shell and Chevron, for example, financed the Nigerian military and police to secure their facilities in Nigeria (Avant, 2004: 154).

This said, displacement is easier if security is privatized. Foreign firms, NGOs and governments are often more content with private solutions. PMCs from the home country are trusted to a better job. Home governments will be happy to secure contracts for their own private security firms. For example, US government pressure was central to the decision that EO would be replaced by MPRI in Angola after the peace agreement (Musah, 2002: 914). Similarly, the UK government insists on the importance of defending British interests in the industry (Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002b). Finally, relying on PMCs, foreigners do not risk being accused of financing the military forces of oppressive African regimes. In 'the test case of international collaboration to defuse the "curse of resources"' – the Chad–Cameroon Petroleum Development and Pipeline Project – a key concern was to prevent the government of Chad using the project to finance its own armed forces engaged in a civil war (Bray,

2003: 345; <http://www.worldbank.org/afr/ccproj>). Controversy did emerge over the use of some \$4 million by president Deby to buy arms for his troops (<http://www.bankwatch.org>). It is, therefore, not surprising that many firms have preferred to complement public security with private guards, causing considerable confusion about the status, roles and responsibilities of public and private security forces in recurring human rights violations, as well as the responsibility of the government and the main investing firms (Exxon, Petronas and Chevron) (<http://www.ciel.org/Ifi/chadcameroonproject.html>).

The market for force also diverts human resources from the public armed forces. It offers better salaries, particularly for the more competent and professional. The salaries in many African armed forces are low and often not paid at all. Hence, it is not surprising to discover that African soldiers (and not only white South Africans) work as contractors for private companies where pay is higher. This is true both in their home region and in far-off places such as Iraq (*The Economist*, 2004).

Moreover, the market for force drains human resources by eroding the status of public forces and accentuating the blurring of boundaries between public and private forces. African governments play a central role in this, as they push their armies to support themselves through the market by not paying salaries. Even more blatant, public officials push the commercialization of armed forces by turning them into money-making ventures. For example, in the DRC, Zimbabwean army units played a central part in propping up Kabila's war efforts, while at the same time defending Mugabe's mineral interests. On the other side, Ugandan and Rwandan army units were waging a predatory war for their leaders (Musah, 2002: 914; based on UN, 2001: §32–93 in particular). The military became thoroughly commercialized in the process.

As the UN panel explained, 'Top military commanders from various countries, for different reasons, needed and continue to need this conflict for its lucrative nature and for temporarily solving some internal problems as well as allowing access to wealth' (UN, 2001: §217).

The outsourcing of training by Western governments (and, most importantly, the USA) further blurs distinctions. It conveys the acceptability of moving between public and private forces. This message is sent out in a context where the fluid boundaries separating public and private forces, interests, behaviour and status are crucial problems for the professionalism of the armed forces. The figure of the Sierra Leonian 'sobel' (soldier by day, rebel by night) epitomizes the concrete problems posed by the existing lack of distinction (Clapham, 2002: 787).

Reducing resources for public forces, draining them of their most qualified staff and diminishing their status could hardly be considered an ideal route for enhancing public security. Even if there is little agreement about what the ideal route is, this one will find few advocates. Weakening public armed forces would rather seem to increase the likelihood that the public security order would be contested, including from within the armed forces themselves.

A second externality of the market for force is that it perpetuates a 'Swiss cheese' security coverage – full of holes – undermining the legitimacy of public security orders and hence increasing the likelihood that it is contested by violent means. It is not because certain groups 'opt out' that African states fail to control the use of force on territory. More frequently, it is because the rulers decide to 'abandon people who could contribute little to a political alliance and would make demands on scarce political resources' (Reno, 1998: 10; Poirier, 1993). There is a sharp and widening gap between *l'Afrique*

utile and *l'Afrique inutile* (Bayart, Ellis & Hibou, 1997). The development of a market for force cannot be charged with creating that gap. However, it does reduce the likelihood that the gap will be closed and the holes in the security coverage mended.

In a market for force, security will and can be covered for those who have the means to pay for it (or to get others to pay for them). This is what is happening as local strongmen, 'warlords', foreign firms, aid organizations and governments ensure the security coverage they need. The trouble is that those who can pay for security are unevenly distributed in space. Even more troublesome is that, when they are present, it is not self-evident at all that their security needs will lead them to cover also the economically and socially weak in the area. On the contrary, as illustrated for example by the conflict between Ken Saro-Wiwa's Movement for the Salvation of the Ogoni People and Shell, where the security needs of the firm sharply diverged from those of the people inhabiting the area (Reno, 1998: 205–208).

This skewed distribution of security is hard to correct in weak African states. One historically central route for compelling public authorities to take people's security needs into account is closed, in part by the expansion of the market for force. Alongside the bargain over taxation – 'no taxation without representation' – one of the key mechanisms by which European citizens managed to persuade their rulers to take their interests and security demands into account was via their role in serving the military. In Tilly's formulation, the increased need to tax and conscript to finance wars led to 'the central paradox of European state formation', namely that 'the pursuit of war and military capacity . . . as a sort of by-product, led to a civilianisation of government and domestic politics' (Tilly, 1990: 206).

The development of a market for force in contemporary Africa allows rulers to buy the

military manpower they need. The need to recruit/conscript a large part of the population diminishes correspondingly, and with it the need to make concessions in terms of security coverage. That need is further reduced by the low importance of taxation. Weak African states can rely on foreign assistance and on the sale of natural resources to an extent unparalleled in early modern Europe. The quest for internal adherence and legitimacy is therefore replaced by a quest for the external recognition necessary to get credits and operate in international markets, including the market for force (Clapham, 1996; Leander, 2004b). The Tillean paradox has not appeared in Africa's weakest states. The point here is that a market for force makes it seem even more unlikely that it will.

Overall, these externalities show that the market for force is likely to diminish both the quality and the extension of the security coverage, as well as the legitimacy of those providing it. The lack of professionalism of African armed forces looks bound to be further aggravated, and the fluidity between public and private forces accentuated. The 'pay for yourself' approach to security sanctions the patchy approach to security needs that rulers in the weakest African states already adopt.

Conclusion

This article has shown that the dynamics of the market for force undermines (rather than helps) the consolidation of public security in the weakest African states. Supply in the market for force is self-perpetuating. It creates its own demand. As PMCs become security experts, lobbyists and consultants, they shape security understandings of clients who consequently require increasing levels of services. The clients whose demand the market responds to include both those con-

testing and those defending security orders. The consequence is a strain on already weak (or non-existent) public security orders. The strain is accentuated because the market for force drains resources from public security establishments and undermines their legitimacy, hence making contestation both from the inside and the outside more likely.

These effects cannot be captured by those who look at the effects of PMCs through their role in single cases. On the contrary, looking at the issue of PMCs through the single-case lens leads observers to ask techno-managerial questions. From this perspective, it might be right that PMCs should be seen as if they were 'weapon systems' at the disposal of policymakers (Shearer, 1998b: 90) whose task is finding the most 'cost effective solution' (Shearer, 2001: 30). Moreover, it is probably also true that, from this vantage point, whether private or public forces should be charged with a specific task is a 'technical question' (Brauer, 1998: 135). The logical (and justified) conclusion to draw is also techno-managerial: if there are difficulties with PMCs, it is because our regulatory framework is not (yet) sufficiently developed.

However, as has just been argued, this approach seriously underestimates the stakes involved in relying on private firms to enhance public security in weak African states. The dynamics of a market for force change the likelihood of crisis, the options available for dealing with crisis and the understanding of their relative effectiveness. The effects of the market for force kick in before the techno-managerial questions arise. The central point of this article is that *only* by neglecting these effects is it possible to reach the paradoxical conclusion that the development of private markets for force will strengthen public authority over the use of force in Africa. Hence, even if the case for an expanded, regulated role for PMCs in

stabilizing weak African states might seem compelling at a first glance, this article has made clear that the case is far from clearcut and possibly unattractive, if given more careful consideration.

References

- Adams, Thomas K., 1999. 'The New Mercenaries and the Privatization of Conflict', *Parameters* 29(2): 103–116.
- Adebajo, Adekeye, 2002. *Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Avant, Deborah, 2004. 'The Privatization of Security and Change in the Control of Force', *International Studies Perspectives* 5(2): 153–157.
- Ayoub, Mohammed, 1992. 'The Security Predicament of the Third World State: Reflections on State-Making in a Comparative Perspective', in Brian L. Job, ed., *The Insecurity Dilemma: National Security of Third World States*. Boulder, CO & London: Lynne Rienner (63–80).
- Ballentine, Karen & Jake Sherman, eds, 2003. *The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (A Project of the International Peace Academy)*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Barnett, Anthony, 2003. 'Scandal-Hit US Firm Wins Key Contracts', *The Observer*, 13 April.
- Barnett, Michael M., 2002. *Eyewitness to a Genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Bayart, Jean François; Stephen Ellis & Béatrice Hibou, 1997. *La criminalisation de l'Etat en Afrique* [The Criminalization of the State in Africa]. Paris: Editions Complexe.
- BBC, 2004. 'The Men Behind the "Guinean Plot"', *BBC Online News*, 13 March.
- Bigo, Didier, 2004. 'Les entreprises para-privées de coercition: de nouveaux mercenaires?' [The Para-Public Firms of Coercion: Are They New Mercenaries?], *Cultures et Conflits* (été): 1–3.
- Bigwood, Jeremy, 2001. 'DynCorp in Colombia: Outsourcing the Drug War', 23 March (<http://www.corporatewatch.org>).
- Brauer, Jürgen, 1998. 'An Economic Perspective on Mercenaries: Military Companies and the Privatisation of Force', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* XIII(1): 130–146.
- Bray, John, 2003. 'Attracting Reputable Companies to Risky Environments: Petroleum and Mining Companies', in Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, eds, *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Washington, DC: World Bank (287–352).
- Brayton, Steven, 2002. 'Outsourcing War: Mercenaries and the Privatization of Peacekeeping', *Journal of International Affairs* 55(2): 303–329.
- Brooks, Doug, 2000a. 'Messiahs or Mercenaries? The Future of International Private Military Services', *International Peacekeeping* 7(4): 129–144.
- Brooks, Doug, 2000b. 'Write a Cheque, End a War: Using Private Military Companies to End African Conflicts', *Conflict Trends* (1): 33–35.
- Burton-Rose, David & Wayne Madsen, 1999. 'Corporate Soldiers: The US Government Privatizes the Use of Force', *Multinational Monitor* 20(3) (<http://multinationalmonitor.org/mm1999/mm9903.07.html>).
- Buzan, Barry; Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde, 1998. *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO & London: Lynne Rienner.
- Clapham, Christopher, 1996. *Africa and the International System: The Politics of State Survival*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Clapham, Christopher, 2000. 'Guerre et construction de l'Etat dans la Corne de l'Afrique' [War and State-Building in the Horn of Africa], *Critique Internationale* (99): 93–111.
- Clapham, Christopher, 2002. 'The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World', *Development and Change* 33(5): 775–796.
- Coker, Christopher, 1998. 'Outsourcing War', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13(1): 95–113.
- Cooper, Richard, 2002. 'The Post-Modern State', in Mark Leonard, ed., *Re-Ordering the World: The Long-Term Implications of 11 September*. London: Foreign Policy Centre (11–21).
- de Waal, Alex, 1998. 'Contemporary Warfare in Africa', in Mary Kaldor & Basker Vashee, eds, *Restructuring the Global Military Sector: New Wars*. London: Pinter (287–332).

- Deen, Thalif, 2004. 'UN Rejects Private Peacekeepers', *Inter Press News*, 27 August.
- Duffield, Mark, 2001. *Global Governance and the New Wars: The Merging of Development and Security*. London & New York: Zed.
- Duffield, Mark, 2002. 'Social Reconstruction and the Radicalization of Development: Aid as a Relation of Global Liberal Governance', *Development and Change* 33(5): 1049–1072.
- The Economist*, 2004. 'The Baghdad Boom', 25 March.
- Financial Times*, 2003. 'Proposal for Private Soldiers in Conflict Gathers Steam', 5 November.
- Fisher-Thomson, Jim, 2004. 'Lawmaker Says U.N. Peacekeeping in Africa Not Up to Task. Rep. Royce Suggests Private Military Corporations Might Have Role To Play', 13 October (<http://usinfo.state.gov/is/Archive/2004/Oct/13-833902.html>).
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002a. *Private Military Companies: Options for Regulation*. London (<http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/mercenaries,0.pdf>).
- Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2002b. *Response of the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs to the Ninth Report of the Foreign Affairs Committee: Private Military Companies (session 2001–2002)* (<http://www.fco.gov.uk/Files/kfile/cm5642.pdf>).
- Francis, David J., 1999. 'Mercenary Intervention in Sierra Leone: Providing National Security or International Exploitation?', *Third World Quarterly* 20(2): 319–338.
- Gambetta, Diego, 1991. '“In the Beginning Was the Word . . .”: The Symbols of the Mafia', *Archives Européennes de Sociologie* 32(1): 53–80.
- Gambetta, Diego, 1993. *The Sicilian Mafia: The Business of Private Protection*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Gambetta, Diego, 1994. 'Inscrutable Markets', *Rationality and Society* 6(3): 353–368.
- Gantz, Peter H., 2003. 'The Private Sector's Role in Peacekeeping and Peace Enforcement', *Refugees International Bulletin*, 18 November.
- Hauffer, Virginia, 2004. 'International Diplomacy and the Privatization of Conflict Prevention', *International Studies Perspectives* 5(2): 158–164.
- Herbst, Jeffrey, 2000. *States and Power in Africa*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Herbst, Jeffrey & Greg Mills, 2003. 'The Future of Africa: A New Order in Sight', *Adelphi Paper* 361(1): 1–86.
- Holsti, Kalevi J., 1996. *The State, War, and the State of War*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Holsti, Kalevi J., 1997. 'Political Sources of Humanitarian Emergencies', *Research for Action* 36.
- Howe, Herbert M., 2001. *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- International Consortium of Investigative Journalists, 2002. *Making a Killing: The Business of War*. Washington, DC: International Consortium of Investigative Journalists.
- Isenberg, David, 2000. 'Combat for Sale: The New, Post-Cold War Mercenaries', *USA Today Magazine* (March): 12–16.
- Isenberg, David, 2004a. 'Corporate Mercenaries: Profit Comes with a Price', *Asia Times*, 19 May.
- Isenberg, David, 2004b. *A Fistful of Contractors: The Case for a Pragmatic Assessment of Private Military Companies in Iraq*. Washington, DC & London: British American Security Information Council.
- Jackson, Robert H., 1990. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Krause, Keith, 1992. *Arms and the State: Patterns of Military Production and Trade*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kuofor, Kofi Oteng, 2000. 'The OAU Convention for the Elimination of Mercenarism and Civil Conflicts', in Abdel-Fatau Musah & Kayode J. Fayemi, eds, *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*. London: Pluto (198–209).
- Le Billon, Philippe, 2000. 'The Political Economy of Resource Wars', in Jackie Cilliers & Christian Dietrich, eds, *Angola's War Economy: The Role of Oil and Diamonds*. Pretoria: Institute for Security Studies (21–43).
- Leander, Anna, 2004a. *Eroding State Authority? Private Military Companies and the Legitimate Use of Force*. Rome: Centro Militare di Studi Strategici.

- Leander, Anna, 2004b. 'Wars and the Un-Making of States: Taking Tilly Seriously in the Contemporary World', in Stefano Guzzini & Dietrich Jung, eds, *Copenhagen Peace Research: Conceptual Innovations and Contemporary Security Analysis*. London & New York: Routledge (69–80).
- Leander, Anna, 2005. 'The Power to Construct International Security: On the Significance of the Emergence of Private Military Companies', *Millennium Journal of International Studies* 33(3).
- Lovering, John, 2000. 'Loose Cannons: Creating the Arms Industry of the Twenty-First Century', in Mary Kaldor, ed., *Global Insecurity*. London: Pinter (147–176).
- Luckham, Robin, 2003. 'Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict', in Gavin Cawthra & Robin Luckham, eds, *Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies*. London & New York: Zed (3–27).
- Lynch, Tony & A. J. Walsh, 2000. 'The Good Mercenary', *Journal of Political Philosophy* 8: 133–153.
- Mandel, Robert, 2002. *Armies Without States: The Privatization of Security*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Menkhaus, Ken, 2004. 'Somalia: State Collapse and the Threat of Terrorism', *Adelphi Paper* 364(1): 1–92.
- Musah, Abdel-Fatau, 2002. 'Privatization of Security: Arms Proliferation and the Process of State Collapse in Africa', *Development and Change* 33(5): 911–933.
- Musah, Abdel-Fatau & Kayode J. Fayemi, eds, 2000. *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*. London: Pluto.
- Neumann, Iver B., 1998. 'Identity and the Outbreak of War: Or Why the Copenhagen School of Security Studies Should Include the Idea of "Violisation" in its Framework of Analysis', *International Journal of Peace Studies* 3(1): 7–22.
- Novak, Robert D., 2003. 'We're Already at War in Colombia', *Houston Chronicle*, 19 February.
- O'Brien, Kevin, 2000a. 'PMCs, Myths and Mercenaries: The Debate on Private Military Companies', *Royal United Services Institute for Defense Studies* 145(1): 59–64.
- O'Brien, Kevin, 2000b. 'Private Military Companies and African Security, 1990–8', in Abdel-Fatau Musah & Kayode J. Fayemi, eds, *Mercenaries: An African Security Dilemma*. London: Pluto (43–75).
- Poirier, Jean, 1993. 'Une nouvelle forme de violence institutionnelle: la violence par préterition' [A New Form of Institutional Violence: Violence by Preterition], in Etienne Le Roy & Trutz von Trotha, eds, *La Violence et l'Etat. Formes et Evolution d'un Monopole* [Violence and the State: Forms and Evolution of a Monopoly]. Paris: L'Harmattan (183–198).
- Reno, William, 1998. *Warlord Politics and African States*. Boulder, CO & London: Lynne Rienner.
- Reno, William, 2000. 'The New Role for Private Armies in Inter-State "Peace-Making" Relations', *International Politics* 37(1): 57–74.
- Ross, Michael, 2003. 'The Natural Resource Curse: How Wealth Can Make You Poor', in Ian Bannon & Paul Collier, eds, *Natural Resources and Violent Conflict: Options and Actions*. Washington, DC: World Bank (17–42).
- Sénat, 2002. 'Répression de l'activité de mercenaire (Projet de loi)' [Repression of Mercenary Activity (Law proposal)] (<http://www.senat.fr/leg/pj101-287.html>).
- Shearer, David, 1998a. 'Private Armies and Military Intervention', *Adelphi Paper* (316).
- Shearer, David, 1998b. 'Private Military Force and Challenges for the Future', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13(1): 80–94.
- Shearer, David, 2001. 'Privatising Protection', *World Today* 57(8/9): 29–31.
- Singer, P. W., 2001/02. 'Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry and Its Ramifications for International Security', *International Security* 26(3): 186–220.
- Singer, P. W., 2003a. *Corporate Warriors: The Rise of the Privatized Military Industry*. Ithaca, NY & London: Cornell University Press.
- Singer, P. W., 2003b. 'Peacekeepers Inc', *Policy Review* (June) (<http://www.policyreview.org/jun03/singer.html>).
- Spearin, Christopher, 2001. 'Private Security Companies and Humanitarians: A Corporate Solution to Securing Humanitarian Spaces?', *International Peacekeeping* 8(1): 20–43.

- Spicer, Lt. Col. Tim, 1998. 'Interview with Lt. Col. Tim Spicer', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 13(1): 165–173.
- Taulbee, James Larry, 1998. 'Reflections on the Mercenary Option', *Small Wars and Insurgencies* 9(2): 145–163.
- Tilly, Charles, 1990. *Coercion, Capital and European States, AD 990–1992*. Cambridge, MA & Oxford: Blackwell.
- UN, 2001. *Report of the Panel of Experts on the Illegal Exploitation of Natural Resources and Other Forms of Wealth of the Democratic Republic of Congo (S/2001/357)*. New York: UN Security Council.
- UN General Assembly, 1997. *Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impending the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination (A/52/495)*. New York: UN.
- UN General Assembly, 2003. *Report on the Question of the Use of Mercenaries as a Means of Violating Human Rights and Impending the Exercise of the Right of Peoples to Self-Determination (A/58/1115)*. New York: UN.
- Uvin, Peter, 1998. *Aiding Violence: The Development Enterprise in Rwanda*. West Hartford, CT: Kumarian.
- Wayne, Leslie, 2002. 'America's For-Profit Secret Army', *New York Times*, 13 October.
- Whelan, Theresa, 2003. 'Remarks to IPOA Dinner', Washington, DC, 19 November (<http://www.ipoa.org/content/Whelantranscript.pdf>).
- Zamparelli, Colonel Steven J., 1999. 'Competitive Sourcing and Privatization: Contractors on the Battlefield', *Air Force Journal of Logistics* 23(3): 1–17.
- Zarate, Juan Carlos, 1998. 'The Emergence of a New Dog of War: Private International Security Companies, International Law and the New World Disorder', *Stanford Journal of International Law* 34(1): 75–162.

ANNA LEANDER, b. 1966, PhD in Social and Political Sciences (European University Institute, Florence, 1997); Assistant Professor, CEU, Budapest (1995–2000); researcher at COPRI, Copenhagen (2000–04); Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark, Odense (2004–).