Why the CCM Won't Lose: The Roots of Single Party Dominance in Tanzania

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Abstract

As many Sub-Saharan African countries enter their second decade of democratization, this paper provides a case study of the progress of democratization in one such country. Many predicted that multi-party democracy would infuse competition into the political system in these countries, adding an incentive for politicians to build strong bases of public support by becoming more responsive to majority interests. This paper addresses whether multi-party democracy has increased political competition in Tanzania, and hence whether democratization is indeed likely to increase the relevance of local concerns to national policy in Tanzania. In particular, this paper provides an empirical investigation of the factors contributing to single-party dominance and rural neglect in Tanzania. Despite the fact that Tanzania has had a multi-party democracy since 1995, the party which ruled during single-party rule, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), won the vast majority of seats in the National Assembly in the first three multi-party elections. In order to understand the CCM's grip on power, I analyze the results of a survey conducted amongst subsistence farmers in Tanzania in June 2008. This survey provides information on farmers' livelihood conditions, access to media, attitudes towards economic reform and political views, and hence provides insight into the preferences underlying voting behaviour and in turn into the factors contributing to the dominance of the CCM. The survey indicates overwhelming support for the CCM, despite policies which continue to prioritize sectors other than agriculture. I discuss the dominant reasons for CCM support, as well as the implications of single-party dominance for poverty reduction, political plurality and economic growth in the country. I conclude by discussing possible policy options for enhancing political participation amongst subsistence farmers.

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1 Introduction

Tanzania, after years of maintaining a highly protected economy, is now in the process of economic restructuring. Former state-owned enterprises are being privatized, fiscal and financial reforms are being instituted, and trade has been liberalized. The basic aim of these reforms is to make the economy more efficient, however they have left a vacuum of political support for the rural sector. The rural private sector remains severely underdeveloped, without the capacity to engage in the newly-liberalized economy. Economic liberalization in Tanzania occurred shortly before the opening of the country's political system to multi-party democracy. Many predicted that multi-party democracy would infuse competition into the political system of Tanzania, adding an incentive for politicians to build strong bases of public support by becoming more responsive to majority interests. This paper discusses the progress of democratization amid economic reform in Tanzania. The particular question that it addresses is: what appears to be leading to single-party dominance in Tanzania? By surveying subsistence farmers, who represent the vast majority in Tanzania, we should be able to come close to the answer to this question.

The objective of this paper is to provide primary evidence on the phenomenon of one-party dominance in a multi-party democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa. Many conjectures have been put forward (for example, Ishiyama and Quinn[14]) for why one-party dominance exists in Africa more generally. Since the 'third wave' of democratization hit Africa in the early 1990's, a vast number of papers have been written on the broad impacts of multi-party democracy on African economies and societies (for example, Bratton and van de Walle[4] and Bratton et al.[3]). However only a handful of studies has endeavoured to collect direct evidence on the preferences underlying voting behaviour (Posner[21] for Zambia, Wood[31] for Mozambique, Smith[24] for Mali, Harris[13] for South Africa and Bratton and Mattes[5] for Zimbabwe, Nigeria, Namibia, Malawi, Ghana and Botswana). In this paper I present the results of an empirical analysis using a survey recently conducted in Tanzania, in order to gauge the reasons behind political choice among rural inhabitants in Tanzania. This analysis in turn allows me to uncover some of the barriers to the articulation of local concerns in Tanzania, and therefore to shed light on the potential of multi-party democracy to reflect such concerns in national policy.

The broader goal of this paper is to explore the puzzle of rural neglect in Tanzania. Such neglect is a puzzle, because rural inhabitants form the numerical majority in Tanzania, and Tanzania has had a multi-party democracy with strong voter participation in all areas since 1995. Furthermore, support for the dominant political party, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), is strong and has grown over the years, despite policies which continue to prioritize sectors other than agriculture. This paper therefore explores whether the simultaneous processes of political and economic liberalization may, perhaps ironically, contribute to increased single-party dominance and whether such dominance is expected to persist over time.

Analysis should begin with an understanding of the determinants of CCM support among rural inhabitants. Identifying the factors contributing to support for the CCM, or alternatively, for the opposition, can in turn provide guidance on what initiatives are needed to infuse political competition and hence criticism into Tanzanian rural society, with a view to making Tanzanian government more responsive to the needs of the poorest. I undertake a qualitative and quantitative analysis of voting behaviour in Tanzania. The qualitative analysis reveals a sense of nostalgia for the CCM, gratitude for the CCM's maintenance of peace, satisfaction with the CCM's performance during one-party rule and a sense that the CCM is the party that identifies the most with farmers' concerns. The empirical analysis then asks: what farmer characteristics tend to lead to opposition to the CCM, or rather, support for an opposition party? The analysis suggests that numerical skills and access to the internet make a farmer more likely to support an opposition party. Involvement with a farmer's organization also increases the likelihood of opposition support. Finally, farmers are more likely to oppose the CCM if they expressed disdain for reform.

The next section provides a brief overview of political and economic liberalization in Tanzania. The qualitative results of the survey are discussed in Section 3. Section 4 then presents a simple model to frame the empirical analysis and the hypotheses to be tested in that analysis. The subsequent section presents the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.

2 Political and Economic Liberalization

Tanzania began reforming its economy in 1986 from a largely state-controlled economy to one more open to market forces. Reforms affecting the rural sector directly were the dismantling of parastatals, price deregulation, an end to pan-territorial pricing, currency devaluation, the removal of input and food subsidies, and the liberalization of trade. As has been the case in many transition economies, agricultural production per person dropped sharply in Tanzania following economic liberalization. However per capita production has not rebounded since that time, and has indeed stagnated since the early 1990s (see Figure 1).

Agriculture's role in the Tanzanian economy is large in many respects. In 2003, agriculture contributed 45% of export earnings, produced half of the economy's aggregate output and employed approximately 80% of the country's population[19]. Despite the importance of the sector, budgetary support for agriculture has been extremely low and has declined since the early 1990's. The real allocation in 1997/98 was about one third the average annual values in the 1991/92 to 1993/94 periods. Table 1 below indicates that in recent years this trend of low support for agriculture has continued.[1]

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[1]Perhaps even more worrying is the declining contribution of government expenditure towards agricultural research and development. Such expenditure fell from 25-30% in the early 1990's to 12% in the 1999-2000 budget[1].

Figure 1:

Index of Agricultural Production per Capita in Tanzania (1999=100)

Table 1: Budgetary Support for Agriculture

Government Expenditure on Agriculture (Percentage of Total Expenditure)					
2001/2	2002/3	2003/4	2004/5	2005/6	2006/7
2.8	3	3.5	3.5	3.3	3.3
Source: Economic Survey, Government of Tanzania					

Table 2 provides a summary of input use and productivity indicators in Tanzanian agriculture. This table highlights the 1990's as an especially poor decade for input use in Tanzanian agriculture. Such declining input use is reflected in declining land and labour productivity (shown in columns 4 and 5). In Table 3 I provide growth rates of the major food crop yields in Tanzania between 1960 and 2000. This table also reveals a sharp downturn in productivity in the 1990's for the very staples that Tanzanian households depend on for subsistence.

Declines in yields over the past decade and a half suggest that output increases have occurred as a result of area expansion. However the average land holding size in Tanzania at 1.6 hectares per household is quite small, indicating that land expansion is not a sustainable production strategy. Increases in planted area have leveled off since 1998, indicating that farmers are indeed pushing up against the land frontier. This indicates that access to inputs is crucial, as the model of this paper emphasizes.

Whereas early claims suggested that poor agricultural performance was the result of a non-existent supply response on the part of farmers to price incentives, two recent papers

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Table 2: Growth of Input Use and Productivity in Tanzanian Agriculture*

	Fertilizer per Hectare	Machinery Per Worker	Average Crop Yield	Labour Productivity
1960-1970	30%	-2%	-3%	-2%
1970-1980	8%	-5%	2%	4%
1980-1990	3%	-5%	6%	1%
1990-2000	-3%	-1%	-2%	-2%

* Fertilizer per hectare includes inorganic fertilizer use per hectare of agricultural land, while machinery includes tractors, harvesters, threshers and milking machines. For both the crop yield and labour productivity statistics, agricultural output was taken as the price-weighted sum of the quantity of each agricultural commodity produced in a given country in a given year, minus quantities of output used as seed and feed (Source: [12])

Table 3: Crop Yields in Tanzania

	Rice Yield	Wheat Yield	Maize Yield	Sorghum Yield	Millet Yield	Cassava Yield
1960-1970	-7%	-1%	-8%	-6%	1%	-1%
1970-1980	4%	5%	16%	2%	0%	12%
1980-1990	6%	4%	2%	8%	5%	2%
1990-2000	-2%	-4%	0%	-1%	-2%	-3%

Source: Evenson [11]

(Danielson[7] and Thiele[26]) suggest that farmers in Tanzania have in fact responded rationally to price incentives. However structural features of the Tanzanian economy have muted this supply response. Such features include poor infrastructure, under-developed credit markets, low population densities implying thin markets, and rising input costs, resulting both from currency devaluations as the inability of the private sector to compensate for state withdrawal in input markets[2].

Many studies suggest a negative impact of these reforms on rural Tanzanians (see for example Ponte [20] or Kelsall [16]). Ponte notes that the government sees its role as confined to provision of market information and monitoring performance, or rather solely as a facilitator or regulator of the market. Especially in a country as poor as Tanzania, whose economy was regulated to a much larger extent than that of other developing countries prior to economic reform, and given the high complementarities between private and public investment, such reforms which imply a withdrawal of the state from economic activity in rural areas (out of marketing, storage, crop transport, crop finance), are likely to strangle private sector development rather than encourage it.

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[2]A number of papers have highlighted such structural features, for example, Winter-Nelson and Temu[30], Winter-Nelson and Temu [29] and Ponte[20].

Rather than investigating the effects of the economic reforms carried out in Tanzania, the concern of this paper is with the question - why have the reforms been maintained? That is, in the context of multi-party democracy, it would appear that pressure would mount for the removal of reforms which were not addressing the livelihood constraints of the majority of citizens. This requires a consideration of the political environment in Tanzania, and it is therefore essential to hear the views of subsistence farmers themselves.[3]

The process of political liberalization began roughly five years after the beginning of economic liberalization in Tanzania. In 1992, under the advisement of ex-President Julius Nyerere, Tanzania amended its constitution to allow the formation of a multi-party democracy and a free market economy. A Political Parties Act was passed in June, 1992, repealing the single-party clause in the Tanzanian constitution. The past three multi-party elections suggest that the Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM), the party that ruled Tanzania for 30 years after independence, remains virtually unchallenged on the mainland. Only the Civic United Front (CUF) poses any substantive threat to the CCM's success, and the CUF's support tends to be clustered on Zanzibar. Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA) (which in English stands for 'Party for Democracy and Development') has also managed to secure a number of seats in the Parliament. As illustrated in the summary of Presidential and Parliamentary results below, other parties have been unable to attract a significant proportion of votes.

Table 4: Multi-party Election Results

Percentage of Votes in the Presidential Election			
Party (Candidate)	1995	2000	2005
CCM	61.82% (Mkapa)	71.74% (Mkapa)	80.28% (Kikwete)
NCCR-Mageuzi	27.77% (Mrema)	N/A	0.49% (Mvungi)
CUF	6.43% (Lipumba)	16.26% (Lipumba)	11.68% (Lipumba)
UDP	3.97% (Cheyo)	4.2% (Cheyo)	
TLP	N/A	7.8% (Mrema)	0.75% (Mrema)
CHADEMA	N/A	N/A	5.88% (Mbowe)
Percentage of Seats in the National Assembly Election			
Party	1995	2000	2005
CCM	79.55%	87.5%	85.1%
NCCR-Magueuzi	7.06%	0.3%	0%
Continued on next page			

[3]The Afrobarometer surveys (available at http://www.afrobarometer.org/index.html) provide a wealth of information on public attitudes towards democracy and economic reform in a number of African countries. My survey differs from these in that my survey samples only subsistence farmers and provides greater detail on their livelihood conditions as well as the reasons behind their political affiliations.

Table 4 – Continued from previous page

CHADEMA	1.49%	1.7%	3.4%
CUF	10.40%	7.5%	9.6%
United Democratic Party (UDP)	1.49%	1.4%	0.3%
Tanzania Labour Party (TLP)	0%	1.7%	0.3%
Note: NCCR stands for National Convention for Construction and Reform			

The continuing strength of the CCM is puzzling. One would expect to see decreasing support for a government which appears to be increasingly neglecting the majority of its citizens. The famous median voter theorem suggests that the platforms of political parties will converge to please the median voter. However the median voter in Tanzania is a subsistence farmer. The most obvious explanation to this puzzle is that subsistence farmers do not vote. However in all regions of Tanzania voter turnout is quite high - voter turnout has been upwards of 70% for the last three elections. Rural neglect in Tanzania therefore remains a puzzle. The analysis of this paper attempts to shed light on the phenomenon of rural neglect in Tanzania through the direct analysis of political opinions among Tanzanian subsistence farmers.

3   Data and Qualitative Analysis

The data used to investigate the issue of single party dominance is from a survey conducted in rural Tanzania in the summer of 2008. This survey was conducted with assistance from the Sokoine University of Agriculture. A total of 286 farmers were interviewed from 7 regions - Mtwara, Iringa, Kilimanjaro, Tanga, Morogoro, Mwanza and Shinyanga. The purpose of this survey was to learn about voting behaviour in Tanzania among rural farmers, and hence farmers were asked whether they voted in the last election, which party they supported if they did vote, and why. The survey also asked for information on agricultural production, educational attainment, family size, access to media, attitudes toward economic reform, perceptions of corruption, involvement in community organizations and propensity to voice concerns and issues to public officials. The share of support attributed to political parties in my dataset are given in Table 5 below.

Farmers surveyed were asked why they support the party they do. For those farmers who indicated they support the CCM, the main reasons provided are given in Figure 3 below.

Table 5: Vote Shares of Survey Respondents

Party	Percentage
CCM	84.62
CUF	4.2
CHADEMA	2.10
Tanzania Labour Party	3.85
NCCR	1.02

Figure 2:

The top reasons for CCM support are: they performed well during one-party rule, they are the only strong party, they have maintained peace, they identify farmers and they brought us independence. These responses are in line with the reasons put forward by Ishiyama and Quinn [14] for why formerly-dominant parties often remain successful after the initiation of multi-party competition. Often such parties are successful because the opposition is weak and fragmented. This is the case in Tanzania and was echoed by farmers who often stated that no other party was strong enough to rule. Many farmers offered that they were not even aware of parties other than the CCM. This likely relates to a financial advantage on the part of the incumbent. However it also relates to the absence of ready-made social bases on which it could capitalize. Once the political system opened up to competition in Tanzania, there was no significant trades union, co-operative movement or human rights movement with a history of independence from the state upon which opposition parties could build. Further,

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with many different ethnic groups in Tanzania, each representing a small proportion of the total, the opposition is unable to attract a large number of votes by appealing to any one group ([16].

Two other dominant responses relate to a sense of nostaglia with regard to one-party rule, in that many farmers still support the CCM due to their role in the independence struggle. The Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) was the predecessor of the CCM, and it was the principal political party involved in the struggle for Tanzania's independence. Many authors have suggested that this struggle lent a sense of legitimacy for the CCM, and the survey responses validate this claim. The association with the CCM and peace is a reflection of the efforts of the CCM to create a sense of nationhood after independence. There was a conscious effort to promote Kiswahili as a national language, as well as efforts to promote a national culture through the creation of state-affiliated organizations such as the Youth League, choirs, dance groups etc.

The most common response is that the CCM performed well during one-party role. A number of authors of voter choice have found that retrospective economic evaluations influence voter choice (see for example Ndegwa [17], Duch and Stevenson [8] or Seligson and Tucker [22]). In the Tanzanian context, farmers' retrospective economic assessment is of a time when the state provided a great deal of support for agriculture (input subsidies, marketing and transport services, credit etc.) or the state's provision of welfare services. Further, many farmers placed the CCM closest to their own needs, similar to the earlier findings of Sivalon [23].[4]

The reasons cited for support of an opposition party are illustrated in Figure 3 below. Reasons given were mainly based on practical rather than ideological grounds. For example, half of those supporting an opposition party cited a reason related to rural neglect - that the opposition party they support was either concerned with poverty, development or farmer's concerns. Other reasons put forward suggest that there is confidence in the abilities of opposition parties - farmers thought such parties are strong, have good policies and could provide a stable economy. Hence although support for the opposition was found to be quite weak among the farmers surveyed, such farmers appear to be reacting to rural neglect, and feel an opposition party is able to deal with such concerns.

4 Empirical Methodology

In order to model voter choice in Tanzania, I use a random utility model. This is a type of index function model where the outcome of a discrete choice (in this case, voting) is

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[4]Sivalon [23] found that farmers actually feared multi-party democracy because of a sense that the opposition parties (mainly centred in Dar es Salaam) did not have their interests at heart.

Figure 3:

observed but the underlying utility leading to the discrete choice are unobserved. Let voter i's valuation of a party P's election be denoted V^*. The valuation is modeled as depending on the economic benefits voter i receives from the election of the party net of the costs of acquiring information on that party and on ideological factors:

$$V_P^* = \alpha + B'\beta_P + C'\gamma_P + X'\delta_P + \epsilon_P \tag{1}$$

where B represents the relative economic benefits that voter i receives from the election of party P, C represent the costs of acquiring information on party P, X represents non-economic or ideological benefits that voter i receives from party P, and the error term ϵ_P is symmetrically distributed with zero mean and its cumulative distribution function (CDF) is denoted F. This formulation reflects the fact that voters in Tanzania are concerned with their own economic well-being, but also with non-pecuniary benefits of political parties.

The observed choice between parties reveals which provides the greatest utility, the CCM or an opposition party. In practice, V_P^* is unobserved; rather what is observed is a dummy variable V. Taking $V = 1$ as a vote for the CCM, and abbreviating the opposition parties with superscript OPP, then:

$$V = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } V^*_{CCM} - V^*_{OPP} \geq 0 \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

The probability that a farmer supports the CCM is then:

$$
\begin{aligned}
\text{Prob}(V = 1) &= \text{Prob}(V^*_{CCM} > V^*_{OPP}) \\
&= \text{Prob}(B'\beta_{CCM} + C'\gamma_{CCM} + X'\delta_{CCM} + \epsilon_{CCM} > \\
& \quad B'\beta_{OPP} + C'\gamma_{OPP} + X'\delta_{OPP} + \epsilon_{OPP}) \\
&= \text{Prob}(\epsilon_{CCM} - \epsilon_{OPP} > -B'(\beta_{CCM} - \beta_{OPP}) - \\
& \quad C'(\gamma_{CCM} - \gamma_{OPP}) - X'(\delta_{CCM} - \delta_{OPP}))
\end{aligned}
$$

$$(2)$$

I assume that the error term above follows the standard normal distribution and make inferences regarding voter choice in Tanzania using a binary probit analysis. I use a binary probit analysis to represent voter choice as a decision between the Tanzanian incumbent (the CCM) and the opposition as a function of voter attributes. While this ignores differences within the opposition, the relatively small share of votes accruing to the opposition makes the maximum likelihood estimation of a multinomial probit unstable. Further, the question of interest of this paper is what causes the strength of the CCM to persist, rather than the reasons behind support for particular opposition parties per se.

4.1   Hypotheses

The above formulation permits a number of hypotheses regarding voting behaviour in Tanzania to be tested. The first relates to the economic benefits derived from CCM rule:

(1) The more social assistance or production/input subsidies a farmer has received over the past year, the higher is the likelihood that they support the CCM.

This is a straightforward hypothesis - if the CCM is 'buying votes' from farmers, they will likely be successful in elections. This hypothesis coincides with the literature on political parties in Africa which suggests that multi-party democracy in Africa has been a continuation of patronage politics of single-party rule (Bratton and van de Walle [4] and van de Walle [27]). This hypothesis will be tested using the coefficient estimate on the variable 'subsidies' which asked farmers how much monetary support they had received from the government, including subsidies for inputs or production or any type of social assistance. The second hypothesis also relates to economic benefits:

(2) The higher is a farmer's non-farming income, the more likely it is that they will support the CCM.

This hypothesis tests the proposition that farmers who are diversifying their income sources are more likely to support the CCM's market-driven, non-farm policy platform. In other words, the more a farmer has been able to diversify their income sources, the more enthusiastic they are about the CCM's platform. There is a large literature suggesting that such livelihood diversification is becoming increasingly common in Africa (see for example Ellis [9], Bryceson [6] and Barrett et al. [2]). This hypothesis will be tested using the coefficient on non-farm income of farmers in the sample. The next two hypotheses concern the cost of acquiring information on the opposition:

(3) The likelihood of CCM support is lower the higher is a farmer's educational attainment.
(4) The better is a farmer's access to media, the lower is the likelihood that they will support the CCM.

As the CCM is very well-known, learning about opposition parties entails a cost for the average Tanzanian. This cost may involve time or money used to access media. This hypothesis then accords with the views of Lansner [18] that the media acts as a watchdog of government activities and also as a civic forum for debating political and economic issues. Lansner writes that the "ills of a country with a free and open media will always be more apparent to their own peoples, and to the wider world - recognition essential to the possibility of their amelioration" (page 199). Through the latter hypothesis I also assert that education makes acquiring information on the opposition parties less costly, or rather, that students acquire information on the political system and parties in school. These hypotheses are tested by including in the model an educational attainment variable and a variable quantifying the frequency with which farmers read newspapers or listen to the radio.

A further hypothesis regarding the cost of acquiring information is that:

(5) The likelihood of support for the CCM is lower the more involved a farmer is with community organizations.

Hypothesis 5 asserts that an additional way that the cost of obtaining information may be lowered is by acquiring information from neighbours through involvement in community organizations, and that with more information on opposition parties, a voter is less likely to support the CCM. An alternative way of framing this hypothesis is that involvement in community organizations sensitizes a farmer to the extent of rural neglect, or strengthens their sense of relative deprivation as they realize that the neglect is a general one. The Tanzania Social Capital and Poverty Survey [10] revealed a striking absence of rural political mobilization in Tanzania. Further, before 1995, political expression outside the CCM

was stifled and facilitated by an 'all-class' ideology. This hypothesis investigates whether community involvement is associated with a greater tendency to question the CCM. This proposition is testing using a variable in the dataset which asked farmers whether they were a member of a religious or farmer's organization.

The next 3 hypotheses concern farmers' ideological support or affection for the CCM:

(6) The older a farmer, the more likely they are to support the CCM.
(7) Support for the CCM is more likely the greater the support for economic reform efforts.
(8) The greater the propensity of a farmer to raise concerns with individuals of authority, the lower is the likelihood of support for the CCM.

The first ideological hypothesis above asserts that older farmers are more likely to support the CCM as for more of their years have they been influenced by the CCM's monopoly during one-party rule. As noted above, under single-party rule, the CCM of absorbed many forms of potential opposition into the organs of the state, such as trades unions, women's groups, youth groups etc. Hypothesis 6 asserts that the longer a farmer lived under such a stifling regime, they more likely their criticism of government is suppressed.[5] Hypothesis 7 then asserts that support for economic reform enhances support for the CCM. To test this hypothesis I include a variable which quantifies the extent to which a farmer supports moving towards a more market-determined economy, with low values of this variable indicating support for market reform. Hypothesis 8 is then meant to test whether the CCM's stifling of civil society has deterred farmers from questioning the CCM and therefore has lowered support for the opposition. This is done using a survey question which asked farmers whether questioning government officials is acceptable.

5   Results

The estimation results are presented in Table 6 below. Instead of examining the coefficient estimates of the regression, it is more intuitive to consider the effect of a marginal change in an explanatory variable on the dependent variable, the probability of voting for the CCM. Such marginal effects are computed for each explanatory variable with all other variables held at their mean values. In column (1) I show the outcome of the estimation including only standard farmer characteristics. In column (2) I include access to media variables. In the third column I include variables denoting membership in community organizations and a variable measuring the extent of support for economic reforms. Column (4) then shows the outcome of the estimation including variables aimed at deciphering farmers' propensity

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[5]Kitschelt (1995) suggests that the suppression of civil society and limits on the extent to which citizens could criticize the government is indeed a legacy of single-party rule. He suggests that in post-Communist democracies, incumbents have been successful given their ability to entrench themselves in different aspects of civil society and therefore repress opposition.

to bring their concerns to government officials (the variable 'lobby') or to voice concerns in general (the variable 'voice'). The final column adds variables aimed at capturing farm productivity - a variable measuring farm yields and a dummy variable indicating whether the farmer has access to irrigation.

Table 6: Probit Estimation - Marginal Effects

	Marginal Effect				
Independent Variables	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Land	0.0122	1.032	0.0488	0.0445	0.136
	(0.0285)	(0.0386)	(0.0402)	(0.0394)	(0.0712)
Non-farm	1.17e-07	1.000	-1.95e-07	8.43e-08	7.42e-08
income	(6.89e-07)	(7.36e-07)	(9.56e-07)	(1.03e-06)	(1.12e-06)
Sex	0.157	1.115	-0.141	-0.136	-0.107
	(0.212)	(0.248)	(0.249)	(0.255)	(0.271)
Age	0.00726	1.009	0.00771	0.00698	0.00919
	(0.00830)	(0.00929)	(0.0102)	(0.0106)	(0.0113)
Marital	-0.00913	1.016	0.0263	0.0498	0.0694
	(0.0754)	(0.0829)	(0.0893)	(0.0935)	(0.0960)
Educational	-0.0119	0.999	0.0252	0.0283	0.00996
Attainment	(0.0504)	(0.0550)	(0.0578)	(0.0623)	(0.0659)
Subsidies	9.96e-06	1.000	1.03e-05	1.23e-05	1.38e-05
	(1.13e-05)	(1.18e-05)	(1.25e-05)	(1.31e-05)	(1.31e-05)
Subsistence	-9.13e-09**	1.000*	-4.04e-09	1.10e-09	-2.27e-08*
consumption	(3.25e-09)	(3.37e-09)	(3.40e-09)	(4.64e-09)	(1.07e-08)
Market	5.58e-08	1.000	6.98e-08	8.33e-08	4.93e-08
production	(5.76e-08)	(5.82e-08)	(7.14e-08)	(7.51e-08)	(8.84e-08)
Literacy	0.721	1.734	0.941	1.061	1.049
	(0.587)	(1.063)	(0.627)	(0.646)	(0.667)
Numeracy	-0.974	0.403	-1.112*	-1.114*	-1.192*
	(0.520)	(0.216)	(0.547)	(0.554)	(0.566)
Newspaper		1.187*	0.177*	0.188*	0.156*
		(0.0799)	(0.0744)	(0.0768)	(0.0793)
Radio		1.376	0.301	0.331	0.474
		(0.270)	(0.252)	(0.262)	(0.322)
Internet		0.888*	-0.119*	-0.133*	-0.148*
		(0.0428)	(0.0549)	(0.0564)	(0.0575)
Religious			0.319**	0.331**	0.368**
group			(0.120)	(0.125)	(0.127)
Farmer's			-0.442***	-0.453***	-0.530***
group			(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.131)
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Table 6 – Continued from previous page

			Marginal Effect		
Support for			-0.639**	-0.642**	-0.600*
			(0.223)	(0.230)	(0.240)
Lobby				-0.0195	-0.0151
				(0.0408)	(0.0421)
Voice				0.151	0.107
				(0.163)	(0.171)
Land					8.36e-08*
productivity					(3.60e-08)
Irrigation					0.239
					(0.356)
cons	0.852	1.274	0.910	0.500	0.136
	(0.938)	(1.355)	(1.176)	(1.252)	(1.327)
N	273	270	267	262	260
Adjusted R^2	0.0759	0.141	0.253	0.248	0.288

Note: Standard errors are in parentheses; * p < 0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Given that specification (5) has the highest adjusted R-squared value, this is my preferred specification. Further, a chi-squared test indicated that this model is significantly different from the intercept-only model and hence passes the basic goodness of fit test. A number of variables have an estimate significantly different from zero, including the value of subsistence production, a dummy variable indicating numeracy of the farmer, the variables indicating access to newspapers and the internet, the support for reform variable, and the land productivity measure.

The negative and statistically significant coefficient on subsistence production is interesting in that it suggests that farmers with relatively low subsistence production are less likely to support the CCM. This suggests that farmers that are worse off in terms of their livelihood conditions do tend to question the CCM's authority. Farmers that are more productive (that have higher yields) have a higher probability of voting for the CCM although the effect is very small. The remaining significant variables are involved with the hypotheses set out in Section 4 above so I defer their discussion to the next section.

5.1 Hypotheses

I first discuss the extent to which my original hypotheses regarding the benefits of CCM rule hold. Both of these hypotheses are unfounded in the data. That is, neither variation

in financial assistance provided by the government nor variation in the level of non-farming affects the likelihood of supporting the CCM. This is because very few farmers in the sample earned incomes outside of farming or had received financial assistance from the government. This contradicts the earlier suggestion of Sivalon [23], at least for subsistence farmers, that the CCM is viewed as the party of the nation because it provides patronage. Rather, the subsistence farmers interviewed supported the CCM for reasons other than patronage. The fact that the variable measuring non-farming income also reinforces the view of these farmers as un-demanding of the CCM, in that these farmers are not even benefitting from the liberalization drive of the CCM. The latter coincides with the findings of Ellis and Mdoe [10].

I am unable to reject the hypothesis that educational attainment has no impact on support for the CCM. This is largely because most farmers in the sample have the same level of education - 7 years, or completion of primary schooling only. A more precise indicator of educational attainment, that of numerical skills, is however statistically significant and negative, suggesting that farmers with numeracy skills are less likely to support the CCM. Rather than indicating that numerical skills per se are important for questioning the CCM, this variable could be proxying for a higher quality education, and could indicate that such a higher quality education sensitizes farmers to their political options.

Hypothesis 4 regarding access to media is neither rejected nor accepted, given that newspaper access tends to increase the likelihood of support for the CCM while internet access decreases this likelihood. This suggests that although newspapers are independent in Tanzania, the CCM's dominance and financial resources give them an advantage over other parties in terms of news coverage. This result confirms the suspicion of Ndulo [18] for the case of Tanzania that some forms of media are beholden to the state. The fact that access to the internet makes a farmer less likely to support the CCM could indicate that farmers that are able to access the internet acquire information on the opposition parties or negative assessments of the CCM which increases opposition support, which would accord with the more general findings of Kalathil and Boas [15].

An ambiguous result is also found with respect to the hypothesis concerning community organizations. On the one hand, involvement with a religious organization makes it more likely that a farmer will support the CCM. This accords with the earlier findings of Sivalon [23] and suggests that farmers may view allegiance or loyalty to the CCM as a moral imperative. However farmers that are involved in farmer organizations have a lower probability of supporting the CCM relative to farmers that are not involved. This suggests that a critical view of the CCM may be developed once farmers interact with one another.

The remaining hypotheses relate to ideology. Hypothesis 6, the hypothesis regarding a farmer's age cannot be accepted given that age has no significant impact on the likelihood of support for the CCM. This is despite the fact that there was a good deal of variation in

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age across the sample, and suggests that, despite the emphasis on length of time reported in the qualitative analysis, the CCM's grip on power extends to young as well as old farmers. Hypothesis 7 is accepted in that a farmer which approves of economic liberalization has a 38% higher probability of supporting the CCM (as a low value of the 'support for economic reform' variable indicates support for reform). The final hypothesis also cannot be accepted. The greater a farmer's propensity to voice their concerns to government officials, the greater the probability of supporting the CCM however this effect is insignificant.

6 Policy Implications

A number of policy implications stem from the empirical results reported above. The significant effect of farmer's organizations on opposition support suggests that greater financial support for such organizations would improve political competition in Tanzania. Although rural organization is weak in Tanzania, an important farmer's organization, Mtandao wa Vikundi vya Wakulima ya Tanzania (MVIWATA), is developing. MVIWATA is a national network of local-level farmer's organizations with the purpose of representing and advocating on behalf of farmers. Its membership is still small, with only 600,000 current individual members, but it has grown each year since its inception in 1991. Its membership base consists of individuals whose livelihood depends on agriculture, and it is representative of the agricultural Tanzanian population as a whole [28].

The significant effect of internet access found above suggests that initiatives to bring internet access to more rural areas may increase political awareness. In general, greater support for independent media, to ensure open media's commercial survival appears important. In this regard, existing initiatives such as USAID's Centre for Democracy and Governance, the Institute for International Communication and Development (IICD) or the World Bank's Information for Development initiative seem crucial.

The fact that greater skepticism for economic reforms (which are generally detrimental to agricultural interests) increases the probability of opposition support suggests that the inclusion of political awareness into school curricula could be helpful. As most farmers were unaware of specific reform initiatives, such awareness could potentially lead to increased mobilization on the part of subsistence farmers.

Perhaps surprisingly, the provision of subsidies and greater outside income has no significant effect on the probability of supporting the CCM. I suspect that this is indicative of rural neglect: very few farmers in the survey actually received subsidies and non-farming income, hence while direct supports to farmers have been removed through economic liberalization, farmers also appear to not be benefiting from market reforms either. The almost uniformly low level of educational attainment among farmers surveyed was another indication of rural neglect. Although one cannot conclude from the analysis that higher educational attainment

would spur support for opposition parties, the positive effect of numerical skills on opposition support suggests that improved school quality in rural areas may do so.

7   Conclusion

"The nature of economic reforms that precludes a public debate can only mean that the public are the losers. That is, while concessions are exchanged among those who have political and economic clout, the public is left to shoulder the burden of reforms" (page 40, Stein [25]).

The results of this paper suggest that while indeed many rural Tanzanians are shouldering the burden of economic reforms, such a burden is not straining their loyalty to the party enacting the reforms. A lack of a strong alternative among the political parties seems to be a prime reason for this loyalty, as does a sense of nostalgia for the party which brought them independence and which has maintained relative peace. A natural retort to this observation is that it will simply take time for such nostalgia to fade and for a pro-rural challenge for the CCM to emerge.[6] An interesting result of the analysis is that farmers which are worse off in terms of their subsistence production do tend to question the CCM's authority. Hence in terms of waiting for subsistence farmers to demand more from the CCM, things may get worse before they get better.

The quantitative analysis suggests that support for rural education or independent media may be important to spurring political awareness numerical skills and access to the internet make a farmer more likely to support an opposition party. Support for farmer's organizations or the inclusion of political awareness into school curricula could be helpful.

An important area for future research is further study on the issue of rural disenfranchisement, and in researching potential solutions to the collective action problem in the rural sector in Tanzania. This could involve learning from existing farmer's organization or cross-country analysis of rural movements and farmer organization within Africa. Another important area of research which follows from the findings of this paper is an analysis of the dynamic implications of single party dominance in Tanzania. That is, how are important indicators such as the level of poverty, aggregate and agricultural labour productivity, food prices or income inequality expected to evolve over time as economic and political liberalization proceed? This requires the construction of a dynamic, theoretical political economy model representing the political and economic features of Tanzania.

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[6]It should be noted however that I find no significant effect of age on CCM support - rural Tanzanians old and young are loyal to the CCM.

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