

# Time matters

## Postindustrialisation, new social risks and welfare state adaptation in advanced industrial democracies

Giuliano Bonoli, Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration (IDHEAP), Lausanne Switzerland

### Acknowledgements:

This paper is based on work presented at several conferences, and benefited enormously from comments made. I would like to thank Klaus Armingeon, Evelyne Huber, Lane Kenworthy, Bruno Palier and John Stephens.

Paper prepared for presentation at the “Congrès des quatres pays”, Université de Lausanne, 17-18 November 2005.

# Time matters

## Postindustrialisation, new social risks and welfare state adaptation in advanced industrial democracies

Abstract:

Western welfare states were built during the postwar years, with one key objective: to protect family (male) breadwinners against the consequences of losing their ability to extract an income from the labour market. Structures of social risk, however, have changed dramatically since then, so that current social risks also include, precarious employment, long term unemployment, being a working poor, single parenthood, or inability to reconcile work and family life. Change in structure of social risk has resulted in the adaptation of welfare states only in the Nordic countries but much less in Continental and Southern Europe. In order to account for this divergence in social policy trajectories, the paper argues that the reorientation of the Nordic welfare state was possible because new social risks emerged before the maturation of the postwar welfare state (especially of pension schemes) that in Continental and Southern Europe constitute today a powerful competing claim on public budgets. The argument is demonstrated through comparative statistical analysis relating the timing of key socio-economic developments to current levels of spending in relevant polices.

### 1. Introduction

Western welfare states were essentially conceived and built during the postwar years, with one key objective: to protect wage earners from the social risks associated with the then dominant patterns of employment and family structures. Above all, postwar welfare states were about reducing the dependency of wage earners and their families on the vagaries of markets. The process of commodification of labour that had been brought about by the industrial revolution and the advent of capitalism was now being turned back for the first time in two centuries (Esping-Andersen 1990; Polanyi 1957). The postwar welfare state protected well against the risk of being unable to extract an income from the labour market, be it because of sickness, invalidity, old age or lack of employment. Because of the dominant family arrangement of the time, its efforts were concentrated on the male breadwinner. Directly, women did not benefit much from the postwar welfare state, except in the event of widowhood, or, in other words, when the male breadwinner was no longer there. Postwar welfare states were arguably well adapted to the societies in which they were conceived and developed: industrial societies with stable family structures and a clear division of labour between men and women in couples. They were successful in guaranteeing a poverty free existence to almost all and in securing extremely high levels of social cohesion.

Since the 1970s, however, things have changed dramatically. A number of socio-economic trends have transformed the societies in which we live, so that today, the inability of the family father to extract an income from the labour market is certainly not the only important risk to which wage earners are exposed, nor is it probably the most serious one. Postindustrial labour markets are characterised by higher wage inequality with the result that for those at the bottom end of the wage distribution, access to employment is not a guarantee of a poverty free

existence. Family instability, resulting in increases in divorce rates and in single parenthood, have reduced the relevance of the figure of the male breadwinner, and created new social problems for which postwar welfare states are at best unprepared. Women's entry into labour markets, if it has reduced the dependence of households on the male breadwinner, it also creates new problems and dilemmas. Socio-economic transformations have "shifted the target" of social policies, away from the male breadwinner and towards women and younger, often low skill people.

But have welfare states adapted their shooting and are they aiming in the right direction? Studies of comparative social policy show that the answer to this question is inevitably mixed. Some welfare states have been rather successful in adapting to changed patterns of social risk. This is the case above all of the Nordic countries, where policies for women and families are highly developed, where unemployed people have access to a whole arsenal of active labour market policies and where wage inequality has increased only moderately. In contrast, continental and Southern European welfare states seem to have largely failed so far to take into account the changing nature of social risk. Countries like Italy or Germany continue to put the bulk of their welfare effort in income replacement programmes designed for core (male) workers and have neglected the emergence of new social risks associated with employment and family change. Liberal welfare states, finally, have somewhat shifted their focus away from the male breadwinner and towards new risk groups, but in a way that puts more emphasis on manipulating the incentive structure they are faced with than on providing protection against the new risks.

The objective of this paper is to account for such divergence in social policy trajectories, focusing in particular on the bifurcation between Nordic and continental European countries. Why did some countries from the 1970s onwards begin to reorient their welfare states in the direction of better protection of new social risks while other ones stuck to the trajectory defined in the early postwar years? Different national paths in social policy developments are nothing new in comparative social policy, but what is intriguing in the current phase of adaptation, is the fact that the countries that have gone furthest in developing protection against new social risks were not the most generous postwar welfare states. As will be argued below, the traditional social risks associated with an industrial society were covered most extensively in continental European countries. Contrary to the dominant view found in the literature, I claim that the most generous welfare states for (male) wage earners were not those found in the Nordic countries, but those located in continental and in Southern Europe. The impression is that a generous postwar welfare state and a high level of coverage for new social risks are mutually exclusive, or at least inversely related. This observation contradicts prevailing theories of comparative social policy-making, which consider welfare state expansion, whether in the old days, as a consequence of the power resources of the left and of the labour movement.

In order to try to untangle this puzzle, this article introduces the time dimension in the analysis of social policy making. As argued by Paul Pierson, policy analysts tend to forget the importance of time-based factors, such as sequences or the relative timing of key events (Pierson 2004). This paper shows that the inclusion of time-based independent variables in an explanatory model of social policy making, improves its ability to account for apparently puzzling observations. It considers several important developments like social change, political mobilisation of actors and policy feedback effects and situates them in time. The result is a picture in which countries display different configurations of the relevant independent variables at key moments in time, in a way that helps to account for the observed

divergence in trajectories of welfare state adaptation. Put it simply, countries which experienced postindustrial social transformations in the 1970s (Northern Europe, English speaking countries) faced a more favourable situation for developing new social risk policies, because competing claims due to population aging and generous pension promises were negligible at the time. In contrast, continental and Southern European countries, where developments like the tertiarisation of employment and increased family instability occur with a time lag of 20-30 years, are facing emerging new demands in a context where competing claims are highest, leaving little room for manoeuvre to develop new social risk policies<sup>1</sup>.

## 2. Social change and new social risks

In this paper, new social risks are understood as situations in which individuals experience welfare losses and which have arisen as a result of the socio-economic transformations that have taken place over the last three to four decades, and that are generally subsumed under the heading of postindustrialisation. The most important of these are: deindustrialisation and the tertiarisation of employment, the massive entry of women into the labour force, increased instability of family structures and the destandardisation of employment. These trends, both individually and in interaction with one another, have altered structures of social risk in western societies (on the concept of new social risks, see also: (Esping-Andersen 2002; Bonoli 2005; Bonoli 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2004; Jenson 2002; Hemerijck 2002).

### ***Deindustrialisation and the tertiarisation of employment***

In recent years one of the most important sources of social risk has been deindustrialisation and its consequences, in terms of mass unemployment among industrial workers but especially in terms of a labour market where the service sector is predominant. Even though the total volume of employment has not decreased over the last four to five decades, the replacement of industrial jobs by service sector employment has left large numbers of former industrial workers jobless and unable to reintegrate the labour market in the service sector. The key consequence of this development has been long term unemployment, a social risk that was virtually unheard of during the *trente glorieuses*. Industrial long term unemployment, however, may not be the most important social consequence of deindustrialisation, especially because it is a temporary phenomenon, related to the transition from predominantly industrial to predominantly service-based economies. As cohorts of dismissed industrial workers reach retirement age, this type of unemployment will slowly fade away.

The decline of manufacturing and the expansion of service employment, however, have altered labour markets in a more fundamental way, especially at their lower end, consisting of low skill, low value added jobs. Low skill individuals have always experienced disadvantage. However, during the postwar years, low skill workers were predominantly employed in manufacturing industry. They were able to benefit from productivity increases due to technological advances, so that their wages rose in line with those of the rest of the population. The strong mobilising capacity of the trade unions among industrial workers further sustained their wages which came to constitute the guarantee of a poverty-free existence. Today, low skill individuals are mostly employed in the low value-added service sector or unemployed.

---

<sup>1</sup> Similar arguments are made in (Huber and Stephens 2006) and (Fargion 2000). These studies, however, do not attempt to test empirically the timing hypothesis

Low value added services such as retail sale, cleaning, catering, and so forth are known for providing very little scope for productivity increases (Pierson 1998). In countries where wage determination is essentially based on market mechanisms, this means that low skill individuals are seriously exposed to the risk of being paid a poverty wage (US, UK, Switzerland). The situation is different in countries where wage determination, especially at the lower end of the distribution, is controlled by governments (through generous minimum wage legislation) or by the social partners (through encompassing collective agreements). Under these circumstances, the wages of low skill workers are protected, but job creation in these sectors is limited, so that many low skill individuals are in fact unemployed (Iversen and Wren 1998). Overall, the fact of possessing low or obsolete skills today entails a major risk of welfare loss, considerably higher than in the postwar years. The resulting new social risks are long term (low skill) unemployment and working poverty.

### ***Women's entry into labour markets***

Women's increased labour force participation is obviously not a source of social risk *per se*. If anything, couples with two incomes are better protected against the risk of poverty. Rather, a new risk stems from the inability to combine motherhood and child rearing with paid employment. Since the 1970s, starting in Northern Europe, we see the gradual entry of women, and particularly married women with young children into labour markets. This has meant that the standard division of labour within couples that was typical of the *trente glorieuses* has collapsed. The domestic and child care work that used to be performed on an unpaid basis by housewives now needs to be externalised, either to state provided services or to markets. In many countries, parents (but most significantly women) experience severe difficulties in finding adequate child care provision. This is a major source of frustration and can result in important losses of welfare, for example if a parent reduces working hours because of the unavailability of adequate child care facilities. But the inability to reconcile work and family life can lead to more than just frustration. To the extent that dual earner couples with children are considerably less likely to be in poverty than families that follow the "male breadwinner model" (Esping-Andersen 2002: 58), inability to reconcile work and family life, can, especially for low income parents, be associated with a poverty risk. The inability to reconcile work and family life concerns above all parents of young children, but also workers who have a frail (elderly) relative requiring care.

### ***Increased instability of family structures***

Since the early postwar years, indicators of family instability have soared in most countries. Divorce rates, out of wedlock births and the proportion of single parent household show that family bonds are today more uncertain than fifty years ago. Like women's participation in the labour market, family instability is not a social risk *per se*, but its consequences are. Lone parenthood, for instance, is associated with a higher incidence of poverty in all OECD countries. What is more, the incidence of poverty is particularly high for lone parents who are not in work (Esping-Andersen 2002: 37). For them, ability to reconcile work and family life may be crucial if poverty is to be avoided. In addition, most social security systems assumed stable family marriages, and divorce often results in entitlement losses for one or both partners. Divorced women, for instance, are often among the least well covered in pension systems.

## ***The destandardisation of employment***

The shift to a postindustrial employment structure has resulted in the presence in modern labour markets of career profiles that are very different from that of the standard male worker of the *trente glorieuses*, characterised by full-time continuous employment from an early age and with a steadily rising salary. Yet the social security schemes (most notably pensions) that we have inherited from the postwar years are still clearly based on these traditional assumptions regarding labour market participation. Pension coverage, in most western European countries, is optimal for workers who spend their entire working life in full time employment. Part-time work usually results in reduced pension entitlements, as do career interruptions. The result of the presence of these new career profiles in the labour market may be, if pension systems are not adapted, the translation of the labour market and working poor problems of today into a poverty problem for older people in thirty or forty years time. From an individual point of view, the fact of following an “atypical” career pattern entails a risk of insufficient social security coverage, and hence a loss of welfare.

## **3. Patterns of welfare state adaptation to new social risks**

The social risks that have emerged over the last two or three decades are generally not well covered by the welfare states that we have inherited from the postwar years. In some cases, however, the policy design chosen for protecting industrial workers turned out to be quite suitable for the new risk groups. One can think for example of the wage bargaining system in the Nordic countries or in Germany, which has existed throughout the postwar years and continues to perform a protective function for disadvantaged workers to the present day. But in most cases, policies designed to protect male industrial workers against the loss of work income are of little use to most new risk groups. Welfare states need to be adapted if they are to continue to deliver the levels of social stability typical of the postwar years and to respond to citizen's expectations.

In this section I try to map the extent to which countries have responded to the emergence of new social risks. For the sake of clarity, I distinguish between a first set of policies labelled “industrial social policies” or the “postwar social policies” and a second group labelled “new social risk policies” or “postindustrial social policy”. The former consists of policies whose objective is to replace the income of wage earners, especially those fulfilling a breadwinning function, when these are unable to extract an income from the labour market. Functional equivalents such as employment protection laws (protection against dismissal) should also be considered part of the “industrial welfare state”. New social risk policies, in contrast, provide protection against the risks and the problems associated with the socio-economic transformations described above, loosely described by the notion of postindustrialisation. This distinction does not cover all the policies that are traditionally considered as part of the welfare state. Most notably, health care, which cannot be unequivocally assigned to one or the other set. Health risks have certainly changed over time, but have not had an impact on the ability of health policy to provide good coverage. Universal access to the best available treatment was and remains the best possible coverage against both old and new health risks. There are also policies that depending on the design can be seen as belonging to one set or to combine features of both. Universal flat rate pensions, for instance, have provided effective protection against old age poverty to industrial workers from, and turn out to be particularly suitable for today's atypical employees. As a result, the analysis that follows must be

considered as a best approximation rather than a precise description of real cross-national differences.

But why distinguish between two sets of social policy along the lines suggested above? *First*, these policies constitute responses to different socio-economic transformations. The postwar welfare state can be seen as the long awaited response to the tremendous disruption and social instability brought about by industrialisation. New social risk policies, instead, constitute attempts to deal with problems that have little to do with industrialisation, and result from more recent social transformation. *Second*, and perhaps more importantly, the target groups of these two sets of policies are different. It is of course impossible to define clear borders between groups that benefit from one or the other set of policies, but quite clearly, today, the postwar welfare state targets (mostly male) older workers and older people in general, while the main beneficiaries of new risk policies are women, younger, and often low skill people. The distinction between these two groups is necessarily blurred, but postwar and new risk social policies are clearly aiming in different directions. *Third*, as will become clear below, an analysis of welfare states that distinguishes between these two sets of policies, suggests that some widely held beliefs in relation to the ranking of welfare state by the extent to which they provide coverage against social risk, should be reconsidered.

The strategy followed to map postwar and new social risks policies consists of two steps<sup>2</sup>. First I outline the main features of each set of policies in different welfare regimes on the basis of secondary literature on comparative social policy. Second, I perform a descriptive quantitative analysis using social expenditure data provided by the OECD.

### ***Industrial social risks in postwar welfare states***

The standard view in the comparative social policy literature is that the most developed and generous social protection systems are found the Social democratic welfare states of Northern Europe (see e.g. Castles and Mitchell 1992; Esping-Andersen 1990; Huber et al. 1993; Korpi 1983; Palme 1990) This conclusion is the result of the conflation of policies belonging to the industrial welfare state and those providing coverage against new social risks. This is clear in Esping-Andersen's seminal work on welfare regimes, whose rank ordering of welfare states in terms of the level of de-commodification they provide, largely depends on the degree of conditionality of benefits, which is lower in Social democratic welfare states. Income replacement benefits in Continental European welfare states tend to be equally generous, but generally require longer periods of labour market participation. This difference is obviously important for new social risk groups, which are considerably better protected in Social democratic welfare states. It mattered less, however, for the industrial workers of the "trente glorieuses". Full employment made it easy to fulfil the contribution requirements of the continental European welfare states. In addition, the contributory character and the equivalence principle embodied in continental social insurance-based welfare states, constituted a safeguard against the possibility of free riding by other social groups (Baldwin 1990; Clasen 1997). This is consistent with the strong attachment to social insurance shown by trade unions throughout continental Europe and by their insistence that the state should not use social insurance as a general social policy instrument (Palier 2002).

---

<sup>2</sup> For reasons of space, the mapping of presented in this paper must be synthetic, but a more comprehensive analysis is provided in (Bonoli 2006).

If, following the perspective put forward in this paper, we distinguish between industrial social policies and policies that provide coverage against new social risks, the standard view found in the literature must be qualified. Policies providing protection against the typical industrial social risks were probably more developed in the continental European welfare states (e.g. Germany, Italy or France) than it is generally acknowledged. This is not only because social insurance served this purpose particularly well, but also because industrial workers in continental Europe benefited from additional advantages in comparison to their Nordic counterparts. First, an earlier age of retirement, both in law and in practice. In 1980 French or Italian men, on average, retired some three years earlier than their Swedish or Danish counterparts, with a comparable benefit level (Scherer 2001). In general, both the legal and the effective age of retirement have been a few years lower in continental European countries than in Northern Europe. From the point of view of industrial workers, the core target of the industrial welfare state, this is obviously not a negligible difference, as shown by the strong reluctance to accept increases in the age of retirement.

Second, employment protection laws were (and are) considerably stricter in continental and particularly southern Europe. In this part of the world, the path followed to protect workers from the vagaries of markets did not rely only on income replacement programmes but put considerable emphasis on securing people's place in the labour market, by making it hard for their employers to lay them off (Bonoli 2003; Whiteside and Salais 1998). Writing in the 1960s, British political economist Andrew Shonefield noted with surprise that in France workers have "quasi property rights" to their jobs (Shonefield 1964). In fact, in countries like Italy, France or Germany, strict employment protection laws were used as functional equivalents to income replacement programmes in order to provide economic security to wage-earners. This form of protection was not included in Esping-Andersen's analysis, but can be seen as a functional equivalent to decommodification. After all, it resulted from workers' and unions' demands.

If all of the above is taken into account, it is then clear that with regard to the degree of protection granted to industrial workers, continental European welfare state were at least as developed as those of Northern Europe. To some extent, they used other tools for providing economic security, but they also targeted their efforts more precisely on industrial workers. This claim is consistent with the view put forward by those who have studied the impact of Christian democracy on social policy, who have argued that the Christian democratic variety of the welfare state is characterised by generous earnings replacement cash benefits and an underdeveloped social service sector (Huber and Stephens 2001; van Kersbergen 1995).

### ***New social risks in postindustrial welfare states***

If we focus on the second set of policies we are interested in, i.e. the policies that provide coverage against the new social risks defined above, then it is clearly the Nordic countries that have gone furthest in providing protection (Taylor-Gooby 2004; Timonen 2004). First, the initial set up of Social democratic welfare states, based less on social insurance and more on universal provision, turned out to be much more suitable to the emerging new postindustrial labour market and family structures. The alliance between workers and farmers at the beginning of the 20<sup>th</sup> century had resulted in a preference for tax financed, non contributory social programmes, for example in the field of pensions (Baldwin 1990; Ferrera 1993) which serves particularly well the new atypical career profiles that have become increasingly common over the last two or three decades. Second, the postwar arrangement, based on

centralised wage bargaining and active labour market policies (the so called Rehn-Meidner model) developed for the benefit of industrial workers, turned out to be particularly useful in protecting postindustrial service workers against the risk of being paid a poverty wage, (Rueda and Pontusson 2000) and in preventing long term unemployment and social exclusion. Social democratic postwar welfare states, thus, even though they were built for industrial workers, embodied already many features that will make them more suitable to protect against the new social risks that have emerged in more recent years.

But the higher level of protection against new social risks found in Social democratic welfare states cannot be explained only by institutional predisposition. Countries like Sweden or Denmark were able to take into account changes in the socio-economic sphere from the 1970s onwards and to reorient their welfare states accordingly. This is clear in the case of policies for women. Indicators from the mid-1960s show little difference between Nordic and continental European countries in relation, for instance, to female employment rates. In 1965 the female employment rate<sup>3</sup> was 53% in Sweden and 49% in Denmark, against 52% for Switzerland and 49% for Germany and the UK and 42% in the US (OECD, Statistical Compendium). Sweden did have a tradition in providing child care services, but these were set up in the context of combating poverty rather than in order to facilitate the conciliation of employment and family life (Morel 2001). In fact, the development of extensive child care coverage and other policies supporting women's (and mothers') employment followed the expansion of female employment; it did not precede it (Leira 1992). Like in much of continental Europe today, the late 1960s and early 1970s for working mothers in the Nordic countries were dominated by juggling; having to a large extent to rely on informal care (Leira et al. 2004; Naumann 2001). The reorientation of the Nordic welfare state began in the 1970s. Sweden introduced individual taxation in 1971, its first law on preschool education in 1973, parental leave in 1974. A law on child care was introduced in Norway in 1975.

Things followed a different course in Continental European countries and in the UK. Female employment remained stable around the 50% mark until the late 1980s, when it started increasing. In fact, female employment in continental and Southern European countries seems to be following the Nordic pattern with a delay of some two to three decades. Thus, female employment reached 60% in Sweden in 1972. The same level was reached in Switzerland in 1988, in the UK in 1989, in the Netherlands in 1999, in Austria in 2002. Other continental European countries have also seen dramatic increases in the female employment rate over the last decade (by around six percentage points), but these remain below the 60% mark: in 2003 the female employment rate in Germany was 59%, in France 56% in Italy 43% (OECD 2004a). In the latter three countries high unemployment and low employment rates among (male and female) older workers are responsible for somewhat lower female employment rates. The social transformations behind the emergence of new risks and new demands are clearly proceeding at a different pace in different countries. Can the same be said for the development of the relevant policies? Is the reorientation of the Dutch, the Swiss, or the German welfare state just a matter of time?

The findings of the comparative social policy literature suggest that this not the case. The country studies included in Scharpf's and Schmidt's comprehensive analysis of trends in social

---

<sup>3</sup> The female employment rate refers to the proportion of women aged 15 to 64 who are in employment. Given the interest in reconciling work and family life, it would have been preferable to use a narrower indicator of female employment, such as the employment rate of women aged 25 to 45, or the employment rate of women with young children. This sort of data, unfortunately, is not available over a sufficient period of time for a large number of countries.

and employment policies show little evidence that countries like Italy, Germany, Switzerland or Austria are responding to increases in female labour market participation with the development of the relevant policies on a large scale (Scharpf and Schmidt 2000). Some reforms have been adopted, but the 2000s in Germany or Italy are clearly not like the 1980s in Sweden or Denmark, even though the demand for child care services can be considered as similar. In 1980, Denmark and Sweden spent 1.8% and 2.2% of their GDP on family services, essentially child care, while in 2001 Germany and Italy spend 1.1% and 0.5% (OECD 2004b). The same argument can be made in relation to other areas of social policy that are particularly relevant to those who are hit by new social risks, in particular active labour market policies.

The above discussion has focused essentially on Nordic and continental European welfare states. But how did liberal welfare states respond to the emergence of new social risks? Generally speaking, in a way that has been consistent with their historical preference for market solutions, and that sees state intervention as appropriate only where market failures are evident. Changes in skill requirements by employers have resulted in a downward adjustment of wages for low skill occupations, with the well known increases in inequality in many English speaking countries (Förster and Pearson 2002). Similarly, with regard to demands stemming from women's entry into employment, markets have provided the services requested. This was more clearly the case in the US, where low wages for child care workers facilitated the expansion of this sector.

### ***Spending on industrial and new social risk policies***

Social expenditure as a proportion of GDP is one of the most widely available and used indicators in the cross-national comparison of social policies. As noted by many, it is problematic in the sense that it is influenced by the denominator (GDP), it is sensitive to changes in the number of beneficiaries and tells us little about *how* the money is spent (Esping-Andersen 1990; Siegel 2000). However, it can provide a first approximation of the extent to which countries have developed policies in given fields. Its other advantage is that it makes it possible to synthesise in a simple indicator a substantial amount of information. An analysis based on social expenditure on industrial and new risk social policies can thus complement the picture presented above by providing a more synthetic view.


In figure 1, different items of social expenditure are assigned either to the category of "industrial social policies" or to the one of "new social risk policies", on the basis of the definitions used above. Policies that aim above all at replacing the income of the family father in a context of full employment are considered as "industrial social policies. These include old age and survivor cash benefits, incapacity cash benefits and services, and unemployment cash benefits. In contrast, policies that aim at protecting individuals from the consequences of postindustrial socio-economic trends in the labour market or in the family field, are counted as "new social risk policies". These include spending for families (cash and services) active labour market policies, old age services<sup>4</sup>, and social assistance (cash and services). This is a rough distinction, partly dictated by the breakdown of data chosen by the OECD. But it does

---

<sup>4</sup> The inclusion of services for older people among the new social risk policies reflects the fact that in many cases, the main beneficiary of such policies are not frail elderly people themselves, but their children, especially their daughters. In the absence of state (or market) provided services, it is in fact generally family members who provide the informal care needed, of course where possible. This is in contrast with the decision to assign services for incapacity to "industrial social risk policies". These include rehabilitation services that aim at reinserting incapacitated workers into labour markets.

correspond to the definitions used in this article, whether in terms of risks or in terms of social groups that are mostly targeted by the relevant polices.

Figure 1: Spending on industrial and on new social risk polices in OECD countries as a proportion of GDP, five year averages (1997-2001)



Source: Recalculation of data from OECD 2004.

The distribution of countries in relation to the effort made in protecting against industrial and new social risks reflects the comments made above in the descriptive analysis of polices. Interestingly, countries cluster around regime type, but not in the way one would expect on the basis of Esping-Andersen decommodification analysis. In relation to industrial social policies, it is Continental European countries that make the biggest effort, especially Italy, Switzerland Austria and Belgium: four typical conservative welfare states. In contrast, in relation to new social risk polices, the leaders are clearly the Nordic countries, especially Sweden, Denmark and Norway. Liberal welfare states, instead, are found in the bottom left quadrant, which means that these countries have made only modest effort in either policy direction. Of course there is also some variation within the three clusters. France and Germany provide better new social risk coverage than other continental European countries. Britain, probably the less liberal of the liberal welfare states, in this classification ends up together with continental European countries, though at the bottom of the group in relation to the effort made in covering industrial social risks.

The separate analysis of industrial and new risk social polices and the resulting country distribution presented in figure 1 reveals a puzzle for the comparative social policy literature. Analysis that do not consider the two areas of social policy separately, by definition, do not allow for the possibility that the factors that lead to the developments of industrial and new

social risk policies respectively, be different. But, as the country distribution presented in figure 1 shows, this must be the case. The factors that are conducive to the development of generous industrial welfare states cannot at the same time be leading to extensive new social risk coverage. It would otherwise be impossible to account for the bifurcation between continental and Nordic countries visible in the graph.

#### **4. Accounting for divergent national trajectories**

In this section I discuss three hypotheses that can help make sense of the pattern of cross-national variation emerging from figure 1: the different role played by Social and Christian democratic parties in the development of postwar welfare states; the changing function and adaptability of postwar welfare state structures, and the timing of relevant socio-economic developments.

##### **Christian versus social democracy**

As shown by several studies, Social democracy was not the only political force behind the development of welfare states. Christian democratic parties played an important role as well (Huber and Stephens 2001; van Kersbergen 1995). The welfare states developed by Christian democrats, however, distinguished themselves for a preference for less redistribution, needed in order to comply with the cross-class character of these parties; and for less emphasis on services, particularly those services that replace family tasks such as child care. The reference to the Catholic social doctrine, subsidiarity and the preference for the traditional male breadwinner-housewife family arrangement explain these features (Huber and Stephens 2001).

This explanation is basically convincing, but there are a number of problems with it. *First*, it neglects the fact that the postindustrial socio-economic trends that resulted in the reorientation of the Nordic welfare states, were much more advanced in these countries in the 1970s than they were in continental, and southern Europe. To some extent, this may be due to the predominance of Catholicism in these countries, which contained and delayed women's aspiration for access to work income. The ideology of social partnership supported by Christian democrats may also have been responsible for a delay in the restructuring of industry and the resulting decline of industrial employment in those countries. The apparent impact of Christian democracy may be due less to the ideological stance of Christian democrats, and more to the impact that Catholicism has had on the timing of key socio-economic developments. *Second*, the decline of Christian democracy over the last decade in almost all the Western European countries in which these parties were once dominant has not freed the way for the expansion of new social risk policies. Over the last ten years Christian democrats have been forced out of government or have seen their traditionally strong influence in government reduced in Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and in Switzerland. Yet, new social risk policies have not mushroomed in these countries. *Third*, it is true, as Huber and Stephens argue, that the aversion of Christian democrats to services is particularly strong for family replacing activities and not so relevant in education or health (Huber and Stephens 2001: 41-44). But there are other areas of new social risk policies, such as active labour market policies, that would fit particularly well with the requirement to satisfy non working class voters. To facilitate re-entry in the labour market is certainly a more appealing solution than the passive compensation of joblessness for the middle class voters who make up a substantial part of the electorate of Christian democrats. Yet active labour market policies, like other new social risk policies, are underdeveloped in continental European welfare states.

In sum, the ideological stance of Christian democrats may be inimical to some new social risk policies, but this is unlikely to be the only explanation of the divergence of national trajectories highlighted above.

### **Institutional predisposition**

As seen above, during the postwar years all western European countries developed comprehensive systems of social protection and labour market regulation providing coverage against the main traditional social risks. The instruments chosen to that end, however, were very different. Some countries limited state intervention to redistribution (UK), while other ones intervened in the functioning of labour markets with clear social policy objectives, either through legislation (France, Italy) or collectively negotiated agreements (Germany, Nordic countries (Bonoli 2003; Whiteside and Salais 1998).

These different instruments have turned out to be more or less suitable to respond to the new social demands and needs resulting from the transition to a postindustrial society. This has been the case in particular in the Nordic countries where some of the social transformations associated with the surfacing of new social risks have not resulted in the emergence of widespread social problems. In fact, the risks associated with service employment (low wage, insecurity) and with family change (reconciling work and family life), were, in some circumstances, already well covered by programmes developed in the context of the postwar welfare states, often for a different purpose. This is above all the case of Sweden (and to an extent of the other Nordic countries), which in the 1950s developed an employment regime, based on egalitarian collective wage bargaining and on active labour market policies, the so called Rehn-Meidner model (Benner and Vad 2000). These two instruments turned out to be particularly useful in dealing with the side effects of postindustrialisation: inegalitarian wage pressures and the possible emergence of a working poor problem, and the risk of skill obsolescence.

Old institutions matter also because they can be more or less amenable to adaptation. Clasen and Clegg (2006) show that the inclusion of activation elements in unemployment compensation schemes has resulted politically more feasible in countries where the government has more or less direct control over these policies, like Denmark and the UK. In contrast, in Germany and in France, where unemployment insurance is managed by the social partners, the inclusion of activation elements has resulted considerably more difficult. The French pre-school system (*école maternelle*) constitutes a second often quoted example of a long standing institution that can be adapted to new demands. Pre-schools were first introduced in at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century in the context of an ongoing struggle between Republicans and the Catholics for the control of the education system. Today, thanks also to various adjustments, for example in opening times, *école maternelle* represents a highly valued and used form of childcare for children aged 3 to 6 (Morgan 2001).

The choices made by the architects of the postwar welfare state clearly have consequences in relation to the extent to which new social risks are covered. In some contexts, for example in the Nordic countries, employment-related new social risks may not even be perceived as such because their emergence is de facto pre-empted by existing policies. Such instances, however, are rare. In most cases effective coverage against new social risks requires the adoption of new policies or the radical reorientation of existing ones.

## Timing

As pointed out above, the trends that are responsible for the emergence of new social risks have progressed at a different pace in different countries and regions. Broadly speaking, the Nordic and some English speaking countries (US, UK and Canada) have been the first set of countries to enter the postindustrial age in the 1970s. They were followed by continental European countries about a decade later and by Southern Europe even later. The claim made in this paper is that differences in the timing of key postindustrial socio-economic developments will not only generate catching up phenomena, but may result in permanent differences in the degree of development of new social risk policies.

The claim is based on the following argument. In countries that have entered relatively early the postindustrial age, new demands generated by the ongoing social transformations found comparatively little competition. Those hit by new social risks had to fight in the political arena to obtain better coverage, but they could count on the broad support of those actors that are generally in favour of welfare expansion, such as the left and the trade unions. In contrast, in countries that have developed into postindustrial societies more recently, demands for protection against new social risks are in strong competition with demands for the preservation, in spite of population ageing, of the current level of protection provided by industrial welfare states. This requires enormous resources, and can count on a substantial level of popular support, whereas new social risk groups are notoriously politically weak, both in terms of presence in key democratic political institutions and in terms of participation in elections (Bonoli 2005; Norris 2002). One consequence of the unbalanced power relationship between old and new social risk groups, is that incentives for vote maximising political actors are clearly geared towards the defence of the industrial welfare state rather than towards the development of new social policies. Demographic trends and differentials in turnout between age groups make it rational for vote seeking politicians to present themselves as the defenders of the pension system rather than the champions of child care, negative income taxes, or active labour market policies.

The presence of competing claims for different sets of social policies affects incentives across the whole political spectrum, but can have a particularly strong divisive effect on traditional pro-welfare constituencies, such as left wing voters and parties, and labour movements. This is visible in the increasingly strong cleavage between modernisers and traditionalists that characterises the left in many continental European countries<sup>5</sup>. Such divisions reduce the chances of seeing the expansion of new social risk policies, particularly, because left wing politicians are exposed to the same incentive structure as everybody else, and are thus likely, if forced to choose, to prefer the defence of the industrial welfare state.

Time is crucial in this argument. Whether countries manage or fail to reorient their welfare states in a way that reflects changed socio-economic circumstances depends on the relative timing of key socio-economic trends in interaction with existing welfare state structures. The key developments are postindustrialisation and the increase in the cost of the industrial welfare state resulting from the combination of demographic ageing and generous pension promises. These two developments must not happen simultaneously if a welfare state is to be reoriented.

---

<sup>5</sup> See for example in Germany the fight within the SPD on social and economic policies (Hering 2004), or in Italy the strong division between the centre left and the reformed Communist party (Ferrera and Gualmini 2000)

How to test this hypothesis is far from being a straightforward task, and requires some ad hoc methods that may not conform to current orthodoxy in comparative policy research, but that produce some intriguing results. The first problem is how to characterise countries in relation how advanced they are at a given point in time in relation to the various relevant postindustrial socio-economic trends. Table 1 offers a pragmatic answer to this question. It takes as a benchmark the level of some relevant socio-economic indicators in Sweden in 1970. As argued above, 1970 marks the beginning of the reorientation for the Swedish welfare state. The choice of this benchmark is to a large extent arbitrary, but it provides us with a yardstick that can be used to compare all countries (yardsticks are often arbitrary, what matters is relativities). Then, for all the OECD countries for which sufficiently long time series are available, it reports the year in which the benchmark (i.e. the Swedish level in 1970) was reached. In order to summarise the information provided in relation to three socio-economic trends: deindustrialisation, expansion of female employment and family instability, it reports for each country the rounded average of the year in which the benchmark was reached in the three trends (average benchmark year).

Table 1: The timing of key postindustrial developments in 18 OECD countries

|  | Service employment as a % of total civilian employment            | Female employment rate, as a proportion of the 15-64 population | Divorce rate (divorces per 100 marriages) | Average benchmark year |
|--|---|---|---|------------------------|
| <i>Benchmark (Swedish level in 1970)</i> | 54%   | 58%   | 30  |                        |
|  | Year in which the Swedish 1970 level was reached (benchmark year) |   |   |                        |
| Sweden                                   | 1970  | 1970  | 1970                                      | 1970                   |
| Denmark                                  | NA  | 1971  | 1972                                      | 1972                   |
| Norway                                   | 1972  | NA  | 1981                                      | 1977                   |
| Finland                                  | 1983  | 1982  | 1976                                      | 1980                   |
| UK                                       | 1975  | 1988  | 1975                                      | 1979                   |
| US                                       | <1970   | 1984  | <1970                                     | 1975                   |
| Canada                                   | <1970   | 1987  | 1978                                      | 1978                   |
| Australia                                | <1970   | 1995  | NA  | 1982                   |
| New Zealand                              | 1978  | 1988  | NA  | 1979                   |
| Germany                                  | 1986  | 2001  | 1981                                      | 1989                   |
| France                                   | 1978  | >2003   | 1982                                      | 1988                   |
| Netherlands                              | NA  | 1998  | 1981                                      | 1990                   |
| Switzerland                              | 1980  | 1987  | 1980                                      | 1982                   |
| Belgium                                  | NA  | >2003   | 1984                                      | 1993                   |
| Austria                                  | 1988  | 1994  | 1982                                      | 1988                   |
| Italy                                    | 1985  | >2003   | >2003                                     | 1994                   |
| Spain                                    | 1989  | >2003   | >2003                                     | 1996                   |
| Portugal                                 | 1992  | 1990  | >2003                                     | 1995                   |

Source: Calculations based on the OCED Statistical Compendium.

Note: In case of data missing in the relevant years, the benchmark year has been estimated through linear interpolation. For the calculation of averages, when the Swedish level was reached before 1970 or was not reached until 2003 (end of data series) 1970 and 2003 were used respectively


The average benchmark year should not be interpreted as an attempt to precisely identify the moment in which countries become postindustrial societies. It simply provides an indication of the relative degree of advancement in the various countries of the social trends identified above as responsible for the emergence of new social risks. In some cases, the Swedish 1970

level was reached before 1970. In some other cases, the Swedish level had not been reached by 2003, when most of the data series used end. In this cases, the average has been calculated by entering 1970 and 2003 respectively. In relation to the hypothesis presented above, this is a conservative solution, which reduces the actual degree of variation of the independent variable.

Broadly speaking, the timing of the relevant socio-economic developments reflects the degree of development of new social risk policies, as presented above. The early postindustrialisers, the Nordic countries, have the most comprehensive systems of new social risk coverage. They are followed by the continental European countries, that reached Swedish levels of postindustrialisation in the late 1980s, and, finally, by Southern Europe. English speaking countries, however, do not seem to fit the hypothesis. The key postindustrial socio-economic trends progressed fast, but were not accompanied by the development of new social risk policies. This, however, reflects what happened during the postwar years, which did not see in these countries the construction of welfare states comparable to those of continental and Northern Europe. There are also differences within groups of countries. For instance Finland is a latecomer among the Nordic group, as Australia and New Zealand are among English speaking countries.

Simple statistical analysis shows that the average benchmark year calculated above is related to the level of spending on new social risk polices, as shown in figure 2. The two variables are clearly associated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient - 0.57, significant at the 0.01 level (one-tailed). The relationship becomes even stronger if the "new social risk bias", or the proportion of social spending that is attributed to new social risk polices, is taken as a dependent variable (Pearson = - 0.64, graph not reproduced). This suggests that, in countries which are less inclined to turn to the state for dealing with social problems (English speaking countries essentially) there is also a relationship between the timing of relevant socio-economic trends and the development of new social risk polices, but his takes place in the context of lower social expenditure.

Figure 2: Relationship between the average benchmark year (see table 1 for details) and spending on new social risk polices, 1997-2001 average (see figure 1 for details)




The hypothesis presented in this paper assumes a trade off between spending on industrial and new social risk polices. However, there is no clear negative relationship between spending on these two functions (see figure 1). Why is it so? The answer is that the trade off is asymmetric. High levels of industrial social policy spending prevent the development of new social risk polices, while high levels of spending on new social risk polices, do not prevent the continuing expansion of spending on industrial social polices. The latter, in fact, does not depend so much on political decisions, but more on inevitable processes such as population ageing and programme maturation. As a result, countries which have developed extensive new social risk coverage in the past will continue to see social expenditure on industrial social policy increase. The average benchmark year is positively but not significantly correlated with spending on industrial social polices (Pearson's  $r = 0.46$ ).

These findings are all compatible with the timing hypothesis presented above, but can we rule out a simpler explanation, making reference to problem pressure and to a time lag that policy needs in order to adapt to new needs and demands? Countries in which problem pressure developed earlier have had more available time to respond to these new problems, and as a result have today more comprehensive system of protection against them. This simpler hypothesis implies that the apparent divergence among western welfare state is just a matter of time, and that if given sufficient time, countries like Italy, Germany or Switzerland will develop policy responses comparable to those that are currently in force in the Nordic countries. Considering the current and expected budgetary pressures in Southern and continental European countries, this scenario looks most unlikely. In addition, like all explanations based simply on problem pressure, this hypothesis is not theoretically very convincing, and it contradicts three decades of comparative social policy research, showing the absence of a direct link between problem pressure and policy solutions. Finally, empirically, this simpler explanation implies that late postindustrialisers should now be catching up with the Nordic countries, and being investing more in new risk social policies. Comparing spending on new social risk polices in two time periods 1987-1991 and 1997-2001, however, suggests that this is not the case. If a catching up process were going on, one

would expect the increase in spending on new social risk polices between the two time periods to be inversely related with the amount spent in the earlier period. There is indeed a negative relationship between these two variables, but it is very weak (Pearson's  $r$  0.25) and non significant (see figure 3).

Figure 3: Increase in spending on new social risk polices in the 1990s and spending in 1987-1991 (see figure 2 for details)



Note: Increase in NSR spending in the 1990s: difference between average NSR spending 1987-91 and 1997-2001.

## Conclusion

The main contribution of this paper is the introduction of timing as an independent variable of social policy making in the last three decades. While the empirical evidence provided shows that the timing of different relevant socioeconomic development has an impact on the shape of current welfare states, some qualifications are needed. First, the timing explanation must not be seen as an alternative to the prevailing interpretations of welfare state development, but as a complement. The relevance of independent variables such as the power resources of the working class, the strength of left wing parties or constitutional structures is not disproved by this study. In fact, the scatter plot above (figure 2) shows a fair degree of unexplained variance in the dependent variable. In particular, both industrial and new social risk polices are underdeveloped in English speaking countries (especially the US), a result that can be more easily explained by the weakness of the left in those countries. Cross-national differences in the political mobilisation of women may also account for variation in the degree of development of new social risk polices (Huber and Stephens 2006). Second, more sophisticated testing of the timing explanation would be required. This could be done by using pooled time series analysis and lagged variables. Ideally, the hypothesis should be tested in multivariate models (impossible with the small number of cases available for this study), together with the other variables identified in the literature as relevant for explaining the development of welfare states, something which is clearly beyond the scope of this paper.

The paper has also attempted to develop a technique that can be used to integrate the time dimension in policy analysis. Following Paul Pierson's call to pay attention to the "when" of social and political phenomena, it shows a relatively simple way in which time-based factors such as sequences, the relative timing of given events or differences in the speed of some trends, can be integrated in policy analysis in a measurable way. Time-based variables can arguably be developed further, and integrated in statistical models of policy-making, providing thus an opportunity to test the "time matters" hypothesis.

Finally, on a more substantive level, the findings presented in the paper are not good news for those who are hit by new social risks in continental and Southern Europe. These countries have missed a window of opportunity to re-orient their welfare states. Over the next two to three decades, because of population ageing, it will become increasingly difficult to introduce new social policies. Of course political struggles may be fought with the aim to improve the living conditions of new social risk groups, but for a long while, the balance of power will be tilted in favour of the preservation of industrial social policies rather than towards the development of a new welfare state.

## References

- Baldwin, P. (1990). *The Politics of Social Solidarity. Class Bases of the European Welfare State 1875-1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Benner, M., & Vad, T. (2000). Sweden and Denmark: defending the welfare state. In F. W. Scharpf & V. Schmid (Eds.), *Welfare and work in the open economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Bonoli, G. (2003). Social Policy Through Labour Markets. Understanding National Differences in the Provision of Economic Security to Wage Earners. *Comparative Political Studies*, 36, 983-1006.
- Bonoli, G. (2005). The politics of the new social policies. Providing coverage against new social risks in mature welfare states. *Policy and Politics*, 33.
- Bonoli, G. (2006). New Social Risks and the Politics of Postindustrial Social Policies. In K. Armingeon & G. Bonoli (Eds.), *The politics of postindustrial welfare states*. London: Routledge.
- Castles, F. G., & Mitchell, D. (1992). Identifying Welfare State Regimes: The Links Between Politics, Instruments and Outcomes. *Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration*, 5, 1-26.
- Clasen, J. (1997). *Social Insurance in Europe*. Bristol: Policy Press.
- Clasen, J., & Clegg, d. (2006). New labour market risks and the revision of unemployment protection systems in Europe. In K. Armingeon & G. Bonoli (Eds.), *The politics of postindustrial welfare states*. London: Routledge.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (1990). *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Esping-Andersen, G. (2002). *Why We Need a New Welfare State*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Fargion, V. (2000). Timing and the development of social care services in Europe. *West European Politics*, 23, 59-88.
- Ferrera, M. (1993). *Modelli di solidarietà. Politica e riforme sociali nelle democrazie*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

- Ferrera, M., & Gualmini, E. (2000). Italy: Rescue From Without? In F. W. Scharpf & V. A. Schmidt (Eds.), *Welfare and Work in the Open Economy* (pp. 351-398). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Förster, M., & Pearson, M. (2002). Income distribution and poverty in the OECD area: trends and driving forces. *OECD economic studies*, 7-38.
- Hemerijck, A. (2002). The Self-transformation of the European Social Model(s). In G. Esping-Andersen (Ed.), *Why We Need a New Welfare State* (pp. 173-214). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Hering, M. (2004). Turning ideas into policies: implementing modern Social Democratic thinking in Germany's pension policy. In G. Bonoli & M. Powell (Eds.), *Social Democratic party policies in contemporary Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Huber, E., Ragin, C., & Stephens, J. D. (1993). Social Democracy, Christian democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State. *American Journal of Sociology*, 99, 711-749.
- Huber, E., & Stephens, J. (2006). Combatting old and new social risks. In K. Armingeon & G. Bonoli (Eds.), *The politics of postindustrial welfare states*. London: Routledge.
- Huber, E., & Stephens, J. D. (2001). *Development and Crisis of the Welfare State. Parties and Policies in the Global Markets*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Iversen, T., & Wren, A. (1998). Equality, Employment, and Budgetary Restraint, The Trilemma of the Service Economy. *World Politics*, 50, 507-46.
- Jenson, J. (2002). From Ford to Lego : redesigning welfare regimes, *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*. Boston.
- Korpi, W. (1983). *The Democratic Class Struggle*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Leira, A. (1992). *Welfare states and working mothers. The Scandinavian experience*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Leira, A., Tobio, C., & Trifiletti, R. (2004). Kinship and informal support as resources for the first generation of working mothers in Norway, Italy and Spain. In ??? (Ed.).
- Morel, N. (2001). Politique social et égalité entre les sexes en Suède. *Recherches et Prévisions*, 64, 65-79.
- Morgan, K. (2001). Conservative Parties and Working Women in France, *Annual meeting of APSA*, San Francisco.
- Naumann, I. (2001). The politics of child care: Swedish women's mobilisation for public child care in the 1960s and 1970s, *ECSR Summer School on "Family, gender and social stratification"*. Stockholm.
- Norris, P. (2002). *Democratic Phoenix. Reinventing Political Activism*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- OECD (2004a). *Employment Outlook*. Paris: OECD.
- OECD (2004b). Social expenditure database (SOCX). Paris.
- Palier, B. (2002). *Gouverner la sécurité sociale. Les réformes du système français de protection sociale depuis 1945*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
- Palme, J. (1990). *Pension Rights in Welfare Capitalism. The Development of Old-Age Pensions in 18 OECD Countries 1930 to 1985*. Stockholm: Swedish Institute for Social Research, University of Stockholm.
- Pierson, P. (1998). Irresistible forces, immovable objects: post-industrial welfare states confront permanent austerity. *Journal of European Public Policy*, 5, 539-560.
- Pierson, P. (2004). *Politics in Time*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Polanyi, K. (1957). *The Great Transformation*. Boston: Beacon Press.
- Rueda, D., & Pontusson, J. (2000). Wage inequality and varieties of capitalism. *World Politics*, 52, 350-383.

- Scharpf, F. W., & Schmidt, V. A. (2000). *Welfare and work in the open economy*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Scherer, P. (2001). *Age of withdrawal from the labour force in OECD countries*. Paris: OECD.
- Shonfield, A. (1964). *Modern Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Siegel, N. A. (2000). Jenseits der Expansion? Sozialpolitik in westlichen Demokratien 1975-95. In M. G. Schmidt (Ed.), *Wohlfahrtsstaatliche Politik. Institutionen, politischer Prozesse und Leistungsprofil* (pp. 54-89). Opladen: Leske und Budrich.
- Taylor-Gooby, P. (2004). New risks and social change. In P. Taylor-Gooby (Ed.), *New risks, New Welfare?* (pp. 1-27). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Timonen, V. (2004). New Risks - Are they still new for the Nordic welfare states? In P. Taylor-Gooby (Ed.), *New risks, new welfare* (pp. 83-110). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- van Kersbergen, K. (1995). *Social Capitalism. A study of Christian democracy and the welfare state*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Whiteside, N., & Salais, R. (1998). Comparing Welfare States: Social Protection and Industrial Politics in Britain and France. *Journal of European Social Policy*, 8, 139-154.