Doctrine and Command in the Swedish Armed Forces

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Abstract

The aim of this paper is to stimulate debate on military doctrine in general and command doctrine in particular. The paper begins with a statement on the current situation regarding command doctrine within the Swedish Armed Forces. After touching briefly on three important aspects of command doctrine—the linguistic and military meaning of the word doctrine, and the relationship of the concepts of command and doctrine, respectively, to different levels of war—we show the central importance of the concept of knowledge for doctrine and sketch out the desirable contents of operational and command doctrine. As a conclusion, we argue that three main categories of command doctrine can be identified:

- A deliberate and normative plan of how to command
- A non-normative description of present command practices in the organization
- A general knowledge of command and a system for organizational learning.

However, quite irrespective of which direction is chosen with respect to the function of doctrine, a command doctrine should satisfy the following requirements:

• A description of the command problem, i.e. ensure *understanding*

• An idea of *how* to command in order to solve the operational problem

• A system for *feedback*.

1. Background

Both the Swedish Armed Forces and the government have claimed that current methods and principles of military command[1] need to be re-evaluated.[2] New tasks, technological development and increased demands for interoperability are the major driving forces. The goal is to overhaul the entire military command system within the framework of the current restructuring of the Swedish Armed Forces. In this process it has been judged necessary to highlight questions of a fundamental nature for the structure and future development of the command system.

The aim of this paper is to stimulate debate on military doctrine in general and command doctrine in particular. It is based on a project conducted at the National Defence Research Establishment

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[1] In accordance with British practice, we normally use the term 'command' instead of 'command and control'. See e.g. British Army Doctrine Publication, Volume 2 (ADP 2), Command, 1995.

[2] See e.g., Försvarsdepartementet. *Regeringens proposition 1996/97:4 Totalförsvar i förnyelse—etapp 2* [Government Defence Bill 1996/97:4 Renewal of Total Defence—stage 2]. 1996/97. Stockholm.

on behalf of the Swedish Armed Forces. The aim has not been to finalize a command doctrine for the Swedish Armed Forces but rather, through the example and application of current research, to explain what command doctrine is, what role it can play and what it should include. The result, which is presented in greater detail in the report *HIGHER 2—Doctrine and Command*,[3] provides an important starting point for the newly launched *Command Review 1999*.

The paper begins with a short statement on the current situation regarding command doctrine within the Swedish Armed Forces. After touching briefly on three important aspects of command doctrine—the linguistic and military meaning of the word doctrine, and the relationship of the concepts of command and doctrine, respectively, to different levels of war—we show the central importance of the concept of knowledge for doctrine and sketch out the desirable contents of operational and command doctrine. Then we show how the function of command doctrine can be influenced by different notions of its origins and of the character of war. Finally we discuss the basic contents of command doctrine, with respect to its aim, and summarize the main conclusions.

2. Doctrine in the Swedish Armed forces

In the operational nomenclature, the Swedish Armed Forces define doctrine as *'a compilation of norms to guide the generation of ideas and practical action. There can be several different types of doctrine for different levels, for example: security, strategic, defence and defence policy, operational and tactical doctrines.'*[4]

There is hardly any adequate formalized doctrine within the Armed Forces today, however, neither in general nor as regards command and the development of the command system. *The Supreme Commander's View of Command* is something of a command doctrine, but the document, a small leaflet of 10 pages, is now dated and insufficient as a policy document for the development of the whole command system. At present, the government and the Armed Forces present their command policy in various policy documents, most of which do not address command specifically. They include:

- *The 1996 Defence Resolution*. On the basis of various influencing factors such as changed battle environment, the tasks of the armed forces within the Total Defence, the size of the organization and technological development, the government considers that the command system of the Total Defence should be changed. The government considers it important to have *'a well known common point of view or common doctrine'*.
- *The Armed Forces Plan 1998*. In the 1998 Plan for the Swedish Armed Forces, it is emphasized that an overall view of the need for command to carry out the main tasks of the Armed Forces will form the basis for the development of the command system.
- *The Armed Forces Vision 2020 (FMI 2020)*. The annual long-term planning reports present a picture of the future armed forces and their command system. In the future 'flexible defence' the number of command levels is expected to decrease and the importance of warfare command to increase. A command philosophy for the future should *'state the goals*

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[3] HÖGRE 2—Doktrin och ledning [HIGHER 2—Doctrine and command], FOA-R—98-00875-505—SE. For phase 1 of the project, see HÖGRE 1—Ledningsstrukturer för militär högre regional ledning [HIGHER 1—Command structures for higher regional military command] , FOA-R—98-00770-505—SE.

[4] Försvarsmakten. *Försvarsmaktens Operativa Planering 1998— Del I, Bilaga 1, Nomen Op* [Operational military planning 1998—Part I, appendix 1, Swedish Armed Forces Headquarters]. 1998. Stockholm: HKV/OP INRI, p. 13.

and means for command of an increasingly flexible defence according to different kinds of change'.

- *The Programme Policy 1999*. The 1999 Programme Policy is based on government policy decisions and, together with the above-mentioned documents, primarily FMI 2020, sets priorities for the short-term (1999–2002) and long-term development.
- *The Command Development Plan*. Starting out from the restructuring work the Command Development Plan is a plan for the development of the command system in 1999–2001. A number of measures are given short-term priority, including a joint information system, new demands on the structure of the command system, uniform command methods and the revision of certain basic documents.

In each branch of the armed services future-oriented work is under way on principles primarily for the tactical command of ground, sea and air forces. So far, however, neither the Army, the Navy nor the Air Force has developed an official command doctrine.

Examination of the relevant policy documents leads to some conclusions:
a) The documents do not establish an obvious context or hierarchical order for the field of command.
b) There is conceptual confusion and there are no uniform definitions or nomenclature.
c) The relationships between the actors and the areas of development work are unclear.
d) There is a need to systematize and direct the development of the Swedish Armed Forces' command system centrally.

There is a clear demand for guidance of command development—in principle all the documents studied express the need for a new command philosophy and call for the revision of manuals and policy documents.

3. Doctrine as a linguistic concept

The linguistic meaning of the concept of 'doctrine' has changed over the years and differs from one country to another. The word used to have several meanings in Swedish, including learning, knowledge, teaching, and science or branch of learning. Later, the main meaning came to be theory and its application as a normative model to guide thought and action.[5] In Anglo-Saxon countries the word seems to have retained the broader meaning of 'something that is taught'.[6]

A survey of Swedish and foreign examples indicates that there are a number of views, including an idea that military doctrine is a collection of experiences and theories, in which the normative element is played down, as opposed to a more normative approach.[7] A third view emphasizes doctrine as a structural factor, which interacts with technology, for example, to drive military development.[8]

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[5] For the Swedish usage of the word see Svenska Akademin. *Svenska Akademiens ordlista, del 7* [Swedish Academy Word List, part 7]. 1925. Svenska Akademins ordlista. Lund och *Nationalencyclopedins ordbok* [National Encyclopaedia dictionary]. 1998. CD-Rom.
[6] See, e.g., *Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English. 1987*. Harlow: Longman House. *Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary*. 1977. Springfield, Massachusetts: G.&C. Merrian Company.
[7] Dupuy, Trevor N. *The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare*. 1984. New York: Da Capo Press Inc, pp. 9f.
[8] Smedberg, Marco. *Om stridens grunder: Från Waterloo till kryssningsrobotar* [On the basics of battle: From Waterloo to cruise missiles]. 1994. Stockholm: Page One Publishing AB, p. 57.

At a higher level, within the wide range of defence and security concepts, the concept of doctrine is best known as a set of individual rules or statements. In this context doctrine can be seen as a system of normative-type guidelines, e.g. for warfare.[9] A more comprehensive approach, like that of the former Soviet Union, is to view the concept as a formalized idea of how the whole country can be mobilized to conduct a war.[10]

Doctrine enjoys varying status and applications in different countries. The United Kingdom is an example of a country where the concept of doctrine has gained considerable importance for ther military defence. The supreme doctrine document, *The British Defence Doctrine*, is published by the Ministry of Defence and signed by the British Defence Minister. Its aim is to give all those who are in any way involved in defence issues an understanding of military defence and its role in society: '*faced with today's diverse and often unpredictable challenges, everyone involved in the United Kingdom's defence effort needs to have a clear understanding of why we have armed forces, how these forces fit into the overall pattern of security and defence, and the principles behind their use. In short, they need to understand British defence doctrine.*'[11] The British Defence Doctrine is thus a framework for understanding the nature of armed conflict and the use of military means. The document describes the tasks of the British Armed Forces and the broad structure of the military defence. Moreover it is schematically shown how the military forces work in peacetime and how they are intended to carry out their tasks in wartime. One of the services defines doctrine as follows: '*Military doctrine is a formal expression of military knowledge and thought. . . . which covers the nature of current and future conflicts, the preparation of the Army for such conflicts and the methods of engaging in them to achieve success . . . put most simply, doctrine is what is taught.*'[12]

How does the British interpretation of doctrine compare with Swedish practice? One of the two official definitions, the one mentioned above – '*a compilation of norms for guiding the generation of ideas and practical action*' – is a starting point.[13] In the explanatory document it is noted that doctrine has a narrower meaning in Swedish compared with the Anglo-Saxon concept of doctrine, which is understood to cover items usually covered by manuals in Swedish terminology. In the official publications of the Swedish Armed Forces the concept of doctrine is used most consistently in the *Joint Military Doctrine for Peace Support Operation*s. The chosen definition is identical to NATO's, namely: '*Fundamental principles by which the military forces guide their actions in support of objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgement in application.*'[14] It is worth noting that the document only exists in an English version. The document describes the conditions for international operations and the consequences of action in different situations. The aim is to provide guidance to our own officers regarding action by Swedish forces in international efforts as well as to foreign armed forces in the course of joint efforts.

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[9] Hugemark, Bo. *Strategiska doktriner* [Strategic doctrines]. 1979. Stockholm: Militärhögskolan.

[10] Nilsson, Per Olov. 'Det var bättre förr' [It was better before]. 1998. *FOA-tidningen*, June, pp. 33f.

[11] *British Defence Doctrine JWP 0.01.* 1997. Joint Warfare Publication. London: MOD CS(M)G, pp. 0–01.

[12] *Design For Military Operations—The British Military Doctrine Army Code 71451.* 1996. Army Code. London.

[13] See note 4.

[14] *Joint Military Doctrine: Peace Support Operation.* 1997. Stockholm: Swedish Armed Forces – Headquarters, p. vi.

A long list of the different usages of the word doctrine can be drawn up, and we can simply note that the choice is not an obvious one; it is important to understand this in order to understand and use the term doctrine.

4. Command

The concept of command is complicated, but it has to be considered if you want to design an adequate command doctrine. Among other things command involves various forms of exercising power, e.g. the right to make appointments, allocate resources and exert influence. Since command can be seen as management of complex systems, a number of other perspectives or ways of looking at it have been used, however.[15] See figure 1 below.


Figure 1. Different aspects of command[16]

Command can thus be seen as a system with more or less the above parts. This so-called system-oriented view of command has primarily come to be used within parts of business life. In the military context the classical view of command still dominates, i.e. command as a process which

[15] In this context it should be noted that within systems research one tries to differentiate between perspectives and systems. The system is the object, i.e. that which is studied, in this case the *command system*. The perspective is the method or the attitude the observer uses when studying the object, in this case *command*. See e.g. Agrell, Per Sigurd. *Vett och vilja i värdering av ledningssystem.* 1997 [Management of Subjectivity in Command & Control Assessments]. Stockholm: Försvarets forskningsanstalt.

[16] Figure from Johansson, Per. *Prövning av ledningsfunktioner: Sammanfattande rapport från tidigare arbeten* [Testing of command functions: Summary report from earlier work]. 1997. Stockholm: Försvarets forskningsanstalt. Institutionen för ledningsstudier.

includes giving orders, coordination and control. A summary of a number of definitions of the command concept indicates that the following activities and circumstances are included in the exercise of command:[17]

- Attain goal - perform task
- Arrange, organize resources
- Plan
- Manage information
- Subordination
- Coordination
- Control, provide feedback, evaluate
- Influence

Figure 2. The exercise of command

Neither the figure showing the different views of command nor the summary of established definitions of command gives a complete picture of the command concept. The point to be made here is that our interpretation of command cannot just be taken for granted. It seems likely that the prevailing view or concept of command will influence the contents of the command doctrine. For example, a systems-oriented view can lead to more complete treatment of the command concept in the doctrine, on the one hand, but on the other hand it can lead to a doctrine that largely ignores perhaps the most central thing, namely the activities in the command process. In this paper the concept of *command system* refers to the *command doctrine, command organization, command personnel* and *command technology* used to exercise command.

5. The levels of war

Another decisive aspect of doctrine is the level for which it is designed. Warfare can generally be viewed at the three traditional levels: strategic, operational and tactical. While the concepts of strategic and tactical level are relatively unambiguous, however, there are different interpretations of the operational level and related areas. Presumably this is because the operational level is primarily a link between the strategic and tactical levels. The continuous shifting in the levels of war complicates matters, mainly because of the technical development which means that more and

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[17] The summary is based on studies of accepted definitions of the concepts of command, management, command and control. See, e.g., *Army Doctrine Publication Volume 2: Command Army Code 71564*. 1995: British Army, *Grunder för ledning: Generella principer för ledning av kommunala räddningsinsatser* [Basis for command**:** General principles for command of municipal emergency and rescue efforts]. 1998: Räddningsverket. *Arméreglemente del 2 Taktik* [Army Regulations part 2 Tactics]— *AR 2*. 1995, *Marintaktik 2000* **[**Naval tactics 2000**]**. 1997, *Joint Doctrine Encyclopedia* and *Joint Publication 1-02*, 1997: DOD/Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, Kotter, J.P. *A Force for Change: How Leadership differs from Management.* 1990, *Nationalencyclopedins ordbok.* 1998, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions. AAP-6.* 1998, *U.S. Army Field Manual 100-5 Blueprint for the AirLand Battle.* 1991: Department of the Army/AUSA, *ÖB Grundsyn Ledning* [*The Supreme Commander's View of Command*]. 1993.

more traditionally tactical activities have a direct influence on the operational and strategic level. This is shown in the figure below.


Figure 3. Shifting in the levels of warfare[18]

It can be seen how activity which is strictly at the operational level, illustrated by the black area, is reduced in the figure on the right, which shows the increasing overlap between the levels of war. The grey area represents activity which affects all levels and is strategic and tactical at the same time. The main conclusion for the structure of doctrine is that activity and organizational level are not the same thing; it is the aim of the activity that decides the level at which a unit operates and, accordingly, also whether a doctrine is strategic, operational or tactical. This means that all tasks at the different levels must be examined continuously with respect to their relevance and position in the organization.

6. Knowledge and doctrine

Common to all definitions and usages of the concept of doctrine is the inclusion of some type of knowledge within a field. As we have seen, in many cases there is also an element of policy for thought or action, i.e. doctrine is usually interpreted as in some sense giving guidance. However, this is not obvious; when all is said and done, how a doctrine is interpreted depends on the meaning of the concept of knowledge.

According to one accepted definition, knowledge is tantamount to a well-founded and true belief.[19] This definition gives rise to several questions, for example: What makes a belief well-founded? What does true belief mean and can it really be properly judged? Is belief in something

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[18] Jablonsky, David. 'US Military Doctrine and the Revolution in Military Affairs'. 1994. *PARAMETERS*, Autumn, p. 6.
[19] *Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. 1972: Macmillan and Iac Press pp. 345ff.

always a precondition for knowledge about it? On the basis of this one can ask more generally: Is knowledge attainable? Is experience or reason the source and basis of knowledge? Do our senses provide us with knowledge?[20] While it is not the intention to deal with these eternal questions here, it is necessary to realize that the question of how doctrines develop and should be perceived is complicated. A strict definition of the concept of doctrine consequently requires a full understanding of the nature of knowledge, which is probably unattainable. It should be possible to formulate an understanding of knowledge which supports our goals, however.

Two important questions arise. How is knowledge created in the interplay between what one wants to achieve, the knowledge one already has, the problems met and the lessons of experiences? What is the purpose of knowledge, or what conscious or unconscious effect does it have?[21]

When it comes to the origin of doctrines it can be said that there are two main ideas: a rational view and a more structural view. According to the former, doctrine changes firstly through environmental influences and through a rational and formalized process in which different opinions are weighed up to achieve the best possible overall solution. The structural view holds that doctrine is firstly an intellectual framework for a development, decided mainly by slow, though sometimes sudden and rapid, and comprehensive external changes. In this case the role of doctrine is to formalize and 'tune' the ideas created by the structural factors, which can be everything from political to technical. These views refer directly back to the opening questions about the source and basis of knowledge. Is it reason or experience? Most would answer that it is a bit of each but, as we will see, notions of the relative importance of these opposites can be decisive for the structure and function of doctrine.

What goals or functions can be attributed to doctrine? An instructive way to describe this is to divide doctrine into different forms of knowledge based on the purpose. For example, three main types could be *categorical* knowledge, *cognitive* or *explanatory* knowledge, and *normative* knowledge, where the names give a direct indication of the meanings.[22] In actual fact the above types of knowledge are found irrespective of the types of doctrine studied. However, the distribution between the different types of knowledge often varies and so therefore does the overall function of the doctrine.

A concrete and illustrative example can be taken from the British doctrine system. The diagram below is taken from a British Army document.

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[20] *Filosofisk uppslagsbok* [Philosophy reference book]. 1984, pp. 169ff.
[21] SOU 1992:94. *Skola för bildning* [School for learning]. 1992: Läroplanskommittén (huvudbetänkandet), p. 59.
[22] SOU 1992:94. *Skola för bildning.* 1992: Läroplanskommittén (huvudbetänkandet), sid 59. Möller, L. R. och H. H. Möller. 'Vaernsfaelles doktrinudvikling i Danmark' [Joint doctrine development in Denmark]. 1997. *Militaert tidsskrift*, nummer 3, p. 271. Goldkuhl, Göran. *Kunskapande.* 1998. Linköping: Institutionen för datavetenskap, universitetet och Tekniska högskolan Linköping.

Figure 4. The aim of the British Army doctrine[23]

The figure shows that there is an explanatory and a normative aim at all levels. The main aim is to establish '*a framework of understanding of the approach to warfare in order to provide the foundations for its practical application*', at least at the two tactical levels.[24] At the top level, the military strategic, it is indicated that (military) doctrine is the foundation for the development of defence policy; it is informative, while policy is mainly prescriptive. Thus the document contains mainly cognitive or explanatory knowledge. There are some elements of normative knowledge, but not of an absolute or imperative nature.

Consequently there are some choices to be made when it comes to doctrine development. *Firstly*,
• to what extent should doctrine be built on the basis of experience or rational reasoning? *Secondly*, should a choice be made of
• the types of knowledge which the doctrine should contain, i.e. what functions should be carried out? This choice is mainly about how normative the doctrine should be.
Before these questions are answered, however, one must be clear about the aims of the doctrine.

7. Operational doctrine and command doctrine

The main subject of this study is command doctrine. The question is how it relates to other 'general' military doctrines and what is included in command doctrine. See figure 5 below:

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[23] *Design for Military Operations — The British Military Doctrine Army Code 71451.* 1996. Army Code. London, pp. 1-2.
[24] Ibid, pp. I, 1-1, 1-2.

Figure 5. The relationship between levels of war and command doctrine[25]

Various levels of warfare are shown—strategic, operational and tactical. Clearly a command doctrine must be largely based on operational art and tactics, perhaps even the strategic, principles for waging war. In order to clarify the relationship more closely, however, you have to ask what is meant by command doctrine and what it is to achieve.

In an attempt to define command doctrine systematically, one can use the *operational problem* as a starting point, i.e. arranging battles and resources in time and space so that a decisive conclusion is reached.[26] According to Clausewitz, the decisive conclusion is central to strategy. It is through decisive conclusion that one defeats the opponent's will and strength to wage war and imposes one's own will upon him.[27] Consequently, command should also be exercised so as to force one's will on the adversary.[28]

But how does the operational problem relate to command? An important part of command can be added to the Anglo-Saxon concept of 'command and control', namely, work with the mental process of understanding the situation and relating it to an aim—'comprehension'[29]. Thus, the *command problem* has to be solved within three domains:[30]
- Comprehend the situation and develop the will to act, i.e. how to create a notion of decisive conclusion—an operational idea. ('comprehension')
- Give instructions and guide the activity in accordance with what you have understood and want, i.e. how to realize the operational idea through cooperation with individuals and units. ('command')

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[25] The idea is partly based on Johansson, Per. *Några systemanalytiska begrepp med anknytning till ledningsstudier* [Some systems-analysis concepts connected to command studies]. 1989. Stockholm: Försvarets forskningsanstalt, p. 23.

[26] Fredholm, Lars. 'Grundläggande forskning om ledningsprocessen' [Basic research on the command process]. 1991. In *Ledning och beslutsfattande: Informationsteknologi till samhällets försvar* [Command and decision making: information technology for the defence of society]. Stockholm: Försvarsmedia, pp. 164.

[27] Clausewitz, Carl von. *Om kriget* [On war]. 1991, Stockholm: Bonniers, pp. 229ff.

[28] Försvarsmakten. *Arméreglemente del 2 Taktik — AR 2* [Army regulations part 2 Tactics—AR 2]. 1995. Stockholm: Försvarsmedia, p. 76.

[29] Compare with the German military command process, which traditionally includes situation assessment ("lagesfestellung").

[30] Fredholm, pp. 165f. The argument has been somewhat modified.

- Follow up and control the course of events, i.e. how the feedback from this will be built up and related to the operational idea. ('control')

What we have described can very easily be understood as the operational problem, however. The main solution to the command problem is thus to solve the operational problem or, more strictly, *how to command to solve the operational problem.* Our conclusion is that a description of the preconditions for command with respect to the character of war, and how one should command to reach a decisive conclusion, are two central elements of a command doctrine.

8. The contents of command doctrine

There can be said to be two competing approaches to understanding war. One is a more mechanical approach, characterized by a higher degree of predictability in the sense that general rules or principles are understood to provide good guidance for warfare, in line with Jomini's thoughts on war.[31] A development of this view can be said to be the notion that in the future it will be possible to see the entire battlefield, down to the individual soldiers and platforms, under all conditions and in almost real time.[32] High transparency would then mean two main things. Command would be a question partly of optimizing solutions to a specific, clear problem on the basis of almost perfect information, and partly of synchronizing available resources as effectively as possible.[33] How does this influence the design of the command doctrine? A mechanical understanding of the war should generally provide more scope to use the doctrine for normative purposes. The need to use doctrine to create an understanding of the character of the war and command, like the importance of questioning, i.e. critical, knowledge, will be smaller.

Probably few would agree with a strict notion of the predictability of war, but many observers support the idea that there is increased transparency on the battlefield. While it is clear that an increased ability to see the battlefield from an operational and strategic level tends to lead to more centralized command, it is not obvious that this also leads to a more normative command doctrine. On the contrary, the need for norms for command may decrease if 'all' command functions are judged to have access to 'perfect' information, especially given the technical possibilities of constantly correcting the command from a superior level. But this should also apply if one tries to maintain decentralized decision making and implementation; controlling information or trying to govern through a strongly normative command doctrine would counteract an optimal use of the available information.[34]

The second notion of war builds upon Clausewitz's ideas on friction.[35] In contrast to the previous approach it places great weight on the uncertainty that arises through the influence of war on ideas and intentions. The idea is that uncertainty does not necessarily decrease with advances in information technology. War tends to become more complex, and it is not the absolute level of

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[31] Jomini, Henri (1779—1869). Swiss military theorist and officer. Representative for the school of military theory that tried to identify laws and rules for warfare.
[32] Försvarsmakten. Årsrapport från perspektivplaneringen 97–98 [Annual Report from the Armed Forces long-term planning 97–98]. 1998. Stockholm: Försvarsmakten/Högkvarteret, pp. 38, 43, 96f.
[33] Johnson, Stuart and Martin Libicki. *Dominant Battlespace Knowledge.* 1995. Washington D.C.: NDU Press, p. 6f.
[34] Roman, Gregory A. 'The Command or Control Dilemma. When technology and organizational orientation collide'. 1997. In *Essay on Strategy XIV.* Washington, D.C.: INSS, National Defense University, pp. 5, 7.
[35] Clausewitz describes friction as the 'invisible and all-powerful factor that creates the difficulties of war . . . and . . . appears everywhere in connection with chance and coincidence'. *Om kriget* [On war]. 1991. Stockholm: Bonniers, pp. 79ff.

friction felt by each party that is relevant but the difference, i.e. the relative information advantage. In turn this advantage would still be very sensitive to influence.[36]

As regards the knowledge component, or function, of command doctrine, the main conclusion should be to include less normative knowledge, given that friction still has a central place in warfare. The need for explanatory and cognitive knowledge seems greater, especially as the command might need to be exercised in a differentiated manner. Less and less distinct boundaries between the different levels of war and an increasingly rapid battle tempo can certainly demand centralized command in some situations,[37] but also room for autonomous command at lower levels in other situations.[38]

The kind of knowledge, and thereby doctrine, that two opposite notions of the character of war and origin of doctrine should lead to can be summarized simply as shown in the figure below. If war is characterized by chaos and friction, external factors and experience will dominate the creation of the doctrine. This implies that the doctrine tends to have a pragmatic content, and primarily describes and explains the operational command problem. According to the other, 'Jomini' school, in which war is thought to be subject to rules and predictability, there is more room for rational reasoning and hypotheses about how the command is to be exercised. Rational hypotheses about an activity which one believes to be subject to rules also make a normative doctrine natural.

| *The character of war*	*Orgin*	*Function*
Chaos Friction ⟶	External factors Experience ⟶	Comprehension
Guided by rules Predictability ⟶	Rationality Hypotheses ⟶	Normative

Figure 6. The character of war and the origin and function of doctrines

If we assume that command doctrine should describe the preconditions for command with respect to the character of war, and how to command in order to reach a decisive conclusion, the next question is how to word this in the doctrine document. A logical way to address this is to concentrate on the actual exercise of command, and not on the specifics of organization, technology and personnel. See the figure 7:

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[36] Watts, Barry D. *Clausewitzian Friction and Future War.* 1996. McNair Paper Number 52. Washington, D.C.: INSS, National Defense University, pp. 11:3f.
[37] Jablonsky, p. 8.
[38] Roman, p. 13.

Directive specificity	Command approach	Examples
Mission-specific	Control-free	WWII German
	Selective-control	Israeli Army
Objective-specific	Problem-bounding	British Army
	Problem-solving	U.S. Army
Order-specific	Interventionist	Modern Soviet
	Cyclic	Chinese Army

Figure 7. Alternative command approaches[39]

The figure illustrates traditional notions of command arrangements in some military powers. At one extreme we have the German mission-specific tactic, in which the subordinate units are given more or less complete freedom to perform a task with the allocated resources, and at the other the cyclical command regime, the Chinese example, in which the upper levels give detailed orders in a specified time cycle. Without going further into the characteristics, we can state that *directive specificity* and *command regime* can be dimensions in command doctrine. Supplemented with an *information regime*, for example, it could look like this:


Figure 8. The content of command doctrines

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[39] Alberts, Davis S. och Richard E. Hayes. *Command Arrangements for Peace Operations.* 1995. Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, National Defense University, p. 83ff. Objective-specific principles are more regulated through certain demands on synchronization in time and space and mean a greater degree of central control than mission-specific principles.

Note that this is not a complete picture, clarification is needed regarding, e.g., centralization versus decentralization and organization type (hierarchy or network), which introduces further dimensions. There can also be contradictions which make some choices unrealistic. The idea here is mainly to show how the contents of various command doctrines relate to each other and that the choice of dimensions is the first step in deciding the contents and function of doctrine.

Perhaps the most important insight from the above reasoning, and also from concrete examples, such as *The Supreme Commander's View of Command*, is the importance of avoiding too great a fixation on organization and technology. Instead, operational art and tactics should be emphasized. This does not mean that one should disregard the command system, but at the same time it should not be considered in too much detail in the actual command doctrine. The problem is not just the balance between the different components but that there can be reasons to limit the scope of the doctrine.

9 The need for operational and tactical doctrine

The structure of the military command system should reasonably be based on operational or tactical ideas or principles. Today, however, Sweden has neither a doctrinal document nor any other clear operational level concept. Operational ideas and principles can of course be traced in the operational and long-term planning work. Given that doctrines should create understanding of the organization, provide guidance as to how to operate and should be able to be tested in a clear feedback process, it seems that both the *Operational Planning (Op P)* and *The Armed Forces Vision 2020* are inadequate as doctrinal documents. A crucial problem of the former, which is often mentioned as a possible doctrine, is of course that it is classified and therefore cannot be widely distributed.

The doctrine work which is nevertheless being conducted by the armed services, so far especially by the Army, thus has no actual equivalent at the operational level. Ground, sea and air forces try to develop their doctrines partly outside of a proper operational context. In addition, officer training does not seem to be sufficiently ambitious as regards tactics and operational art to be able to make up for the absence of operational doctrine by giving future commanders much in the way of individual knowledge or skills in the area.

In summary, the operational consequences of the new tasks of the Swedish Armed Forces and changes in other requirements are not widely enough known, and knowledge of tactics and operational art is generally inadequate within the Armed Forces. We also question whether the operational consequences of the military's new situation are sufficiently analysed within the Armed Forces.

In this context it can be noted that, internationally, doctrine development is extensive, both at the multinational and national levels. The most usual reasons given for this are:
• new tasks in a security environment that, moreover, is characterized by uncertainty, but also
• increased international cooperation between countries with different working methods.

Less timebound motives that are often put forward can be added to these. Doctrine can give an organization the means:
• to guide certain activities
• to disseminate knowledge and create understanding in the organization
• to analyse and manage new threats and situations.

In the light of the latter motives for doctrine it also becomes clear why the new situation of the Swedish Armed Forces provides a new role for doctrine. A new situation must be analysed, new knowledge disseminated and new policies must be made. In actual fact the development and the work of continually renewing doctrine is as important as the actual contents of the document. The organization becomes involved during this work and is forced to study the operational problems and continuously reconsider the conclusions.

10. Conclusions

What are the conclusions of our studies of doctrine and its relation to knowledge, the character of war, the operational problem and, more specifically, command?

We propose that doctrine can have different functions and, drawing on the example of management, three main categories of command doctrine can be identified:
• A deliberate and normative plan of how to command
• A non-normative description of present command practices in the organization
• A general knowledge of command and a system for organizational learning.
In the latter case the aim is primarily to arrive at a readiness for action and ability at the level of the individual rather than a homogeneous and uniform view of command throughout the organization.

However, quite irrespective of which direction is chosen with respect to the function of doctrine, a command doctrine for the Swedish Armed Forces should satisfy the following requirements:
• A description of the command problem, i.e. ensure *understanding*
• An idea of *how* to command in order to solve the operational problem
• A system for *feedback.*
Something which is often indirectly mentioned, but seldom part of the make-up of the doctrine, is just this last point, namely, how to keep the doctrine up-to-date. A critical attitude to all knowledge, not least if it is elevated to doctrine and is also normative, is fundamental, otherwise the knowledge will certainly get out of date and the doctrine will cease to develop.[40] It is important to make this clear. A formalized system for feedback as part of the doctrine can increase the prospects that the contents of the doctrine interest those affected and that it is relevant.[41]

Work on a new command doctrine for the Swedish Armed Forces is still in its infancy and we have pointed out one way of approaching the problem and some important choices to be made. It is our firm opinion that the doctrine question should be focused upon during the ongoing command overhaul. We see clear and well laid out principles for the Swedish Armed Forces'

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[40] Möller, L. R. and H. H. Möller, p. 272.
[41] Clay, John. 'The Fifth Service Looks at Doctrine'. 1996. *Joint Force Quarterly*, Winter 1996–97, p. 32f.

operational level and tactical level—command doctrine if you prefer—as essential for securing our aims for the command system and being able to change it in pace with new demands.

As regards the overhaul of the command system we can only state that this demands well analysed operational ideas. In the light of this and the international development in the field of doctrine it seems very important that the Swedish Armed Forces embark upon an extensive buildup of knowledge within operational art and tactics, linked to the current military problems. The Armed Forces can wait to decide the extent to which it should have formalized doctrines and the functions they should have.

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