


Formalized Mathematics

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Abstract

It is generally accepted that in principle it's possible to formalize completely almost all of present-day mathematics. The practicability of *actually* doing so is widely doubted, as is the value of the result. But in the computer age we believe that such formalization is possible and desirable. In contrast to the QED Manifesto however, we do not offer polemics in support of such a project. We merely try to place the formalization of mathematics in its historical perspective, as well as looking at existing praxis and identifying what we regard as the most interesting issues, theoretical and practical.

1 History and Philosophy

Mathematics is generally regarded as the exact subject *par excellence*. But the language commonly used by mathematicians (in papers, monographs, and even textbooks) can be remarkably vague; perhaps not when compared with everyday speech but certainly when compared with the language used by practitioners of other intellectual disciplines such as the natural sciences or philosophy. Trybulec and Świączkowska (1992) point out that in a way this is natural: since the underlying semantics of mathematics is generally clearer than that of other disciplines, the mind is naturally trammelled into a precise mode of thinking, and terminological exactness is less important. But a knowledgeable reader is sometimes needed to separate rhetorical flourish from real content, and to appreciate the context in which results are asserted. Some everyday phrases are imbued with a particular significance; observe for example the crucial distinction between a ‘mapping into X ’ and a ‘mapping onto X ’, or the precise (albeit context-dependent) meaning of woolly-sounding expressions like ‘for almost all x ’. And on the other hand many issues that the author feels are obvious or unimportant may be glossed over. Bourbaki (1968) stresses the importance of ‘*abuses of language*, without which any mathematical text runs the risk of pedantry, not to say unreadability’, but many of the conventions go beyond mere abuse of language. Consider the following examples taken from the early pages of Matsumura (1986):

- If $f : A \rightarrow B$ is a ring homomorphism and J is an ideal of B , then $f^{-1}(J)$ is an ideal of A and we denote this by $A \cap J$; if A is a subring of B and f is the inclusion map then this is the same as the usual set-theoretic notion of intersection. In general this is not true, but confusion does not arise.
- When we say that R has characteristic p , or write $\text{char } R = p$, we always mean that $p > 0$ is a prime number.
- In definitions and theorems about rings, it may sometimes happen that the condition $A \neq 0$ is omitted even when it is actually necessary.

Trybulec and Świączkowska (1992) remark that the language of mathematical texts isn’t incontrovertibly a natural language at all; but it invariably contains a substantial admixture of natural language, and that has all the usual potential for ambiguity and imprecision. This might not be a problem if mathematics were a small, unified subject easily graspable by a single practitioner. But on the contrary mathematics is heading increasingly in the direction of specialization, and it’s not realistic to expect mathematical physicists, say, to appreciate deeply all the theoretical results in topology, differential geometry, numerical analysis and what not that they use.

There is also the question of the correctness of mathematical reasoning. Mathematical proofs are subjected to peer review before publication, but there are plenty of well-documented cases where published results turned out to be faulty. A notable example is the purported proof of the 4-colour theorem by Kempe (1879); the error in this proof was eventually pointed out in print by Heawood (1890), and it is only with the work of Appel and Haken (1976) that the theorem has finally come to be ac-

cepted.¹ The errors need not be deep mathematical ones, as shown by the following from Littlewood (1986):

Professor Offord and I recently committed ourselves to an odd mistake (Annals of Mathematics (2) 49, 923, 1.5). In formulating a proof a plus sign got omitted, becoming in effect a multiplication sign. The resulting false formula got accepted as a basis for the ensuing fallacious argument. (In defence, the final result was known to be true.)

A book by Lecat (1935) gave 130 pages of errors made by major mathematicians up to 1900. With the abundance of theorems being published today, often emanating from writers who are not trained mathematicians, one fears that a project like Lecat's would be practically impossible, or at least would demand a journal to itself!

We have separated the concerns of imprecision and incorrectness, but they are linked. If one mathematician uses another's result without fully appreciating the definitions underlying it or the conditions attached to it, this can lead to errors. Moreover, as famously shown by Lakatos (1976), incorrectness and imprecision can shade imperceptibly close to one another. Lakatos discusses how Euler's theorem about polyhedra has changed over time. It was shown to be incorrect, but rather than being overthrown, it merely evolved, incorporating additional explicit conditions which formerly were either left unsaid or not appreciated at all. In the final incarnation its validity stands almost as a definition of a certain kind of polyhedron. This is not such an uncommon fate for important theorems. For example, Stokes's theorem has been generalized so much, and been associated with the development of so much technical machinery, that the theorem itself is almost a triviality. Even if one does not subscribe in full to Lakatos's thesis that mathematics has a strong empirical component placing it almost on a par with physical sciences, such examples are worth reflecting on.

The formalization of mathematics addresses both these questions, precision and correctness. By *formalization* we mean expressing mathematics, both statements and proofs, in a (usually small and simple) formal language with strict rules of grammar and unambiguous semantics. The latter point bears repeating: just writing something in a symbolic language is not sufficient for formality if the *semantics* of that language is ill-defined.² We can split the project of formalization into two parts:

1. Formalizing the statements of theorems, and the implicit context (definitions etc.) on which they depend.
2. Formalizing the proofs of the results and subjecting them to precise checking.

These are usually considered together, but perhaps merely stating theorems formally without proving them has itself a valuable role. In the construction of computer systems, formal specification has proved to be valuable in bringing out unstated assumptions and clarifying thoughts — it doesn't seem too fanciful to suggest that there

¹There are still qualms over the fact that the proof relied on computer checking of cases. We distinguish sharply between ad hoc checking programs like this and the kind of use we propose of computers to prove theorems *in a formal deductive calculus*.

²For example, the Z specification language (Spivey 1988), which has been around for many years, is really only now becoming formal in our sense, as a standardization effort clears up ambiguities in its semantics. Indeed, the book just cited discusses four different semantics for 'undefined' expressions.

could be similar benefits for mathematics. In practice, though, we are also interested in checking the correctness of proofs, and formalization of the statements and then the proofs is a prerequisite for doing this systematically.

1.1 Rigour and the axiomatic method

There are all sorts of arguments used in technical disciplines to establish the truth of assertions. Sometimes people become convinced of the truth of arithmetical conjectures on the basis of numerical evidence. But these methods can lead to errors, and since at least the time of the Greeks it has been generally accepted that a true mathematical proof must be *deductive*. That is, it must proceed from accepted, or at least explicitly stated, assumptions via a series of small incontrovertibly correct steps. Sometimes these steps themselves may be based on spatial or even mechanical intuition — Uspenskii (1961) gives some examples of the latter. But such intuition too has fallen into disrepute in recent times, following the discovery of such pathologies as Peano’s space-filling curve and Bolzano’s and Weierstrass’s everywhere continuous nowhere differentiable functions.

Now it doesn’t seem fair to dismiss all geometric reasoning as non-rigorous. Since the time of Descartes it has been known how to reduce geometry to arithmetic (understood in a wide sense); sometimes this makes things easier, but at times it can obscure the immediacy and simplicity of geometric arguments. Arnol’d (1990) detects a vivid contrast already between the inventors of calculus: Newton’s reasoning was strongly geometric whereas Leibniz stressed algebraic manipulation. More recently, Minkowski has shown how quite elementary geometrical reasoning can lead to deep and important results in number theory. Nevertheless, geometric reasoning nowadays tends to be seen as a convenient and illuminating shorthand for a purely symbolic proof,³ as Littlewood (1986) says:

A heavy warning used to be given that pictures are not rigorous; this has never had its bluff called and has permanently frightened its victims into playing for safety. Some pictures, of course, are not rigorous, but I should say most are (and I use them whenever possible myself). [...] pictorial *arguments*, while not so purely conventional, can be quite legitimate [...] in the sense that in translating into symbols no step occurs that is not both unequivocal and trivial.

But geometry is just one particularly important example of how everyday intuitions can lead us astray. There is always a danger of being misled by the superficial similarity of an abstract structure to some particular concrete one; for example one might accidentally assume that multiplication in a ring must be commutative. Sometimes the results can be serendipitous, e.g. the use of complex numbers and Euler’s successful manipulations of infinite series. But they can also lead to serious errors, e.g. the purported proof of Fermat’s Last Theorem based on the assumption of unique factorization in arbitrary algebraic number fields.

³By contrast, some early proofs of the Fundamental Theorem of Algebra, for example, leave some doubt over whether the simple geometric observations they use do in fact fit easily into a symbolic framework.

The pathologies of real analysis and the discovery of non-Euclidean geometries, among other innovations, stimulated a general determination among mathematicians to bring out unstated assumptions and either justify them or avoid them. Even the Euclidean canon was not immune from criticism: indeed long before Gauss had pointed out that the notion of ‘betweenness’ is often used in Euclid, but never defined. This in turn led to the rise of the modern refinement of the axiomatic method, where a set of axioms is established and all conclusions must proceed from them by steps that are *purely logical* and make no additional mathematical assumptions. Apart from the question of reliability, this turns out to be very useful, since the same set of axioms often admits various different realizations (a point made before, e.g. by Boole). Consequently the same reasoning can be applied in different situations, giving benefits of elegance and economy. One of the early classics of the axiomatic method was a treatise on geometry by Hilbert (1899), which made all assumptions explicit and analyzed the interdependence of the axioms in detail. Reputedly he once stated that it should be possible to replace the words ‘point’, ‘line’ and ‘plane’ by ‘table’, ‘chair’ and ‘beer-mug’ without invalidating any of the theorems of geometry.

Also present in the *Zeitgeist* at about the turn of the century was a foundationalist tendency. Not satisfied merely with uncovering the hidden assumptions in mathematics, many tried to justify them on the basis of less dubitable principles. Various mathematicians showed how the reals could be understood as certain infinite sets of natural numbers, and Dedekind (1888) showed how all the properties of natural numbers could be deduced from a very small set of axioms. He also showed how the natural numbers could be constructed directly in pure set theory, given an infinite set; Frege proposed another definition which he claimed was based on logic alone.

But Cantor’s set theory marked a bold introduction of the actual infinite into mathematics. This had long been viewed with scepticism, Gauss’s interdiction being well-known. Cantor distinguished carefully between ‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’ multiplicities, but many who used superficially similar methods of reasoning started to encounter worrying paradoxes. Some of these paradoxes, notably Russell’s (‘the set of all sets that are not members of themselves’), involved only very simple concepts like membership and predication. Foundational studies were plunged into a new crisis, even the most trivial intuitive ideas seeming to cause major problems.

In this atmosphere, it’s not surprising that the complete formalization of mathematical proof should be attempted; in any case, it can be seen as the natural next step in the evolution of ever greater precision and rigour in mathematics. If basic concepts like ‘set’ and ‘member’ are problematical, how can natural language and intuitive proof ever be trusted? Moreover Zermelo, who independently discovered Russell’s paradox at about the same time, had now isolated a few set construction principles that seemed enough for all the applications of set theory in mathematics, and apparently did not lead to contradiction. But Zermelo’s *Aussonderungssaxiom*⁴ relied on the notion of a ‘definit’ property, and attempts by others to make this precise inevitably focused on restricting the *language* in which that property was stated.

Whatever the level of formalization of a deductive proof, it may be rather unenlightening to read. In cases where the deductive proof is arrived at via geometric intuition, that intuition is valuable for understanding the proof. In general, the whole

⁴‘Separation’, or perhaps better ‘picking-out’ axiom.

process by which the theorem and its proof were discovered may be of paramount importance to grasp the theorem, the proof and their significance (e.g. applicability to physical science or relation to other parts of mathematics). It's well-known that one doesn't 'understand' a proof merely by having checked the correctness of each inference it contains. Some mathematicians prefer the intellectual purity of the deductive part, probably following the examples of such worthies as Newton and Gauss (the latter famously referred to other considerations as the scaffolding used to construct a beautiful building, which should be taken down when the building is finished). But generally, especially in introductory textbooks, there is a lot of additional discussion. A. Trybulec distinguishes the 'formal stratum' and the 'informal stratum', which are present in different proportions depending on the style of the author and the intended audience. A similar combination often occurs in formal specifications of computer systems, and advocates of 'literate programming' accompany program texts with an interwoven explanatory discussion.

1.2 The History of Formal Logic

The idea of reducing reasoning to computation in some kind of formal calculus is an old dream, surveyed by Marciszewski and Murawski (1995). Some trace the idea back to Raymond Lull, though this is perhaps dubious. Certainly Hobbes (1651) made explicit the analogy in the slogan 'Reason [...] is nothing but Reckoning'⁵. This parallel was developed by Leibniz, who envisaged a 'characteristica universalis' (universal language) and a 'calculus ratiocinator' (calculus of reasoning). His idea was that disputes of all kinds, not merely mathematical ones, could be settled if the parties translated their dispute into the *characteristica* and then simply calculated. Leibniz even made some steps towards realizing this lofty goal, but his work was largely forgotten. Meanwhile, mathematics continued to acquire new symbolisms, which as Whitehead (1919) says:

[...] have invariably been introduced to make things easy. [...] by the aid of symbolism, we can make transitions in reasoning almost mechanically by the eye, which otherwise would call into play the higher faculties of the brain. [...] Civilisation advances by extending the number of important operations which can be performed without thinking about them.

It was to be expected that the use of symbolism would eventually extend beyond the subject matter of mathematics, to the reasoning used *in* mathematics. Boole (1848) developed the first really successful formal system for logical and set-theoretic reasoning. What's more, he was one of the first to emphasize the possibility of applying formal calculi to several different situations, and doing calculations according to formal rules without regard to the underlying interpretation. In this way he anticipated important parts of the modern axiomatic method. However Boole's logic was limited to propositional reasoning, and it was not until the much later development of

⁵Chapter V: Of Reason, and Science. 'For as Arithmeticians teach to adde and subtract in *numbers* [...] The Logicians teach the same in consequences of words [...] And as in Arithmetique, unpractised men must, and Professors themselves may often erre, and cast up false; so also in any other subject of Reasoning the ablest, most attentive, and most practised men, may deceive themselves, and inferre false conclusions.'

quantifiers that formal logic was ready to be applied to general mathematics. The first systems adequate for this purpose were developed by Frege and Peano. Both were mathematicians, and to some extent they had a common motive of making mathematical reasoning more precise. But there were many contrasts between them.

Frege (1879) devised his ‘Begriffsschrift’ (‘concept-script’ or ‘ideography’) for formal logic and mathematics, with the particular aim of carrying through what later became known as the logicist programme. He wanted to prove that not only the reasoning used in mathematics, but the *underlying assumptions too*, and therefore the whole of mathematics, are just pure logic. This would show that mathematics is analytic, refuting Kant’s dictum that it is synthetic a priori. Frege made all his deductions using a precisely defined formal deductive system. For this reason above all others he is nowadays commonly regarded as the founding father of modern logic. Moreover, he independently invented quantifiers, and drew attention to numerous important distinctions (e.g. between x and $\{x\}$ and between \in and \subseteq). However his Begriffsschrift, whatever its merits, was a two-dimensional system of lines which was quite unlike conventional mathematical notation, and was a nightmare for printers.⁶

Peano’s teaching experience led him to be interested in stating mathematical results and arguments precisely. He developed a formal notation for expressing mathematical propositions, which was rather closer to conventional symbolism than was Frege’s concept-script. He was not so interested in a foundational reduction, but concentrated on rewriting mathematics in a formal framework. Together with his colleagues and assistants he published a substantial amount of formalized mathematics: his journal *Rivista di Matematica* was published from 1891 until 1906, and polished versions were collected in various editions of the *Formulaire de Mathématique*. However, although he stated mathematical propositions in symbolic form, and seemed to be striving towards a way of transforming assertions by analogy with algebraic equations, he never developed a formal deductive system.

On meeting Peano at a mathematical congress, Russell was sufficiently impressed to adopt Peano’s symbolism in his own foundational investigation of mathematics. He had started a similar programme to Frege, at first independently, before becoming aware, via Peano, of how much Frege had already done. On studying his works, Russell found a logical inconsistency at the core of Frege’s system (the Russell paradox which we have already mentioned). The story of how he informed Frege of this just as the second volume of Frege’s book was in the press is well-known. Peano did not escape either: Zermelo (1908) waspishly rebutted Peano’s criticism of the Axiom of Choice by remarking that since Peano’s system was inconsistent, AC was deducible in it along with everything else.

Russell developed his own logic, which was distinguished from others by its introduction of the notion of *type*. (We shall have more to say about this idea later.) His logic combined, to some extent, the notational convenience of Peano’s system with the precision and foundational aspirations of Frege’s work; moreover it wasn’t obviously inconsistent. In their monumental work ‘*Principia Mathematica*’, Whitehead and Russell (1910) began a formal development of mathematics from this basis. Without the flexibility which typelessness allowed, it was no longer possible to derive the

⁶Frege remarked that ‘the comfort of the typesetter is certainly not the *summum bonum*’.

existence of an infinite set from logic alone,⁷ and a separate Axiom of Infinity needed to be posited (as well as an Axiom of Reducibility, but that was a consequence of the unnecessary complication of ramified types). For this reason, *Principia* failed to establish the logicist thesis that mathematics is completely reducible to logic. Moreover, as Gödel (1944) remarks:

It is to be regretted that this first comprehensive and thorough going presentation of a mathematical logic and the derivation of mathematics from it is so greatly lacking in formal precision in the foundations (contained in *1–*21 of *Principia*), that it presents in this respect a considerable step backwards as compared with Frege. What is missing, above all, is a precise statement of the syntax of the formalism.

Despite these misgivings, *Principia* unmistakably succeeded in showing that important parts of real mathematical reasoning could be written out in a completely formal logic, albeit starting from a few non-logical axioms. In a way this was a triumph that has never been surpassed. But the resulting text demands extremely close attention from the reader, and there can be few who made the effort. Indeed, Russell (1968) remarks that his own intellect ‘never quite recovered from the strain of writing it’.⁸ Given this, the idea of a practical project to formalize mathematics completely, or even to use formal logic at all, seemed a dubious one. The development of *Principia* was never carried further, perhaps because of Russell’s exhaustion, or simply because his primary interest was the logicist thesis rather than formal mathematics *per se*. Increasingly, formal logic came to be seen as a theoretical device, rather than as a practical tool. The aim of the pioneers of actually *using* logic was widely dismissed. For example Rasiowa and Sikorski (1970) say:

... this mechanical method of deducing some mathematical theorems has no practical value because it is too complicated in practice.

1.3 Hilbert’s Programme

But there was still considerable interest in logical systems *as themselves objects of study*. The crisis over the introduction of infinitistic methods into mathematics, which we have already mentioned, was still rumbling on, and Brouwer even rejected the general use of the law of the excluded middle ($P \vee \neg P$). Now on previous occasions, when mathematicians wished to provide a foundation for some new technique, they did it by an interpretation in terms of known mathematics. The classic example is the interpretation of complex numbers as pairs of real numbers. But for justifying infinite sets, there seemed to be no such way out: how can one find an interpretation for infinite sets in terms of finite ones? Hilbert’s ingenious idea was to get round this by studying not the *objects*, but the mathematical *proofs*, which are always finite, even when they are about infinite sets.

⁷There are related systems, e.g. Quine’s NF and ML, presented formally by Rosser (1953), which can prove the Axiom of Infinity, yet are not known to be inconsistent. However precisely because of the perverse way in which infinity is deduced (the Axiom of Choice fails) these are widely distrusted.

⁸‘I have been ever since definitely less capable of dealing with difficult abstractions than I was before’.

Specifically, Hilbert proposed the following programme.⁹ Formal systems for various mathematical theories should be developed; thanks to the line of work culminating in Russell’s logic, combined with Hilbert’s own flair for axiomatization, this was straightforward. Then these should be proved *consistent*, i.e. that it is not possible to deduce both a theorem and its negation; in symbols $\vdash P$ and $\vdash \neg P$. Now given this, any ‘concrete’ theorem of the form $\forall n \in \mathbb{N}. P[n]$ that is deducible in the system must be true. Otherwise there’d be some $k \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $\neg P[k]$, so any reasonable logical system will certainly be capable of proving $\vdash \neg P[k]$ (we assume that $P[k]$ is simply a matter of calculation for each specific k , in particular not itself involving unbounded quantifiers). But since $\vdash \forall n \in \mathbb{N}. P[n]$, we also have $\vdash P[k]$, which is impossible because the system was assumed consistent. This reasoning extends to arbitrary numbers of universal quantifiers; a good example of such an assertion is Fermat’s Last Theorem: $\forall x, y, z, n \in \mathbb{N}. n > 2 \wedge x^n + y^n = z^n \Rightarrow x = 0 \vee y = 0$.

For Hilbert, therefore, the business of proving consistency of formal theories was central. An interesting subsidiary question was the *Entscheidungsproblem* (decision problem): is it possible to decide questions in these formal mathematical theories purely mechanically?¹⁰ Hilbert and his assistants, as well as numerous other mathematicians and logicians, attacked these problems. Before long, there were negative conclusions.

First Gödel (1931) proved his famous First Incompleteness Theorem, which says more or less that no given (consistent) formal system can ever encompass even all the truths of elementary number theory: there will always be true statements that cannot be proved in the system.¹¹ Gödel’s method was roughly as follows. It’s easy to see that each sentence ϕ of the formal language can be allocated a unique ‘Gödel number’ $\ulcorner \phi \urcorner$, and likewise each proof — there are after all only countably many of each, and they have a quite simple structure. Moreover, for any sensible encoding, the question of whether p is (the numerical coding of) a proof of ϕ can be encoded as a representable predicate¹² $Prov(p, \ulcorner \phi \urcorner)$, with the basic property that if $\vdash \phi$ then also $\vdash \exists p. Prov(p, \ulcorner \phi \urcorner)$. Now using a diagonalization argument, Gödel was able to exhibit a statement ϕ that (intuitively) asserts its own unprovability in the system:

$$\vdash \phi \equiv \neg \exists p. Prov(p, \ulcorner \phi \urcorner)$$

Now if the formal system is consistent, $\not\vdash \phi$, for if $\vdash \phi$ we have $\vdash \exists p. Prov(p, \ulcorner \phi \urcorner)$ and hence $\vdash \neg \phi$. However ϕ is certainly *true* because it states precisely that unprovability! On the additional assumption that the system is *1-consistent*, i.e. all provable existential statements are true, then also $\not\vdash \neg \phi$. But note that since ϕ isn’t provable, adding $\neg \phi$ as a new axiom retains consistency, so a formal system can be consistent yet

⁹For a more detailed discussion of Hilbert’s programme, we recommend the penetrating analysis by Kreisel (1958).

¹⁰This would amount to a realization of Leibniz’s dream, at least if it is restricted to mathematics.

¹¹True to the practices of informal mathematics that we spend so much energy berating, we shall not state precisely the conditions on a system for Gödel’s theorem to apply, and shall sometimes take it for granted later that we are discussing such a formal system, and that it is consistent. This is a reasonable practical assumption.

¹²Roughly speaking, a predicate that can be calculated (by proof if need be) for each specific allocation of numeric arguments — this corresponds to the fact that a ‘formal system’ must allow an unambiguous algorithmic way of checking whether a purported proof is valid.

not 1-consistent; thus the argument above that consistency implies the truth of provable *universal* formulas cannot be sharpened. Now neither of these conclusions is fatal to Hilbert's programme:¹³ he never identified mathematics with reasoning in a particular formal system, and apparently influenced by Brouwer's critique, was prepared to dismiss existential theorems without a construction as strictly meaningless anyway!¹⁴ But soon after came Gödel's Second Incompleteness Theorem, which states roughly that any realistic mathematical theory, even elementary number theory, is unable to prove its own consistency. So any consistency proof of a formal system requires *greater* mathematical resources than are available in the system, and so it certainly isn't possible to justify infinite sets finitistically. Despite the apparent promise of Hilbert's ingenious idea of using proofs, it turns out to be just as circular as using interpretations — it's as if there's some mysterious conservation principle at work like that forbidding perpetual motion! Moreover Church (1936) and Turing (1936) showed the *Entscheidungsproblem* to be unsolvable even for pure first order logic, Turing by introducing his famous machines and so giving the first really convincing definition of a 'formal system'. Finally Tarski (1936) showed that arithmetical truth is not even arithmetically definable, let alone recursively enumerable.

Despite the apparent failure of Hilbert's programme, the general interest in metalogical studies has yielded many benefits and thrown new light on parts of mathematics. (Though destructive to Hilbert's programme, some of the negative results mentioned above have a profound mathematical and philosophical significance.) First order logic seems particularly interesting from a metalogical point of view: it's strong enough to express some nontrivial mathematics, yet weak enough to allow interesting metatheorems (e.g. on the existence on nonstandard models of the first order theory of reals). There turn out to be some interesting first order mathematical theories that *are* decidable, and this often generalizes previous results. For example, the quantifier elimination procedure for real closed fields given by Tarski (1951) is a natural generalization of well-known results on polynomial elimination such as Sturm's theorem.

1.4 The Bourbaki view

The book series in the name of Nicolas Bourbaki (a pen-name for a group of French mathematicians) 'takes up mathematics from the beginning, and gives complete proofs'. This beginning (Bourbaki 1968) is something like Zermelo set theory¹⁵ axiomatized in a system of first order logic, which includes an indefinite descriptor τ building in the Axiom of (Global) Choice.

For whereas in the past it was thought that every branch of mathematics depended on its own particular intuitions which provided its concepts and

¹³Though it does refute the stronger form that all these theorems should be provable in a fixed finitistic system. Hilbert's precise agenda was never clear; at first he presented consistency as the objective *per se*.

¹⁴It seems bizarre to accept P as meaningful while dismissing $\neg P$ as meaningless. However there is some Popperian justification for this, since a universal statement is *refutable* by calculation. Anyway, Hilbert's views varied over time and were not always clear, so a detailed exegesis is difficult. Certainly it's necessary to accept universal formulas as meaningful since an assertion of consistency is itself of this form.

¹⁵Later editions included the Axiom of Replacement, giving something closer to ZFC. The author is not sure whether this axiom has ever been *used* in Bourbaki.

prime truths, nowadays it is known to be possible, logically speaking, to derive practically the whole of known mathematics from a single source, the Theory of Sets.

Elsewhere Bourbaki (1948) says:

On these foundations, I state that I can build up the whole of mathematics of the present day; and if there is anything original in my procedure, it lies solely in the fact that, instead of being content with such a statement, I proceed to prove it in the same way as Diogenes proved the existence of motion; and my proof will become more and more complete as my treatise grows.

The Bourbaki development is intellectually elegant, if rather austere. Stress is placed on developing properties of various key mathematical structures like topological spaces and groups. Some structures are instances of several others (e.g. topological groups are both topological spaces and groups), or are derived from others using certain canonical techniques such as completion. The relative sophistication of these techniques means that the set theory is used heavily even in the study of abstract structures; moreover, set theory is often necessary to provide existence proofs for many of them. So although Hilbert's axiomatic method was an important inspiration, deduction from the structure axioms uses much more than pure (first order) logic. Really, one is working all the time in axiomatic set theory. In the IMPS terminology (Farmer, Guttman, and Thayer 1990) the Bourbaki system is a 'big theory' rather than a mosaic of 'little theories'. A typical example of how concrete structures arise from consideration of abstract ones is the development of real numbers given by Bourbaki (1966). The reals are constructed as the completion of the uniform space (this structure is a Bourbaki innovation) induced by the topological group of rationals.

The stated purpose of the Bourbaki treatise is 'to provide a solid foundation for the whole body of modern mathematics'. He works, notionally anyway, with a fixed formal system axiomatizing set theory. Mathias (1991) expresses surprise and dismay that Gödel's theorems on the essential incompleteness of such systems seem not to perturb the Bourbachistes. Kreisel (1970) remarks:

The failure of Hilbert's programme shows that formalism does not provide a theory of the actual process of mathematical reasoning; *it is not*, so to speak, *a fundamental theory*. (Of course, formalization is useful, either in limited areas or in combination with other considerations.)

But even Gödel's undecidable sentence for a simple number theory is really just a theoretical pathology. Paris and Harrington (1991) have come a bit closer to a realistic mathematical statement that cannot be proved in a simple first order arithmetic; even this relies on a rather artificial encoding of a combinatorial result in number theory. It seems we are nowhere near finding a mathematically interesting incompleteness in ZFC set theory, by which we mean a statement unprovable in ZFC but known for other reasons to be true, as distinct from statements like the Continuum Hypothesis which have no more been decided by non-formalistic methods. Certainly, it's hard to imagine a mainstream mathematical result which could not be proved in ZFC set theory; the

Bourbaki project has developed extensive parts of mathematics and failed so far to find any. So from a *practical* point of view, a disdainful attitude to the significance of Gödel's results seems justified.¹⁶ As remarked by Gentzen (1935):

It is remarkable that in the whole of existing mathematics only very few easily classifiable and constantly recurring forms of inference are used, so that an extension of these methods may be desirable in theory, but is insignificant in practice.

Although Bourbaki introduces a formal logical system in considerable detail, it is soon forgotten about for reasons of readability and practicality:

If formalized mathematics were as simple as the game of chess, then once our chosen formalized language had been described there would remain only the task of writing out our proofs in this language, [...] But the matter is far from being as simple as that, and no great experience is necessary to perceive that such a project is absolutely unrealizable: the tiniest proof at the beginning of the Theory of Sets would already require several hundreds of signs for its complete formalization. [...] formalized mathematics cannot in practice be written down in full, [...] We shall therefore very quickly abandon formalized mathematics, [...]

Nevertheless, translatability *in principle* into the formal set theory is taken as the final arbiter of correctness. Bourbaki (1968) clearly says that 'the correctness of a mathematical text is verified by comparing it, more or less explicitly, with the rules of a formalized language'. The intention is that the whole Bourbaki series uses only layers of convention and abbreviation, and could in principle be written out completely formally. This view of formalizability as the criterion of correctness now seems to be widespread in the mathematical community. For example, Mac Lane (1986) says almost the same thing (p. 377):

As to precision, we have now stated an absolute standard of rigor: A Mathematical proof is rigorous when it is (or could be) written out in the first-order predicate language $L(\in)$ as a sequence of inferences from the axioms ZFC, each inference made according to one of the stated rules. [...] When a proof is in doubt, its repair is usually just a partial approximation to the fully formal version.

That such a view is widespread really does seem to ignore Gödel's theorem. Simple reasoning shows that the Gödel sentence for ZFC set theory is not provable in ZFC, but, if we accept the consistency of ZFC (and surely if it is our criterion for rigour we must), it is true. Are we to dismiss this argument for the truth of the sentence as non-rigorous? In fact Lakatos (1980) identifies this, and other examples like the duality principle of projective geometry, as *post-formal* proofs, reached by analysis of a formal system rather than derived inside it. (Though of course the reasoning could in its

¹⁶This does however suggest the interesting research problem of systematically using non-formal reasoning to obtain new results; perhaps Gödel's theorems indicate that in our reliance on the axiomatic method we're failing to exercise the full potential of our mathematical faculties!

turn be written out in another formal system.) But once again, we accept that Gödel's theorem isn't likely to be relevant to any mathematical proofs we are interested in, and from a strictly practical point of view, this objective standard of rigour is a good one. Rather than discuss that, we want to focus on the following question: why do we only accept formalizability in principle, not formalization in practice?

1.5 Enter the computer

Thus far, formalized mathematics seems an unpromising idea. Bourbaki may be right that such formalization is simply impractical for people to do. In any case, as Naur (1994) points out, formalization sometimes leads to *more* errors, not fewer, as the underlying intuition which provides a check on correctness begins to get lost — so even one of the claimed merits of formalization is open to question. The problems of formalization have been well put by Constable, Knoblock, and Bates (1985):

It is thus possible to translate the proof of any mathematical theorem into a completely formal proof. However, the prospect of actually doing this is quite daunting because an informal proof of modest length will expand to a formal one of prodigious size and will require in its production extreme care and detailed knowledge of the more or less arbitrary conventions of the particular formalism. These tedious details will in sheer number dominate the interesting mathematical ideas which are the *raison d'être* of the proof.

But like the authors just quoted, we believe that the arrival of the computer changes the situation completely, for several reasons.

1. As pointed out by Naur and others like van Gasteren (1990), as one relies less on intuition and more on rules of formal manipulation, accuracy in those manipulations becomes more important. This is tedious for people;¹⁷ but checking conformance to formal rules is one of the things computers are very good at. Indeed, the Bourbaki claim that the transition to a completely formal text is routine, but too boring and tedious for people, seems almost an open invitation to give the task to computers.
2. The computer need not simply check the correctness of formal arguments, but can try to help in their construction. We will discuss in more detail later how this is to be done, but at one extreme, it is sometimes possible for computers to find proofs of theorems completely automatically. Furthermore, the computer can provide interface assistance, helping to mitigate the austerity of formal deductive calculi and to organize the user's work.
3. Among modern computer scientists, formal logic is quite widely known and substantially used; many regard formal logic as the 'applied mathematics' underlying computer science, just as real analysis etc. underlies physics and engineering. Dijkstra (1985) has remarked that 'computing scientists may well have

¹⁷However mathematicians are expected to acquire facility at certain kinds of formal manipulations as part of their training, so perhaps the apparent greater difficulty presented by logical formalism is just a question of its familiarity.

been the first to *use* the predicate calculus regularly [...] as far as the mathematical community is concerned George Boole has lived in vain’.

4. Computer correctness is itself a topic of concern, especially since computers are used in safety-critical systems like fly-by-wire aircraft, antilock braking systems, nuclear reactor controllers and radiation therapy machines. One means of verifying a design is to prove that a mathematical model of the system satisfies some formal properties, designed to correspond to real-world requirements. Such proofs are much more technically intricate, albeit perhaps shallower, than typical mathematics proofs, and of necessity involve very complicated formal manipulations.

It isn’t very surprising that the computer should make such a dramatic difference; after all it has revolutionized work in many scientific disciplines. Previously unthinkable ideas like detailed simulations of weather systems have become possible — formalizing mathematics in a deductive calculus demands fairly modest computer power by comparison.

So thanks to the computer, we may at last be able to do something about the lack of formality in ordinary mathematics. This would be welcome to ‘hawkish’ logicians¹⁸ like Nidditch (1957), who complained that ‘in the whole literature of mathematics there is not a single valid proof in the logical sense’, but perhaps not to people such as DeMillo, Lipton, and Perlis (1979) who regard the conventional ‘social mechanisms of the mathematical community’ as the only real means of establishing a valid proof. We do not agree with either of these extreme positions. Regarding the latter, we think that social processes may just be a necessary evil resulting from the difficulty (hitherto) of producing formal proofs.¹⁹ Compare the enthusiasm among the Greeks for deciding scientific questions by a social process rather than empirically, a tendency that survived until about Descartes.

1.6 Automated Reasoning

MacKenzie (1995) traces the history of computerized theorem proving. The early experiments were mainly concerned with completely automatic proofs of theorems, and work can broadly be divided into two tracks. Research in the Artificial Intelligence tradition, exemplified by Newell and Simon (1956), tried to emulate the way mathematicians actually think. Other more successful efforts, e.g. by Gilmore (1960) and by Wang (1960), simply relied on the speed of the computer, using exhaustive search for a proof in certain formal systems for (usually) first order logic. Of course even here the search wasn’t completely blind: at the very least the formal systems were chosen to limit the search space. For example, the pioneering work of Prawitz, Prawitz, and Voghera (1960) was based on a tableau presentation of Gentzen’s cut-free sequent systems.²⁰

¹⁸This apt label is from MacKenzie (1995).

¹⁹The similarity or otherwise of formal proofs to conventional ones, and whether they should really be called ‘proofs’ at all, have no direct consequences as regards their objective value or persuasive power. Similarly, questions about whether a machine can ‘think’ have no direct relevance to whether a particular computer program can beat one at chess.

²⁰For many proof procedures, the proof-theoretic details of Gentzen’s results are not really relevant; all that is required is that the provability of $\exists x. P[x]$ is equivalent to the existence of some terms t_i with

The next step forward, discussed by Prawitz (1960) and Kanger²¹ was to use free or ‘meta’ variables, discovering the right instantiations gradually during search. Subsequent implementations of tableaux and related calculi such as model elimination (Loveland 1968) invariably used some such technique. These methods are ‘global’, in that the instantiations need to be applied throughout the partial proof tree. It’s therefore not surprising that the modern incarnations rely heavily on Prolog technology; see the work of Stickel (1988) or Beckert and Posegga (1995) for example. Another stream of work approaches the problem bottom-up rather than top-down, i.e. the idea is to start from the axiom level of the proof tree, generate an ever-expanding set of consequences, and aim eventually to find the goal among them. The ‘inverse method’ of Maslov (1964) was presented in just this way, as a bottom-up approach to proof search in cut-free sequent calculus. These ‘local’ methods sacrifice goal-directedness but make instantiation cheaper and, since all variables in intermediate results are effectively universal, they allow the garnering of lemmas which can then be re-used with different instantiations; moreover, strategies such as subsumption and simplification can be applied to limit the explosion of theorems.

The most influential bottom-up method was resolution, invented by Robinson (1965). This relied on unification; Robinson seems to have been the first to present a unification algorithm explicitly and prove that it gives a most general unifier.²² With unification, just a single rule of inference is required, resolution, together with factoring (unifying literals in the same clause and deleting the duplicates).²³ The introduction of resolution caused a renaissance of interest in automated theorem proving. Otter, directly descended from this line of research, has recently achieved impressive results, settling open problems in mathematics and producing quite new theorems (Argonne National Laboratories 1995). Tableaux and model elimination are more popular, but this is probably only because they are more straightforward to implement. Resolution-type systems need a certain amount of craftsmanship to deal with the sets of theorems generated in an efficient and directed way, and there are innumerable search techniques and refinements worthy of consideration.

General first order provers tend to be inefficient in restricted areas compared to specialized methods. Numerous algorithms that tackle certain areas of mathematics more efficiently have been devised, e.g. for tautology checking (Bryant 1986; Stålmarck 1994), linear arithmetic (Shostak 1979) and equational reasoning (Knuth and Bendix 1970), not to mention the panoply of techniques used by computer algebra systems. The NQTHM prover, developed by Boyer and Moore (1979), is a general theorem prover for quantifier-free arithmetic; since the logic is quite simple, powerful proof automation, notably for induction proofs, is feasible. Though the logic is restricted, it

$P[t_1] \vee \dots \vee P[t_n]$ provable. This result (which together with an explicit construction is essentially Herbrand’s theorem) is an easy consequence of Gentzen’s Hauptsatz, but it can be derived purely model-theoretically; Kreisel and Krivine (1971) give a particularly elegant proof of what they pointedly call the ‘uniformity theorem’.

²¹See footnote 11 of Prawitz’s paper for a bit more detail on the genesis of the idea.

²²Herbrand’s thesis (1930) contains what is effectively a unification algorithm. Prawitz’s procedure already mentioned also used unification, but since his logic had no function symbols, it was only a special case. Davis apparently used full unification in a proof procedure in 1962, influenced by Prawitz.

²³At an abstract level, viewing clauses as *sets* (not multisets) of literals, unification is complete without considering factoring. However in proof search, it is necessary to consider it since duplications only appear when the right instantiations are found.

is amazingly expressive in the hands of a skilled practitioner, and NQTHM has been used in a wide variety of applications.

Nevertheless the achievements of fully automatic provers soon began to reach a plateau, well below the ability to prove many substantial mathematical theorems unaided. The emphasis moved to the development of ‘proof assistants’, ‘proof checkers’ and ‘interactive theorem provers’, which are closer to our present interests. The idea is not to prove difficult theorems automatically, but simply to assist a human in constructing a formal proof, or at the very least check its correctness. Several pioneering projects for the computer formalization of mathematics appeared in the 1970s. A notable example was the Automath effort led by de Bruijn (1980). Here, a language for formal mathematics was designed, together with a computer system for checking the correctness of formal texts. Significant parts of mathematics were proof-checked; for example van Bentham Jutting (1977) formalized the famous book on the construction of the real number field by Landau (1930). The history of the project and the lessons derived from it are detailed by Nederpelt, Geuvers, and de Vrijer (1994). Though the project was important and influential, the Automath system is hardly used today.

One of Automath’s difficulties was that it was ahead of its time technologically, always struggling to make the computer keep pace with the ideas. It was a batch program, and this made the slowness and lack of memory of the machine more critical. Perhaps another factor contributing to its decline was that it used some rather original notational and foundational ideas (the banishment of named bound variables and the exploitation of the Curry-Howard correspondence;²⁴ for example). The Mizar project, which began a little later, is still quite vital today, and one of the reasons may be that, as its originator Trybulec (1978) explicitly stated, it attempted ‘not to depart too radically from the usual accepted practices of mathematics.’ Though until recently it was not well known among the theorem proving community in the West, Mizar has been used to proof-check a very large body of mathematics, spanning pure set theory, algebra, analysis, topology, category theory and various unusual applications like mathematical puzzles and computer models. Selected Mizar articles are automatically abstracted and printed in human-readable form in the journal *Formalized Mathematics*.²⁵ Mizar is also a batch program, but can still proof-check its formal texts with remarkable speed.

There are reasons for dissatisfaction with very low-level proof checking à la Automath, simply because of the tedium involved and the unreadability of the resulting proofs. But fully automatic theorem provers, though they work well in some situations, are often hard to use in practice. Usually they need to be led to the required result via a carefully graded series of lemmas, each of which they can prove automatically. Choosing this series often requires intimate knowledge of the system if one is not to lead it up a blind alley. And if one is interested in the proof, a completely automated prover may not be what is wanted. The ideal seems to be a judiciously chosen combination of automation and interaction; this for example was the aim of the later part of the Semi-Automated Mathematics project (Guard, Oglesby, Bennett, and Settle 1969). Though this project produced a number of novel ideas, and is famous for “SAM’s Lemma”, a

²⁴Independently discovered by de Bruijn.

²⁵For more information about this journal, which is surprisingly inexpensive, contact: Fondation Philippe le Hodey, Mizar Users Group, Av. F. Roosevelt 134 (Bte7), 1050 Brussels, Belgium, fax +32(2)6408968. Also available on the Web from ‘<http://math.uw.bialystok.pl/~Form.Math/>’ (in updated form).

property of lattices proved automatically by the machine, it died out almost completely, again probably because of being ahead of its time technologically.

Perhaps the best methodology for combining interaction and automation was developed in Milner’s Edinburgh LCF project (Gordon, Milner, and Wadsworth 1979). In LCF-like systems, the ML programming language is used to define data types representing logical entities such as types, terms and theorems. A number of ML functions are provided that produce theorems; these implement primitive inference rules of the logic. The use of an abstract type of theorems with these inference rules as its only constructors ensures that theorems can only be produced this way. However the user is free to write arbitrarily complex proof procedures which ultimately decompose to these primitives. So in principle, most automatic proof procedures can be translated into LCF programs, while guaranteeing that even if the program has errors, no false ‘theorems’ will arise (the program may fail or produce a theorem other than the one intended, of course, but the latter is easy to guard against and both are rare). It seems in practice that this can be done reasonably efficiently; we discuss this issue in more detail later. HOL (Gordon and Melham 1993), which uses classical higher order logic rather than the LCF logic, takes this a step further by insisting that all theories be built up using special definitional extension mechanisms. These give a guarantee that consistency is preserved. Such an approach is consonant with the LCF philosophy, since it entails pushing back the burden of consistency proofs or whatever to the beginning, once and for all, such that all extensions, whether of the theory hierarchy or proof mechanisms, are correct per construction.

Some of the systems described here were not primarily developed in order to formalize textbook mathematics. For example, the HOL system was designed expressly for the purpose of verifying computer hardware. As we said above, this is a promising new application area for theorem provers, and many, e.g. NQTHM and HOL, have been applied successfully to it. This is still mathematics of a sort, and often quite a bit of pure mathematics is needed in a supporting role — see the work of Harrison (1994) for example. But the theorems proved tend to be different; shallower but more technically complex. It may be that proof techniques which work well in pure mathematics are unsuitable for verification, and vice versa. The LCF style offers the most hope here, since its inherent programmability allows multiple proof styles to be based on the same logical core.

2 Formalizing mathematics

In formalizing mathematics, we must rephrase informal constructs in terms of formal ones, which is merely an extreme case of defining non-rigorous concepts rigorously. This isn’t always easy, but there can be surprising successes — for example, before Turing it would have seemed implausible that a simple and rigorous definition of ‘computable’ could be given. For a good historical precedent, consider how Bolzano and Weierstrass arrived at rigorous ‘ $\epsilon - \delta$ ’ definitions of notions like limits and continuity. We may have our own intuitive ideas of what a continuous function is: perhaps one whose graph we can draw without taking our pencil from the graph paper, or which passes through all intermediate values. But the definition of continuity which is now standard is neither of these; we say a function $f : \mathbb{R} \rightarrow \mathbb{R}$ is continuous on \mathbb{R} iff:

$$\forall x \in \mathbb{R}. \forall \epsilon > 0. \exists \delta > 0. \forall x'. |x - x'| < \delta \Rightarrow |f(x) - f(x')| < \epsilon$$

In what sense is this or any other formal definition ‘right’? Why not take the intermediate value property (called ‘Darboux continuity’) instead?

$$\begin{aligned} \forall x, x', z \in \mathbb{R}. \quad & x < x' \wedge (f(x) < z < f(x') \vee f(x') < z < f(x)) \\ \Rightarrow \exists w. \quad & x < w < x' \wedge f(w) = z \end{aligned}$$

Such worries can be allayed when the various plausible-looking formalizations are all provably equivalent. For example, the various definitions of computability in terms of Turing machines, Markov algorithms, general recursive functions, untyped λ -calculus, production systems and so forth all turned out so. But here this is not the case: continuity implies Darboux continuity but not conversely²⁶ The usual definition of continuity has probably won out because it is intuitively the most satisfying, leads to the tidiest theory or admits the most attractive generalization to other metric and topological structures. But note that it also led to the counterintuitive pathologies of real analysis which, as we have already remarked, caused such disquiet once. This example well illustrates how formalization can be a difficult and creative task, and that the formal version of a concept can take on an unexpected life of its own. However, since present-day mathematics is mostly quite rigorous, the final step to complete formalization shouldn’t usually be so problematical.

2.1 Formalization

There is no reason to be dogmatic about what is the ‘natural’ formalization of informal (or preformal) notions. We do not claim that reductionism always reflects the most interesting aspects of mathematics — in fact as Mac Lane has remarked, it can give a rather one-sided view of mathematical activity — but this is no more a problem than the fact that formal grammar rules do not contribute to poetry. And we should certainly avoid regarding the implementability of mathematical concepts as sets, say, as constituting some kind of ontological discovery — this view is rightly parodied by Benacerraf (1965). Rather, it’s an interesting and surprising *practical* discovery about the flexibility of set theory, to be compared with Gentzen’s discoveries about the flexibility of a simple inferential apparatus. (At the same time the reduction is not without philosophical significance: in particular the consistency of practically all of mathematics can be reduced to the problem of whether ZF set theory is consistent, so our foundational concerns tend to come home to roost in set theory.)

With these disclaimers in mind, let’s look now at a few examples of how the basic concepts of formal systems can be used to define other notions. We’ll arrange these in order of the amount of light they throw on the informal concept (in our opinion).

1. Kuratowski showed that ordered pairs could be defined by $(x, y) = \{\{x\}, \{x, y\}\}$ (a more complicated alternative was earlier proposed by Wiener (1914)). However it seems that this tells us nothing new about ordered pairs, except for pathological theorems which we don’t want anyway. Indeed in stratified set theories

²⁶For example, the derivative of $f(x) = x^2 \sin(1/x^2)$ (with $f(0) = 0$) is Darboux continuous, as are all derivatives, but it is not continuous at $x = 0$, nor in fact even Lebesgue integrable over any interval including 0.

like Quine’s NFU (Holmes 1995) and work in coinductive definitions (Paulson 1994a), another definition is normally used.

2. von Neumann’s definition of the ordinals is often used to identify the natural numbers with the set ω of finite ordinals. This means that $0 = \emptyset$, $1 = \{0\}$, $2 = \{0, 1\}$ etc. Although this is also quite arcane and ad hoc (do we really want $0 \in 1$?) it does have the benefit of streamlining and simplifying a lot of theorems about natural numbers and integrating them with their counterparts for ordinals and cardinals. Indeed Halmos (1963) finds the use of 2 as a canonical 2-element set sufficiently convenient to remark on it.
3. We identify sequences indexed by the natural numbers, as used for example in real analysis, with functions out of \mathbb{N} . It’s quite conceivable that one could work with sequences without making explicitly the realization that the two concepts are identical. However it seems there are no reasons for forcing a distinction, so here the formalization is a unifying and simplifying force. In fact, this observation seems first to have appeared with Peano’s ‘*Formulaire*’, so it provides a concrete example of a mathematical development being stimulated by a programme of formalization.
4. Variable binding constructs (extensional ones anyway), such as summation, integration and differentiation, can all be regarded as a higher order operator applied to a lambda-term. That is, $\sum_{i=1}^{10} i$ is ‘really’ $SUM(1, 10, \lambda i. i)$ while the derivative notation $\frac{d}{dx}x^2$ is really $DIFF(x, \lambda x. x^2)$. This really can be valuable, confronting us with awkward constructs where the everyday notation confuses free and bound variables or a function with its value. For example, in the example above of Leibniz notation for differentiation, x has both free and bound occurrences. (It’s precisely analogous to $\int_0^x 2x dx$, except that here the standard notation separates the two instances.) The breakdown to a lambda-term has helped to make this explicit. Though the Leibniz notation is familiar, it can be awkward and is often abandoned in advanced or multivariate work. Other notations like $f'(x)$ seem better, but can still lead to confusion; the author has witnessed a heated debate on `sci.math` among good mathematicians over whether $f'(g(x))$ denotes the derivative of f evaluated at $g(x)$ (this view seems most popular) or the derivative of $f \circ g$ evaluated at x (‘the prime notation (f) is a shorthand notation for [the] derivative of a univariate function with respect to the free variable.’)

2.2 Criticism and reconstruction

The process of formalization must also incorporate a critical aspect when the need arises. Certain concepts which do not admit a satisfactory formalization may have to be jettisoned, modified, or relegated to the status of heuristic aids. It is hoped that this procedure leads only to superficial notational rigorization of mathematics, rather than the mutilation of important ideas and principles.

In a computer-based system especially, it’s vital to avoid all notational ambiguities. Generally, the more flexible grammatical rules are, the more complicated they are too, and the more scope they leave for misunderstanding. A balance needs to

be struck. Computer programming languages and formal specification notations have already blazed the trail, and we can look to them not only for warnings about the difficulties, but for solutions to them. For example, most people would agree that different precedences for binary operators are a good idea, but sometimes the precedences chosen can confound people's expectation. (In C the bitwise AND operator ' $\&$ ' binds less tightly than the equality relation ' $=$ ', a historical accident that must have caused innumerable programming errors.) A controversial question is the overloading of operators, e.g. the use of $+$ for addition of both integers and floating point values. Possibly the theory of type classes (Wadler and Blott 1989), intended to put overloading for programming languages on a firmer footing, contains lessons for formalized mathematics too.

A good example of abuse of notation in mathematics books is the use of $f(x)$ to represent both application of a function f to an argument x , and the image under f of a subset, x , of f 's domain. These ambiguities are often avoided by, for example, the use of upper case letters for sets and lower case for elements. But in pure set theory, there are often so many layers of sets that this sort of convention cannot be maintained; some writers, e.g. Kunen (1980), carefully use $f'x$ and $f''x$ respectively. Similarly, f^{-1} is sometimes used to denote the inverse function, and at others merely reserved for the preimage under f , which may make sense even if there is no inverse function (left or right). Although when f is bijective these are equivalent, fairly sophisticated use of context is required to determine that.

Another notation that is usually clear intuitively but hard to describe formally is indexed set abstraction $\{f(x) \mid P[x]\}$, for example $\{(m, n) \mid m + n = p\}$. In general, it's not easy to determine whether variables are supposed to be bound by the construct or not (for example, the above example is probably intended to bind both m and n , but if m means something outside, that might no longer be so.) For this reason the Z specification language uses a more precise notation which separates the variables being bound and the condition which the tuples of variables need to satisfy. Mathematics contains other confusions between free and bound variables and between constants and variables. There is a popular disclaimer attached to the general quartic equation: ' $ax^4 + bx^3 + cx^2 + dx + e$ where e is not necessarily the base of natural logarithms'. And we have already discussed the problems of the Leibniz derivative notation. Another popular abuse of language is to employ X to refer to the poset (X, \leq) , leaving the ordering implicit. Bourbaki (1968) has already shown a good way out here: we can take the ordering relation as primitive, replacing the reflexivity property in the usual definition of partial order by $x \leq y \Rightarrow x \leq x \wedge y \leq y$, recovering X if desired as $\{x \mid x \leq x\}$.²⁷

It is quite possible that the critical faculties of the formalizer may go well beyond cleaning up sloppy notation. The formalizer may not merely want to reconstruct existing mathematics in a formal framework, but may prefer to develop a new (better?) mathematics. It is clear that Zermelo had the former aim in mind when he introduced his set theory,²⁸ but not all logicians and philosophers of mathematics take such a respectful view of existing practice. In particular, among many mathematical logicians

²⁷This approach was independently arrived at by the present author and used in the standard library of wellorderings in the HOL system.

²⁸Zermelo didn't want to do truly formal reasoning, merely to make set-theoretic assumptions explicit.

there is a strong tendency to be:

1. Constructivist — although Brouwer had a visceral dislike of formal logic, constructivism is nowadays mainly the interest of logicians and computer scientists, not ‘mainstream’ mathematicians.²⁹
2. Minimalist — logicians are interested in discovering extremely simple systems in which a reasonable amount of mathematics can be done. For example, Takeuti (1978) has shown in detail how to reduce much of real and complex analysis and analytic number theory to a conservative extension of PA, and Fitch (1952) has claimed that his provably consistent set theory is sufficient for most applications of mathematics in physics.
3. Sceptical — perhaps because of the difficulty of finding consistency proofs, many logicians are apt to be wary of strong systems, even ZF set theory. Actually there are those who do not accept as obvious the consistency of Peano arithmetic, and some ultra-finitists who even find a belief in arbitrarily large numbers to be philosophically dubious.

Perhaps the formalization of mathematics provides an ideal opportunity to make a clean break, just as when one rewrites a program in a new language, it’s a good opportunity to make some revisions. On the other hand, if we hope to interest many mathematicians, we need to accommodate existing mathematics. We are already trying to wreak one revolution by making the mathematicians formalize their work. Surely one revolution at a time is enough! And, if we take a crude measure of productivity, it seems much easier to develop classical mathematics than constructive mathematics. Formalization is not a mechanical and trivial process, but a significant research problem in itself. If we add to that the new problems which arise, say, when trying to constructivize mathematics, then we are probably going to find the process particularly difficult. Experience of Nuprl researchers indicates that formalization of constructive analysis and algebra is difficult, since the existing treatments leave a lot unsaid. Sometimes the textbook approaches do not scale up well in practice; for example, maintaining the standard Bishop $1/n$ bound on convergence of Cauchy sequences is very tedious when doing nontrivial things with constructive reals (like solving differential equations). But on the positive side, this can be seen as an interesting motivation for new research! For example, several practitioners of constructive mathematics consider G. Stolzenberg’s approach to analysis much more suitable as the basis for computer formalization.³⁰

Of course to some extent classical and constructive mathematics can coexist. The approach of Bishop and Bridges (1985) to constructive analysis has the merit of being compatible with classical analysis. But it is more complicated: one classical theorem often splits into several constructive versions (classically equivalent); the classicist may regard this as meaningless clutter. And certain constructive systems are actually in conflict with classical analysis and with each other — Bridges and Richman (1987) give an interesting comparative survey. So though it sounds very nice to say ‘if a

²⁹At least in the sense of constructive logic; classical reasoning about algorithms is not the same thing.

³⁰Described in his Northeastern University notes, which as far as we know remain unpublished.

theorem can conveniently be proved constructively, then prove it constructively, and it can still be used classically’, the real situation is more complicated. Those without constructive interests are unlikely to make the additional effort, anyway.

2.3 The choice of a foundational system

As already indicated, the intellectual trend has in the past moved away from the idea of actually using formal systems towards using them at one remove. This is responsible for the almost exclusive concentration on first order logic, despite its obvious defects.³¹ In general we should not be awed by existing foundational systems (as Kant was by Aristotelean logic) but should be prepared to invent our own new ideas. Even quite trivial syntactic changes, like making quantifiers bind more weakly than other connectives (most logic books adopt the opposite convention) can help with the usability of the system!

There are two major foundational schemes for mathematics: set theory and type theory. These can be traced back to Zermelo and Russell, respectively, and to their different reactions to the paradoxes of naive set theory. Zermelo felt that the Russell set $\{x \mid x \notin x\}$ was paradoxical because (since so many sets *don't* have the property $x \in x$) it was simply *too big* to be a set. Indeed, Cantor had already distinguished between ‘consistent’ and ‘inconsistent’ multiplicities, more or less on the basis of size (whether they were equinumerous with the class of all ordinals). This is called the ‘limitation of size’ doctrine. Russell, on the other hand, felt that the problem was with the circular nature of the definition (considering whether a set is a member of itself), and proposed separating mathematical objects into layers, so that it only makes sense to ask whether an object at layer n is a member of an object of layer $n + 1$, making the Russell set meaningless on syntactic grounds.

In fact the distinction between set theory and type theory is not clear-cut. Fraenkel added the Axiom of Foundation to Zermelo’s set theory, and this gave rise to an intuitive picture of the set-theoretic universe as built up layer by layer in a wellfounded way. (A picture which is nowadays *de rigueur* among set theorists, and even presented as the motivation for the ZF axioms!) This really amounts to an admixture of type theory, although the layers are cumulative (each layer includes the previous one) and continued transfinitely. What’s more, Quine has proposed set theories which, while not having a global notion of type, have a kind of local type discipline based on stratified formulas in the comprehension schema. On the other hand, it seems that Martin-Löf, one of the standard-bearers of type theory, now prefers to refer to his systems as ‘Martin-Löf set theory’.

We can still perhaps distinguish types in that they render ill-typed phrases *meaningless*, whereas ZF set theory, say, merely makes them *false*. (For ZF set theory, we mean by ‘ill-typed’ statements of the form $s \in t$ where s has a rank in the cumulative hierarchy at least as great as t , rather than those ill-typed in a more intuitive sense.)

³¹Note that the systems of the pioneers like Frege and Peano were clearly higher order. For example, the basic Peano axioms for natural number arithmetic which Peano took from Dedekind (1888) and formalized, give in first order logic only a trivial decidable theory — it’s necessary to include addition and multiplication as primitive to get anything really interesting. Actually Peano used a principle of primitive recursive definition, but did not justify it or even state it explicitly. In this respect his development of arithmetic from the axioms, though formal, represented a big step backwards in rigour from Dedekind.

Moreover, typing judgements have traditionally been syntactic, or more precisely, decidable. For simple type theory, not only typechecking, but type inference, is automatic: the Hindley-Milner algorithm generates a most general type for any typable expression. However this usually fails for more complex type theories, e.g. PVS's; even type *checking* can be undecidable in certain dependent type theories.

Types also arose, perhaps at first largely independently of Russellian foundational schemes, in programming languages. In general we may say that types impose additional layers of structure. Even FORTRAN distinguished integers and floating point values. One reason was clearly efficiency: the machine can generate more efficient code, and use storage more effectively, by knowing more about a variable. For example the implementation of C's pointer arithmetic varies according to the size of the referenced objects. If p is a pointer to objects occupying 4 bytes, then what C programmers write as $p + 1$ becomes $p + 4$ inside the (byte-addressed) machine. C's ancestor BCPL was untyped, and was therefore unable to distinguish pointers from integers; to support the same style of pointer arithmetic it was necessary to apply a scaling at every indirection, a significant penalty. Apart from efficiency, as time went by, types also began to be appreciated more and more for their value in providing limited static checks (i.e. checks that can be made before running the program) on program correctness and for achieving modularization and data hiding. It seems that types might offer at least these advantages to pure mathematics too. For automated theorem proving there may even be comparable efficiency advantages, since types can be used to direct proof search and avoid considering 'nonsensical' combinations of terms. From a practical point of view, one appeal of type theory is that the rendering of higher-level mathematical notions like functions is rather direct, whereas in set theory it relies on a few layers of definition. There seems a well-established view that type theory is in some ways a more natural vehicle for mathematics. For example, Hilbert and Ackermann (1950) assert that 'the calculus of order ω is the appropriate means for expressing the modes of inference of mathematical analysis'. Such a system, more usually known as simple type theory, is considered below.

We will concentrate on such *practicalities* of set theory and type theory as foundations, but it's worth pausing a while to examine the matter philosophically. It seems that there really is a notion of type at work in everyday mathematics; we do think of real numbers as something different from sets of complex numbers, and flattening the whole universe of mathematical discourse into a single undifferentiated realm doesn't seem natural. However the same can be said of any reductive foundationalist programme. In any case, whatever the intuitive appeal of types, ZFC seems to indicate that they are not necessary to ensure consistency.³² There are other special attributes that mathematical objects may have, and 'type' should perhaps just be one of these. Types as primitive can also present awkward choices over whether to formalize some set as a new type or as a subset of (or predicate on) an existing type. In any kind of collaborative programme, it's good policy to avoid giving people too many unnecessary choices (the C programming language and the Macintosh user interface both reflect this philosophy). While on the subject of programming, we might say that however

³²The Axiom of Foundation was not added for this reason — of course one doesn't make a system consistent by *adding* an axiom! Rather, it was deemed 'true' of the universe of mathematical sets, or at least a valid simplifying assumption.

one uses a type discipline in a high-level programming language, it's all implemented using machine code, which is almost completely untyped. Similarly, we might regard set theory as an underlying machine code to which statements with higher levels of structure may be 'compiled'.

Simple type theory (higher order or ω -order logic) is a direct descendant of Russell's type theory, as simplified by Chwistek (1922), Ramsey (1926) and Church (1940). It is successfully implemented in SAM V (Guard, Oglesby, Bennett, and Settle 1969), TPS (Andrews, Bishop, Issar, Nesmith, Pfenning, and Xi 1996) and, with the addition of a form of polymorphism, in HOL (Gordon and Melham 1993). True to its name, simple type theory is a simple system, formally and conceptually. In fact, only a higher-order equational calculus with λ -binding need be taken as basic; as shown by Henkin (1963), all the logical operations can be defined as higher order functions given some 2-element type of propositions.³³ The resulting system is in many ways quite close to informal mathematics; the types are often helpful and natural, and functions are first-class objects. However it is rather inflexible in some ways; for example there are no dependent types (where a type depends on a term, e.g. a type of $n \times n$ matrices for variable n). So although convenient for some parts of mathematics (particularly concrete situations like number theory and real analysis), it becomes rather inflexible for other parts, e.g. abstract algebra. However some objections often made to type theory are rather specious. For example, it's true that \mathbb{R} and \mathbb{N} are completely different types in simple type theory, but there are subtyping schemes which can make $\mathbb{N} \subseteq \mathbb{R}$; in any case this inclusion also fails in the standard set-theoretic development of the reals. Moreover, one can perfectly well do limited set-theoretic reasoning within a fixed 'universe' type in type theory simply by using predicates.

There are plenty of more advanced type theories which allow dependent types and other more sophisticated type constructors. Many of these are descended from Martin-Löf's constructive type theories, which are based on the Curry-Howard correspondence between propositions and types (type constructors correspond to logical operators, e.g. the product type to conjunction). However there is no reason why these systems cannot be used classically. It seems that they are much more flexible than simple type theory, but they are also much more complicated. For example, Nuprl's type theory has over 200 inference rules, although the Calculus of Constructions and related systems are much simpler. Quite how easy it is to formalize mathematics in these systems is still an open question. Many of the researchers are also constructivists, and it is not easy to separate the peculiarities of using constructive logic from the peculiarities of using type theory. There are a number of interesting research projects under way in this line. For example Huet and Säbi (1994) have been investigating category theory, notoriously hard to formalize in any kind of system, in the Calculus of Constructions.

Set theory (e.g. ZFC) is probably the most obvious choice as a foundation. It isn't as simple as simple type theory, and as our earlier remarks indicate, is a rather ad hoc solution to the paradoxes. However it is reasonably simple, and appears to be flexible enough for just about all present-day mathematics. Importantly, it is much better known among mathematicians than type theory.³⁴ There are still question marks

³³Even intuitionistically, implication and universal quantification are enough to define all the usual connectives, whereas in first order logic they are all independent except for negation — see Prawitz (1965).

³⁴Although among computer scientists the opposite is probably true.

over its suitability, even with additional axioms, for some parts of category theory (the category of all sets, etc.) Moreover, if the system is based on first order logic, some theorems such as recursion on a wellfounded relation need to be stated in an artificial manner using devices such as proper classes. There are no types to hinder us, but none to help us either. In practice it seems likely that some quite simple abbreviations for set constraints are sufficient to give most of the convenience of types, without irrevocably tying the user to them.

The exact set theory to choose is open to debate. The ‘standard’ foundation for mathematics is ZFC based on first order logic. However basing the system on higher order logic brings some advantages. Notably, one can express axioms like Replacement as Zermelo thought of them informally, rather than via artificial first order paraphrases. Carnap (1958) presents set theory in this way, and even shows how using a second order quantifier one can express Fraenkel’s ‘Axiom of Restriction’ in a direct way. Recently Gordon (1994) has axiomatized such a higher order set theory in the HOL prover. Since one can use higher order bound variables in axiom schemas, this gives a properly stronger theory than first order ZF. However this can be avoided in several ways while still retaining some of the convenience of higher order logic. For example Mizar uses first order logic with free second order variables (‘1.001 order logic’), which does at least render axioms schemas more pleasant to deal with. Corella (1990) restricts the ZF axioms to their first order forms and proves that this is a conservative extension of first order ZF, while nevertheless allowing some attractive higher order features (e.g. uniformity of definitional mechanisms).

There is also the possibility of retaining first order logic, but making classes first-class objects, as in NBG. Some descendants of Quine’s set theories include something similar to the ZF universe of sets, while providing some convenient additional facilities like a set universe which is a Boolean algebra (Holmes 1995). Finally, it is possible to add extra axioms, e.g. the Tarski-Grothendieck axiom of universes,³⁵ or take them away — for example Replacement is seldom used in mainstream mathematics.³⁶ Mizar settled on Tarski-Grothendieck set theory, after a few experiments with Morse-Kelley. This latter theory, by the way, was the basis for an unusually formal but very elegant book by Morse (1965); the present author been told that Morse used this formalism in his teaching and research in analysis. It is also familiar to many practising pure mathematicians, as it was presented as an appendix to the classic topology textbook by Kelley (1975).

Of course, it is possible to combine features of type theory and set theory. For example, the work of Gordon (1994) already mentioned includes some experimental features to link the two. Agerholm (1994) has formalized the construction of the D_{∞} model of untyped λ -calculus in Gordon’s combined system, something very hard to do in (simple) type theory alone. A more radical solution is to make some of the theorem-proving facilities *generic*, allowing the use of the prover for set theory, type theory, and other logics too. For example, Isabelle (Paulson 1994b) includes some fairly powerful

³⁵This asserts that every set is contained in a universe set, i.e. a set closed under the usual generative principles. It was introduced by Tarski (1938), and subsequently popularized by Grothendieck in the 60s — SGA 4 (Grothendieck, Artin, and Verdier 1972) has an appendix on this topic attributed to ‘N. Bourbaki’.

³⁶Though it streamlines some parts of pure set theory: every woset is isomorphic to a von Neumann ordinal, recursion is admissible on a wellfounded class-relation etc.

proof tools which are applicable to various logics. It has been used for quite extensive developments of simple type theory *and* first order ZF set theory.

We can judge a foundational system by several criteria: aesthetic and philosophical appeal, flexibility, simplicity and closeness to ordinary mathematical language. These are partly subjective of course. And unfortunately many of them, especially the last two, tend to be in conflict. It seems that at present set theory is the winner, but with more research on different foundational systems, this may change. We do not believe the last word has been said.

2.4 Definitions and locutions

In practice, even in quite rich foundational systems, let alone in pure set theory, representations of mathematical objects become unwieldy. For example, Bourbaki (1968) estimates³⁷ that even the number 1 if fully expanded would occupy thousands of symbols in his system. So some kind of definitional mechanism is needed, at least for human consumption, and possibly to stop overflow even for a machine! The fundamental property of definitions is that it should be possible in principle to do without them, though we need to say precisely what this means.

The simplest kinds of definitions are just shorthands for more complicated expressions, for example 2 rather than $\{0, 1\}$, (x, y) rather than $\{\{x\}, \{x, y\}\}$ and $\exists!x. P[x]$ rather than $\exists x. P[x] \wedge \forall y. P[y] \Rightarrow y = x$. We can understand such definitions in two ways, either as metalogical abbreviations used to make formal texts more palatable to the reader, or as a method of sanctioning the addition (in the object logic) of new equational axioms. Generally, the latter is more efficient, since it keeps the underlying terms small, but the former is more flexible: the defined notion need not correspond to any kind of logical object, nor respect any underlying type system. In fact the Nuprl system allows both kinds of definition.

Assuming that the object language has facilities for variable abstraction (something like lambda-calculus), then any definitional constructs of this kind can be reduced to new abbreviations or axioms of the form $c = t$ where c is a new constant name any t any closed term. For example, instead of writing $f(x) = E[x]$, we use $f = \lambda x. E[x]$. In any reasonable logical system the addition of such axioms makes no difference: in principle we could do without them (replace c by its expansion everywhere), and we do not derive any new facts not mentioning c . They thus fulfil all the criteria we could demand of definitions.

There is a more general means of extending the logic with new constant symbols: using names for things which have been proved to exist. If we can prove $\vdash \exists x. P[x]$, then adding a new constant c and an axiom $\vdash P[c]$ is a conservative extension of most logical systems, in the sense that anything not involving c could equally well be deduced without using c or its axiom. (Simply because something like the natural deduction \exists -elim rule is usually valid.) It's not quite conservative in the sense that it can be written away from formulas, though any formula $Q[c]$ can be read as $(\exists x. P[x]) \wedge \forall x. P[x] \Rightarrow Q[x]$, for example. Given a theorem $\vdash \forall x. \exists!y. P[x, y]$, it is usually conservative to add a new function symbol f and an axiom $\vdash \forall x. P[x, f(x)]$. However if unique existence is weakened to existence, this can smuggle in the Axiom

³⁷Section III.§3.1, 'The cardinal of a set', footnote.

of Choice. The situation for constructive logics is even more delicate.

A useful feature in a practical logic is a *descriptor*. For example, we may allow a new term constructor $\iota x. P[x]$ ('the (unique) x such that $P[x]$ '), together with an axiom $\vdash (\exists! x. P[x]) \Rightarrow P[\iota x. P[x]]$, or $\varepsilon x. P[x]$ ('some x such that $P[x]$ '), together with an axiom $\vdash (\exists x. P[x]) \Rightarrow P[\varepsilon x. P[x]]$. These are called definite and indefinite descriptors, respectively. Note that the latter is something like the Axiom of Global Choice if we allow $P[x]$ to contain other free variables, and even the former is weakly non-constructive because it effectively allows us to introduce a total function even though $\exists x. P[x]$ may be conditional on some other property. For this reason descriptors in formal presentations of constructive logic (Troelstra and van Dalen 1988) are usually partial operators — this topic is discussed below.

A descriptor is very useful for rendering informal notions of 'the x such that ...' (it's much used by Bourbaki), and can even be used to implement lambda-binding, set abstraction and so on, e.g. define $\lambda x. E[x]$ to be $\varepsilon f. \forall x. f(x) = E[x]$. If we have $\vdash \exists x. P[x]$ and we have an indefinite descriptor, then defining $c = \varepsilon x. P[x]$ gives us $\vdash P[c]$. Conversely, for any term t we have $\vdash \exists x. x = t$, so the existential kind of definition always sanctions the equational kind. There is thus a close relationship between the two kinds of definition, given a descriptor.

There are more complex definitional mechanisms which cannot be expanded away in such a simple-minded manner, but can nevertheless be understood as inessential abbreviations that could in principle be done without. These are usually referred to as *contextual definitions*. A good example is the use of ZF proper classes, where set-like statements about classes are really encoded using logical predicates. Another example: cardinal numbers can in principle be done without for most purposes, since all statements about arithmetic and equality of cardinals may be regarded as statements about equinumerosity etc. of sets. For example instead of $|X| = |Y| \uparrow |Z|$ we can write 'there is a bijection between X and $(Y \times Y) \times Z$ '. The most sophisticated example of all is using category-theoretic language like 'the category of all sets' purely as a syntactic sugar on top of quite different statements. One of the interesting questions in formalized mathematics is the extent to which this is possible.

In any case, we shouldn't lay too much stress on the theoretical eliminability of definitions. It's mainly a way of assuring ourselves that we aren't 'really' extending the logic. Life without definitions would be unbearably complicated, and anyway the whole significance of a theorem may subsist in the definitions it depends on.

There are other forms of definition, for example definition by recursion and definition of inductive sets or relations. However given a mathematical theorem justifying the existence of such a function, it can then be defined using one of the mechanisms given above. In programmable systems, the tedious matter of deriving the required case of this theorem can be automated completely.

2.5 Partial functions and undefined terms

In informal mathematics, our minds filter out (subconsciously?) troublesome degenerate cases. However in a formal treatment we must address these matters. One of the most interesting questions is: what does it mean to apply a function f to a value x outside its domain? For example, what is 0^{-1} in the reals?

There are numerous different approaches. The simplest is to regard $f(x)$ for

$x \notin \text{dom}(f)$ as something arbitrary; in effect we are expanding the domain of f but saying nothing about the values it takes there. Alternatively, we can specify an explicit value for arguments outside the domain; this approach can be exploited by choosing a particularly convenient one. For example, if we decide $0^{-1} = 0$, we have lots of nice unconditional theorems, like $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}. (x^{-1})^{-1} = x$, $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}. -x^{-1} = (-x)^{-1}$, $\forall x, y \in \mathbb{R}. (xy)^{-1} = x^{-1}y^{-1}$ and $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}. x^{-1} \geq 0 \Leftrightarrow x \geq 0$. However some may regard these theorems as pathological, obscene or simply untrue. Actually even if an arbitrary value is chosen, these freak theorems show up occasionally. If we define, as one normally would, $x/y = xy^{-1}$, then $0/0 = 0$, because whatever 0^{-1} might be, it's some real number, and multiplying it by zero gives zero! In an untyped system this problem happens less (in the example given we wouldn't even know that $0^{-1} \in \mathbb{R}$), but does not disappear completely.

There is a more serious disadvantage of this scheme. (In constructive systems there is yet another: membership of the domain may be undecidable, so the above solution simply isn't available.) In some mathematical contexts, writing down $f(x) = y$ is taken to include an implicit assertion that $x \in \text{dom}(f)$. For example, when we write:

$$\forall x. \frac{d}{dx} \sin(x) = \cos(x)$$

we take this to include an assertion that \sin is in fact differentiable everywhere. But if the differentiation operator is total, it will yield a value, regardless of whether the function is actually differentiable at the relevant point. It might accidentally happen that the above equation were true even if the function weren't differentiable! Hence an equation like the above contains less information than one would intuitively expect. This situation becomes even more serious when such constructs are nested, e.g. in differential equations. They need to be accompanied by a long string of differentiability assumptions, which in informal usage are understood implicitly. Again, this is less of a problem in set theory; one might for example adopt the convention of extending partial functions $X \rightarrow Y$ to total functions $X \rightarrow Y \cup \{Y\}$, using the value Y to denote undefinedness.

What are the alternatives? If we have a typed logic, then we can simply make $f(x)$ a typing error when $x \notin \text{dom}(f)$; that is, the term is not syntactically well formed. This avoids the problems above, but it might mean that in certain situations in analysis, the types become complicated, since they need to excise all the singularities. It also makes it difficult to use constructs which are permissive of point singularities (for example, it often makes sense to integrate such functions). Moreover, the truth of certain theorems such as $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}. \tan(x) = 0 \Rightarrow \exists n \in \mathbb{Z}. x = n\pi$ depend on quite small details of how the typechecking and basic logic interact.

The most sophisticated alternative of all is to have a special logic which allows certain terms to be undefined, as in the IMPS system (Farmer, Guttman, and Thayer 1990). This is more or less the same (there are some differences in detail) as taking an extra 'undefined' element on top of a conventional logic, so the result of a function application may be this special element.³⁸ The undefined value propagates up through terms, so a term with an undefined subterm is itself undefined. In IMPS, predicates involving an undefined argument become *false*. For example, $a = b$ means 'a and

³⁸Which is what the original LCF (Logic of Computable Functions) logic did.

b are both defined and are equal’. One might question these choices, but since a definedness operator is provided, one can invent one’s own bespoke notion of equality. In particular, IMPS supports ‘quasi-equality’, where $a = b$ means ‘either a and b are both undefined, or are both defined and equal’. In some parts of mathematics, this is probably the usual convention, but it has some surprising consequences, e.g. the logical equivalence $s = t \Leftrightarrow s - t = 0$ is false for quasi-equality for certain terms s and t . One could even imagine circumstances in which $\forall x \in \mathbb{R}. (x^2 - 1)/(x - 1) = x + 1$ was desired behaviour (wherever the two sides are both defined, they are equal). Actually, Freyd and Scedrov (1990) use a special asymmetric ‘Venturi tube’ equality meaning ‘if the left is defined then so is the right and they are equal’.

We spoke above of the informal convention in mathematics. It seems that many authors are actually doing something like defining the equality predicate contextually. This seems surprising when equality is considered such a basic thing, but the conclusion is hard to avoid when one sees phrases like ‘if y is the unique value with $(x, y) \in f$, we write $f(x) = y$ ’. This isn’t specific to a foundational discussion of function application; many analysis texts do similar things for the limiting operation, for example. In fact it’s rather common to see mathematics books make ‘conditional’ definitions — ‘if x is ..., then we define $f(x) = E[x]$ ’ rather than just ‘we define $f(x) = E[x]$ ’ — again, there is probably a wish to have certain contextual information carried around with the definition. Set theory texts are occasionally more precise, e.g. they may say ‘ $f(x)$ is the (unique) y such that $(x, y) \in f$ ’. One formalization of this, made explicit by Rosser (1953), is as a descriptor term $\iota y. (x, y) \in f$, but, depending on the precise semantics of the descriptor and the logic, this can mean different things.

It is important not only that a convention for handling partial functions should have attractive mathematical features, but also that it should remain intuitive. Users must be aware, for example, that $0/0 = 0$, or that $s = t$ may hold even if both s and t are undefined. If there are arcane features hidden inside the logic, these can be damaging to the fancied clarity of formal mathematics. As Arthan (1996) remarks ‘all but the most expert readers will be ill-served by formal expositions which make use of devious tricks’. For this reason, we do not find very elaborate schemes for dealing with partial functions, such as the use of a 3-valued logic, so attractive. Arthan goes further, claiming that that ‘in an ideal world, the subtleties of different treatments of undefinedness should not be a central concern for people writing specifications. In our experience, most real-life specifications that do make essential use of undefined terms are just wrong — they do not say what their author intended.’ Though this is based on experience of computer system specification rather than pure mathematics, it may still hold true there.

3 Practical issues

We now move on to issues of system engineering. These largely cut across the divisions that spring up over set theory versus type theory, classical versus constructive logic, and so on. Generally, the same kinds of problems need to be solved in each case, though to be sure, they differ in detail and in severity.

3.1 Feasibility

We have stated that the computer can handle tedious low-level details of proof. This isn't just an airy idea; on the contrary the LCF methodology allows the user to create higher-level proof structures which decompose to simple primitives inside the computer. But what grounds do we have for believing that this is practical even for a computer? (Accepting that some kind of definitional principle will be used as detailed above.) It's well-known that computers are amazingly fast, and getting faster, but it's equally well-known that their speed cannot defeat problems that have an inherent combinatorial explosion. The fact that fully automatic theorem provers have *not* displaced human mathematicians, and that the World Chess Champion is not (quite yet) a computer, are evidence of this. For example, if the length of a fully formal proof were an exponential function of the length of an informal proof, then the proposed approach would probably be doomed.

We've already seen that for any formal system of the kind we need to consider, there are true statements which aren't provable in the system (Gödel's first theorem). At the same time we have argued that such statements are pathologies and we're unlikely to hit them in practice. We will make an exactly parallel claim about the *feasibility*, rather than *possibility in principle*, of proofs.

The measure of feasibility will be the *size* of a proof, which is meant to denote something like the number of symbols in the proof based on a finite alphabet — this seems the most reasonable practical measure. Certainly, from a theoretical perspective, there must be sentences out there whose proofs are possible but not feasible. Indeed, given any (total) recursive function f (e.g. a large constant function or a huge tower of exponentials), there are provable sentences of size n that have no proofs of size $\leq f(n)$. For otherwise, provability would be decidable (just check all possible proofs up to size $f(n)$), contradicting the results of Church and Turing that the *Entscheidungsproblem* is unsolvable. More explicitly, we can modify Gödel's diagonal argument and exhibit a sentence which says not 'I am unprovable', but rather 'all proofs of me are unacceptably big':³⁹

$$\vdash \phi \Leftrightarrow \forall p. \text{Prov}(p, \ulcorner \phi \urcorner) \Rightarrow \text{size}(p) > f(\ulcorner \phi \urcorner)$$

Now, whether or not there are proofs of ϕ whose size is bounded by $f(\ulcorner \phi \urcorner)$ is decidable, and so ϕ is provable iff it is true. But ϕ cannot be false, since that would mean there exists a proof of it, indeed, one within the stated size bounds. Therefore ϕ must be true, provable, and yet have no proof within the stated bounds.

But now we claim once again that all such theorems are likely to be theoretical pathologies, never to arise in 'normal' mathematics. Of course such a claim is rather bold, and always open to refutation, but we can at least point to some agreeable empirical evidence. First, looking at a modern, rigorous mathematical textbook such as Bourbaki's, it's hard to see how an unbridgeable gap between informal and formal proofs could arise. And in practice some significant pieces of mathematics have been formalized, e.g. in Mizar, without any exponential dependency appearing. On the contrary, there is some empirical evidence so far that the length of a formal proof is a

³⁹In a reasonable logic f , being recursive, will be representable, though in general only by a predicate rather than a function.

fairly modest *linear* function of the length of a thorough textbook proof, as explicitly stated by de Bruijn (1970):

A very important thing that can be concluded from all writing experiments is the *constancy of the loss factor*. The loss factor expresses what we lose in shortness when translating very meticulous ‘ordinary’ mathematics into AUTOMATH. This factor may be very big, something like 10 or 20 (or 50), but it is constant; it does not increase if we go further in the book. It would not be too hard to push the constant factor down by efficient abbreviations.

Of course, the ‘very meticulous’ should be noted; Landau’s book is a most unusual one, and de Bruijn chose it after great deliberation. Although Mizar has been used for an unrivalled number of mathematical formalizations, we are unaware of any published comparisons between the original textual sources (such as they are) and the resulting formal texts. Perhaps this is because the Mizar formalizations are usually arrived at independently after consulting many sources, rather than by translating existing texts or papers directly. However, more efforts of this latter kind should throw new light on the question we are considering. One attempt to follow a textbook faithfully is detailed by Paulson and Grąbczewski (1996). They translated the early parts of set theory books by Kunen (1980) and Rubin and Rubin (1985) into Isabelle, and found that the relationship between the size of the formal and informal texts was much more variable. (Though not to the extent of infeasibility, it should be stressed. They merely had to work rather harder themselves at certain points.)

3.2 Extensibility and LCF

As de Bruijn says, we want to use abbreviations for common patterns of inference. The patterns of inference that are common may, of course, depend on the particular piece of mathematics being formalized, so it’s desirable to allow ordinary users to extend the inference system, while at the same time being confident that only correct inferences are made. LCF realizes this desire exactly. Arbitrary programs can be written to prove a fact, perhaps from several premisses; the only restriction being that although terms and types may be built up, and theorems decomposed, quite arbitrarily, theorems can only be *created* by the primitive inference rules. It is not necessary that the program should prove some fact in a uniform way; it might, depending on the form of the fact to be proved, invoke one of several quite different algorithms. This is not always appreciated by outsiders, as one can see from the following assertion by Davis and Schwartz (1979): ‘an LCF tactical is limited to a fixed combination of existing rules of inference’. It is *not*, and therein lies the value of the LCF approach as compared with simple macro languages.⁴⁰

⁴⁰There is also a misunderstanding of terminology outside the LCF community. A *tactic*, as described by Gordon, Milner, and Wadsworth (1979), is a specific way of supporting backward proof in terms of forward proof; a *tactical* is a higher order function for combining tactics. In some quarters today the decomposition to primitives is supposed to be the distinguishing feature of a ‘tactic’. But this decomposition, which we focus on here, is a separate issue; rather than obliterate the original meaning of ‘tactic’, we will refer to ‘derived rules’ without greatly concerning ourselves whether they work forward or backward.

Just how practical is this idea of breaking all inferences down to primitives? At first sight, when one considers the enormous number of special-purpose algorithms and the likely cost of generating formal proofs, it looks completely impractical; Armando, Cimatti, and Viganò (1993) opine that it ‘turns out to be both unnatural and ineffective’ (though apparently on general grounds rather than on the evidence of having tried). And indeed, not all LCF systems have stuck with the rigorous policy of decomposing all inference to the primitives. For example, Nuprl users have quite happily added extra proof procedures for linear arithmetic or tautologies when the need arises. However these human factors do not provide hard evidence about feasibility.⁴¹ The users of the HOL system at least have ploughed their own furrow, implementing a variety of quite sophisticated proof techniques, all decomposing to primitive inferences. We are now able to step back and survey the lessons. There are two questions: whether it is a reasonably tractable task for the programmer, and whether the resulting program is acceptably efficient (the latter question is closely related to our previous discussion of feasibility). It has emerged that many HOL derived rules are feasible and practical. We can identify two clear reasons why the apparent difficulties are often not really serious.

First, complex patterns of inference can be encoded as single theorems, proved once and for all. These can then be instantiated for the case in hand rather cheaply. This idea has long been used by HOL experts; an early example is given by Melham (1989). A more recent, and complex, example is the following (Harrison 1993) justifying a step in a quantifier-elimination procedure for the reals; it states that a finite set (list) of polynomials are all strictly positive throughout an interval if and only if they are all positive at the middle of the interval and are nonzero everywhere in it.

$$\begin{aligned}
& \vdash \forall l, a, b. \ a < b \wedge \\
& \quad (\forall x. a < x \wedge x < b \Rightarrow \text{FORALL (POS } x) l) \\
& = \ a < b \wedge \\
& \quad \text{FORALL (POS } (\frac{a+b}{2})) l \wedge \\
& \quad \neg \exists x. a < x \wedge x < b \wedge \text{EXISTS (ZERO } x) l
\end{aligned}$$

Many special-purpose algorithms can be understood as a natural process of transformation on terms or formulas. It is not difficult to store theorems that justify the individual steps; the algorithm can often be implemented almost as one would do without the primitive inference steps, and generally with a modest linear slowdown. This applies, for example, to HOL’s implementation of rewriting, as well as numerous special-purpose rules that users write in the course of their work, e.g. the conversion to differentiate algebraic expressions by proof described by Harrison (1994). There are a few delicate points over the efficiency of equality testing and the use of imperative data structures, but these do not usually cause problems. More awkward are situations where a decomposition to primitive inferences may cause certain sidecondition checks to be repeated unnecessarily. This is precisely analogous to the insertion of array bound checks by some programming language compilers, even though they can be seen, by the global logic of the program, to be unnecessary. However it is potentially more pernicious, in that it can fundamentally change the complexity of certain operations.

⁴¹We are uncomfortably aware that this resembles the argument that various political systems are good in principle, but merely badly implemented in practice! By the way, Slind (1991) has remarked that in LCF ‘the user controls the means of (theorem) production’.

More experience is needed to see if this ever becomes a problem in practice.

Second, many other proof procedures rely heavily on *search*. For example, automated theorem provers for first order logic often perform thousands, even millions, of steps that are purely devoted to *finding* a proof. Once the proof is found, it is usually short, and can be translated into HOL inferences very easily, and proportionately the burden of translating to primitive inferences is practically nil; performance can match any other system written in the same language. There are now several tools for first order automation in HOL, the earliest being due to Kumar, Kropf, and Schneider (1991); they all work in this way. Actually, it's not even necessary to perform proof search in the same language or using the same machine; Harrison and Théry (1993) describe the use of the Maple computer algebra system as an oracle, to find solutions to integration and factorization problems which can then be checked fairly efficiently inside HOL. LCF-style checking of a result discovered by arbitrary other means forms an interesting contrast with computational reflection, a technique relying on code verification which we consider below. Blum (1993) has put the case for result checking rather than code verification in a more general context; an example in a rather different field, computer graphics, is given by Mehlhorn et al. (1996). It is not essential that the 'certificate' allowing the result to be formally checked should merely be the answer. For example, in first order automation, the proof itself is the certificate. Supporting this kind of checking may lead to more emphasis on algorithms that produce such certificates. For example, Pratt (1975) has shown how to give polynomially-checkable certificates of primality for natural numbers;⁴² it would be worth investigating similar methods for other symbolic algorithms.

The combination of these two factors is enough to make it plausible that any inference patterns likely to occur in normal mathematics can be performed with acceptable efficiency as an LCF-style derived rule. Even for the special algorithms often used in system verification, it's not inconceivable that an LCF implementation would be fast enough in practice; for example Boulton (1993) describes an implementation of a linear arithmetic decision procedure. An apparently difficult case is the BDD algorithm, but a HOL implementation has been produced by Harrison (1995) which exhibits only a linear slowdown, albeit a large one (around 50). Moreover, a finding/checking separation does offer *some* hope here, since deciding on a variable ordering can be done outside the logic, and a good ordering can cut the runtime of the main algorithm by orders of magnitude.

What are the rules that we can, in principle, implement in the LCF fashion? Suppose that a rule whose instances are schematically of the form:

$$\frac{\Gamma_1 \vdash \phi_1 \quad \dots \quad \Gamma_n \vdash \phi_n}{\Gamma \vdash \phi}$$

has the property that whenever the hypotheses are provable, so is the conclusion. That is, the rule is conservative or 'admissible'.⁴³ Assuming also that the rule is describable, i.e. recursively enumerable, then it is possible to write an LCF derived rule that

⁴²Probably his motivation was more theoretical than practical; it shows that primality testing is in NP as well as co-NP.

⁴³Some writers use this notion for a Hilbert-style proof system. In that case the definitions are slightly different. Thanks to Seán Matthews and Randy Pollack for discussion of this point.

implements it. It need simply accept the argument theorems, and begin an exhaustive proof search for the corresponding conclusion.

One might argue that this doesn't *really* implement the rule, since if one faked some non-theorems as hypotheses, the corresponding conclusion would not result, even though any rule with an unprovable hypothesis is (vacuously) admissible. Since in an LCF system one cannot derive such non-theorems, this objection is moot. Nevertheless it is clear that few if any practical LCF derived rules are going to work in such a fashion. Instead they are going to use the form of the hypotheses to construct a proof in the formal system. So the rules that are likely to be implemented in practice in LCF are the (recursively enumerable and) *derivable* ones. A rule is said to be derivable if for any instance, there is a deduction in the formal system of its conclusion from the hypotheses. Crudely, we may contrast admissible rules with derivable ones by saying that the latter do not rely on any special properties of the turnstile '⊢', such as inductive closure of the set of theorems.

The fact that the standard LCF approach cannot, in one sense (and as we have argued, in a practical sense as well), implement arbitrary admissible rules has been pointed out by Pollack (1995). However, as he also stresses, many admissible rules become directly implementable if one has not merely the form of the hypotheses, but also information about the way they were proved. Consider the Deduction theorem for Hilbert-style proof systems, which allows passage from $\Gamma \cup \{p\} \vdash q$ to $\Gamma \vdash p \Rightarrow q$, and 'Skolemization' in certain systems of intuitionistic logic, allowing a step from $\forall x. \exists y. P[x, y]$ to $\exists f. \forall x. P[x, f(x)]$. Both these can be justified by a transformation on the proofs of the hypothesis, but apparently not easily just from the form of the hypothesis.

It is not clear that there are any useful admissible rules that are not derivable for 'reasonable' logics (such as HOL). For example, we are aware of only one major theorem proving system that is based on a Hilbert-style axiomatization, namely Metamath (Megill 1996), and it uses various tricks to avoid use of the Deduction Theorem if possible. If non-derivable rules are desired, it is of course possible to store proofs as concrete objects with the theorems. Various constructive systems such as Coq and Nuprl are already capable of doing that, since extracting programs from proofs is one of the key ideas underlying them. Of course there is a question mark over whether such manipulations on proofs are computationally practical.

3.3 Metatheory and reflection

If our speculation above is wrong, what is to be done when we come across an inference pattern that can't be implemented efficiently as an LCF derived rule? One alternative is to throw in whatever additional proof procedures might be deemed necessary. But for a serious project of formalization, we need a high level of assurance that the rule is correct. If it doesn't actually perform a formal proof, how can this be done?

One idea is to use metatheory. Suppose we formalize the object logic under consideration, its syntax and its notion of provability, in an additional layer of logic, the metalogic. The idea is that metatheorems (i.e. theorems in the metalogic) can then be proved which justify formally the *possibility* of proving a result in the object logic, without actually producing the proof in complete detail. One can use another layer

of logic for this purpose, as discussed by Pollack (1995). This metalogic can then be particularly simple and transparent, since few mathematical resources are needed to support the proofs of typical metatheorems. However, it's also possible to use the *same* logic; this is often referred to as *reflection*. From Gödel's work we already know how a system can formalize its own notion of provability. The only extra ingredient needed is a rule acting as a bridge between the internal formalization and the logic itself.⁴⁴

$$\frac{\vdash \exists p. \text{Prov}(p, \ulcorner \phi \urcorner)}{\vdash \phi}$$

It is clear that if the system is 1-consistent, this rule does not introduce any new theorems, since all provable existential statements are true. However the absence of hypotheses in the above theorems was crucial. The subtly different rule with a nonempty set of hypotheses, or equivalently an additional axiom scheme of the form $\vdash (\exists p. \text{Prov}(p, \ulcorner \phi \urcorner)) \Rightarrow \phi$ does make the logic stronger. In the special case where ϕ is \perp , it amounts to a statement of consistency, which Gödel's second theorem rules out, and in fact Löb (1955) proved that such a theorem is provable in the original system only in the trivial case where $\vdash \phi$. Since these assertions amount to an expression of confidence in the formal system, as seen by reflecting on it from outside (the system is consistent, everything provable is true),⁴⁵ they were dubbed 'reflection principles' by Feferman (1962), who, following on from work by Turing (1939), investigated their iterated addition as a principled way of making a formal system stronger. Our reflection rules are intended rather to be a principled way of making proofs in a system easier.

The value of using metalogic or reflection in this way depends, of course, on the fact that the metalogical proof of provability is easier (in some practically meaningful sense) than doing a full proof in the object logic.⁴⁶ For example, this definitely seems to be the case for the Deduction Theorem and Skolemization steps discussed above: the metatheorem can be established once and for all in a general form by induction over the structure of object logic proofs, and thereafter instantiated for the cases in hand very cheaply. But we've already expressed scepticism over whether these examples are realistic for logics that one would actually use in practice.

The most popular examples cited are simple algebraic manipulations. Suppose one wants to justify $a_1 + \dots + a_n = b_1 + \dots + b_n$ (for real numbers, say) where the a_i and b_i are permutations of each other. An object-level proof would need to rewrite delicately with the associative and commutative laws; this is in fact what HOL's function `AC_CONV` does automatically. When implemented in a simple-minded way this takes $O(n^2)$ time; even when done carefully, $O(n \log(n))$. However we can prove a metatheorem stating that if the multisets $\{a_1, \dots, a_n\}$ and $\{b_1, \dots, b_n\}$ are equal, then the equation holds, without any further proof. Davis and Schwartz (1979) say confidently that 'the introduction of an appropriate "algebra" rule of inference

⁴⁴Note that the formalized provability is for the *original* system, without the reflection rule. Care is needed if instances of the reflection rule are to be nested. Two different approaches are discussed by Knoblock and Constable (1986) and by Allen, Constable, Howe, and Aitken (1990).

⁴⁵By Tarski's theorem we can't actually have a predicate representing truth, but the above axioms say something intuitively close.

⁴⁶One may say that the ML programming language is the metalogic of LCF systems, but a peculiarly limited or ultra-constructive one where the only way of proving something exists is to produce it explicitly.

shortens to 1 the difficulty of a sentence which asserts an algebraic identity'. But assigning a difficulty of 1 is of no practical significance. What of the complexity of checking multiset equality? In fact, it is $O(n^2)$ in the worst case, according to Knuth (1973). Even if the elements are pairwise orderable somehow, we can't do better than $O(n \log(n))$. So all this additional layer of complexity, and the tedium of proving a precise metatheorem, has achieved nothing except perhaps shaving something off the constant factor.

The constant factor is not even likely to change much. However it would change a lot more if the multiset equality test didn't have to be performed in some formal system, but could be evaluated directly by a program. This suggests another popular variant of the reflection idea: computational reflection. The idea is to verify that a program will correctly implement a rule of inference (e.g. correctly test for multiset equality and in the case of success, add the appropriate equation to the stock of theorems), then add that program to the implementation of the theorem prover, so thereafter it can be executed directly. This does indeed offer much more efficiency, and in certain special situations like arithmetical calculation, the speedup could be considerable. It would also be a systematic way of gaining confidence in the many theorems which are nowadays proved with the aid of computer checking. The proof of the 4-colour theorem has already been mentioned; more prosaic examples include simply assertions that large numbers are prime. Journals in some fields already have to confront difficult questions about what constitutes a proof in this context; the issue is discussed by Lam (1990) for example.

However there are a number of difficulties with the scheme. In particular, correctly formalizing the semantics of real programming languages, and then proving nontrivial programs correct, is difficult. The formal system becomes dramatically more complicated, since its rules effectively include the full semantics of the implementation language, instead of being separate and abstract. (This has a negative effect on the possibility of *checking* proofs using simple proof-checking programs, an oft-suggested idea to increase confidence in the correctness of machine-checked proofs.) And finally, reflection, though extensively studied, has not often been exploited in practice, the work of Boyer and Moore (1981) being probably the most significant example to date.⁴⁷

We should add that the idea of proving program correctness doesn't necessarily demand some kind of logical reflection principle to support it. Boyer and Moore, for example, need no such thing. Typical decision procedures only involve a rather restricted part of the logic (e.g. tautologies or arithmetic inequalities), and the semantics of this fragment can perfectly easily be internalized, even though by Tarski's theorem this cannot be done for the whole logic. (Nuprl's type theory, stratified by universe level, allows one to come very close to the ideal: the semantics of one layer can be formalized in the next layer up.) Ostensibly 'syntactic' manipulations can often be done directly in ordinary logic or set theory, defining some appropriate semantics; following Howe (1988), this is often called 'partial reflection'. For example, the above method for justifying an AC rearrangement based on multiset equality can easily be carried out in the object theory.

⁴⁷The author has been told that an attempt was made to verify in Nuprl the correctness of a Presburger arithmetic implementation, but the researcher involved eventually became discouraged by the difficulty of the proofs.

We should also point out the following. It is often stated that, issues of efficiency apart, some of the theorems in mathematics books *are* metatheorems, or can only be proved using metatheory — ‘most of’ them according to Aiello, Cecchi, and Sartini (1986). Matthews (1994) is one of the few who cites an example:

For instance in a book on algebra one might read:

‘If A is an abelian group, then, for all a, b in A , the equivalence

$$\overbrace{(a \circ b) \circ \dots \circ (a \circ b)}^{n \text{ times}} = \overbrace{(a \circ \dots \circ a)}^{n \text{ times}} \circ \overbrace{(b \circ \dots \circ b)}^{n \text{ times}}$$

holds’

... On the other hand, instead of a book, imagine a proof development system for algebra; there the theorem cannot be stated, since it is not a theorem of abelian group theory, it is, rather, a meta-theorem, a theorem *about* abelian group theory.

But all this is from the completely irrelevant perspective of an axiomatization of group theory in first order logic. As we have already stated, any serious development of group theory is going to use higher-order or set-theoretic devices, as Bourbaki does for example. With these mathematical resources, iterated operations are trivially definable and their basic properties easily provable — this appears right at the very beginning of the well-known algebra textbook of Lang (1994) for example, and in section 1.4 of Jacobson (1989)! The stress on direct first order axiomatizations in the AI community probably results from a laudable scepticism in some quarters towards the fancy new logics being promulgated by others, but it completely fails to reflect real mathematical practice. What *is* true is that one often sees statements like ‘the other cases are similar’ or ‘by symmetry we may assume that $m \leq n$ ’. These have the flavour of metatheorems in that they relate similar *proofs* rather than *theorems*. But bear in mind that when presenting proofs informally, this is just one of many devices used to abbreviate them. Certainly, a way of formalizing statements like this is as metatheorems connecting proofs. But another is simply to do (or program the computer to do!) all the cases explicitly, or to use an object-level theorem directly as justification, e.g.

$$(\forall m, n. P(m, n) \Leftrightarrow P(n, m)) \Rightarrow ((\forall m, n. P(m, n)) \Leftrightarrow (\forall m, n. m \leq n \Rightarrow P(m, n)))$$

Performing similar proofs in different contexts may anyway be a hint that one should be searching for a suitable mathematical generalization to include all the cases.

So, we have yet to find the LCF approach inadequate, and yet to see really useful implementations of reflection. Whatever exotic principles are added, the provable sentences will form a recursively enumerable set (we are after all considering a computer implementation), and once again there will be unprovable statements and infeasible ones. Now since we haven’t come across any interesting infeasible statements yet it seems extremely conjectural that they won’t still be infeasible in the expanded system. Boyer reports that the metafunction facility of NQTHM is not widely used in practice,

even though it is the *only* way for an ordinary user to add new facilities to NQTHM. And Constable, Knoblock, and Bates (1985), who are no enemies of the idea of reflection as indicated by their extensive writings on the subject, say: ‘Of all these methods [of providing extensibility] we have found the LCF idea easiest to use and the most powerful.’

3.4 How much automation do we want?

We have seen that automation is *possible* even while producing an explicit proof, but how much do we actually want? Despite some *tours de force* by automated theorem provers, the emphasis in applications is moving increasingly towards interactive systems, where the user guides the prover. In mathematics this seems reasonable, since the proofs are important, and we don’t usually want an *ex cathedra* assertion that something is true from a machine. On the other hand, we also don’t want to have to direct proofs at very low levels, so some automation of ‘obvious’ steps is required.

As pointed out by John McCarthy, there is an important distinction between what is *mathematically* obvious and what is *logically* obvious. In mathematical proofs we want to skip over levels of reasoning which we can intuitively see to be trifling; but this intuition may be based on quite sophisticated domain-specific knowledge, and the step may not be at all obvious in the sense of having a formal proof which is easy to find using one of the common techniques for automated proof search (whether by machine or by hand). An interesting discussion of just what is logically obvious is given by Rudnicki (1987). It seems that we need more work on automating what is mathematically obvious, whereas existing technology is already capable of automating much larger logical steps than we can perceive as obvious, e.g. very large tautologies or even subtle predicate calculus reasoning like the following theorem due to Łoś:

$$\begin{aligned} & (\forall x y z. P(x, y) \wedge P(y, z) \Rightarrow P(x, z)) \wedge \\ & (\forall x y z. Q(x, y) \wedge Q(y, z) \Rightarrow Q(x, z)) \wedge \\ & (\forall x y. Q(x, y) \Rightarrow Q(y, x)) \wedge \\ & (\forall x y. P(x, y) \vee Q(x, y)) \\ & \Rightarrow (\forall x y. P(x, y)) \vee (\forall x y. Q(x, y)) \end{aligned}$$

However, there are certain steps which are completely routine for a machine to check, and baffling to a human being, that we probably *do* want to automate, simply because carrying out the proof in detail is no more illuminating to the human than knowing, based on confidence in the correctness of the theorem prover, that it is valid. A good example is the following identity:

$$\begin{aligned} & (x^2 + y^2 + z^2 + w^2)(x'^2 + y'^2 + z'^2 + w'^2) = \\ & (xx' + yy' + zz' + ww')^2 + \\ & (xy' - yx' + wz' - zw')^2 + \\ & (xz' - zx' + yw' - wy')^2 + \\ & (xw' - wx' + zy' - yz')^2 \end{aligned}$$

It’s used as a lemma in the proof that every natural number is expressible as the sum of four squares. But proving it, at least simply by multiplying it out in a routine way, is no more illuminating than checking the result of a numerical calculation by hand.

Of course a proof that exhibited a deep, simple reason for the above (e.g. something based on quaternions) is a different matter.

In any case, automating what is mathematically obvious is itself a research project in the artificial intelligence line. In the short term, it's probably better to accept a lower level of automation. As theorem-proving technology improves, it should be possible to simplify proofs automatically by excising intermediate steps which become unnecessary for the machine.

3.5 User interaction

We want to avoid making systems that are difficult for mathematicians to use. This means we should try to keep the interface close to the familiar style of mathematics books. Perhaps even small changes in notation (e.g. '&' instead of '^') could help a lot. Alternative styles of expression should be permitted ('for real x ', 'for any $x \in \mathbb{R}$ ' or 'for any real number x ') and perhaps even a few redundant 'noise words'. For example, Mizar allows the word 'that' (e.g. 'suppose X ' or 'suppose that X ') but essentially ignores it. It should be possible to provide a degree of tailoring to suit individual tastes.⁴⁸ However we must avoid making the interface *too* flexible and intelligent, for two reasons:

1. If there is an additional complicated layer of interpretation between the user and the underlying logic engine, then we are bringing back all the potential for vagueness and ambiguity that we are trying to banish. It will require substantial work for a new user to understand the relationship between what is seen at the user level and what exists inside the machine.
2. Making an intelligent flexible interface is probably just too hard; we're getting embroiled in a difficult AI project. The success of the Unix environment is partly because it is formal, simple, flexible, and makes no attempt to be clever. Anyway, opinions and fashions about what is best change quickly; remember the light pens in 60s visions of future computers.

It is not necessary to use a full-blown logical symbolism; one can quite well have stylized constructs of ordinary English. Mizar, for example, does not use special symbols for quantifiers and connectives. Some writers like Halmos oppose the use of logical symbolism, but as far as we can see this is just a matter of personal taste, and no more in need of justification than the use of symbols for arithmetic operations. Current systems certainly leave a lot to be desired in the matter of user interaction. HOL tactic scripts are an arcane mix of higher order functions; some systems like IMPS, NQTHM and ONTIC use LISP syntax, which is even further from conventional notation. Mizar's proof scripts are undoubtedly the closest to familiar mathematical notation. This was after all one of the goals of the Mizar project; perhaps the developers were also less corrupted by the tendency to ready acceptance of machine-oriented syntax which tends to arise among computer scientists.

Even though the system itself may still be reasonably formal, there is plenty of potential for translating automatically or semi-automatically into something readable

⁴⁸It has been remarked that computer scientists would rather use each other's toothbrushes than each other's notation.

by any mathematician. Mizar’s journal ‘Formalized Mathematics’ points the way here. The translation is by no means sophisticated, but works quite well (admittedly it is only the statements of theorems, not their proofs, at present). In line with the above remarks on alternative modes of expression, sometimes different alternatives are chosen using a random number generator, to give something like the ‘elegant variation’ discussed by Fowler (1965). (‘Now we prove’, ‘The following hold’, ‘The following propositions are true’, ...)

It’s much easier to translate from a formal language to (possibly stilted and artificial but correct) natural language than vice versa. So mathematics expressed in a formal way is a valuable resource: it could be automatically translated into many different languages, avoiding some of the difficulties of communication among the world’s mathematicians (most of whom are now forced to use English; a few decades ago German or French). It may even be that the formal language would itself become an accepted interlingua⁴⁹ for mathematical texts; though it would be rather spartan and colourless, the success of international chess publications like Šakovski Informator, which are languageless, is worth noting.⁵⁰

Rendering proofs in HTML or another hypertext format, to allow users to examine proofs at different levels of details, is a topic which has already attracted some attention (Grundy 1996). Conversely, one could imagine, in education, having different levels of automated theorem proving. Just as students are now supposed to master arithmetic before being given calculators, it might be thought desirable for them to master constructing formal proofs before being given computer assistance. (To some extent, this depends on whether one is trying to teach *logic* or *mathematics*.) Several systems have already been used in education, notably Mizar, with interesting results as recounted by Szczerba (1989):

There occurred a substantial change in my role as a teacher. Earlier, when assigning homework tests, I was treated as an enemy who has to be forced to accept the solution, sometimes in not an exactly honest way. Now the enemy to be defeated was the computer and I was turned into an ally helping to fight this horrible device. This small fact has seriously influenced my contacts with the students. They were much more eager to approach me with their problems, to report on their difficulties, and ask for help.

We have said little so far about computer algebra systems such as REDUCE, Maple, Mathematica and Axiom, which seem to provide a quite acceptable style of user interaction. These are also aids to symbolic computation, and are unquestionably much more popular among and useful to practising mathematicians than theorem provers are. However, despite their use of symbolic languages, they are typically not very rigorous. For example, one is often in doubt as to whether an expression like $x^3 + x$ is supposed to be a member of \mathbb{R} , $\mathbb{R}[x]$, $\mathbb{C}(x)$ or something else. Such ambiguities are often harmless, though by the same token unpleasantly insidious, since many

⁴⁹The artificial language Interlingua (aka ‘*latino sine flexione*’) was, by the way, invented by Peano, whose interest in new languages was not restricted to the mathematical field. Unfortunately, the fact that the few informal parts of his formalized mathematics was written in *latino sine flexione* must have contributed to their limited impact.

⁵⁰And apropos of Halmos’s sceptical view of logical symbolism, the author has heard chess players use the Informator abbreviations in conversation, e.g. ‘triangle’ instead of ‘with the idea’.

formal manipulations can be done regardless. Computer algebra systems also make mistakes, often as a result not of bugs, but conscious decisions not to worry about precise conditions and degenerate cases (zero denominators etc.) in the determined quest for ‘simplification’.

Given the complementary strengths and weakness of computer algebra systems and theorem provers, it is natural to attempt to combine their best features. (We need to worry, of course, whether a greater injection of rigour in computer algebra will merely alienate their traditional users — the same question may be levelled at the project of formalization in general.) Our own use of Maple as an oracle has already been mentioned as an illustration of the separation of finding and checking. This approach, interesting and rigorous though it is, has its limitations given the need for checkable certificates (albeit not necessarily simply ‘answers’). Another approach, which worries less about correctness but effectively imports the power of Mathematica’s simplifier into theorem proving, is realized in Analytica (Clarke and Zhao 1991). This system can prove some remarkably complicated theorems completely automatically.

3.6 Experience of formalized mathematics

There has already been considerable experience of formalized mathematics in widely differing theorem proving systems. It’s important to absorb the lessons this yields about the process in general, and the strengths and weaknesses of particular formal systems and proof methodologies. Most of the following is based on personal experience, but we feel that much of it will be echoed by other practitioners.

Formalizing mathematics is sometimes quite difficult. It’s not uncommon to make a definition, set about proving some consequences of it, fail, and then realize that the definition was faulty. Usually this is because some trivial degenerate case was ignored, sometimes because of a more substantive misunderstanding. This can be tedious, but at other times it is clarifying, and forces one to think precisely.

It’s an interesting question whether modest changes to normal mathematical style can render mathematics completely formal, or whether this will always be an unbearably tedious load (some say that ‘rigour means rigor mortis’). It certainly doesn’t seem too much trouble always to say explicitly that p is a prime, that n is a natural number, that when we talk about the poset X we are talking about the partial order \leq_X , or to distinguish between a function and its value. But it may be that the accumulation of such details renders mathematics too inelegant. Only experience can tell.

Formal proofs can be long and tedious, and tend to look quite unreadable compared with their textbook models. However we believe several existing systems such as Mizar show that one can still provide fairly readable proof texts, and the main difficulty in practice is automating just the right parts of the reasoning. In principle, there seems no reason why proofs cannot be brought down to something close to the length of textbook ones; even less perhaps. Of course, for a few exceptionally explicit and precise textbooks, this may already be the case.

In any case (though this comment might seem to smack of desperation) there are advantages in the fact that proofs are more difficult. One tends to think more carefully beforehand about just what is the best and most elegant proof. One sees common patterns that can be exploited. All this is valuable. Compare the greater care one would take when writing a book or essay in the days before word processors.

In practice formalized mathematics is quite addictive (at least, for a certain kind of personality). This may be similar to the usual forms of computer addiction, but we believe there is another important factor at work. Since one can usually see one's way intuitively to the end of the proof, one has a continual mirage before one's eyes, an impression of being almost there! This must account for the times people stay up till the small hours of the morning trying to finish 'just one last proof'. Moreover, the continual computer feedback provides a stimulus, and the feeling of complete confidence that each step is correct helps dispel any feelings that the undertaking is futile since mistakes will have been made anyway.

Many of the problems are not connected with the profound and interesting difficulties of formalizing and proving things, but with the prosaic matter of organizing the resulting database of theorems. Since one will often need to refer back to previous theorems, possibly proved by other people, it's useful to have a good lookup technique. In mathematics texts, readers can only remember a few 'big names' like the Heine-Borel theorem, the Nullstellensatz, and the rather ironic relic of 'Hilbert's Theorem 90' which in retrospect needed a name! For run of the mill theorems, it's better to number them: although the numeration scheme may be without significance, it does at least facilitate relatively easy lookup (though some books unhelpfully adopt distinct numbering streams for theorems, lemmas, corollaries and definitions). Mizar numbers its theorems, though inside textual units which are named. But this policy seems to us less suitable for a computer theorem prover because it's more common to want to pass from a (fancied) theorem to its identifier, rather than vice versa. Admittedly in the long term we want people to read formal proofs, but at present the main emphasis is on constructing them. Still, we want to bear in mind the convenience of a later reader or user as well as the writer.

With a computer system, textual lookup is at least as easy as numeric lookup, and names can have a mnemonic value, so using names throughout seems a better choice. It also makes it easier to insert or rearrange theorems without destroying any logic in the naming scheme. HOL names all theorems, but some theories do not have a consistent naming convention, notably natural number arithmetic which used to include the aptly-named `TOTALLY_AD_HOC_LEMMA`. A computer can offer the new possibility of looking up a theorem according to its structure, e.g. finding a theorem that will match a given term, or contains a certain combination of constants. HOL and IMPS have such facilities.

Then there are the social problems: when different people work at formalizing mathematics, they will choose slightly different conventions, and perhaps reinvent the same concepts with different names. For example, one may take $<$ as the basic notion of ordering, one may take \leq (or $>$ or \geq). Perhaps there needs to be some kind of central authority (like the Mizar 'library committee') which establishes certain canons, but this is rife with potential for disagreement and petty politicking. We should reiterate our earlier remarks here: there are real advantages in only allowing users one way to do things! If different users prove the same results at different level of generality, this is less likely to lead to ideological division. However there may be no generally agreed 'most abstract' form of a given result, and even if this can be agreed on, the task of integrating the two theories may not be trivial. Sometimes it may be most natural to prove a result at different levels of generality, for reasons of logical dependency. For example, Gauss' proof that if a ring R is a unique factorization domain then so is its

polynomial ring $R[x]$, uses as a lemma the fact that the ring of polynomials over a field is a UFD; this lemma is however a special case of the main result.

And in practice, a given arrangement is not set in stone; people may want to add more theorems to existing libraries, perhaps slightly modify the theorems on which other libraries depend. It seems that making minor changes systematically should become easier with computer assistance, just as making textual changes becomes easier with word processing software. But sometimes it does prove to be very difficult — the problem has been studied by Curzon (1995) with respect to large hardware verification proofs. How much worse if we want to change the foundational system more radically (e.g. constructivists might like to excise the use of nonconstructive principles in proofs). It seems that a suitably ‘declarative’ proof style is the key, and one should try to write proofs which avoid too many unnecessary parochial assumptions (e.g. the assumption that there are von Neumann ordinals floating around). This is comparable to avoiding machine dependencies in programming.

3.7 The Future

Only with more practical experience, ENOD⁵¹ in the words of Kreisel (1990), can we really decide the best way to go. Perhaps nobody is farsighted enough to anticipate all the problems that will arise, and we will only discover them by colliding heavily with them. For example, there are still many questions over the formalization of category theory, the role of types, the use of partial functions, and many other things. We might find that some problem domains, e.g. those demanding a lot of geometric intuition, are very hard to formalize, present new problems and require new ideas. Accepting that geometrical insight, or even geometric proof techniques (for the most ‘algebraic’ subjects often include commuting diagrams!) are likely to be useful, the problem arises of fitting them into existing formal calculi, or developing better calculi. The difficulty has been noted by Yamamoto, Nishizaha, Hagiya, and Toda (1995):

Among many fields of mathematics and computer science, discrete mathematics is one of the most difficult to formalize because we prove theorems using intuitive inferences that have not been rigorously formalized yet.

Recently a proposal has been made to draw together the world’s theorem proving communities in a ‘QED Project’ (Anonymous 1994) to formalize all mathematics. Such an undertaking would demand a huge collaborative venture, perhaps comparable to the Human Genome Project. We haven’t spent so much of our time here on advocacy, though some of the potential benefits of formalized mathematics have been mentioned. Whatever one’s opinion of these dreams, we share the optimism of the QED proponents that formalization of mathematics is both useful and practicable. What’s more, given the disparate research community and the wealth of experience collected piecemeal, its greater development, for good or bad, seems to be inevitable.

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⁵¹Experience Not Only Doctrine.

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Glossary

Here we list some of the logical symbols we use in the paper, for the benefit of readers who aren't used to symbolism at all, or are used to different symbols. Connectives bind according to their order in the table below, \neg being the strongest. The scope of a quantifier, lambda-abstraction or descriptor extends as far to the right of the dot as possible. For example $\forall x. P[x] \wedge Q[x] \Rightarrow R[x]$ is parsed as $\forall x. ((P[x] \wedge Q[x]) \Rightarrow R[x])$. We make a fuss about this last point because some books adopt the opposite convention.

Symbol	Other notations	English reading
\perp	$F, 0$	false
\top	$T, 1$	true
$\neg P$	$\sim P, -P$	not P
$P \wedge Q$	$P \& Q, P . Q, PQ$	P and Q
$P \vee Q$	$P Q, P \text{ or } Q, P + Q$	P or Q
$P \Rightarrow Q$	$P \rightarrow Q, P \supset Q$	P implies Q
$P \Leftrightarrow Q$	$P \equiv Q, P \sim Q$	P if and only if Q
$\forall x. P$	$(\forall x) P, \forall x P, (x) P, \bigwedge x P$	for all x, P
$\exists x. P$	$(\exists x) P, \exists x P, (Ex) P, \bigvee x P$	there exists an x such that P
$\varepsilon x. P$	$\tau x. P$	some x such that P
$\iota x. P$		the unique x such that P
$\lambda x. t$	$x \mapsto t, [x]t$	the function of x which yields t
$\Gamma \vdash P$	$\Gamma \rightarrow P$	P is deducible (in a formal system) from Γ

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⁵²See <http://saxon.pip.com.pl/MathUniversalis/contents.html>.

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
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