



Pre-crime and post-criminology?

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Abstract

Conventionally, crime is regarded principally as harm or wrong and the dominant ordering practices arise post hoc. In the emerging pre-crime society, crime is conceived essentially as risk or potential loss, ordering practices are pre-emptive and security is a commodity sold for profit. Though this dichotomy oversimplifies a more complex set of changes, it captures an important temporal shift. As the intellectual offspring of the post-crime society, criminology must adapt to meet the challenges of pre-crime and security. This article examines the key features a theory of security needs to encompass. It explores the immanent capacities of criminology for change and suggests exterior intellectual resources upon which it might draw. It concludes that the pre-crime society need not be a post-criminological one.

Key Words

crime prevention • criminal justice • criminology • fortress continents • risk • security

Though criminology constitutes itself with increasing confidence as a discipline, it is far from clear that it is yet an independent or settled disciplinary state (Abbott, 2000: 139–44). Though criminology journals, monograph series, departments and degree programmes proliferate, their practitioners share little more than a common substantive interest in the subject of crime and its control. It follows that significant change in the topography of crime control has profound implications for the discipline. If, as it will be argued, the very subject matter of criminological attention is changing beyond recognition, either criminology must also change or risk irrelevance.

In important respects we are on the cusp of a shift from a post- to a pre-crime society,¹ a society in which the possibility of forestalling risks competes with and even takes precedence over responding to wrongs done. In consequence, the post-crime orientation of criminal justice is increasingly overshadowed by the pre-crime logic of security. This shift poses important questions about the role of criminology and its future. If a pre-crime society is not to be a post-criminological one, the first task is to map the coordinates of this shifting terrain and to identify the core concepts and characteristics that a general theory of security would need to elucidate. A second is to establish the adaptive potential of criminology both in respect of its immanent capacity for change and the exterior disciplinary resources upon which it might draw in securing its future. This article explores the substantive shifts and intellectual challenges posed by pre-crime and the pursuit of security. It goes on to ask if a pre-crime society need necessarily be a post-criminological one or whether criminology can transform itself to meet the challenges it now faces.

Pre-crime and the security society

Criminology is the intellectual offspring of a post-crime society in which crime is conceived principally as harm or wrongdoing and the dominant ordering practices arise post hoc. In a post-crime society there are crimes, offenders and victims, crime control, policing, investigation, trial and punishment, all of which are staples of present criminological enquiry. Pre-crime, by contrast, shifts the temporal perspective to anticipate and forestall that which has not yet occurred and may never do so. In a pre-crime society, there is calculation, risk and uncertainty, surveillance, precaution, prudentialism, moral hazard, prevention and, arching over all these, there is the pursuit of security (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Loader and Sparks, 2002; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; O'Malley, 2004). Already the criminological lexicon has expanded: though they were scarcely in use just two decades ago, these terms are now commonplace in criminological enquiry.² A coincidental facet of the temporal shift to pre-crime is that responsibility for security against risk falls not only to the State but extends to a larger panoply of individual, communal and private agents. The shift is therefore not only temporal but also sectoral; spreading out from the State to embrace pre-emptive endeavours only remotely related to crime.

Private security is a burgeoning industry, community safety, and personal crime prevention are major platforms of public policy, and the technological paraphernalia of security scatter the social world (Crawford, 1998; Jones and Newburn, 1998; Lyon, 2001). According to the British Security Industry Association (BSIA) there are now over 600,000 people working in the UK private security industry; over 4.25 million CCTV cameras in operation; and the estimated turnover of the UK security industry in 2004 was over £5 billion. Private security industry turnover in respect of CCTV has risen from £84 million in 1993 to £509 million in 2005, while turnover in respect of manned

security guarding has risen from £530 to £1575 million over the same period (<http://www.bsia.co.uk/>). Figures for North America are even more striking. These developments have sparked a lively debate. Where some see total rupture, others observe more continuity with the past, less radical or more contradictory patterns of change (Bayley and Shearing, 1996; Jones and Newburn, 2002). But no one is any longer pretending that criminology can remain complacent if it is to meet the challenge of these new social ordering practices (Braithwaite, 2000a; Shearing, 2001; Reiner, 2006).

The growth of non-state actors in the production of security is such that (if it ever could) it no longer makes sense to focus on the workings of the criminal justice state to the exclusion of private, commercial, communal, voluntary and individual actors. Even within the public sector profiling, offender registers, surveillance, CCTV, situational crime prevention and community safety initiatives all signal a shift in temporal perspective. Equally important is the changing relationship between the public and private spheres (Shapland and van Outrive, 1999). Mechanisms of delegation, of contract (Crawford, 2003) and strategies of responsabilization (Garland, 2001: 124–7) invite enquiry into the new means by which states govern at a distance. Relations between different ventures in security are so complex that the very distinction between public and private is increasingly blurred (Jones and Newburn, 1998: ch. 8; Marx, 2001). Mapping these relations exposes deep ligatures between public and private. The demarcation is transgressed by the contracting out of public services to private providers; by state regulation via the licensing, inspection and auditing of the private security industry (Zedner, 2006c); and also by private sponsorship of state policing, for example through the provision of hardware or even vehicles. In some US states the police are, quite literally, ‘brought to you by Toyota’. Concern with the antagonistic, competitive or simply antithetical aspects of the public/private relationship has tended to obscure the degree to which professional interaction, reciprocity, even mutual dependency now characterize working relations between the two (Feeley, 2002; Vindevogel, 2005).

The tendency to see private security as competitor to public policing has cemented the view that they are functionally analogous, masking important temporal differences and distinctions of role and orientation. The traditional post-crime functions of the state police in enforcing the criminal law, pursuing criminal investigations, prosecuting criminal offences and serving the criminal process apply much less to those working in the private security sector (Loader, 1997). To the extent that there are common areas of functional overlap these arise pre-crime: in respect of patrol, surveillance, order maintenance and property protection. Once an offence has occurred, private security agents, constrained by the limits of their legal powers, their mandate and the interests of their employers, are quick to dispatch suspects to the public police. Post-crime, agents of the security industry are interested less in punishing the wrong done or even in making good other than in the narrow economic sense of recovering losses (Williams, 2005). Their principal interest is rather to identify the source of the opportunity taken,

to harden targets and so minimize future losses. The distinct functions of public police and private security are worthy of closer attention, not least because they attest to a larger change. The growth of private security signals not merely a transfer of authority for crime control. It presages a more radical shift from the largely post hoc logic of criminal justice to the forward trajectory of pre-emption and protection (Shearing and Johnston, 2005: 32). The key transition is, therefore, less a contested shift between public and private, though this is important, than the temporal move from post- to pre-crime.

Of course it is important not to exaggerate these temporal and sectoral shifts. Policing, particularly in its formative years, had a decidedly preventative turn (McMullen, 1998; Zedner, 2006a). Garland describes this early preventative orientation as the 'path not taken' (2001: 30–2). And yet, although it was later overshadowed by largely reactive practices, prevention was never absent from police beat and patrolling functions. Even in the heyday of the modern criminal justice state, crime control was not exclusively a state function: preventing crime and maintaining social order were tasks shared also by private citizens, communities and private security agents. It is important therefore not to overstate 'the novelty and the "epochal" nature of current trends' and thereby overlook continuities (Jones and Newburn, 2002: 130).

This said, the impact of 9/11, of the London bombings and the continuing threat of catastrophic risk has significantly increased the pressure on governments to think and act pre-emptively. The trajectory towards anticipatory endeavour, risk assessment and intelligence gathering is accelerating. It follows that as security comes to contest crime control as a key object of criminological enquiry, larger changes in arrangements for national security and in respect of terrorism acquire a new relevance for criminology (Stuntz, 2002). Reorientation around security exposes domestic crime control policies to the impact of global terrorism to a degree not seen even at the height of the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland and the IRA bombing campaign in mainland Britain. Government has not been slow to enact a raft of powers instituting draconian security policies.³ The temporal shift denoted by the war on terror poses a powerful challenge to the historic precincts of criminological scholarship. Where once terrorism and counter-terrorism stood outside the normal boundaries of criminological knowledge, they now demand criminological attention (Deflem, 2004). Together these temporal and sectoral shifts pose a powerful challenge to criminology's *raison d'être*.

Theorizing security

The developments so far described are disparate and not easily amenable to coherent explanation. Superficially there appears to be little in common between the burglar alarm and the satellite tracking system or the work of the bouncer and the security systems analyst. But is there an underlying logic common to them all—the logic of security perhaps? At a minimum, a

'general theory' of the security society would need to be able to account for and explain the following conceptual contours and topographical features of the emergent terrain.

First, as has already been observed, seeking security implies a *temporal shift* pre-crime. Security is less about reacting to, controlling or prosecuting crime than addressing the conditions precedent to it. The logic of security dictates earlier and earlier interventions to reduce opportunity, to target harden and to increase surveillance even before the commission of crime is a distant prospect (Clarke, 1995; von Hirsch et al., 2000).

Second, *risk* frames and provides the rationale for many features of the security society (O'Malley, 1992; Ericson and Haggerty, 1997). Although concern about the risks of crime is a major force behind the market for security, it is driven by a larger array of anxieties that do not derive necessarily or solely from crime (Bauman, 1998: 116; Crawford, 2002). Prudentialism or the logic of actuarialism, which underpin measures designed to locate, sort and manage diverse risks, become at least as important as reactive penal measures (Feeley and Simon, 1994; O'Malley, 2001; Harcourt, 2003; Feeley, 2004). Preoccupation with individual offenders is overlaid by concern with identifying and classifying suspect populations in order to manage the risks they collectively pose. In this context the prison is less an instrument of punishment, still less reform, than a carceral warehouse for detaining those categorized as posing the highest risks (Simon, 2000).

Third, rather than focus on crime as wrongdoing, the dominant *raison d'être* of security is to pre-empt, minimize and displace *loss* (Williams, 2005). Much of the pressure to mitigate loss derives from the insurance industry, an industry devoted to the management and pooling of risk (Ericson et al., 2003). Security provision is also concerned with providing the appearance and assurance of protection (Crawford and Lister, 2004; Innes, 2004). The millions spent annually on security derive from the demands of private and corporate consumers to cocoon themselves and, in the case of commercial enterprises, their customers in an apparently safe environment as much as any direct determination to reduce crime rates.

A key issue therefore is that protection provided as a public good to which all have access is endangered by its commercial sale as a *commodity* or club good, access to which is limited by the capacity to buy (Hope, 2000; Crawford, 2006). In the distinction between public good and private commodity the source of provision is arguably less important than the question of access (Coase, 1974). To the extent that the private industry is becoming a major provider of security, market-driven discrimination in the distribution of risks is a vital concern. Securing an exclusive commercial environment such as an inner-city business district may be conducive to maximizing turnover but have displacement effects that bear heavily on neighbouring 'unsecured' environs (Rigakos, 2002; for a different view see Vindevogel, 2005).

Central to the selling of security is the pursuit of *profit* (Wakefield, 2003), both political and financial, which derives from the industrial production of security.⁴ Pursuit of the profit motive may coincide with the

demands of crime reduction, but may equally lead in quite other directions. The desire to hide company losses suffered through fraud, for example, militates against the public revelation that prosecution would require. It follows that changing patterns of governance are indivisible from the normative question of how the security society is itself regulated (Ericson and Stehr, 2000; Johnston and Shearing, 2003). Where security is a saleable commodity, accountability to the democratic polity is liable to be usurped by the more powerful demands of narrower constituencies, be they bounded political communities, consumer groups or shareholders. The rise of contractual governance and the onset of the post-regulatory state pose serious difficulties for the regulation of powers once, theoretically at least, reserved to the State (Scott, 2004). Inseparable from the question of how to govern security is the question of how far society is now *governed through security* in the sense that diverse policies are pursued from the standpoint of security (Valverde, 2001: 89).

From this brief mapping of the conceptual contours of the security society, several questions arise. If the logic of security is only connected to crime at one remove, what becomes of criminology? In what ways does prudentialism distort or pre-empt the traditional criminal justice functions of pursuing, prosecuting and punishing crime that have historically engaged criminological attention? Do criminologists need a new vocabulary and new disciplinary resources with which to describe and to tackle the problems posed by the pursuit of security? To what extent do the values and principles of the criminal law, process and trial, and the aims and justification of punishment speak to the concerns it throws up? If not, do we need to develop a new normative framework or to articulate a fresh 'ethics of security' with which to govern its provision?

Security is inherently a normative concept: it describes a good. Though we can haggle over its meaning (Freedman, 1992; Rothschild, 1995; Zedner, 2003a), we cannot escape the need to establish what sort of good it is, for whom it is sought and by what means. Ensuring that the means of security are consistent with its ends; that its measures are inclusive, consistent with equality and fairness; that they do not unduly erode trust; nor impinge without warrant upon civil liberties and that they are proportionate to the risks faced are just some of the challenges to be met. It follows that if criminology is to respond to the challenge of security, it too cannot escape the implicit duty to engage in normative theorizing (Braithwaite, 2000b: 87; Loader and Walker, 2007).

What might this normative project look like? An essential first step is to excavate the entrenched, often hidden assumptions that drive the security agenda by means of immanent critique. Revealing the political and economic interests underlying the present pursuit of security as well as the intellectual assumptions upon which security policies are based are essential first steps. Second, in the spirit of intellectual pilfering that has long characterized criminology, we can profitably draw upon the insights of adjacent disciplines. Historically, criminology has looked principally to sociology,

psychology and, in more recent years, to legal scholarship for sources of intellectual renewal. The following sections first examine the adaptive potential of criminology before going on to argue that there are other apposite disciplinary seams that might now be mined for insight and inspiration in meeting the new challenges faced by criminology.

The adaptive potential of criminology

Criminology's ability to respond to the seismic shifts in its substantive terrain presaged here depends largely upon its capacity to adapt and evolve, so an essential first question is, 'does criminology have the capacity to change?'

Criminology is the child of a set of assumptions about crime and the self-designated observer of strategies that follow logically from these assumptions. Crudely put, it has been assumed that crime is an aberration from the norm; that those who commit criminal acts can and should be held responsible for their wrongdoing; and that the wrongs in question offend not only against their immediate victims but also the public interest. These assumptions about crime have dictated the main trajectories of criminological enquiry and, to the extent that they also inform crime control responses by the State, have furnished the basic framework, principles and values of criminal justice. These core assumptions are now under threat.⁵ Where crimes are regarded as continuous with normal behaviour; where future crimes are anticipated by actuarial calculation and forestalled by preemptive endeavour; where past crimes are conceived less as wrongs than losses; and where responsibility for limiting loss lies as much with the individual or the company as the State, then criminology must also adapt or risk being rendered marginal, even obsolete.

The shift has already begun. A small revolution has occurred in the conceptual and theoretical tools deployed by criminology, a revolution that is suggestive of its reflexive capacity for adaptation. The conceptualization of crime as 'a routine activity' or 'opportunity' (Clarke, 1995: 91), a 'fact of everyday life' (Felson, 2002: ch. 11) or 'normal social commonplace aspect of modern society' (Garland, 2001: 128) are all important first steps. New criminologies deriving from rational choice theory, opportunity theory, environmental analysis, routine activity theory and crime pattern theory have been developed to make sense of change within domestic crime policy (Felson and Clarke, 1998: 4; Zedner, 2006b). Yet 'ironically' to conceptualize crime as a routine, rational activity may be a self-denying ordinance. It risks depriving criminology of the very subject matter that has, historically, been its defining object. Testimony to this danger is the emergent sub-discipline of crime science: 'a new approach intended to get upstream of crime and to proactively prevent it rather than merely respond to it'.⁶ Advocates of crime science regard theirs primarily as a technical enterprise focused on opportunity reduction and closely allied to the security industry.

Alarming, they also view the discipline of criminology as redundant and see crime science as the future.

If crime science is not to reduce criminology to a technician adjunct to the security industry, then criminology needs to meet and defeat the challenge posed. Assessing the adaptive potential of criminology requires a better sense of its inherent traits and latent capacities. The following sections focus on the cultural, structural, substantive and normative capacities of criminology for change.

Culturally, criminology is an interstitial discipline (Abbott, 2000: 6). It inhabits the spaces between other more established social sciences, thieving their intellectual styles, concepts and explanatory tools. Criminology distinguishes itself from its social scientific neighbours less by any defined heuristic, methodological or normative distinction than by its substantive concern with a particular topic—crime.

It is an open question how much coherence of intellectual approach any social scientific discipline can claim since enquiry in this field is inherently interdisciplinary. Intellectual borrowing arises from the fact that social scientists observe the same phenomena from different angles. Arguably, this is a necessary feature of disciplinary development without which stasis might creep in. Criminology is born out of the common interest of sociologists, historians, lawyers, economists and psychologists in the phenomenon of crime. But, as yet, it lacks any established, distinctive explanatory or methodological framework.⁷ Rather its history can be tracked against the waxing and waning of different disciplinary influences: from the phrenological measurement of skull types through psychological analysis of individual development to the sociology of deviance. Awareness of the limits of these approaches stimulated and made possible each subsequent transition to new modes and goals of enquiry. Thus the sociology of deviance grew out of impatience with positivism, and radical criminology rebelled against mainstream criminological endeavour (Downes and Rock, 2003: ch. 10). More recently, the influence of law and political science shifted the focus again, away from crime itself to legal, political and institutional responses to crime. Much that now goes under the heading of criminology is in fact the study of crime control and criminal justice. For all that, this continuing adaptation to external influences betokens a lack of solidity; it also suggests an innate elasticity and capacity for change essential to its flourishing.

Structurally, criminology is only now establishing its institutional foundations through the formation of faculties, degree programmes and bespoke monograph series that consolidate earlier forays in the form of seminar series, journals, conferences and colloquia. Probably, the majority of criminologists still reside in the parent faculties of law, sociology or other social sciences and were themselves trained in these older disciplines. If one applies the simple but defensible test that a discipline is only really established once it mainly hires PhDs in its own field, then criminology is yet to attain discipline-hood (Abbott, 2000: 139). Given its relative structural immaturity, its interstitial nature and lack of well-defined intellectual

approach, criminology is especially vulnerable to external change. Read negatively, the cultural porosity and structural frailty of criminology are weaknesses that render it a camp follower of shifting intellectual fashions and raise doubts about its claim to independent status. The criminological project is not yet (and may never be) a settled disciplinary state. Read positively, however, it might be that in its precarious existence as raider tribe lays its potential strength. It can adapt to the changing topography of what is new, salient and in need of explanation. It can draw upon its many disciplinary influences to develop analytical tools appropriate to the changing nature of its self-appointed task. And free of the fetters of disciplinary institutionalization, it is capable of radical self-redefinition of its assumptions, values and methods.

Substantively, the cutting edge of criminological enquiry already extends well beyond, or rather *before*, the criminal justice system to the temporally prior logics of actuarial justice and risk management, surveillance, social and situational crime prevention, and new urban forms, not least mass private property and gated communities. This said there are important areas of larger change that still await a fully developed criminology. The emergence of so-called reassurance policing, the role of private security; the increasing transnational character of policing, security and intelligence services; and, not least, the war on terror all invite further enquiry (Walker, 2004; Zedner, 2005). There are excellent new studies on the technology of surveillance exemplified by CCTV (Norris and Armstrong, 1999; Goold, 2004) and the work of private security agents, guards and bouncers (Jones and Newburn, 1998; Hobbs et al., 2003). There is also an important emergent literature on the role of the insurance industry and its intersection with state policing and risk management (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997; Ericson et al., 2003). Less attention has yet been given by criminologists to the fields of financial regulation, commercial licensing, audit, profiling and data mining, to transport security, Internet and computer security, and forensic systems analysis—all of which are now central to the workings of the public and private security industries (Sheptycki, 2002: 330; Williams, 2005). Documenting these burgeoning arenas of activity is only the first substantive step towards elaborating analytical tools apposite to the security society. And even these are but preparatory to the yet more challenging task of evolving legal frameworks and regulatory mechanisms by which the security society might be governed (Lister et al., 2001; Zedner, 2006c).

Normatively, criminology has only begun to meet the challenge posed by the pursuit of security to engage in prescriptive theorizing (Hudson, 2003; Johnston and Shearing, 2003; Loader and Walker, 2007). Criminologists are by nature ‘pessimists and cynics’ (Braithwaite, 1998: 49) who conventionally display a healthy ambivalence towards enlightenment projects and the claims of progress. Criminology has a strong record of critical engagement, alert to the ways in which crime is constructed. It is politically sophisticated in its appreciation of the oppressive and illegitimate features of crime control. Yet this predilection for negativity has tended to result in a

collective unwillingness to develop constructive theories of change (Ericson, 2003).⁸ Furthermore, the dispassionate, apolitical bent of post-modernism has resulted in wry, often penetrating observation but rarely in positive critical engagement. Deconstruction done well is potentially illuminating, but its position of absolute relativism is arguably an avoidance tactic, an evasion of moral responsibility. Whether disassociated critique suffices as the academic purpose of criminological enquiry is debatable. Whether it is adequate to the explicitly normative challenges posed by security is more questionable still. As Hudson laments,

[w]hat criminology and penology have lost touch with, however, is work aimed at normative reconstruction of law and penalty. Penology seems content to be descriptive or instrumental: it does not appear to see its endeavour as an aspiration to justice.

(2003: xvi)

Debate about the proper role of intellectual endeavour has a distinguished history and is a matter of insightful controversy in the neighbouring discipline of sociology (Braithwaite, 2005; Burawoy, 2005; see also Chancer and McLaughlin, this issue). Gramsci famously distinguished between 'traditional intellectuals' who consider themselves free thinkers above the partisan divisions of society (but who, according to Gramsci, nevertheless help buttress the prevailing hegemony) and 'organic intellectuals' who self-consciously play a political role as critics of the dominant discourses and constructors of alternative modes of thought (1971: 5–23, 323–77). Leaving on one side Gramsci's particular political purpose (to advance proletarian emancipation and foment revolution), there is much to be said for the organic intellectual as a critical thinker willing to engage in programmes of thought designed to abet change. At one level, this entails systematic criticism of existing practices and the detailed specification of the wrongs, burdens and costs of particular courses of action. At quite another level, it requires utopian thinking, unconstrained by the strictures of realism. Although this second approach is liable to be condemned as hopelessly idealistic, such thinking may furnish what Williams called 'resources of hope' (Williams and Gable, 1989). To promote utopian goals unrealizable today nevertheless pushes the boundaries of what it is possible to conceive and, in so doing, renders movement towards these goals more likely (Young, 1992; Loader, 1998).

In between the critical and the utopian projects lies an intermediate path, the development of normative theory according to whose values and precepts present practice can be appraised and prescriptions for change developed. The normative project is less ambitious than the utopian one in that it begins with the status quo rather than a hypothetical blank sheet and it works within the realms of the possible rather than the ideal. As Lacey observes: 'the temptations of elaborate and elegant theory-construction, of the development of beautiful utopian visions, provide a substantial incentive to ignore inconvenient obstacles thrown up by the recalcitrant empirical world' (forthcoming). This does not require that we accept the status quo as inevitable, but it does

ground normative theory within empirical enquiry. Thus informed, normative theorizing has a greater chance of developing prescriptions that are, if not immediately, then prospectively, realizable. By this means criminology might seek to elaborate and defend a conception of justice apposite to the problems and potential of the security society (Hudson, 2003; Zedner, 2003b; Loader and Walker, 2007).

‘Resources of hope’

Earlier it was suggested that criminology remains less a settled disciplinary state than a raider tribe. Looting other disciplines for intellectual resources is something criminologists do rather well, not least because many have been trained first in other schools. Several disciplines suggest themselves as resources that supply conceptual and analytical techniques in which criminologists might productively become more literate and suggest an alternative lens through which to view the problems of the security society. Interdisciplinarity need not be a one-way traffic. One productive outcome of ‘tooling-up’ in adjacent disciplines may be to enhance criminology’s future capacity to feed back into the development of those disciplines from which it now steals. What follows is a sketch of just some resources, drawn respectively from economics, international relations, moral philosophy and political theory that, for quite different reasons, appear germane to the present challenge.

First, *economic analysis* lies behind so many of the most salient changes so far described that criminologists need to engage with it far more rigorously and systematically than has hitherto been the case. The impact of economic reasoning, the assumptions of rational choice theory and the conceptual toolkit of game theory together underpin policy makers’ conceptions of crime and the pursuit of security in and outside the public sphere. To the extent that criminology is a policy field, criminologists need better to appreciate the foundations of present policy in rational choice theory (Ericson, 2003; Zedner, 2006b). The founding assumption that crime is less a moral wrong than the product of opportunity (Becker, 1968) creates the expectation that crime is a ‘normal’ and probably ineradicable fact of everyday life, a calculable cost that can be estimated, insured against and otherwise minimized. It is thus in large measure from economic analysis that prudential orientations of present policy arise (O’Malley, 2001). According to its logic, reducing opportunities for crime is likely to be more effective than tackling root causes or engaging in moral re-education (Felson and Clarke, 1998): target hardening, monitoring and surveillance are all obvious consequences. Accepting that economic analysis provides the rationale behind much that goes under the banner of security is not the same as claiming that it can also furnish a guide to the moral and ethical dilemmas thrown up by the pursuit of security. And yet to the extent that it underpins the logic of pre-crime, criminologists need to engage much more closely with economic reasoning. What follows

are just a few examples of how economic analysis might inform criminological understanding.

Achieving adequate, fair, equal and universal levels of protection requires reflection upon how security is provided and distributed. Protecting security as a public good, available equally to all, raises particular difficulties where the nature of its provision limits access, for example in business districts, gated housing complexes and university campuses. These 'clubs' are by definition exclusive, creating negative externalities for those outside (Hope, 2000: 86; Crawford, 2006). Economic analysis suggests that one means of limiting these burdens is to force suppliers to internalize the externalities they impose and so absorb some of the costs otherwise born by those outside the club.

Given that the market is an increasingly important mechanism for the supply of security, economics provides expert insight into its operation and the components essential for it to thrive. A flourishing market requires that there be competition, that contracts are enforceable and that consumer choice is well informed. Problems such as competitive breakdown, information deficits and incomplete markets are common in the provision of security, but are difficulties with which economics is well acquainted and for which sophisticated solutions have been developed. Relying upon the market for the provision of security is clearly problematic. Yet given it is impossible to envisage that this market will wane, developing the means to manage it is an essential first step to contending with the realities of the security society (Zedner, 2006c).

International relations, with its substantive interest in national security and its conceptual toolkit for thinking about the nature, the costs and benefits of security strategies, also has a new salience for criminological endeavour. Of particular interest are 'critical security studies'—an amalgam of disparate approaches distinguished by their commitment to think 'critically' about security; to eschew statism; to widen the security agenda; and to anchor the pursuit and study of security in a broader concern with 'human emancipation' (Krause and Williams, 1997; Wyn-Jones, 1999). Emancipation here is the idea of freeing peoples 'from those physical and human constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do ... Security and Emancipation are two sides of the same coin. Emancipation, not power or order, produces true security' (Booth, 1991: 319). The idea of emancipation is so loosely articulated it arguably raises as many questions as it answers. None the less it is a provocative idea, not least because it invites consideration of the means by which people may seek their own security rather than having order foisted upon them (Shearing and Wood, 2003).

Significantly, just as criminology is taking increasing note of international affairs by studying crimes of the State, transnational and international crime and policing, and terrorism (Cohen, 2001; Walker, 2003; Deflem, 2004), so international relations has developed a closer interest in domestic social issues. Security is seen to reside not only in political and military endeavour by nation states but also in social, economic

and environmental policies to secure people in their homes, jobs and communities. As policing relies increasingly on international co-operation or is carried out by supranational bodies, the earlier domestic societal focus of criminology is replaced by concerns held more closely in common with international relations.

Of particular interest is 'human security', a concept that displaces national security by fusing ideas from international relations and development studies to foster a new focus on people rather than states.⁹ In so doing it brings international relations even closer to a sociological understanding germane to criminological interests. The goods to be protected are not only political and territorial but also personal, communal and environmental. In place of the negative logic of defence, human security promotes concern for the basic necessities of human flourishing and the upholding of human rights. It is predicated upon the belief that the chief threats to security arise out of deprivation and frustration which together breed disorder and, at the extreme, terrorism. Human security has become important conceptually and practically, motivating efforts to supplement state provision with programmes aimed at empowering people to secure their own interests. The State retains a vital role in developing and sustaining norms, policies and institutions essential to protection, but human security requires that this be supplemented by the expansion of human rights and the fostering of the basic goods of health, education and employment at the micro level. In order to encompass these larger concerns, security is reconceived not as a technical, military or policing issue but as a political concept within which state security is less an end in itself than the means of securing individual liberty.

Whether it is possible thus to expand the meaning of security without risking the problems of 'securitization'—not least distorting priorities to fit the security agenda—is a matter of live debate within international relations. Viewing problems that are arguably only tangentially related through the lens of security risks other important issues being subsumed by the security agenda and may dictate policies inimical to their proper solution (Wyn-Jones, 1999: 107). There is much to be learned from international relations therefore as criminology, too, faces the challenge of rapid securitization (Loader, 2002).

Finally, in pursuit of the larger normative project, criminology could profit from the insights and intellectual resources of *moral philosophy* and *political theory* to address the difficult question of how to achieve justice in a security society (Hudson, 2003). Outside the limited domain of justifying punishment, criminology has engaged little with philosophy and political theory despite their obvious relevance to tackling issues such as the just distribution of security and the role of the State in the increasingly mixed market of security provision, to say nothing of the moral and metaphysical dilemmas of pre-emptive intervention. For example, some argue that where there is as strong a reason to believe someone is about to commit an offence as is sufficient to merit post-punishment then that person is 'pre-deserving' of punishment (New, 1992). Yet even if it appears almost certain that the

person will commit an offence, respect for the individual as a moral agent must acknowledge a categorical 'window of moral opportunity' or chance to remain innocent (Smilansky, 1994: 52). To close this window pre-emptively fails to respect the moral autonomy of the individual to choose to do right.

Moral philosophy might also inform consideration of what kind of good security is and how it relates to other goods. One persuasive line of philosophical argument is that the pursuit of security is justified only in so far as it serves ulterior goods such as liberty, justice, equality, trust and social inclusion (Dinwiddy, 1978: 21). It does not make sense therefore to posit the relationship between security and these goods as in tension, still less as a zero-sum game but rather as properly interdependent (Kelly, 1990: 89). Whereas security is generally seen as standing in competition with the protection of individual liberty, a better view might be that the pursuit of security is justified precisely because it is a precondition of liberty. Upholding individual liberties looks less like the defence of liberty against security than an integral facet of its pursuit. Understanding security this way would lead us to abandon balance and other computational metaphors in favour of a more cohesive conception of security and other goods as interdependent.

The pursuit of security also poses difficult distributive questions whose resolution might lie in the sophisticated work of political theorists on questions of distributive justice (Rawls, 1973; Nozick, 1974: ch. 7). Who should provide protection, to whom and in what measure are all questions at the heart of political theory but with which there has yet been only limited criminological engagement. The role of the State in providing protection is accepted by even those, like Nozick, who propose a minimal 'night watchman state'. Yet it is arguable that the privatization of security eats into even this core state function. As we have already seen, private provision of security results in unequal provision and in circuits of inclusion and exclusion. And even state provision may not meet the expectation that security is for all. Security presumes a threat, those who threaten and, necessarily therefore, those within and without protection. Again, resort to political theory provides the basis for arguing that security of the self can be guaranteed only by providing equal security for all (Loader and Walker, 2005). The challenge is to ensure a realm of security in which each is able to exercise the widest possible freedom compatible with the same realm of security for others. Theories of distributive justice are particularly apposite therefore to the task of allocating benefits and burdens of security that this requires.

Finally, recognizing that security should be sought only by means consistent with its ulterior purpose of serving other goods renders it impossible to specify its end in a way that leaves the means open. Since security is the indefinite pursuit of the unattainable, it cannot in any case make sense to draw a sharp distinction between ends and means. New forms of moral reasoning are needed to capture this dual aspect of security, which recognize that means and ends are logically, not merely contingently, related (Duff, 1986: 7). So, for example, although it might be practically efficacious to prevent crime by imposing a blanket curfew on all teenage boys, the means

here would be patently inappropriate to the goal of providing security for all and, therefore, unjust. What renders a security measure just is that it employs means that can be rationally defended as intrinsically appropriate to the end sought. To put it another way, the justice of the means is integral to the very attainment of a just security society.

This preliminary foray focuses on intellectual resources that have, for the most part, yet to capture criminologists' imagination. It suggests just some of many insights to be derived from raiding neighbouring disciplines. Engaging with ideas that have such powerful potential application to the dilemmas of the coming security society is a vital step towards securing criminology's own future. At a time when other disciplines, not least the bio-sciences, statistics, psychiatry, genetics and, in quite a different way, war studies, scramble to colonize security as a terrain over which they can claim sovereignty, criminology has both an existing expertise in the area and a structural capacity for adaptation that renders it particularly well placed to lead the field. Reducing 'security threats' to matters of crime prevention; insisting that even the gravest prospective harms be tackled with proper regard to due process; recognizing that security measures, like penal ones, require special justification; and maintaining the central role of the State in providing security as a public good are just a few of the steps criminologists might take to tame security, capture the field and reassert the Enlightenment values that lie behind much criminological endeavour.

Conclusion—the triumph of criminology?

Pre-crime—or the study of risk, uncertainty, precaution and security—lies at the cutting edge of criminological endeavour posing a considerable challenge to existing modes of scholarship and stretching existing conceptual and methodological resources to the full. Happily, criminology is well adapted to change, voracious in its capacity to absorb new ideas, and unashamed in its plundering of neighbouring social science disciplines in a continuing bid to adapt, advance and meet new challenges. The particular challenge of security requires new resources, especially in the exacting task of establishing the values, principles and human rights that are to be defended in its pursuit.

There is an exciting array of analytical and conceptual tools being developed by criminology's social scientific neighbours. These furnish 'resources of hope' with the aid of which the daunting hurdle of securing justice in the security society may successfully be surmounted. And although pre-crime shifts the temporal perspective it does not radically undermine criminology's expert knowledge about the causes, meanings and means of managing crime. Providing criminology maintains its historical facility to adapt to social change and succeeds in reinventing itself with a prospective orientation, the pre-crime security society need not be a post-criminological one.

Exactly what sort of criminology will persist is perhaps harder to anticipate. In significant degree, this claim for the continued flourishing of criminology relies upon its intimate interrelation and expertise in related social scientific disciplines. A larger question therefore is what will occur as criminology becomes a popular undergraduate degree course turning out skilled practitioners who may, however, have little exposure to other modes of thought or access to other disciplinary tools. Such gains as the development of criminology degrees undoubtedly bring in generating large cadres of well-educated, self-identifying professional criminologists may just come at the cost of a growing insularity and a loss of intellectual vitality. Those drawn to criminology by the appeal of its intellectual rendezvous status and the challenge of applying different disciplinary proficiencies to a particularly intractable social problem may come to be regarded as ill-educated dinosaurs by the new criminologically trained entrants to the field. So to end on a note of caution: the claim that criminology can surmount the challenges of the pre-crime, security society is a claim about the discipline as it is presently constituted. Whether the professional consolidation and structural establishment of criminology within the academy will compromise its flexibility and capacity for adaptation is a matter to which some thought might profitably be given as criminologists collectively set about entrenching the subject's disciplinary boundaries.

Notes

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1. Both terms derive from the prescient science fiction short story by Philip K. Dick first published in 1956 about a future society where murders are prevented before they happen (Dick, 2002: 2–3).
2. Though they have earlier historical antecedents in the work of 19th-century social statisticians and in Lombrosian Positivism.
3. Most notably the Terrorism Act 2000, the Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 and the Terrorism Act 2006.
4. In ways not dissimilar to the development of the penal industrial complex described by Christie (1994).
5. It has been suggested that they are also under threat from a certain disciplinary fragmentation witnessed by the rise of distinct 'policing studies', 'probation studies' and 'community safety studies'.
6. As advocated by the practitioners of this new approach like Gloria Laycock, Ron Clarke, Nick Tilley and Ken Pease at the Jill Dando Institute of Crime Science, University College London. <http://www.jdi.ucl.ac.uk/>

7. As Vick rightly insists 'disciplines are not just distinct bodies of knowledge or branches of learning' (2004: 166).
8. Restorative Justice is an obvious exception.
9. The United Nations' Commission on Human Security promoted human security as a necessary complement to state security by addressing fundamental problems of poverty, ill health, illiteracy and other maladies to secure freedom from fear and freedom from want (UN Commission on Human Security, 2003).

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