ABSTRACT

Some feminists have been critical about the dominant conception of autonomy, questioning, for example, its conception of persons and ideal of personhood. Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (B&C), the major proponents of the dominant conception of autonomy, believe that these feminists have misunderstood their theory and, moreover, that their theory is immune to feminist attack. Their response to feminist critics, however, has been dismissive and does nothing to assuage these critics’ concerns. In this paper I briefly review the state of play in this debate about autonomy, showing that B&C are not without positive rejoinders to objections raised by feminist critics. These rejoinders rest on the notion that feminist concerns are a matter of what is logically entailed by B&C’s theory of autonomy and attempt to show that feminist commitments are logically consistent with that theory. However, these rejoinders are less than convincing for reasons illuminated by Cheshire Calhoun. Calhoun reminds us that feminists are sensitive to ways in which the shape of discourse is influenced by non-epistemic considerations. In particular, Calhoun draws our attention to the cumulative effect of a whole tradition of moral reasoning that focuses on too narrow a range of moral problems and too narrow an understanding of people and the human condition. B&C’s conception of autonomy relies on and reinforces ideologies of the moral life created in just this way. Following Calhoun, I show that criticism of their theory as ideology is not criticism of its logical implications, but something far more damaging, something without available rejoinders.

Key words: autonomy, feminism, ideology

I. INTRODUCTION

In Western bioethics, autonomy is widely understood to be a very important moral consideration. Major proponents of the dominant conception of auto-
nomony are Tom Beauchamp and James Childress (B&C), according to whom autonomy is the “personal rule of the self that is free from both controlling interferences by others and from personal limitations that prevent meaningful choice” (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 121). On this view, an autonomous person is one who “freely acts in accordance with a self-chosen plan” (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 121). Like most liberal conceptions of autonomy, B&C hold that the capacity to make rational decisions and act on them are together associated with the meaning of autonomy.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, some feminists began to criticize the dominant conception of autonomy, and specifically to criticize B&C. Susan Sherwin raises two major concerns that some feminists have. First, feminists have questioned the conception of persons that the dominant theory of autonomy implies, a conception of persons that feminists typically believe to be false. As a result, these feminists charge that the theory overemphasizes people’s independence and deference to rationality in decision making. Second, some feminists have also questioned the value of autonomy espoused by the dominant theory, especially since the dominant theory relies on an ideal of personhood that feminists generally believe to be “both unrealistic and pernicious” (Sherwin, 1992, pp. 137–138).²

In their most recent edition of Principles of Biomedical Ethics, B&C respond to these specific criticisms, with the dismissive explanation that:

These criticisms typically apply to stark, individualistic conceptions of autonomy that more balanced theories [like our own] avoid. Communal life and human relationships provide the matrix for the development of the self, and no defensible theory of autonomy denies this fact (Beauchamp and Childress 1994, pp. 124–125).

Thus, B&C believe that these feminists have misunderstood their theory and that, moreover, their theory is immune to feminist critique. This dismissive response is unsatisfactory. It fails fully to appreciate the nature of the criticism. However, B&C are not without possible, positive rejoinders. Such rejoinders attempt to show that feminist commitments are logically consistent with the dominant conception of autonomy. Even though B&C themselves remain largely silent about what concerns their critics, their theory can in principle accommodate those concerns. However, these rejoinders are less than convincing for reasons illuminated by Cheshire Calhoun in her analysis of gender bias in the ethics of justice.
The rejoinders available to B&C rest on the notion that feminist concerns are solely a matter of what is logically entailed by the theory. But feminists are aware that the shape of discourse is also influenced by non-epistemic considerations, such as the nature of one’s ideological commitments. This feminist sensitivity to the nature of discourse has bearing on the debate about autonomy. In particular, the dominant conception of autonomy relies on what Calhoun calls “ideologies of the moral life.” Ideologies of the moral life are sets of ideas and beliefs that bear on moral requirements, permissions, and prohibitions created as the cumulative effect of a whole tradition of moral reasoning which as a matter of fact, if not of logic, focuses on too narrow a range of moral problems (Calhoun, 1988, p. 461). By purporting to explain some facts about what is naturally and morally the case, ideologies shape political and social institutions which in turn shape persons so that those persons think and act in accordance with the ideologies thereby providing evidence for those ideologies’ “truth” (Scheman, 1993, p. 46). For instance, as will become clear to the reader, overly narrow concern for rationality and impartiality has resulted in the dominant conception of autonomy’s reliance on, and reinforcement of, ideologies of the moral life. Evaluation of the dominant theory of autonomy must include these non-epistemic ideological considerations. Such an evaluation changes the focus of the current debate away from matters of logical implication to critique of the ideologies upon which the dominant theory rests and also reinforces. In using this approach I do not claim that the feminist conceptual framework I use is free from ideological commitments. Rather the moral analysis presented here reveals that feminist commitments about the nature of people and moral problems more accurately reflect people’s lived moral experience than do the ideological commitments that B&C rely on. Moreover, fundamental inaccuracies about the nature of people and moral problems underlying B&C’s conception of autonomy render their theory morally unacceptable.3

While at the most basic level I am claiming simply that there is something important that has gone unconsidered in B&C’s conception of autonomy, the larger point that I wish make is that B&C do not have room in their theory to consider what has gone unconsidered. That is, their theory relies on the unacceptably narrow focus of vision that is its foundation. To attempt to widen the focus to amend the theory’s short comings is to destroy the theory.

Accordingly, my approach in this paper is first to draw out the debate between B&C and their feminist critics, showing how B&C could reply to objections raised without significantly affecting the theory of autonomy that
they espouse. Then, using Calhoun, I show that a feminist critique goes beyond what is immediately apparent in the current debate. I show that criticism of the theory as ideology is not criticism of its logical implications, but something far more damaging. It is criticism of the basic assumptions upon which the theory depends. Because these criticisms cannot be adequately responded to without dismantling the theory, the theory is left without acceptable rejoinders.

II. BRINGING POSITIVE REJOINDERS INTO THE DEBATE

Some feminists claim that actual people are not like the people implied by the dominant view of autonomy. They are not solely independent, nor do they strictly follow reason. In fact, people sometimes act contrary to their best interests, which violates a liberal understanding of an autonomous person (Sherwin, 1992, p. 137). Against this criticism, B&C have at their disposal the caveat that their view does not require an extreme of “full” rationality. They reject any view of autonomy with standards so high that “ordinary persons” do not qualify “as deserving respect for their autonomy” (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 122). “No theory of autonomy is acceptable if it presents an ideal beyond the reach of normal choosers” (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 123). It is sufficient, they believe, to be only substantially autonomous (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 123). Their view that “ordinary persons” meet the requirements of autonomy also seems to deny that an extreme independence from others is required, since any view of ordinary people would admit, as B&C do, that communal life and human relationships at least in part shape the people we become.

Feminists might counter that the group believed to be “normal choosers” too often excludes women and other oppressed people. After all, those appearing to choose may not actually be choosing in the way B&C’s theory demands if, for example, the “chooser’s” situation involves relative powerlessness. Moreover, women, as well as other oppressed people, have had their rationality (and consequently their autonomy) unjustly denied (Cook, 1994, p. 198; Sherwin, 1998, p. 26). B&C’s claim that “ordinary persons” are autonomous is also sufficiently vague to call into question whether the sick, injured, young, old, poor, foreign, queer, and so on, are “ordinary persons.” Perhaps many would believe that they are exceptions.
Given the features of autonomy that B&C stipulate, it might make better sense to think of their understanding of “ordinary persons” as those who are ordinarily assumed to be rational, knowledgeable, and relatively free. This description best applies to educated, rational, independent persons. This conclusion would bolster feminists’ claims that the dominant conception of autonomy is grounded on and implies too narrow a conception of persons, yet B&C’s use of autonomy suggests that they do not intend so narrow an understanding of “ordinary persons.” For instance, they describe at least some psychotics, religious fanatics, prisoners, nursing home residents, and to a lesser degree those with a low IQ as having decisional autonomy (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, pp. 136, 137, 168). These examples, coupled with their claim that autonomy is a feature of normal choosers, suggest that a rich feminist understanding of ordinary people is consistent with B&C’s conception of autonomy.

Some feminists are critical of the dominant conception of autonomy because it requires a high degree of independence in thought and action. B&C have tried to grant this point. They admit that most of us do live in communities and have relationships with other people, both of which affect how we develop, think and act. While this may be an important realization, some feminists fault B&C for failing to realize the degree of effect communal life and human relationships has on independence, both on independence of action and of thought, and for failing to make use of these effects in their theory. For instance, childhood socialization has a fundamental effect on independence by shaping the skills we develop that either enhance or limit our autonomy. Diana Meyers argues that boys tend to have a higher degree of autonomy than girls in part because boys, more so than girls, are socialized in ways that allow them to practice autonomy skills such as self-assertion in action (Meyers, 1989, p. 166). B&C could reply arguing that the degree of autonomy typically experienced by boys meets their requirements for substantial autonomy and thus provides evidence for their theory’s compatibility with the social character of subjectivity. Furthermore, they could consistently claim that that degree of autonomy could be achievable by girls were certain social practices changed, and that their conception of respect for autonomy as a moral principle provides justification for changing certain social practices in just the ways that feminists want them changed. Significantly, B&C could, it seems, make these arguments from the perspective of their own theory.

More than mere influence and socialization, feminists are concerned with the repressive influence of social institutions and practices on persons. This
too affects independence and autonomy. Anne Donchin mentions this oversight as a specific failure of B&C’s reply to feminists (Donchin, 1995, p. 46). She draws our attention to several ways in which social practices compromise people’s autonomy (Donchin, 1995, pp. 49–50). These oversights notwithstanding, B&C could simply grant these points as further examples of what interferes with substantial autonomy. Their silence on the matter does not preclude accommodation within their theory.

B&C’s feminist critics believe that the liberal view of personhood is unacceptable as an “ideal” on at least two grounds. First, the factual ground: persons simply are not, and cannot be, the sort of beings that the ideal in the dominant conception of autonomy requires. This I have discussed above, showing that B&C’s conception of autonomy has, or could have, a richer notion of persons than some feminists give their theory credit for. Second, the consequentialist ground: the imposition of such an ideal by the dominant conception of autonomy can be harmful. For instance, people can be harmed by social demands to meet the ideal. Susan Wendell shows how the ideals of independence, implicit in the ideal of personhood, can be “turned against people with disabilities as unrealistic demands that they achieve goals deemed appropriate by others or as excuses for refusing to provide necessary services” (Wendell, 1996, p. 145). B&C could well reply that the ideal of personhood, as with the principle of respect for autonomy, is not to be conceived as a moral trump (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 181). Other values and interests are morally important as well, and the particulars of the situation determine which values and interests and moral principles take precedence. Moreover, people with physical (and even some mental) disabilities are, or can be, substantially autonomous (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, pp. 136, 137, 168). That some substantially autonomous decisions are overridden by others is a matter distinct from having substantial autonomy in the first place (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 141).

III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE DOMINANT CONCEPTION OF AUTONOMY

Concluding that the dominant conception of autonomy is seriously and irreparably flawed, some feminists have advanced alternatives to the dominant conception of autonomy. Most promising are theories developing alternative conceptions of autonomy that are grounded on or imply a relational concep-
tion of persons (Donchin, 1995, pp. 50–52; Friedman, 1989, p. 160; Grimshaw, 1988, pp. 103–105; Hoagland, 1988, p. 145; Meyers, 1989, p. 97; Nedelsky, 1989, p. 21; Sherwin, 1998, pp. 35–36; Shildrick, 1997, p. 89). On such views, persons are always and necessarily socially situated, that is, they are always and necessarily in relationships with others. These alternative conceptions of autonomy emphasize just what these feminists have found lacking in the dominant conception of autonomy: a realistic conception of persons that entails interdependency. They tend to understand autonomy grounded on this relational conception of persons as involving the competent exercising of skills, derived and constrained by social circumstances, that facilitate self-direction. Thus, as Sherwin claims, autonomy conceived this way is a social project residing in individuals (Sherwin, 1998, p. 32).

Numerous advantages obtain for these alternative conceptions of autonomy. They support richer and more acceptable notions of persons and, as a result, they support more comprehensive understandings of what counts as moral problems. Significantly, responsibility for choices and actions extends to society to the extent that society contributes to the development of the necessary skills for choice. These conceptions of autonomy make clear that having and respecting autonomy requires anticipation by others of what is needed to make the choice in question and facilitating that choice accordingly. Thus developing and enabling the skills of autonomy are more easily morally motivated from these conceptions of autonomy than the dominant conception of autonomy that is often thought to require only non-interference by others. Of special note, these conceptions of autonomy do not rely on or reinforce unacceptable ideology.

This work of feminist theorists will no doubt go a long way to supplant the dominant conception of autonomy. However, the tasks set out for this paper preclude further discussion of these alternatives here. For the balance of this paper I want to shift the focus of the current debate. To do that, a different line of argument is necessary.

IV. CRITICISM OF THE THEORY AS IDEOLOGY

Calhoun gives us a new way to think about the debate between B&C and their feminist critics. While that debate centers on the logical structure and implications of B&C’s conception of autonomy, Calhoun’s analysis of gender bias inherent in the ethics of justice suggests we look beyond these matters.
Since B&C’s conception of autonomy arises from a history of moral theory epitomized by the ethics of justice, Calhoun’s critique is particularly apt.

Calhoun is concerned with the history of intellectual traditions. Her attention is drawn to “the results from the cumulative effect of moral theorizing rather than from errors or omissions in particular ethical works considered individually” (Calhoun, 1988, p. 461). Rather than confining critical evaluation to the structural aspects of the theory at hand, Calhoun’s work suggests that we expand our evaluation to include the effects of history on the theory and the effects of the theory on history. I suggest that we do just that in our evaluation of the dominant conception of autonomy.

By repeatedly working on and thinking about a narrow range of moral problems (problems that are “solved” by keeping autonomy figural), we come to believe that what most counts as a moral problem has to do with what is rational, impartial, self-controlling, individualistic, abstract. This is the “lopsidedness” that Calhoun sees in dominant moral theories (Calhoun, 1988, p. 462). We come to believe that solving moral problems involves respecting autonomy, too often to the exclusion of other considerations. We come to see autonomy as a moral trump turning right action on competence even if autonomy theorists do not explicitly consider it such. We develop moral blinders so that other problems, problems of interconnectedness and interdependency, for example, seem to be peripheral and hence minor, or worse, absent and hence not problems at all. We become blind to other approaches for solving moral problems. All such limited vision can work to the detriment of people, for example, with serious chronic impairments whose moral experience of impairment cannot be captured in rational, impartial, self-controlling, individualistic, or abstract terms and whose moral problems extend beyond those considerations as well. Their moral problems often involve the effect of the prevailing values of their community and the impact of their conditions on the financial, temporal, emotional, and physical resources of their intimates. Solving moral problems can involve such actions changing social programs, improving access to social spaces, and supporting or relieving in-home care givers.

By repeatedly focusing our attention on a narrow, individualistic conception of people, our beliefs about people are similarly affected. We come to believe that people are as our theories describe them. Our own experiences of ourselves as otherwise are either not attended to or attended to as abnormal and flawed. We fail adequately to grasp people as, for example, necessarily interconnected and interdependent and unequal in many respects. Feminists
who criticize B&C for their use of a narrow understanding of people do so correctly, but feminist criticism is more effective when it moves beyond structure to process. As Calhoun puts it, “[i]t does not matter what the ethics of justice could consistently talk about, only what it does talk about” (Calhoun, 1988, p. 453). Even if B&C’s theory were such that it could accommodate more comprehensive understandings of moral problems and the moral nature of people, B&C’s silence on the full range of human characteristics and the full range of moral problems, along with the silence on these matters of the whole dominating moral tradition, is sufficient to create and sustain ideologies of the moral life.

By relying on a limited understanding of people and moral problems, B&C’s conception of autonomy produces such ideologies. Beauchamp acknowledges that he and Childress rely on paradigms to ground their moral principles, including the principle of autonomy: “We start with the paradigms of what is morally proper or morally improper. We then search for principles that are consistent with these paradigms and consistent with each other” (Beauchamp, 1994, p. 11). But what they offer as a justification for their theory really seems more to be the problem. For if the paradigms they rely on are too narrow, then relying on them risks producing and reproducing ideologies of the moral life.

In addition to ideologies about an individualistic conception of persons and what count as moral problems, B&C draw upon and reinforce other ideologies of the moral life. Ideologies about rationality and impartiality are created by focusing too much on these two aspects to the near exclusion of other aspects of human experience. We fail to see and so fail to believe the whole picture. For instance, beliefs that rationality (1) distinguishes humans from other animals, (2) makes people responsible, and (3) is unaccompanied by emotion, incline us to forget or ignore that (1) there are other important features of human life aside from rationality, (2) responsibility is sometimes shared and includes factors other than rationality, and (3) our emotional experience attends all our experience and sometimes an emotional response is appropriate. Because of, or fearing, an emotional reaction to disclosure about poor diagnosis or prognosis, health care providers sometimes incorrectly assume that patients are not rational and thus ill-equipped to participate in care management decisions. As a result, these health care providers defer prematurely to involving proxy decision makers. In addition to usurping legitimate authority and self-control, this practice risks compromising care management consistent with patients’ best interests.
Similar remarks can be made about ideological beliefs about impartiality. For instance, beliefs that impartial decisions are always the best decisions are used to support conclusions that moral disputes are best solved by an impartial arbitrator. However, this approach is often counterproductive. Acceptable resolutions to moral disputes necessarily involve partiality because what is sought is a good outcome, the right solution, which depend on the particulars of a situation. Hence, arbitration techniques alone are typically insufficient to yield a good outcome in clinical ethics consultations.

Ideologies about rationality and impartiality draw on and reinforce a notion of objectivity. It is assumed that there are objective perspectives from which one can properly understand the world and make moral judgments. Many ethical theories (e.g., utilitarianism) and religious views are objectivistic. But as Thomas Nagel realizes, “[t]here is no room in an objective picture of the world for a type of explanation of action that is not causal. The defense of freedom requires the acknowledgment of a different kind of explanation essentially connected to the agent’s point of view” (Nagel, 1986, p. 115). Nagel reveals an absurdity of perspectives, two contradictory perspectives that we concurrently have. We have an internal perspective from which we understand ourselves as agents taking “our lives in our own hands” and we have an external perspective that gives rise to an objective picture of the world which reveals to us a “basis for action” (Nagel, 1986, p. 118). Significantly, our external perspective is not completely outside ourselves. It is “our standpoint as much as the internal one is” (Nagel, 1986, p. 118). That external view seems both to give us grounds for action and choice and assure us that we are parts of the world determined by its history. Contradictorily, in order to do anything we must already be something. We might on one perspective feel like we can step outside ourselves enough to make and act on choices but actually “[w]e cannot assess and revise or confirm our entire system of thought and judgment from outside, for we have nothing to do it with” (Nagel, 1986, p. 118). Whatever beliefs and actions seem to be grounded on an objective standpoint, “we continue to be threatened by the idea of a still more external and comprehensive view of ourselves that we cannot incorporate, but that would review the unchosen sources of our most autonomous efforts” (Nagel, 1986, p. 119). We all see the world from very specific perspectives, through our own specific lenses. Our understanding of morality must take this feature of human life into account.

Donchin is critical of a voluntariness bias in B&C’s understanding of human relationships which she identifies “in their assumption that individuals
are social creatures only contingently, free to accept or reject the moral principles that they have internalized” (Donchin, 1995, pp. 46–47). This interpretation is supported by B&C’s claim that “each individual must will the acceptance of his principles” (Beauchamp and Childress, 1994, p. 58). On this view, we adopt or reject at will our moral commitments. We are free to choose our beliefs and change them also. On this view, beliefs are external to some “core” self that chooses them. Likewise, a voluntariness bias is found in assumptions that people freely choose their relationships and their actions. According to these biases, people are themselves responsible for their actions and their relationships because, significantly, they choose those actions and relationships. Feminist analysis debunks these assumptions, but feminist analysis also takes this conclusion further. The voluntariness biases underlying B&C’s conception of individual moral responsibility could well be understood as ideologies of the moral life. By focusing too narrowly on the choices we do make and feel responsible for and by not attending to the choices that are closed to us or the choices that are not made freely, we come to believe that we are always responsible because we could have chosen otherwise. By focusing too much on our capacity for choice, we ignore features of our social lives that inhibit voluntariness and where responsibilities are shared. The “choice” of someone with serious chronic impairment to stay at home may have more to do with lack of or inefficient transportation, inaccessible buildings, or others’ impatience or hostility than with a desire to stay at home. Yet Western society typically holds impaired people themselves accountable for not overcoming their impairments to live “normally.”

Eva Feder Kittay draws our attention to an ideology of equality affecting our workplaces and social spaces. According to this ideology, “we are a society of equals” (Kittay, 1999, p. 47). Society is conceived as if constituted by equally situated autonomous, self-interested individuals. Kittay’s insight shows the dominant conception of autonomy as reinforcing an ideology of equality. This view of autonomy also draws on this same ideology that it reinforces. It is because we are taken to be a society of equals that B&C assume that contextual aspects of people’s lives need not inform their theory of autonomy in any significant way. They seem to assume that “ordinary persons” are fundamentally the same.

From this sampling of ideologies of the moral life operative in B&C’s conception of autonomy, at least two things are clear. It is clear that these ideologies are sets of beliefs that do not rest on logic. They are beliefs that arise because of the way a discourse is practiced. Being overly concerned with
a subset of moral problems and a subset of moral understandings restricts one’s vision to those subsets such that the full range of moral problems and moral understandings is not seen, and so is not factored into moral reasoning. It is clear also that these ideologies fold in on each other creating or revealing one huge organic ideology. A feminist critique will encourage us to level out the “lopsidedness” in our thinking and in our theory, by embracing a better, more complete and more accurate, understanding of persons, the human condition, and the moral problems people confront. A feminist critique will move our analysis of intellectual theories beyond logical structure and entailments to an analysis of the effects of those theories on history and the effects of history on those theories. A feminist critique will encourage us to correct the deficiencies in our social institutions and practices brought about by ideologies of the moral life.

Without explicitly embracing and utilizing a radical re-understanding of people that involves, for example, a greater degree of interdependence among people, B&C’s theory cannot be made acceptable. Yet such a radical re-understanding of people is not available to them without dismantling the major features of their whole approach. Thus B&C have not only failed to adequately address feminist concerns about their conception of autonomy, but they espouse a theory that cannot alleviate those concerns.

NOTES

1. I am grateful to James Lindemann Nelson, Françoise Baylis, Betsy Postow and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier versions of this paper. Any deficiencies are my own responsibility. Research for this paper was supported by a Doctoral Fellowship from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

2. In more recent work, Sherwin enumerates many practical problems of applying the dominant conception of autonomy. She also presents her own feminist alternative to the dominant view (Sherwin, 1998, pp. 24–39).

3. More can be said about feminist use of ideology. Significantly, the feminist conceptual framework I use involves a distinctly different use of ideology than is found in the liberal tradition. This feminist ideology is critically self-aware. Feminists critically assess the conceptual framework they use. In contrast, while B&C look to and adopt prevailing social ideologies to ground their moral theory, they make no attempt critically to assess those ideologies (Beauchamp, 1994, p. 11). Although feminist ideology has the potential to shape persons and institutions, its critical self-engagement will temper those affects such that gross conceptual and practical inaccuracies can more easily than liberal ideology motivate revisions of ideological commitments.

4. Gerald Dworkin also makes this point (Dworkin, 1988, p. 114).
5. For instance, Tod Chambers notes how Tom Beauchamp and Laurence McCullough omit any reference to Dax’s mother in their version of the “real” Dax case (in which a young man, badly burned, received treatment that he had refused). Because Beauchamp and McCullough viewed the case as a conflict between autonomy and beneficence, they failed to incorporate features of the case, such as the effect the decisions on Dax’s mother, that challenged that approach (Chambers, 1999, p. 136).

6. Granted, a theory can be given better applications. A silence can be broken and a theory can start talking about or using what Calhoun finds lacking in dominant liberal theory. Doing so retains the theory and may accommodate what feminists find lacking, thereby disengaging from at least some of the ideologies upon which the original theory has rested. Yet, to do so is effectively to develop a new version of the theory. This does not undermine Calhoun’s claim that what matters is what a theory “does talk about.” Presumably why the “better application” is better is precisely because of what it “does talk about.”

7. B&C are themselves responding to an unacceptable ideology when they develop their four principles approach for bioethics. Before their influence, beneficence and nonmaleficence were the narrow and near-exclusive emphases of medicine’s moral commitments. The prevailing assumption that “doctors know best” guided discharge of these commitments. As a result, patients tended to be completely disempowered, uninformed and uninvolved in major aspects of their care.

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