

# Introduction

By Neil Wilson, Editor in Chief

The quality of submissions to the new issue of *The Future of History* is testimony to the enormous success of this journal of undergraduate research. The sheer volume of submissions alone (63 essays in total) signals the high level of interest in the journal among the history community at the University of Toronto, while the outstanding caliber of each submission attests to the remarkable talents of the University of Toronto's undergraduate history students.

The ten essays selected for inclusion, after a demanding assessment process, were chosen not only for their originality and articulacy but also for their serious engagement with the historical questions raised. They also reflect one of the greatest strengths of U of T's undergraduate history program: its diversity. In their subject areas, these essays are geographically diverse, discussing issues in Asian, European, and Middle Eastern history. These articles also exemplify the wide range of approaches to history that makes the discipline so dynamic. Topics represented here include military history, political history, and the history of gender. They will provide something of interest whatever the branch of history with which you are most engaged.

We hope that the journal will help to spark your own interest in becoming involved with the history community at U of T. Participation in the work of the History Students' Association is a great way to meet others who are passionate about the field. Consider becoming involved with planning and participating in the many events – guest lectures, movie nights, and socials – that the HSA hosts each year. Furthermore, the Journal Committee is looking for people to carry on the publication of *The Future of History*, so that the Journal will continue for years to come and others will have as much pleasure as we have had in preparing it. Enjoy!

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# Religious Backlash Against the Pazzi Conspiracy

By Victoria Loucks



Lauro Martines opens his book on the 1478 Pazzi conspiracy, *April Blood*, with the claim that "no 'real' historian had ever written a book on the famous plot to murder the Medici", and, furthermore, that to do so would carry with it "a strong whiff of sensationalism".<sup>1</sup> In making this claim, Martines seems to be suggesting that even some five

hundred years after the birth of the Pazzi conspiracy, there is still some kind of taboo surrounding the 1478 plot. While this may be something of an exaggeration, there was – at least in 1478 – a degree of sensationalism attached to the attempted murder of Lorenzo de' Medici and the actual murder of his brother Giuliano. Whether or not the Medici were as widely loved at this time as later historians would suggest, they were widely regarded as pre-eminent in

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<sup>1</sup> Lauro Martines. *April Blood* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. xi.

Florentine society. And given the very public nature of the attack, the conspiracy did not and could not have gone unnoticed or un-remarked upon. Had the conspiracy been successful, it would have marked not just the effective end to the house of Medici, but a sharp turn in the path of Florentine history.

The Pazzi conspiracy cannot be seen merely as the perpetration of private revenge, but must instead be viewed as an act of political violence, which it was certainly intended to be. The double murder of the Medici brothers would not have affected the Medici kinship network alone, but the whole city of Florence. The Medici were too public figures, and the plot too politically charged, for the conspiracy not to have touched other branches of Florentine society. That society may not have crumbled had the conspiracy succeeded, but it would have been irremediably changed. This fact was not lost on chroniclers of the era. Indeed, Angelo Poliziano described the conspiracy as an act that "very nearly overthrew the whole Florentine Republic."<sup>2</sup> In this sense, then, the Pazzi conspiracy did carry with it the decided odour of sensationalism. It attracted immediate attention and commentary, all of which was necessarily partisan and sensationalist. But that attack in the Florence Duomo<sup>3</sup> in 1478 was

shocking not just because of its victims, but because of where it took place. To attack and murder one of the Medici brothers would have been sensational enough – but to do so in the cathedral brought an entirely new dimension to the conspiracy. It was no longer a simple attack on the primacy of the house of Medici, but an attack on the sanctity of the cathedral, and, by extension, an attack on God. By placing the action in the cathedral, the violence of the conspiracy was magnified: it was not merely politically-charged homicide, but impious as well.

The Pazzi conspiracy was essentially political, and most contemporary writers recognised that fact. Their primary concern was that this was a plot against the Medici, and, by extension, the Florentine government. Although Lorenzo de' Medici had no official power within the framework of the Florentine republic, he was recognised by many as the de facto ruler of the city – and that the conspiracy targeted him specifically makes this fact rather self-evident. Giuliano, on the other hand, had not even the same tacit power as Lorenzo; but he seems to have been no less important for that. According to Guicciardini, Giuliano was perceived to be an "obstacle" to the success of the conspiracy, and "to leave him alive was equivalent to accomplishing nothing, for he was very well liked by

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<sup>2</sup> Angelo Poliziano, "The Pazzi Conspiracy" in *Humanism & Liberty*, trans., ed., Renée Neu Watkins (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1978), p. 171.

<sup>3</sup> Three accounts of the Pazzi conspiracy that I have used (Guicciardini, Machiavelli and Poliziano) refer to the Duomo by its old name,

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Santa Reparata, while another (Landucci) refers to it by its new name, Santa Maria del Fiore. To eliminate confusion, I have elected to call it the Duomo, a name on which all four probably could have agreed.

the people."<sup>4</sup> Thus, at least part of the outcry following the failure of the conspiracy was due to popular support for the Medici. They were well-liked, and well-respected, and clearly the Pazzi and their co-conspirators knew it.

But it would be a mistake to think that all reactions following the attack in the cathedral reflected popular support for either the Medici or the Pazzi and their co-conspirators. Guicciardini referred to Lorenzo's power in Florence as "great but suspect" prior to 1478.<sup>5</sup> While many Florentines, like the Pazzi and their co-conspirators, would have been happy to see the Medici lose their place of eminence, there seem to have been many more who were equally content to see them remain where they were. At the same time, there may have been still more who cared not for the politics of the conspiracy – who had no stake in Florentine politics, and who could not see the replacement of the Medici with the Pazzi as anything but the exchange of one tyrant for another. Such witnesses were not concerned with the political aspects of the conspiracy, but they were nonetheless outraged by its perpetration.

This seems particularly true of Poliziano's peasants, who came "from all parts of the country" and who had no specific interest in Florentine politics. Nonetheless, in the days following Giuliano's murder

in April 1478, they entered Florence to express their outrage at the Pazzi, and their horror that Jacopo de' Pazzi had been buried in sacred ground, though he "had shown no regard for religion or God".<sup>6</sup> Observers such as these were not reacting to the political aspect of the conspiracy, but to the terrible impious nature of the crime itself. Such reactions were not limited to those wholly unconnected with the politics of the crime, either. Though the printed accounts of the conspiracy emphasize the political nature of the crime, there is a strong element of religious condemnation to them as well.

The Pazzi conspiracy can be read as an act of sacrilege in a variety of different ways. The primary element denoting the impiety of the act was the location of the crime; of lesser importance were the questions of who committed the crime, and whom the crime was committed against. As already stated, placing the crime within the confines of the cathedral gave the conspiracy an entirely new dimension of impiety. It seems that the conspirators themselves were not unaware of this. Indeed, one would-be assassin, Giovanni Battista da Montesecco, is said to have withdrawn from the conspiracy upon learning that the murders would take place in the Duomo; "he was horrified and refused to do it",<sup>7</sup> and furthermore, he argued "that sacrilege ought not to be added to treason."<sup>8</sup> However, his withdrawal from the conspiracy did not forestall

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<sup>4</sup> Francesco Guicciardini, *The History of Florence*, trans. Mario Domandi (New York: Harper & Row, 1970), p. 31.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 36.

<sup>6</sup> Poliziano, p. 182.

<sup>7</sup> Guicciardini, p. 34.

<sup>8</sup> Niccolo Machiavelli, *Florentine History*, trans. W. K. Marriott (London: J. M. Dent & Co., 1912), p. 320.

the commission of the crime; he was merely replaced by two assassins who were, apparently, less reluctant to shed blood on sacred ground.

Giovanni Battista was not in any way peculiar for refusing to commit murder in the cathedral. There was a strong belief in the church as a sacred space, and thus a real, attainable house of God. In his study of the intersection of religion and violence in late medieval England, Daniel Thiery states that, [b]y ritual and law, churches were fashioned into otherworldly havens which removed parishioners from contemporary norms of violence and presented them with a new perspective on social relations – one in which violence was shameful and charity was honourable.<sup>9</sup>

Furthermore, the dedication of a church was understood to create "an area that was liberated from all violence, both human and divine,"<sup>10</sup> while popular belief in transubstantiation allowed the clergy to stress the importance of "peaceful reverence and quiet contemplation in God's presence."<sup>11</sup> This translated into a deep-seated reluctance on the part of many Christians to spill blood unnecessarily in church. They did not want to defile the "otherworldly haven" of the church, nor did they want to be caught violating the commandment against murder in God's very presence. That Giovanni Battista balked at the request that he commit an act of violence in the

house of God should come as no surprise; that his co-conspirators did not do the same is very surprising indeed.

Accounts of the attack emphasize the outrage associated with the shedding of blood within the Duomo. Poliziano expresses righteous anger that "[r]eligion and hospitality have been violated and the church polluted with human blood,"<sup>12</sup> while Niccolo Machiavelli attributes a speech to Lorenzo, who denounces the fact that "where parricides and assassins find sanctuary the Medici found murderers."<sup>13</sup> People clearly expected a church to be a peaceful space, where charity was extended to all, and where everyone could feel safe. The attack on the Medici offended God not just because it was perpetrated in His sanctuary, but because the very act of violence rejected the peaceful and charitable foundations on which the Christian religion was based. In this sense, then, the Pazzi and their co-conspirators can truly be said to have had "no regard for religion or God".<sup>14</sup> They did not care if the conspiracy offended God; all that concerned them was that the conspiracy be successful for their own political advancement.

As if the location were not enough to render the conspiracy sacrilegious, some chroniclers emphasized the timing of the event to heighten the impiety associated with the attack. Luca Landucci sensationalizes the execution of the conspiracy by placing the action at the moment of the Elevation of the Host –

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<sup>9</sup> Daniel Thiery, "Polluting the Sacred: Violence and Religion in English Daily Life, c. 1400-1553" (Toronto, 2002), p. 16.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 18.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 38.

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<sup>12</sup> Poliziano, p. 179.

<sup>13</sup> Machiavelli, p. 326.

<sup>14</sup> Poliziano, p. 182.

that is, the very moment that the wafer became flesh and God actually perceived to be present, even watching.<sup>15</sup> Other reports corroborate his claim: Francesco Guicciardini indicates that the priest's taking communion was the signal to attack the Medici brothers,<sup>16</sup> while Poliziano claims that, "Everyone was indignant that a pious and innocent youth [Giuliano] should have been cruelly slain at the altar, while taking part in a sacred rite."<sup>17</sup> Whether or not Giuliano's murder actually occurred at the Elevation of the Host is unclear and, from this distance in time, unknowable, but it certainly makes for a good story. The reiteration of that story in so many sources suggests, if not faithfulness to actual events, at least the degree to which the attack on the Medici was perceived as impious and sacrilegious. The exaggerated reaction from contemporaries indicates that Giuliano's murder could not have been more despicable. If Giuliano's murder did not occur at the moment that the priest elevated the Host, then it might as well have. It could not have warranted a stronger condemnation than it received.

It is also striking to note the extent to which contemporaries linked the choice of victims with impiety. The death of Giuliano clearly enraged writers like Poliziano, who described Giuliano's

death as "hideous" and "cruel",<sup>18</sup> and the conspiracy more broadly as "one of the most memorable evils committed in [his] time."<sup>19</sup> Though he was quite deeply entrenched in the Medici pocket,<sup>20</sup> Poliziano's ire went beyond mere outrage that an act of treason had been committed against his patrons, and it seems to have been shared by a wider Florentine public. Giuliano's death gave way to great consternation apparently due to a common belief that Giuliano was a good and pious individual, and undeserving in a very unique way of the fate that befell him. In Poliziano's elegy for the murdered Medici, Giuliano is, to some extent, rendered into a martyr. He exhibited the qualities of the perfect, innocent Christian: "he fostered piety and good morals...he hated liars and men who hold grudges", but "he was very mild, very kind, very respectful of his brother, and of great strength and virtue." Giuliano was, after all, "beloved by the people and his own family...and [his virtues] rendered most painful and bitter to us all the memory of his loss." Poliziano's Giuliano is not a saint, but he has taken on the qualities of a sacrificial victim for all of Florence, which becomes strikingly clear in Poliziano's conclusion: "Yet we pray to Almighty God that he may not forbid 'this youth's helping our suddenly stricken generation.'"<sup>21</sup> As he appeared in the elegy, Giuliano was no longer just a dead Medici, but a soul in heaven who

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<sup>15</sup> Luca Landucci, *A Florentine Diary*, trans. Alice de Rosen Jervis (London: J. M. Dent & Sons Ltd, 1927), pp. 15-16.

<sup>16</sup> Guicciardini, p. 33.

<sup>17</sup> Poliziano, p. 179.

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<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 171.

<sup>20</sup> Martines, p. 4.

<sup>21</sup> Poliziano, p. 183.

was capable of interceding on Florence's behalf.

Poliziano's construction of Giuliano as a martyred youth seems a very deliberate act of propaganda. The violent and sacrilegious nature of Giuliano's death made it a natural and convenient starting point for criticism of the Pazzi conspiracy. Giuliano was coded as a martyr, and his death coded as a sacrifice for the maintenance of order in Florence and the perpetuation of the house of Medici. It should be noted, however, that Giuliano was not a willing sacrifice, and his death opened an avenue for further violence, not peace. Giuliano was decidedly not one of those "indifferent victim[s]" described by René Girard,<sup>22</sup> an indifferent victim whose death may have acted as a release valve for the violence inherent in Florentine society. The murder of Giuliano de' Medici was not a deflection of violence that might otherwise have been vented on other members of Florentine society. It was, instead, the sincerest expression of the violence of Florentine society: it violated all acceptable norms of violence by being enacted against such a pious individual, and, above all, in such a sacred setting as the Duomo. Giuliano is characterized as a type of martyr for Florence not to show how worthy his death was, or to show how peace might be maintained, but to show how uncontrollably violent Florentines could be. His murder demonstrated

that the problem of Florentine violence was such that it could not be restrained even by the presence of God.

In some symbolic way, the enactment of the Pazzi conspiracy represented an inversion of social norms of violence and understanding of sacred space. It was an act of violence perpetrated in a sacred setting, at a sacred time, against an arguably sacred individual. It represented for many contemporaries not just a rejection of Medici power over Florence, but a rejection of God. If one accepts Bossy's claim that the mass may be taken as "a locus for the extrapolation of social violence",<sup>23</sup> then the conspiracy clearly represents the failure of the mass to act as such. In choosing the Duomo as the setting for the murder, the Pazzi and their co-conspirators essentially rejected the notion that the space within the cathedral was in any way exempt from the enactment of violence. Likewise, in choosing the enactment of the ritual of the Eucharist as the signal for attack,<sup>24</sup> the conspirators rejected the notion that peace could be attained through Christ's sacrifice. In this instance, the Church had failed in its mission "to subdue violence, to keep it from running wild"<sup>25</sup> – and witnesses would have been fully aware of it. The decision to place the violence of the Pazzi conspiracy at the highest point of the mass allowed witnesses to question the efficacy of the Church in controlling violence, and was a clear invitation for further violence. The

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<sup>22</sup> René Girard, *Violence and the Sacred*, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977), p. 4.

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<sup>23</sup> John Bossy, "The Mass as a Social Institution 1200-1700", *Past and Present* 100 (1983), p. 53.

<sup>24</sup> Landucci, p. 16.

<sup>25</sup> Girard, p. 20.

enactment of the conspiracy rejected the notion that violence could be controlled by religion, and for that alone it could be deemed impious.

However, it would be mistaken to suggest that the attack on the Medici and the subsequent murder of Giuliano was in any way a *deliberate* act of sacrilege. Due to location and timing, the events of the Pazzi conspiracy seemed impious and sacrilegious to contemporaries; but there is little to indicate that this was deliberately planned by the conspirators.

According to Machiavelli, the conspirators had originally intended to commit the murders elsewhere:<sup>26</sup> the first plan had been to draw Lorenzo and Giuliano to Rome for Easter, and kill them there, privately. However, when the conspirators learned that Giuliano would not be making the trip from Florence, that plan was aborted. The next plan had been to kill the brothers while they were at the Medici family villa in Fiesole, where, once again, the murders might occur in secret. The second plan was aborted as well, when Giuliano once again failed to materialize at the appointed time. It was only after the first two attempts to murder the Medici brothers had failed that the conspirators elected to commit the attack in the Duomo. The Duomo during High Mass was one location

at which both Lorenzo and Giuliano could be assured of being found. It is for this reason that the attack occurred in the Duomo, and not out of a perverted sense of justice on the part of the Pazzi and their co-conspirators, or any malicious desire to desecrate the sacred space of the cathedral. But simply because the desecration was not intended, at least in principle, does not mean that it was accidental. Clearly at least one conspirator – the aforementioned

## MONTESECCO RECOGNIZED THE IMPLICATIONS OF STAGING A MURDER WITHIN THE CATHEDRAL

Giovanni Battista da Montesecco – recognised the implications of staging a double murder within the cathedral, and summarily renounced his involvement in the plot. However, clearly not all of

the conspirators were so interested in preserving the sanctity of the Duomo. What is striking about those conspirators who did not abandon the plot, even seeing the desperation inherent in committing violence within a church, is that they were not limited to members of the laity, but also members of the clergy.

The involvement of the clergy in the Pazzi conspiracy rendered the plot yet more suspect. And clerical involvement was not limited: it was a priest who attacked Lorenzo de' Medici in the Duomo,<sup>27</sup> and the Archbishop of Pisa found himself deeply implicated as an instigator of the plot, while the

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<sup>26</sup> Machiavelli, pp. 319-320.

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<sup>27</sup> Poliziano, p. 181; Landucci, p. 18.

shadow of Pope Sixtus IV loomed large in the aftermath of the conspiracy. Contemporaries were clearly aware of clerical involvement in the Pazzi conspiracy, and they condemned it just as harshly as they did the actual acts committed. Clerical involvement in peninsular politics was tolerated for the most part, but contemporaries drew the line at clerical violence. It was perceived to be a violation of clerical norms, and was even, to some extent, a sacrilegious act. In perpetrating acts of violence, a cleric would be rejecting his identity as a peacemaker, and consequently, his identity as a servant of God.

When he was found, Stefano Sacerdote, the man who attacked Lorenzo de' Medici, was beaten, had his ears and nose cut off, and was ultimately hanged for his crime. His involvement in the conspiracy had been limited to watching as his co-conspirator, Antonio da Volterra, delivered a cut to Lorenzo's neck, being himself "by nature and training quite unfit for such a deed" as murder<sup>28</sup>; and yet Poliziano refers to him as an assassin, and he was hanged like a common murderer.<sup>29</sup> Clearly, in the eyes of the Florentine populace, his crime went far beyond mere assault on Lorenzo. His crime was that, in addition to conspiring against the Medici and attacking Lorenzo, he, Stefano, was a priest. As such, he had no business involving himself in the politics of the laity, and certainly none in committing acts of violence.

In taking up arms against the Medici, Stefano had rejected his role as a peacemaker. He could no longer look upon the violence of Florentine society with the dispassionate regard of the priestly class; instead, he chose to become involved in that violence, and thereby stain the reputation of the clergy. He had failed in his duties as a priest, and it was for that that he was punished.

It is true that Stefano received no worse a punishment than his co-conspirator, Antonio da Volterra.<sup>30</sup> According to Poliziano, both had fled the Duomo after the attack and sought refuge in a monastery for several days. Upon their being found, both were beaten, both had their noses and ears cut off, and both were hanged.<sup>31</sup> But it must be noted that, as a clergyman, Stefano should have been exempt from such summary judgment, and instead should have been transferred to an ecclesiastical authority for punishment. That he was not granted the benefit of clergy suggests that his crime was thought to be so heinous that he did not deserve it – perhaps because there was such popular support for the Medici, but perhaps because Stefano had already shown himself to be unworthy of his clerical status simply by becoming involved.

Stefano was not among the more important clerics involved in the conspiracy. Compared to the other ecclesiastical authorities implicated in the conspiracy, Stefano was, simply put, the least of Florence's problems. There were far more important Church figures involved in the plot, who

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<sup>28</sup> Machiavelli, p. 320-321.

<sup>29</sup> Poliziano, p. 181.

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<sup>30</sup> Landucci, p. 18.

<sup>31</sup> Poliziano, p. 181.

perhaps outstripped even the Pazzi in terms of guilt. In this respect, the label of the "Pazzi conspiracy" is too limiting and even misleading. While the Pazzi were deeply implicated in the conspiracy, and bore most of the retribution for the acts of violence committed against the Medici, they were not the instigators of the plot. Rather, the leading conspirators were Francesco Salviati, who was the Archbishop of Pisa, and Pope Sixtus IV himself. The significance of their involvement cannot be understated, particularly because they, as spiritual leaders, should have had no stake in the removal of the Medici from Florence, but rather a duty to preserve peace among Christians. This was even truer of the archbishop and the Pope than it was of the priest Stefano. Being spiritual leaders, Archbishop Salviati and Pope Sixtus IV were not supposed to have political ambitions, and they were certainly not supposed to employ violent means in order to achieve those ambitions. They were meant to promote peace among Christians, and not sow discord through the pursuit of temporal power.

The sources suggest that Florentines were resentful towards the archbishop and the Pope not because they, the Florentines, so deeply loved the Medici. Rather, it was that the archbishop and the Pope had deigned to enter into temporal political alliances that had so enraged the populace. Chroniclers were not so naïve as to think that spiritual leaders did not become involved in peninsular politics; it was that their involvement had now turned against

Florence and the Medici that was so objectionable. Guicciardini alludes to a previous political interaction between Sixtus IV and the Medici, when Lorenzo convinced the Pope to give the empty archbishopric of Florence "to his [Lorenzo's] own brother-in-law messer Rinaldo Orsini" rather than the future Archbishop of Pisa, Francesco Salviati. Lorenzo also had no qualms about goading either the Pope or the archbishop along political lines, as when Francesco Salviati was finally given the archbishopric of Pisa, and Lorenzo forced him "to suffer a long wait before he could take possession."<sup>32</sup> Clearly Lorenzo was to be tolerated in using his political power to attack the Church; but the moment that the Church retaliated in like manner, a dialectic exchange of temporal power was not to be permitted.

Chroniclers of the conspiracy suggest that the Church's use of whatever temporal power it had was a wholly inappropriate response to any political threat it received. Poliziano makes this clear in his account, in which he refers to Francesco Salviati not as "the Archbishop of Pisa", but by the much more mundane title of "the Pisan leader".<sup>33</sup> To Poliziano, by conspiring with the Pazzi against the Medici, Salviati was not acting in a manner appropriate to his position as archbishop. It would therefore be inappropriate to refer to him by his holy title. It would award Salviati a level of respect which he, in Poliziano's estimation, did not deserve; and moreover, it would tarnish the title

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<sup>32</sup> Guicciardini, p. 31.

<sup>33</sup> Poliziano, p. 177.

of archbishop to be associated with such a base individual. In the same vein, Landucci refers to the archbishop's involvement in the plot as treacherous.<sup>34</sup> But Salviati had not betrayed any temporal lord by involving himself in the Pazzi conspiracy – he had betrayed God, which was the worst betrayal of all. All reports agree, with a certain degree of bloodthirsty satisfaction, that Salviati met his end hanging out a window of the Palagio di Signori,<sup>35</sup> in a manner wholly unfit for one who might plead the benefit of clergy – and yet wholly appropriate for one who had so completely violated the socially accepted rules of violence.

The Pope's involvement was less explicit than that of Stefano the priest or the Archbishop of Pisa. It is not actually clear from the sources if contemporaries knew or suspected any involvement on his part in the conspiracy as far back as April 1478; but evidently it was known that the Pope had some connection to the Pazzi conspiracy. It was over a banking deal with Sixtus IV that the Pazzi and the Medici first clashed,<sup>36</sup> and the Pope had familial ties to some of the top conspirators. But whether or not contemporaries saw the Pope's hand in the instigation of the conspiracy, they certainly saw it in the aftermath of the plot. Sixtus IV was deeply concerned by the Florentine reaction to the Pazzi conspiracy, and not, as Florentines might have hoped, because he sided

with them. Far from it. Sixtus IV did not approve of the Florentine forwardness in executing representatives of the Church, and made his opposition to Florence abundantly clear. On June 7, 1478 – a month and a half after the attack in the Duomo – he excommunicated the whole of Florence.<sup>37</sup>

The excommunication immediately sparked Florentine anger. It was seen to be an extension of the Pazzi conspiracy, for where the Pazzi and their co-conspirators had attacked the Medici with violence, now the papacy attacked them with eternal damnation. The hypocrisy of the excommunication was not lost on Florentines; they had already watched as Sixtus IV sat idly by as the sanctity of their cathedral was defiled and their temporal leader was assaulted by clerics. The Pope only became interested when Florentine violence turned against individual clerics of his Church – not, as Florentines might have hoped, when violence turned against the very peaceful ideology of Christianity. In excommunicating the city of Florence, Sixtus IV did nothing but exacerbate Florentine anger over the conspiracy.

It is clear that by this point, the issue extended beyond what had taken place in the Florentine Duomo. But the same issue of the intersection of violence and the sacred remained. Florentines had questioned the validity of violence enacted within the confines of the cathedral; now, even more strongly than before, they questioned the validity of violence enacted by

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<sup>34</sup> Landucci, p. 16.

<sup>35</sup> Guicciardini, p. 34; Landucci, pp. 16-17; Machiavelli, p. 323; Poliziano, p. 178.

<sup>36</sup> Guicciardini, pp. 30-31.

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<sup>37</sup> Landucci, p. 20.

those of clerical status. Evidently, Florence had already decided the matter, as the punishments suffered by the Pazzi and their co-conspirators

indicate. The conspirators suffered violent punishments whether or not they held clerical rank; but evidently such retribution could not be visited upon the Pope, who was a rather more imposing figure in Italian politics than a local priest or even the Archbishop of Pisa.

What followed the excommunication was a rather less violent war between the temporal Italian lords on the one hand, and the papacy on the other – instead, a war fought uniquely "on paper and in the minds if men."<sup>38</sup> The Pope's inaction had already enraged the Florentine populace, but the excommunication only exacerbated tensions. This was more than a slap on the wrist for the Florentines' reluctance to return Cardinal Riario to Rome,<sup>39</sup> or for their decision to hang the Archbishop of Pisa; it was a condemnation of the Florentine reaction to what should have been perceived to be a serious offence against the Church. The Pazzi had defiled the Duomo, and Stefano Sacerdote and Archbishop Salviati had, through violence, forsaken their positions of spiritual power, all in the name of political advancement. But apparently the

Pope did not accord the same impious significance to these actions as did the Florentines. Instead, by punishing Florence, the Pope gave tacit consent to the violence perpetrated by the Pazzi and their co-conspirators, and, in so doing, essentially repudiated his claim to spiritual superiority. The Florentines seem to have thought that the Pope would side with

them, as they, at least, had moral justification for their actions. In their eyes, Sixtus IV was lowering himself to the level of the Pazzi, of Stefano Sacerdote, and of the Archbishop of Pisa. The excommunication of Florence indicated where Sixtus IV's allegiance lay, and it was clearly not with the Church.

The ensuing "war" revealed the deep unease that developed from the Florentine excommunication. It is clear from the deeply negative response that it garnered that the excommunication represented more than mere papal dissatisfaction with and disapproval of Florentine modes of piety. Siding with Florence and the Medici were Milan, Venice, Bologna, and Louis XI of France; and while some of their support derived from mere opportunism, the anti-papal alliance, as it were, did express a rather sincere concern over the Pope's stance on the Pazzi conspiracy. They saw the excommunication of Florence as a rejection of papal responsibility for preserving the sanctity of the Church.

## THEY SAW THE EX- COMMUNICATION OF FLORENCE AS A REJECTION OF PAPAL RESPONSIBILITY

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<sup>38</sup> Martines, p. 178.

<sup>39</sup> Landucci, pp. 19-20.

Florentines understood that the Pazzi conspiracy had, in many ways, defiled their city: it resulted in the death of a pious youth, it brought corruption to the clergy, and it violated the sanctuary of the Duomo. Thus, what punishment the conspirators received was meant to avenge the wrongs committed against the religious community of Florence. But in excommunicating the city, Sixtus IV clearly indicated that he thought such vengeance inappropriate, or perhaps even unnecessary. He does not seem to have perceived the Pazzi conspiracy as having any particularly impious or irreligious connotations – on the contrary, it was the Florentine reaction to the conspiracy that represented such sacrilege.

While some political leaders may have thrown in their lot with Florence out of sheer opportunism, it is clear that they did understand the religious dynamics at play. Although, as Martines points out, "King [Louis XI] and Pope, at any rate, had been at loggerheads for some time",<sup>40</sup> and Sixtus IV was generally not terribly well-liked,<sup>41</sup> the reaction to the excommunication of Florence was more than just an opportune moment to dominate or replace an unpopular Pope. There was some popular concern over the irreligious aspect of the Pazzi conspiracy – without it, political leaders like Lorenzo or Louis XI could not have hoped to build such massive campaigns in support of Florence against Sixtus IV. When Louis XI began to press

for a general Church Council to address the interdicts against and excommunication of Florence, it was a moment of political opportunity, but it also reflected a larger concern over the Pope's handling of his so-called flock. Though Louis XI and other leaders themselves may not have shared in such a concern, the fact that they could use the issue as leverage in support of their own political advancement suggests that the issue was worthy of some consideration.

Though a Church Council never did materialize, there did develop an intellectual debate concerned with judging the legitimacy of the Florentine excommunication. Lorenzo de' Medici hired a number of "leading jurists of the age" to determine the validity of the excommunication, and while it is hardly shocking that they decided in Lorenzo's favour, their reasoning is critical in understanding the extent to which the impiety of the Pazzi conspiracy mattered to contemporaries. As Martines suggests, their legal argument in favour of Florence's re-entry to the communion rested on two canon-law decretals that stated that "priests are not in ecclesiastical dress when they are caught in the act of bearing arms and disposed to commit murder. They thereby forfeit their clerical privileges."<sup>42</sup> While Martines goes on to point out that only two of the five or six priests known to have suffered punishment for their involvement in the Pazzi conspiracy were armed,<sup>43</sup> there is perhaps more

<sup>40</sup> Martines, p. 178.

<sup>41</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 179-180.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 179.

<sup>43</sup> The second priest in question is apparently Antonio da Volterra; but I have found no

room for interpretation of the notion of being disposed to commit murder. While an individual like the Archbishop of Pisa may not have been armed, his involvement in the conspiracy plainly indicates that he was "disposed to commit murder", for that was exactly what the conspiracy entailed. Thus, canon law seems to have fully supported the Florentine reaction to the archbishop's involvement in the conspiracy – it was only due to the Pope's interest in the success of the plot and his disappointment when it failed that led him to excommunicate the city. The hypocrisy of his actions was not lost on contemporaries.

While the Pazzi conspiracy was in many ways political, it was imbued with greater significance than a mere act of political violence. The strength of the backlash against the conspiracy can in part be attributed to the popularity of the Medici in Florence; but popular allegiance to the Medici can only explain so much. The outrage expressed by Florentines in the days following Giuliano's murder in the Duomo far outstripped that which might have been drummed up by Lorenzo alone. Landucci suggests that in the three days following Giuliano's murder, "the number of those killed amounted to more than seventy"<sup>44</sup> – surely these executions were not committed solely at Lorenzo's command, for, as has already been stated, his power was merely suspect, and not

magnificent as it someday would be. The popular backlash cannot be attributed to a love of the Medici alone; the issues which stirred the Florentine public were more far-reaching than that.

For many Florentines, then, the issue of the conspiracy was not about which Medici was dead and which, if any, remained alive. Instead, the conspiracy represented a serious crime against the sanctity of the clergy and of the Duomo, and against God. Florentines felt deep unease towards the Pazzi and their co-conspirators not because the Medici were so loved, but because the perpetration of violence within the Duomo, by clergy, revealed a deep moral failing on the part of the conspirators but also on the part of the witnesses. Florentine anger was not just about the actual blood that was shed in the commission of the crime, but about where it was shed, and who shed it. What garnered so much attention was that the conspiracy wilfully violated all socially accepted norms of violence. It violated sacred space, and it tarnished the reputation of the clergy. In many ways, the Pazzi and their co-conspirators had violated the inviolable. They had committed acts of violence against the sacred spaces of Florence, and in so doing they had not only harmed the perpetuation of the house of Medici, but the perpetuation of Florentine piety. The Pazzi conspiracy damaged the city's access to salvation, and that had far deeper resonance among contemporaries than the fact that Giuliano de' Medici was dead.

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corroborating evidence in the sources to suggest that he was also a priest. Martines, p. 179.

<sup>44</sup> Landucci, p. 17.

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# Gender Identities:

## Transformations in Eighteenth Century England

*By Andrea Yau*



The reconfiguration of gender identity in the eighteenth-century had its roots in the new two-sex model whereby women were no longer sexual inversions of men. As a result, society prescribed what were believed to be inherent and opposite gender qualities to males and females that were compounded by the economic and cultural climate of the period, and which transformed gender identities in the eighteenth century. The changes to society's perception of the female identity will be emphasized here due to greater

interest and a personal belief that women's gender roles underwent a greater reconstruction in this period. In the eighteenth-century, biological factors such as the discovery of a separate female anatomy and the possible anesthetisation of females to the pleasures of the flesh served as the main impetuses for changing prescribed gender roles for men and women. The consideration of previous gender roles, combined with transformed social factors such as notions of gentility, domestic service and the feminization of religion and

literacy all contributed to the creation of modern social constructs of men and women.

In order to fully appreciate the reconfiguration of gender roles in the eighteenth-century, it is necessary to look at previous notions of masculinity and femininity. In a strongly patriarchal British society, male superiority had always prevailed as a social concept. Before the eighteenth-century, this dominance was based on feudal notions of martial glory, honour through violence and leadership capabilities. Women were considered weak by nature; their bodies were not capable of processing nutrition properly. *The Secrets of Women*, written in the later Middle Ages spoke of the uncontrollable sexual appetite for intercourse as a direct result of the build-up of residue from daily food.<sup>45</sup>

The idea of women being sexually uncontrollable was based on the work of Galen, who, in the second century AD, theorized that women and men were fundamentally different due to the levels of heat in their body: men were considered to be hot and dry, while women were cool and wet. It was believed that women had the same genitalia as men: a woman's vagina was imagined as an interior penis, the

labia as foreskin and the ovaries as testicles.<sup>46</sup> But according to Galen, while anatomically the same, men and women differed in their ability to create heat, the element of perfection. Women's levels of heat were not high enough to expel their genitals, and so, as Nemeius, the fourth century bishop of Emesa noted, "[women's genitalia] are inside the body and not outside it."<sup>47</sup> Despite this predestined gender inequality, there existed the belief that in the Chain of Being, imperfection could perhaps attain perfection: a story of a girl named Marie one day sprung a penis after having ruptured the ligaments by which her male genitalia had been enclosed.<sup>48</sup> It was therefore

## ANATOMICAL DISCOVERIES LED TO THE REALIZATION OF THE FEMALE BODY BEING DIFFERENT FROM THE MALE

possible for women to become men, but there existed no "true story that any man ever became a woman, because nature tends always toward what is most perfect and not, on the contrary, to perform in such a way that what is perfect should

become imperfect."<sup>49</sup> This one sex model was influential for over a millennia and served as the basis of gender notions before the eighteenth-century.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth century, a greater interest in the genitalia of women emerged.

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<sup>45</sup> Thomas Laquer, *Making Sex: Body and Gender from the Greeks to Freud* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992), 4.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> Ibid., 127.

<sup>49</sup> Ibid.

Anatomical discoveries led to the materialization of a greater understanding of the female body as being different from the male; an absolute departure from the one sex model occurred in this period. Anatomical observations on women, first made in the middle of the seventeenth-century, made clear that female bodies were not the sexual perversions of the perfect male body: scientists began to bestow new names on exclusively female organs such as ovaries, instead of naming them 'female testes'. This better anatomical understanding of the female body gave rise to the two-sex model whereby female and male anatomical make up were considered binary opposites. Psychological attributes ensued following the discovery of male and female biological differences. Both sexes were given new identities: society created and reinforced new gender characteristics deemed natural to their biological being. The belief that males and females were polarized social entities had been created by science, confirmed by science, and now, psychological differences between the two sexes were emphasized. Women became a distinct group of persons, not by virtue of their reproductive organs but through their behaviour: female physiology was understood as a totality, and health and pathology were defined in terms of life-style and social roles.<sup>50</sup> Constructions of

femininity and masculinity have always taken place in relation to one another,<sup>51</sup> and men responded to changing social ideas of femininity by adopting a diametrically opposed gender identity the feminine distinctions; men became the embodiments of rationality in response to a belief in a woman's inherent emotionality. It was competition with their female "other" that drove men to aggressively assert their superiority through an opposite social and psychological gender descriptions.

Another belief that lost its claims to validity in the eighteenth-century was the idea that an orgasm was necessary by both women and men in order to reproduce. This would be the logical conclusion of a one-sex model: women, being the same as men, must orgasm during sex, albeit a woman's would occur internally. While previously taken for granted, the certainty of a female orgasm during intercourse was now overturned based on dissections. Assertions that women were passionless, or at the very least, biologically predisposed with the capacity to restrain their sexual passions, stood in direct contrast to previous notions of women as sexually uncontrollable beings.<sup>52</sup> This idea was carried so far that women became, in some accounts, creatures whose whole reproductive life might be spent anaesthetised to the pleasures of the flesh; it became a possibility that "the

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<sup>50</sup> Ludmilla Jordanova, *Sexual Visions: Images of Gender in Science and Medicine between the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Toronto: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989), 26.

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<sup>51</sup> Hannah Barker and Elaine Chalus, eds., "Introduction" in *Gender in Eighteenth-Century England: Roles Representations and Responsibilities* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Inc., 1997), 6.

<sup>52</sup> Laquer, *Making Sex*, 150.

majority of women were not much troubled with sexual feelings.”<sup>53</sup> In this way, sex could then been seen as a predominantly masculine pleasure, and any possible dislike borne by the female should be subordinated for the purpose of reproduction or for the happiness of the husband. Men were increasingly seen as the active partner in a period that continuously stressed penetrative sex while women were relegated to the role of submission.<sup>54</sup> This very act reinforced male dominance in the private sphere and facilitated the disparity in gender hierarchy and authority.

Changing biological and social notions of gender necessitated overt displays of masculinity in different methods than the previously idolized idea of violent feudal manhood. Before the eighteenth-century, aristocratic men were the prototype of masculinity, and as such, set invisible ethical standards for society. A small group of aristocratic men in the late seventeenth century in the Stuart court were nicknamed the “libertines,” or the “rakes.” The libertines were a group of powerful, wealthy, extravagant, sexually charged and sexually ambiguous men. The Earl of Rochester, a man whose sexual exploits are still of particular renown, was actively involved with this group. Shortly before his death at the end of the

seventeenth-century, he renounced his life of sensuality and reflected that despite the sacrifice of “some pleasure,” monogamy offered “marital harmony... one of the greatest joys of life”.<sup>55</sup> This reflection may have been inspired by a popular movement that emerged in the end of the seventeenth century and which called for the reformation of male manners; the publication of *The Libertine’s Religion*, the *Dissertation upon Drunkenness*, and *Sinne Stigmatized* illustrated the degree to which old “libertine” notions of masculinity had been reversed.<sup>56</sup> Eighteenth-century men now hoped to cultivate an increased sense of refinement, rationality, morality, and reluctance to participate in violence, sinful entertainment like duelling, gambling, and excessive drinking. This was in response to the notion that the ideal life of a seventeenth century man was seen as being devoted to pleasure; a lifestyle which was now condemned by reformers as being wasteful, indulgent and effeminate. “Rakes” and “libertines” were now seen as the most egregious representatives of male culture: they were defined by their incompatibility with the new sense of public “decency, order in the streets and the non-brutalization of women.”<sup>57</sup> Reformers admonished rakes and libertines as effeminate and sexually ambivalent in an era that emphasized a strong male heterosexual culture. As a

<sup>53</sup> Ibid., 4.

<sup>54</sup> Robert Shoemaker, *Gender in English Society, 1650-1850: The Emergence of Separate Spheres?* (New York: Addison Wesley Longman Ltd., 1998), 9.

<sup>55</sup> G.J. Barker-Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility: Sex and Society in Eighteenth-Century Britain*, (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press, 1992), 41-2.

<sup>56</sup> Ibid., 55.

<sup>57</sup> Ibid., 91.

result, these men were regarded as ultimately dangerous to the social order and were socially marginalized.

Changing notions of masculinity did not just affect the upper classes. This period signified the rise of the increasingly prosperous and burgeoning middle class. The middle class played a progressively influential role in society, and began to affect public perceptions of British masculinity. As a result, the idea of masculinity adopted bourgeois values concerning morality and the male gender role. Bourgeois values such as honesty, directness, rationality and economical practicality began to be incorporated into male culture. As the century progressed, ideas of masculinity increasingly revolved around heterosexuality, a rejection of the ambiguous sexuality previously associated with rakes and libertines. Conduct books in this period were keen to emphasize that the virtuous man possessed discretion, caution, prudence and humility. Old aristocratic notions of cultivation and bourgeois values of simplicity, education, and honesty forged a new character for men in the eighteenth-century.

The eighteenth century was a period of economic disparity. While there was a significant increase in poverty, there were also those who prospered from changed economic conditions: members of the middle class with aspirations to gentility.<sup>58</sup> Businessmen in the mid

eighteenth-century had long recognized the value of cultivating refinement: it enhanced their reputation and their status.<sup>59</sup> The publication of conduct literature for the middle class demonstrated that the bourgeoisie wished to adopt the manner code of the aristocracy and more specifically, that they sought to attain gentility, the mark of cultivation and gentle birth. Thomas Day, in the late eighteenth century wrote that “all women [were] now mad about gentility, and, when once gentility begins there is an end of industry.”<sup>60</sup> Among the many ideas associated with gentility, one had important economic repercussions: a genteel woman was forbidden to work, especially in the public areas of social life. Middle class women absorbed this aristocratic notion of idleness as being a mark of status and wealth. The ‘end of industry’ for women was only made possible with the social and economic stability of their husband’s or father’s prosperity. Of course, this option was not viable to all segments of the population: lower middle class women were still expected to make contributions to the family budget through their direct labour on the family farm or in labouring occupations. But overall, the major trend in the eighteenth century was the middle class female’s awareness that work was a class barrier, cutting off those who worked from those who did not.<sup>61</sup> Gentility for women inevitably meant a rejection of manual industriousness. Alice Clark wrote that

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<sup>58</sup> Bridgett Hill, *Women, Work and Sexual Politics* (New York: Basil Blackwell Inc., 1989), 49.

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<sup>59</sup> Barker- Benfield, *The Culture of Sensibility*, 91.

<sup>60</sup> Hill, *Women, Work and Sexual Politics*, 51-2.

<sup>61</sup> *Ibid.*, 49.

the withdrawal of women from productive work was underway in the seventeenth century if not earlier, and she wrote of 'a tendency' among the wives of 'capitalistic farmers...to withdraw from the management of business and devote themselves to pleasure.'<sup>62</sup> This obsession with gentility had not only infiltrated the ranks of the middle class, but also the aspiring lower class, especially women, whose significant contribution to the domestic labour force in the eighteenth century changed from the countryside to urban centres.

England in the eighteenth-century witnessed a rising standard of living associated with the prospering middle class. The better living conditions of the middle class necessitated greater needs in terms of luxury and comfort in the home: "the creation of middle class domestic ideology and the re-creation of the household as the natural and exclusive domain of women involved domestic servants from the very beginning."<sup>63</sup> In this period, the appearance of a multitude of migrating females to towns across the country indicated the high demand for domestic help: by the end of the century, the urban population had blossomed to 30%.<sup>64</sup> Because few other respectable jobs were open

to females in urban centres, most women took up 'the service'. In the eighteenth-century, a transformation in the male to female ratio of domestic servants became quite visible in urbanized London society. It was remarkable in qualitative and quantitative terms<sup>65</sup>: it was estimated that there was a London-wide ratio of four female servants to every one male servant, although male servants had far more opportunities for long term service.<sup>66</sup> There were far more alternative occupations open to men, and as masculine interest in the service declined, domestic work began to be viewed as 'women's work' - inferior and menial.<sup>67</sup> The sheer numbers of female servants consolidated the idea of a female domestic culture by encouraging the idea that a woman's place was in the home. Bridgett Hill wrote that 'most of the new tasks associated with "housework" towards the end of the eighteenth-century were related to the middle class wife's idea of domestic comfort.'<sup>68</sup> It is possible to trace the feminization of domesticity as it became increasingly gendered as part of the female realm: the marginalization of women's public occupations in agriculture and artisan workshops in the eighteenth-century forced women to find jobs in the 'domestic sphere': jobs that secured the comfort of the home but unfortunately relegated women into a social political corner that reinforced the domestic ideology of women.

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<sup>62</sup> Ibid., 51.

<sup>63</sup> Tim Meldrum, *Domestic Service and Gender, 1660-1750: life and Work in the London Household* (Toronto: Longman, 2000), 73.

<sup>64</sup> Karen Harvey, "Gender, Space and Modernity in Eighteenth Century England: A Place Called Sex," *History Workshop Journal* 51 (2001): 159.

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<sup>65</sup> Ibid., 159.

<sup>66</sup> Meldrum, *Domestic Service and Gender, 1660, 16-7.*

<sup>67</sup> Hill, *Women, Work and Sexual Politics*, 128.

<sup>68</sup> Meldrum, *Domestic Service and Gender*, 42.

It has been argued that while working class women served in the 'respectable' households of their socially superior employers, they absorbed popular middle class notions of gentility and trends of greater morality and respectability.<sup>69</sup> Not only were they students of the new female gender role, but they also became its enforcers. Writers of manuals directed to the female managers of households stressed the importance of a female servant's cleanliness, reputation and character. Specifically, the aspect of a potential female servants' character that excited the most concern among commentators was their sexual reputations. A direct parallel was seen between a servant's internal 'dirtiness' and the nature of their work. Gaining a reputation for sexual promiscuity, (or "sluttishness") would damage a female servant's ability to find a well paying position in a respectable household<sup>70</sup>:

"The constant attendant on sloth is sluttishness: she who gives her mind to idleness can neither be thoroughly clean in her own person or the house...there will always be some dirty thing about this one...everything infallibly shows a slut, than which there cannot be a more scandalous character or that will more effectively disqualify you for any good service."<sup>71</sup>

Servants would, and often did quit households where the behaviour of the master and mistress would reflect

badly upon the employees.<sup>72</sup> Thus, all members of society were now subject to an increasing amount of social pressure to conform to a higher morality. Society, which previously did not care, or pretended to ignore the questionable private lives of neighbours, now increasingly saw those intimate lives as being indicative of a dishonourable and disreputable character, whose negative traits were no doubt symptomatic of their inherent propensity for moral corruption. Often, servants would voice disapproval or even resign due to their master or mistress' adultery or extravagance, which contradicted the precepts of housewifely economy and instead, was an embarrassingly explicit display of luxurious over-consumption.<sup>73</sup> The ability of domestic servants to actively disapprove of their employers' private lives indicates the growing universality of ethical standards across class boundaries. The female gender role of a woman as chaste, modest and moral was reinforced by a large degree of peer pressure that came not only from social equals, but also from social inferiors.

Another area which experienced a distinct 'feminisation' was religion. In the eighteenth century, it is evident that a distinctive female identity and lifestyle emerged. As middle class women became excluded from public life and concentrated their attention on their domestic responsibilities, women's lives became increasingly defined by family responsibilities and more sharply differentiated from those of men. A

<sup>69</sup> Hill, *Women, Work and Sexual Politics*, 128.

<sup>70</sup> Meldrum, *Domestic Service and Gender*, 59.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Meldrum, *Domestic Service and Gender*, 95.

greater emphasis was placed on a woman's distinctive features: an alleged greater religiosity and characteristic sexuality.<sup>74</sup> The separation of the private world of females and the masculine world of public affairs gave rise to a concentrated attention by women who saw their domestic duties increasingly viewed as 'moral duties.'<sup>75</sup> This period witnessed an increased female participation in religious life, resulting in what some have named the 'feminisation of religion': a movement in which female religious enthusiasm stemmed from what were seen as feminine characteristics - benevolence and moral purity.<sup>76</sup> These traits were in accordance with the expectation that women were naturally predisposed to be mothers, and were thus affectionate, caring and compassionate; church groups would later effectively mobilize these sympathies to create strong female lobby groups in the nineteenth-century.

The increasing Protestant religiosity of the nation facilitated mass literacy in Britain. With the advent of mass literacy, increased publication of popular manuals, printed books, pamphlets and periodicals was foreseeable. Such instructional literature educated women not just on social etiquette but also on the reconfigured female gender role. Not only were women reading conduct literature instructing them how to fulfill their roles

properly as women, but they were also encouraged to read and reflect upon the Bible. Biblical passages emphasized the subordination of women to their husbands and the inherent sinfulness of women, such as in the story of the Garden of Eden.<sup>77</sup> The 'feminisation of religion' in its domestic role designated women as the moral guardians of the household. Evangelically inspired 'domestic ideology,' with its emphasis on the moral value of women's domestic moral and social duties took root in the eighteenth century and would survive with great influence in the Victorian era.<sup>78</sup>

The socially constructed 'inherent' qualities of women in the eighteenth-century lead to a reconfiguration of a female gender role that stemmed from the biological discovery of the two-sex anatomical model. The male gender identity was one forged from a rejection of past notions of masculinity and the adoption of some characteristics of a new economically and socially powerful English middle class. The transformation of gender roles in the eighteenth century provided the basis for modern day conceptions of masculinity and femininity. This eighteenth-century female identity of domesticity and morally uprightness would transform into the particular English notion of the 'Angel in the House' in the Victorian era, and would continue to dominate idealized traditional conceptions of males and females into the twenty-first century.

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<sup>74</sup> Shoemaker, *Gender in English Society*, 8.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibid.*, 6-7.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid.*, 8.

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<sup>77</sup> Shoemaker, *Gender in English Society*, 17.

<sup>78</sup> Shoemaker, *Gender in English Society*, 118.

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# The Union of 1707: Scottish Loss, English Gain

*By Stefanie Wasyluk*



On January 16<sup>th</sup>, 1707 the Scottish Parliament ratified the Act of Union, thus surrendering Scotland's political autonomy by agreeing to merge with England and create a United Kingdom of Great Britain. Scotland was stripped of her independent Parliament in exchange for minimal representation in the Parliament of Great Britain, and Scottish authorities lost much control over both domestic and international affairs. The promised economic benefits were slow to develop and in some industries the union led to a period of decline. There was little support for the union among the

Scottish population and many regarded its final authorization on May 1<sup>st</sup> 1707 as (in the words of one contemporary) "A day on which the Scots were stripped of what their predecessors had gallantly maintained...the independency and sovereignty of the Kingdom".<sup>79</sup> The seemingly illogical ratification of the Union has caused many to wonder why the Scottish Parliament, which had previously shown strong nationalist tendencies, decided to debate and pass

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<sup>79</sup> 'Scotland's Ruine' Lockhart of Carnwath's *Memoirs of the Union*. Daniel Szechi, ed. (Aberdeen: Association for Scottish Literary Studies, 1995) 204.

such an unpopular and self-destructive act. Were their actions fuelled by foresight and national interest, or were they pressured into submission by their stronger southern neighbour? When surveying the state of affairs in England and Scotland during the immediate pre-Union period, it becomes evident that it was primarily English, and not Scottish, concerns which brought forth the Act of Union. An examination of the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Act in the 1706-1707 session of the Scottish Parliament similarly demonstrates that it was English determination which pushed the Act through. After the Union was established, English interests continued to dominate the realm and their concerns often took priority in the united parliament of Great Britain. Scotland experienced an era of economic and political decline and it was not until the latter part of the century that the country began to experience the benefits it had been promised in 1707. Overall, the 1707 Act of Union was driven by English needs and worked primarily for their benefit throughout much of the 18<sup>th</sup> century.

Historians have assessed the Union of 1707 in a variety of ways. Early historical works on the subject were often pro-British and tended to portray the union as a mutually beneficial and desirable act. Many

claimed that the pro-Union members of the Scottish Parliament were able to see the long term benefits of the merger and supported it for the well being of their nation. As one contemporary historian highlights, however, this view is grounded in hindsight and it is unlikely that early eighteenth century Scottish MP's could have foreseen the benefits that would emerge in the nineteenth and twentieth

centuries.<sup>80</sup> More recent historical evaluations of the Union have questioned earlier assumptions and offered increasingly analytical approaches. In his much quoted article "The Union of 1707 as an episode in English Politics", J.P.W. Riley argues that the Union was crafted for the

benefit of the English Whigs who hoped to secure a firmer majority by bringing Scottish lords and MP's to the English Parliament. He describes the bitter political rivalries of the time and concludes that it was primarily self-serving English political manoeuvring that led to the conception and ratification of the Union. Paul Scott's *The Union of 1707: Why and How* agrees that English motives dominated the union and he presents the issue from the Scottish nationalist point of view. Scott asserts that, despite their economic problems, early 18<sup>th</sup> century Scots desired independence and were opposed to the Union. He draws

## ANGLO-SCOTTISH RELATIONS BEGAN TO SUFFER

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<sup>80</sup> Christopher A. Whatley. *Bought and Sold for English Gold? Explaining the Union of 1707*. (Scotland: Tuckwell P., 1994) 34.

attention to the bribery and corruption which engulfed the Parliament of 1706-1707 and demonstrates that the act was passed against the will of the majority of the Scottish population. His portrayal of English actions is highly negative and states that it was their desire to ensure Scottish support for their policies which instigated the push for union. Although he presents a compelling case, it can be argued that he overemphasizes the role of bribery and does not give adequate attention to the concessions granted by the English.

An opposing view can be found in Frank O’Gorman’s *The Long 18<sup>th</sup> Century: British Political and Social History 1688-1832*. In his section on the Union, O’Gorman argues that the Union developed out of a mutual recognition that Anglo-Scottish quarrels had to be set aside in a time when European warfare was threatening the interests of both countries. He portrays the union as a relatively conflict-free process and states that there was very little Scottish resistance to the Act. This idealized take on the events fails to account for the various protests and petitions being issued by the Scottish people and does not assess the role of economic enticements or English political manoeuvres. C.A. Whatley’s *Bought and Sold for English Gold? Explaining the Union of 1707* provides a more balanced view of the situation. He places less emphasis on the role of bribery, but recognises that the poor economic condition of Scotland in the wake of the Darien expedition made the economic

promises of the Union very enticing to the political elite. Like Scott, he notes that the Union was propelled primarily by English interests. However, he also recognises that it eventually brought a number of significant benefits that would not have occurred otherwise. In general, historians have now rejected the romanticized view of the Union promoted in earlier works and have focused on assessing the various factors which contributed to the Union’s development and ratification. There is no firm consensus on which factor was most significant, but many recent works on the subject agree that the pursuit of English interests was a major driving force.

An assessment of the situations in England and Scotland between 1688 and 1706 demonstrates that the Act of Union was the result of English, rather than Scottish, initiatives. The Glorious Revolution of 1688 provided Scotland with the chance to reassert the independence it had lost after the Union of the Crowns in 1603.<sup>81</sup> Although Scotland, like England, eventually decided to depose James II, they did so on their own terms four months after the English had taken action. In 1689 a Convention of Estates met in Edinburgh and passed the Scottish Claim of Right; an act which recognized William and Mary as the new sovereigns but also asserted the right of the Estates to dispose of unsuitable monarchs.<sup>82</sup> The Scots used

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<sup>81</sup> Paul Henderson Scott. *The Union of 1707*. (Edinburgh: The Saltire Society, 2006) 11.

<sup>82</sup> Frank O’Gorman. *The Long Eighteenth Century: British Political and Social History 1688-1832*. (New York: St. Martin’s P., 1997) 54.

this opportunity to re-establish the strength of their Parliament and repeal measures which established royal influence over the area.<sup>83</sup> Initially, public opinion seemed to favour the new monarchs, but after the Jacobite uprising of 1689 and the Glencoe Massacre which followed, Anglo-Scottish relations began to suffer.<sup>84</sup>

The tensions between the two countries were further aggravated by the Darien Expedition of 1698. After years of poor harvests and economic decline, the Scots had begun to recognise the need to establish overseas trade. The Navigation Act, passed by the English in 1651, had restricted Scottish access to English colonies, thus hampering Scotland's economic growth. The decision was made to set up a Scottish trading post at Darien (between North and South America) and when the English refused to assist, the Scots reacted with patriotic fervour and managed to raise all of the funds themselves.<sup>85</sup> Unfortunately, by 1700, mismanagement, inadequate preparation, and English hostility had combined to make the expedition a complete failure. The economy suffered and resentment of the English increased; many were now convinced that success could only be

achieved if they distanced themselves from English influence.<sup>86</sup> This resentment was further compounded by the unpopularity of the Nine Years War (1688-1697) and the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1713) which Scotland had unwillingly been forced to support.<sup>87</sup>

When a new Scottish Parliament was elected in 1703, the bitterness towards their southern neighbours was made evident.<sup>88</sup> Debate was centred on the consequences brought about by the Union of the Crowns, the need to control foreign affairs, and the path of succession after the death of the childless Queen Anne. In an attempt to settle these pressing matters, the Act of Security was

## ENGLAND HAD DESIRED CONTROL OF SCOTLAND SINCE THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY

passed in 1703 thus giving the Scottish parliament the power to determine their own royal succession. The Act anent Peace and War, which was passed soon after, once again affirmed Scottish independence by declaring Parliamentary control over foreign affairs. From these actions, it is apparent that late 17<sup>th</sup> and early 18<sup>th</sup> century Scots desired freedom from English control.<sup>89</sup> The nationalistic behaviour of the Scottish Government between 1688 and 1706 had begun to move Scotland towards increased

<sup>83</sup> Scott, 11.

<sup>84</sup> O'Gorman, 55.

<sup>85</sup> Scott, 13.

<sup>86</sup> Scott, 18.

<sup>87</sup> O'Gorman, 56.

<sup>88</sup> O'Gorman, 56.

<sup>89</sup> Whatley, *Bought and Sold*, 27.

independence and it appeared that the country was hoping to emerge from its century of subordination to England. The Union of 1707, however, thwarted this aspiration by binding the two countries together and forcing Scotland to accept English policies. The Union did not conform to the desires of Scotland (as expressed in the pre-union era) and was instead driven by the aspirations of the English.

An examination of the situation in England at this time provides an explanation for the development of the Union. As Paul Scott highlights, England had desired control of Scotland since the thirteenth-century and it had won it (at least partially) by dynastic accident in 1603.<sup>90</sup> They were not prepared to surrender this domination, and the movement for Scottish independence in the late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-centuries convinced them that a more solid union was necessary.<sup>91</sup> The succession issue proved to be particularly significant to the formation of English attitudes. The English passed the Act of Succession in 1701, thus decreeing that the throne would pass to Sophia, Electress of Hanover, and her heirs upon Queen Anne's death. The act did not apply to Scotland, but it was assumed that they would accept a similar measure.<sup>92</sup> When the Scots passed the Act of Security in 1703, however, it was feared that Scotland would pursue its own path after

Anne's death. This possibility was considered unacceptable, especially in light of the current international situation.<sup>93</sup> The prospect of a Stuart (and thus pro-French and pro-Catholic) succession in Scotland was a threat to England's national security in an era when war with the French was frequent.<sup>94</sup> The English were not willing to risk a reestablishment of Scotland's old alliance with France, and they began to consider union as a possible way to ensure their own self-interest.<sup>95</sup>

From the English perspective, there were also other benefits to a union with Scotland. Increased Scottish support for England's ongoing wars, in the form of both manpower and money, would undoubtedly further the countries national interests. Furthermore, Scottish trade aspirations had long been viewed as a rival to England's security, and thus, England sought to eliminate this economic threat. Although the Navigation Act and their efforts to thwart the Darien expedition had been effective, union would bring further protection to England's economy. As P.J.W. Riley highlights, there were also perceived political benefits to a union with Scotland. The Triennial Act (which called for elections to be held every three years) had strengthened English political rivalries. Political parties were constantly fighting to gain the upper hand, and it was thought that bringing Scottish MP's and Lords to London

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<sup>90</sup> Scott, 33.

<sup>91</sup> Whatley, *Bought and Sold*, 28.

<sup>92</sup> Scott, 21.

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<sup>93</sup> O'Gorman, 56.

<sup>94</sup> O'Gorman, 57.

<sup>95</sup> O'Gorman, 57.

might help tip the scales.<sup>96</sup> Overall, it is evident that, unlike the Scots, the English had many reasons to formulate and encourage the Union of 1707. The Union would provide national security, ensure control of trade, offer political benefits, and guarantee the desired succession. When taking all of these factors into consideration, the English determination to pursue the cause is understandable.

Surveying the circumstances surrounding the ratification of the Act in the Scottish parliament of 1706-1707 makes the dominance of English interests increasingly evident. As stated, the idea of full political union received serious consideration by the English Government after Scotland's nationalistic actions in 1703.<sup>97</sup> In 1705 the English forced the debate ahead by passing the Aliens Act which threatened to cut off Scottish trade and land rights if an agreement over the succession could not be reached by December 25<sup>th</sup> 1705.<sup>98</sup> This action caused uproar in the Scottish Parliament and some, most notably the Duke of Hamilton, felt threatened enough to begin supporting English initiatives.<sup>99</sup> The English then offered to suspend the act if the Scottish Parliament agreed to enter into union negotiations; a move which was quite obviously intended to propel their interests

forward. Their plan was a success. The Treaty of Union was developed by English Commissioners in early 1706 and put before the Scottish Parliament in October of that year. The first part of the battle had been won, and similar political cunning would ensure that the next stage of the process also played out in accordance to English desires.

As Paul Scott notes, the Scottish politicians who debated the Union in 1706-1707 were the same politicians who had been voted into office in 1703. Their earlier nationalist tendencies, however, seemed to have been hampered by 1706 and it was clear that the English had managed to sway their allegiances.<sup>100</sup> The willingness of the English to resort to bribery, threats and concessions demonstrates the importance that they placed on this treaty. On the advice of her Treasurer, the Earl of Godolphin, Queen Anne sent £20,000 to be dispersed among those who proved their loyalty by ratifying the Treaty.<sup>101</sup> The money was distributed by the Earl of Glasgow who was later accused by the anti-unionist Lockhart of Carnwath of "...promoting his countries ruine and misery."<sup>102</sup> It must be noted, however, that bribes were not an uncommon feature in 18<sup>th</sup> century politics and the bribes given out on this occasion were not enough to influence every member of the Parliament.<sup>103</sup> Nevertheless, their significance cannot be ignored. Some, most famously the

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<sup>96</sup> P.J.W. Riley "The Union of 1707 as an Episode in English Politics." *The English Historical Review* 84 (1969): 502.

<sup>97</sup> O'Gorman, 57.

<sup>98</sup> Scott, 36.

<sup>99</sup> Scott, 37.

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<sup>100</sup> Scott, 52.

<sup>101</sup> Neil Davidson. *Discovering the Scottish Revolution, 1692-1746*. (London: Pluto P., 2003) 160.

<sup>102</sup> Lockhart, 256.

<sup>103</sup> Whatley, *Bought and Sold*, 37.

Duke of Hamilton, were persuaded by bribes at critical moments and these economic incentives undoubtedly helped the Act pass.<sup>104</sup> Threats were another factor which contributed to the changing attitude of the Scottish Parliament. The Aliens Act had made English hostility to Scottish resistance apparent, and there was a widespread fear that defying the Act of Union would result in an English military invasion.<sup>105</sup> Personal threats were also issued. Sir Kenneth Mackenzie, for example, was threatened with a loss of his pension if he did not agree to ratify the Union.<sup>106</sup> In general, the use of threats and bribes by the English shows that they were willing to resort to any means necessary to propel their interests forward.

There were also various enticements and concessions woven into the Act, making it a tempting offer for many of the individuals in the Parliament. The failure of the Darien expedition had led to huge economic losses and many who had lost the most in the scheme were members of the Parliament. The inclusion of a sum of money called 'the Equivalent', which proposed to pay back much of the money that had been lost, was therefore a major

enticement.<sup>107</sup> (Unfortunately, England, which was burdened by national debt, only managed to pay £150,000 of the £398,085 promised)<sup>108</sup> The offer of trade access was another factor which inspired some loyalty to the cause. Clause four, for example, pledged "...full Freedom and Intercourse of Trade and Navigation to and from any port or place within the said United Kingdom and the Dominion and Plantations thereunto belonging."<sup>109</sup> This was particularly appealing to those involved in trading enterprises and did bring them some benefit in the post Union years. Despite such concessions, however, Scotland still gained less from the treaty than their

southern neighbours. Scotland received trade rights, some short term monetary benefits and was permitted to uphold its existing religious, legal, and educational structures. The country lost its independent Parliament (in exchange for under representation in the British Parliament), was forced to adopt an increased tax burden and gave up any hope of controlling its foreign affairs. England, on the other hand, achieved all that it had sought in the

## SOME WERE PERSUADED BY BRIBES AT CRITICAL MOMENTS

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<sup>107</sup> John Stuart Shaw. *The Political History of Eighteenth-Century Scotland*. (London: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1999) 2.

<sup>108</sup> J.G. Pittendrigh. "The Equivalent." *The Union of 1707*. By Paul Henderson Scott. (Edinburgh: The Saltire Society, 2006.) 76.

<sup>109</sup> *The Treaty of Union of Scotland and England, 1707*. George S. Pryde, ed. (Toronto: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1950) 84.

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<sup>104</sup> Whatley, Bought and Sold, 40.

<sup>105</sup> Scott, 34.

<sup>106</sup> Davidson, 160.

pre-Union era. The Hanoverian succession was established, control over the troublesome Scots was strengthened, national security was ensured, and economic dominance was maintained.<sup>110</sup>

A survey of the post-union years provides further proof that the union was crafted to serve English interests. As stated, the English failed to provide the full amount promised in the Equivalent, and the general population did not benefit from this provision. The Union also failed to provide short-term economic benefits and Scotland continued to experience economic decline well into the century.<sup>111</sup> Although the free access to English markets did benefit some, the disestablishment of traditional Scottish trade with continental Europe had a negative effect on many areas of the economy.<sup>112</sup> Scottish politics also experienced decline. The Scottish Privy council was abolished in 1708 and the office of Scottish Secretary of State was abolished soon after.<sup>113</sup> The Scots were given 1/10 of the seats in the British Parliament and between 1727 and 1745 only nine Acts of Parliament dealt with Scotland.<sup>114</sup> Popular unrest was expressed through the Jacobite risings of 1715 and 1745 which (among other things) were fuelled by dissatisfaction with the British state.<sup>115</sup> The disregard for Scottish affairs and the lack of

improvement experienced in the decades following the Union demonstrates that it was English, rather than Scottish, needs which were best served by the Act. The situation did, however, begin to improve in the 1760's and Scotland eventually became an important and prosperous member of the British state.<sup>116</sup>

Overall, it can be concluded that the 1707 Act of Union was propelled by and served to benefit the English. The events before and during the ratification of the union demonstrate that it was primarily English determination and self-interest which motivated the Act's development. Cunning political manoeuvring was used to push the Act through the Scottish Parliament and Scotland was subject to the negative consequences of the union for several decades. The situation did improve by the end of the century and many cite this long term advancement as evidence that the union did eventually work in Scottish interest. As one historian points out, however, "If Scotland became more prosperous many decades after the union, one should consider the possibility that this may have been not because of but perhaps in spite of, the union."<sup>117</sup>

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<sup>110</sup> Shaw, 1.

<sup>111</sup> Christopher A. Whatley. *Scottish Society, 1707-1830*. (Vancouver: UBC Press., 2000) 6.

<sup>112</sup> Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 53.

<sup>113</sup> Shaw, 26.

<sup>114</sup> Whatley, *Scottish Society*, 58.

<sup>115</sup> Davidson, 178.

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<sup>116</sup> Whatley *Scottish Society*, 58.

<sup>117</sup> Pittendreich, 76.

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# A Comparative Examination of Coded Women's Roles in the Tokugawa and Meiji Periods

By Emma Selby



*'In the beginning, women in truth were the sun. We were authentic human beings. Today, women are the moon. We live as dependents...Our faces are pale blue, like the moon, like the sick'*

Hiratsuka Raichō, 1911<sup>118</sup>

Amaterasu the sun goddess was the founding deity of Japan and ancestor to the imperial family and commanded a great deal of respect at the dawn of Japanese history. The throne of imperial Japan was frequently occupied by a woman, such as Pimiko in the second century or

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<sup>118</sup> Hiroko Tomida, & Gordon Daniels, *Japanese Women: Emerging from*

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*Subservience, 1868-1945*, (Global Orient Ltd, 2005), 25.

Empress Jingū Kōgō in the third century. The family system was that of a matriarchy; for example, a husband went to live with his wife's family. Women of ancient Japan certainly enjoyed greater equality than those who lived through the periods of feudalism and modernization. It is understood why Japan changed but this essay will focus on why the position of women did not change. With the passing of time, the feminine status actually deteriorated. This essay will highlight the vehicles of this continuation of inequality from the Tokugawa period into the late Meiji period.

The influence of Chinese thought and Buddhism in the fifth and sixth centuries began to erode the equality enjoyed by the female portion of Japan's population. Confucian China promoted the doctrine of hierarchical order and Buddhism taught that salvation was not possible for women. The 'Tale of Genji' demonstrates women's acceptance of their position within this new hierarchical order. Written by a woman for a female audience, the characters in 'The Tale of Genji' reflect the thinking of men of this time, for example when Prince Genji questions, "what was the good of trying to please women? If they were not fundamentally evil, they would not have been born women at all."<sup>119</sup> As Japan progressed into a strict patriarchy, women gradually fell deeper into subservience. This was

cemented by the ascendancy of the samurai class in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and the imposition of their rigid hierarchical social order. The ideal behaviour for a samurai woman was defined in Kaibara Ekken's 'Greater Learning for Women', or *Onna Daigaku*, which presented the Confucian doctrine of the Edo period into a comprehensible set of behavioural regulations for women. It stressed the organisation of society into a clear hierarchy, which was determined by a person's gender and age and also called for the separation of men and women. Ekken's work was considered to be the most important ethical text for Japanese women in particular, mostly because it was the first of its kind to dictate specific terms for what women's inferior role in society should be, 'the great lifelong duty of a woman is obedience.'<sup>120</sup>

With the end of the Tokugawa rule, the Meiji restoration looked promising and the unprecedented prospects of reform and equality now seemed possible. Indeed, significant political, social, economical and cultural changes were made. The early Meiji period saw numerous reforms which brought about drastic changes to Japanese society, dismantling the traditional class system and the feudal state; compulsory education was instated and industrialisation and urbanisation were promoted. The Meiji leaders embarked on a process of modernization, believing this to be the only guarantee of independence and

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<sup>119</sup> Murasaki Shikibu, *The Tale of Genji*, translation by Arthur Waley, (New York: Random House 1960), 666.

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<sup>120</sup> <http://chnm.gmu.edu/wwh/p/84.html>, Women in World History, The Centre for History and New Media (CHNM) at George Mason University, website created in 2005-2006

defence against future international threats. However, the numerous reforms of the early Meiji period included no specific measures to improve the status of women, 'with the arrival of the new era of Meiji there was an initial rush to adopt Western things and practices. But the status of women hardly changed.'<sup>121</sup> Misiko Hane argues that the status of women actually worsened as a result of the Meiji Restoration of 1868. Hane further notes that the frustration felt by these women drove many to socialism, communism and anarchism; a general radicalization of a social group who were tired of being held down.

When studying both the Tokugawa and the Meiji periods, there are often three main misconceptions made. Firstly, the assumption that the situation of women during the Tokugawa period was worse than that of the Meiji Period due to the lack of "civilization" and "modernization" of the former. This leads into the second tendency where the Meiji definition of "modern" is viewed in present-day terms. Today "modern" implies "progress," "improvement" and "liberation" and this definition can undermine the actual transformations taking place in the Meiji period. Lastly, there is the

tendency to generalise and discuss unspecified sectors of society within the study of the period, for example, they are discussing the imposition of the strict female behavioural regulations presented in the *Onna Daigaku*. Even when discussing the Meiji period it is important to specify which sectors were affected by social controls, such as the Meiji Civil Code, as although the Code touched every

class, complete transformation in thought and behaviour was not fully accomplished in the remote rural population of Japan until well into the twentieth century. This specification of status, wealth, and rank within society is extremely important

as the elite (including the upper samurai and wealthy merchant classes) only accounted for approximately seven to ten percent of the population during the Edo period and thus the vast majority of the population were commoners, peasants and townspeople.

In order to observe the transformation across the periods it is necessary to begin with the status of women in the Tokugawa period. Since the common people made up the majority of the population in this time there tended to be more of an overlap in gender roles and a higher degree of legal and economical equality than in the elite classes. As a general rule, the higher up the social spectrum, the more rigid and strict the gender roles became. For elites, there was a

## THE INFLUENCE OF CHINESE THOUGHT AND BUDDHISM ERODED FEMALE EQUALITY

<sup>121</sup> Mikiso Hane, 'Reflections on the Way to the Gallows: Rebel Women in Pre-war Japan', (University of California Press and Pantheon Books, 1989).

separation between the workplace and the household that restricted women to the “reproductive” sphere of the home and men to the “productive” sphere of work in the outer realms of society. The *Onna Daigaku* was popular among these upper classes as it emphasised this clear division of gender roles and also denounced the norms of the common people. Gender division was not so apparent among the common people as the need for household harmony was greater in order to survive the economic hardships. An example of this can be seen in the lower classes where women shared the same value of labour as men and performed many similar tasks. ‘The very structure of the commoners’ household and the sexual division of labour within it made it imperative that it contain an able-bodied adult couple. No man could possibly manage on his own to perform all the tasks required to keep a household going, nor could a woman do so. In this sense, a wife and husband were absolutely interdependent.’<sup>122</sup> In contrast, especially within Samurai households, the labour of men was more valuable than that of a woman. This suggests that women were more “indispensable” as within wealthy households one could find numerous maids and concubines thus they were easily replaced whereas the male head of the household was the sole provider. From this observation of

Tokugawa law and family regulations it is obvious that among the lower classes certain issues were dealt with according to local traditions and customs and the Tokugawa state did not have a significant impact. However for the upper classes, the state was more involved in each individual’s life, for example the Tokugawa government regulated elite marriages but the same did not apply to the common people. Later, the Meiji state would attempt to impose the upper Samurai norms upon the entire country in a more “watered-down” version.

On the matter of divorce the husband would normally write a *mikudari-han*, the usual format of these Divorce Letters consisted of just three and a half lines,

‘*To Fuyo Dono,*

*It is my pleasure to divorce you hereby. Therefore hereafter there is no objection to your marrying anyone whomsoever. Witness my hand, the eleventh of the seventh month,*

Joyce Ackroyd uses the above example of a *mikudari-han* and states that most letters demonstrated the arbitrary power of the husband. Many historians imply that men were able to divorce women freely, ‘a man could cast off his wife at will’<sup>123</sup> and that as a result of divorce women became social outcasts, ‘divorce for any reason was considered the greatest disgrace for a woman’<sup>124</sup>. However, marriage for the Japanese of the Edo period was never primarily a union of two individuals – it was primarily a union of two families, regardless of class. Since

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<sup>122</sup> Robert J. Smith., “Making Village Women into “Good Wives and Wise Mothers in Pre-war Japan,” *Journal of Family History* 1983 8: 70-84 79.

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<sup>123</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>124</sup> Ibid, 33.

marriage was thus a “family matter” a husband could not easily dispose of his wife with just the *mikudari-han*. The majority of divorces were intensely discussed with both families and then usually it was finalised with *mikudari-han* which also acted as written permission for the wife to remarry. Obviously there were some divorces that did not end so peacefully and many women were forced to flee to temples for refuge; the majority of these wives were of the upper echelons. For the samurai classes, a woman could never initiate divorce, thus women of this class had no protection against divorce. In contrast, for the lower classes, marriage was a more casual affair as indicated by the high rate of marriage and divorce especially in the Edo period and thus the majority did not incur social disapproval with divorce. This high rate continued even into the Meiji period but only in rural areas. Ella Wiswell’s study of Suye in the Kumamoto prefecture during the mid 1930s includes a description on an elderly woman from the village who was living with her eleventh husband. Wiswell’s study shows that after the 1930s the divorce rate began to decrease for the rural areas as the custom of an elaborate marriage ceremony became more popular among the lower class thus it could only be afforded once. Wiswell’s study proves that even into the

## THE USUAL FORMAT OF DIVORCE LETTERS CONSISTED OF JUST THREE AND A HALF LINES

Taishō period men and women of the lower classes were ignoring the norms of the aristocracy and continuing with their own customs and traditions. Adultery was also a major issue for the upper class as it was punishable by death if committed by a wife. The situation for the rest of the population was much less severe as from high rates of marriage and divorce one can expect a high degree of sexual freedom for the commoners, ‘the efflorescence in Tokugawa urban society of cultural practices that centred on bodily pleasures and their aesthetic representations’<sup>125</sup>. Visiting brothels, parties, plays and viewing *shunga* were all perfectly normal pastimes for the lower classes.

From the Tokugawa period a strong male dominated society among the elite can be observed where the rules and regulations of the social order were firmly set in stone. This is the classic image of Tokugawa Japan that has so often been cast upon the whole of the Japanese population during this time. However, for the majority of the population, this was not the case and this is evident through the sharp class divisions of this period. The Meiji state did bring about dramatic transformations within society, one of which was the increased involvement of the state in

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<sup>125</sup> Janine Tasca Sawada, “Sexual Relations as Religious Practice in the Late Tokugawa Period: Fujido.” *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 32.2 (2006), 341.

the personal behaviour of Japanese citizens of all classes. The newly centralised government's interest in the individual was a product of increased western incursion into Japan. The presence of foreigners within Japan made the Meiji government realise that in order to gain their respect they must prove that their citizens were highly civilised. The Meiji state needed this western recognition to undo the unequal treaties signed with the foreign powers during the Tokugawa period and also to become a more prosperous and prominent nation, for example the Meiji state wanted to reverse the extraterritoriality of the foreign visitors to Japan. From this, the Meiji government began a transformation of the Japanese population towards western ideas of "civilization," "the removal from public view of phallic images and sculptures depicting sexual intercourse. The *o-kagura*...was purged of its overtly sexual passages and transformed into a discrete, even stately, dance. Public near-nudity was discouraged and mixed bathing was officially frowned upon...The government had rightly guessed that the Western powers were more likely to take Japan more seriously and to treat it as one among equals if its people behaved in ways that met the standards implied by the words of the slogan *bunmei-kaika*."<sup>126</sup>

The practices and attitudes developed during the feudal period regarding the elite classes did indeed persist after the Meiji restoration of

1868 but they were not necessarily under the title of controls such as *Onna Daigaku*. The Meiji Civil Code of 1898 was a de facto transference of Tokugawa patriarchy into the Meiji era and stood at the heart of the limitations of women's rights during this time. It was indeed the *Onna Daigaku* of its time. The code firmly established the institution of the household as the basic unit of society and the traditional patriarchal head of the household, or *ie*, was maintained. Robert J. Smith argues that due to the code's Confucian roots, there was no mention of the position of women within the household thus guaranteeing the primacy of the male head and his successor. Numerous reforms were made in terms of marriage, adultery, divorce, and education, but women continued to hold a marginalized place in society and lacked any public role. Wives were allocated considerable domestic power, the "housewife's authority," however her authority lacked the legal legitimacy of her husband. Within the samurai class, a husband's authority completely overshadowed that of his wife's. In the majority of peasant households and those households associated with agriculture, women enjoyed a more advantageous position than those who were members of the wage-earning and salaried households, 'common people became more deferent to the authoritative patriarchal concept of the family in the Meiji era.'<sup>127</sup> Any property or assets brought into the marriage by the wife were

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<sup>126</sup> Smith, 77.

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<sup>127</sup> Takeshi Koyama, "The Changing Social Position of Women in Japan," *UNESCO*, 1961, 34.

administered by her husband. The code gave women the right to divorce their husbands “on grounds of cruelty, desertion, or serious misconduct, but not for infidelity.”<sup>128</sup> Female divorcees left the house of their husband empty handed: no property, no children, no family and no support and thus they became outcasts of society. This resulted in the number of women filing for divorce remaining very low as a result of the Code. Smith argues that the code actually reduced the divorce rate among the rural peasantry as after 1898 both marriage and divorce had to be legally registered. Before the enactment of the code, marriage and divorce were viewed with a casual attitude. However, the code changed everything. For instance property was passed on from the household head to his male successor, and not to his wife, who thus remained dependent upon her son as formerly she had been on her husband. The code did give women limited property rights however, in order to serve as heads of their households or legal guardians of their children they had to obtain the consent of their husbands; thus women continued to be marginalized under the guise of reform.

By the late nineteenth century the Meiji government used

the concept of the nuclear family as the building blocks of society and the popular Meiji slogan, “Good Wives, Wise Mothers” (*ryōsai-kenbo*) to define the position of women. The latter in particular explained the central purpose of education for women. Mandatory elementary educating of girls (1872) highlighted the Meiji desire for women to have basic knowledge and was also evidence of the Meiji state replicating the path to economic success and international respect from their industrialised and prosperous western counterparts. Baron Kikuchi, one-time Minister of Education and President of both Tokyo and Kyoto Universities explained that “The question naturally arises what constitutes a good wife and wise mother, and the answer to the question requires a

knowledge of the position of the wife and mother in the household and the standing of women in society and her status in the state.”<sup>129</sup> Female education thus focused on domestic arts, absolute obedience to the male household head and the importance of virginity at marriage. “The purpose of women’s education was to prepare them, not to become professional women, but to become ‘good wives and wise mothers.’”<sup>130</sup> Hane stresses

## MEIJI WOMEN WRITERS TENDED TO WRITE ABOUT MISFORTUNES OF MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

<sup>128</sup> Joyce Lebra, Joy Paulson, and Elizabeth Powers, “Women in Changing Japan” (Westview Press, 1976), 15.

<sup>129</sup> Robert J. Smith, “Making Village Women into “Good Wives and Wise Mothers in Pre-war Japan,” *Journal of Family History*, 1983 8: 70-84, 75.

<sup>130</sup> Hane, 11.

that approximately twenty percent of the subjects taught in the girls' schools fell into the category of home economics, sewing, and handicrafts; ideals that were reminiscent of Kaibara Ekken's teachings. This was quite a difference from the boys' schools where foreign languages, mathematics and science were the main subjects. Sievers argues that much emphasis was also placed on lower class girls and women joining the labour force and becoming economic contributors to society: by 1876 sixty percent of the entire industrial work force was made up of women,<sup>131</sup> the majority of which worked in the textile industry. Girls were mostly recruited from the rural areas and put to work in various factories. "At the turn of the century ninety percent of the workings in weaving sheds and silk filatures and eighty percent of the operatives in the cotton-spinning mills were women."<sup>132</sup> The pay was low, the hours were long and the conditions were poor, this led to many girls contracting tuberculosis and other such diseases. The deterioration of workers' health led to the first female strike in 1885 in Kōfu City. Alas it was futile due to the suppressing force of the authorities. The numbers of women entering the work force quickly increased during the Taishō era and new professions were available, such as teaching and medicine. However, a stark contrast

remained between women of different classes; upper class women were not expected to take employment outside the home, many saw it as "unnatural."

More women began to distinguish themselves in literature towards the latter half of the Meiji period. These women were all from middle class families with either samurai or mercantile backgrounds. Thus the majority of literary women grew up in homes with a strong authoritarian father and a submissive mother. Most of the women received between nine and ten years of formal education, the most a woman could attain at this time. Also nearly all of the women were married and many were also mothers. Their works differed from those of western women's, as they did not denounce their submissive roles; instead they more or less accepted the patriarchal definition of women. They wrote about certain themes and events in a style that was considered appropriate to their gender. For example the majority of lead female characters were benign and helpless. Meiji women writers tended to write about the misfortunes of marriage and family life – in order to understand why these female writers relied on a theme of female victimisation in a period of transformation, one must consider the position of Meiji women from a Meiji man's point of view, "the widespread and socially sanctioned practices of selling and buying women; such practices most definitely affected men's evaluation and treatment of

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<sup>131</sup> Sharon L. Sievers, "Flowers in Salt: the Beginnings of Feminist Consciousness in Modern Japan," (Stanford University Press, 1983), 50.

<sup>132</sup> Hane, 13.

women in general.”<sup>133</sup> The practice of prostitution combined with the Confucian disdain for women encouraged men to openly view women as exploitable objects. By observing women in literature during the Meiji period one can easily observe the far reaching impact the Meiji restrictions had upon women, in all aspects of life.

An ideal wife had to be able to help the husband by taking on the burden of household affairs, such as looking after the household economy and tending to the parents-in-law and the children, thus elementary education was a must for “Good Wives, Wise Mothers.” A wife had to call her husband “master” and obey his wishes. If not she was to face punishment, as a child would. A wife who failed to bear a child within three years of marriage usually was sent back to her natal home – as would a wife who was disobedient. Female divorcees who wished to marry were looked upon as “damaged goods” and thus faced a dramatic decline in their already lowly social status. Therefore, the objective of elementary education was to teach a girl that her goal was to become a good wife and a wise mother. Empress Shoken also promoted women’s education and

was seen as the ideal Meiji woman, resulting in her nickname “The Mother of the Nation,” despite not bearing any children.

Motherhood in the Meiji period was significantly more important than in the Tokugawa period as now women were the educators of the future generation. During the Edo era, lower class children were raised by a variety of people, such as parents, siblings, grandparents and neighbours. This was the same for upper class children as the biological mother was rarely the main provider for the child,

## MOTHERHOOD IN THE MEIJI PERIOD WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAN IN THE TOKUGAWA PERIOD

thus the responsibility would be passed on to servants and tutors. However, during the Meiji period mothers were now charged with educating their children as well as maintaining a household hence, women should be “good wives, wise

mothers.” A mother should teach her daughter to suppress her ambitions, desires and hopes for the future and train her to be ready to submerge her individuality in her husband’s personality and his family’s temperament. Thus the education system was limited for girls: its primary purpose was to prevent the Japanese nation from relapsing into the “barbarism” of the Tokugawa period. This development in women’s education may have seemed like a watershed in the history of Japanese women but when considering other aspects in society, such as politics

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<sup>133</sup> Yukiko Tanaka, *Women Writers of Meiji and Taishō Japan: Their Lives, Works and Critical Reception, 1868-1926*, (McFarland & Company Inc, 2000), 10.

which women were excluded from until 1947, it is evident that the achievements made by women during this time were minor.

The continuation of the coded role of women from Tokugawa society into the Meiji period highlights the difficulties of undoing nearly three centuries of tradition, especially for the upper classes. The Meiji leaders launched Japan on the path of modernisation in order to become a prosperous and respected power among their western counterparts. However, Japan's desire to modernize in such a short space of time proved impossible for certain aspects of society that were too steeped in traditional, Confucian ideals. The role of women in Japan did not improve until the very end of the Meiji period and the beginning of the Taishō era when they finally began to voice their dissatisfaction. Even this did not produce dramatic improvements.

Numerous movements were held to extend the rights of people, such as the Popular-Rights (*minken*) Movement. This gradual shift from silence to radicalism was to increase during the Taishō period as women turned towards anarchism, syndicalism and eventually Bolshevism. The modern Meiji state had sought to suppress the indifference to the social order witnessed during the Tokugawa period by changing female values and behaviour. The modern era did indeed bring about many benefits, for example the general standard of living was gradually increased throughout most of Japan after 1880. However, this improvement in the

standard of living is not reflected in the situation of women who experienced the oppressive morals of the *Onna Daigaku*, which were later legalised by the Meiji Civil Code and finally indoctrinated under the slogan "Good Wives and Wise Mothers." From observing both the Tokugawa and Meiji Period one can assert that as feudalism progressed and was taken over by a patriarchal order, the status and situation of women worsened under constantly reinforced coded women's roles.

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# “Another England, and a Better”:

Advertising Colonial Emigration, 1815-1914

*by Kathryn Exon*



Despite being a time of unprecedented peace and prosperity in the history of the British Empire, the era between the British victory over Napoleon and the outbreak of the First World War was characterized by the emigration of millions of British people seeking a better life in a foreign country. Many left for Britain’s white settlement colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Cape Colony of South Africa. Exploring the ways that the colonies were promoted can provide insight into both the numerous factors behind the decision of so many to leave their homes, and also how many in Britain saw the colonies during this era. It is clear that colonial promoters attempted to

appeal both to the practical and sentimental in their advertisements, through combining images and rhetoric of potential progress and prosperity for the hard-working emigrant with that of a destination closely connected to and very much a part of the Empire. A third element, in some ways a combination of the other two, drew upon imperialist language to call for the colonization and civilization of “vacant” lands in order to extend British rule to new places and over new people. By simultaneously emphasizing opportunities for individual prosperity and similarities to England, colonial advertisements portrayed Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Cape Colony each as a “better Britain” to a

primarily urban, working-class audience. The overriding theme of all advertisements, however, was that of the preservation and expansion of Empire. This served both as a motivating factor for those who promoted the colonies believing emigration to be a remedy for the ills of Britain and the colonies alike, and linked together the progress of the individual emigrant with that of the Empire as a whole.

Much of the historiographical debate over emigration from Britain in this period has emphasized the importance of so-called “push” and “pull” factors in the decision to emigrate. The majority of the literature in this domain attributes British emigration in the nineteenth century either to a perceived deficiency in Britain or the increased opportunities available in the white settlement colonies or the United States. In *Moving Europeans*, for example, Leslie Page Moch conducts a long-range study of the variations in migration patterns that occurred as a result of changes in the location and possession of land and capital, and the consequent changes in the employment of workers. She emphasizes the importance of decreasing rural land ownership as a contributing factor to much of the internal migration in Britain in the nineteenth century. She also discusses how an increasing population and additional market

competition from foreign workers created dissatisfaction within the nation. In contrast, Dudley Baines in *Migration in a Mature Economy* and Terry Coleman in *Passage to America* both focus on emigration as a result of positive feedback from newly-expatriated settlers in the United States and Canada. Coleman argues that the countries in North America were seen as an ideal solution to the problems experienced by the lower classes of Britain at the time. Avril Maddrell also discusses the importance of marketing emigration in schools as a practical alternative to life in Britain in

“Empire, emigration and school geography,” though this is a study of emigration to all of the white settlement colonies, especially Canada. Both *Passage to America* and *Moving Europeans* discuss improvements in transportation and

## ADVERTISEMENT ONLY IMPLICITLY RECOGNIZED THE PUSH FACTORS BEHIND EMIGRATION

communication in detail; however, while Moch argues that they helped to facilitate the mass migration, Coleman believes they were instead a result of the newly created inter-continental traffic. While the majority of authors believe the migration movement was due to either the detriments of Britain or the magnetism of the colonies, these factors are complementary and must be viewed together, with the assistance of the themes emphasized in colonial advertisement, in order to create a complete picture of emigration in the nineteenth century. One significant

point, however, is that advertisements only implicitly acknowledged the “push” factors behind emigration, and instead preserved imperial unity by emphasizing the “pull” factors of the colonies, in order to maximize the number of emigrants to Britain’s dominions and not other destinations outside of the Empire.

In order to understand both the working-class audience and the claims made to attract it, it is necessary to examine who the principal actors were in promoting colonial emigration. Within Britain, a series of agricultural crises and industrial strikes incensed farmers and labourers and led many alarmed Britons in the nineteenth century to look to emigration as a way of relieving the nation of some of its ever growing working-class population. Landlords and trade unions often provided support for those seeking assisted emigration,<sup>134</sup> as did many voluntary assistance societies like the British and Colonial Society and the East End Emigration Fund.<sup>135</sup> Others groups, like the

National Emigration Aid Society and Worker’s Emigration League, lobbied the government to assist in passage fares and co-ordinate a welcoming colonial reception for the unemployed poor.<sup>136</sup> Membership in these groups was predominantly middle-class, and their preferred destination was Britain’s white settlement colonies, which symbolized both democracy, a cause toward which they were sympathetic, and British imperial expansion abroad.<sup>137</sup> For example, in 1879, one Stephen Bourne delivered a well-received lecture advocating a “new colonization” in which the British government would relocate members of the working class into state-funded utopian societies in the colonies. This would serve the twin goals of emigration and imperial expansion and benefit Britain and the colonies alike.<sup>138</sup>

The British government, however, was little involved in the direct promotion of the colonies. To the extent that British government oversight existed in this period, it served a coordinating rather than a promoting function, linking the activities of the many agencies which assisted emigration. Direct intervention in the form of colonization schemes was attempted in the earlier part of the period by government

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<sup>134</sup> Charlotte Erickson, *Emigration from Europe, 1815-1914* (London: A. & C. Black Ltd., 1976), 148.

<sup>135</sup> Stanley Currie Johnson, *A History of Emigration from the United Kingdom to North America, 1763-1912* (London: Routledge, 1913), 65. While historians usually draw a distinction between assisted and unassisted, or voluntary, emigration, and while the scope of this study is primarily the latter group, it must be noted that potential emigrants were not always recruited and in fact often applied for assistance, in which case the activities of voluntary organizations to attract these emigrants constitute a form of colonial advertising.

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<sup>136</sup> Howard L. Malchow, *Population Pressures: Emigration and Government in Late Nineteenth-Century Britain* (Palo Alto: The Society for the Promotion of Science and Scholarship Inc., 1979), 68; 23.

<sup>137</sup> Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire Society and Culture in Britain* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 97.

<sup>138</sup> Malchow, 67-68.

agents such as Wilmot Horton, Parliamentary Undersecretary to the Colonial Office in the 1820s and 1830s, but irregular land sales and steady decline in government interest throughout the century led the Colonial Land and Emigration Office and its successor, the Emigrant's Information Office, to serve an informational purpose only.<sup>139</sup> The responsibility for promoting and selling colonial land therefore rested primarily upon the colonial and provincial governments, and numerous colonial agents established themselves in major cities across the country, distributing information and propaganda.<sup>140</sup> The Canadian government, for example, published over 3 million pamphlets in 1888, comprising almost twenty percent of the budget allocated to sustain Canadian immigration initiatives.<sup>141</sup> Independent, third-party agents also played a large role in advertising emigration. Colonial governments relied upon a network of agents in Britain which offered information and coordinated the limited subsidization of travel offered by federal and provincial governments.<sup>142</sup> Officials also worked in conjunction with private companies, sharing in the cost of

promotions, such as the partnership between the Canadian government and the Anchor Line shipping company in the 1870s.<sup>143</sup> Another partnership developed between colonial governments and railroad and land companies eager to settle the lands near new (or forthcoming) railroads.<sup>144</sup> The Dominion Land Act, proposed by the Canadian government when track construction on the Canadian Pacific Railroad began in the 1880s, is a classic example of colonial governments equating imperial progression with individual opportunity. The Act encouraged settlement near its route with free land and also advertised places for construction workers to create the railroad itself, a scheme designed to benefit both emigrant and colony.<sup>145</sup>

The most common ways to advertise migration throughout the period were with cheap handbooks, leaflets and pamphlets, which were accessible to the masses and easily

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<sup>143</sup> Erickson, 229. Here it must be noted that the Anchor Line paid the majority of the costs associated with overseas advertising. Shipping companies were very involved in advertising to potential emigrants, though the majority of these advertisements were for information purposes only, particularly before the steamship was in regular use. Historians debate whether shipping company advertisements were in fact successful, or whether the companies were simply involved in a burgeoning market that grew steadily throughout the century without promotions. Shipping company advertisements nonetheless carry many of the same imperial images and symbols common to colonial advertising, and are thus valuable tools for assessment, as at the very least they served to reinforce common themes.

<sup>144</sup> Erickson, 185.

<sup>145</sup> Malchow, 83.

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<sup>139</sup> Malchow, 17; 219; Avril M. C. Maddrell, "Empire, emigration and school geography: Changing discourses of Imperial citizenship, 1880-1925" in *Journal of Historical Geography* 22 no. 4 (1996), 385.

<sup>140</sup> Erickson, 121.

<sup>141</sup> Jarrett Henderson, "'Most of our country is wild and unspoiled': Advertising Gender, Race, and Empire for Western Canada, 1867-1911" (MA thesis, University of Manitoba, 2005), 10-11.

<sup>142</sup> Erickson, 185.

printed and distributed by promoters, particularly those stationed in large port cities such as Liverpool.<sup>146</sup> Other written promotions included emigrant “letters” sponsored by emigration societies, since many emigrants relied primarily on feedback from family and friends who had already made the journey abroad, and moved in similar regional patterns.<sup>147</sup> Advertisements in the style of letters frequently appeared in newspapers and popular journals throughout the period, including *Household Words* and *Penny Magazine*.<sup>148</sup> Horse-drawn exhibition vans and public speeches were also used as spectacles to attract attention.<sup>149</sup> As the majority of emigrants targeted by colonial advertisements were the urban labouring poor and those with a small amount of capital, most advertising occurred in metropolitan areas, but it was also common for cottages throughout the countryside to be papered over with posters advertising emigration.<sup>150</sup>

For the majority of the urban poor, emigration was considered a last resort, even if it did represent the opportunity to better themselves.<sup>151</sup> Certainly, the decision to emigrate was not made lightly, and most potential emigrants spent a lot of time researching and reading critical newspaper accounts

of their destinations.<sup>152</sup> Colonial promoters thus relied upon hard data such as comparative wages and consumer price indexes, and practical inducements such as land and the prospect of financial independence, to attract emigrants.<sup>153</sup>

The writers of handbooks and pamphlets usually confirmed their target audience in the first few pages, often stating explicitly what kind of emigrant they sought. Most encouraged general agriculturalists, farm labourers, and a small number of craftsmen such as mechanics, carpenters and bricklayers, to emigrate.<sup>154</sup> Some provided more detailed requirements, such as that “the classes most needed...are [those] who will turn their hands to anything,” a clear indication that the working classes were their primary audience.<sup>155</sup> In 1852, the Fourth Annual Report to the Poor Law Board agreed, stating that emigrants to Australia and the Cape of Good Hope needed to be “sober, industrious, and of general good character...the adults must, in all respects, be capable of labour...the

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<sup>152</sup> Erickson, 203; Robert D. Grant, *Representations of British Emigration, Colonisation and Settlement: Imagining Empire, 1800-1860* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan Ltd., 2005), 63.

<sup>153</sup> Johnson, 62.

<sup>154</sup> Department of the Commissioner of Agriculture and Public Works, *The Province of Ontario: its soil, climate, resources, institutions, free grant lands, &c, &c, for the information of intending emigrants* (Toronto: Hunter, Rose, 1871), ii; 4; Thomas Spence, *Manitoba and the North-West of the dominion: its resources and advantages to the emigrant and capitalist, as compared with the western states of America* (Winnipeg: Hunter, Rose, 1871), 14.

<sup>155</sup> *The Province of Ontario*, 4.

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<sup>146</sup> Johnson, 61.

<sup>147</sup> Moch, 153.

<sup>148</sup> Porter, 97.

<sup>149</sup> Johnson, 62.

<sup>150</sup> Terry Coleman, *Going to America* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1972), 56.

<sup>151</sup> Porter, 27.

candidates most acceptable are young married couples without children.”<sup>156</sup>

The potential rewards for such immigrants were advertised also, voiced frequently in the language of financial security. One carpenter wrote of Canada that “this is a good country for an industrious person, he may live well and be more independent than in England.”<sup>157</sup> Offers of free land often accompanied the promotions, typically followed up with the expected number of years it would take to establish a self-sufficient farm.<sup>158</sup> One William Catermole said in an 1831 lecture that “The emigrant who goes out with habits of industry...cannot fail of success”; the “general air of prosperity” in the colonies would, for the dedicated worker, turn a profit within one year.<sup>159</sup> The key element was the ability to persevere. Frequent descriptions and often images of the clearing of forests and tilling of land

## EMIGRATION WAS CONSIDERED A LAST RESORT

served to drive this message home.<sup>160</sup> As one pamphlet noted, “Only one thing is to be remarked, no one need

come here in prospect of doing well unless he intend to be diligent, and work hard.”<sup>161</sup>

Another qualified it further, stating that Australia was looking for “men...who are actuated by a proper spirit – a desire to live for some worthy end, and to accomplish something in their day

that will live after them when they are gone. We want an infusion of this element into our social life if we are to make the colony ‘another England,’ and a better.”<sup>162</sup> This clearly linked individual prosperity with the future prosperity of the colony.

Pamphlets also commonly stated explicitly who would *not* be welcomed in the colonies. In this group were those “not directly engaged in the arts of production,” as one author referred to professional men.<sup>163</sup> Members of the middle and upper classes, who were thought to have utopian ideas or “extravagant expectations,” were also quite frequently discouraged from emigrating.<sup>164</sup> This is not to say that the better classes were not the target of any advertisements, however. It was common for joint-stock companies,

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<sup>156</sup> Erickson, 122.

<sup>157</sup> *Letters from settlers in Upper Canada to their friends here: containing important practical information relating to that country for the guidance of immigrants* (London: Marchant, 1831), 1.

<sup>158</sup> *The Province of Ontario*, 9.

<sup>159</sup> Quoted in Sherrie A. Inness, “‘An Act of Severe Duty’: Emigration and Class Ideology in Susanna Moodie’s *Roughing It in the Bush*” in *Imperial Objects: Essays on Victorian Women’s Emigration and the Unauthorized Imperial Experience*, ed. Rita S. Krandis (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1998), 190.

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<sup>160</sup> *Letters from settlers in Upper Canada*, 7.

<sup>161</sup> *Letters from settlers in Upper Canada*, 9; *The Province of Ontario*, 14.

<sup>162</sup> Ballantyne, 13.

<sup>163</sup> *The Province of Ontario*, 4.

<sup>164</sup> Ballantyne, 16.

such as the New Zealand Company, to jointly promote emigration for the masses and investment opportunities for the wealthy few. Such advertisements favourably surveyed the prospect of financial success as well, mentioning the numerous waterfalls, mills and ports “worthy of Britain’s maritime Empire.”<sup>165</sup>

The obvious target audience remained those willing to work the land themselves, even those without experience. Often this carried gendered connotations. Handbooks commonly featured instructions in homesteading to help to ease to transition from metropolitan to rural life.<sup>166</sup> One promotion for the Cape Colony, subtitled “Urban and rural industries, their probable future development and extension,” discussed at length the potential for success to be found in sheep and goat farming, dairying, and viticulture, with detailed instructions for everything from curing animal diseases to establishing an irrigated field.<sup>167</sup> These promotions subtly implied that, through engaging in the rough process of expanding and cultivating the British frontier, emigrants would not only gain financial independence, but regain the sense of masculinity that eluded them in British cities.<sup>168</sup> Successful emigrants would not only exercise their mastery over the land and climate, but over themselves as well,

in the name of the British Empire, and over the “uncivilized” inhabitants of the land.<sup>169</sup> Several advertisements did in fact strongly emphasize the role of the British emigrant in making the “native Indians...a moralized and good kind of people.”<sup>170</sup> The idea of the British mission to civilize (and colonize) others was often coupled with the idea of gaining independence for oneself.

Women received pro-emigration messages as well, from such voluntary societies as the National Benevolent Emigration Fund for Widows and Orphan Daughters of Gentlemen, Professional Men, Officers, Bankers and Merchants and the Fund for Promoting Female Emigration, which encouraged genteel and poor women, respectively, to take up domestic service in the colonies in the 1850s and 1860s.<sup>171</sup> A few years later, pamphlets advertising Western Canada began to target women specifically, seeking domestic servants in order to counter the largely disproportionate number of men who had already established homesteads there. Among the listed advantages of emigration, the ease of finding a marriage partner who was already established with his own farm ranked highly.<sup>172</sup> Avril Maddrell sums up this type of colonial advertising best when she states that the colonies were promoted to women as “less formal than British society, as places of social and physical freedom, with the very attractive combination of an exciting

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<sup>165</sup> Grant, 62.

<sup>166</sup> Henderson, 6.

<sup>167</sup> A.R.E. Burton, *Cape Colony for the Settler* (London: P.S. King & Son, 1903), various.

<sup>168</sup> Henderson, 32.

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<sup>169</sup> Henderson, 32.

<sup>170</sup> *Letters from settlers in Upper Canada*, 4.

<sup>171</sup> Simpson, 127.

<sup>172</sup> Henderson, 7.

but familiar environment, but also as places where they could contribute as a civilizing influence.”<sup>173</sup> One female emphasized the modernity of the colonies in writing to fellow women in Britain that Ontario lacked primogeniture, noting that women too might become independent and own their own land in the colonies.<sup>174</sup> Imperial expansion, however, remained the salient theme of advertisements, and even those women who considered emigration “a matter of necessity, not of choice” and only a “severe duty” to be endured for the sake of prosperity or their husband’s happiness, recognized the importance of furthering the state’s growth through moving to the colonies.<sup>175</sup>

The idea of individual and imperial progress was furthered by the images used in colonial advertisements, many of which used familiar symbols of prosperity and imperial domination to indicate better opportunities for independence and self-sufficiency. A common image, especially on posters, was of rolling hills ready to be easily and profitably cultivated, particularly in advertisements for Canada. In promotions for colonies like Australia, New Zealand and the Cape Colony, vineyards and fruit trees were shown to give a hint of the money to be made by future vintners and fruit producers.<sup>176</sup> Potential progress and imperial unity were also shown by images of rivers, canals

and ports, and other traditional symbols of development like railways.<sup>177</sup> One handbook praised the many “watercourses” of Canada, which served to facilitate travel and communication across the country, and which were stocked with fish.<sup>178</sup> The modern state of cities was shown by drawings, and later photographs, of banks, courthouses and industry.<sup>179</sup> Images therefore emphasized the benefits emigrants could gain from the advanced state of the colonies, tying individual with imperial progress.

One element of colonial advertising that cannot be overlooked is the prominence of maps. Nearly every promotional handbook and pamphlet contained a map, which was usually placed significantly on the inside front or back cover or as a special insert.<sup>180</sup> These maps were frequently employed to show the potential remunerations of emigration, by emphasizing trade and military routes, which signalled progress and security, respectively, and showing natural resources and current economic activity in clusters in the visual space.<sup>181</sup> They highlighted the construction of roads, railroads and canals (both existing and anticipated), which signified easy communication and travel, and lands that were still

<sup>173</sup> Maddrell, 380.

<sup>174</sup> *The Province of Ontario*, 26.

<sup>175</sup> Quoted in Inness, 194.

<sup>176</sup> Grant, 69.

<sup>177</sup> Grant, 69-70.

<sup>178</sup> *The Cape and Canada Viewed as to their Eligibility: Information for Emigrants by an Englishman* (London: Kent & Richards, 1848), 34; Inness, 190.

<sup>179</sup> Ballantyne, 56; 112.

<sup>180</sup> Grant, 63.

<sup>181</sup> Thomas J. Bassett, “Cartography and Empire Building in Nineteenth-Century West Africa” in *Geographical Review* 84, no. 3 (1994), 320.

unoccupied and ready to be farmed.<sup>182</sup> These maps, along with other images and rhetoric, drew on the themes of British expansion and imperialism to link material prosperity for the individual and with imperial growth.

The language of imperialism was also invoked in colonial advertisements to indicate the similarities between the colonies and Britain, and to emphasize their unity. The amount of general imperial propaganda ballooned in the last quarter of the century, and the public meetings, exhibitions and music pieces of societies such as the British Empire League (established 1896) and Royal Colonial League (established 1868) were undoubtedly important in advertising the colonies. Without a direct call to action, it is difficult to determine how large a role this more general pro-imperial propaganda played in promoting emigration, though it certainly created an interest in, and attachment to, the Empire. It may also have implications for the increase in the number of emigrants to the dominions around the turn of the century, though it does not explain the flood of emigration prior to that date.<sup>183</sup> The period after 1900 saw an even greater interest among colonial promoters to advertise the colonies as

a part of the Empire, capitalizing upon the positive feeling toward them in Britain after many sent troops to fight in the Boer War of 1899-1902. For example, in 1902, the government of Canada gave several newspapermen, including those from

metropolitan newspapers such the London *Daily News*, *Daily Mail*, *Daily Telegraph* and *Daily Chronicle*, a tour of the country intending to procure from them favourable reviews once back in Britain.<sup>184</sup>

It was very common also for pamphlets and handbooks to highlight those things which made the colonies “British,” including laws, institutions, churches, and prosperous centres of commerce, with the frequent tagline that moving to Canada, Australia, New Zealand or the Cape Colony was little different from moving anywhere else in Britain.<sup>185</sup> They also emphasized the easy access to good education, particularly around the turn of the century when education was thought to play a major role in building character.<sup>186</sup> One handbook, which advertised migration to Canada, said that, “In coming to Ontario, old country people will not feel much greater change than in going from one part of the United Kingdom to another.” In their Canadian comforts,

## IT WAS VERY COMMON FOR PAMPHLETS TO HIGHLIGHT THOSE THINGS WHICH MADE COLONIES BRITISH

<sup>182</sup> Henderson, 34.

<sup>183</sup> Porter, 174.

<sup>184</sup> Desmond Glynn, ““Exporting Outcast London”: Assisted Emigration to Canada, 1886-1914” in *Social History* 15 (1982), 216.

<sup>185</sup> Henderson, 56.

<sup>186</sup> Henderson, 60.

and secure in the knowledge that Canada was an important part of the Empire, emigrants maintained “the old national feeling for the land of their fathers.”<sup>187</sup> Another commented that “every thing you see and hear [in Toronto] reminds you strongly of your English home.”<sup>188</sup> Even the speed of the post was advertised, to show the potential emigrant that he or she could maintain personal connections with home through reading British newspapers and letters from family.<sup>189</sup> By emphasizing what they had in common with Britain, the colonies simultaneously linked themselves into the greater British world while promoting the freedom and independence many lacked at home.

Of course, the promoters of the settlement colonies were also in competition with each other and so tried to distinguish their subjects accordingly. Frequently, “objective” surveys were published which rated each colony on criteria such as climate, the absence of malaria, natural communications, exterior trade and commerce, and indigenous and foreign political relations – all considered to be elements that gave a colony “a relative progressive value.”<sup>190</sup> One handbook lauded the temperate climate, gold and mineral reserves and wool industry in Victoria while simultaneously noting that New Zealand was too wet and

Canada too cold.<sup>191</sup> Canadian promoters often tried to play down the perception that the colony had a harsh climate, a significant detractor in the mid-nineteenth century when many diseases were linked to climate and temperature.<sup>192</sup> Even within Canada, Upper Canada was promoted much more heavily than Lower Canada, the former being more “English.”<sup>193</sup> Emigration to the white settlement colonies was almost always advocated over emigration to one of the ruled colonies, however, as the latter were usually portrayed as sites of “racial degradation,”<sup>194</sup> or even as the “White Man’s Grave” because of their numerous tropical illnesses and native insurrections.<sup>195</sup>

Moreover, advertisers at all times promoted colonial migration over that to the United States. Throughout the period, colonial promoters had to compete with American emigration agents who were affiliated with state governments and thus better organized and able to offer free land and often free passage as well.<sup>196</sup> Indeed, with the mass exodus of the 1840s and 1850s, little advertising was necessary in Britain except to divert emigrant traffic from that destination.<sup>197</sup> Colonial promoters struck back with a variety of attacks on

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<sup>191</sup> James Ballantyne, *Homes and Homesteads in the Land of Plenty: A Handbook of Victoria as a Field for Emigration* (Melbourne: Mason, Firth & McCutcheon, 1871), 5-6.

<sup>192</sup> Grant, 72.

<sup>193</sup> Charles F. Grece, *Facts and Observations Respecting Canada and the United States of America* (London: J. Harding, 1819), 15.

<sup>194</sup> Grant, 59.

<sup>195</sup> Maddrell, 374.

<sup>196</sup> *Ibid.*, 375; Erickson, 185.

<sup>197</sup> Richards, 152.

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<sup>187</sup> *The Province of Ontario*, 5.

<sup>188</sup> Grant, 71.

<sup>189</sup> *Letters from settlers in Upper Canada*, 10.

<sup>190</sup> Maddrell, 379.

the United States and its inhabitants, most of which relied upon a sense of pride in Empire in addition to practical reasons. Canadian handbooks in particular stressed the better quality soil, lower land and machinery prices and cheaper, easier travel, both by land and sea.<sup>198</sup> One comparative promotion noted the large number of Americans who emigrated to Canada, inferring that it was therefore logical for the British to do the same.<sup>199</sup>

Another pamphlet, the express purpose of which was to present a comparison of Manitoba with the western United States, commented that the American lands were barren and desolate throughout the Midwest, while Canadian lands offered an abundance of coal and potentially prosperous farms.<sup>200</sup> This rhetoric was frequently coupled with the assertion that the United States was already full and that it had reached its frontier, meaning that new immigrants would not be welcomed, or that once there they would fall victim to the diseases common in overcrowded locations.<sup>201</sup> Handbooks also played upon the distrust many Britons still felt toward the Americans. One emigrant to Canada is quoted as saying that “in the States, you are far heavier taxed,

and emigrants there are certain to be cheated out of what they may have by the Yankees.”<sup>202</sup> Another promoted Canada as the morally superior destination, mentioning that Canada lacked the “sickening” institution of slavery which was common in America.<sup>203</sup> By far the most common practice in these promotions, however, was to highlight the “Englishness” of the colonies in comparison with the United States. One emigrant letter from Canada quoted the writer as saying, “I like the country well, much better than I do the States, we are under the English banners and laws, but the best of them independent and free.”<sup>204</sup> Indeed, emigrants to America were portrayed as having renounced flag, queen and country, a great loss of dignity for any proud Englishman.<sup>205</sup>

## ADVERTISERS AT ALL TIMES PROMOTED COLONIAL MIGRATION OVER THAT TO THE UNITED STATES

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<sup>202</sup> *Letters from settlers in Upper Canada*, 9.

<sup>203</sup> Grece, 64.

<sup>204</sup> *Letters from settlers in Upper Canada*, 3.

<sup>205</sup> Grant, 72. It is difficult to measure how successful colonial promoters were, particularly against the exodus of Britons to America. Fully two thirds of emigrants from Britain during this period went to the United States; in last decade of the century, fewer than 28% went to colonies, including those who landed in Canada before heading south, which was a common practise that skewed immigration statistics. Some of the appeal of the United States can no doubt be explained by the desire of the primarily metropolitan emigrants to try their luck in an urban setting instead of learning a new occupation and braving the untamed wildernesses of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the Cape Colony.

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<sup>198</sup> Ballantyne, 62.

<sup>199</sup> Grece, xii.

<sup>200</sup> Spence, 8-12.

<sup>201</sup> Henderson, 72; Grant, 71.

Images of flags, especially the Union Jack, were also prominent in advertisements for emigration. In nearly every pamphlet, the flag is celebrated as a symbol of British imperial unity, which could only be found in British colonies, and not in foreign lands like the United States.<sup>206</sup> It also represented security and strength, and as such was often shown alongside cannons and military garrisons, or of mythical figures like the English Lion or Britannia.<sup>207</sup> The inscription on one advertisement, “New Homes Under the Old Flag: A Summary of the Opportunities Offered By the British Colonies for Settlers of All Classes” is significant because it exemplifies the greater message of colonial advertising in this period, that the colonies represented great prospects without being far removed from the comforts, prosperity and familiarity of Britain.

Maps, which have already been discussed with reference to advertising imperial progress, were another important way to advertise the British colonies as similar to Britain. They served to highlight the “Englishness” of conquered lands and indicate imperial unity with colours and lines while simultaneously marking potential future conquests and developments. Many showed all of Britain’s colonies, often painted in red, which served to link the Empire with Britain and visually depict a

community of nations. Others, especially advertisements for Canada, emphasized how short a distance the colony was from the metropolis, using monikers like “the nearest British colony.”<sup>208</sup> One emigrant to Canada wrote to his brother in 1831, saying, “I was told, once I got here, I should never have it in my power to come back again, but in this, I say they are quite mistaken.”<sup>209</sup> Easy travel and closeness to the home country was a key element tying the colonies with Britain. While promoters of Australia and New Zealand were at a disadvantage in this regard, as there was no service to those colonies that was reliable, cheap and quick until 1883, they emphasized that it was continually being shortened, and also contrasted the type of passage with that to Canada. One pamphlet noted that the journey was “a very pleasant one, through mild latitudes and generally quiet seas. In this it is greatly preferable to the voyage through boisterous Atlantic billows...”<sup>210</sup> Of course, there were exceptions, as many emigrated to these colonies because they were so far away from the control of their old oppressors. As one emigrant to Australia wrote back to his brother in England, “We have no overseers here to tread [sic] us under foot.”<sup>211</sup> These cases were exceptional, however, and the majority of promotions placed a strong emphasis on close ties with the home country.

Place names also served to reinforce connections with Britain. In

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Without any colonial advertising, however, the number may have been much higher.

<sup>206</sup> Maddrell, 382.

<sup>207</sup> Bassett, 327.

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<sup>208</sup> Henderson, 35.

<sup>209</sup> *Letters from settlers in Upper Canada*, 1.

<sup>210</sup> Ballantyne, 7.

<sup>211</sup> Quoted in Porter, 28.

renaming aborigine territories in southern Australia, choosing names that mirrored or recalled Britain was a large part of making a place “British” and creating its own, new history.<sup>212</sup> Names acted as “symbolic British flags,” essentially nullifying any history associated with the place before colonization and proclaiming it a blank space.<sup>213</sup> Actual visual blank spaces also served an important function on nineteenth-century maps. They not only lent credibility and authority to the cartographer, who in previous times might have filled them with fictitious mountain ranges or mythical geography, but they also sent a powerful message to would-be colonizers that the land was “empty” and waiting to be conquered by an ambitious emigrant.<sup>214</sup> Indeed, even the Latin root of the word colony was invoked at this time – to “till, plant and cultivate” – to indicate the ease of mastering an unpopulated, vacant land.<sup>215</sup>

Moreover, as the lands represented on maps as British territory were not always officially

conquered, maps also served the function of legitimizing and prophesizing future British claims to disputed lands.<sup>216</sup> The fact that maps were by no means always the objective representations of the colonies that many Britons assumed them to be made them a powerful propaganda tool for those seeking to promote emigration.<sup>217</sup>

Another very important way to advertise the colonies was to target working-class children attending state-sponsored schools. In 1885, the Revised Instructions to inspectors of British schools sought to promote emigration among youth through the school geography curriculum.

## MAPS ALSO SERVED THE FUNCTION OF LEGITIMIZING AND PROPHECIZING FUTURE BRITISH CLAIMS

Typical test questions included finding the shortest shipping distance to Montreal, and discussing the “English colonies and their productions, government and resources and those climatic and other conditions which render our distant possessions suitable fields for emigration, and for honourable enterprise.”<sup>218</sup> The emphasis on empire is clear in this passage, as is the focus on the hard work necessary to be successful within it. In addition, many schools were supplied with atlases and readers by colonial governments which not only focused on the physical geography of the colonies, but also included explicit

<sup>212</sup> Tony Birch, “‘A land so inviting and still without inhabitants’: erasing Koori culture from (post-) colonial landscapes,” in *Text, Theory, Space: Land, literature and history in South Africa and Australia*, ed. Kate Darian-Smith, Liz Gunner and Sarah Nuttall (New York: Routledge, 1996), 180.

<sup>213</sup> Birch, 180.

<sup>214</sup> Bassett, 322-324.

<sup>215</sup> Maddrell, 380.

<sup>216</sup> Bassett, 325-326.

<sup>217</sup> Bassett, 333.

<sup>218</sup> Quoted in Maddrell, 379.

messages to emigrate.<sup>219</sup> The new century brought an even greater increase in imperialist rhetoric in schools, with the emphasis on “imperial citizenship” after the Boer War and essay competitions sponsored by colonial governments to highlight the advantages of intra-Empire migration.<sup>220</sup> Schools most often encouraged the emigration of the lower classes; indeed, there was a lack of practical education found in public schools for the majority of the nineteenth century. It was only after 1880 that careers in the colonies were routinely encouraged by schools and the government. From that time until 1914, around 300 000 men migrated to the colonies, up to one third of graduates from some schools, though many returned to England having found themselves unsuited to life as a farmer or professional.<sup>221</sup> The emphasis on the Empire in schools was thus a powerful tool to advertise colonial emigration.

The unity and expansion of Empire, indeed, was the main element of colonial advertising between 1815 and 1914. It served to motivate those who advertised the colonies, and provided a way for colonial promoters to link together the progress and prosperity of the individual emigrant with that of the Empire as a whole. Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the Cape Colony were advertised as lands of opportunity for ambitious, working-class emigrants, and lands that very much resembled Britain, though they

offered more to the potential emigrant than he or she could ever hope for at home. In the language of colonial promotions, emigration pointed the way towards not only a better Britain, but a better life.

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<sup>219</sup> Henderson, 34.

<sup>220</sup> Maddrell, 374; Glynn, 216.

<sup>221</sup> Maddrell, 378.

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# Ned Kelly: Australian Hero?

By Tessa Murphy



On November 11, 1880, Edward (Ned) Kelly was hanged at the Melbourne jail after being convicted of the murder of Constable Thomas Lonigan.<sup>222</sup> This was not the first time the young man—thief, assailant, and for a time the most wanted criminal in Australia—had found himself before the court. Yet, then as now, many Australians mourned as the man they viewed not as a psychotic criminal but as a righteous outlaw went to the gallows. Two competing schools of thought ensure that the legend of Ned Kelly remains heavily debated: was he just one of Australia's many outlaws, albeit much more notorious than

most? Or was he truly the embodiment of a distinctly Australian mentality: masculine, independent and suspicious of authority?<sup>223</sup> This heated debate, fuelled in no small part by “wild supposition in [contemporary] newspapers”<sup>224</sup> continues to rage. Kelly gained notoriety during a time when a growing segment of the Australian population was agitating for the status of an independent

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<sup>222</sup> Roy Mendham. *The Dictionary of Australian Bushrangers*. (Melbourne: The Hawthorn Press, 1975), 100.

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<sup>223</sup> Michael Fitzgerald. *Man and Myth: More than a century after his execution, bushranger Ned Kelly continues to inspire a distinctly Australian iconography*. Time International 161.12 (March 24, 2003)

<sup>224</sup> Keith McMenomy. *Ned Kelly: The authentic illustrated story*. (Victoria: Gordon & Gotch Ltd., 1984), 90.

republic,<sup>225</sup> and his dramatic story easily “gained publicity to an extent unequalled in [Australian] history.”<sup>226</sup> Ned Kelly’s symbolic importance to an Australian national psyche consciously attempting to differentiate itself from that of Britain remains evident to this day, perpetuated by innumerable books and films dedicated to an individual whose exploits illuminated the growing gap between British and Australian identity.

The innumerable books commemorating Kelly’s life and legend are a testament to his continued popularity in Australian national history. Unfortunately, they are also characteristic of a trend common to all nationalist histories: they bear a distinct and often overwhelming bias. As Australia sought first to find and then to assert an identity independent from that of England, academics and the popular media alike began to produce valorizing portraits of the young outlaw who openly defied the colonial state. In fact, “academics have devoted more time to the Kellys than to any other group of Australian historical figures.”<sup>227</sup> Even ostensibly objective studies of Kelly’s impact on nationalist mythology often carry

undertones of colloquial adoration. Such is evidenced by the words of Australian historian Keith Dunstan, who writes of the outlaw’s association with the bush: “Kelly had a deep feeling for this area...they called it the Kelly country then and they still do.”<sup>228</sup> The task of sifting through mountains

## THE CHARACTER KELLY’S CRIMES SEARED HIS IMAGE ONTO THE PUBLIC IMAGINATION

of information in an effort to distil the true character and motivations of Ned Kelly is a monumental one. Fortunately, the blindly valorizing depictions which were first published have been succeeded by discussions

informed by “the [growing] demand for...popular history [through which]...the definition of national identity became more adventurous.”<sup>229</sup>

The events of Ned Kelly’s early life would likely occupy even the most experienced psychoanalyst for an entire lifetime. The son of an Irishman, John Kelly, who was transported to Van Diemen’s Land in 1841 at the age of 21,<sup>230</sup> and of a free Irish mother whose family had a respectable holding of 600 acres,<sup>231</sup> Ned’s brief childhood was marked by grinding poverty and frequent encounters with the law. Although many historians argue that Ned “grew up in [an]

<sup>225</sup> John Hirst. “Towards the Republic.” from *Sense and Nonsense in Australian History*. (Sydney: Blank Inc. Books, 2006), 262.

<sup>226</sup> McMenomy, 200.

<sup>227</sup> Allan Nixon. *100 Australian Bushrangers, 1789-1901*. (Adelaide: Rigby Publishers, 1982), 98.

<sup>228</sup> Keith Dunstan. *Saint Ned: The story of the near sanctification of an Australian outlaw*. (Sydney: Methuen of Australia, 1980), 14.

<sup>229</sup> Dunstan, 12.

<sup>230</sup> Ibid.

<sup>231</sup> McMenomy, 11.

atmosphere of petty crime and frequent violence, and [developed]...resentment against authority,”<sup>232</sup> others defend John Kelly and his wife as “quiet and reserved” people who tried to abide by the law until economic hardship necessitated minor theft.<sup>233</sup> Even this subordinate debate concerning Ned’s childhood environment alludes to the more significant question of whether Ned was a born criminal or a man justly fighting against the economic and social oppression of the British colonial state. In either case, the Kellys were undoubtedly one of the many Australian families continually struggling to make ends meet in a country with almost no social welfare system.<sup>234</sup>

Regardless of the precise conditions of his youth, young Ned quickly turned to theft, ostensibly to help provide for his struggling family; at fourteen years old he was arrested for “the assault and robbery of a Chinese merchant.”<sup>235</sup> Although Ned was acquitted of the crime, he “was a marked man.”<sup>236</sup> His involvement with notorious outlaw Harry Power likely did not help his reputation, and on “10 November 1870...[Ned] received six months in gaol...on two charges of assault and one of using obscene language.”<sup>237</sup> Kelly’s time in prison

failed to change his behaviour, and just one year later he was sentenced to “three years for horsestealing,”<sup>238</sup> despite his many public claims of innocence.

Although this criminal record might initially appear astoundingly long for someone so young, it must be emphasized that rural Australia at the end of the nineteenth century was a frontier society. In Kelly’s sparsely-populated region of North Eastern Victoria alone there were more than sixty separate arrests in less than twenty years.<sup>239</sup> The existence of numerous tomes documenting the individual crimes of hundreds of Australian bushrangers suggests not only the frequency of such activities, but also their importance in Australian popular memory. For most of its early existence, Australia was an island of outlaws, current and reformed, attempting to eke out an existence in an unforgiving and sparsely populated desert. Ned Kelly was but one of thousands of rural residents, both men and women, convicted of theft, robbery or assault. Yet the character and scale of Kelly’s future crimes seared his image onto the public imagination.

The notion of Kelly, and indeed of other bushrangers, as Robin Hood archetypes, stealing only what they truly needed, remains a very popular one. “In 19<sup>th</sup> century Australia bush ranging was so widespread, and so widely supported by public sympathy, that it amounted to a leading

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<sup>232</sup> Nixon, 99.

<sup>233</sup> McMenomy, 12.

<sup>234</sup> Stuart Macintyre. *A Concise History of Australia*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 151.

<sup>235</sup> Dunstan, 16.

<sup>236</sup> Nixon, 99.

<sup>237</sup> Ibid, 102.

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<sup>238</sup> Ibid, 103.

<sup>239</sup> Dunstan, 16

national institution.”<sup>240</sup> This sympathy, however, is largely unwarranted. Although Kelly’s crimes were prolific on the scale of the Merry Men, much of the livestock he stole was in fact “not taken from wealthy squatters,”<sup>241</sup> but from other rural families, often as poor as his own. Kelly was not redistributing the land’s bounty; rather he was stealing for his own gain. Further, Kelly fails to live up to the romantic image of the Outback outlaw, as “he and his gang did little or no bush ranging in the traditional style.”<sup>242</sup> Nonetheless, Kelly both then and now serves as an ostentatious representation of the “pureblood Irish” Australian,<sup>243</sup> an oppressed Catholic man standing up to the authority of the British state.

Kelly himself was fully convinced of this identity and he sought to publicly demonstrate it to others. In his infamous Jerilderie Letter, Kelly bemoaned that “there never was such a thing as justice in the English laws”<sup>244</sup> and threatened that “it will pay Government to give these people who are suffering

innocence, justice and liberty. If not I will be compelled to...open the eyes of not only the Victoria police and inhabitants but also the whole British army.”<sup>245</sup> Kelly’s personal grievances against the British colonial state, so

violently voiced throughout the Jerilderie Letter, are reinforced by his comparisons with the condition of the people of Ireland, the ancestral home of many Australians. Linking his own defiance of authority with that of thousands of Irish transportees,

Kelly wrote that “many a blooming Irishman rather than subdue to the Saxon yoke, were flogged to death and bravely died in servile chains but true to the shamrock and a credit to Paddy’s land.”<sup>246</sup> Yet the very names of the people against whom Kelly trespassed suggest the fallacy of his allegory of the Irishman battling British tyranny.

Kelly’s 1878 murder of police officers Kennedy, Scanlon and McIntyre enraged not only the Victoria police force but also the people of Australia- many of whom were of Irish descent, or even former transportees.<sup>247</sup> While there was unarguably a sectarian segment of rural Irish Australian society that lauded Kelly’s outlaw ways, historians argue that a significant number also thought it “best to put their northern-hemisphere politics

## KELLY SERVES AS AN OSTENTATIOUS SYMBOL OF THE PUREBLOOD IRISH AUSTRALIAN

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<sup>240</sup> Russel Ward. *The Australian Legend*. (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1966), 145.

<sup>241</sup> McMenomy, 49.

<sup>242</sup> Nixon, 104.

<sup>243</sup> Ibid, 98.

<sup>244</sup> Kelly, Ned in Alex McDermott (editor). *The Jerilderie Letter*. (London: Faber and Faber, 2001), 18.

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<sup>245</sup> Ibid, 28.

<sup>246</sup> Ibid, 68.

<sup>247</sup> Nixon, 104.

behind them...with the desire to make [their] way in a colonial world in a sober, industrious and respectable fashion.”<sup>248</sup> Furthermore, while some urban dwellers, possessed of a romantic notion of the bush, openly praised the Kelly gang as heroes,<sup>249</sup> popular newspapers “joined in the outcry for swift justices.”<sup>250</sup>

Kelly’s attempt to portray his criminal activity as an embodiment of the ongoing battle between British oppressors and the oppressed Irish Catholics fails to withstand scrutiny. Nonetheless, the tendency to see “the Irish...as special victims of the legal system in Ireland and of the misdistribution of property and power there under the English Ascendancy”<sup>251</sup> found popularity not only in contemporary Australia but also with many nationalist historians. In this view, Kelly, like the Irish transportees and the struggling rural Australians, is not a bad person; he is simply the victim of an unjust British system imposed from afar. Kelly’s flair for the dramatic likely contributed to the preponderance of this sympathetic myth. Particularly vivid are his diatribes against the Australian police, a group of men who “deserted the shamrock, the emblem of true wit and beauty to serve under a flag and nation that has

destroyed massacred and murdered their forefathers by the greatest of torture.”<sup>252</sup> In Kelly’s righteous mind, the true criminals were those who chose to serve the oppressive state; each one is “a traitor to his country ancestors and religion.”<sup>253</sup>

Given Kelly’s fiery prose and his propensity for outrageous and highly public crimes, it is not difficult

## IT IS NOT DIFFICULT TO SEE WHY KELLY’S INFAMY GREW AS QUICKLY AS IT DID

to see why his infamy grew as quickly as it did. His local celebrity as a reckless young criminal catapulted to the wider stage with the 1878 shootings of the three officers mentioned above.

The Kelly gang’s lengthy run from the law, which was punctuated by bank robberies and similarly headline-grabbing crimes, resulted in the passage of “a new act of Parliament...the Felons’ Apprehension Act, in order to make their capture easier.”<sup>254</sup> Kelly’s actions during his short life unarguably left a mark on Australian history, but his death was to prove indelible.

In his popular tome on the creation of a distinct Australian national identity, historian Russel Ward writes that “no doubt bushrangers [and Kelly in particular] came to occupy such a prominent place in Australian legend partly because, in the last century, Australia took part in

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<sup>248</sup> McDermott, xxx.

<sup>249</sup> Ibid, xxxii.

<sup>250</sup> Nixon, 104.

<sup>251</sup> Dyster, 261.

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<sup>252</sup> Kelly, 67.

<sup>253</sup> Ibid, 65.

<sup>254</sup> McDermott, vi.

no great wars, and thus there were no colourful military figures.”<sup>255</sup> Certainly Kelly’s final gun battle with police helped to fulfil a nationalist need, real or imagined, for dramatic exploits of battle. Contemporary newspapers and modern historians alike breathlessly recount the nightlong battle between the Kelly gang and at least thirty police officers at Glenrowan Inn, when “an apparition in amazing head gear and a body armour of steel, blaz[ed] at police]...bullets ricocheted.”<sup>256</sup> Kelly’s unprotected legs proved to be his downfall and, unable to escape in his 97 pound suit of armour, he was quickly apprehended.<sup>257</sup> His speedy trial and execution was breathlessly followed by the people of Australia—rural and urban—and opinions varied widely as to whether it was an end justly met, or the hand of British justice once again condemning a helpless underdog.

Far more dramatic than the shootout or the trial was the amount of attention both received throughout the colony. Even Kelly’s suit of armour gained mythic status: forged from beaten ploughshares, it was widely celebrated as a conscious symbol of the rugged labourer defending himself against the

repressive state.<sup>258</sup> In reality, ploughs were probably the only metal that the fugitive Kelly was able to obtain. Nonetheless, some elements of the popular media, buoyed by public opinion, seized on examples of Kelly’s bravery, daring, and gallantry<sup>259</sup> to fashion him into a true hero. Kelly was widely mourned by his compatriots in the bush, many of whom shared his nationalist, Irish Catholic working class identity.<sup>260</sup> Even more strikingly, Kelly’s exploits found a sympathetic audience among some urban dwellers, who followed his every move in the local newspapers.<sup>261</sup> The 1870s and 1880s witnessed a substantial increase in the number of daily, weekly and monthly publications, many of which bore a distinctly Australian

emphasis.<sup>262</sup> The lure of Kelly’s dramatic exploits held captive the literate urban public, who were far removed from the harsh reality of bush life. Nonetheless, some media outlets attempted to present the state’s view of Kelly as a hardened criminal. When

## EVEN KELLY’S SUIT OF ARMOUR GAINED MYTHIC STATUS

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<sup>258</sup> Ibid.

<sup>259</sup> Although Kelly was a murderer, he also showed a sense of empathy for fellow human beings: it was widely reported that he allowed one of his hostages during the shootout, schoolmaster Thomas Curnow, to take his wife home safely. Nixon, 106.

<sup>260</sup> Dyster, 77.

<sup>261</sup> McDermott, xxxi.

<sup>262</sup> Donald Horne. *The Australian People: Biography of a nation*. (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972), 120.

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<sup>255</sup> Ward, 145.

<sup>256</sup> Mendham, 100.

<sup>257</sup> Ibid.

Kelly had long solidified his place as an Australian folk hero, the centenary guide published in Victoria nonetheless “dealt with [him] in cold terms, distant from popular adulation.”<sup>263</sup> Despite the official government view of this convicted criminal, his sensational appeal as a true, rugged Australian was and is undeniably strong.

It is estimated that more than 75% of Australians currently live in urban areas,<sup>264</sup> far removed from the isolation and hardship that shaped so much of Ned Kelly’s life. Yet this single man has found a place in the popular memory of Australia, spawning books, feature films, and visual art and in effect gaining far more celebrity in death than he did in life. It would be easy to posit that a nation originally intended as a home for criminals should naturally find its identity in a fellow outlaw, but the reality of Australian history exposes the fallacy of such an argument. The colony sought to shed its association with convicts as early as possible and to adopt instead a distinctly British character. As physical distance and the reality of daily life in Australia exposed how far removed it truly was from its mother country, Australians of the late nineteenth century sought to carve out their own nation, and with it their own unique identity. Ned Kelly, enemy of the colonial state,

filled the void left by one segment of the population’s conscious rejection of traditional British identity. Propelled by the national and local media, his rugged exploits quickly reached a mythic status that has become enshrined in Australian identity.

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<sup>263</sup> Stephen Alomes. *A Nation at Last? The changing character of Australian nationalism, 1880-1988* (North Ryde: Angus & Robertson Publishers, 1988), 109.

<sup>264</sup> Wayne Hudson & Geoffrey Bolton. *Creating Australia*. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), 1.

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# The October Revolution and the Popular Overthrow of Liberal Democracy in Russia

*By Michael Yuzdepski*



During the Cold War, the debate over why and how the Provisional Government was overthrown was obstructed by political biases. Pro-Soviet historians tended to demonize the Provisional Government as a counterrevolutionary institution that was toppled by the massively popular Bolsheviks.<sup>265</sup> On the other hand, anti-

Soviet historians exaggerated the accomplishments of the Provisional Government and seriously downplayed the genuine support that the Bolsheviks and their far left allies enjoyed. They argued that the Bolsheviks manipulated a politically immature and ignorant populace.<sup>266</sup> They interpreted the October Revolution as an elitist coup that foreshadowed the later

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<sup>265</sup> Yuri Polyakov, *The Socialist Revolution and Its Defenders: Early History of Soviet Russia*. Translated by Paula Garb (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1987), 14-21.

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<sup>266</sup> Alexander V. Obolonsky, *The Drama of Russian Political History: system against individuality* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2003), 187.

authoritarian Soviet state.<sup>267</sup> An objective evaluation of the Provisional Government and its fall is much more nuanced than either of these two diametrically opposed viewpoints suggest. The reality is that the Provisional Government was genuinely patriotic and committed to constitutional democracy. But despite the good intentions of the Provisional Government, as 1917 progressed, there was indeed popular support amongst the politically aware Russian masses for a variety of radical socialist parties and Soviet power.<sup>268</sup> It was this support that permitted the Bolshevik government to quash early armed resistance and spread “Soviet power” throughout the army and most of Russia by January 1918. The Provisional Government was easily overthrown because it was virtually powerless; it quickly lost the support of the populace and a viable alternative to it existed in the form of Soviet power. When all three of these equally important factors are combined, as in the case of the Provisional Government, it is impossible for a government to retain power. Therefore, while the overthrow of the Provisional Government was a lost opportunity for liberal democracy in Russia, it was also inevitable and understandable considering that the Provisional Government was powerless, genuinely unpopular and challenged by a viable alternative.

The February Revolution presented an extraordinary opportunity for the people of Russia to communicate their goals and to organize for their

achievement.<sup>269</sup> But despite the initial optimism following the February Revolution, the diverse and often conflicting goals of the populace could not be satisfied.<sup>270</sup> Pro-Soviet historians have traditionally given insufficient credit to the Provisional Government, however.<sup>271</sup> The Provisional Government introduced civil rights in a country with virtually no history of such. They wanted to replace arbitrary autocracy with constitutional democracy. They also wanted to prosecute the war until they could achieve “peace without annexations or indemnities.”<sup>272</sup> They were also committed to convening a constituent assembly as soon as circumstances permitted.<sup>273</sup> They even introduced some social reforms. Although the Provisional Government was seen as insufficiently radical in the political environment of revolutionary Russia, by international standards it had introduced sweeping political and social reforms while also attempting to maintain political and social stability.<sup>274</sup>

However, the Provisional Government was not willing to meet the radical demands of the populace because it saw itself as temporary.<sup>275</sup> It interpreted its task as maintaining order and prosecuting

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<sup>267</sup> Richard Pipes, *The Russian Revolution* (New York: Random House Ltd., 1999), 439, 507.

<sup>268</sup> Geoffrey Hosking, *Russia and the Russians: A History* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 400.

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<sup>269</sup> John M. Thompson, *Revolutionary Russia, 1917* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1981), 44-5.

<sup>270</sup> S.A. Smith, *The Russian Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 14-5.

<sup>271</sup> Polyakov, 16-21.

<sup>272</sup> Hosking, 391-3.

<sup>273</sup> Beryl Williams, *The Russian Revolution 1917-1921* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Ltd., 1987), 16.

<sup>274</sup> Rex A. Wade, *The Russian Revolution, 1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 299.

<sup>275</sup> Hans Rogger, *Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution 1881-1917* (London: Longman, 1983), 106-7.

the war until a democratically elected constituent assembly was convened. The moderates in the Provisional Government, particularly the Kadets, distinguished between state and government. They were convinced that the Provisional Government only had to right to take apolitical measures to protect the state from internal and external threats. While relatively minor social reforms could be excused in the name of the war effort, any sweeping changes would be inherently political and could only be enacted by a constituent assembly.<sup>276</sup>

This caused conflict as radicals demanded far-reaching social and political reforms immediately.<sup>277</sup> It was the Provisional Government's commitment to democracy and legislative sovereignty that prevented it from implementing radical social reforms and led it to eventually lose the support of the populace.

Some historians have argued that if the Provisional Government had called elections earlier, rather than in November, it would have stemmed the tide of radicalism.<sup>278</sup> The government had originally intended to hold elections in September but they were unavoidably delayed for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the Provisional Government objected to holding elections during a military offensive due to the divisiveness and

administrative burdens that would result. Secondly, the Provisional Government had to hold elections in a country that had never had universal suffrage before. The members of the Provisional Government had to reach a satisfactory agreement on the electoral system, the constituencies and the electoral status of soldiers. Since the various military fronts would be used as electoral districts, a lull in the fighting was necessary and this did not occur until the autumn. Results from an election held before preparations could be fully made and while the war was still raging would have been contested.

This would have discredited any resulting constituent assembly, particularly in the eyes of the soldiers, who would be the most heavily disenfranchised by early elections.<sup>279</sup>

In addition, it is doubtful whether the masses would have unconditionally thrown

their support behind a democratic constituent assembly when they desired a class-based system. Democracy to them meant an elimination of bourgeois influence.<sup>280</sup> History has shown that Constituent Assemblies have failed to meet the demands of much less desperate and demanding populations; for instance, the French Constituent Assembly and the German Frankfurt Assembly in 1848.<sup>281</sup> The deliberations and conflicting priorities

## FROM ITS INCEPTION THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT WAS IN A PRECARIOUS POSITION

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<sup>276</sup> Dietrich Geyer, *The Russian Revolution: Historical Problems and Perspectives* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 117.

<sup>277</sup> Williams, 18.

<sup>278</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 38-9.

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<sup>279</sup> James D. White, *The Russian Revolution 1917-1921* (New York: Routledge, Chapman and Hall, Inc., 1994), 91-2.

<sup>280</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 209-10.

<sup>281</sup> David S. Mason, *Revolutionary Europe 1789-1989: Liberty, Equality, Solidarity* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005), 60-3.

amongst the various parties would have only frustrated the population. The masses were only committed to democracy so long as it could further lower class interests.<sup>282</sup>

One of the three reasons why the Provisional Government was so easily deposed was because of its incapacity to enforce its decisions and defend itself. From its inception the Provisional Government was in a precarious position.<sup>283</sup> While it inherited the central bureaucracies of the imperial regime, it was virtually powerless to enforce its decisions.<sup>284</sup> The police force had dissolved during the revolution and was replaced by unruly local militias.<sup>285</sup> The Provisional Government commissars appointed throughout Russia to head local government were in practice outranked by the reformed local city governments, local soviets and sometimes the new nationalist organizations. Therefore, when the Provisional Government made a decision that was unpopular with an influential segment of the population it was powerless to enforce it.<sup>286</sup>

A government's hold on power is almost always determined by its control over the military. Therefore, the Provisional Government's loss of control over the military was of the greatest consequence. The lack of control that the Provisional Government exercised over the revolutionary soldiers can be seen in Order No. 1. When the Military

Commission of the Duma Committee attempted to re-impose military discipline to defend against an expected assault by Nicholas II, soldiers revolted and irrevocably altered military relations.<sup>287</sup> The Petrograd Soviet's Order No.1 formalized the Provisional Government's loss of control over the military. It mandated the creation of "committees from the elected representatives of the lower ranks."<sup>288</sup> Soldiers could now formally challenge the authority of their officers and promote their own interests at the expense of the war effort and internal stability.<sup>289</sup> As explained in a *Russkiiia Vedomosti* editorial in August, "But mainly, the troops little by little learn to make *their* decisions on small matters, without considering the wishes of other public groups... these small things cleared the way for the efforts at major decisions on basic state questions of force."<sup>290</sup> In addition, Order No. 1 placed the military under the ultimate authority of the Petrograd Soviet, which quickly rechristened itself the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies. If the Provisional Government had been able to maintain order and discipline in the military it would have been able to use it to crush radical opposition, even if such opposition was widespread.<sup>291</sup> The ability of the Prussian and Austrian monarchs to retain

<sup>287</sup> *Ibid.*, 103.

<sup>288</sup> Hosking, 394.

<sup>289</sup> Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Russian Revolution* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 52-3.

<sup>290</sup> "Editorial in *Russkiiia Vedomosti*" in *The Russian Provisional Government 1917: Documents*. Vol. III. Edited by Robert Paul Bowder and Alexander F. Kerensky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961), 1593.

<sup>291</sup> Jonathan Frankel, "1917: The Problem of Alternatives" in *Revolution in Russian: Reassessments of 1917*. Edited by Edith Rogovin Frankel, Jonathan Frankel and Baruch Knei-Paz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 5.

<sup>282</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 209-10.

<sup>283</sup> Christopher Read, *From Tsar to Soviets: the Russian people and their revolution, 1917-21* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 64.

<sup>284</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 20.

<sup>285</sup> John Lawrence, *A History of Russia* (New York: Meridian, 1993), 220.

<sup>286</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 54-6.

power through their disciplined militaries during the mass upheavals of 1848 is evidence of this.<sup>292</sup> However, the military command structure was effectively dismantled and it was placed under the authority of the Soviet.<sup>293</sup> The virtual powerlessness of the Provisional Government, demonstrated by its loss of control over the police, local government and the military, was one of the three equally important causes of its downfall.

An effective loss of control was not the only reason for the Provisional Government's downfall. Had there not been a viable and dominant alternative, the Provisional Government may have been able to survive despite its weakness and unpopularity. But the Provisional Government could never achieve real security as long as the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies continued to exist.<sup>294</sup> Wary of the new "bourgeois" Provisional Government, the Soviet quickly asserted its role vis-à-vis the Provisional Government and a situation of "dual-authority" emerged.<sup>295</sup> The

## THE GOVERNMENT DID NOT MEET THE PEASANTS' DEMAND FOR IMMEDIATE SWEEPING LAND REFORMS

industrial workers, soldiers and to a lesser extent the peasantry saw the class-based Soviet as the true object of their loyalty since it could further class interests unhesitatingly.<sup>296</sup> As the minister of war Alexander Guchkov explained on March 13<sup>th</sup> to his army commanders: "We do not have authority, but only the appearance of authority; the real power lies with the Soviet."<sup>297</sup> The opinion of the Soviet of

Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies regarding the Provisional Government was expressed by one of its deputies during a debate on government-Soviet relations on March 10<sup>th</sup> when he avowed that "the Provisional Government should be the secretary of the Soviet... and nothing more."<sup>298</sup> Although the Soviet of Workers' and

Soldiers' Deputies agreed to an "alliance" with the Provisional Government, many of its decrees were actually subversive. For example, Order No. 1 stripped the Provisional Government of its authority over the army and prevented it from prosecuting the war abroad and maintaining peace at home.<sup>299</sup>

Even though the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies was genuinely committed to coexisting with the Provisional Government, its mere presence undermined the authority of the Provisional Government since it provided an alternative object of loyalty.<sup>300</sup> For the sake of stability,

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<sup>292</sup> Rudolf Stadelmann, *Social and Political History of the German 1848 Revolution* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1975), 58.

<sup>293</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 103.

<sup>294</sup> Donald J. Raleigh, "Political Power in the Russian Revolution: A case study of Saratov" in *Revolution in Russian: Reassessments of 1917*. Edited by Edith Rogovin Frankel, Jonathan Frankel and Baruch Knei-Paz (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 34.

<sup>295</sup> E.N. Burdzhakov, *Russia's Second Revolution: The February 1917 Uprising in Petrograd*. Edited and translated by Donald J.

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Raleigh (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1987), 265-7.

<sup>296</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 209-10.

<sup>297</sup> Rogger, 107-8.

<sup>298</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 57.

<sup>299</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 16.

<sup>300</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 92.

the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies should have dissolved itself and thrown its support unequivocally behind the Provisional Government once its moderate socialist leaders were allowed to enter the government in May. Its existence was unnecessary since the interests of "the masses" were now being represented within the government and the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies' dissolution would have eliminated a vehicle for the workers and soldiers to pursue narrow class interests. When the radicals seized control of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, they had control over the military, transport, communications and a vital means of information.<sup>301</sup> But without the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, there would not have been an established, legitimate and viable alternative to the Provisional Government in the capital. This would have eliminated one of the three equally important conditions for the overthrow of the Provisional Government and would have increased its chances of survival exponentially. France during the early 1870s is an example of how a weak and unpopular government can survive when no alternatives exist. Despite the population's desire to replace the weak democratic Third Republic with a monarchy, the heir to the throne, the *Comte de Chambord* refused the crown and went into voluntary exile. Therefore, the Republic survived.<sup>302</sup> Without the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies, the Provisional Government could not have been so easily toppled.

The third and equally important reason for the fall of the Provisional Government was its mass unpopularity. Eventually as the year progressed, the Provisional Government could not claim substantial support amongst any sector of the lower classes that made up the vast majority of Russian society and controlled the army, the countryside and the cities. The government lost the support of the soldiers, peasants and workers because it could not fulfill their basic needs.<sup>303</sup>

Arguably the most crucial group that turned on the Provisional Government was the common soldiers. Along with industrial workers, soldiers played the most pivotal role in the eventual fall of the Provisional Government. The February Revolution had a profound impact on the common soldiers in the Russian military. Formerly submissive, they were now a vocal political force with particular aims. The political party that could sustain their support could control the revolution.<sup>304</sup>

Soldiers had three main demands: reform of military conditions, an end to the war and common political, social and economic demands. The committee system, augmented by the urban soviets, provided the medium for the soldiers to champion their goals and become a highly influential, structured force in the revolution.<sup>305</sup> Soldiers initially supported "Revolutionary Defensism" and "peace without annexations or indemnities."<sup>306</sup> But soldiers believed that Revolutionary Defensism only involved repelling German or Austrian assaults on Russian soil. When they realised that it

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<sup>301</sup> Smith, 19.

<sup>302</sup> William Fortescue, *The Third Republic in France: Conflicts and Continuities* (London: Routledge, 2000), 24-5.

<sup>303</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 287-90.

<sup>304</sup> *Ibid.*, 111.

<sup>305</sup> Allan K. Wildman, "Officers of the general staff and the Kornilov movement" in *Revolution in Russian: Reassessments of 1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 76-9.

<sup>306</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 16.

would entail an offensive drive to the west involving heavy casualties, they felt betrayed by the moderate leadership of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies and the Provisional Government and began calling for an immediate end to the war.<sup>307</sup> The dissatisfaction and new assertiveness of the soldiers is revealed in a discussion recalled by an officer about the proposed June offensive, "What's the use of invading Galicia anyway, when back home they're going to divide up the land?!" "What the devil do we need another hilltop for, when we can make peace at the bottom?" "Yes, the commander gets a St. George's [Cross] for taking the hilltop, but for that we'll be pushing up daisy."<sup>308</sup> As casualties mounted, a growing number of soldiers turned to the radical parties to obtain peace at any price. Growing support for Bolsheviks, leftist-SRs and leftist-Mensheviks amongst the soldiers was not coerced. With the dissolution of the traditional military hierarchy, rank and file soldiers became highly political and were free to choose which factions to ally with. Their desire for peace, along with other radical reforms, led them to conscientiously refuse to come to the aid of the Provisional Government in October and many actively assisted the Bolsheviks in their seizure of power.<sup>309</sup>

Despite the emphasis that Marxists placed on the industrial workers, obtaining at least the tacit support of the land-starved peasantry would be essential to overthrowing the "bourgeois" republic,

since they constituted three-fourths of the population.<sup>310</sup> The masses of nearly destitute peasants had had two aims for most of Russia's history. Their primary aim was land reform. Their secondary aim was closely related to the first and was a desire to gain control over their lives and be treated as free citizens of the republic.<sup>311</sup> The revolution gave them the opportunity to fulfill these goals when the police, the courts and the army – the traditional instruments used to oppress peasants – either dissolved or were unwilling to suppress peasant rebelliousness.<sup>312</sup>

The peasantry were initially optimistic at the news of the February Revolution. Revolution for them meant the redistribution of land and if the Provisional Government was willing to do this then they would give it their support.<sup>313</sup> Like the workers and the soldiers, the peasants experienced a new self-awareness and became increasingly assertive in 1917.<sup>314</sup> This was partly due to an infusion of new leadership in the peasant community. In the democratic spirit of the February Revolution, the traditional peasant assembly was expanded and democratized. This allowed younger men and landless labourers to enter the assemblies.<sup>315</sup> These individuals were more assertive and less cautious than the traditional village elders. They were

<sup>310</sup> Ibid., 6.

<sup>311</sup> Aaron B. Retish, "Creating Peasant Citizens: Rituals of Power, Rituals of Citizenship in Viatka Province, 1917" in *Revolutionary Russia*, 16, No. 1 (June 2003), 51.

<sup>312</sup> John Channon, "The Peasantry in the Revolutions of 1917" in *Revolution in Russian: Reassessments of 1917* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 110-2.

<sup>313</sup> Graeme J. Gill, *Peasants and Government in the Russian Revolution* (London: Macmillan, 1979), 21.

<sup>314</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 17-8.

<sup>315</sup> Ibid., 20.

<sup>307</sup> Hosking, 394-5.

<sup>308</sup> Allan K. Wildman, *The End of the Russian Imperial Army: The Old Army and the Soldiers' Revolt (March-April 1917)* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 222.

<sup>309</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 22, 37.

joined by radicalized soldiers returning from the front and helped sustain a revolutionary atmosphere amongst the peasant population. The peasantry were well-organized and politically aware. They were not naïve and easily controlled as the anti-Soviet historians portrayed them.<sup>316</sup>

The government did not meet the peasants demand for immediate sweeping land reforms for a variety of reasons. Firstly, the Provisional Government's priority was to maintain a supply of food for the military and the cities. Radical land reform was incompatible with this.<sup>317</sup> Secondly, while the government was supportive of land redistribution, it believed that such an inherently political issue needed to be decided by a constituent assembly.<sup>318</sup> Even if they had wanted to implement reforms, the members of the Provisional Government would not have been able to decide on a single policy. The liberals and the socialists were divided over the issue of compensation.<sup>319</sup> Furthermore, the socialist parties themselves had no predetermined plan for land redistribution and were divided over specifics.<sup>320</sup>

The peasants did not separate their local demands from the questions facing Russia as a whole. Many villages sent representatives to the cities to gather information and they also received returning politicised soldiers and workers. The *zemliachestvas*, which served as a link

between the cities and the countryside, had a strong leftist-SR and Bolshevik presence and worked hard to foment the existing discontent amongst the peasantry. Even before the revolution, the peasantry had long standing connections with the radical intelligentsia. During the revolution this symbiotic relationship was strengthened. The socialists would help articulate the peasants' demands and the peasants would reward them with their support.<sup>321</sup> As the peasants grew angry with the procrastination of the Provisional Government on the issues of land, the constituent assembly and peace, they moved away from the moderate socialists and gave their support to radicals.<sup>322</sup> While the Bolsheviks did enjoy some support amongst the peasantry, pro-Soviet historians have exaggerated it. The most popular and influential faction in rural Russia were the SRs.<sup>323</sup> By autumn radicals would constitute a majority of SRs, duly reflecting the radicalization of the peasantry.<sup>324</sup> The important role that the radicals in the "peasant party," i.e. the Social Revolutionary Party, played in the October Revolution secured peasant support for the "Third Russian Revolution," at least temporarily.<sup>325</sup>

While workers constituted only ten percent of the population, their urban concentration, organization through industrialization, ideological significance to the political parties and crucial role in the February Revolution, gave them disproportionate influence in Russian

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<sup>316</sup> Channon, 122, 125.

<sup>317</sup> John L.H. Keep, *The Russian Revolution: A Study in Mass Mobilisation* (London: Norton, 1976), 172.

<sup>318</sup> Michael D. Richards, *Revolutions in World History* (New York: Routledge, 2004), 41.

<sup>319</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 31.

<sup>320</sup> Roy Medvedev, *The October Revolution*. Translated by George Saunders (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 31-2.

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<sup>321</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 142-4.

<sup>322</sup> Lawrence, 221-3.

<sup>323</sup> Hosking, 399.

<sup>324</sup> Michael Melancon, *The Socialist Revolutionaries and the Russian Anti-War Movement, 1914-1917* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1990), 282.

<sup>325</sup> Hosking, 400.

politics.<sup>326</sup> Their numbers also increased as many in the lower middle class began to identify themselves as “proletarians.”<sup>327</sup> Like most other groups, the “proletariat” initially welcomed the February Revolution but soon became disillusioned when they perceived the Provisional Government and the moderate leadership of the Soviet of Workers’ and Soldiers’ Deputies as not carrying the revolution far enough.<sup>328</sup>

In addition to the soviets, many other grassroots organizations appeared in the cities to promote workers’ interests following the revolution. Factory committees were one of these organizations.<sup>329</sup> The Provisional Government failed to endorse factory committees and the soviets were less than enthusiastic in their support. Serious friction with the workers resulted. When Bolsheviks, leftist-Mensheviks and leftist-SRs announced their support for the factory committees it raised their prestige amongst workers.<sup>330</sup>

Trade unions, district soviets, *zemliachestvas* and Red Guard units were other grassroots organizations that competed with the Provisional Government for authority amongst

workers.<sup>331</sup> The radical Red Guards in particular demonstrated the workers’ willingness to use force to achieve their goals.<sup>332</sup> These organizations were heavily influenced by general factory meetings where ordinary workers could participate directly.<sup>333</sup> They initially supported moderate socialists but this changed as fears

grew that the revolution was unfilled and that they were losing the gains they had made in spring.<sup>334</sup> When leftist-Mensheviks, leftist-SRs and the Bolsheviks seemed to be the parties that could most effectively champion the cause of the proletariat, workers elected representatives of these

parties to factory committees, trade unions, *zemliachestva* and soviets.<sup>335</sup> Workers realized the importance of the political arena and understood that “all power to the soviets” would mean a society governed according to their interests. The politics of these grassroots organizations demonstrate the mass unpopularity of the Provisional Government amongst the common workers and dispels the myth propagated by anti-Soviet historians that elitists Bolsheviks manipulated “ignorant” workers into overthrowing the Provisional

## THE FATE OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT IS OFTEN VIEWED AS A LOST OPPORTUNITY

<sup>326</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 10, 16-8.

<sup>327</sup> Michael C. Hickey, “Discourses of Public Identity and Liberalism in the February Revolution: Smolensk, Spring 1917” in *Russian Review* 55, no. 4 (1996), 636.

<sup>328</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 101.

<sup>329</sup> S.A. Smith, *Red Petrograd: revolution in the factories 1917-18* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 105-6.

<sup>330</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 30.

<sup>331</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 99.

<sup>332</sup> Rex A. Wade, *Red Guards and Workers’ Militias in the Russian Revolution* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 52.

<sup>333</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 99.

<sup>334</sup> Paul Flenley, “Industrial Relations and the Economic Crisis of 1917” in *Revolutionary Russia* 4, no. 2 (1991), 184-6.

<sup>335</sup> Robert Service, *The Russian Revolution 1900-1927* (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1999), 48.

Government.<sup>336</sup> When the concentrated and highly organized industrial workers turned against the Provisional Government, they lost a crucial base of support within the cities.<sup>337</sup>

Whatever Kornilov's intentions, his chaotic August coup attempt increased support for the radicals exponentially when it was interpreted as undeniable proof by workers, soldiers and peasants that counterrevolutionary forces were at work.<sup>338</sup> While many liberal politicians had opposed the coup attempt, there was now the perception that all non-socialists were hidden "Kornilovites."<sup>339</sup> Radical parties and their associated militias had rallied to the defence of the revolution and had been armed by the Provisional Government.<sup>340</sup> They were now more militant than ever and had gained prestige in the eyes of the masses. Minister-President Alexander Kerensky's controversial role in the coup attempt irreparably damaged his reputation amongst soldiers, workers and peasants and his removal became inevitable.<sup>341</sup> The moderate Soviet leadership was also implicated since they had approved Kornilov's appointment as commander-in-chief, while the radical left had opposed Kornilov from the beginning. Soldiers were now convinced that their officers were plotting to use them for counterrevolutionary purposes and they lost any remaining authority that they had.<sup>342</sup>

The Kornilov affair, along with other moves by the Provisional Government to assert its authority and a worsening economic crisis, seemed to confirm the fears of workers, soldiers and peasants that the bourgeoisie were collaborating to turn back the clock.<sup>343</sup> They responded by replacing moderate Mensheviks with Bolsheviks and moderate SRs with leftist-SRs and Bolsheviks in the soviets, factory committees and army committees.<sup>344</sup> This surge in radical support climaxed with the election of a Bolshevik-led radical coalition to the leadership of the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.<sup>345</sup> While the Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies had always existed as part of the "dual authority," it had previously been committed to cooperating with the Provisional Government.<sup>346</sup> Now it was determined to assume sole authority and had the support to do so. This set the stage for the October Revolution.<sup>347</sup> When Kerensky tried to clamp down on Bolshevik subversion, the Bolsheviks overthrew his government and the approval of the Second Congress of the Soviets, along with the formation of the multiparty Central Executive Committee, legitimized the takeover.<sup>348</sup> Kerensky's crackdown on the 24<sup>th</sup> only quickened his overthrow; it was not the cause of it. If the Bolsheviks had not been provoked into action on that day, a more inclusive radical socialist government (i.e. not as tightly

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<sup>343</sup> Mark D. Steinberg, *Voices of Revolution, 1917* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 199.

<sup>344</sup> Mary McAuley, *Bread and Justice: State and Society in Petrograd, 1917-1922* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 35.

<sup>345</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 207.

<sup>346</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 16-9.

<sup>347</sup> Raleigh, 49.

<sup>348</sup> Edward Action, "The Battleground" in *The Russian Revolution*. Edited by Martin Miller (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 2001), 33-5.

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<sup>336</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, , 98-101.

<sup>337</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 10.

<sup>338</sup> Raleigh, 49.

<sup>339</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 207.

<sup>340</sup> Leonard Schapiro, *The Russian Revolutions of 1917: The Origins of Modern Communism* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), 114.

<sup>341</sup> Lawrence, 225-6.

<sup>342</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 207.

controlled by the Bolsheviks) would still have seized power at the Second Congress of the Soviets. This is because those who favoured an “all socialist” government enjoyed a majority in the Congress.<sup>349</sup> If the Bolsheviks had not pre-empted the Second Congress and caused the moderate socialists to walk out, there would not have been a government as tightly controlled by the Bolsheviks, and the history of Russia may have been different, but it would still have had a radical socialist government.<sup>350</sup>

The election of Bolsheviks and other radicals by soldiers, peasants and workers to various positions is evidence of the government’s mass unpopularity.

Revolutionary activity amongst ordinary soldiers, peasants and workers demonstrates that they were indeed politically conscious. There were a multitude of parties to choose from in revolutionary Russia and the masses supported those that would further their interests. There was no mass manipulation, as anti-Soviet historians have charged.<sup>351</sup> On the other hand, it was a coalition of radical parties that had mass support, not simply the Bolsheviks. The pro-Soviet historians are guilty of misrepresenting the facts in this case.<sup>352</sup> If the Provisional Government had managed to maintain the support of the population

by ending the war, nationalizing industry and redistributing land, it may have been able to survive. For example, the United States was very weak and decentralized from 1777 until 1788 under the Articles of Confederation. Yet it was able to survive various rebellions because of the willingness of the population to defend the government.<sup>353</sup> However, the weak Provisional Government could not overcome the threat of “Soviet power” when that was what the populace demanded.

History has shown that a strong but unpopular government can survive, like the Prussian and Austrian monarchies during the 1848 revolutions.<sup>354</sup> It has also demonstrated that a weak but popular government, such as the United States of America at its inception, can continue to govern.<sup>355</sup> There are even instances of weak and unpopular governments

enduring when there are no viable alternatives, such as the Third French Republic during the 1870s.<sup>356</sup> However, when all of these equally important conditions are present, as they were in the case of the Provisional Government, it is virtually impossible for a government to survive. The fate of the Provisional Government is often correctly viewed as a lost opportunity for liberal democracy to take root in Russia. It was not toppled in an

## HISTORY HAS SHOWN THAT A STRONG BUT UNPOPULAR GOVERNMENT CAN SURVIVE

<sup>349</sup> Leopold H. Haimson, “Lenin, Martov and the Issue of Power” in *Russia’s Revolutionary Experience, 1905-1917* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), 2.

<sup>350</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 301-3.

<sup>351</sup> *Ibid.*, 100-1.

<sup>352</sup> Richards, 30.

<sup>353</sup> John J. Newman and John M. Schmalbach. *United States History* (New York: Amsco, 1998), 86.

<sup>354</sup> Stadelmann, 58.

<sup>355</sup> Newman, 86.

<sup>356</sup> Fortescue, 24-5.

elitist coup, however. The Provisional Government fell because of the lethal combination of powerlessness, unpopularity and the existence of alternative authorities. All three of these factors were of equal importance and the absence of any could have meant the survival the Provisional Government. Yet for the Provisional Government to have satisfied the various segments of the population and continue to govern, it would have needed to implement radical reforms redistributing land and nationalizing industry immediately. This would have violated the liberal democratic principles of the rule of law, property rights and legislative sovereignty, which it sincerely believed in. To maintain the support of the populace, the Provisional Government would also have needed to surrender to the Central Powers, betraying their western allies, acquiescing to an extraordinarily punitive peace treaty and possibly witnessing the end of the revolution.<sup>357</sup> Since the ideological and patriotic members of the Provisional Government were not willing to do this, it quickly lost the support of the populace and was unable to repel the radical soviets that presented themselves as an alternative form of government.<sup>358</sup> It is understandable why the Provisional Government was unwilling or unable to betray its patriotic and liberal democratic principles to appease the masses. Likewise, considering the desperate plight of the workers, soldiers and peasants, it is logical why they became increasingly radical and overthrew an idealistic government that was not fulfilling their immediate needs. The idea of liberal democracy seemed irrelevant to Russians

when their basic needs were not being met. There was indeed popular support for Soviet power, which Russians believed would achieve peace, land redistribution and nationalization.<sup>359</sup> The fact that the Bolsheviks popularity fell as they sidelined the other radical parties and became increasingly totalitarian in 1918 does not negate the fact that they (and their leftist SR and Menshevik allies) enjoyed widespread popular support in 1917.<sup>360</sup>

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<sup>357</sup> Lawrence, 222.

<sup>358</sup> Lawrence, 222-31.

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<sup>359</sup> Smith, *The Russian Revolution*, 38.

<sup>360</sup> *The Russian Revolution, 1917*, 304.

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# The New Woman- Myth or Reality?

Germany's Women in the Weimar Republic

By Elaine Giamou



She was a vision of modernity. Created by popular culture, embodied in the imported male imagination of Hollywood and Germany's UFA film studios: she was young, confident, fashionable, and provocative. With bobbed hair and an androgynous silhouette, she smoked, drank liquor, exuded sexuality, worked all day and danced to American jazz music at night,

living the true, urban lifestyle.<sup>361</sup> She was the "New Woman". Her metaphorical and physical image appeared in post World War I Germany for only a short time; yet, she was quickly exploited, mainly by men for their own political and social agendas, concerning female representation in the Weimar Republic. This paper will maintain that the

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<sup>361</sup> Detlev J.K. Peukert, *The Weimar Republic: The Crisis Of Classical Modernity*, trans. Richard Deveson (1987; New York: Hill and Wang, 1992), 99.

Weimar government, after granting suffrage and equal status for women in the 1919 Constitution, failed to support these gains, and actually manipulated women with regard to employment, but, primarily with regard to the control of their own bodies through contraception and abortion. Family issues important to women were attacked, even before the “New Woman’s” appearance in the mid-1920s threatened the increasingly conservative elements of society with images of moral decay and family disintegration. As the economic depression of the 1930s contributed to the polarization of political opinion, many women willingly returned to the private sphere, and the right replaced the “New Woman” with the image of mothers of the nation.

At the end of the First World War, to the surprise of German feminists, socialist and bourgeois alike, women were granted the vote.<sup>362</sup> In the beginning of the new Weimar Republic, great strides by and for women were made politically as ninety percent of women turned out to vote in their first election; their highest electoral turnout during all the Weimar years.<sup>363</sup> All forty-nine female

representatives voted into the Weimar National Assembly, most of them Social Democrats, focused their work, specifically on women and family issues.<sup>364</sup> The left, who had adamantly endorsed female suffrage since 1902, suffered low support levels from the women who voted in 1919: these women backed mostly the centre and the right.<sup>365</sup> Not all German women wholeheartedly welcomed female suffrage; many remained unconvinced through the life of the Republic that politics was not solely a male concern.<sup>366</sup> The historian Helen Boak believes that many women felt they were not ready for the vote, recognizing that the timing of female suffrage was not viewed as totally advantageous, coming at the end of the war in a defeated, demoralized nation.<sup>367</sup>

The First World War put thousands of women of various classes to work, replacing men who had gone to battle; most were displaced as surviving soldiers returned to their old jobs, but the dire economic situation presented new problems. Two million soldiers never returned, leaving a huge hole in the labour force. Employment opportunities opened up again and many women found work. Far from glamorous, most jobs were low-paying,

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<sup>362</sup> Helen L. Boak, “Women In Weimar Germany: The “Frauenfrage” And The Female Vote”, *Social Change And Political Development In Weimar Germany*, ed. By Richard Bessel and E.J. Feuchtwanger (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1981), 156.

<sup>363</sup> Ute Frevert, *Women In German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation To Sexual Liberation*, trans. Stuart McKinnon-Evans

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(1988; Oxford: Berg Publishers Limited, 1989), 169.

<sup>364</sup> Frevert, 169-170.

<sup>365</sup> Cornelia Usborne, *The Politics Of The Body In Weimar Germany: Women's Reproductive Rights And Duties* (London: MacMillan Press, 1992), 158.

<sup>366</sup> Boak, 156.

<sup>367</sup> Boak, 156.

physically demanding and menial work, having to stand long hours, and in many cases, work more than an 8-hour day. Of all female wage-earners, over fifty percent were classified as manual workers in poorly paid unskilled or semi-skilled jobs.<sup>368</sup>

By far, the largest group to join the workforce was the young, single females. "Of the 1,959,457 female manual workers in industry, over two-thirds were single and under thirty."<sup>369</sup> These women came of age after the war, with little comprehension of the hardships experienced on the home front, and the chaos of the revolution; many had grown up without fathers. The strongest sense of female emancipation came from this group. Contrary to the perception of the New Woman, however, this woman was not quite free. Most single women either lived at home with their parents or rented rooms, and they may have been required to provide some income to supplement family finances. Permanent careers were not a concern as her new employment was only expected to continue until marriage.<sup>370</sup> Her income did not bring in enough to

enable her to live on her own and live the wild life. What she did have was more discretionary income and leisure time, as she became part of a consumer culture. Questions about gender roles and the urban woman of the 1920s came into conflict as she played an increased role in the new culture of "leisure, consumption, and body consciousness."<sup>371</sup> The cinema played an enormous role in the shaping of popular culture. In 1930, six million cinema tickets were sold in Germany each week.<sup>372</sup> White-collar girls were the cinema's main audience, and the cinema, along with the press and advertising, recognized a potential market.

Many young, single women gravitated towards white-collar employment in new, largely commercial enterprises, as shop girls, secretaries, and telephone operators; and in civil service employment, as teachers and nurses.<sup>373</sup> In 1925, there were almost 1.5 million white-collar workers—three times as many as in 1907.<sup>374</sup> Almost all were single, and two-thirds of them under 25.<sup>375</sup> For the most part, these were visible jobs, and a necessary consumerism was required, as appearance was seen as more

## SHE WAS YOUNG, CONFIDANT, FASHIONABLE AND PROVOCATIVE

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<sup>368</sup> Boak, 162.

<sup>369</sup> Boak, 162.

<sup>370</sup> Frevert, 179.

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<sup>371</sup> Katharina Von Ankum, introduction, *Women In The Metropolis: Gender And Modernity In Weimar Culture* (Berkeley: University Of California Press, 1997), 4.

<sup>372</sup> Frevert, 181.

<sup>373</sup> Boak, 163.

<sup>374</sup> Frevert, 177.

<sup>375</sup> Frevert, 179.

important here than in factory work. In 1925, 90.6% of white-collar work was performed by young, single women, and 89.2% in 1933, with most of them under 30.<sup>376</sup> Therefore, white-collar work represented only 2.3% of the total 'married' female workforce in 1925 and 2.7% in 1933.<sup>377</sup>

Until 1918, most women upon marriage were forced to leave their civil servant positions; the practice continued in Weimar. A law was passed on October 7, 1923, "which allowed the dismissal without severance payments of all married women civil servants whose future seemed economically secure." As a result of this law, of the 2,718 married women in the Reich Post Office on October 1, 1923 only 21 remained on April 1, 1924.<sup>378</sup> Yet, from 1925 to 1933, the number of married women in the workforce increased by 13%, most likely because of economic necessity.<sup>379</sup> Boak confirms that in the manual workforce, married women's employment opportunities actually increased over men during the depression, from 21.4% in 1925 to 28.6% in 1933.<sup>380</sup> Most notably, 70% of women stayed at home.<sup>381</sup> Traditional gender roles had not changed drastically. Families were

still the most important, even if economic times were grim.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Germany's birthrate had been drastically declining. The Wilhelmine period before the First World War took a pro-natalist stance regarding the declining birthrate, believing that "a nation's military, economic and cultural influence was essentially derived from the size of its population, and subsequently led to the belief that the state should stimulate the birth-rate above all else."<sup>382</sup> State policy focused on reversing the trend by interfering in the lives of its women through the regulation of sexuality and fertility.<sup>383</sup> In the interest of eugenics, German population policy was altered in the interests of quality, not quantity. Still, the birth rate continued to decline, causing fear for many nationalists; Germans were increasingly having fewer children within marriage, and the trend continued. Marriages immediately after the war did not increase the birth rate either. In fact, it declined, "25.9 per 1,000 population in 1920 to 14.7 in 1933."<sup>384</sup> After 1918, policymakers, especially traditionalists on the right, became alarmed by the continuing decline of the birthrate given Germany's lost population, and felt the need to combat the causes of this decline. The subject of sex, specifically contraception and abortion, became a matter for debate, and the interpretation of women's role within the Weimar state varied between

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<sup>376</sup> Boak, 163.

<sup>377</sup> Boak, 172.

<sup>378</sup> Boak, 165.

<sup>379</sup> Boak, 163.

<sup>380</sup> Boak, 163.

<sup>381</sup> Boak, 163.

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<sup>382</sup> Osborne, 4.

<sup>383</sup> Osborne, xii.

<sup>384</sup> Osborne, 32.

individual choice and national interest.<sup>385</sup>

Early in the Republic, the Socialist Weimar government lessened the state's stance on population policy, which had been in place prior to the war. Cornelia Osborne is one of the few historians who claim, that the Weimar Republic actually had a national population policy, referring to it as "diffuse, incoherent and frequently contested."<sup>386</sup> As early as late 1920, the state recognized the dire economic situation families found themselves in, and that contraception was a more viable option over abortion.<sup>387</sup> Contraceptives began to be seen less as obscene, because of their association with promiscuous sex and a threat to morality, than as a safety measure of family limitation in such unstable economic times.<sup>388</sup> Birth control was elevated from a woman's personal issue to a social-hygiene issue, which allowed contraception to be morally acceptable to the right, as it coincided with their eugenics and "fewer but better" selective breeding debate. It was within this issue that the decriminalization of contraception succeeded.<sup>389</sup>

To the militant left-wing, Berlin-based Sex Reform movement, the right to contraception was more than a social-hygiene issue. It was perceived as a major component to

women having control over their lives. The movement's focus was to advance the use of birth control and legal abortions, in order for women to better plan the size of their families, given their new role and responsibilities in society.<sup>390</sup> Helene Stocker, a pacifist and a radical women's rights activist, took up the cause of the sex reform movement. She campaigned in 1921 and 1931 against Paragraph 218 of the Penal Code and worked toward decriminalizing abortion. Stocker believed women should always have control of their reproductive rights, especially during such unstable times.<sup>391</sup> If women were to bear Germany's future population, Stocker argued, they had a right to play a part in the environment their children were to live.<sup>392</sup> Simply but powerfully, she declared that "Women should not have to bear the cannon fodder for the next war."<sup>393</sup>

Successful gains were made, but we must recognize that any gains achieved by politically-based feminist movements were to benefit their own members. Socialist feminist groups fought for the working-class, bourgeois groups for the middle class. Class solidarity was more important here than gender.<sup>394</sup> They were not fighting

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<sup>390</sup> Von Ankum, 5.

<sup>391</sup> Regina Braker, "Helene Stocker's Pacifism In The Weimar Republic: Between Ideal And Reality," *Journal Of Women's History* 13 (2001) : 75.

<sup>392</sup> Braker, 82.

<sup>393</sup> Braker, 76.

<sup>394</sup> Renate Bridenthal et al., eds., *When Biology Became Destiny: Women In Weimar And Nazi Germany* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1984), 2.

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<sup>385</sup> Osborne, xv.

<sup>386</sup> Osborne, 203.

<sup>387</sup> Osborne, 104.

<sup>388</sup> Osborne, 104.

<sup>389</sup> Osborne, 105.

for the benefit of all women, although all women did benefit. As a result of their efforts, “cheap, effective and safe contraception” became more widely available.<sup>395</sup> Women were able to purchase contraceptives by brand name over the counter, even when it was still illegal to give contraceptive information.<sup>396</sup> The number of sex and birth control clinics increased, providing advice and dispensing free or inexpensive contraceptives to women of all classes, regardless of their marital status.<sup>397</sup>

As the contraceptive debate lost steam, traditionalists and religious groups changed their focus to the abortion debate.

Female Social-Democratic politicians along with the working-class fought the hardest for abortion reform. Four of these women signed the first motion in the Reichstag to legalize abortion, in July 1920.<sup>398</sup> Throughout the 1920s, the left held thousands of meetings, protests and strikes and they were not afraid to use the issue as a means to get women involved in politics. Being a complex issue, the subject raised some of the fiercest political and social debates during Weimar, as the left proclaimed, “women of the

working population do not want to bear children as long as they cannot feed them.”<sup>399</sup> An estimated 500,000 abortions were performed in 1923 and close to 1 million by 1928, covering the most stable period of the republic’s existence.<sup>400</sup> If these figures are accurate for a stable period, one can imagine what the figure would have been during four years of economic failure and extraordinary unemployment levels. That being said, the accuracy of abortion statistics should be questionable, as numbers

must be difficult to accurately ascertain when abortions were illegal, were not always performed by medical doctors, were sometimes deliberately labeled a miscarriage, or were inflated or deflated according to the agenda of politicians and medical experts. The

left had less success in changing abortion laws as they had in the contraception debate, but the success they did have was considerable. Changes to Article 218 of the Penal Code of 1871 were made in May 1926. Its main feature was in the reduction of penal servitude, which had included the loss of civil rights, to plain jail sentences for the woman and her accomplice. Also, the act of abortion itself was reduced from homicide to a misdemeanour.<sup>401</sup> Another attempt in

## WOMEN WERE NOT GIVEN REAL POWER TO PROTECT THEMSELVES

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<sup>395</sup> Usborne, 211.

<sup>396</sup> Usborne, 2.

<sup>397</sup> Usborne, 211.

<sup>398</sup> Usborne, 162.

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<sup>399</sup> Usborne, 158.

<sup>400</sup> Usborne, 102.

<sup>401</sup> Usborne, 173-174

1931 to legalize abortion brought together the middle class with the working-class; however, they were unsuccessful.<sup>402</sup> The 1926 Act made Germany's abortion law the most lenient in Western Europe, a fact that enraged conservative politicians.<sup>403</sup>

To Germany's traditionalists, the New Woman posed a threat to a stable society. Interest in sexual emancipation was resisted throughout the Weimar period by powerful conservative misgivings, and by anxieties aroused by the new "scientific" approaches to sexual behaviour and modernity.<sup>404</sup> The loss of war population triggered the Right's need to continue a pro-natalist agenda to increase the birth rate. However, economic and political upheaval discredited pro-natalism after the war. Instead, the Right indirectly pursued their goal by fighting sexual immorality and the dissolution of the family.<sup>405</sup> They always had a following, as not all of Germany's women were interested in an emancipated lifestyle; many sought the role of wife and mother in an insulated world of family life. Well into the country's stable period, women found their new role included pressures they were not comfortable or interested in bearing.<sup>406</sup> The feminist movement had fragmented and failed to attract the new generation of young women. Its members were older and they had

lived through war and had already achieved their aim of *female suffrage*. The younger female, to whom they had aimed their campaigns, had shown a lack of political interest and lukewarm support.<sup>407</sup> Women pulled out of political parties and labour organizations, as once again, economic and political turmoil and high employment took priority over their lives.<sup>408</sup> Women were willingly moving back into the private sphere, by returning to traditional values after becoming disillusioned with modernity; the opportunities that were supposed to accompany modernity were either non-existent or not as fulfilling as expected. As the economic fortunes of Weimar Germany declined during the depression, the conflict between the individual and the "common good" was increasingly decided in favour of the latter.<sup>409</sup> The New Woman image was pushed aside and room was made for the idealistic view of motherhood, reflecting the growing volkish vision of the "German" state. Weimar politics had crippled a possible sexual revolution, and the Right's brand of conservatism in family policy was appropriated relatively easily by the National Socialists to justify their own anti-feminist policies.<sup>410</sup> As Osborne has pointed out, "once the reactionary and autocratic regime of the National Socialists took over, progress in birth

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<sup>402</sup> Bridenthal, 16.

<sup>403</sup> Osborne, 174.

<sup>404</sup> Peukert, 104.

<sup>405</sup> Osborne, 203.

<sup>406</sup> Peukert, 99

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<sup>407</sup> Osborne, 203.

<sup>408</sup> Von Ankum, 3-4.

<sup>409</sup> Osborne, 106.

<sup>410</sup> Osborne, 203.

control was easily subverted to sexual repression.”<sup>411</sup>

The New Woman may have been created to represent progress and the future, but she was created during a short, five years of stability. The remainder of the republic’s fourteen years was anything but stable. A minority of women changed their lifestyles to emulate this new image, and it was they who became the focus as the symbol of mass culture and the symbol of a decadent society. On the other hand, the lives and concerns of Germany’s real women were difficult and substantial. For the majority, motherhood was no longer perceived as their life focus, but putting food on the table or contributing to the family finances was seen as more urgent than female emancipation. Therefore, family still took precedence.

Emancipation came at an inopportune time: the end of a devastating war. Most German women were not politically active and had no experience of democracy. Understandably, most weren’t ready or interested. With two million dead, conservative elements sought to direct women’s lives to the task of reproduction for the sake of the nation; feminist movements on the left used contraception and abortion reform to strengthen its own agenda with regard to individual rights against the state. Regardless of manipulation, women tried to make their own decisions regarding reproduction, as soaring abortion

rates contend. Most gains women made in the control of their own bodies were sought to reduce the size of their families during volatile times, so as to reduce the number of mouths to feed. As historian Detlev Peukert affirms, “Society and culture during the Weimar Republic were thus faced with two momentous new challenges: mass social change was to be introduced, and it was to be introduced at the very time when economic and political crisis made success most doubtful.”<sup>412</sup>

The Weimar Republic was preoccupied by economic and political turbulence during almost two-thirds of its existence. The state did not live up to its declaration of equality for its women because the state itself had changed, from socialist to conservative. In such a climate, most women were unable to advance from low-paying jobs. Personal decisions regarding their bodies and their families had been attacked. Women were not given real power to protect themselves. Eighteen years, including the war years, had taken their toll. Many women sought a return to traditional gender roles, a return to the private sphere. They wanted stability and many believed Hitler offered it.

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<sup>411</sup> Usborne, 213.

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<sup>412</sup> Peukert, 85.

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# Pope Pius XII

By Charlotte Freeman- Shaw



The aggressive and shockingly deceptive nature of Nazi foreign policy has intrigued historians for the past 60 years. Two historiographical opinions recently proposed by the historian Ian Kershaw state that Hitler was driven either by opportunism or by an intentional and well-orchestrated plan;<sup>413</sup> was Hitler following a concrete strategy or was he merely a fanatic driven by well-timed opportunism? Evidence strongly

indicates that it is plausible that Hitler and his foreign policy were, in reality, a combination of both. Hitler's eastern policy of *Lebensraum* exemplified his racially based ideology articulated in *Mein Kampf*; the Anschluss of Austria and subsequent invasion of Russia are further evidence of this definite 'plan.'<sup>414</sup> Furthermore, it is widely known that Hitler created a three-tiered plan designed to conquer Europe, the Middle East and parts of Africa, concluding with the entire world. Thus, the Nazi leader was clearly aware of certain goals to advance the prospects

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<sup>413</sup> Ian Kershaw, *The Nazi Dictatorship: Problems and Perspectives of Interpretation*. 4<sup>th</sup> ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 159.

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<sup>414</sup> *Ibid.*, 137.

of the German Reich. However, it is equally clear in an historical analysis of events leading up to the outset of World War II that Hitler's success relied upon spontaneity, opportunism and timely action. Such rash and rapacious goals of foreign expansion and dominance driven by this charismatic and aggressive individual caught many international figures off-guard, for their politics of appeasement, governed by the traditions of generation of international diplomacy, did not phase the tyrannical doctrines and relentless drive of the German power house. Despite numerous attempts by the European powers to seek compromise with Germany, Hitler continued to surprise and dismay the international community by his lack of predictability and intense nature of his politics. This bizarre approach to foreign policy not only caught experienced leading politicians, militarists and diplomatists off guard, but also resulted in the later character assassination of such key figures as Neville Chamberlain and Pope Pius XII, who were seen as weak or complicit in promoting German success simply because of their inability to decipher Hitler's true intent.

Throughout National Socialism's ascendance, Hitler's subsequent rise to power in Germany and the turbulent years of World War II, the Catholic Church led by Pius

XII assumed a role consistently opposed to Nazism; the Pope referred to this ideology as "national terrorism" based on policies driven by the "superstition of race and blood."<sup>415</sup>

Pius XII, then Eugenio Pacelli, tirelessly fought to ward off the foreboding spectre of National Socialism by means of condemnatory messages and public addresses to Catholic nuncios and the National

Socialist party itself while serving as first apostolic nuncio to Germany in Munich and Berlin from 1917 to 1929, and Cardinal Secretary of State from 1930 until 1939.

In fact, he had created such a concrete anti-Nazi image that following his appointment as

Supreme Pontiff, German sources lamented that Pius XII was "known as a staunch Liberal and as a friend of the democratic powers [who]...[would] conduct an anti-Nazi and anti-Fascist policy."<sup>416</sup> Unfortunately, this position did not translate into any tangible success in stemming the progress of National Socialism. Indeed, the Church's reliance on conventional diplomacy during the war in many ways facilitated the Nazi's genocidal aims; however, it would be incorrect to blame Pius XII for directly facilitating the Nazi's race-based and aggressive

## THE CONCORDAT IS MISCONSTRUED AS A COMPROMISE OF CATHOLIC MORAL STANDARDS

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<sup>415</sup> Margherita Marchione, Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace. (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2000), 20.

<sup>416</sup> Ronald J. Rychlak, Hitler, the War, and the Pope. (Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, 2000), 111.

foreign policy and the ‘Final Solution’. Despite persistent efforts to conduct effective humanitarian aid for suffering Jewish populations following the outbreak of the Second World War, the new Pope and the Vatican were ultimately only capable of pursuing a generic, seemingly passive policy against Hitler in order to avoid risking the hundreds of thousands of lives that the Vatican believed would have been lost resulting from immediate German retaliation in response to aggressive or direct diplomacy. Tragically, Pius XII’s actions and the power he actually wielded were inadequate to deal with the unprecedented magnitude of Nazi anti-Semitism—an anti-Semitism which featured as a tenet of an unpredictable Totalitarian regime, hitherto unimaginable to civilized societies, who along with the Roman Catholic Church would soon find out how out of place existing practices of international diplomacy had become.

Contrary to popular belief, Pope Pius XII, supported by the Vatican, was consistently opposed to National Socialism throughout his entire career; what began as a determined quest for peace as Papal Nuncio, eventually evolved into the outspoken denunciation of Hitler’s growing Nazi regime in the late 1930s. From the commencement of his nunciature in Germany in 1917, Pius XII, then known as Eugenio Pacelli, worked tirelessly towards peace, ultimately concluding twenty-seven concordats within Prussia,

Germany, and Bavaria.<sup>417</sup> As early as 1921, he began warning Germans about the dangers of National Socialism, delivering forty out of forty-four addresses clearly and openly criticizing aspects of this emerging ideology which Pacelli was convinced would result in the harmful indoctrinating of a once strong and proud society.<sup>418</sup>

Throughout the late 1920s and early 1930s, the Vatican shared Pacelli’s negative views of Nazism and actively condemned the political party with speeches, as well as statements in the Vatican newspaper, *L’Osservatore Romano*. On the twenty-fifth of March, 1928, the Holy Office issued a decree that “...the Holy See is obligated to protect the Jewish people against unjust vexations and, just as it reprobates all rancour and conflicts between peoples, it particularly condemns...the hatred that commonly goes by the name of anti-Semitism.”<sup>419</sup> Two years later, the Vatican and Eugenio Pacelli published two articles in *L’Osservatore Romano* which emphatically expressed the disparity between Catholicism and National Socialism and that “belonging to the National Socialist Party of Hitler [was] irreconcilable with the Catholic conscience.”<sup>420</sup> Soon after his promotion as Secretariat of State in 1930, Pacelli began negotiations with

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<sup>417</sup> Ralph McNerny, *The Defamation of Pius XII*. (Indiana: St. Augustine’s Press, 2001), 19.

<sup>418</sup> Margherita Marchione, *Consensus and Controversy*. (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 2002), 17.

<sup>419</sup> Margherita Marchione, *Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace*, 36.

<sup>420</sup> Ibid.

Germany regarding the Concordat which has sparked much controversy over the years pertaining to the motives of the Vatican. Although the signing of the 1933 Concordat facilitated the creation of a dictatorship under Adolf Hitler in Germany, it is misconstrued as an agreement and compromise of Catholic moral standards between the Nazis and the Vatican, as well as an endorsement of Nazism. However, under the terms set by the National Socialist Party and the Holy See, it was originally seen as a liberation and confirmation of the ensured protection and security of German Catholics, a continuation of religious tolerance and the preservation of human dignity throughout the entire country.<sup>421</sup>

Hitler's deliberate actions against the Jews, as well as Catholic youth groups, schools and organizations that began five days following the signing were completely unforeseen and unpreventable by the Vatican, clearly foreshadowing its impotence throughout World War II. Furthermore, Pacelli and the Vatican have been blamed erroneously for the dissolution of the German Catholic Centre Party, which was rapidly declining in popularity relative to the Nazis before the agreement was ratified. On July 5, 1933, the floundering party voluntarily disbanded in hopes of ending the persecution of German Catholics, not resulting from any order or act

instituted by the Holy Office.<sup>422</sup> If the Vatican had been in league with the Nazis, it would not have proceeded to release fifty-five protests signed by Eugenio Pacelli between 1933 and 1939 protesting the violation of the Concordat and the violent racial laws passed against the Jewish population. Lamentably, these protests went unheeded and ignored by the Nazis as the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joachim von Ribbentrop, acknowledged during the Nuremberg trials,<sup>423</sup> for Hitler fostered only disrespect for any religious institution, claiming that "one is either a Nazi or a Christian...you cannot be both."<sup>424</sup>

Despite its lack of success in placating the hostile forces in Germany, the Vatican along with Pacelli continued to rebel, publishing numerous articles and delivering speeches, such as the addresses at Lourdes and Notre Dame in 1935 in which Pacelli described the Nazis as "possessed by the superstition of race and blood" and stated that "the Church [did] not consent to form a compact with them at any price."<sup>425</sup> In a final attempt to condemn Hitler's regime before his death, Pius XI, with Pacelli's loyal partnership, wrote and released the condemnatory encyclical, *Mit Brennender Sorge*, or, *With Burning Anxiety* in 1937, which infuriated the Nazis and attracted searing remarks that were published in papers nation-wide defaming "the Jew-God and his deputy in Rome,"<sup>426</sup> not to

<sup>422</sup> Rychlak, *Hitler, the War, and the Pope*, 295.

<sup>423</sup> Marchione, *Consensus and Controversy*, 217.

<sup>424</sup> Rychlak, *Hitler, the War, and the Pope*, 49.

<sup>425</sup> Marchione, *Consensus and Controversy*, 21.

<sup>426</sup> McNerny, *The Defamation of Pius XII*, 31.

<sup>421</sup> Rychlak, *Hitler, the War, and the Pope*, 49.

mention cartoons portraying Pius XI as half Jewish and Pacelli as entirely Jewish and a critical letter from Hitler, further confirming the growing gap between the Vatican and its North-Eastern neighbour.<sup>427</sup> It is evident that Pacelli and the Holy See were deeply concerned with the German situation and vehemently opposed to the growing racial hostility and violent nature of the National Socialist party. Following the devastating horrors of *Kristallnacht* in November, 1939, the Jewish Congress issued a statement concerning the support of the Catholic Church, expressing “the Jewish people’s deep appreciation of the stand taken by the Vatican against the advance of resurgent paganism which challenges all traditional values of religion as well as inalienable human rights.”<sup>428</sup> There would not have been such a gesture of thanksgiving if the Vatican had not actively attempted to aid the persecuted Jews. After nearly twelve years of fearlessly criticizing this growing ideology, “Eugenio Pacelli was almost universally recognized, especially by the Nazis themselves, as an opponent of Hitler, a tireless defender of the faith and seeker of peace”<sup>429</sup> long before his selection as Supreme Pontiff. Thus, the Vatican and Eugenio Pacelli were never in league with the National Socialist Party, nor did they compromise Catholic beliefs or morals in order to

appease the emerging political powerhouse. Rather, they firmly and clearly released continuous statements and deliveries championing the inalienable rights of humanity, the importance of religious freedom without discrimination, and most importantly, the separation and complete lack of similarities between the Catholic faith and the nationalist and racist views of Nazism.

Following his appointment as Supreme Pontiff, Pope Pius XII continued to conduct an anti-Nazi policy from the Vatican through his condemnatory encyclicals and addresses in conjunction with publications for *L’Osservatore Romano*. This diligent communication with his representatives across Europe resulted in humanitarian aid to the suffering masses, and his cooperation with the Allied powers. Pius XII’s primary concern upon succeeding the Pontifical Throne was to negotiate a peaceful solution to the turbulent relations between the Vatican and Germany by means of a letter to Hitler. Regrettably, like most communications between the Holy See and the Nazi dictator, this message went unheard. This clearly demonstrates the lack of power that the Vatican wielded in the face of the German supremacy. However, Pius XII was not fazed by the stony silence, for in September of 1939 he released his first encyclical, *Summi Pontificatus* which condemned the over-zealous German nationalism catering to rising racism and aggression and encouraged all members of the Catholic faith to rebel against Nazism and aid those who were suffering. Although the Allies air-

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<sup>427</sup> Marchione, *Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace*, 56.

<sup>428</sup> McNerny, *The Defamation of Pius XII*, 34.

<sup>429</sup> Marchione, *Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace*, 31.

dropped eighty-eight thousand copies over Germany in order to compensate for the curtailed publication rights, the infuriated Gestapo quickly reacted, closing many publishing houses and punishing those found with the latest encyclical.<sup>430</sup> Furthermore, the organization protested that “the Pope [was] virtually accusing the German people of “injustice” toward the Jews and [made] himself the mouthpiece of the Jewish war criminals.”<sup>431</sup> As a method of retaliation, Nazi propagandists manipulated the text, substituting the name of Germany for that of Poland in hopes that the Poles would believe that Pius supported the German Nazis.<sup>432</sup> Determined to remain faithful, the Pontiff published *Opere et Caritate (By Work and by Love)* in 1940 which was circulated to all European Catholic churches to be read by bishops and priests. However, Vatican efforts were again forced to combat with decisive German reactionary methods, such as censorship and violence that prevented effective communication from the Pope and his flock.

This steely resistance to any form of opposition from the Vatican demonstrated by the Nazis was a regular occurrence throughout the war. For instance, although the

Vatican radio was declared an independent entity at the outset of World War II, its signal was repeatedly jammed in Germany. In fact, the Nazis declared it a crime to listen to the voice of the Pope. Nonetheless, the radio remained a highly influential and critical source of information internationally as it provided the Allies with news from Europe, and openly denounced the atrocities and totalitarianism. The radio announced to all Christians and citizens of the world that “...the Pope [condemned] those who [dared] to place the fortunes of whole nations in the hands of one man alone”<sup>433</sup> and that “he who [made] a distinction between Jews and other men [was] unfaithful to God and [was] in conflict with God’s commands.”<sup>434</sup>

In addition to making general statements regarding the war, the Vatican radio was also employed as the medium used to transmit the Pope’s Christmas messages to the international community. Two of Pius XII’s most famous addresses were delivered in 1941 and 1942 as he spoke of universal “liberty, justice and love”<sup>435</sup> and the injustice of racial discrimination. *The New York Times* referred to Pius XII as “...a lonely voice in the silence and darkness enveloping Europe” and British scholar, Anthony Rhodes, applauded the Pontiff, stating that “he [was] clearly speaking on behalf of the Jews...[ and ] that [the] speech [was] directed exclusively against the New

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<sup>430</sup> Marchione, Consensus and Controversy, 217.

<sup>431</sup> Marchione, Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace, 51.

<sup>432</sup> Jose M. Sanchez, Pius XII and the Holocaust: Understanding the Controversy. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2002), 48.

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<sup>433</sup> Marchione, Consensus and Controversy, 191.

<sup>434</sup> Marchione, Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace, 51.

<sup>435</sup> *Ibid.*, 61.

Order in Europe as seen in National Socialism.”<sup>436</sup>

The Vatican’s newspaper, *L’Osservatore Romano* was also an essential source of anti-Nazi publications and protestations over the course of the conflict. In fact, it was the most widely read and circulated source throughout Italy during the war and “was one of the few remaining [papers] in Europe that dared to criticize Hitler or Mussolini.”<sup>437</sup> Its highly critical nature to the Nazi regime generated such outrage that it was banned by both Fascists and Nazis and acclaimed by author Joseph Dineen as a “forthright and downright denunciation of Hitler for his excesses against the Jews, his sterilization law, his restrictions upon the freedom of speech and assembly and freedom of religious worship.” (8 p.197)

In addition to resisting Nazism in the form of radio broadcasts and published works, the Vatican was also in direct communication to the best of its ability with all papal representatives across Europe and engaged in cooperative measures with Allied powers. Despite the death of millions of European Jews, many were in fact saved by the constant and persistent efforts from the

Vatican and Pope Pius XII himself. As a result of regular communication between the Pope and his representatives in 1943, the Pope aided the Nuncio of the Dominican Republic in granting four hundred visas to Jews who had been refused admittance to the United States,<sup>438</sup> not to mention the over 120 central European Jews who were granted access to Spain followed by an additional 2,600.<sup>439</sup> That same year, an estimated 500 Jews who were captured by Italians en route to Palestine from Bratislava were transferred to an improvised camp in Southern Italy where they safely lived until the conclusion of the war owing to a papal appeal.<sup>440</sup> Furthermore, the Pope contributed to the protection of thousands of Jews in Budapest as a result of documents sent to the nuncios in Istanbul and Budapest<sup>441</sup> and sent condemnatory letters

## THE POPE AIDED THE GRANTING OF FOUR HUNDRED VISAS TO JEWS

to the Archbishop of Poland, Adam Sapieha, who decided against publishing for fear of an escalated death toll.<sup>442</sup>

Some historians suggest that the Pope was not in support of aid given during the ‘Roman occupation’ owing to the lack of official documents

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<sup>436</sup> Ibid., 62.

<sup>437</sup> Marchione, *Consensus and Controversy*, 197.

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<sup>438</sup> Ibid., 295.

<sup>439</sup> Marchione, *Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace*, 75.

<sup>440</sup> Marchione, *Consensus and Controversy*, 23.

<sup>441</sup> John K. Roth and Carol Rittner, *Pope Pius XII and the Holocaust*. (London: Leicester University Press, 2002), 94.

<sup>442</sup> Marchione, *Consensus and Controversy*, 24.

signed by the Pontiff. However, laypersons, priests, nuns and monks who hid Jews did not have time to send requests and notifications to the Vatican while Nazi troops were searching throughout the vicinity. It is evident that Pius XII did in fact support these efforts, for it is recorded that a large donation of gold was given to the Jewish community from the Pontiff according to the Grand Rabbi of Rome, Professor Anton Israel Zolli<sup>443</sup> and the largest number of Jews saved in a concentrated area throughout the war was in Italy where the Pope had the most influence. Throughout Nazi occupation, a total of 6 000 Jews were supplied with medicine, food and clothing.<sup>444</sup> 150 convents and monasteries hid an estimated 5 000 Jews, and many hundreds more found refuge in Castel Gandolfo, the Pope's summer residence, as well as within the Vatican itself.<sup>445</sup> The multiple records of consistent humanitarian aid throughout World War II encouraged, supported and given by Pius XII clearly proves that he was always in favour of employing Vatican resources to the productive assistance of the persecuted and suffering European citizens.

Finally, although the Vatican could not openly declare ally status to the United States, France or Britain, it did engage in cooperative

efforts in order to prevent Hitler's destructive strategies. After the commencement of the war, Pius XII secretly agreed to serve as a conduit between anti-Hitler Germans and the British government in order to arrange peace agreements,<sup>446</sup> in addition to devoting much energy to the attempt of persuading Vittore Emmanuele III and Mussolini to dissociate from Hitler prior to Italy's involvement in World War II.<sup>447</sup> In May, 1940 the Pope reported future attacks against Belgium, Holland and Luxemburg to sources in London<sup>448</sup> and in 1942, Pius XII clarified the confusion surrounding Pius XI's anti-communist encyclical, *Divini Redemptoris*, calling all American Catholics to support cooperation with the Soviet Union in order to combat the terror of the Third Reich.<sup>449</sup> Thus, the Vatican was in constant contact with Allied powers throughout World War II in order to minimize future horrors of Hitler's racist and totalitarian regime and participate in the efforts to save thousands of lives.

Unfortunately, after the onslaught of war, efforts emanating from the Holy See by means of word, deed and speech, have not always been subject to praise; in fact, a vast portion of the international community has instead demonstrated scepticism and scrutiny owing to the traditionally

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<sup>446</sup> Sanchez, Pius XII and the Holocaust: Understanding the Controversy, 18.

<sup>447</sup> Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, A Moral Reckoning: The Role of the Catholic Church In the Holocaust and Its Unfulfilled Duty of Repair. (New York: Random House Inc., 2002), 183.

<sup>448</sup> Marchione, Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace, 183.

<sup>449</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>443</sup> Marchione, Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace, 58.

<sup>444</sup> McNerny, The Defamation of Pius XII, 106.

<sup>445</sup> Joseph Bottom and David G. Dalin. The Pius War: Responses to The Critics of Pius XII. (New York: Lexington Books, 2004), 21.

passive diplomatic rhetoric which inhibited Pius XII from releasing specific names or identities of the criminals and victims of World War II. The popular belief that a provocative policy would have triumphed over one that was pastoral is patently false. If the Pope had spoken in a more controversial tone, it is likely that “the screw would have been turned more tightly.”<sup>450</sup> More lives would have been lost than saved owing to aggressive German retaliation. For instance, in 1937, the encyclical *Mit Brennender Sorge* triggered drastically intensified violence against the Jewish population, opposition to the horrendous occurrences in Poland led to the deportation of 110, 000 men, women and children, and in 1942, the public protestations of Dutch bishops regarding deportations led to the death of 40 000 people.<sup>451</sup> Furthermore, in the smaller Eastern states where a majority of the murders were being committed, the papal nuncios did not wield a considerable amount of power owing to their lack of diplomatic status. If the German forces were angered in any way by aggressive measures, it is highly likely that the Vatican would have completely lost any means of contact

with its representatives in these areas where Nazi killing troops known as the *Einsatzgruppen* were at work.<sup>452</sup>

Thus, Pius XII was placed in a truly agonizing situation in which he had to vacillate between two extreme stances. However, “after many tears and many prayers, [he] came to the conclusion that a protest...would not only not help anyone, but would arouse the most ferocious anger against the Jews and multiply acts of cruelty because they [were] undefended”,<sup>453</sup> despite the fact that he was well aware that a protest would certainly win him more praise from the civilized world.

In 1942, Pius XII lamented as a he burned a document which would have mentioned not only Hitler by name, but the Jews as well, that “if the letter of the bishops [cost] the lives of 40 000 persons, my own protest... could cost

the lives of perhaps 200 000 Jews.”<sup>454</sup> Although this position could be seen as morally flawed in that Pius XII did not visibly take a firm enough stance against the Nazis, he in fact did all that was humanly possible for an institution in the most responsible and effective manner and followed advice given by most Jewish leaders, “Polish Archbishop Adam Sapieha, almost all German religious leaders, the International Red Cross, and many

## PIUS XII WAS PLACED IN A TRULY AGONIZING SITUATION

<sup>450</sup> John Cornwell, *Hitler's Pope: The Secret Diplomacy of Pius XII*. (New York: Penguin Group (USA) Inc., 1999), 177.

<sup>451</sup> Marchione, *Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace*, 163.

<sup>452</sup> Ibid.

<sup>453</sup> Sanchez, *Pius XII and the Holocaust: Understanding the Controversy*, 116.

<sup>454</sup> Rychlak, *Hitler, the War, and the Pope*, 301.

Jewish rescue organizations.”<sup>455</sup> Pius XII was undoubtedly “...a saintly man, a scholar, a man of peace, a tower of strength, and a compassionate defender and protector of all victims of the war and genocide”<sup>456</sup> who is directly responsible, not for passive contribution to the Nazis ‘Final Solution’, but rather for the invariably higher survival rates of Jews in Catholic countries than elsewhere<sup>457</sup> and the prevention of an estimated 700 000 to 860 000 Jewish deaths during the raging conflict of World War II.<sup>458</sup> In the words of Margherita Marchione, “there were limits to the capacity of the Pope and the Roman Catholic Church to prevent a world power with military domination over a continent, from murdering the civilians it defined as its enemies. The fundamental responsibility for the Holocaust lies with the Nazi perpetrators.”<sup>459</sup>

Regardless of the numerous political forces that united to combat Hitler’s Third Reich during World War II, it is the Vatican of Pope Pius XII that receives the most severe criticism. This should not be the case, for the Vatican was not the only institution to be caught off guard by Hitler’s duplicitous, covert and unconventional diplomacy, nor was

Pius XII the only man to enter into agreements that were deliberately broken and betrayed by the Nazi party. Two prime examples of unsuccessful agreements are the Munich Accord of 1938 concerning the cession of the Sudetenland to Germany and the Nazi-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression of 1939. Confronted by the intensifying aggression in Germany, Europe’s great powers were desperate to avoid conflict following the devastation of World War I. Rather than voicing a call to arms which would have generated vast public opposition in their own states, while quite possibly leading to the restraint of aggressive Nazi foreign policy, they were in favour of creating peaceful agreements, similar to the position of the Vatican with the signing of the 1933 concordat. In 1938, Hitler’s growing adamancy regarding the cession of the Sudetenland in Czechoslovakia to Germany led British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, to agree to the ratification of the Munich Accord. Owing to his “unerring faith in the efficacy of personal diplomacy”<sup>460</sup>, Chamberlain was convinced that such a negotiation would successfully prevent a European war, the annihilation of Czechoslovakia, and would allow this floundering state to one day achieve integrity and security. On the contrary, despite numerous private meetings between Hitler and Chamberlain during which both leaders strongly agreed on the importance of peace and stability in Europe, by January of 1939,

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<sup>455</sup> Marchione, Consensus and Controversy, 293.

<sup>456</sup> Marchione, Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace, 13.

<sup>457</sup> Rychlak, Hitler, the War, and the Pope, 263.

<sup>458</sup> Sanchez, Pius XII and the Holocaust: Understanding the Controversy, 139.

<sup>459</sup> Marchione, Pope Pius XII: Architect for Peace, 87.

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<sup>460</sup> Robert J. Caputi, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement. (Susquehanna: Associated University Press, Inc., 2000), 177.

Hitler was delivering public speeches announcing possible attacks on the Low Countries, and even the United Kingdom.<sup>461</sup> As of March 14<sup>th</sup>, 1939, German troops had successfully occupied Czechoslovakia and the state was officially declared a protectorate of the Third Reich.<sup>462</sup>

In an identically duplicitous manner, Hitler entered into the Nazi-Soviet Treaty of Non-Aggression with Joseph Stalin in 1939 who, after being ignored by the Allied forces during the Munich Accord, believed that Britain and France were only in favour of an alliance in order to intimidate Germany for personal gain, eventually leaving the Soviet Union to face a stronger and less cooperative Germany. Whereas Stalin was nonplussed with any Allied proposals, Germany seemed to ensure a secure future, as well as the acquisition of territories in Poland, providing that Russia pledged its isolation and neutrality from the Western powers and supplied Germany with materials and economic assistance.<sup>463</sup> Over the course of the succeeding two years until June 22, 1941, Stalin, who was not as naïve as Chamberlain, utilized the time to prepare for the worst. The worst inevitably came with the infamous invasion plan, 'Operation Barbarossa' which would endeavour

to create *Lebensraum* or living space for the German populace.<sup>464</sup> Thus, it is unreasonable and baseless to accuse Pius XII of engaging in agreements with the corrupt Nazi party, ultimately facilitating the outbreak and havoc of World War II, for numerous influential powers attempted to negotiate with Hitler, believing that such actions would reduce the possibility of conflict and prevent further devastation and destruction across Europe.

Throughout the duration of World War II, the Vatican was considered the most powerful existing international institution. Perhaps this is the reason that it attracts such monumental amounts of criticism. However, this belief reveals what can only be identified as a complete lack of historical understanding. In the words of Pope John Paul II, "anyone who does not limit himself to cheap polemics knows very well what Pius XII thought of the Nazi regime and how much he did to help the countless people persecuted by the regime."<sup>465</sup> The concrete convictions of the man who John Cornwell wrongly calls 'Hitler's Pope' are strikingly evident in his encyclicals, messages, addresses and actions from the time of his appointment as Papal Nuncio to Germany in 1917 continuing through his term as Secretariat of State, and finally, as Supreme Pontiff.

Using historical hindsight one can speculate that it is undeniable that there is much more that could have been accomplished by the Vatican upon looking back on the Holocaust at this point in history. However, this is

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<sup>461</sup> R.A.C Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement: British policy and the Coming of the Second World War. (London: Bedford/St.Martins, 1993), 190.

<sup>462</sup> Caputi, Neville Chamberlain and Appeasement, 179.

<sup>463</sup> R.A.C. Parker, The Second World War: A Short History. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 64.

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<sup>464</sup> Ibid.

<sup>465</sup> Rychlak, Hitler, the War, and the Pope, 307.

an anachronistic standpoint which is unproductive and prevents one from effectively analyzing the true capability of Vatican diplomacy in the face of Hitler's totalitarian regime. The Pope could have excommunicated Hitler and all members of the Nazi party and could have made aggressive and direct statements. Ultimately, the only definite outcome of such actions would have been intensified aggression and the unnecessary loss of more innocent lives. Hitler did not respect the Catholic Church. An excommunication would have meant very little and direct statements simply would have continued to be ignored and dealt with by means of violence. Furthermore, the Vatican did not possess the luxury of superior intelligence and insight into the future actions of the Nazis. It is unjust to condemn Pius XII for failing to act sooner as he was unaware of the 'Final Solution' and mass extermination of the Jews which did not begin to slowly filter into the West until after the Wannsee Conference in January of 1942, as it did to the rest of the civilized world.<sup>466</sup>

Thus, Pope Pius XII and the Vatican did not intentionally facilitate the rise of Hitler's Third Reich, nor did they condone or be silently complicit with the horrific 'Final Solution'. On the contrary, the Pope vehemently abhorred and publicly denounced National Socialism throughout his career, beginning with the rise of the Nazi

Party in the 1920s by way of addresses and letters. Furthermore, upon becoming Secretary of State and Pope, Pius XII continued to champion the inalienable rights of humanity and the importance of peace. Through encyclicals, addresses, direct communication with representatives across Europe and his consistent cooperation with Allied powers, Pius XII demonstrated his opposition to Nazi Germany, as well as his determination to save as many lives as was humanly possible. Similar to fellow international leaders, the Vatican was continuously faced with a plethora of agonizing decisions and was forced to cope with Hitler's deceptive and inconsistent methods of foreign policy, which were completely incongruous with any previously employed diplomacy. However, the Vatican maintained its firm stance which resulted in the renewed hope of faithful citizens worldwide and the prevention of further deaths. Pius XII must not shoulder the blame for the devastation caused by a fanatical dictator. He was a tremendous figure "with human shortcomings [who] had to act in tragic circumstances"<sup>467</sup> and although he, much like the rest of the great powers, did the utmost to his ability to avoid conflict, he was relatively powerless in the face of Germany's institutionalized hatred; "no one could have done better than this good, brilliant, powerful man, and nonetheless it was not enough."<sup>468</sup>

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<sup>466</sup> Sanchez, *Pius XII and the Holocaust: Understanding the Controversy*, 43.

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<sup>467</sup> Goldhagen, *A Moral Reckoning*, 40.

<sup>468</sup> Bottom and Dalin, *The Pius War*, 46.

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# The 'Concept', AMAN and the Israeli Intelligence Failure to Predict the Yom Kippur War

By James Dorrington



On October 6, 1973, the armed forces of Egypt and Syria achieved a strategic and tactical surprise in their coordinated offensive against Israeli held territory. The Israelis, who were celebrating Yom Kippur, were caught completely unprepared by the Arab onslaught. This surprise attack was made possible by a monumental intelligence failure by the Israeli intelligence community. Similar to other twentieth century intelligence failures such as Pearl Harbour and the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, the failure lay neither in a lack

of information nor collection of intelligence but in the evaluation or analysis of it. The cause of the intelligence failure was AMAN (Israeli military intelligence) and the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) Eliyahu "Eli" Zeira, whose agency had the sole responsibility to provide the Israeli Military (IDF) with advanced warning of enemy intentions to attack Israel. Indeed, the IDF's mobilization plans depended on timely warnings. The reason for AMAN's failure was its stubborn adherence to an intelligence assessment that acted as a prism for viewing all Arab intentions, an

assessment which became known as “the concept.” Beyond that the role of the Research Branch of AMAN, whose department heads stuck to “the concept,” and the extensive Arab deception, such operations all contributed to the biggest intelligence failure in Israeli history.

Any account of the Arab-Israeli War of 1973 must begin with the conclusion of the spectacular Israeli victory in a previous war. In 1967, Israel won a war in six days against the Arab states that led to the tripling of her territory.<sup>469</sup> Thereafter, the Israeli military and political establishment anticipated a war with the Arab states in which the Arab nations would attempt to regain their lost territory. The responsibility in determining when this war would or could possibly take place was the job of Israeli military intelligence, AMAN, whose answer to this question became known in Israel as *ha-konseptzia*—“the concept.” “The concept” rested on two assumptions regarding Egyptian armaments and Syrian dependence. First, AMAN believed that Egypt would not launch another war until they could acquire the necessary military hardware to neutralize the superiority of the Israeli Air Force. This was due to the severe losses suffered by the Egyptians at the hands of the Israeli Air Force in the Six Day War of 1967; second, that Syria was far too weak to go to war on its own (i.e.

without Egypt).<sup>470</sup> Thus war would not occur until these disadvantages could be remedied.

The second underlying factor for the intelligence failure, but intimately connected to the first, was the role played by the Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), Eli Zeira. He was appointed in the spring of 1973, and was a military man by trade, not an intelligence analyst.<sup>471</sup> Zeira had been described as a man with enormous and unusual self confidence in his own abilities and who was well acquainted with Israel’s politicians.<sup>472</sup> He was a man more comfortable as a commander, who made clear cut decisions without ambiguity, than as a staff officer. Historian Abraham Rabinovich stated that Zeira’s attitude was indeed “admirable in a commander but devastating in an intelligence officer.”<sup>473</sup> As Director of AMAN he was the main person responsible to Israeli policy makers in presenting assessments of Arab intentions for war. His role in the failure was paramount and twofold. First, as we shall see later, in his unwavering support for the “Concept” until precisely less than twelve hours before the Arab attack; second and equally important was his promise and reassurance at the General Staff meeting on September 24, 1973 that

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<sup>469</sup> *The Arab states included principally Egypt, Syria and Jordan. The Israelis gained the Sinai Desert from Egypt, the Golan Heights from Syria and the West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan.*

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<sup>470</sup> Avi Shlaim, “Failures in National Intelligence Estimates: The Case of the Yom Kippur War,” in *World Politics* 28, no.3 (April, 1976): 352.

<sup>471</sup> Abraham Rabinovich, *The Yom Kippur War*. New York (Schocken Books, 2004): 21.

<sup>472</sup> The Sunday Times Insight Team, *The Yom Kippur War*. Garden City (Doubleday Inc, 1974): 95.

<sup>473</sup> Rabinovich, 56.

AMAN would provide at least forty-eight hours warning before the outbreak of any hostilities.<sup>474</sup> Both these factors would prove disastrous.

Another issue highly integrated with the previous two was the place occupied by AMAN within the Israeli intelligence community. The community was structured and composed of four organizations of which AMAN was by far the nation's largest and most important intelligence agency.<sup>475</sup> The problem of organization limited AMAN to have a big part in the intelligence failure. First, only AMAN was responsible to submit an annual national intelligence assessment to Israeli policy makers. This national intelligence assessment presented its evaluations as a single opinion, giving Israeli policy makers the misguided view that there were no divergent opinions and that all analysts within AMAN shared the same assessment.<sup>476</sup> This was because AMAN had a monopoly on the assessment and evaluation of intelligence. Although all agencies

within the intelligence community had collection capabilities, only AMAN (and more specifically the department within it known as the Research Branch) had the responsibility of analysis and evaluation of that intelligence. The Research Branch dominated the small air force, naval and combat intelligence sections. Senior army officers from Israel's various command theatres were dependent on AMAN because they had a monopoly on raw intelligence.<sup>477</sup>

Thus no organ or person was in a position to really challenge AMAN's 'dominant estimation' of the situation before the war broke out.

In Zeira's defence the "Concept" was not something he came up with, but was rather inherited from his predecessor.

Originating in 1971, "the concept" was based

on the information of a high level HUMINT source within Egypt which claimed that the Egyptian political and military leadership assessed that they could not embark on war until they could neutralize Israeli air power. It was also based on an evaluation of Arab military capabilities. The problem was that "the concept" was correct at the time it was formulated. However, what was not appreciated was that the political situation had changed for the Arab states. Because of the monopoly held by AMAN, and the decline in influence of the Foreign

## ‘THE CONCEPT’ WAS CORRECT AT THE TIME IT WAS FORMULATED

<sup>474</sup> Sunday Times, 97.

<sup>475</sup> Dan Raviv and Yossi Melman, *Every Spy a Prince: The Complete History of Israel's Intelligence Community*. Boston: (Houghton Mifflin Company, 1990): 207. *The other agencies included: Shin Bet, Mossad and the Foreign Ministry's Research Bureau.*

<sup>476</sup> Uri Bar Joseph, "Israel's 1973 Intelligence Failure," in *Revisiting the Yom Kippur War*. Ed. P.R. Kumaraswamy. London: (Frank Cass Publishers, 2000): 27.

<sup>477</sup> Ibid. *These commands included: Southern, Northern and Central Command's respectively.*

Ministry, AMAN was charged with assessing the political situation of the Arab World as well as the military one. AMAN's political analysis was basically to subjugate the political intentions of the Arabs to "the concept." As one historian stated, "Without air superiority, the Arabs lacked the ability to go to war, therefore the Arabs' rational political intention must be to avoid war."<sup>478</sup>

Sadly, the political moves in the Arab world consistently showed that they were indeed preparing for war.<sup>479</sup>

In Israel's defence Egypt and Syria mounted an effective, extensive and ultimately successful deception operation to mask their plans for war. The deception operation encompassed several factors including: the choice of the Egyptian General Staff to launch the attack when Israel would least expect it, on both Yom Kippur and on Ramadan, the holiest days in both the Jewish and Islamic calendars respectively;<sup>480</sup> the instigation of diplomatic initiatives for peace, principally with talks under the United States Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger;<sup>481</sup> a political diversion by Syrian sponsored

terrorism in Europe against Israeli interests,<sup>482</sup> and media misinformation and disinformation. For purposes of brevity, only the most successful operation will be examined.

The foundation of the Arab deception operation (at least Egypt's) was the Egyptian General Staff's adoption of Soviet military doctrine to conceal preparations for war under the guise of a military exercise.<sup>483</sup> This

exercise was codenamed "Tahrir 41" after the Arabic word for Liberation. Under the context of this exercise the Egyptians were able to: mobilize their reserves under the pretext that they would take part in the exercise; the bringing of vital bridging equipment to cross the canal in

routines that indicated an exercise;<sup>484</sup> the issuing of false military orders to both soldiers and officers to return to routine activity on October 9;<sup>485</sup> fake lists of soldiers would be making the pilgrimage to Mecca in late October; Finally, right up to the time of the attack Egyptian soldiers on the canal line could be seen sunbathing, fasting and resting for Ramadan, swimming and relaxing right up to the day of the attack.<sup>486</sup> All of the above elements

## ZEIRA'S SUPPORT OF 'THE CONCEPT' LASTED TO THE DAY OF THE ATTACK

<sup>478</sup> Sunday Times, 96.

<sup>479</sup> Ibid.

<sup>480</sup> Hassan el Badri, *The Ramadan War*, 1973. Dunn Loring (T.N. Dupuy Associates Inc, 1978): 49.

<sup>481</sup> Sunday Times, 105

<sup>482</sup> Sunday Times, 111.

<sup>483</sup> Bar-Joseph, 24.

<sup>484</sup> Mohamed Heikal, *The Road to Ramadan*. London: (Collins St. James Place, 1975): 16.

<sup>485</sup> Bar-Joseph, 25.

<sup>486</sup> A.H.Hockley-Farrar, "The October War," in *The Arab-Israeli War, October 1973 Background and Events*. Ed. Elizabeth Monroe.

were observed and noted by Israeli intelligence.

One aspect of the deception operation was the constant mobilization and demobilization of Egyptian reserves. It would eventually lead to an incident that would have ominous effects. Before war was to break out in 1973, Egypt had twenty such mobilizations.<sup>487</sup> During Egyptian training exercises in the spring of 1973, a high level HUMINT source claimed that a possible attack was going to take place with Syria as a potentially ally. Aerial photo-reconnaissance revealed surprising Egyptian concentrations of offensive capabilities.<sup>488</sup> A cabinet meeting was called, whereby Zeira stated that according to the logic of “the concept,” the probability for war was low. Zeira’s assessment was in opposition to some in AMAN who also believed that Egypt was about to attack. Chief of Staff Elazar and Mossad Director Zvi Zamir disagreed with “the concept” and questioned Zeira’s assessment. Zeira’s view was discounted and a mobilization of the first reserves soon followed. Weapons and ammunition stocks were removed from storage, and military vehicles were repositioned to meet the threat.<sup>489</sup> However, no attack occurred, and the entire mobilization would cost the Israeli government 4.5 million pounds.<sup>490</sup>

The effects of this fiasco were to prove devastating later on. First, it ensured that all subsequent Egyptian mobilizations would not be taken as serious and thus lost much of their alarm value.<sup>491</sup> Even more important was the effect it had on Elazar. Elazar would think twice before questioning Zeira again, as well as restraining his voice in the fear that he would be labelled an alarmist.<sup>492</sup> Worse still, Zeira’s confidence in “the concept” seemed vindicated since war did not occur. Thus “the concept” had been questioned and demonstrated to be true. This would be devastating in its effects.

With the above factors in place we can now discuss the actual information that the Israeli intelligence community possessed, and how that information was evaluated in accordance to “the concept” and how that information was passed on to Israeli policy makers. Overall, Israeli intelligence received over four hundred messages leading up to the war.<sup>493</sup> For purposes of brevity, only Early Warning (EW) indicators will be discussed, since Israeli intelligence possessed most of the actual information relating to the movements and dispositions of enemy forces: nothing really escaped their notice. However, the evaluation of that information proved fatal.

Perhaps the most interesting thing that AMAN knew but did not attach much significance to was the weapons platforms that were being acquired by Egypt. These high profile

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London(The International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1975): 18.

<sup>487</sup> Bar-Joseph, 17.

<sup>488</sup> Hockley, 17

<sup>489</sup> Ibid.

<sup>490</sup> Ibid.

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<sup>491</sup> Bar-Joseph, 17.

<sup>492</sup> Rabinovich, 24.

<sup>493</sup> Shlaim, 376.

defensive weapons included the SA-6 Gainful surface to air (SAM) missile which the Soviets began supplying in vast numbers to Egypt and Syria in early 1973.<sup>494</sup> In April 1973 new planes were beginning to be brought in so that by the eve of war, the Egyptian order of battle included 30 Mirage V Fighters and 20 Hunter's.<sup>495</sup> The existence of these weapons systems by Egypt were known by AMAN but their assessment was that the Arab states would not embark on war without air superiority.<sup>496</sup> However, what was not appreciated was that in a limited conflict, the Egyptians had achieved parity they sought with these weapons, provided the range of the conflict was kept limited where the missile would serve as an umbrella shielding a limited advance of offensive action: this is exactly what Egypt had in mind.

On September 25, 1973, the Israelis received a warning that the Egyptian and Syrian mobilizations were for war. King Hussein and Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifai, arrived in Israel for an urgent meeting with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir. Hussein warned Meir that the Syrians had been in pre-jump positions for the previous four days. What is more, Hussein told her that he suspected that Syria and Egypt were cooperating.<sup>497</sup> Golda Meir, called a special cabinet meeting to discuss the

allegations. During the meeting, Zeira assured her and the cabinet that the allegations were false and that Syria would not wage war alone, nor was Egypt ready for war.

On October 1, 1973, a HUMINT source for AMAN sent a report warning that Syria and Egypt were about to attack that same day, or no later than the sixth. Zeira, however, was not convinced. He maintained that the Egyptian preparations were only for an exercise and refused to believe that war was a possibility. Furthermore, he declined to even take precautionary measures when requested that he mobilize AMAN intelligence reserves and conduct photo-reconnaissance missions over enemy territory.<sup>498</sup> Zeira's belief in the "Concept" seemed unshakeable.

The adherence to the "Concept" went beyond Zeira: it was permeated throughout many levels at AMAN. On October 1, 1973, the same day as the HUMINT source sent the warning that war was coming, a young intelligence officer name Binyamin Siman-Tov wrote an assessment report concluding that the Egyptian exercise was the 'staging point for an offensive campaign.'<sup>499</sup> The senior Intelligence officer of Southern Command, Lt. Col. David Gedaliah simply ignored the report, without sounding any alarms or addressing Siman-Tov's concerns. On October 2, 1973, Siman-Tov submitted another Situation Report on the Egyptian army's intention to attack, and Gedaliah simply ignored it again. Indeed, in his daily report to AMAN

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<sup>494</sup> Samuel M. Katz, *Soldier Spies: Israeli Military Intelligence*. Novato (Presidio Press, 1994): 238.

<sup>495</sup> Bar-Joseph, 12.

<sup>496</sup> Katz, 238.

<sup>497</sup> Bar Joseph, 15.

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<sup>498</sup> Katz, 246.

<sup>499</sup> Ibid, 247.

HQ and the General Staff, he did not even mention it.<sup>500</sup>

On October 4, 1973, AMAN received which was probably the clearest indicator that war was approaching. On this date the Soviet Union began evacuating their personnel and families from Egypt and Syria as well as moving their navy out of Egyptian ports. The handling of this information demonstrates Zeira's support of "the concept." Besides rejecting Brig.

Gen. Yoel Ben-Porat's, head of AMAN's collection department, repeated suggestions to mobilize AMAN's intelligence reserves, he formulated three possibilities for the Soviet withdrawal: (a) the Soviets knew that war was going to break out and were evacuating their personnel; (b)

Syrian-Soviet relations deteriorated to the point that the Syrians asked them to leave (which did not explain why they were leaving Egypt as well); (c) that the Soviet Union believed Syrian allegations that Israel was about to attack them, something Syria had been broadcasting for weeks (this was also problematic since the Soviet Union could have avoided an Israeli attack by simply have telling the United States of Israel's intentions. No such warning had been issued however).<sup>501</sup> As

historian Janice Gross Stein pointed out, Zeira believed that the first explanation was the most plausible, despite his adherence to his belief in "the concept" and his conviction that war was unlikely. However, he "did not follow his reasoning to their logical conclusion."<sup>502</sup> As a result, when he presented the three factors at a cabinet meeting the next day, he stated that he had no idea why the Soviet evacuation occurred and was awaiting more information.<sup>503</sup> His conclusion was that the probability for an attack remained low.

## **ADHERENCE TO AN OUTDATED 'CONCEPT' WOULD BRING ISRAEL TO THE NEAR BRINK OF DEAFEAT**

Zeira's support of "the concept" lasted to the very day of the attack itself. It was only on October 6, 1973 at exactly midnight the intelligence of a high level HUMINT source was confirmed

by Mossad chief Zamir which proved that war was inevitable and would begin at 6:00pm that day.<sup>504</sup> Zeira's adherence to "the concept" was finally shattered and war preparations began, far too late to make an effective difference or deterrence. At 2:00pm, the Arab onslaught began and "the concept" was shown to have been tragically false. Nothing could ever be the same again.

The intelligence failure had many interrelated and connecting factors. Although Zeira cannot assume all of the blame, as he inherited "the

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<sup>500</sup> Ibid.

<sup>501</sup> Janice Gross Stein, "The 1973 Intelligence Failure: A Reconsideration," in *The Jerusalem Quarterly* 2, (Summer, 1982): 49.

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<sup>502</sup> Ibid.

<sup>503</sup> Ibid, 45.

<sup>504</sup> Katz, 249.

concept” and since many Egyptian actions seemed ambiguous, he nonetheless shared a huge part of the blame for refusing to question that belief in light of new evidence and the many warnings his agency received. With such a man controlling the intelligence agency responsible for national intelligence evaluation, such rigidity had tragic consequences. Although a monopoly does not necessarily lead to an intelligence failure, with many of its department heads subscribing to “the concept,” it ensured that the voices of

dissent such as Porat or Siman-Tov, whose views should have caused concern, were not heard. With AMAN charged to assess the political situation, all the components necessary for a disaster were in place. True, the Arab states organized an excellent deception campaign, but with the information at AMAN’s disposal mixed with the Early Warning indicators, it should have been enough to take at least precautionary measures against attack. Instead, a rigid and unquestioned adherence to an outdated “concept” would bring Israel to the near brink of defeat and oblivion.

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