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## Commodity Auctions and Frugality Ratios

Citations: | 1 - 1 self |

### Citations

1754 |
Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders
- Vickrey
- 1961
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...oragente we denote this cost by ce. Atfirstglance,thismayappeartobesomewhatrestrictive,buttruthful mechanisms turn out to be widespread. The first study of a truthful mechanism was by Vickrey in 1961 =-=[11]-=- showing how a sealed-bid second-price auction is truthful (an item is sold to the highest bidder, at a price equal to the secondhighest bid). Furthermore, due to the revelation principle (see, e.g., ... |

976 |
Multipart Pricing of Public Goods
- Clarke
- 1971
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Citation Context ... Definition 1. They also described a polynomial-time mechanism, based on an approximation algorithm, which gives a frugality ratio which is close to that of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) =-=[11,3,6]-=- mechanism (the VCG mechanism must solve the vertex cover problem exactly, which is known to be NP-complete and hence cannot be solved in polynomial time unless P=NP). We give, in Section 2.1, a more ... |

778 |
Incentives in teams
- Groves
- 1973
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Citation Context ... Definition 1. They also described a polynomial-time mechanism, based on an approximation algorithm, which gives a frugality ratio which is close to that of the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) =-=[11,3,6]-=- mechanism (the VCG mechanism must solve the vertex cover problem exactly, which is known to be NP-complete and hence cannot be solved in polynomial time unless P=NP). We give, in Section 2.1, a more ... |

591 | Algorithmic Game Theory
- Nisan, Roughgarden, et al.
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... showing how a sealed-bid second-price auction is truthful (an item is sold to the highest bidder, at a price equal to the secondhighest bid). Furthermore, due to the revelation principle (see, e.g., =-=[5,9]-=-), it is possible to take any mechanism that has a dominant strategy and convert it into atruthfulmechanism. ⋆ Supported by EPSRC Grant EP/G069239/1 “Efficient Decentralised Approaches in Algorithmic ... |

402 |
Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Gibbard
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... showing how a sealed-bid second-price auction is truthful (an item is sold to the highest bidder, at a price equal to the secondhighest bid). Furthermore, due to the revelation principle (see, e.g., =-=[5,9]-=-), it is possible to take any mechanism that has a dominant strategy and convert it into atruthfulmechanism. ⋆ Supported by EPSRC Grant EP/G069239/1 “Efficient Decentralised Approaches in Algorithmic ... |

119 | Frugal path mechanisms.
- Archer, Tardos
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...asure of overpayment is necessary, it seems reasonable to try and keepthisaslowaspossible,particularly if we are looking for any real-world motivation. This overpayment is often described (see, e.g., =-=[1,10,7]-=-) in terms of a frugality ratio. Thefrugalityratiois defined as the worst-case ratio between the payments made by a given truthful mechanism and a benchmark figure for the same instance. It has been c... |

55 | Beyond VCG: Frugality in Truthful Mechanisms
- Karlin, Kempe, et al.
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...asure of overpayment is necessary, it seems reasonable to try and keepthisaslowaspossible,particularly if we are looking for any real-world motivation. This overpayment is often described (see, e.g., =-=[1,10,7]-=-) in terms of a frugality ratio. Thefrugalityratiois defined as the worst-case ratio between the payments made by a given truthful mechanism and a benchmark figure for the same instance. It has been c... |

45 |
The price of truth: Frugality in truthful mechanisms,
- Talwar
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...asure of overpayment is necessary, it seems reasonable to try and keepthisaslowaspossible,particularly if we are looking for any real-world motivation. This overpayment is often described (see, e.g., =-=[1,10,7]-=-) in terms of a frugality ratio. Thefrugalityratiois defined as the worst-case ratio between the payments made by a given truthful mechanism and a benchmark figure for the same instance. It has been c... |

12 | Frugality ratios and improved truthful mechanisms for vertex cover
- Elkind, Goldberg, et al.
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...hefrugalityratiois defined as the worst-case ratio between the payments made by a given truthful mechanism and a benchmark figure for the same instance. It has been called “the price of truthfulness” =-=[4]-=-. When frugality was first studied [1,10], it was in the context of path auctions, and benchmark figures were described as properties of the paths. More recently, Karlin, Kempe and Tamir [7] described... |

10 | Frugal mechanism design via spectral techniques
- Chen, Elkind, et al.
- 2010
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Citation Context ...d on the frugality ratio for any truthful mechanism, and show that their mechanism is within a constant factor of this lower bound. This constant factor was later improved by Yan [12] and Chen et al. =-=[2]-=-. Since then, Elkind, Goldberg and Goldberg [4] considered alternatives to the benchmark that was proposed in [7] (in [4] they are denoted TUmin, TUmax, NTUmin, NTUmax). Formal definitions of these ar... |

10 |
Frugal and truthful auctions for vertex covers, flows and cuts
- Kempe, Salek, et al.
- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...d in the integer case, and showing good frugality results in terms of n may be an interesting goal. We have only considered frugality in this setting with respect to NTUmin. More recently (see, e.g., =-=[2,8]-=-) we have seen frugality ratios analysed with respect to NTUmax. It is likely that we will get more satisfactory frugality ratios with respect to NTUmax, particularly in the {1, 2} case. Although, in ... |

5 | On the price of truthfulness in path auctions
- Yan
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...hey give a lower-bound on the frugality ratio for any truthful mechanism, and show that their mechanism is within a constant factor of this lower bound. This constant factor was later improved by Yan =-=[12]-=- and Chen et al. [2]. Since then, Elkind, Goldberg and Goldberg [4] considered alternatives to the benchmark that was proposed in [7] (in [4] they are denoted TUmin, TUmax, NTUmin, NTUmax). Formal def... |